Admin Elman

Administrative Law - Atty. Rodolfo E.
Elman 1
INTRODUCTION
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW is that branch of public law which fixes the organization of the government
and determines the competence of administrative authorities who execute the law and makes available to
the individual relief against administrative action.
It is also that branch of public law dealing with the doctrines and principles governing the powers
and procedures of administrative agencies including especially judicial review of administrative action.
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY refers to any governmental authority other than a court or legislative
body performing rule-making or adjudicatory functions.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW vs. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW prescribes the permanent framework of the system of government and
supplies the general plan of governmental organization; whereas
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW carries into effect the general plan of governmental organization as
prescribed by the Constitution.
2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW prescribes the limitations on the exercise of governmental powers so as to

protect the rights of individuals against abuse of such powers; whereas
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW provides for the relief to the individuals should there be violations of their
rights by official government action.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW stresses on the rights of citizens; whereas

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW gives stress on their duties to the government.
ADMINISTRATIVE BODY vs. COURT
1. An ADMINISTRATIVE BODY is composed of persons or individuals who are considered experts in

their particular fields; whereas
a COURT is a tribunal manned by persons who are learned in the field of law, imparted and removed
from the passing pressure of politics.
2. An ADMINISTRATIVE BODY has variety of functions; whereas

a COURT has only judicial function.
3. An ADMINISTRATIVE BODY is given a wider discretion in the exercise of its power since it is not
bound by the rigid technicalities as prescribed upon a court; whereas
a COURT has to observe the principles and rules embodied in the Rules of Court.
Acad com 2007 robert hernandez

Administrative Law - Atty. Rodolfo E. Elman 2
TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A BODY/AGENCY IS ADMINISTRATIVE OR JUDICIAL
Administrative → if its function is primarily regulatory even if it conducts hearings and determines
controversy to carry out its regulatory duty.
Judicial → if its primary duty is to decide legal rights between private parties affecting their property or
liberty.
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
 The purpose of Administrative Law is the protection of the rights of the individuals.
 Its subject matter is the nature and mode of powers exercised by administrative bodies and their
officers.
 It has for its basic functions the effective and efficient operation of the government machinery.
 It originated from legislation and from the recognition of the legislature that it cannot, on its own,
cope with the various activities of men as they become more progressive. Thus, having realized
that the legislature and the courts cannot adequately answer the needs of its citizens, the
government created a mechanism, an administrative agency or body, to cater the needs of the
individuals. For such reason, administrative agencies are also called the 4 th branch of the
government.
In almost every human activity, the government created administrative agencies to regulate such
undertaking.
BAR QUESTION: What are the types of administrative bodies or agencies?
They are the following:
1) Administrative agencies created to carry on governmental functions (BIR, BoC, CSC, LRA)
2) Administrative agencies created to perform business services for the public (Philippine Postal
Authority, PNR, NFA, NHA)
3) Administrative agencies created to regulate businesses affected with public interest (NTC, LTFRB,
Insurance Commission, ERB, HLURB, Bureau of Mines and Geosciences)
4) Administrative agencies created to regulate private businesses and individuals under police power
(SEC, Dangerous Drug Board, CID, PRC)
5) Administrative agencies that adjudicate and decide industrial controversies (NLRC, POEA)
6) Administrative agencies that grant privileges (GSIS, SSS,PAO, Philippine Veterans Administration)
7) Administrative agencies making the government a private party (COA)
8) Administrative agencies doing business activities (PAGCOR, PCSO)
SOURCES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
1. Constitutional or statutory enactments creating administrative bodies.

2. Decisions of courts interpreting the charters of administrative bodies and defining their powers, rights,
inhibitions, among others, and the effects of their determinations and regulations.

3. Rules and regulations issued by the administrative bodies in pursuance of the purposes for which they
were created.
4. Determinations and orders of the administrative bodies in the settlement of controversies arising in
their respective fields.
GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (GRP) vs. NATIONAL

GOVERNMENT
The Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to the corporate government entity
through which the functions of the government throughout the Philippines, including, save as the contrary
appears from the context, the various arms through which the political authority is made effective in the
Philippines, whether pertaining to the central government or to the provincial, city, municipal or barangay
subdivisions or other forms of local government.” (Sec 2(1) AC 1987)
On the other hand, National Government refers only to the central government, consisting of the
legislative, executive and judicial departments of the government, as distinguished from local
governments and other governmental entities.
National Government is definitely a part of the government of the Republic of the Philippines but
this refers to the entire machinery of the central government namely executive, legislative and judicial
branches of the government.
Bacani vs. National Coconut Corporation

100 S 468
Facts: Plaintiffs are court stenographers assigned in a case Sycip v. National Coconut Corporation
(NCC). Counsel for NCC requested said stenographers for copies of the transcript of stenographic notes
taken by them during the hearing. Plaintiffs complied with the request by delivering to the counsel the
needed transcript. NCC paid for the said transcript at the rate of P1 per page. Upon inspecting the books
of this corporation, the Auditor General disallowed the payment of these fees and sought the recovery of
the amounts paid.
Defendants set up the defense that the NCC is a government entity within the purview of Sec 2 of the
Revised Admin Code of 1917 and, hence, it is exempt from paying the stenographers’ fees under Rule
130 of the Rules of Court.
Under Sec. 16, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines is
exempt from paying the legal fees provided for therein, and among these fees are those which
stenographers may charge for the transcript of notes taken by them that may be requested by any
interested person.
Issue: Whether or not the NCC may be considered as included in the term “Government of the Republic
of the Philippines” for purposes of the exemption of the legal fees provided for in Rule 130 of the Rules
of Court.
Held: Government of the Republic of the Philippines refers to that government entity through which
the functions of the government are exercised as an attribute of sovereignty, and in this are included those

arms through which the political authority is made effective whether they be provincial, municipal or
other form of local government. These are what we call municipal corporations.
They do not include entities which are to be given corporate personality separate and distinct
from the government and which are governed by the Corporation Law, such as the National Coconut
Corporation. Their powers, duties and liabilities have to be determined in the light of that law and of their
corporate charters.
It is true that in Sec. 8, Rule 130, stenographers may only charge as fees P0.30 for each page of
the transcript of not less than 200 words before the appeal is taken and P0.15 for each page after the filing
of the appeal, but where, as in the case at bar, the party has agreed and in fact has paid P1 per page for the
services rendered by the stenographers and has not raised any objections to the amount pain until its
proprietary was disputed by the Auditor General, the payment of the fees become contractual and as such
is valid even if it goes beyond the limit prescribed by the court.
Central Bank vs. CA

63 SCRA 431
FACTS: Central Bank of the Philippines assailed the decision of the CA which sentenced it to pay
respondent Ablaza Construction and Finance Corporation damages for breach of contract in that after
having formally and officially awarded, pursuant to the results of the usual bidding, to Ablaza in
December 1965 the "contract" for the construction of its San Fernando, La Union branch building and
allowed said contractor to commence the work up to about May, 1966, albeit without any written formal
contract having been executed, the Bank failed and refused to proceed with the project, unless the plans
were revised and a lower price were agreed to by Ablaza, the Bank claiming that its action was pursuant
to the policy of fiscal restraint announced by the then new President of the Philippines on December 30,
1965 and Memorandum Circular No. 1 dated December 31, 1965 of the same President.
CB contends that there could be no perfected contract in this case because there is no showing of
compliance with the requirement that there must be a certification of the availability of funds by the
Auditor General pursuant to Section 607 of the Revised Administrative Code which provides:
“Except in the case of a contract for personal service or for supplies to be carried in stock, no contract
involving an expenditure by the National Government of three thousand pesos or more shall be entered
into or authorized until the Auditor General shall have certified to the officer entering into such obligation
that funds have been duly appropriated for such purpose and that the amount necessary to cover the
proposed contract is available for expenditure on account thereof.”
ISSUE: Whether or not Central Bank is part of the National Government?
HELD: NO.
SC: It is our considered view that contracts entered into by petitioner Central bank are not within the
contemplation of Sections 607 and 608 cited by it. Section 607 specifically refers to "expenditure of the
National Government" and that the tern Natl. govt. may not be deemed to include the CB.
To be sure, the CB is a government instrumentality. But it was created as an autonomous body

under RA 265, "to administer the monetary and banking system of the republic".

It does not depend on the National Government for the financing of its operations; it. is the national
Government that occasionally, resorts to-it for the needed budgetary accommodations. Under Section 14
of the Bank's Charter, the Monetary Board may authorize such expenditures by the CB as are in the
interest of the effective administration and operation of the bank. Its prerogative to incur such liabilities
and expenditures is not subject to any prerequisite found in any stature or regulation not expressly
applicable to it. Relevant to the issue in this case, it is not subject, like the Social Security Commission, to
section 1901 and related provisions of the Revised Administrative Code, which require national
government, construction to be done by or under the supervision of the Bureau of Public Works. For these
reasons, the provisions of the RAC invoked by the bank do not apply to it. To our knowledge, in no other
instance has' the Bank considered itself subject thereto.
Note: Under the Oct. 9, 1989 Minute Resolution, the University of the Philippines does not fall within
the term Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP)
IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY (ISA) vs. CA

249 SCRA 539
FACTS: ISA was created in order, generally, to develop and promote the iron and steel industry in the
Philippines. P.D. No. 272 initially created petitioner ISA for a term of 5 years counting from 9 August
1973. When ISA's original term expired on 10 October 1978, its term was extended for another 10 years
by Executive Order No. 555 dated 31 August 1979. It institutes expropriation proceedings covering the
properties of Maria Kristina Fertilizers, but while the case was pending, the statutory term of ISA expired,
so GRP substituted it.
ISSUE: Whether or not ISA may be properly substituted by the GRP?
HELD: Yes.
SC: ISA is a non-incorporated authority, thus GRP could substitute.

The Iron and Steel Authority (ISA) is a non-incorporated agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the
Philippines, or more precisely of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines. When the statutory
term of a non-incorporated agency expires, the powers duties and functions as well as the assets and
liabilities of that agency revert back to and are reassumed by, the Republic of the Philippines, in the
absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof.
 For incorporated agencies, GRP may not substitute because they have an independent personality.
FONTANILLA vs. MALIAMAN

194 SCRA 486
FACTS: The Supreme Court ruled in one case that the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) is a
government agency performing primarily proprietary function and therefore, is liable for the tortuous act
of its driver, Hugo Garcia.

This is a motion for reconsideration where NIA, through the Solicitor General maintains that it is
a governmental agency performing governmental function and thus, it should not be held liable for the
tortuous act of its driver who is its special agent.
ISSUE: Whether or not NIA is a part of the "Government of the Philippines'"?
HELD: The Supreme Court held that while it is true that NIA is a service agency of the government
aimed at promoting public interest and public welfare, such fact does not make it essentially and purely a
governmental functioning corporation. NIA was created for 'the purpose of "constructing, improving,
rehabilitating, and administering all national irrigation systems in the Philippines, including all communal
and pump irrigation projects." Certainly, the state and the community as a whole are largely benefited by
the services the agency renders, but these functions are only incidental to the principal aim of the agency.
Furthermore, the NIA is a government agency with a juridical personality, separate and distinct
from the government. It is not a mere agency of the government and hence, it is not part of the
Government of the Philippines because it is a corporate body performing proprietary functions. Therefore,
it may be held liable for the damages caused by the negligent act of its driver who is not its special agent.
Philosophy at work
“Philosophy may not give you a living but it makes your life worth living.”

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION
Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, courts cannot and will not determine a controversy
involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal, especially where the
question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge,
experience and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact
and where a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute which
is to be administered.
The doctrine applies where a claim is originally cognizable in courts, and comes into play
whenever enforcement of a claim requires the resolution of issues which, under a regulatory scheme have
been placed within the special competence of an administrative body; in such case, the judicial process is
suspended pending referral of such issues to the administrative body for its view.
The purpose of the doctrine is not only to give the administrative agency the opportunity to decide the
controversy by itself correctly, but also to prevent unnecessary and premature resort to courts.
Ex: exercise of power of the Bureau of Immigration. The Bureau may even look into the issue of
citizenship as an incident thereto.
Board of Commissioners of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (BoC) vs. dela Rosa
May 31, 1991
Facts: The Bureau of Immigration recognized Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William

Gatchalian, as a natural born Filipino citizen. The latter .was also admitted as a Filipino citizen. The new
Board of Commissioners however reversed the Board of Special Inquiry’s decision and ordered the
exclusion of William Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen. William filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with injunction before the RTC Manila presided by Judge De La Rosa. Petitioners filed a
Motion to Dismiss alleging that respondent Judge has no jurisdiction over the Board of Commissioners
and/or Board of Special Inquiry.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court is competent to take cognizance of the case?
Held: The court is not empowered to look into this question: whether or not a person is an alleged alien.
This is within the competence of the BOI. The Bureau of Immigration has the exclusive authority to hear
and try cases involving alleged aliens, and in the process, determine also their citizenship.
The Primary Jurisdiction of the Bureau of Immigration over deportation proceedings admits of an
exemption, i.e. judicial intervention may be resorted to in cases where the claim of citizenship is so
substantial that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the claim is correct. The Bureau of
Immigration is not of equal rank as the RTC, hence its decisions may be appealed to, and may be
reviewed through a special civil action for certiorari by the RTC.

Qualitrans Limousine Service, Inc. v. Royal Class Limousine Service

179 SCRA 569
FACTS: The Land Transportation Commission (LTC) rendered a decision granting Qualitrans a
Certificate of Public Convenience to operate a garage (tourist) air conditioned service within the City of
Manila and from said place to any point in Luzon and vice versa. Meanwhile, an order was issued by the
LTC granting a provisional permit in favor of private respondent on the same routes as that of the
petitioner.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration before the LTC to correct the route. It also filed a
case before the RTC, which was denied. The Court of-Appeals dismissed petitioner's petitions and
directed it to respect the issuance of a Certificate of Public Convenience in favor of respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the LTC has jurisdiction over the case?
HELD: Yes. Applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the LTC has the power to look into the
controversy notwithstanding the fact that it is a petition for declaratory relief. What is important is not the
nomenclature or the name attached by the parties to their pleadings, but what the petition alleges.
Actually, the petition although named as “petition for declaratory relief”, is a petition to declare the
rights given by the LTC to the Royal Class. The LTC has the power to modify, revise or set aside the CPC
by applying the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Moreover, the LTC as well as most of the administrative bodies are now empowered to award damages
pursuant to the doctrine of primary jurisdiction.
Marina Properties Corp. v. CA and HL Carlos Construction

294 S 273
FACTS: Petitioner Marina is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of real estate development.
Among its projects was Marina Bay Homes Condo Project with respondent HL Carlos Construction as
principal contractor, particularly of Phase 3. As an incentive to complete the construction, Marina
allowed Carlos to purchase a condo unit and they entered into a Contract to Purchase and Sell. But after
paying more than half, Petitioner refused for the delivery of said unit which prompted respondent to file 2
cases:
1.Collection for a sum of money corresponding to unpaid billings from their construction contract
before the RTC.
2.Complaint for specific performance with damages for Marina’s unilateral cancellation of their
contract to buy and to sell a condominium unit before the HLURB.
Marina alleged that the case before the HLRUB should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia and
forum shopping.
ISSUE # 1.: Whether or not the filling of the two cases at the same time is proper?
HELD : It is proper because the 2 cases involved 2 different issues and causes of action.:
1. arising from unpaid billings of Marina
2. arising from Marina’s unilateral cancellation of their contract.

ISSUE #2: Whether or not private respondent was guilty of forum shopping?
HELD: NO. Private respondent was not guilty of forum shopping when it sued Marina before the
HLURB. Forum Shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in
one forum and seeks another opinion in another forum. They are grounded on the same cause of action on
the supposition that one or the other might look with favor upon the party.
There was hardly a duplication of the civil case filed to collect a sum of money corresponding to
unpaid billings from their construction contract from that before the HLURB.
Arranza v. BF Homes
333 SCRA 800
FACTS: Petitioners filed a case against BF Homes, Inc. for specific performance to enforce their rights as
purchasers of subdivision lots as regards their rights of way, open spaces, roads and security with the
HLURB. BF Homes was then under receivership – It claims that under PD No. 902- A, SEC has
jurisdiction over the case because it involves action for claims against BF Homes, which is under
receivership.
ISSUE: Which body has jurisdiction over the case?
HELD: The HLURB has jurisdiction over the case which involves specific performance against a
subdivision developer filed by a purchaser of subdivision lots under PD No. 957. The fact that BF Homes
is under receivership does not divest the HLURB of the jurisdiction over the case because the case does
not involve pecuniary matters which is under the jurisdiction of SEC as provided by PD 902- A.
Solid Homes, Inc. v. Payawal

177 SCRA 72
FACTS: Teresita Payawal filed a complaint against Solid Homes, Inc. before the RTC alleging that Solid
Homes contracted to sell to her a subdivision lot in Marikina. Solid Homes executed a Deed of Sale after
her payment of the agreed price but it failed to deliver the corresponding certificate of Title despite
Payawal’s repeated demands because the Solid Homes had mortgaged the property to a financing
company.
Solid Homes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction, this
being vested in the NHA under PD 957 (now HLURB).
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction to try and decide cases involving real estate business and
practices under Section 1 of PD 957?
HELD: NO.
The National Housing Authority (now HLURB) has exclusive jurisdiction over cases involving real estate
business and practices under Section 1 of PD 957.

NHA shall have exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature:
a) Unsound real estate business and practices

b) Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit
buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker and salesmen.
c) Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligation.
Note: Section 1 of PD 957 as Amended by PD #1344- Empowers the National Housing Authority to issue
Writs of Execution in the Enforcement of its decision under PD957.
CT Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada

191 SCRA 268
FACTS: Petitioners, as agent of Pleasantville Development Corporation sold a subdivision lot on

installment to private respondent Efren Diongon. The installation payments having been completed,
Diongon demanded delivery of the Certificate of Title of the subject land. He consequently filed a
complaint for specific performance and damages in the RTC.
CT Torres filed a Motion to Dismiss for lack of jurisdiction contending that the competent body to
hear and decide the case was the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB).
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case?
HELD: NO.
PD # 957 otherwise known as "The Subdivision and Condominium Buyer's Protective Decree"
provides that the National Housing Authority shall have exclusive authority to regulate the real estate
trade and business. Regulatory functions conferred on the NHA under PDs 957, 1344 and other related
laws were transferred to the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission which was renamed Housing
and Land Use Regulatory Board(HLURB)
The matters within the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB are the following:
1. Unsound real estate business practices;

2. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer
against the project owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman; and
3. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers, of
subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman.
Note: The HLURB is competent to award damages although this is essentially a judicial power
exercisable ordinarily only by the courts. In the exercise of its powers, the HLURB must interpret and
apply contracts, and award damages whenever appropriate.
On 2/7/1981, by virtue of EO 648, the regulatory functions of NHA were transferred to the
Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC). But pursuant to EO 90 dated 12/17/1986, the
functions of the HSRC were transferred to the HLURB.

Fabia vs. CA
363 SCRA 433
Although the doctrine of primary jurisdiction exhorts the referral of the instant case to the SEC
for its resolution, however, RA 8799 (30 May 2000),The Securities Regulation Code, has amended PD
902 – A, and transferred the jurisdiction of the SEC over intra-corporate cases (all those enumerated
under Sec. 5 of PD 902-A) to the courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Courts.
PAL vs. Kurangking,

389 SCRA 588
On 15 December 2000, the Court, in A.M. No. 00-8-10-Sc, adopted the Interim Rules of
Procedure on Corporate Rehabilitation and directed the transfer the SEC to RTCs, all petitions for
rehabilitation filed by corporations, partnerships and association under PD 902 –A in accordance with the
amendatory provisions of RA 8799.
Padua vs. Ranada

390 SCRA 664
The laws and the TRB Rules of Procedure have provided the remedies of an interested
Expressway user, that is, to file a petition for review of the adjusted toll rates with the Toll Regulatory
Board (TRB), The TRB is the agency assigned to supervise the collect on of toll fees and the operation of
toll facilities petitioner Zialcita’s argument that the provisional toll rate adjustment are exorbitant,
oppressive, onerous and unconscionable is a question of the fact requiring knowledge of the formula used
and the factors considered in determining the assailed rates. This task is within the province of the IRB.
Further , PD 1112 explicitly provides that “the decisions of the Toll Regulatory Board on petitioners for
the increase of toll rate shall be appeasable to the Office of the President within 10 days from the
promulgation thereof”.
Philosophy at work
“Man is not what he is but he is what he is not.” – Jean-Paul Sartre

POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES
Generally, administrative bodies can only exercise those powers which are either conferred by the
Constitution or statute or those which are necessarily implied from their exercise.
Administrative bodies commonly exercise 2 basic powers:

1. quasi-legislative or rule-making power → enables them to promulgate implementing rules and
regulations.
2. quasi judicial or adjudicatory power → enables them to interpret and apply such regulations
A. QUASI-LEGISLATIVE POWER
Congress may validly delegate to administrative agencies the authority to promulgate rules and
regulations in order to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies. The power of
administrative agencies to promulgate rules in the implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to
what is provided for in the legislative enactment. In order to be valid, the rules and regulations:
1) must be germane to the objects and purposes of the statute;
1) must conform to the standards that the law prescribes; and
2) must relate solely to carrying into effect the general provisions of the law.
If the implementing rules and regulations are issued in excess of the rule-making authority of the
agency, it is without binding effect upon the courts. At best, the same may be treated as administrative
interpretations of the law and such as, they may be set aside by the Supreme Court in the final
determination of what the law means.
Legislative Power Quasi-legislative Power

Power to make laws and the power to fix a Power of administrative agencies to issue
legislative policy administrative rules and regulations in order to
implement the law and the legislative policy
fixed by the legislature
Cannot be delegated by legislature to Power of subordinate legislation
administrative agencies
Requisites for a valid delegation
a) the law must be complete in itself; it must set forth a policy to be executed (Completeness test)
b) the law must fix a standard, the limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable, to
which the delegate must conform in the performance of his functions (Sufficient Standard Test)
To avoid an undue delegation of legislative power to administrative authorities, the law itself
authorizing the promulgation of the rules and regulations must be complete in all its terms and
provisions so as not to leave the judgment or discretion to determine what the law shall be. A law is
considered complete when the subject, the manner, and, the extent of its operations are stated in it.
The" test of completeness is whether its provisions are sufficiently definite and certain to enable one to
know his rights and obligations under the law.

If the law is incomplete, the law must offer a sufficient standard to specify the limits of the
delegate’s authority announce the legislative policy and specify the conditions under which it is to be
implemented. The standard is usually embodied in the law itself and this serves as a guide to indicate
the extent and the limit of the discretion of administrative authorities may exercise under the statute.
Requisites for the validity of Administrative Regulations:
1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature.

The authority to promulgate the regulation is usually conferred by the charter itself of the
administrative body or by life law it, is supposed to enforce.
2) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature.

It is necessary that the authority delegated be properly exercised, that is, that the regulation
promulgated must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred.
3) It must be promulgated m accordance with the prescribed procedure.

The promulgation of administrative regulations of general application does not require previous
notice and hearing the only exception being, where the legislature itself requires it and
mandates that the regulation be based on certain facts as determined at an appropriate
investigation.
But where the regulation is in effect a settlement of controversy between specific parties, it is
considered an administrative adjudication and so will require notice and hearing."
Note: If' the rules and regulations are product of the administrative agency's quasi-legislative
function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the affected parties is not a. requirement of" due
process. If, on the other hand, these rules and regulations are promulgated by the administrative
agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to
their validity.
4) It must be reasonable.
The rules and regulations must not be unreasonable and arbitrary as to violate due process. They
must show a reasonable relation to the purposes for which they are authorized to be issued.
Kinds of Administrative Rules and Regulations
1. Supplementary or detailed legislation – these are rules and regulations intended to fill in the details
of legislation
Example: Rules and Regulations implementing the Labor Code.
2. Interpretative legislation – these are rules and regulations construing or interpreting the provisions of
a statute to be enforced and they are binding on all concerned until they are changed.
Examples: BIR Circulars, CB Circulars
a.) They have the effect of law and are entitled to great respect; they have in their favor the
presumption of legality.

b.) The erroneous application of the law by public officers does not bar a subsequent correct
application of law.
3. Contingent legislation – these are rules and regulations made by an administrative authority on the
existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of the law depends.
Example: The Congress gives the President the authority to allocate calamity loans pursuant to
Presidential Decree 1177.The allocation is contingent upon the happening of an event. There is still no
undue delegation of legislative power because the executive department is simply implementing what
the law provides. What the President is required in this kind of act is simply the execution of the act,
not in the making of the law. He becomes a mere agent of Congress in ascertaining and declaring the
event upon which its expressed will is to take effect.
Note: The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an
administrative function.
If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to affected parties is not a
requirement of due process. In the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are
essential to the validity of such rates.
When the rules laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given
kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character. If it applies exclusively to a
particular party, based upon a finding of fact, it is a quasi-judicial function in character.
People v. Maceren
798 CRA 450
FACTS: A 1967 regulation penalizing electro fishing in fresh water fisheries, promulgated by the Sec .of
Agriculture and Natural Resources was challenged by the accused for not being in conformity with the
fisheries law, such act not being penalized by the law itself.
ISSUE: Whether or not such regulation made by an administrative agency is valid?
HELD: Such regulation is not valid because the fisheries law does not expressly punish electro fishing.
As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Dept. Secretary and the Commission of Fisheries are
powerless to penalize it. Hence, they exceeded in their authority to promulgate regulations because such
was not made in accordance with the law.
Republic v. Migrino
189 S 300

FACTS: PCGG chair Jovito Salonga created an Anti-Graft Board to investigate the unexplained wealth of
AFP Personnel. He ordered an investigation on Lt. Col. Tecson who argued that PCGG has no jurisdiction
over him since there was no allegation of his association with Marcos.
ISSUE: Whether or not PCGG has the power to investigate and prosecute Lt. Col. Tecson for violation of
R.A. 3019 (Anti-graft) and R.A. 1379 (Forfeiture of unlawfully required wealth) without relation to
recovery of ill gotten wealth of Marcos?
HELD: PCGG has no power to investigate and prosecute for an ordinary case under R.A. 3019 and R.A.
1379 such as in the case of Lt. Col. Tecson. It cannot do more than what it was empowered to do. Its
powers are limited to the recovery of the ill gotten wealth of the Marcoses, their relatives and cronies.
PCCG still has the power to investigate and prosecute for violations under R.A. 3019 and 1379 as
long as it is in relation to the ill gotten wealth of the Marcoses because its power is limited to such
purpose.
Federacion Español Profesores vs. Sec. Quisumbing

Jan. 26,1988
FACTS: Sec. Quisumbing issued an order abolishing the Spanish subject as part of the curriculum and
allowed Arabic as a voluntary subject. Federacion Espanol protested that there was violation of due
process because there was no notice and hearing.
ISSUE: Whether or not the order is valid?
HELD: It is valid.
Find out first the power performed by administrative bodies.
Quisumbing was performing a quasi-legislative .function so there was no. need for notice and
hearing. If quasi – judicial – there must be due process and hearing.
Dadole v. COA
393 S 262
FACTS: RTC and MTC judges of Mandaue City were receiving monthly allowances of P 1, 500 for each
judge. However, the DBM issued Local Budget Circular No. 55, which provides that the additional monthly
allowances by a Local Govt. unit should not exceed P 1, 000 in provinces and cities and P 700 in
municipalities. The legal basis of LBC 55 is Sec. 458 of RA 7160, which allows the grant of additional
allowances to judges “when the finances of the city govt. allows.”
ISSUE: Whether or not LBC 55 goes beyond the law it seeks to implement?
HELD: Yes, because RA 7160 does not authorize setting a maximum limit to the additional allowances
granted to judges. Hence, the finances of a city govt. may allow the grant of additional allowances higher
than P 1, 000 if the revenues of the said city govt. exceed its annual expenditures. Therefore LBC 55 is void.

The circular is also void because the DBM exceeded its powers in implementing the circular and
it lacks publication.
Philippine Bank of Communication v. CIR

302 S 241
FACTS: PBCOM files a claim for tax refund and tax credits of overpaid income tax for the year 1985 and
1986.
The Court of Tax Appeals denied the request of PBCOM on the ground that it was filed beyond
the 2-year reglementary period provided for by Sec. 230 of the National Internal Revenue Code. PBCOM,
however, insisted its claim relying on Revenue Memorandum Circular No. 785 issued by the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue changing the prescriptive period of 2 years to 10 years.
ISSUE: Whether or not RMC 785 is a valid administrative memorandum circular?
HELD: RMC 7-85 is not valid because it is inconsistent with sec. 230 of NIRC which provides for a 2
year reglementary period. By doing so, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue did not simply interpret the
law, rather, it legislated guidelines contrary to the statute passed by Congress.
Lupangco v. CA
60 S 848
FACTS: PRC issued an order requiring that the candidates for CPA board exams are not allowed to
participate in any review classes or receive materials within 3-day period prior to the examination day.
The order was questioned by the students.
ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is a valid resolution by PRC?
HELD: Resolution No. 105 is not valid. It is unreasonable and arbitrary. It infringes the examinee’s right
to liberty to take whatever measures they deem proper in order that they will successfully hurdle the CPA
board exams. It also violates the academic freedom of schools.
CIR v. CA and Fortune Tobacco Corporation

261 S 236
FACTS: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue Liwayway Vinzons-Chato Revenue Memorandum

Circular (RMC) No. 37-93 reclassifying HOPE, MORE, and CHAMPION cigarettes, owned by Fortune
Tobacco, as foreign brands because they were listed in the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to
foreign companies and are required to pay 55% ad valorem tax.
Fortune Tobacco requested for review, reconsideration and recall of RMC 37-93 with the BIR but
was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not RMC 37-93 is a valid exercise of quasi-legislative powers?

HELD: No, because the BIR did not interpret the law; rather, it legislated under its quasi-judicial
authority, requiring notice, hearing and publication, which were not complied with in this case. There
must be compliance with due process.

The circular also violated the constitutional mandate that taxation must be uniform and equitable
because only HOPE, MORE, and CHAMPION were classified as foreign brands considering that there
are other cigarettes bearing foreign brands.
The circular, then, may be considered adjudicatory in nature and is thus violative of due process
following the Ang Tibay doctrine because the measure suffers from lack of uniformity of taxation. The
other cigarettes bearing foreign brands were not similarly included within the scope of the circular.
Philippine Consumers Foundation v. DECS

8/31/1987
FACTS: Petitioner questioned DECS order authorizing tuition fee increase of 15% to 20%. DECS
reconsidered and decreased it to 10% - 15%. Petitioner was not contended and filed a petition for
prohibition before the courts saying that DECS has no power to increase school fees and the order
constitutes a denial of substantive and procedural due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Dept. order is valid?
HELD: The order is a valid exercise of quasi-legislative power because it applies to all. Thus, prior
hearing is not needed.
Section 57 (3) of BP Blg 232, otherwise known as The Educator Act of 1982, vests the DECS
with the power to regulate the educational system in the country. In the absence of a statute stating
otherwise, this power includes the power to prescribe school fees and as such, the power should be
considered lodged with the DECS, if it is to properly and effectively discharge its functions and duties
under the law.
Nasipit Lumber v. NWPC

289 SCRDA 670
The Labor Code, as amend by RA 6727 (Wages Rationalization Act), grants the National Wages and
Productivity Commission (NWPC) the power to prescribe rules and guidelines for the determination of
appropriate wages in the country. Hence, guidelines issued by the Regional Tripartite Wages and
Productivity Board (RTWPB) without the approval of or worse, contrary to those promulgated by the
NWPC, are ineffectual, void and cannot be the source of rights and privileges.
Romulo, Mabanta, Buenaventura & de Los Angeles vs. HDMF

333 SCRA 777
FACTS: Petitioner is a law firm, exempted from Pag-ibig Fund coverage because of its superior
retirement plan. A board resolution was passed though saying that in order to be exempted it must have a
plan providing for both provident retirement and housing benefits superior to those provided under the
Pag-ibig Fund.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Board Resolutions is valid?

HELD: The board resolution is not valid. Where the Board of Trustees of the Home Development Mutual
Fund (HDMF) required in section 1, Rule VII of the 1995 Amendments to the Rules and Regulations
implementing PD 1752, as amended by RA 7742, that employers should have both provident/retirement
and housing benefits for all its employees in order to qualify for exemption from the Pag-ibig Fund
Coverage, it effectively amended Section 19 of PD 1752 which merely requires as a pre-condition for
exemption from coverage the existence of either a superior provident / retirement plan or a superior
housing plan, and not the concurrence of both plans. And when the HDMF Board subsequently abolished
that exemption through its 1996 Amendments, it repealed Section 19 of PD 1752. Such amendment and
subsequent repeal of section 19 are both invalid, as they are not within the delegated power of the Board.
Sanz v. Abad Santos
FACTS: The board of examiners for nursing issued an order requiring a periodic inspection on nursing
schools and prohibits the graduates of those schools which do not comply with the minimum standards
imposed by the board. The validity of the order was assailed.
ISSUE: Whether or not such order is valid?
HELD: The order is valid. It is an exercise of quasi-legislative power; thus prior hearing is not needed.
RA 877 as amended by RA 4704 (The Phil. Nursing Act), empowers the Board of Examiners to
promulgate rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this act. It is also
empowered to inspect nursing colleges and schools and vests it with authority “to issue, suspend, revoke
or reissue certificates of registration fro practice of nursing.” Thus, statutory authority plainly exists for
petitioner board to conduct periodic inspections of nursing schools in order to discharge its supervisory
and regulatory functions vested in it under the Phil. Nursing Act.
Ople v. Torres
293 S 141
FACTS: Pres. Ramos issued AO no. 308 w/c provides for the establishment of a national computerized
identification reference system w/c was challenged by Sen. Ople for being an encroachment of legislative
power to enact laws and for being violative of the citizen’s night to privacy.
ISSUE: WON AO no. 308 is a valid administrative order?
HELD: It is not valid because it establishes a system of identification that is all encompassing in scope
and affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen. Hence, it is on the lawmaking domain of
Congress. The task of the executive is only to execute laws.
Further, it violated the citizen’s right to privacy.
Conte v. COURT OF APPEALS

264 S 20

FACTS: Petitioners are SSS employees. Upon their retirement, they availed of RA 660 and SSS
resolution No. 56. COA disallowed all the claims, saying it violated RA 4968 (Teves Retirement Law)
which specially bars the creation of insurance or retirement plan other than the GSIS government law for
GSIS government employees.
HELD: Resolution 56 contravenes the Teves Retirement Law. This is an act arrogating unto itself the
power solely belonging to Congress.
The rule-making power of a public administrative body is a delegated legislative power, which it
may not use either to abridge the authority given to it by the Congress or the Constitution or to enlarge its
power beyond the scope intended. The SSS, in promulgating Res. 56 which provided a supplementary
pension/ retirement plan in contravention of the Teves Retirement Law (Sec 28 of CA 186 as amended by
RA 4968), cannot, in the guise of rule-making, legislative or amend laws or worse, render them nugatory.
B. QUASI-JUDICIAL POWER
This is the administrative body’s power of adjudication. Quasi-judicial power is the power of the
administrative authorities to make determinations of facts in the performance of their official duties and to
apply the law as they construe it to the facts so found. The exercise of this power is only incidental to
their main function, which is the enforcement of the law.
The quasi-judicial power, which is incidental to the power of regulation vested in the administrative
body, is often expressly conferred by the legislature through specific provisions in the charter of the
agency. The justification for the grant as against the contention that it violates the doctrine of separation
of power is that the power is needed to enable the administrative officers to perform their executive
duties.
Procedural due process should be complied with in the exercise of its quasi-judicial powers. It
requires prior notice and hearing. For an administrative body to be considered and to act as quasi-judicial,
there must be an express empowerment by law. Absent express empowerment, jurisdiction should be
construed to mean mere regulatory and supervisory, not judicial powers. Adjudicative power must always
be read and exercised as being in aid of the principal function of an administrative body. In other words,
the grant of quasi-judicial power should not be only power conferred but should instead be only incidental
to the administrative agency’s main task of implementing the law in the specific fields of its expertise.
Otherwise, the agency becomes a specialized court of justice under the judicial branch.
Conditions for the Exercise of Administrative body’s Quasi-judicial Power
The proper exercise of the quasi-judicial power requires compliance of two conditions, to wit:
1. The administrative body must properly acquire jurisdiction.
Without jurisdiction, determinations made by the administrative bodies are absolutely

null and without any legal effect whatsoever. These acts are subject to direct and even collateral
attack and may be assailed at any time since they are regarded as invalid ab initio.

Before the administrative body uses its power of adjudication, it must first determine
whether it is authorized by law to take cognizance of the controversy submitted before it. It must
likewise decide whether it is competent to act upon the matter. Thus, the basis is the law itself.
The law must confer on the administrative agency the power to adjudicate the controversy.
Otherwise, the matter is resolvable not by the administrative agency but the courts.
To illustrate this, It is used to be that any action for specific performance should be filed
before the courts. However, with the passage of Presidential Decrees Nos. 957 and 1344, the
Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) is given the exclusive authority to take
cognizance of the action for specific performance with damages filed by a disgruntled lot or
condominium buyers against the developer, broker, realtor or in cases of any unfair real estate
practices committed by the developer. Thus, if such actions are filed with the court, the latter will
dismiss the case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
2. Due Process must be observed in the conduct of the proceedings.
The lack of notice and hearing essential to due process will, as a general rule, invalidate the
administrative proceedings. Nevertheless, it is incorrect to say that this right is indispensable for there
are some instances when it can validly be omitted.
PCGG v. Judge Peña

Feb. 7, 1989
FACTS: PCGG issued a freeze order to two export garment firms who filed an injunction before RTC to
restrain PCGG.
ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC can validly restrain PCGG?
HELD: The RTC cannot restrain PCGG Under its charter, the PCGG exercises quasi-judicial power; thus
it is deemed a co-equal body of RTC.
Quasi Judicial is the term applied to the action or discretion of public administrative officers who
are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts and draw conclusions from them as a
basis for their official action, and to exercise discretion of a judicial nature. A quasi-judicial proceeding
involves the taking and evaluation of evidence, determining facts based upon the evidence presented and
rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved.
UP Board of Regents v. CA and Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine

313 SCRA 404
FACTS: Private respondent is a citizen of India and was enrolled in the doctoral program in
Anthropology of the UP College. She was able to graduate with the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Anthropology. However, in a decision issued by the Board of Regents, it ordered for the withdrawal of
private respondent’s doctorate degree.
The Committee submitted report findings at least 90 instances or portions in private respondent’s
thesis, which were lifted from sources without proper or due acknowledgment (a case of plagiarism).

Respondent maintains that petitioners are estopped from withdrawing her doctorate degree.
ISSUE: Whether or not the UP Board of Regents can withdraw the doctorate degree of the respondent.
HELD: Yes, it can. There was no violation of due process because she was given opportunity to be heard.
Due process in the administrative context does not require a trial type proceeding.
Various committees had been created to investigate the case and in all proceedings, the
respondent was given the opportunity to defend herself. Under the UP Charter, the Board of Regents is
the highest governing body of the University of the Philippines. It has the power to confer degrees upon
the recommendation of the University council. It follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on
error or fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to
withdraw what it has granted without violating the student’s rights.
The pursuit of academic excellence is the university’s concern. It should be empowered, as an act
of self-defense, to take measures to protect it from serious threats to its integrity.
Cariño v. CHR
204 S 483
FACTS: Public School Teachers went into what they called “mass concerted actions” for failure of the
public authorities to act upon their grievances. As a result, they were preventively suspended and
temporarily replaced. Others were eventually dismissed from their works.
A petition was filed before the RTC, which was dismissed. Thus, it was raised to the Supreme
Court on certiorari. Meanwhile, respondents raised also the matter to the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR). A dialogue was then scheduled by CHR and a subpoena was issued to the DECS Secretary. Sec.
Cariño contends that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE: Whether or not the CHR has the power under the Constitution to try and decide the case.
HELD: No, the CHR has no such power to adjudicate. It was not meant by the fundamental law to be
another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country. The Commission may however investigate, i.e.
receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and
political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a
court of justice, or even a quasi – judicial agency.
Eastern Telecom v. International Communication Corporation

435 S 55
FACTS: Petitioner applied for and was granted by NTC a Provisional Authority (PA) to install, operate
and provide local exchange service in different cities and provinces including Navotas and Metro Manila.
Respondent ICC was also given PA by NTC to operate in Manila and Navotas, which are already covered
by authority given to petitioner. Aggrieved, petitioner filed a petition for review, questioning the PA
granted to respondents.

ISSUE: Whether or not NTC has the authority to grant respondent a Provisional Authority?
HELD: YES it has the authority to grant respondent a PA to provide local exchange service as the
regulatory agency which has jurisdiction over all telecom entities. The power of the NTC in granting or
denying a provisional authority to operate a local exchange carrier is a quasi-judicial function and hence it
has the power to grant respondent PA considering that it has the expertise in determining the capabilities
of respondent.
Rule against Forum Shopping
The rule against forum shopping applies to quasi-judicial/administrative proceedings. Before an

administrative complaint may be lodged in any administrative tribunal, the following requirements must
first be complied:
1.) The complaint must be under oath (verified)
2.) There must be certification that no similar complaint is filed in any other tribunal.
Forum shopping – is the act of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.
It is an act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one
forum, of seeking another (other than by appeal or by a special civil action for certiorari) or of instituting
two or more actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause on the supposition that one or the other
would make a favorable disposition.
In this jurisdiction, a party is not permitted to pursue simultaneous remedies in two different forums.
Where forum-shopping is deemed to exist, the summary dismissal of both actions is warranted.
The test to determine whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is where the
elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
the other.
The requisites of res judicata are:

1. identity of parties,
2. identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and
3. the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action
will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the action under
consideration.
The first agency who takes cognizance of a case excludes all other agencies with concurrent
jurisdiction. But there is no forum shopping when the action does not involve the same cause.
If an action is filed in an administrative body and another in the NBI – no forum shopping
because NBI has no power to adjudicate.
If one involves civil liability and the other criminal liability – no forum shopping.

If one is filed in an administrative body and another before the Commission on Human Rights
(CHR) – no violation of rule against forum shopping
Marina Properties Corp. v. CA and HL Carlos Construction

294 S 273
FACTS: Petitioner Marina is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of real estate development.
Among its projects was Marina Bay Homes Condo Project with respondent HL Carlos Construction as
principal contractor, particularly of Phase 3. As an incentive to complete the construction, Marina
allowed Carlos to purchase a condo unit and they entered into a Contract to Purchase and Sell. But after
paying more than half, Petitioner refused for the delivery of said unit which prompted respondent to file 2
cases:
1. Collection for a sum of money corresponding to unpaid billings from their construction contract
before the RTC.
2. Complaint for specific performance with damages for Marina’s unilateral cancellation of their
contract to buy and to sell a condominium unit before the HLURB.
Marina alleged that the case before the HLRUB should be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia and
forum shopping.
ISSUE # 1: Whether or not the filling of the two cases at the same time is proper?
HELD : It is proper because the 2 cases involved 2 different issues and causes of action.:
1. arising from unpaid billings of Marina

2. arising from Marina’s unilateral cancellation of their contract.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not private respondent was guilty of forum shopping?
HELD: NO. Private respondent was not guilty of forum shopping when it sued Marina before the
HLURB. Forum Shopping is the act of a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in
one forum and seeks another opinion in another forum. They are grounded on the same cause of action on
the supposition that one or the other might look with favor upon the party.
There was hardly a duplication of the civil case filed to collect a sum of money corresponding to
unpaid billings from their construction contract
Montemayor v. Bundalian
405 S 264
FACTS: The Phil. Commission against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) made an investigation for the
alleged unexplained wealth of petitioner Montemayor, as Regional Director of DPWH based on the
unverified letter complaint of respondent Bundalian, mainly due to Montemayor’s acquisition of a house

in the US worth P3..9 M. As a result, he was dismissed from service with forfeiture of gov’t. benefits.
Petitioner contends that he was denied process; that his guilt was not proven by substantial evidence and
that the case was rendered moot and academic due to an earlier dismissal of similar cases before the
Ombudsman.
ISSUES:
1. Was he denied of due process? No, because he was given opportunity to explain his side, and
it is a sufficient compliance of due process.
2. Was his guilt not proved by substantial evidence? It was proven by substantial evidence.
3. Whether or not the earliest dismissal of similar cases before the Ombudsman rendered the admin case
before the PCAGG moot and academic? Was there forum shopping?
HELD: There was no forum shopping. The decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata
because such doctrine is applicable only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the exercise of
admin powers. PCAGC’S investigation was admin in nature.
HLC Construction v. Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners Association (EHSHA)

411 S 504
What if there are numerous complainants?
FACTS: Respondents Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners Association and the 150 individual
members filed an action for breach of contract, damages and attorney’s fees with the RTC against
petitioner-developer alleging that petitioner used substandard materials in the construction of their houses.
Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss claiming that the RTC has no jurisdiction over the case and that the
respondent’s certification on non forum shopping was defective because it was signed only by the
president of EHSHA and not by all its members.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction?
HELD: No, it is HLURB which has jurisdiction because the case involves specific performance of
contractual obligations filed by the subdivision lot owners against the developers.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not the respondents certification on non-forum shopping is defective? NO, it is
already a substantial compliance, despite the rule that all the plaintiffs must sign, considering that it is not
practicable to do so. Further, the plaintiffs are properly represented by their president.
Velasquez v. Hernandez
437 S 358
CSC & Ombudsman

1 is admin in nature, 1 is criminal in nature

FACTS: The complainant teachers filed a case before the Ombudsman against respondent Hernandez for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for allegedly soliciting, accepting, and receiving
sums of money, in exchange for transfer or promotion of complainant teachers or for direct bribery. The
Ombudsman ordered the withdrawal of the information against respondent.
Meanwhile, after a committee investigated the alleged misconduct, it recommended the filing of
administrative and criminal complaint against respondent. So, a formal charge was filed against
respondent before the Civil Service Commission (CSC).
The CSC found respondent guilty of the charges against her and ordered her dismissal from
service. Respondent contends that the case before the CSC should be dismissed because of lack of
certification of non-formal shopping.
ISSUE: Whether or not the case before the CSC should be dismissed because of lack of certification of
non-forum shopping?
HELD: The case should not be dismissed.
Forum shopping would find no application in this case because the action filed before the CSC-
CAR is administrative in nature while that filed before the office of the Ombudsman deals with criminal
accountability of respondent for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Act. The rule against forum
shopping does not apply because the 2 cases, although based on the same facts, they do not raise identical
causes of action and issues.
Fiscal Autonomy
Fiscal autonomy is the autonomy given to certain administrative bodies to have freedom from control and
limitations except those provided by law.
Only few administrative bodies are granted fiscal autonomy. They are the following:
1. Judiciary
2. the 3 constitutional commissions
3. Ombudsman
If an admin body is not granted with fiscal autonomy, it is with limitations and restrictions by the
Commission on Audit (COA)
Fiscal autonomy – freedom from outside control and limitations, other than those provided by law. It is
the freedom to allocate and utilize funds granted by law in accordance with law and pursuant to its own
wisdom as its needs may require from time to time.
CHR Employees Association v. CHR

444 S 300
FACTS: The Commission on Human Rights (CHR) adopted an upgrading and reclassification scheme
among selected positions in the commission by virtue of RA 8522 (General Appropriations Act of 1998)
authorizing the constitutional commissions and offices enjoying fiscal autonomy to do so.

The scheme however was disapproved by the Department of Budget Management (DBM). But
the CSC approved such scheme of reclassification of positions.
Meanwhile petitioner CHREA requested the CSC to affirm the CSC–NCR recommendation to deny the
reclassification scheme due to DBM’s disapproval, but was denied.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not CHR enjoys fiscal autonomy?
HELD #1: No, because although it is a commission created by the constitution, there is no provision in
the constitution that grants CHR fiscal autonomy unlike the other constitutional commissions.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not the fact that CHR is a member of the Constitutional Fiscal Autonomy Group
(CFAG) clothed it with fiscal autonomy?
HELD #2: No, because fiscal autonomy is a constitutional grant, not one obtainable by mere
membership.
ISSUE #3: Whether or not having vested with fiscal autonomy vests the agency with the authority to
reclassify, upgrade and create positions without approval of DBM?
HELD #3: No, they are still subject to the approval of the DBM.
CSC v. DBM
July 22, 2005
Fiscal Autonomy – automatic release in full of what has been appropriated by the legislature. It cannot be
subjected to any restrictions. They should be given preference.
FACTS: The CSC seeks to compel the DBM to release the balance of its budget for the fiscal year 2002
amounting to P 5, 807.392.30. According to the CSC, this balance was intentionally withheld by DBM on
the basis of its “no report, no release policy, which according to it, is a violation of the principle of fiscal
autonomy and, hence, unconstitutional.
DBM contends that the reason for the delay in releasing the balance was due to shortfall in
revenues.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not the “no report, no release policy” of the DBM may be validly enforced against
offices vested with fiscal autonomy?
HELD #1: It cannot be validly enforced against them without violating Art. XIA, sec.5 of the
constitution, which provides that the CSC shall enjoy fiscal autonomy. Their approved appropriations
shall be automatically and regularly released. Meaning, no condition to fund releases to it may be
imposed.

ISSUE #2: Whether or not shortfall in revenues is a valid reason to justify delay in the release of CSC
budget?
HELD #2:
1. In this case the alleged shortfall is totally unsubstantiated.
2. But even if there is a shortfall, that does not justify non-compliance of the automatic release of
budget because it would defeat such provision of the law. The agencies with fiscal autonomy
should be given priority in the release of their approved appropriations over all other agencies.
Retention or reduction of appropriations is generally allowed when there is unmanageable budget
deficit, but those vested with fiscal autonomy are exempted. The budget for these agencies shall
be automatically and regularly released subject to availability of funds. This condition refers only
to a situation where the total revenue collections are so low that they are not sufficient to cover
the total appropriations for all entities vested with fiscal autonomy.
Other Powers of Administrative Agencies
Discretionary and Ministerial
Discretionary power is the power of administrative agencies to act officially on certain cases referred to
them according to the dictates of their own judgment and conscience and not controlled by the judgment
or conscience of others.
Ministerial power is the power of administrative agencies in the discharge of the officer’s function which
is imperative and requires neither judgment nor discretion on his part.
Investigatory or Inquisitorial Powers
Investigatory or inquisitorial power, also known as the examining power, refers to the authority of
the administrative agency to gather evidence. This consists in requiring the disclosure of information by
means accounts, records or documents through the issuance of subpoena or subpoena duces tecum, the
attendance of witnesses and compelling their testimonies and the filing of statements.
This power must be conferred by law. This is the power to gather information and even inspect
in the premises and to call on witnesses and issue subpoenas but which in the latter case, is a power that
must be conferred upon the administrative officer. The power to investigate and inquire carries with it
the power to issue subpoena.
Power to issue Subpoena
The power to issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum is not inherent in administrative bodies.
It is settled that these bodies may summon witness and require the production of evidence only when: (a)
duly allowed by law, and (b) always only in connection with the matter they are authorized to investigate.
The fact that an administrative body has been authorized to conduct an investigation does not necessarily

mean it can also summon witnesses and take testimony in the absence of a clear grant of this power from
the legislature.
Under the Administrative Code of 1987 (Sec. 13, Book VII of EO 292), administrative and quasi-
judicial bodies shall have the power in any contested case to require the attendance of witnesses or the
production of books, papers, documents and other pertinent data, upon request of any party before or
during the hearing upon showing of general relevance.
Further, when authority to take testimony or receive evidence is conferred upon any
administrative officer or any non-judicial person, committee, or other body, such authority shall include
the power to administer oaths, summon witnesses and require the production of documents by a
subpoena duces tecum ( Sec. 37).
Distinguish administrative subpoena from judicial subpoena
The purpose of administrative subpoena is not to prove a pending charge but to discover evidence
on the basis of which a charge may be filed if the evidence so justifies. On the other hand, the purpose of
a judicial subpoena is to prove a charge.
Q. Suppose the law does not confer such power to the administrative body, how may it compel witness to
appear before it?
A: The administrative body must apply to the court for the issuance of subpoena.
Power to punish for contempt
Like the subpoena power, the power to punish for contempt is essentially judicial and cannot be
claimed as an inherent right by the administrative body. The power to punish for contempt should be
clearly defined and granted by law and its penalty determined. In the absence of such provision of law,
administrative bodies do not possess inherent power to contempt.
EO 292 provides that unless otherwise provide by law, the agency may, in case of
disobedience, invoke the aid of the Regional Trail Court within whose jurisdiction the contested case
being heard falls. The Court may punish refusal as contempt (Sec. 13, Chapter 3, Bk VII).
Where the administrative agency is given the power to punish for contempt, its exercise of the
power is limited to making effective the power to elicit testimony and it cannot be exercised in
furtherance of administrative functions. This limitation is derived from the nature of the power to punish
for contempt as inherently judicial and from the existence of the power to punish for contempt as being
essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings and consequently, in the administration of
justice.
The power to punish for contempt is intended not for the protection of the administrative
officers but to safeguard the integrity of the functions that they perform.
Validity of Implementing Rules or Interpretative Policies
Administrative bodies, corollary to their obligation to enforce the law, must perforce have the
competence to interpret, at first instance, the meaning of the laws that they are to execute. Such
interpretations are however not binding upon the courts but carry persuasive weight. When an
administrative agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it merely interprets a pre-

existing law and the administrative interpretation is at best advisory for it is the courts that finally
determine what the law means.
Requisites for the validity of Administrative Rules and Regulations
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature

It is usually conferred by the charter of the administrative agency or by the law it is supposed to enforce.
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature.

The regulation promulgated must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred.
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure.

Promulgation of administrative rules and regulations of general application does not require previous
notice and hearing. The only exception is where the legislature requires it and mandates that the
regulation be based on certain facts as determined in an appropriate investigation. If the regulation is in
effect a settlement of controversy between specific parties, it is considered an administrative adjudication
and so will require notice and hearing.
4. It must be reasonable.
It must not be unreasonable and arbitrary as to violate due process. It must show a reasonable relation to
the purposes for which it is authorized to be issued.
5. It must be published.
Publication must be in full, or it is no publication at all.
The following, however, need not be published:
1. interpretative rules and regulations

2. those which are merely internal in nature (regulating only the personnel of the administrative agency
and not the public)
3. letter of instruction issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules and guidelines to be
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.
Caltex, Inc. v. CA
292 SCRA 273
Issuances by an administrative agency have the force and effect of law, and when the issuances are of
“general applicability”, publication is necessary as a requirement of due process.
Philippine Trading Corp. v. COA

309 SCRA 177
DBM-CCC No. 10 which has issued by the DBM pursuant to Sec. 23 of RA 6758 and which
completely disallows payment of allowances and other compensation to government officials and
employees is of no force and effect due to the absence of publication in the Official Gazette or in a

newspaper of general circulation. The fact that it was reissued and then submitted for publication in the
O.G. does not cure the defect and retroact to the time that above mentioned items were disallowed in
audit because publication is required as a condition precedent to the affectivity of a law to inform the
public of the contents of the law or rules and regulations before their rights and interests are affected by
the same.
De Jesus v. COA
294 SCRA 152
The circular issued by the DBM to implement the Salary Standardization Law, which discontinues the
payment of allowances and fringe benefits previously granted on top of basic salary, was ineffective for
lack of publication in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation as required by law.
Republic v. Express Telecommunication Co., Inc.

373 S 317
FACTS: The 1978 Rules of Practice and Procedure of NTC provides that the NTC may, on its own
initiative, grant the relief prayed for.
Extelcom contends that the NTC should have applied the revised rules which were filed with the
office of the National Administrative Register on Feb. 3, 1993. These rules deleted the phrase “on its own
initiative”. Hence, a provisional authority may be issued only upon filing of a proper motion before the
NTC.
The revised rules of 1993 however have not been published in a newspaper of general circulation
but where filed with the UP Law Center on Feb. 3, 1993.
ISSUE: Which rule should govern?
HELD: The 1978 rules should govern because of the absence of publication of the Revised Rules. The
filing of the Revised Rules with the UP Law Center does not cure the defect or is not enough for the rules
to become effective. Publication is a condition sine qua non for its effectivity.
Pesigan v. Angeles
129 S 174
At issue in this case is the enforceability, before publication in the official gazette of EO 626-A,
providing for the confiscation and forfeiture by the gov’t. of carabaos transported from one province to
another.
EO 626- A was date Oct. 25, 1980 but was published only on June 14, 1982.
FACTS: The Pesigans transported carabaos from Camarines Sur to Batangas on April 2, 1982. On the
way, the carabaos were confiscated by gov’t. authorities based on EO 626-A.
ISSUE: Whether or not the EO should be enforced against the Pesigans on April 2, 1982?

HELD: No, because EO 626-A was only published on June 14, 1982. Without such publication , such
law, was not yet effective.
Pilipinas Kao v. CA
372 S 548
FACTS: The Bureau of Investments (BOI) reduced the tax credits on net value earned and net local
content applied for by petitioners in 1980 and 1989. Pilipinas Kao assailed such reduction.
The Manual of Operations, which provides for the base figure in reducing petitioners tax Credits,
however, was not published.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Manual of Operations is valid and effective despite its lack of publication.
HELD: The Manual of Operations, as it was issued to implement the Investment Code, needs to be
published to become effective. Hence, for lack of publication, it is not effective.
The Manual of Operations is not just an internal rule affecting only the personnel of BOI. It
affects the petitioners and other enterprises. It affects the right of the public.
Additional requisites for Administrative rules with penal sanctions:
1. the law must itself declare as punishable the violation of the administrative rule or regulation
2. the law should define or fix the penalty for the violation of the administrative rule of regulation.
Philosophy at work
“Ubermensch” – Friedrich Nietzsche

ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS
Proceedings before Administrative Bodies
An administrative body has the power or authority to promulgate its own rules of procedure in
order for it to carry out its objective, which the law has conferred upon its creation. The rules and
regulations promulgated by these administrative bodies must be liberally construed to promote justice, to
effect promptness in the disposition of cases and to obtain just, speedy and inexpensive determination of
cases.
Proceedings before administrative bodies partake the nature of a judicial proceeding as it involves
the taking of evidence and of evaluation of the same; facts are determined based upon the evidence
presented, and their decision and orders are based on such facts.
In other words proceedings before administrative bodies require the determination of facts just
like in judicial proceeding. The quasi- judicial officer is required to ascertain the applicable laws upon the
determination of the facts of the case.
However, unlike in a judicial proceeding, the administrative authorities are not strictly bound by
the rigid technicalities observed in courts. The administrative authorities can interpret their own rules and
may even dispense with any particular rule and in so doing, they have a wider degree of discretion. So
long as they are guided by the principle of justice and fair play and that there is no arbitrariness in the
conduct of the proceeding, there can be no question in the procedure observed by the administrative
officer.
A Rule in the Rules of Court may be applied suppletorily in the conduct of administrative
proceedings. In fact it is common among administrative agencies to provide a provision that rules and
regulations observed by the court may likewise be observed in these agencies.
Due Process
Substantive due process – requires that the law itself is fair, reasonable and just.
Procedural due process – refers to the method or manner by which the law is enforced.
Requirements of Administrative Due Process
1. The case must be tried by an impartial tribunal;

2. There must be due notice and hearing or opportunity to be heard;
3. The procedure at the hearing must be consistent with the essentials of a fair trial;
4. Proceedings must be conducted in such a way that there will be opportunity for a court to
determine whether the applicable rules of law and procedure were observed;
Note: Violation of any of these would render the decision null and void.

1. The case must be tried by an impartial tribunal
Fabella v. CA
282 S 256
FACTS: Sec. Cariño filed administrative cases against the teachers of Mandaluyong High School. Said
teachers have taken part in the mass action in violation of civil service laws and regulations. An
investigating committee was created by Sec. Cariño to conduct the administrative hearings.
The teachers filed before the RTC questioning the composition/proceedings of the said
committee. DECS investigating committee however rendered a decision finding the teachers guilty and
ordering their immediate dismissal. Respondents questioned the said order contending that it violated
their right to due process.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondents were denied due process?
HELD: They were denied of due process.

RA 4760, known as the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, specifically covers administrative
proceedings involving public school teachers. Section 9 of said law expressly provides that the committee
to hear public school teacher’s administrative cases should be composed of the following:
1. The School Superintendent of the division as chairman

2. A representative of the local or any existing provincial or national teacher’s organization
3. A supervisor of the division.
In the present case, the various committees formed by DECS to hear the administrative charges
against private respondents did not include “a representative of the local or any existing provincial or
national teacher’s organization.” Hence, the teachers were denied of due process.
Emin v. de Leon
378 S 143
FACTS: Some teachers in Kidapawan were found to have forged their certificates of eligibility. When
questioned, they all pointed petitioner Emin, a Non- Formal Education Supervisor, as the person who
gave them the RA 6850 certificates of eligibility they had attached to their appointment for fee. Petitioner
was formerly charged with the CSC.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not the CSC has original jurisdiction over the case against petitioner?
HELD: CSC has no jurisdiction. Under RA 4670 or the Magna Carta for Public School Teachers, original
jurisdiction over admin cases against public school teachers should be lodged before an investigating
committee.
However, the proceedings conducted can no longer be nullified on procedural grounds because of
the principle of estoppel by laches. It was shown that the CSC had afforded petitioners sufficient
opportunity to be heard and defend himself against the charges against him. He even participated in the
hearings.

ISSUE #2: Whether or not petitioner was denied of the process?
HELD: No. He avers that he was not allowed to cross-examine. But in admin proceedings, technical rules
of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. He did not even ask for cross-examination during the
hearing. What is important is that petitioner was given sufficient opportunity to be heard and defend
himself.
Alcala et. al. v. Villar

416 S 147
FACTS: Respondent Villar is the School Principal of Lanao National High School, Pilar, Cebu City.
Petitioners, as teachers of said school, filed a complaint for dishonesty against respondent; that he gave
complainants reimbursements and loyalty benefits which are less than what they are entitled. Respondent
contends that he was authorized by complainants to deduct said benefits and pay to E & E Lending
Investors.
The case was investigated and resolved by the Office of the Ombudsman finding Villar guilty of
dishonesty and dismissed him from service.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction?
HELD: No, Under RA 4670, it must be lodged first before an investigating committee. But the decision
of Ombudsman should not be annulled because petitioner was amply afforded due process, the essence of
which is an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action.
In this case, respondents had filed a counter–affidavit and a motion for reconsideration; he also
participated in the hearing before the Ombudsman and was given opportunity to cross-examine witnesses
against him. Hence Villar, can no longer question the proceeding under the principle of estoppel by
laches.
Cruz v. CSC
370 S 650
FACTS: Zenaida Paitim, the Municipal Treasurer of Bulacan, and Gilda Cruz, a co employee were
charged and found guilty of dishonesty, grave misconduct and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of
the service by the Civil Service Commission. Paitim took the civil service exam in behalf of Gilda Cruz.
Petitioners alleged that their right to due process was violated since respondent CSC acted as the
investigator, complainant, prosecutor, and the judge all at the same time.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of due process?
HELD: NO.
The CSC is mandated to hear and decide administrative cases instituted by it or before it directly or on
appeal, including actions of its officers and the agencies attached to it. The fact that the CSC itself filed
the complaint does not mean that it could not be an impartial judge. As an administrative body, its

decisions are based on substantial findings. Factual findings of administrative bodies, being considered
experts in their field, are binding on the Supreme Court.
2. There must be due notice and hearing or opportunity to be heard
Philippine National Construction Corporation (PNCC) v. Republic of the Philippines (RP)

August 20, 1990
FACTS: RP filed an action for quo warranto saying that some portion of the Expressway be withdrawn
from PNCC’S franchise because PNCC had long fully recovered its investments. PNCC & RP later
compromised.
The PNCC was then authorized to collect the maintenance fees in a reduced amount. It shall no
longer exercise supervision and control over the construction of additional facilities, as well as the
operation of the subject portion of the expressways which is transferred to DPWH thru the Toll
Regulatory Board, in coordination with PNCC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the maintenance fees to be collected from the motorists using the questioned
portions of the expressway require public hearings before the Toll Regulatory Board?
HELD: Not necessarily.
A public hearing is mandatory only in cases of petitions for increases in toll rates the purpose of which is
to give users of the expressway who will be adversely affected, an opportunity to contest the validity of
such increase.
Indeed, no affected toll buyer shall be prejudiced where the collectible rates are reduced as in this
case.
Note: Due notice and opportunity to be heard – means the right not only to present the evidence on one’s
behalf but also a reasonable opportunity to know the claims of the complainants.
Republic v. Express Telecom

373 S 319
Where the order refers to a single revival of the archived application of Bayantel in NTC Case
No. 92-426, it cannot be said that oppositor Extelcom’s right to procedural due process was prejudiced if
it was not given an opportunity to question the motion for revival. There is no denial of due process where
it will still have the opportunity to be heard during the full blown adversarial hearings that will follow.
A party may be declared in default in an administrative proceeding. So if there is a directive

but the respondent did not file the answer within the prescribed period, the administrative officer may
consider such party in default. And thus, the complainant may then proceed with the presentation of his
evidence ex parte, unless there is waiver likewise of such presentation and that pleading be made clearly
on the basis on such submission of a position paper.

CIR v. CA and Fortune Tobacco Corporation

261 S 236
FACTS: The Commissioner of Internal Revenue Liwayway Vinzons-Chato Revenue Memorandum

Circular (RMC) No. 37-93 reclassifying HOPE, MORE, and CHAMPION cigarettes, owned by Fortune
Tobacco, as foreign brands because they were listed in the World Tobacco Directory as belonging to
foreign companies and are required to pay 55% ad valorem tax.
Fortune Tobacco requested for review, reconsideration and recall of RMC 37-93 with the BIR but
was denied.
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was observed by the CIR?
HELD: No. The circular violated the constitutional mandate that taxation must be uniform and equitable
because only HOPE, MORE, and CHAMPION were classified as foreign brands considering that there
are other cigarettes bearing foreign brands.
The circular, then, may be considered adjudicatory in nature and is thus violative of due process
following the Ang Tibay doctrine because the measure suffers from lack of uniformity of taxation. The
other cigarettes bearing foreign brands were not similarly included within the scope of the circular.
Zambales Chromite Mining vs.CA

94 S 261
FACTS: Director Gozon rendered a decision adverse to Zambales Chromite while he was still director of
Bureau of Mines. Pending appeal, Gozon was promoted as secretary of the DENR; thus, he is reviewing
his own decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is violation of due process?
HELD: There was a violation of due process because the Chromite Mining cannot expect a fair decision
in the appealed case.
The palpably flagrant anomaly of the Secretary of DENR reviewing his own decision, as
director of mines is a mockery of administrative justice. The decision of the reviewing officer would be
biased. Inevitably, it would be the same view since being human, he would not admit that he was
mistaken in his first view of the case. A sense of proportion and consideration for the fitness of things
should have deterred Secretary Gozon from reviewing his own decision as director of mines. He should
have asked his Undersecretary to undertake the review.
Singson v. NLRC
FACTS: Labor Arbiter Aquino rendered a decision adverse to Singson. Aquino was later promoted as
NLRC Commissioner. The decision was appealed to his division and he took part in resolving the case on
appeal. But he did not participate in the deliberation of the motion for reconsideration.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was violation of due process?

HELD: There was violation of due process.
Petitioner was denied due process when Commissioner Aquino participated as presiding commissioner of
the 2nd division of the NLRC. In reviewing private respondent PAL’s appeal, he was reviewing his own
decision as a former labor arbiter. Litigants are entitled to a review of 3 commissioners who are impartial
right from the start of the process of review. Commissioner Aquino can hardly be considered impartial
since he was the arbiter who decided the case under review. He should have inhibited himself from any
participation in the case.
CSC v. Lucas
301 S 560
FACTS: Raquel Linatok, an assistant information officer of the Dept. of Agriculture, filed with the Office
of the Secretary of Agriculture a complaint against respondent Jose Lucas, a photographer of the same
agency, for misconduct allegedly for touching her thigh.
The Board of Personnel Inquiry (BOPI) of the Dept. of Agriculture found respondent guilty of
simple misconduct, and recommends the penalty of suspension for 1 month and 1 day. The secretary
approved the recommendation.
When respondent appealed the decision to the CSC, the CSC found him guilty of grave
misconduct imposing on him the penalty of dismissal from service.
The CA however set aside the CSC resolution saying that Lucas was denied of due process
because he was not informed of the charge of grave misconduct against him.
ISSUE: Whether or not Lucas was denied due process when the CSC found him guilty of grave
misconduct on a charge of simple misconduct?
HELD: Lucas was denied of due process. A basic requirement of due process is that a person must be
duly informed of the charges against him and that a person cannot be convicted of an offense which he
was not charged.
In this case, Lucas was found guilty of grove misconduct by the CSC when the charge against
him was only simple misconduct.
Note: In court proceedings, there must be formal hearing. In admin cases, there may be no formal hearing
especially if such is waived by the respondent. Admin cases may be decided simply by submitting
pleadings by the parties.
UP Board of Regents vs. CA and Arokiaswamy William Margaret Celine

313 SCRA 404
FACTS: Private respondent is a citizen of India and was enrolled in the doctoral program in
Anthropology of the UP College. She was able to graduate with the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in
Anthropology. However, in a decision issued by the Board of Regents, it ordered for the withdrawal of
private respondent’s doctorate degree.

The Committee submitted report findings at least 90 instances or portions in private respondent’s
thesis, which were lifted from sources without proper or due acknowledgment (a case of plagiarism).
ISSUE: Whether or not due process was observed by petitioner in withdrawing PR’s doctorate degree?
HELD: Yes, due process was properly observed. There was no violation of due process because she was
given opportunity to be heard. Due process in the administrative context does not require a trial type
proceeding.
Various committees had been created to investigate the case and in all proceedings, the
respondent was given the opportunity to defend herself. Under the UP Charter, the Board of Regents is
the highest governing body of the University of the Philippines. It has the power to confer degrees upon
the recommendation of the University council. It follows that if the conferment of a degree is founded on
error or fraud, the Board of Regents is also empowered, subject to the observance of due process, to
withdraw what it has granted without violating the student’s rights.
The pursuit of academic excellence is the university’s concern. It should be empowered, as an act
of self-defense, to take measures to protect it from serious threats to its integrity.
NAPOCOR v. NLRC
272 S 704
FACTS: NAPOCOR (NPC) entered into an agreement with private respondent (PR) Westinghouse as
principal contractor and Power Contractors, Inc. (PCI) as subcontractor for the construction of power
plant in Bataan. Over 6,000 workers were hired by PCI who were eventually terminated without any
separation pay. PR workers then filed illegal dismissal cases against PCI.
The labor Arbiter ordered petitioner and Westinghouse impleaded as additional respondents.
Copies of the order were not served on respondents Westinghouse. A copy was served to ACCRA but it
filed a manifestation that it did not enter its appearance for Westinghouse. The OSG entered its
appearance for NPC. During the proceeding, however, Atty. Mallo represented NPC under the designation
“Counsel for respondents, special Attorney–OSG”.
NPC, Westinghouse and PCI were held solidarily liable to pay the money claims. A copy of the
decision was served on NPC thru the deputized special attorney.
The OSG was not served with a copy of the decision. Attys. Mallo and Alcantara, the special attys.–OSG
filed a motion for Extension of time to file appeal. They filed an appeal but it was filed out of the, hence
the issuance of writ of execution. NPC contends that since its lawyer, the OSG, was never served a copy
of the Labor Arbiter’s decision, its right to due process was violated.
ISSUE: Whether or not the NPC was denied due process?
HELD: Yes, because the copy of the decision must be served to the OSG which is the petitioner’s
principal counsel. The deputized special attorney has no legal authority to decide whether or not an appeal
should be made. Service of copy of the decision on the deputized special attorney is insufficient and not
valid and binding on the Solicitor General. Hence, the period to appeal should be reckoned from the date
the OSG received a copy of the decision. Since service was not made to the OSG, the period to file an
appeal did not commence to run.

As to Westinghouse, it was also denied due process because it was held liable in a case where
jurisdiction over it was not acquired. Hence, the decision against it is null and void.
Lincoln Gerald vs. NLRC

July 23, 1990
FACTS: Lincoln Gerald complained that he was deprived of due process because the notice adverse to
him was furnished to his former counsel who failed to inform him and failed to file the necessary
pleadings.
ISSUE: Whether or not there was denial of due process?
HELD: There was no denial of due process. Notices were sent to counsel of record, not to the client.
Records show that petitioner’s former counsel did not withdraw his appearance. Hence, service of a copy
of the decision was valid.
In other words, there must be notice and application filed before the administrative agency of
such withdrawal as counsel. In the absence of such application and the approval by the administrative
agency, the counsel continues to be the counsel of record. Thus, any notice given to the counsel is binding
and is a notice on the client.
PPA v. Sargasso Construction and Development Corp.

435 S 512
FACTS: Respondent filed a complaint with the RTC for specific performance against petitioner. PPA was
represented by the Govt. Corporate Counsel and Atty. Madarang with collaboration forom the Legal
Services Dept. of petitioner, thru Atty. Mancile.
The RTC ruled in favor of respondents.
July 3, 1998 – petitioner, thru the Office of the Govt. Corporate Counsel (OGCC) filed MFR.
Jan. 26, 1999 – motion was denied.
Feb. 16, 1999 – petitioner was served a copy of said order thru its legal Dept.
Feb. 26, 1999 – petitioner thru the GCC, filed a notice of appeal and was given due course.
Respondents filed a motion to dismiss contending that petitioner’s notice of appeal was filed 6 days after
the period allowed by law.
Petitioner answered that the decision was served on its legal services Dept. and not on the OGCC as its
lead counsel, hence the period to perfect its appeal never commenced.
ISSUE: Whether or not the service of the notice of the decision to the petitioner’s legal department, is not
sufficient?
HELD: Service of the decision to the legal Dept. is already binding upon petitioner. The petitioner was
represented by both the OGCC and its legal service Dept.; hence, the copies of the decision of the RTC
may be served either to both. Further, petitioner, thru the OGCC admitted that the decision was served to
it on June 22, 1998.

Note: In criminal cases, the accused has the right to counsel in custodial investigation. This is not
applicable in admin cases because there is no duty on the part of the admin tribunal to require respondents
to be represented by counsel. It is at the option of the respondent if he wishes to be assisted by a counsel
regardless of the gravity of the charge.
DOH v. Camposano
457 S 438
FACTS: Some concerned employees of DOH-NCR filed a complaint before the DOH resident
Ombudsman against respondents for an alleged anomalous purchase of some medical supplies. The
Ombudsman recommends the filing of a formal administrative charge against respondents for dishonesty
and grave misconduct.
Exec. Sec. Torres issued Admin Order 298 creating an ad hoc committee to investigate the case. It
was then indorsed to the Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC). President
Ramos also found respondents guilty and recommends the case to the Health Secretary for appropriate
action.
The Health Sec. ordered the dismissal of respondents.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not the PCAGC has jurisdiction to investigate the case?
HELD: Although under EO 151 the PCAGC has jurisdiction to investigate only complaints against
presidential appointees allegedly involved in graft and corruption, the investigation was authorized under
A0 298, which is within the power of the Chief Executive considering that he has full control of the
Executive Dept. to which the respondents belong.
Also, the PCAGC is now given the authority to investigate non-presidential appointees who may
have acted in conspiracy with presidential appointees.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not respondents were denied due process by the health secretary’s failure to
consider the facts and the law of the case?
HELD: YES, respondents were denied of due process. The Health Secretary ordered the dismissal of
respondents based on the recommendation of the PCAGC and the president, without considering the law
and the facts of the controversy, which is a requirement of due process in admin proceedings.
Note: Guilt cannot be pronounced nor penalty imposed, unless due process is first observed. This is the
essence of fairness and the rule of law in a democracy.
Alba v. Nitorreda
254 S 753
The right to appeal is not natural right nor part of due process. It is only a statutory privilege.
Hence, the law itself may deprive a party the right to appeal – there is no denial of due process, such as
that provided in Sec. 27 of the Ombudsman Act.

Lumiqued v. Exevea
282 S 125
FACTS: 3 admin charges were filed against Arsenio Lumiqued, Regional Director of DAR-CAR for
malversation thru falsification of official documents by falsifying gasoline receipts, for making
unliquidated cash advances and for oppression and harassment against subordinate employee, the PR
herein.
The complaints were referred to the DOJ for appropriate action DOJ created a committee to
investigate the complaints against Lumiqued and the respondent prosecutors were assigned to investigate
the case.
During the investigation, Lumiqued submitted a counter-affidavit and was repeatedly asked if he
wished to be assigned by a counsel but he replied that he is confident to defend himself. Meanwhile,
Lumiqued died. The investigating committee found him administratively liable and the office of the
President ordered Lumiqued’s dismissal from service with forfeiture of retirement benefits.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not assistance of counsel is indispensable in admin proceedings?
HELD: No, it is not indispensable in admin proceedings. The essence of due process is simply the
opportunity to explain one’s side.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not petitioner’s contention that Lumiqued’s right to counsel could not be waived
unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel is correct?
HELD: Such contention is untenable and misplaced because such right is afforded to a suspect or an
accused during custodial investigation. It can therefore be invoked only in criminal proceedings. The case
at bar is an admin proceeding. Hence, such right cannot be invoked.
ISSUE #3: Whether or not Lumiqued’s death prior to the resolution of the case terminates the
proceeding?
HELD: NO. Jurisdiction acquired is not lost upon the death of respondent. The proceeding will still
proceed.
Codinielo v. Exec. Sec.

August 4, 1997
FACTS: A party complained of denial of due process because there was no participation in the formal
hearing or investigation but nonetheless such party was given the opportunity to file and in fact did file a
motion for reconsideration.
HELD: There was here a cure of whatever infirmity because there was opportunity given to the adverse
party to be heard. So whatever defect in due process was cured by the subsequent act of the party in filing
a motion for reconsideration wherein he argued his position where he presented his evidence.
Pepsi Cola v. NLRC

300 S 66
FACTS: Private Respondent (PR) Rene Estilo sued petitioner before the Regional Arbitration of NLRC
for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages and other monetary claims.
Executive Labor Arbiter Oscar Uy sent notices to the parties to appear before him on a certain
date but only respondent’s lawyer appeared. So, the Labor Arbiter instead directed the parties to submit
their position papers within 20 days. Thereafter, the case is deemed submitted for decision.
Petitioners Pepsi Cola submitted its position paper and supporting evidence which controverted
the allegations and various claims of PR stating that PR was not dismissed but voluntarily resigned after
petitioner found him guilty of serious misconduct and dishonesty.
PR did not submit any paper. The Labor Arbiter rendered decision dismissing the complaint of PR. PR
appealed with the NLRC and the latter set aside the decision stating that PR was not afforded the
opportunity to be heard by just deciding the case based on Pepsi’s position paper alone.
ISSUE: Whether or not PR was not affordable with opportunity to be heard?
HELD: PR was afforded the opportunity to be heard. He has been duly accorded an opportunity to submit
his position paper in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter, but he failed to comply with the order.
When PR appealed, he was given opportunity to present his side. Thus, the fundamental rule of due
process that mandates notice and opportunity to be heard has been amply met.
Padua v. Ranada
390 S 663
FACTS: The Toll Regulatory Board (TRB) issued Resolution No. 2001-89 authorizing provisional toll
rate adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway due to the request of Citra Metro Manila Toll ways Corp.
(CITRA). Such resolution was issued in accordance with the Rules of Practice Governing Hearing before
the TRB. Petitioners Ceferino Padua and Eduardo Zialcita as tax and toll payers contested the validity of
the resolution for being made without the benefit of any public hearing and that it violated the constitution
when it did not express clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the resolution was based.
ISSUE #1: Whether or not petitioners’ petitions are proper?
HELD: No, they are procedurally impermissible. The TRB Rules of Procedure itself provided remedies
of an interested Expressway user. They must first file a petition before the TRB. Petitioners’ recourse is
against the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and exhaustion of admin remedies.
ISSUE #2: Whether or not public hearing is necessary in this case?
HELD: No, LOI No. 1334–A itself provides that the TRB may grant and issue ex-parte to any petitioner
without need of notice, publication or hearing, provisional authority to collect, pending hearing and
decision on the merits of the petition, the increase in rates such LOI has the force and effect of
law. This is to attract investment in govt. infrastructure projects.

Hence, hearing is not necessary for the grant of provisional toll rate adjustment. All that is
necessary are a.) the finding that the main petition is sufficient in form and substance, b.) the submission
of an affidavit showing that the increase in rates substantially conforms to the formula, c.) the submission
of a bond.
ISSUE #3: Whether or not the facts and the law on which Res. 2001-89 is based must be stated.
HELD: Not necessarily because such rule applies only to a decision of a court of justice, not TRB.
Cardinal Primary Rights in Administrative Proceedings

(Ang Tibay Case)
1. The right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and submit evidence in
support thereof;
2. The tribunal must consider the evidence presented;
3. The decision must have something to support itself;
4. The evidence on which the decision is based must be substantial;
5. The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in
the record disclosed to the parties affected;
6. The board or its judges must act on its or their own independent consideration of the law and the
fact of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of the subordinate in arriving at a
decision; and
7. The decision must be rendered in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the
various issues involved and the reason for the decision rendered.
The right to a hearing simply means the right to present evidence on his behalf and also the right
to know the allegations of the other party and the opportunity to controvert these findings
Padua vs. Ranada

390 SCRA 663
An administrative agency may be empowered to approve provisionally when demanded by

urgent public need rates of public utilities without a hearing, the reason being that provisional rates are by
their nature temporary and subject to adjustment in conformity with the definitive rates approved after
final hearing.
There is nothing irregular that the TRB resolution No. 2001 89 authorizing provisional toll rate
adjustments at the Metro Manila Skyway effective January 1, 2002 was signed by the TRB Executive
Directors and four TRB Directors, none of whom personally attended the hearing. An administrative
agency may employ other persons, such as a hearing officer, examiner or investigator, to receive
evidence, conduct hearing and make reports, on the basis of which the agency shall render its decision.

Note: There is no violation of due process where the investigation is conducted not by the officer duly
authorized to render a decision but one who is a subordinate of that duly authorized officer, because the
matter of conducting investigations may be delegated by the superior to a subordinate.
But there is a violation of due process where on the basis of a complaint, an ocular inspection is
conducted in the premises of the company which is subject of the complaint and on the basis of the ocular
inspection and interrogation of the witnesses – the laborers, the administrative agency makes a decision.
A decision based simply on ocular inspection and interrogation of laborers is not the decision
contemplated by law as to fall under the concept of observance of due process, because ocular inspection
is not the main trial. There is the requirement for the conduct of a formal investigation.
There is also a violation of due process where the public officer respondent is adjudged guilty of
an offense of which he was not charged.
Malinao vs. Reyes

55 SCRA 616
FACTS: Petitioner Virginia Malinao filed an administrative case against respondent Mayor Wilfredo Red
in the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Marinduque, charging him with abuse of authority and denial of due
process. (The Mayor filed a case against Malinao before the Ombudsman.) The Sanggunian found
respondent Mayor guilty of the charge and imposed on him the penalty of one-month suspension. The
decision however was signed only by one member of the Sanggunian who did so as “Presiding Chairman,
Blue Ribbon Committee, Sangguniang, Panlalawigan.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the decision is valid?
HELD: NO. In order to render a decision in administrative cases involving elective local officials, the
decision of the Sanggunian must be “in writing, stating clearly and distinctly the facts and the reasons for
such decision. Member Sotto admits that the draft decision he prepared had only his signature due to the
reluctance of some kagawad to affix their signatures. Consequently the draft never became a decision.
Notice and Hearing
When an administrative proceeding is quasi-judicial in character, a fair and open hearing is

essential to the validity of the proceeding. However, it is incorrect to say that this right is indispensable
for there are some cases when it can be validly omitted. It is not essential in all cases that a formal notice
and hearing be done so long as the requisites of due process are observed. The following are the instances
where notice and hearing in administrative proceedings are not required.
1.) The arrest of criminal offenders before the filing of charges against them;
2.) The distraint of property of delinquent taxpayers to prevent unlawful concealment of such
property. However, notice and hearing is necessary in case of sale of the property of a delinquent
payer.
3.) The granting of preliminary attachments ex parte;
4.) The issuance of preliminary injunction ex parte;
5.) The suspension of officers or employees pending an investigation;

In case of preventive suspension, no notice and hearing is necessary whereas in case of

suspension, notice and hearing is required.
6.) Removal of an acting employee;
7.) Cancellation of a passport where no abuse of discretion is committed by the Sec. of Foreign
Affairs (since this is a mere privilege)
8.) Grant of provisional authority for increased rates, or to engage in a particular line of business
9.) Summary abatement of nuisance per se which affects the immediate safety of persons or property.
In granting a franchise, there must be notice and hearing since this is an order which substantially
alters the rights of the parties under an existing line. The parties should be made to present their own
respective position.
However, if the order is merely to clarify matters or mere clerical errors, they may be made even
without notice and hearing since they do not alter or prejudice the rights, which have already accrued.
Time for Rendering Administrative Decisions
As a general rule, the law itself provides for the time frame within which the agency must
terminate and must issue a resolution. The period is only directory.
Administrative Appeals and Review
The right to appeal is not a natural right. It can only be exercised within the provisions of the law.
Unless otherwise provided by law or executive order, relief from administrative determination may be had
by filing a motion for reconsideration or by asking a review of the same by the superior authorities, whose
decision may further be brought to the regular courts of justice, in accordance with the procedure
specified by the law.
Q: Upon appeal of a decision, must there be trial de novo?
A: As a general rule, no trial de novo is necessary since the superior officer only reviews the decision of
the subordinate officer. The parties have already been afforded with formal hearing, although the superior
officer at his discretion may issue an order and may conduct a trial de novo.
Q: May the Executive Secretary, acting by the authority of the President, reverse a decision of the
Department Secretary, which had been appealed before the Office of the president?
A: The recognized rule is that under our constitutional set-up, the Executive Secretary who acts for, in
behalf and under the authority of the President has an undisputed jurisdiction to affirm, modify or even
reverse any order that a Department Secretary may issue. The assumed authority of the executive
secretary should be accepted for only the President can rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not
authorized to do so. Unless therefore, the action taken by the Executive Secretary is disapproved by the
President, it remains the act of the President and cannot be assailed.

Q: Supposing that a decision of the Department Secretary is appealed before the Office of the Executive
Secretary but the Assistant Executive Secretary reversed it. May the Department Secretary complain that
the reversal is invalid because he is of higher rank?
A: NO. The Assistant Executive Secretary has the power to reverse the decision appealed from since he is
acting under the authority of the President. In the same manner, it is only the President who could say that
his action is illegal or improper.
Q: Supposing that A appeals the decision of the Regional Director B and in the meantime the Department
Secretary resigned, so B was promoted to the latter’s position, is B’s decision on the review valid?
A: NO. It is essential that the reviewing officer must not be the same person who rendered the decision
sought to be reviewed. Otherwise, there is denial of due process. The proper thing to do is for B to inhibit
himself from the case and allow another person or subordinate officer to handle or decide the appealed
case.
Right against Self-Incrimination
The right against self-incrimination is available in all kinds of proceedings, whether civil,
criminal or administrative. But such right is available only to natural persons and not to a juridical person.
Thus, an administrative agency may require an organization (corporation, partnership or

association) to furnish it with records of books although these may incriminate such an organization. The
reason for the exclusion of juridical persons from the no self-incrimination rule is the need for
administrative bodies tasked by legislature to ensure the compliance with law and public policy.
Generally, when the law requires that certain records be kept, these records are withdrawn from the
protective mantle of the no self-incrimination clause (Shapiro doctrine).
Philosophy at work
“The only true knowledge is knowing that you know nothing.” - Socrates

EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES
The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies lays down the rule that where the law
provides for remedies against the action of an administrative board, body or officer, relief to the courts
against such action can be sought only after exhausting all the remedies provided for. This doctrine
applies only when there is a law authorizing the taking of a particular step or remedy. If there is no law
prescribing for this procedure, there is no need for exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus, judicial
relief may be immediately sought.
A case filed without first exhausting administrative remedies may be dismissed outright and the
court may refer the case to the appropriate administrative agency.
Failure to exhaust administrative remedies is not jurisdictional. A petition to exhaust

administrative remedies may affect the cause of action but not the jurisdiction of the court. The rule which
provides that administrative remedies must first be exhausted merely implies the absence of a cause of
action and does not affect the jurisdiction of the court either over the parties, if they have been summoned
properly, or over the subject matter of the case.
Before a party may be allowed to seek judicial recourse, he is required to resort to all
administrative remedies. Whenever there is an available administrative remedy provided by law, no
judicial recourse can be made until all such remedies have been availed of and exhausted.
3 reasons for the doctrine:
1. in order to give admin tribunal the opportunity to correct errors it may have committed in the
course of admin proceedings;
2. to prevent unnecessary resort to courts;
3. the principle of separation of powers which enjoins the judiciary from interfering in matters
falling within the primary competence of the administrative agencies.
Where the law requires a certain remedy, it must be complied with.

Ex. Petition for Certiorari – not allowed if no motion for reconsideration (MFR) first
The aggrieved party should not merely initiate the prescribed administrative procedures to obtain
relief but must make sure that the case is pursued until the total disposition of admin tribunal.
Doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies Doctrine of prima5ry jurisdiction

If a law provides for a remedy or relief against The court cannot and will not take cognizance
an administrative action, the court is not the of an action brought before it if such requires
proper body to decide on the matter until all the knowledge and expertise of an
administrative remedies has been exhausted. administrative agency.
Applies when the claim is originally cognizable Applies when the claim is within the
by an administrative tribunal concurrent jurisdiction of an administrative
tribunal and the courts
Both deals with the proper relationship between courts and administrative bodies.
Both principles do not apply where the issue involved is a pure question of law.

Delta Ventures v. Cabato

327 S 522
FACTS: There was a decision rendered by the Labor Arbiter which was subject of an alias writ of
execution. On the basis of that writ, the property of the respondent Mr. Ongpin in the labor case was
levied.
Petitioner, claiming ownership over the real property levied, filed with the RTC a complaint for
injunction and damages, with a prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order against the sheriff.
The labor Arbiter and PR-laborers were also impleaded as defendants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court may take cognizance of the complaint filed by petitioners and
consequently provide the injunctive relief sought.
HELD: NO. The action before the court was really in the nature of a labor case incident, which should
warrant the exhaustion of administrative remedies. In other words, since the relief that the party wants to
get from the court was in the nature of prohibition i.e. one to prohibit the sheriff from executing the
decision over the property likewise claimed by Deltaventures, the court should not act on the matter.
The body that has the authority to take cognizance of the same issue is the NLRC because this is
an incident arising from the labor case and where the law has provided a remedy, the aggrieved individual
must avail of such remedy.
Further, in denying petitioner’s petition for injunction, it is a time-honored principle that being a
co-equal body of the NLRC, the RTC has no jurisdiction to issue any restraining order or injunction to
enjoin the execution of any decision of the NLRC.
Note: There may be a waiver of the doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedy if there is no timely
objection of failure to comply w/ such exhaustion
Sec. 187 of the LGC provides for remedy of a party who questions the validity of local tax measure
Within 30 days – appeal to Secretary of Justice (secretary must decide w/in 60 days)
Applying the doctrine of exhaustion of admin remedies, the direct filing of the complaint before a court
is not proper.
Q: But suppose the provision of law only gives discretion on the admin officer to exercise a function or
not such as to review a case (such as that provided before in the Local Tax Code), should the doctrine
necessarily be applied?
A: No need to apply the doctrine because it imposes no obligation on such officer.

Aurillo vs. Rabi

392 SCRA 604
When Regional State Prosecutor (RSP) Aurillo motu proprio took over the preliminary
investigation of IS No 95-043 after the same had already been dismissed by the city prosecutor and
ordered the assistant regional state prosecutor to conduct a preliminary investigation of the case, he
exercised not only administrative supervision but control over the city prosecutor. By doing so, Aurillo
nullified the resolution of the inquest prosecutor as approved by the city prosecutor and deprived Rabi as
the aggrieved party in IS 95-013 of his right to file a motion for reconsideration and said motion were
denied to appeal to the Secretary of Justice. The office of the RSP, does not conduct any preliminary
investigation or prosecute any criminal case in court at all. The bulk of his work consists of administrative
supervision over city and provincial fiscals and their assistants.
As to whether Rabis’ petition w/ the RTC was premature for failure to exhaust admin remedies, the
instant case false w/in the exception because Rabi did not have adequate time to seek redress from the
Sec. of Justice whose offices are located in Manila while he was in Tacloban City.
Corsiga v. Defensor
391 S 274
FACTS: PR Romeo Ortizo was the Senior Engineer B in the National Irrigation Administration (NIA) in
a certain irrigation system in Region VI. Petitioner Eduardo Corsiga, then Regional Irrigation Manager of
NIA Reg. VI, issued an order reassigning PR Ortiza to another station..
Aggrieved, PR requested exemption from the policy of rotation because such policy does not
apply to him. Petitioner denied the request. PR filed a compliant w/ the RTC for prohibition and
injunction.
ISSUE: Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the case?
HELD: No, it is the CSC that has jurisdiction over personal actions by all govt. employees w/ original
charter such as the NIA.
Hence, PR’s action is premature and he has no cause of action to ventilate in court. He failed to
exhaust administrative remedies. The instant case is not one of the exceptions for the exhaustion of
remedies because there are still certain facts to be settled in admin bodies and the case does not involve
pure question of law.
Note: Personnel actions – (Civil Service Commission) CSC has jurisdiction
As to cases falling within the jurisdiction of the CSC, the following steps should be followed:
Decisions of lower level officials → Agency head → CSC → CA

Laguna CATV Network V. Maraan

392 S 221
FACTS: PRs filed w/ the DOLE Region IV separate complaints for underpayment of wages & non
payment of other employee benefits pursuant to Art. 128 of the labor Code.
DOLE Region IV conducted an inspection & found that petitioner violated the laws on payment
of wages & other benefits. DOLE requested petitioner to correct its violations but the latter refused.
Regional Director (RD) Alex Maraan ordered the sheriff to collect in cash from petitioner the
amount specified in the writ of execution or to attach its goods & chattels after petitioner failed to pay the
employees. The sheriff subsequently levied on Doctor Bailon’s (of Laguna) L300 Van & garnished his
bank deposits.
Petitioner filed MFR but was denied. Petitioner then, instead of appealing to the Sec. of labor,
filed appeal w/ the CA because accordingly, an appeal to the Sec. of labor would be an exercise in futility
considering that the said appeal will be filed w/ the Regional Office & it will surely be disapproved
.
CA denied petitioner’s motion stating that it failed to exhaust admin remedies.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner failed to exhaust admin remedies?
HELD: Yes, Art. 128 of the labor code provides that an order issued by the duly authorized representative
of the Sec. of Labor may be appealed to the latter. Thus, petitioner should have first appealed to the Sec.
of Labor instead of filing w/ the CA a motion for extension of time to file a petitioner for review.
The instant ease also does not fall under any of the exceptions of the rule on exhaustion of admin
remedies.
Exceptions to the Doctrine of Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
1. When the issue is purely legal
It is only the court which has the power to rule with finality such legal issue. If the petition stated
that the decision of the administrative officer is contrary to law and jurisprudence, then what is being
raised here is purely a question of law and this is not within the competence of the administrative officer.
The question of whether respondent’s transfer to the position of Regional Director of the Public
Attorney’s Office, which was made without her consent, amounts to a removal without cause is a legal
issue (Dimaisip vs. Bacal GR 139382, 6 December 2000);
The issue of whether or not the decision of the Sangguniang Panlungsod in disciplinary cases is
appealable to the Office of the President, as well as the propriety of taking an oath of office anew by
respondent Barangay Captain Laxina, are questions of law. (Mendoza v. Laxina 406 SCRA 156)
NAPOCOR v. Province of Misamis

FACTS: An action was filed by the province against NAPOCOR for the collection of delinquent real
property taxes pursuant to PD 464 or Real Property Tax Code. NAPOCOR filed a motion to dismiss
alleging that PD 242 should apply – prescribes administrative settlement instead.
HELD: Here, the issue is clearly a legal one i.e. which law applies. Thus, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies does not apply in the case.
In Castro vs. Gloria (363 SCRA 423), the Court ruled that the issue of whether or not
petitioner’s dismissal from the service is the proper penalty for the first offense of disgraceful and
immoral conduct is a pure question of law. Hence, the doctrine may be dispensed with and judicial action
may be immediately resorted to by petitioner.
2. The Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency
This doctrine means that when the respondent is a department secretary who acts as an alter ego
of the President, it bears the implied or assumed approval of the latter. Under this doctrine, the acts of the
Department Secretary acting as agents or alter egos of the President are considered the acts of the
President himself unless the President has disapproved the official act made by the Department Secretary
or when the president is required to act personally on the matter.
Dimaisip vs. CA
FACTS: There was an order by the Director in favor of Dimaisip awarding to him a fishpond. But on
appeal to the Department Secretary, the decision of the Director was a set aside and the Secretary awarded
the fishpond in favor of Buenaflor.
Dimaisip filed an action not before the administrative agency, not before the office of the
President, but before the court. So, the issue is whether or not this was valid.
ISSUE: Whether or not Dimaisip’s resort to the court is valid?
HELD: The SC ruled that this is an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies
because the decision was one made by the Department Secretary who is an alter ego of the President.
Note: In Calo v. Fuentes, the SC made a reversal of its earlier decision in Dimaisip v. CA.
Calo vs. Fuentes
FACTS: The Director of Lands and Dept. Sec awarded homestead application to Fuentes. Calo initially
filed an appeal before the Office of the President. But even before the Office of the President could act on
the matter, he withdrew such appeal.
HELD: The withdrawal of such an appeal before the Office of the President was fatal because it was the
last act required of him in compliance with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
But in many other cases decided by the SC, it went back to its earlier ruling such as that in the case of:

Quisumbing v. Gumban
193 S 523
FACTS: DECS Secretary Quisumbing transferred Mrs. Yap to South Cotabato. The order was contested
not before the Office of the Secretary but before the sala of Judge Gumban. Department Secretary filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that there should be exhaustion.
HELD: The court ruled that there was no need for exhaustion of administrative remedies because the act
complained of was one made by the Department Secretary as the alter ego of the President.
How to reconcile these contradictory rulings:
A: The first basis is to look the provisions of the law i.e., where the law itself prescribes remedy, then,
there must be compliance with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies. But if the law is
silent – there is no such provision requiring exhaustion – there is no need to exhaust administrative
remedies.
Example: Under PD 1281, the matter of the conflicting mining claims is now within the
competence of the Bureau of Mines. The matter of resolving conflicting mining claims is now purely
administrative. Thus, under PD 1281, the authority which has the say on the matter is the Director of
Bureau of Mines. But his decision is appealable to the Department Secretary of Natural Resources and
from the decision of the DENR Secretary, if the party is still aggrieved, the same may be elevated to the
Office of the President.
So, there is in this case the need to comply with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative
remedies. The doctrine of qualified political agency does not apply here because there is a provision in the
law requiring that an appeal be taken from the decision of the Department Secretary to the President
within a period of 5 days. The law itself even provides that the decision of the president on the matter of
conflicting claims is final and executory.
Of course, it does not mean that the party has no remedy. Even if the provision of law makes the
decision of the Office of the President final and executory but the same has been made in abuse of
authority, then it can be the subject of judicial review.
3. Where the action of the administrative officer is clearly devoid of authority or is patently illegal.
We know that in the conduct of administrative investigation, there must be observance of
procedural due process. One requirement is the need for the service of summons. Supposing there was no
service of summons and the decision was rendered and this was the subject of a case filed before the
court.
Q: Is there still need to comply with the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies?
A: NO, because the action here of the administrative officer is clearly and obviously devoid of any
authority, patently illegal, contrary to law.
4. When the administrative body is in estoppel.

If in the course of the proceeding before the administrative agency there is representation made
by the administrative officer that it is only an action before the court that can resolve the issue and on the
basis of this declaration, such court action was taken, the administrative agency is already in estoppel to
state that the matter ought to be decided within the administrative level.
5. Where the application of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies will only cause
grave and irreparable damage or injury to any of the parties.
6. Where the doctrine does not provide for a plain, speedy and adequate remedy.
7. If further pendency of the case for the administrative agency will only delay the proceedings and
thus you are deprived of your right to file an action before the court.
8. The doctrine, of exhaustion of administrative remedies applies only as to public lands.
It does not apply where the subject of controversy involves a private property. In such situation,
the body that has the power to take cognizance of the matter is the regular court.
9. If the exhaustion of administrative remedies will only result in the denial of due process.
Llorena v. Lacson
May 30, 1960
FACTS: A laborer was dismissed by the mayor because of the loss of a piano. The law requires that the
action must be taken before the Office of the President. Laborer did not comply with this requirement,
saying that since he is uneducated (barely reached the 4 th grade), he is exempted.
HELD: lack of education is not a defense. There must still be compliance with the doctrine of exhaustion
of administrative remedies.
Sabello v. DECS
Dec. 26, 1989
FACTS: School Principal Sabello was found guilty in a criminal case. He was reinstated because there
was an absolute pardon given to him. But he was reinstated as a mere classroom teacher. He did not file
his appeal with the DECS, but went directly to the court. Saying poverty denied him the services of the
lawyer.
HELD: The case was allowed to continue. The rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies and the
application of the exceptions is not a fast and rigid rule.
In the case of Sabello, the Court granted the petition of the petitioner. Sabello claimed that
poverty denied him the services of a lawyer. On that basis, the Court set aside this requirement of

exhaustion of administrative remedies and looked into the merits of the case and so, he was reinstated to
the position of school principal.
In this situation, where the interest of justice requires, the Court rules that there was no need to
exhaust administrative remedies because poverty deprived the petitioner access to lawyers.
Doctrine of Qualified Political Agency or Alter Ego Doctrine
In the absence of a constitutional provision or a statute to the contrary, the official acts of a
department secretary are deemed acts of the President himself unless disapproved by the latter
The power of the DILG to investigate administrative complaints is based on the alter-ego
principle or the doctrine of qualified political agency (Joson vs. Torres, 290 SCRA 281). Under this
doctrine, which recognizes the establishment of a single executive, “all executive and administrative
organizations are adjusts of the Executive Department and the heads of the various executive departments
are assistants and agents of the Chief Executive.”
Except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law to act in person,
or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally the multifarious executive and
administrative departments, and the acts of the Secretary of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless, disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive (Fortich vs. Corona. 298 SCRA 705).
Province of Camarines Norte vs. Province of Quezon

367 SCRA 91
The claim of respondents (Quezon Prov. Gov. Rodriguez and Calaug Mayor Lim) that the DENR
technical team conducted the survey (to make a delineation of the boundary separating the Provinces is
baseless. The authority of the team emanated from the Special Order No. 1179 duly issued by the DENR
Secretary, the alter ego of the President. Being an alter ego, the acts of the DENR Secretary are presumed
to be the acts of the President unless expressly repudiated by the latter. The DENR team was precisely
created to comply with the SC Decision to conduct the survey.
Philosophy at work
“Roll Sisyphus! Roll!” – Albert Camus

ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL AND REVIEW
When provided by law, appeal from an administrative determination may be made to a higher or
superior administrative officer or body. (Basis: Power of Control).
Power of Control Power of Supervision

Power of the president over the executive The power of the president over administrative
branch of government, including all executive disciplinary cases against elective local
officers from cabinet secretary to the lowliest officials is derived from his power of general
clerk supervision over local government.
It is the power of the president to alter or The power of insuring that laws are faithfully
modify or nullify or set aside what a executed, or that the subordinate officers act
subordinate officer had done in the within the bounds of the law.
performance of his duties and to substitute the
judgment of the former with that of the latter
Includes the power of supervision
Supervision is not incompatible with discipline which must be construed to authorize the President to
order an investigation of the act or conduct of local officials (Joson vs. Torres, 290 SCRA281)
The power to discipline evidently includes the power to investigate. As the Disciplining Authority, the
president has the power derived from the Constitution itself to investigate complaints against local
elective officials.
AO 23, however, delegates the power to investigate to the DILG or a special investigation Committee as
may be constituted by the Disciplining Authority. This is not undue delegation as what is delegated by the
President is the power to investigate not the power to discipline.
Hence, jurisdiction over administrative disciplinary cases against elective local officials is lodged in two
authorities:
- The disciplining authority (the president) and

- The investigating authority (the DILG Secretary, who may act by himself or constitute an
investigating committee.
- In lieu of the DILG Secretary, the disciplining authority may designate a special
investigating committee.
The Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, may reverse a Decision of the Director that
had been affirmed by the Department Secretary
The argument that the Executive Secretary is equal in rank with other department heads is incorrect for he
acts by “authority of the President.”
His decision should thus be given full faith and credit by the courts His assumed authority should be
accepted for only the President can rightfully say that he is not authorized to do so.

Review of Administrative Decisions by the Courts
Review by Administrative Agencies Review by the Courts

The superior administrative official is Since the authority of the court is simply to
authorized, in the exercise of his discretion, to find out whether there is substantial evidence in
receive additional evidence support of the conclusion reached by the
administrative officer, its power to review is
limited only to all the evidence already
submitted by the parties.
It cannot be compelled by the parties for them
to submit new evidence, precisely because its
role is not to determine conflicting claims
which a power is given to the administrative
body.
It is within the prerogative of the superior The role of the court is simply to find out
admin officer to order the conduct of a new whether the evidence supports the decision –
hearing or trial de novo. In the exercise of his whether or not there is substantial evidence to
discretion, and even the admission of new support the finding made by the administrative
evidence. officer.
Findings of facts of administrative bodies are as a rule not subject to judicial review and must be accorded
not only utmost respect but even finality as long as such decisions are confined to matters within their
respective jurisdiction and are supported by substantial evidence (San Sebastian College vs. CA, 197
SCRA 139; labor Congress of the Philippines vs. NLRC, 29 SCRA 469).
Philsa International Placement & Services Corp. vs. Labor Secretary

356 SCRA 174
Findings of the POEA regarding alleged contract substitution constitute question of fact which
may not be disturbed if supported by substantial evidence.
Cosep v. NLRC
290 S 705
But if there is a misappreciation of facts by the quasi-judicial agency like the NLRC, thereby
impairing petitioner’s right to security of tenure, or where the factual findings lack support, the Court is
compelled to deviate from this well established rule. Even decisions of Administrative agencies which are
declared “final” by law are not exempt from the judicial review when so warranted.
Malonzo vs. COMELEC

269 SCRA 295
In cases filed before administrative and quasi-judicial bodies, a fact may be deemed established if
it is supported by substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind
might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.

Neugene Marketing v. CA
303 SCRA 295
The rule that the appellate court will not generally disturb the factual findings of the trial court
does not apply where the Securities and Exchange Commission overlooked certain facts of substance and
value which if considered would affect the result of the case.
Oarde vs. CA
280 SCRA 235
Certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a tenant are
merely provisional and not conclusive on the courts.
Bautista vs. Araneta

326 SCRA 234
FACTS: Bautista claimed he is a tenant, but the owner of the land – Araneta, denies it. DARAB ruled that
he is a tenant. This was reversed by the CA.
HELD: CA can reverse DARAB’s finding that he is a tenant.

The Supreme Court rejected petitioner’s claim that he is a tenant by virtue of the factual finding of the
DARAB considering that DARAB mainly relied on the certifications issued in favor of petitioner in
holding that he is a tenant of the disputed landholding.
Certifications issued by administrative agencies or officers that a certain person is a tenant are merely
provisional and not conclusive on courts. The SC court is not necessarily bound by these findings
especially if they are conclusions that are not supported by substantial evidence.
Note: Tenancy is not purely a factual relationship dependent on what the alleged tenant does upon the
land. It is also a legal relationship that can only be created with the consent of the true and lawful
landholder.
Questions which may be subject of judicial review:
1. Questions of Law involves the constitutionality of law, treaty, ordinance or administrative order.
a. jurisdiction of the administrative agency
b. there is an error committed by the administrative officer
2. Question of Fact
General Rule: Factual findings of administrative bodies are accorded respect, if not finality.
Exceptions, if:
a. The decision is not supported by substantial evidence.
b. The findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion.
c. The procedure is irregular.
d. Palpable or serious errors have been committed.
e. When grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest.

f. The law explicitly authorizes review of factual matters.

g. There is conflict in the factual findings not only at the Ombudsman level, but even at the
appellate court.
3. Mixed Questions of Law and Fact (Brandeis Doctrine of Assimilation of Facts)

This doctrine lays down the rule that when a finding of fact is so intimately involved and
dependent upon the question of law, the court will, in order to resolve the question of law, examine the
factual setting including the evidence adduced thereto. (Findings of facts are necessary in order to
determine the findings of law).
Fabian v. Agustin
Feb. 14, 2003
The Ombudsman Investigation Officer found DPWH District Engineer Agustin guilty of grave
misconduct as well as irregular or immoral conduct and recommended his dismissal from the service,
which finding was approved by Ombudsman Desierto with modification that the offense is only
misconduct and that the penalty is suspension from office for one year without pay. Eventually, Deputy
Ombudsman Guerrero dismissed the complaint for insufficiency of evidence imposing the one-year
suspension. Later, the CA rendered an amended Decision this time affirming the Guerrero dismissal of the
case.
Such conflict in the factual findings compels the Supreme Court to deviate from the general rule
and review the evidence. In this case, the Court reversed the CA amended Decision and ordered
respondent’s dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits and with prejudice to his
reemployment in the government.
All errors or decisions of administrative bodies involving questions of law are subject to judicial review
consistent with Sec. 5(2-e), art. VIII, 1987 Constitution which provides that: “All cases in which only an
error or question of law is involved.”
Appeal by Certiorari Special Civil Action for Certiorari (Rule 65)

(Rule 45)
Only questions of law may be raised The only question that may be raised is whether or not the
(Sec 1, Rule 43) respondent (tribunal or officer exercising judicial function)
has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion.
The parties are : The petitioner is the aggrieved party and the respondent is
The appellant as petitioner and the the tribunal or officer exercising judicial function who is
appellee as respondent alleged to have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction
or with grave abuse of discretion.
Filed before CA; within 15 days The party benefited by the act complained of is included
as respondent.

Questions of Law Questions of Facts

If the facts are established or admitted, their legal A question of fact arises when there is a conflict in
effect is a question of law for the court to testimony. The question must be resolved by the
determine court. No question of fact exists if only one
conclusion is possible from the facts established
There is a question of law in a given case when There is a question of fact when the doubt or
the doubt or difference arises as to what the law difference arises as to the truth or the falsehood of
is on a certain state of facts. alleged facts.
Tuazon vs. CA
118 SCRA 4464
In Brandeis Doctrine of Assimilation of Facts, the more important issue, which is law, assimilates
the facts. Thus, questions of facts and of law are subject to judicial review. For instance the issue of
tenancy involves legal questions as tenancy is not a purely factual relationship dependent on what the
alleged tenants do upon the land but it is also a legal relationship.
Sanado vs.CA
356 SCRA 546
If a party disagrees with the decisions of the Office of the President, he should elevate the matter
by petition for review before the Court of Appeals for the latter’s exercise of the power of juridical
review. (Rule 43).
Matuguina Integrated Wood Products (MIWP) v.

263 SCRA 508
The issue of whether or not petitioner MIWP is an alter ego of Milagros Matuguina, the losing
party – respondent in the MNR case is one of fact, and which should have been threshed out in said
administrative proceedings, and not in the prohibition proceedings in the trial court, where it is precisely
the failure of the respondent Minister of Natural Resources to proceed as mandated by law in the
execution of its order which is under security.
Republic vs. Imperial

303 SCRA 127
The classification of public lands is a function of the executive branch, especially the Director of
lands, (now the Director of the Lands Management Bureau) and the decision of the director of lands when
approved by the DENR Secretary as to questions of fact is conclusive and not subject to review by the
court in the absence of any showing that such decision of findings is tainted with fraud or mistake (In Re:
Petition seeking for Clarification as to the Validity and Forceful Effect of Two Final and Executory but
Conflicting Decisions of the SC, 321 SCRA 62.)

Bureau of Patents: where there is a question as to whether or not such a trade name causes confusion, or
similar to a prior registered trade name or trademark, such issue is one belonging to the courts.
Bureau of Immigration : it is within its jurisdiction:

- to exclude an alien on the ground that he is not a Filipino citizen
- whether or not a person is authorized to reside or is an immigrant or an alien.
If the issue of citizenship is put into issue, then it is within the power of the court to order the
administrative agency to defer action on the matter in order for the court to look into the issue of
citizenship. The issue of citizenship is one within the exclusive authority of the court and not of the
administrative agency.
COA: (PD 1445) the findings made by the auditor on the matter of claims or settlement of accounts may
be the subject of an appeal to the COA within a period of six 6 months from the findings made by the
auditor. And from the decision of the COA, the same may be the subject of judicial review within a period
of 30 days as mandated by PD 1445.
CRIMINAL AND CIVIL IMMUNITIES
General Rule: Administrative bodies are not allowed to grant criminal and civil immunities to persons.
Exceptions: where the law itself authorizes the grant of such immunity to the individual.
1) Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) pursuant to Sec 5, E.O. 14 as

amended by E.O. 14-A. The PCGG has the power to grant criminal, civil and
administrative immunity to persons who testify on the matter of alleged acquisition of ill-
gotten wealth by associates of the Marcoses; and the
2) Office of the Ombudsman, pursuant to Section 17 of RA 6770, may grant immunity from
criminal prosecution to any person whose testimony or possession and production of
documents and evidence may be necessary in any proceeding or hearing being conducted
by the Office of the Omsbudman.
THREE-FOLD RESPONSIBILITY OF PUBLIC OFFICERS AND EMPOYEES
A basic principle of the law on public officers is that a public official or employee is under a
three-fold responsibility for violation of duty or for a wrongful act or omission – a public officer may be
held civilly, criminally and administratively liable for a wrongful doing (Tecson vs. Sandiganbayan, 318
SCRA 80).
A criminal prosecution will not constitute a prejudicial question even if the same facts and
circumstances are attendant in the administrative proceedings. A finding of guilt in the criminal case will
not necessarily result in a finding of liability in the administrative case. Neither would the results in one
conclude the other. (Gatahalian Promotions Talents Pool vs. Naldoza, 315 SCRA 406).

Thus, an absolution from a criminal charge is not a bar to an administrative prosecution or vice
versa. The court in dismissing the criminal complaint was simply saying that the prosecution was unable
to prove the guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt. The absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt
does not mean an absence of any evidence whatsoever for there is another class of evidence which,
though insufficient to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt, is adequate in administrative cases; the
substantial evidence rule in administrative proceedings merely requires such relevant evidence that a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion (Ocampo vs. Ombudsman, 322 SCRA
22).
Administrative offenses do not prescribe (Floria vs. Sunga, 368 SCRA 551). (Prescriptive period
for criminal case is 15 years, while administrative case is imprescriptible; Sec 20 of the Ombudsman Act
provides that no investigation is needed – this is merely directive)
The withdrawal of a complaint or the desistance of a complainant does not necessarily warrant
the dismissal of an administrative complaint (Guro vs. Duronio, 397 SCRA 1).
In instances, however, where an administrative case cannot proceed without the active
cooperation of the complainant, the Supreme Court may find itself with hardly any alternatives but to
dismiss the complaint. (Dagsa-an vs. Conag, 290 SCRA 12).
An administrative complaint against public officers cannot just be withdrawn at any time by the
simple expediency of the complainant suddenly claiming a change of mind (Nones vs. Ormita, 390 SCRA
320).
An affidavit of desistance will not automatically result to the dismissal of an administrative case
or to the exoneration of respondent. This is because the complainant is merely a witness in an
administrative case. It cannot, by his own desistance, divest the court of its jurisdiction for the court has
an interest apart from complainant’s own in determining the truth and, when necessary imposing
sanctions against erring court employees (Jacob vs. Tambo, 369 SCRA 148).
While a reelected official may no longer be held administratively liable for signing a questionable
contract before his reelection, this will not prejudice the filing of any case other than administrative case
against him (Garcia vs. Mojica, 314 SCRA 207).
LOYAO, JR vs. CAUBE

A.M. No, P-02-1599. April 30, 2003
FACTS: Clerk of Court Caube issued summons to plaintiffs although there was no case pending against
them. Caube called them so that they could forge an amicable settlement with their creditors. Caube was
dismissed. Pending appeal he died.
HELD: The death or retirement of any judicial officer from the service does not preclude the finding of
any administrative liability of which he shall still be answerable.
SC: This jurisdiction that was ours at the time of the filing of the administrative complaint was not lost by
the mere fact that the respondent public official had ceased in office during the pendency of the case. The
Court retains its jurisdiction either to pronounce the respondent public official innocent of the charges or

declare him guilty thereof. A contrary rule would be fraught with injustice with dreadful and dangerous
implications…If innocent, respondent public official merits vindication of his name and integrity as he
leaves the government which he has served well and faithfully; if guilty, he deserves to receive the
corresponding censure and a penalty proper and impossible under the situation.
To be sure, respondent Caube’s death has permanently foreclosed the prosecution of any other
actions, be it criminal or civil, against him for his malfeasance in office. We are, however, not precluded
from imposing the appropriate administrative sanctions against him.
DOCTRINE OF FORGIVENESS AND CONDONATION
Under this doctrine, public officials cannot be subject to disciplinary action for administrative
misconduct committed during a prior term.
The doctrine is not only founded on the theory that an official’s re-election expresses the
sovereign will of the electorate to forgive, or condone any act or omission constituting a ground for
administrative discipline which was committed during his previous term, but also dictated by public
policy, otherwise his second term may just be devoted to defending himself in the said cases to the
detriment of public service. The doctrine cannot however apply to criminal acts which the reelected
official may have committed during his previous term.
Aguinaldo v. Santos
212 SCRA 768
FACTS: DILG Secretary Santos filed an administrative case against Governor Aguinaldo for disloyalty to
the republic. The penalty of such is dismissal. Pending the administrative case, he ran for the same
elective position and got elected as governor.
HELD: Applying the doctrine of forgiveness and condonation, Gov. Aguinaldo could not be held
administratively liable for a prior act committed.
Why? It is because the previous term is distinct from the succeeding term. Where no sanction was meted
for an act during a previous term, definitely, no sanction should be allowed for such act committed during
a previous term in a subsequent term of office.
Who may appeal?
Paredes vs. CSC

192 SCRA 84
Civil Service law “does not contemplate a review of decisions exonerating officers or employees
from administrative charges.
Section 39(a), in relation to Section 37 (a) of PD 807 which provides that ‘Appeals, where allowable,
shall be made by the party adversely affected by the decision “x x x “ was interpreted by the Court: “The
phrase ‘party adversely affected by the decision’ refers to the government employee against whom the
administrative case is filed for the purpose of disciplinary action which may take the form of suspension
(of more than 30 days, demotion in rank or salary, transfer, removal or dismissal from office.

Parenthetically, the Philippine Civil service law does not allow the complainant to appeal a decision
exonerating or absolving a civil service employee.
Note: In CSC v. Dacoycoy (306 S 426), the govt. agency which may be prejudiced by the decision, may
appeal. By this ruling, the SC expressly abandoned and overruled prior decisions holding that the Civil
Service Law “does not contemplate a review decisions exonerating officers or employees from
administrative charges” enunciated in Paredes v. CSC.
Sec 39 & 37 of CSL: penalty of suspension for less than 30 days; or more fine of less than 1
month salary; or reprimand – is final and executory.
RES JUDICATA IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASES
Decisions and orders of administrative agencies have, upon their finality, the force and binding
effect of a final judgment within the purview of the res judicata doctrine. The rule of res juidcata thus
forbids the reopening of a matter once determined by competent authority acting within their exclusive
jurisdiction.
Once an issue has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a competent court, it can no
longer be controverted anew and should be finally laid to rest.
Exception to the doctrine of res judicata:
1. Where the are supervening events which make it imperative, in the higher interest of justice, to
modify a final judgment to harmonize it with prevailing circumstances (Teodoro vs. Carague, 206
SCRA 4290.
2. Where the applicability of the doctrine would involve the sacrifice of justice to technicality (De
Leon vs.CA), as when it would amount to a denial of justice or a bar for a vindication of a
legitimate grievance (Suarez vs. CA, 194 SCRA 183);
3. Where the parties involve have waived it or do not timely raise it as a defense (Teodoro vs.
Carague).
4. The doctrine of res judicata does not apply to question of citizenship (Labo vs. COMELEC).
BID vs. dela Rosa

197 SCRA 855
Every time the citizenship of a person is material or indispensable in a judicial or administrative

case, whatever the court or administrative authority decides as to such citizenship is generally not
considered as res judicata, hence, it has to be threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand.

The doctrine of res judicata applies only to judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings, not to the
exercise of administrative powers. The doctrine embraces two concepts:
1. bar by prior judgment par. (b) of Rule 39, Sec. 47; and
2. conclusiveness of judgment under par. (c) thereof
Ocho vs. Calos

345 SCRA 488
FACTS: Calos’ land was subjected to CARP. His property was distributed through Operation Land
Transfer (OLT). Calos questioned the qualifications of beneficiaries. PARAD ruled that the land be
returned to Calos since the beneficiaries are already landowners. DARAB reversed PARAD. CA held that
Polinar (one of the beneficiaries) is disqualified since he already owns land.
HELD: Res judicata applie. Thus, DARAB’s decision that Polinar does not own land is final and
conclusive on the Courts.
Conclusiveness of judgment bars the re-litigation of particular facts or issues in another litigation
between the same parties on a different claim or causes of action.
Thus, the decision of the DAR hearing officer in admin case 006-90, which had long attained
finality, that petitioner Ocho is not the owner of other agricultural lands, foreclosed any inquiry on the
same issue involving the same parties and property.
Although the action instituted by the Calos in Adm Case 006-90 (Anomalies in OLT Transfer
Action) is different from the action in Adm case X-014 (Annulment of Deeds of Assignment,
Emancipation Patents and TCT’s, retention and Recovery of Possession and Ownership), the concept of
conclusiveness of judgment still applies because the identity of causes of action is not required but merely
identity of issues.
In other words, it does not matter that the issues are different. The issue here (DAR) is one of
cancellation of title and recovery of possession and ownership, whereas, the issue in the CA pertains to
whether or not this person is the owner of another agricultural land. But nonetheless, since the facts are
the same, the issues are related, even if the causes are different; the doctrine of res judicata still applies.
Montemayor vs. Bundalian

405 SCRA 265
The decision of the Ombudsman does not operate as res judicata in the case before the
Presidential Commission Against Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) subject of the review. The doctrine of
res judicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings, not on the exercise of administrative
powers.

Petitioner DPWH Regional Director Montemayor was investigated by the Ombudsman for his
possible criminal liability for the acquisition of the Burbank property in violation of RA 3019. For the
same alleged misconduct, petitioner, as a presidential appointee, was investigated by the PCAGC by
virtue of the administrative power and control of the President over him. As the PCAGC investigation of
petitioner was administrative in nature, the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in this case.
Philosophy at work
“A man who dies before he dies, does not die when he dies.” - Martin Heidegger

ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICES
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE (PNP)
Section 6, Art. XVI of the 1987 Constitution provides: The state shall establish and maintain one
police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in character to be administered and controlled
by a National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM). The authority of local executives shall be provided by
law.
The authority of local executives over the elements of the PNP shall be provided by law. Thus,
you have RA 6975 as amended by RA 8851
Manalo v. Sistoza
August 11, 1999
FACTS: Pres. Aquino appointed respondents to PNP Superintendents and Directors without the approval
of the Commission on Appointments. RA 6976 mandates that CA confirmation is needed. Manalo argued
that PNP is akin to AFP where appointment to colonel and naval captain requires confirmation.
HELD: CA confirmation is not needed
The Philippine National Police is separate and distinct from the Armed Forces of the Philippines.
The Constitution, no less, sets forth the distinction. Under Section 4 of Article XVI of the 1987
Constitution:
“The Armed Forces of the Philippines shall be composed of a citizen armed force which shall undergo
military training and service, as may be provided by law. It shall keep a regular force necessary for the
security of the State.”
On the other hand, Section 6 of the same article of the Constitution ordains that:
“The state shall establish and maintain one police force, which shall be national in scope and civilian in
character to be administered and controlled by a national police commission. The authority of local
executives over the police units in their jurisdiction shall be provided by law.”
To distinguish the police force from the armed force, congress enacted republic act 6976 which states in
part:
Section 2. Declaration of policy – it is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to promote peace and
order, ensure public safety and further strengthen local government capability aimed towards the effective
delivery of the basic services to the citizens through the establishment of a highly efficient and competent
police force that is national in scope and civilian in character.
The police force shall be organized, trained and equipped primarily for the performance of police
functions. Its national scope and civilian character shall be paramount. No element of the police force

shall be military nor shall any position thereof be occupied by active members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines.
Thereunder, the police force is different from and independent of the armed forces and the ranks
in the military are not similar to those in the Philippine National Police. Thus, directors and chief
superintendent of the PNP, such as the herein respondent police officers, do not fall under the first
category of presidential appointees requiring the confirmation by the Commission on Appointments.
Important Provisions of RA 69775 (DILG Act of 1990)
Section 8. No retired or resigned military officer or police official shall be appointed within one 1 year
from the time of his resignation or retirement. In other words, the prohibition is only for a period of 1
year from his separation from the military or police service. Thereafter, the President is empowered to
appoint such retired or resigned military officer or police official.
Section 12 = defines the relationship between the DILG and the Department of national Defense.
The primary role of the Department of National Defense through the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP) is to secure and preserve the external security of the State. In other words, the AFP has the primary,
the principal role of preserving external security.
Under the DILG are several offices, bureaus, i.e. PNP, the National Police Commission (which
exercises administrative control and supervision over the PNP), Bureau of Jail and Management.
What is the role of DILG through the PNP?
- it has the primary role of preserving the internal security of the State.
- But where there are serious threats, through the national security of the state and in the interest of
public order, the President may upon the recommendation of the Peace and Order Council, may
call upon the Armed Forces to reassume the primary responsibility of preserving not only the
external but also the internal security of the state.
Section 39 = compulsory retirement of officers and non-officers upon reaching the age of 56 years.
In case an officer with the rank of Chief Superintendent, Director or the Deputy Director General,
the National Police Commission may allow his retention in the service for an unextendible period of one
year.
Positions Covered: Director General, the Deputy Director General, the Chief of the PNP, the Director, and
down the line is the Chief Superintendent.
Section 45 = citizen’s complaints.

Authorizes the filing by the private individual of a complaint against a member of the PNP;
1. offense calls for a penalty punishable by a fine 0f 5-day salary or suspension, the citizen’s
complaint shall be filed before the Chief of Police.
2. where the penalty is not more than 30 days suspension, the complaint may be filed before the
mayor;
3. where the penalty is more than that period of suspension – more than a one month of suspension
as penalty or even dismissal from the service, a citizen may file a such administrative complaint
before the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB).
There is created a PLEB in every municipality, city or legislative district – composed of:
1. a member of the Sanggunian

2. Barangay Captain; and
3. Impeccable citizens of the place (known for probity and independence)
The membership in the PLEB is a civic duty. This is one instance where an officer aware of a private
individual may be called upon to render public service, to membership in the People’s Law Enforcement
Board.
Section 45 = disciplinary action imposed by the PNP Regional Director or the PLEB involving demotion
or dismissal from the service, may be appealable to the Regional Appellate Board. (RAB).
Decision of the PLEB is final unless the penalty is demotion or dismissal from service. It will be
appealed within 10 days from receipt of decision to:
a. Regional Appellate Board (RAB) = cases taken cognizance of by the Regional Director or the
PLEB;
b. National Appellate Board (NAB) = cases taken cognizance of by the Chief of the PNP
RAB is given a period of 60 days to decide on such an appeal.

If no such decision is made on such appeal by the RAB, then it means that the decision appealed from has
become final and executory but subject to the right by the aggrieved individual to appeal to the DILG
Secretary.
So notwithstanding the lapse of the 60 day period and no action taken on such appealed case by
the RAB, the matter can still be the subject of an appeal to the DILG Secretary.
It is erroneous to state that the appeal may be taken to the NAPOLCOM because the
NAPOLCOM takes cognizance of appealed cases only through its recognized disciplinary machineries-
RAB and NAB.
Cabada v. Alunan
260 SCRA 839

FACTS: The aggrieved individual filed the appeal addressed to the DILG Secretary in his capacity as ex-
officio Chairman of the NAPOLCOM.
HELD: His appeal is not deemed an appeal to the NAPOLCOM
Section 45 of the DILG Act of 1990 (RA 6976) clearly shows that the NAPOLCOM exercises appellate
Jurisdiction only on the following cases and through
a.) the National Appellate Board (NAB) in personnel disciplinary actions involving demotion or
dismissal from the service imposed by the PNP Chief; and
b.) the RAB in administrative cases against policemen and over decisions in claims for police
benefits:
The NAPOLCOM has no appellate jurisdiction over decisions rendered by the NAB and the RAB.
Consequently, the NAPOLCOM did not have authority over the appeal and the petition for review and
just because both mentioned the DILG Secretary as Chairman of the NAPOLCOM did not bring them
within the jurisdiction of the NAPOLCOM.
Section 46= members of the PNP are no longer subject to the provisions of court martial proceedings nor
under the provisions of the CA 408 known as the Articles of War.
The PNP shall be national scope and civilian in character. Meaning, all members of the PNP are now
subject to the authority of civilian courts. So, if cases are to be filed against the members of the PNP, the
cases, if evidence warrants, should be filed before the regular courts and not before courts martial
pursuant to the provision of PD 1850 and the matters are tried under the civilian laws.
Courts martial are not judicial bodies but are implementing arms of the executive branch. It is an
administrative body under the executive branch and not a judicial body.
The Sandiganbayan is a regular court. The ranks in the PNP service that belongs to the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan are:
 From the rank of Provincial Director up-salary grade 27 and up (high ranking officer
 below salary grade 27, superintendent is a low ranking officer of the PNP.
Section 47 = preventive suspension
General Rule: Preventive suspension of a public officer must be for a fixed period– 90 days, 60 days, etc.
Exceptions:
1. the preventive suspension from office of a PNP member criminally charged with grave offense
where the suspension cannot be lifted before that time
2. where there may be indefinite preventive suspension – such as under RA 3019 in relation to the
RA 1379 (III-gotten Wealth.)

The reason why PNP members are treated differently is that they carry weapons and the badge of
the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them. ( Himagan vs. People , 237
SCRA 538-541)
Section 51 defines the powers of local government executives over PNP units.
The Regional Police Director has the prerogative to name the five (5) eligible police officers for
the position of the chief of police from a pool of eligible officers screened by the Senior Officer
Promotion and Selection Board, PNP, Camp Crame , Quezon City, without interference from the local
executives.
As deputy of the National Police Commission, the authority of the mayor is very limited –in
reality he has no power of appointment and has only the limited power of selecting one from among the
list of the five eligible police officer to be named the chief of police.
The mayor cannot require the Regional Police Director to include the name of any officer, no
matter how qualified, in the list of five to be submitted to the mayor (Andaya vs. Regional Trial Court.
Cebu City, Br. 20. 319 SCRA 696).
In the provincial level, the Provincial Governor is limited to list the names of 5 eligible police
officers as screened by the Senior Police Officer’s Promotion and Selection Board of the PNP, Camp
Crame, Quezon City.
General Rule: The power of local executives is one of operational supervision and control. Meaning, the
Local Chief Executives shall exercise operational supervisions and control over the PNP units within his
territorial jurisdiction.
Exception:
Within a period of 30 days immediately before a national, local, or barangay elections and 30 days
thereafter, the local chief executives do not have operational control and supervision. It is the COMELEC
which has the operational control over the PNP units within 30 days before and 30 days after the elections
pursuant to Section 51 of the PNP Law.
Operational supervisions and control exercised by the local chief executives over the PNP units.
 The power to direct, oversee and even inspect police units, police forces, and the power
to employ and deploy PNP units through the Station Commander to ensure public safety and
the maintenance of peace and order within the territorial jurisdiction of the local chief
executives
 The power to employ and deploy units and elements of the PNP through the police station
commander to ensure the maintenance of peace and order within the territorial jurisdiction.
Section 52 = withdrawal of operational power

The President may upon consultation with the Provincial Governor and the Congressman,
suspend the power of operational supervision and control of any Local Chief Executive over police units
on any of the following grounds:
a. abuse of authority by the local chief executives;
b. frequent unauthorized absences; (Note that this is also one of the grounds for the Institution of
disciplinary action against a local executive official under Section 60 of RA 7160;)
c. providing material support to criminal elements if the local chief executive is in cahoots, or
maintains an army of goons who are members of the PNP;
d. engaging in acts inimical to national security.
ALUNAN vs. ASUNCION

323 SCRA 623
FACTS: DILG Sec. Alunan issued Resolution 93-032 stopping the members of the Criminal Investigation
Service (CIS) from exercising certain police powers – power to arrest, investigate commission of offenses
as well as the power to effect seizures. The resolution classifies them as merely civilian components of
the PNP. The resolution was questioned as violative of the DILG Law (RA 6975).
HELD: the questioned resolution implements RA 6975.
Resolution No. 93-032 issued by the NAPOLCOM which strips members of the Criminal
Investigation Service (CIS) with police powers (such as effecting arrest, search and seizures and the
investigation of the commission of crimes), and instead classifies them as civilian personnel of the PNP
does not violate RA 6975 but actually implements it.
RA 6975 had the effect of revising the whole police force system and substitute a new unified one
in its place. The new police force absorbed the members of the former NAPOLCOM, Philippine
Constabulary (PC) and Integrated National Police, all the three of which were accordingly abolished.
With the abolition of the PC, including necessarily the CIS, RA 5750, which provides for the
qualifications, selection and appointment of civilian investigation agents of the CIS as well as their
powers as peace officers, has been rendered inutile. RA 5750 has been superseded by RA 6975.
Accordingly, police powers have been reserved for such uniformed PNP personnel. Hence, those
former CIS agents who opted not to join the uniformed personnel of the PNP are effectively denied police
powers.
OFFICE OF THE SOLICITOR GENERAL

The Solicitor General is the lawyer of the government, any of its agencies and officials in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of a lawyer. This is so provided under
Sec. 11 of PD no. 478. The exception is when such officials or agents
1. are being charged criminally or

2. are being civilly sued for damages arising from a felony
The reason here is that, the government as the principal, cannot commit a wrong. The illegal acts or
omission committed by the agent cannot be imputed on the principal.
Orbos vs. Civil Service Commission

12 Sept. 1990
FACTS: DOTC Secretary Orbos made a reorganization in the DOTC. Madarang questioned the
appointment of Ayug and Maglayon. He subsequently filed an appeal before the CSC – which ruled that
Madarang should be appointed instead. Orbos refused to heed CSC since the matter of appointment is one
solely belonging to the sound discretion of the appointing authority. OSG represented DOTC. CSC
questioned this.
HELD: OSG can validly represent DOTC.

When confronted with a situation where one government office takes an adverse position against another
government agency, the Solicitor General should not refrain from performing his duty as the lawyer of the
government. It is incumbent upon him to present to the court what he considers would legally uphold the
best interest of the government although it may run counter to a client’s position. In such an instance, the
government office adversely affected by the position taken by the Solicitor General if it still believes in
the merit of its case may appear in its own behalf through its legal personnel or representative.
In situations where the other agency has already filed a pleading which is inconsistent with the
stand taken by the Solicitor General, the Solicitor General may seek permission from the courts not to
represent such agency and for that agency to represent itself through its own in-house counsel.
Virata v. Sandiganbayan
272 SCRA 663
Sec. 35 Chapter 123, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987 (EO 292), which reproduces
the powers of the OSG enumerated in PD 478, provides that the OSG shall deputize legal officers of
government bureaus, agencies and offices to assist the Solicitor General and represent the Government in
cases involving their respective officers, and call on any office or instrumentally of the Government for
such service assistance.
NPC vs. NLRC

272 SCRA 706
When authorized by the President or head of office, the OSG also represents GOCCs. The OSG is
the principal counsel of the National Power Corporation (NPC). As such copies of orders and decisions
served on the deputized special attorney, acting as agent or representative of the Solicitor General, are not
binding until they are actually received by the Solicitor General. The proper basis for computing the
reglementary period to file an appeal and for determining whether a decision has attained finally is
service on the OSG and not on the special attorney.
Urbano vs. Chavez & Co vs. Chavez

183 SCRA 347
FACTS: DILG Secretary Luis Santos was charged before the Ombudsman. He was represented by OSG
HELD: OSG cannot represent Santos.
The Office of the Solicitor General is not authorized to represent a public official at any stage of a
criminal case or in a civil suit for damages arising from a felony. This applies to all public officials and
employees in the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the government.
A public official who is sued in a criminal case is actually sued in his personal capacity inasmuch
as his principal, the State, can never be the author of a wrongful act. In the same light, any pecuniary
liability a public official may be held to account on the occasion of a civil suit for damages arising from a
felony committed by him is for his own account. The State is not liable for the same.
Go v. Chavez
183 SCRA 347
FACTS: Solicitor General Frank Chavez was interviewed by Business World and he uttered defamatory
remarks. Go filed a civil action for damages arising form these utterances of malicious remarks. Chavez
was represented by the Office of the Solicitor General.
HELD: Chavez should not be represented by the Office of the Solicitor General because the case for
damages cannot be attributable to the state. If ever there is a judgment for the payment of damages, the
government cannot be made answerable therefore.
Of course, it does not mean that the Solicitor General should not represent a government official
sued in his official capacity where such representation would be adverse to a position taken by another
government office.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN

The Supreme Court, in the leading case of Deloso vs. Domingo (191 S 545), stated that the
jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance and non-feasance
committed by any public officer and employee during their tenure of office.
The Supreme Court cited the constitutional mandate that it being the protector of the people, is
mandated and is bound to act promptly on any case brought before it in any form or manner. Thus, any act
or omission of a public officer when such appears to be illegal, improper and unjust or inefficient may be
the subject of investigation by the Ombudsman.
(The findings or resolutions of the Ombudsman will not be looked into. If the case has not yet been filed
before the court, the Ombudsman has Jurisdiction over it but if it has been filed with the court, the
Ombudsman loses power over it.)
Deloso v. Domingo
191 S 545
FACTS: Deloso was the mayor of Botolan and was elected Governor of Zambales. Sometime in the
evening of April 22, 1988, Gov. Deloso with his convoy of security of men composed of civilian and
military personnel attended a basketball victory party. While on their way to a barangay in Botolan, they
were allegedly ambushed. Not one of the convoy of Gov. Deloso was injured or killed. However, it was
found in the investigation that Deloso's men were actually the ambushers. So cases were filed against the
governor and his escorts before the court martial because at that time there was yet ho RA 6975.
Deloso claimed in the preliminary investigation by the Ombudsman that the crime of multiple
murders allegedly committed by him was not office-related, and therefore the Ombudsman has no
authority to conduct preliminary investigation against his person.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ombudsman has jurisdiction.
HELD: YES.
The Office of the Ombudsman covers all kinds of offense - all misfeasance, malfeasances and non-
feasances committed by public officers and employees.
Kinds of Jurisdiction of the Ombudsman
1. Primary
The Ombudsman has primary jurisdiction over offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan. If other
agencies have, in the meantime, investigated the case, at any time of the proceeding, the Ombudsman can
take over the investigation.
RA 1975 as amended by RA 8249 provides for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan:

1. Office related offenses
2. Regardless of penalty
3. High Ranking officer (Salary grade of 27 up)

NOTE: Even if below salary grade 27, they can still be under the Sandiganbayan. The
law expressly includes these.
1. Prosecutors
2. Regional Director and above
3. Municipal Mayor
4. Senior Superintendent
5. Head of Offices LGU's
2. Shared/Concurrent
These are cases wherein the Ombudsman exercises Jurisdiction together with the RTC and MTC.
High Ranking Officers------file with the Sandiganbayan

Low Ranking Officers-------file information before the MTC or RTC
Sanchez v. Demetriou
227 SCRA 637
FACTS: Rape and Homicide cases were filed against Sanchez. Prior to that, there was an invitation
extended to the Mayor by police authorities. While he was already in the police quarter, some witnesses
pointed to him as the culprit, which led to his arrest. On the spot, an inquest proceeding was undertaken.
Sanchez questioned the authority of the DOJ prosecutors conducting the preliminary investigation on the
ground that it is only the Ombudsman, which has the power to conduct preliminary investigation against a
public officer.
HELD: The authority of the Ombudsman is one of shared and concurrent jurisdiction with other
investigating body of the government such as the DOJ. Hence, there is no infirmity in the filing of the
information before she regular courts, in this case the RTC.
Olivarez v. Ombudsman
248S 701
A permit was applied for by the Baclaran Cooperative to establish a fair. But Olivarez
disapproved it despite it being resolved already by the Sanggunian. Graft charges were filed against
Olivarez because he granted it to another. The Supreme Court said that it would not intervene with the
decision of the Ombudsman.
Q: Is there a need for conduct of a preliminary investigation?

A: No. Because there was already an investigation conducted by the OSP. The Ombudsman will simply
review whether the findings of the OSP are of accord. This is an exercise of discretion
The authority of the Ombudsman covers all elective and appointive officials under Section 21 of RA 7160
except members of Congress, members of the judiciary, impeachable officers.

PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION BY THE OMBUDSMAN
Garcia vs. Mojica

314 SCRA 207
FACTS: Mayor Garcia signed the anomalous purchase of asphalt 4 days before the local elections. Garcia
was re-elected, Ombudsman then preventively suspended him. Garcia claims that he could no longer be
placed under preventive suspension because of his re-election citing the case of AGUINALDO.
HELD: The Ombudsman can still issue preventive suspension order even if the act in question happened
during a previous term.
The power of the Ombudsman to issue preventive suspension order is provided for under Section 24 or
R.A. 6670. The power to investigate is separate and distinct from the power to impose administrative
sanctions. The power to investigate is also separate and distinct from the power to preventively suspend a
local elective official.
But because of Garcia’s re-election, he cannot be sanctioned administratively because the subject
of the administrative complaint was committed during a previous term despite the fact that the act
complained of happened 4 days before the elections. What is determinative is the time of commission i.e.
during a previous term. It does not matter that it took place a few days before the elections. There was
here a presumed knowledge on the part of the people re-electing him to the same office. Thus, there was
condonation as in the AGUINALDO case.
The power of the Ombudsman to preventively suspend any officer of employee “under his
authority” means that he can preventively suspend all officials under investigation by his office regardless
of the branch of the government in which they are employed, excepting those removable by
impeachment, members of Congress and the Judiciary.
 To initiate impeachment, the Ombudsman can investigate
Yabut v. Ombudsman
233 SCRA 311
FACTS: While Vice Mayor Yabut was in traffic, a fistfight ensued between him and an American. While
investigation for simple misconduct and oppression was on-going, he was preventively suspended for 90
days. His penalty was 90 day suspension. Yabut now asks that the period of preventive suspension must
be credited to whatever penalty of suspension that may be imposed by the Ombudsman.
HELD: the period of preventive suspension cannot be credited

A preventive suspension decreed by the Ombudsman by virtue of his authority under Section 21 of RA
6770 in relation to Section 9 of Administrative Order No. 07, is not meant to be a penalty .the period of
preventive suspension cannot be credited to whatever penalty that may be meted out.
Buenaseda v. Flavier
226 SCRA 646
FACTS: DOH Sec. Flavier filed graft cases against several employees including the Chief (Dr.
Buenaseda) of the Hospital of the National Center for Mental Health. After filing their answer, the
Ombudsman issued preventive suspension order. The respondents contended that there was yet no formal

hearing conducted on the matter and so, the issuance of the preventive suspension order violated due
process.
HELD: They can be preventively suspended.

Being a mere order for preventive suspension, the questioned order of the Ombudsman was validly issued
even without a full blown hearing and the formal presentation of evidence by the parties.
The moment criminal or administrative complaint is filed with the Ombudsman, the respondent is
deemed to be “in the authority” and he can proceed to determine whether said respondent should be
placed under preventive suspension.
Castillo-Co v. Barbers
290 CSRA 719
FACTS: Gov. Castillo was charged with graft practices because she purchased reconditioned heavy
equipment when the requirement is for brand new ones. Castillo contends that she can only be
preventively suspended for 60 days since that was what is provided under LGC.
HELD: She can be suspended for 6 months

The provisions under the LGC are different from that under the Ombudsman Act. So, administrative
proceedings taken by the Ombudsman pursuant to the Ombudsman law ought to be followed. In other
words, the Ombudsman can mete out the maximum preventive suspension of six (6) months.
A preventive suspension can be decreed on an official under investigation after charges are
brought and even before the charges are heard since the same is not in the nature of a penalty. The length
of the period of suspension within the six-month limit prescribed by Sec. 24 of RA 6770, like the
evaluation of the strength of the evidence, lies in the discretion of the Ombudsman.
Yasay vs. Desierto

300 SCRA 494
The matter of imposing the period of preventive suspension up to six months lies within the
discretion of the Ombudsman. The Supreme Court cannot substitute its own judgment for the
Ombudsman on this matter, absent clear showing of grave abuse of discretion.
Generally, the SC will not interfere into the exercise of the discretion by the Ombudsman.
Although in the case of Garcia vs. Mojica, the SC ruled that the imposition of six (6) months preventive
suspension on Mayor Garcia was unreasonable and so the SC reduced the period. As a general rule
however, the matter is within the discretion of the Office of the Ombudsman.
Appeal
Alba v. Nitorreda
254 SCRA 753
FACTS: DECS Asst. Regional Director Alba was charged of being partial to the owner of the school in
Tagum. He was found guilty but cannot appeal because of Sec. 27 of RA 6770

HELD: No violation of right to appeal.
Section 27 of RA 6770 and Section 7, Rule 111 of Administrative order No. 7 (known as the Rules of
Procedure of the office of the Ombudsman), denying the right of appeal and providing for the finality of
the decision where the penalty imposed is public censure or reprimand, suspension of not more that 1
month or a fine equivalent to 1 month salary, is constitutional and not tantamount to a deprivation of
property without due process of law.
The right to appeal is not natural right nor part of due process. All other decisions of the Office of
the Ombudsman which imposed penalties that are not enumerated in Section 27 are not final,
unappealable and immediately executory. In these other cases, the respondent therein has the right to
appeal to the Court of Appeals within ten days from receipt of the written notice of the order, directive or
decision. An appeal timely filed will stay the immediate implementation of the decision. In all these other
cases therefore, the judgment imposed therein will become final after the lapse of the reglementary period
of appeal if no appeal is perfected or, an appeal therefrom having been taken, the judgment in the
appellate tribunal becomes final.
Lapid v. CA.
334 SCRA 741
FACTS: Lapid was suspended for 1 year. Pending appeal, the NB DILG and Ombudsman wants the
penalty immediately executed.
HELD: penalty cannot be immediately executed since no law allows it. This case was decided before A0-
14-A
A decision of the Ombudsman finding him liable for misconduct and imposing the penalty of one
year suspension without pay, is not among those listed in the Ombudsman Act of 1989 as final and
unappealable.
There is no general legal principle that mandates that all decisions of quasi-judicial and
administrative agencies are immediately executory. Decisions rendered by the SEC and the Civil
Aeronautics Board, for example, are not immediately executory and are stayed when an appeal is filed
before the Court of Appeals.
On the other hand, the decisions of the Civil Service Commission, under the Administrative
Code, and the Office of the President under the Local Government Code are immediately executor even
pending appeal because the pertinent laws under which the decisions were rendered mandate them to be
so.
The provisions of the last two cited laws expressly provide for the execution pending appeal of
their final orders or decisions. Section 68 of the Local Government Code only applies to administrative
decisions rendered by the Office of the President or the appropriate Sanggunian against elective local
government officials. Similarly, the provisions in the Administrative Code of 1987 mandating the
execution pending review applies specifically to administrative decisions of the Civil Service
Commissions involving members of the Civil Service. There is no basis in law for the proposition that the
provisions of the Administrative Code and the Local Government Code on execution pending review

should be applied suppletorily to the provisions of the Ombudsman Act as there is nothing in the
Ombudsman Act which provides for such suppletory application.
Lopez vs. CA and Romero Liggayu

389 SCRA 570
FACTS: Liggayu, Manager of the Legal Department of the PCSO, was found guilty by the Ombudsman
of Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service for issuing a subpoena in excess of his authority
as Resident Ombudsman of PCSO and was meted the penalty of six months and one day suspension
without pay.
HELD: Suspension cannot be executed pending appeal

The legislature has seen fit to grant a stay of execution pending appeal from disciplinary cases where the
penalty imposed by the Office of the Ombudsman is not public censure, reprimand, or suspension of not
more than one month, or a fine not equivalent to a month salary.
The CA committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the Writ of Preliminary Injunction
enjoining the execution of private respondent Liggayu’s suspension pending appeal. Considering that
Liggayu appealed from the decision of the Office of the Ombudsman, the stay of execution of the penalty
of suspension should therefore issue as a matter of right. The fact that the Ombudsman Act gives parties
the right to appeal from its decisions should not generally carry with it the stay of these decisions pending
appeal.
General Rule: The filing of an appeal will stay the immediate execution of the penalty
Exception: when the law itself allows the execution ( this may have been repealed by AO-14-A dated
8/17/2000 issued by the Ombudsman which states that an appeal shall not stop the decision of the
Ombudsman from being executory; he is entitled to back wages though )
Fabian vs. Desierto

295 SCRA 470
Appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in administrative disciplinary cases
should be taken to the Court of Appeals under Rule 43 of the 1977 Rules of Civil Procedure. In so
holding, the SC declared unconstitutional Sec. 27 of RA 6770 which provided that decisions of the office
of the Ombudsman may be appealed to the Supreme Court by way of petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Such provision was violative of Section 30, Article VI of the
Constitution, as it expanded the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court without its advice and consent.
Villavert v. Desierto
23 February 2000
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure precludes appeals from quasi-judicial agencies, like
the Office of the Ombudsman, to the Supreme Court. Consequently, such appeals in administrative cases
should be taken to the Court of Appeals.

Marquez v. Desierto
June 23, 2001
FACTS: Ombudsman ordered the bank manager of Union bank to produce the bank record of Lagdameo,
who is subject to a fact finding investigation pertaining to alleged graft practices.
HELD: The fact-finding examination is a fishing expedition which does not warrant an exception from
the Bank Secrecy Law, RA 1405.
Before an in camera inspection may be allowed:
1. There must be a pending case before the court

2. The account must be clearly identified
3. The inspection must be limited to the subject matter of the pending case
4. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present during the inspection
5. Such inspection may cover only the account specified in the pending case.
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. There
is only an investigation by the Ombudsman.
Exceptions to the Bank Secrecy Law:
1. In the course of an examination by the bank pursuant to an authority given by the Central Bank
2. An authority given to the auditor for the conduct of an audit
3. Upon written permission of the depositor
4. In cases of impeachment proceedings
5. Where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the controversy
6. Upon order of competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty on the part of the public officer
COMMISSION ON AUDIT
Under the 1987 Constitution, Article 9B Section 2, Paragraph l, the COA has the power, authority
and duty to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenues and receipts and
disbursements of government funds. So, anything requiring the disbursements of funds for the use of
property is subject to audit by the COA.
Under Article 9B Section 2 Paragraph 2, the COA has the power to promulgate rules and
regulations on auditing and accounting, including those for the prevention and disallowance on irregular
and improper, unnecessary or unconscionable expenditure or use of public funds and properties.
NHA vs. COA

226 SCKA 65
FACTS: There was a loan agreement entered into by the Republic through NHA with the KFW, a German
entity. Under the contract, the German firm would finance the urban housing—the Dagatdagatan

Project of the government. There was a need to extend the loan contract and one of the conditions for the
renewal of the contract was the extension of the services contract of the German consultant. COA
disallowed the extension.
HELD: COA’s disallowance was valid. The claim that renewal of NHA’s foreign loan with German entity
would have been jeopardized if NHA did not agree to the extension of a foreign consultant’s services is
no justification for not complying with the constitutional mandate prohibiting unnecessary expenses of
public funds which is beyond compromise.
CIR v. COA
218 S 204
Under the law, upon the recommendation of the BIR, the Department of Finance, which has the
supervision and control over the BIR, .may grant an informer's reward pursuant to the provision of the
NIRC.
But the matter of disallowing the informer’s reward may still be the subject of review by the
courts. The court may determine whether the disallowance made by the COA of the grant of informer’s
reward is proper or not. Thus, it is within the power of the court to rule on the disallowance made by
COA.
DBP v. COA
373 S 356
The COA’s jurisdiction covers all government agencies, offices, bureaus and units, including
GOCCs, and even non-government entities enjoying subsidy from the government. However, nothing in
section 26 of PD 1445 states that COA’s power to examine and audit government banks is exclusive,
thereby preventing private audit of government agencies concurrently with the COA audit. The Central
Bank has concurrent jurisdiction to examine and audit government banks. But still, the COA’s audit
prevails over that of the Central Bank since the COA is the constitutionally mandated auditor of
government banks. The Central Bank is also devoid of authority to allow or disallow expenditures of
government banks since this function belongs exclusively to the COA.
Rodrigo, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan

303 S 309
The findings of COA is not binding on the other investigatory office of the government, such as
the Office of the Ombudsman, from taking cognizance of a criminal complaint on matters covered by the
audit report.
As a rule, the audit report is given respect. But nonetheless, if the Ombudsman finds basis to
proceed the conduct of investigation, it is within its power to disregard the findings of COA.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG)
EO 1 (Feb. 28, 1986) mandates the PCGG to recover ill-gotten wealth accumulated by the
Marcoses, their immediate families, relatives, subordinates, associates and cronies, whether such
properties are found in the Philippines or abroad. This includes the power to take over or sequester all
business enterprises or entities controlled or owned by them. PCGG has the power to take over or place
under its control any property or office within its authority.
No civil action shall prosper against the PCGG or any member thereof for the discharge of their
functions and duties.
EO 2 empowers the PCGG to freeze all assets and properties in the Philippines and likewise
prohibit any person from transferring or concealing such property alleged to be ill-gotten
EO 14 and EO 14-A mandate the PCGG to file and prosecute all cases before the Sandiganbayan
which has the exclusive jurisdiction to try and hear cases of the PCGG. Section 5 of E.O. 14 as amended,
empowers the PCGG to grant immunity from criminal prosecution of any person who testifies.
Baseco v. PCGG
150 S 181
The PCGG cannot perform acts of ownership or dominion over sequestered properties. The
essence of the sequestration order is not an act of ownership. It is simply an act to conserve properties to
prevent further dissipation of assets alleged to be ill-gotten. Since the PCGG is not the owner of the
sequestered assets, it is not allowed to vote sequestered shares of stocks or even elect members of the
board of director concerned (Cojuangco vs. Azcuna, April 16, 1991). The reason here is that PCGG is a
mere conservator and not an owner of the sequestered property.
The exception to this rule is in case of a take over of a business belonging to the government of
whose capitalization comes from government funds, but now in the hands of the private business. In such
situation, the PCGG may vote on the sequestered shares not as an act of ownership but to conserve
properties already in the hands of private business but which used to be owned by the government or the
capitalization comes from the government.
Two clear “public character” exceptions under which the government is granted the authority to vote the
shares:
(1) Where government shares are taken over by private persons or entities who/which registered
them in their own names, and
(2) Where the capitalization or share that were acquired with public funds somehow landed in private
hands (Republic v. COCOFED, 372 SCRA 463; Republic v. Sandiganbayan, 402 SCRA 85)
Republic v. COCOFED
372 SCRA 463

The sequestered UCPB shares having been conclusively shown to have been purchased with
coconut levies, the Court holds that these funds and shares are at the very least, affected with public
interest; thus private respondents even if they are the registered shareholder cannot be accorded the right
to vote them.
The coconut levy funds are not only affected with public interest, they are in fact prima facie
public funds. They also partake of the nature of taxes which are enforced proportional contribution from
persons and properties, exacted by the state by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of the government
and for all public needs.
The PCGG has no authority to sell sequestered property as it is not the owner of the property it
sequesters. It is only an overseer, a protector and a preserver.
Under Sector 5 of Executive order No. 14, the PCGG is authorized to grant immunity from
criminal prosecution to any person who testifies. As ruled by the Supreme Court in Republic vs.
Sandiganbayan (173 SCRA 72), the PCGG, pursuant to E.O. No. 14, in relation with Section 3 of the
same Executive Order, may grant criminal and civil immunities. The Sandigangbayan though has the
jurisdiction to look into the validity of the immunity granted by the PCGG.
Republic v. Sandigangbayan
173 S 72
FACTS: There was a grant of civil immunity to Jose Campos, such immunity was extended to his son.
Jose Campos, Jr. Whether or not the PCGG is empowered to grant civil immunity? Note that section 5 of
E.O. 14 talks only of immunity given by PCGG in criminal cases.
HELD: Section 5 must be related to section 3 of E.O. 14 as amended which provides for the procedure
and the applicable laws in the prosecution of civil cases and applying the provision of the New Civil
Code, Article 2028 the mandate is to conciliate civil cases. Therefore, the grant of civil immunity in the
civil case to the son (Jose Campos, Jr.) was within the power of the PCGG.
Republic v. Sandiganbayan
258 S 686
FACTS: A representative of the PCGG, Atty. Ramirez issued a sequestration order over the assets and
properties of Dio Island resort in Leyte Allegedly owned by the Romualdezes.
HELD: To be valid, a sequestration order must be issued with the authority of 2 commissioners. Under
the rules promulgated, the PCGG may issue writ of sequestration upon the authority of at least two
commissioners when the commission has reasonable grounds to believe that the issuance thereof is
warranted. But the PCGG may not delegate its authority to sequester to its representatives and
subordinates and any such delegation is invalid and ineffective. The power to sequester, therefore carriers
with it the corollary duty to make a preliminary determination of whether there is a reasonable basis for
sequestering a property alleged to be ill-gotten. The absence of such prior determination by the PCGG is a
fatal defect which renders the sequestration void ab initio and thus, not subject to ratification by the
PCGG.

HELD: The order was invalid even though it was ratified by the Commission. The writ of sequestration is
null and void since the issuance made by the representative of the PCGG did not conform to the rules
implementing the law. No ratification by the PCGG can cure the defect, such non compliance is a fatal
defect.
Republic vs. Migrino

30 August 1990
FACTS: PCGG initiated an investigation on the alleged ill-gotten wealth of Col. Tecson, yet there were
no allegations that Tecson is related to the Marcoses.
HELD: PCGG has no jurisdiction: Ombudsman has.

The PCGG is the agency empowered to bring proceedings for forfeiture of property allegedly acquired
unlawfully before February 25, 1986, while the power to investigate cases of ill-gotten or unexplained
wealth acquired after that date is vested in the Ombudsman (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan 237 SCRA 242)
and if warranted the Solicitor general may file the forfeiture petition with the Sandiganbayan.
Republic vs Sandiganbayan
407 SCRA 13
Where there is no jurisdiction to waive, as the PCGG cannot exercise investigative or

prosecutorial powers never granted to it, then respondent Major General Ramas could not be deemed to
have waived any defect in the filing by the PCGG of the forfeiture petition by filing an answer with
counterclaim. Parties may raise lack of jurisdiction at any stage of the proceeding. Ramas’ position alone
as Commanding General of the Philippine Army does not suffice to make him a ‘Subordinate’ of former
president Marcos for purposes of EO 1 and its amendments. It is precisely a prima facie showing that the
ill-gotten wealth was accumulated by a ‘subordinate’ of Marcos that vests jurisdiction on PCGG failing in
this the PCGG should have recommended the instant case to the Ombudsman.
PCGG vs. Peña

April 12, 1988
FACTS: There was a freeze order issued by the PCGG over the assets and records of two government
firms. This freeze order was contested before the RTC. Based on a complaint, the RTC issued a
restraining order.
HELD: The RTC has no jurisdiction over PCGG. The SC applied the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
and exhaustion of administrative remedies. The PCGG is a co-equal body with the RTC and co-equal
bodies have no power to control the other. It is only the Sandiganbayan which has the exclusive
jurisdiction over the PCGG.

CENTRAL BANK
The actions of the Monetary Board in proceedings on insolvency are explicitly declared under
Section 29 of the Central Bank Act (RA. 265, as amended by EO 289) to be “Final and executory.” They
may not be set aside, except upon ‘convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad
faith” (Central Bank vs. Judgo dela Cruz 12 November 1990).
The Central Bank can close down a bank for insolvency without prior notice and hearing. The
close now and hear later policy that empowers the Central Bank to take over a bank before it could even
disprove the CB’s findings of insolvency is intended to prevent the unwarranted dissipation of the bank
assets and protect its depositors, creditors, stockholders and the public.
Central Bank v. Triumph Saving Bank

220 SCRA 536
Section 29 of the Central Bank Act does not require prior notice and hearing before a bank may
be directed to stop operations and place under receivership because that would only create more liabilities
and destroy evidence of fraud.
Requisites before the Central Bank can close down a bank for insolvency without prior notice and
hearing:
1. There must be an examination pursuant to the authority of the Central Bank. In other words the
examining department of the Central bank is given the power by the latter to look into the
accounts and records of the bank in question.
2. On the basis of such examination, a report has to be submitted to the Monetary Board; and
3. The Monetary Board on the basis of such report finding that further operation would only cause
danger to the bank and to the public, then it can order the immediate closure of the bank.
Of course under the law, the aggrieved bank is given the opportunity to sue the Central Bank within a
period of ten 10 days from the date of closure.
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM (DAR)
Republic Act No. 6657 explicitly recognizes the effectivity and applicability of PD 229, vesting the
Department of Agrarian Reform with original jurisdiction, generally, over all cases involving agrarian
laws, although under Section 57 of said act, it restores to the Regional Trial Court original and exclusive
jurisdiction over;
1. petitions for the determination of just compensation to be paid to the landowner ; and
2. the prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act ( Tangub vs. Court of appeals, 03 December
1990)
Under Sec. 50 of RA 6657, it is the DAR which is vested with

1. primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and

2. the exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of Agrarian
reform (includes determination of just compensation) except those falling under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the department agriculture and the DENR.
DAR”s exclusive original jurisdiction is exercised through hierarchically-arranged agencies of the DAR,
namely.
1. DARAB (Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board)

2. RARAD ( Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudicator);and
3. PARAD (Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator)
- All cases under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the DAR must commence in the PARAD of
the province where the property is situated.
- The DARAB only has appellate jurisdiction to review the order and findings of the PARAD.
Roxas & Co. v. CA

321 SCRA 106
FACTS: DAR determined that the property in Nasugbu, Batangas should be brought under CARP.
Presidential Proclamation 15-20 declared the same area as tourist zone.
HELD: DAR authorities must not simply disregard the proclamation because it has the effect of a law
unless the same is repealed. The character of a parcel of land is not determined merely by a process of
elimination – the actual use which the land is capable should be the primordial factor. Presidential
Proclamation No. 1520, which declared Nasugbu, Batangas as a tourist zone has the force and effect of
law unless repealed as it cannot be disregarded by DAR or any other department of Government.
Since it governs the extraordinary method of expropriating private property, the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) should be strictly construed.
Section 50 Section 57
Refers to administrative proceedings which may be Refers to judicial proceedings in determining just
subject to judicial inquiry compensation
Confers to the DAR the primary jurisdiction to Confers the exclusive original jurisdiction to the
determine agrarian reform matters and the RTC to hear and decide petitions for the
exclusive authority over all matters pertaining to determination of just compensation.
the implementation of agrarian reforms which
necessary includes the determination of just
compensation to be paid to the landowner
Preliminary determination made by the DAR in the RTC is not exercising appellate jurisdiction
matter of the value of the land placed under the
CARP and the just compensation.

Under Section 11 Rule 13 of the DARAB Rules, the decision of the adjudicator in the summary
administrative proceeding on land-valuation and preliminary determination and payment of just
compensation shall not be appealable to the DARAB but shall be filed directly with the RTC which shall
be constituted as a special agrarian reform court. So, this is still an exercise of original exclusive
jurisdiction of the RTC.
This is consistent with the doctrine of primary jurisdiction and the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies. It only means that primary jurisdiction is lodged in the DAR as an administrative
agency to determine in a preliminary manner the just compensation.
The STAGES required under Section 50 under this agrarian (administrative) proceeding:
1. The land bank determines a preliminary determination as to the value of land placed under the
CARP and the compensation to be paid to the landowner.
2. The DAR initiates the acquisition of agricultural land by notifying the owner of the property of
the desire of the government to place the property under the coverage of the CARP together with
the notice and the valuation as initially determined by the Land bank;
3. Within 30 days from notice given by the DAR, the landowner must decide whether to accept or
reject the offer made by the DAR;
4. If there is rejection by the landowner, there will be a summary administrative proceeding held by
the PARAD or RARAD, as the case may be, depending on the value of the land, for purposes of
determining just compensation;
5. Parties interested in the transaction are required to submit their respective evidence
6. The DAR adjudicator must decide the matter within 30 days from submission of the case;
7. If the landowner still finds the price unsatisfactory, the he can bring the case immediately and
directly to the RTC within 15 days from receipt of notice of such decision. There is no need to
bring it to the DARAB.
Philippine Veterans Bank v. CA

322 SCRA 140
FACTS: PVB’s properties were placed under CARP, PVB filed its appeal before the RTC beyond the
15 day period as required under Section 11, Rule 13 of the DARAB rules. The RTC dismissed the
petition.
HELD: The 15 day period to file the petition for just compensation is mandatory. The jurisdiction of
the courts is not any less original and exclusive because the question is first passed upon by the DAR,
as the judicial proceedings are not a continuation of the administrative determination. Hence, as the
petition of the landowner PVB was filed beyond the 15-day period provided in Rule XIII, Sec. 11 of
the DARAB Rules, the trial court correctly dismissed the case (for judicial determination of the just
compensation) and the CA correctly affirmed the order of dismissal.
Laguna Estate Dev’t Corp. v. CA.

335 SCRA 38
FACTS: CARP beneficiaries filed a case before the DAR to compel LEDC to grant them an easement
of right of way
HELD: DARAB has no power to grant to the beneficiaries a right of way (easement) since there is no
tenancy relationship between the parties.
For the DARAB to have jurisdiction ever the case, there must be TENANCY relationship
between the parties. In the instant case, there exist no tenancy relationship between the petitioner
estate and the beneficiaries.
The following indispensable elements must be established:
1. The parties are the land-owner and the tenant or agricultural lessees.
2. The subject matter of the relationship is agricultural land
3. There must be consent between the parties to the tenancy relationship
4. The purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production
5. There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessees; and
6. The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessees
Obviously, in this case, the issue of a right of way or easement over private property without
tenancy relation is outside the jurisdiction of the DARAB . This is not an agrarian issue. Jurisdiction
is vested in a court of general jurisdiction.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR)
Under PD 1869, the Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation or PAGCOR has the
authority to operate gambling joints in any part of the Philippines, whether on land or water.
It Was formerly PD 1066A, then amended to PD 1067B which granted franchise to operate
gambling casinos; further amended on June 2, 1978 as PD 1399 with the objectives of "Responding
through Responsible Gaming" before being amended again by PD 1869 to centralize and integrate all
gambling activities under one authority. Public welfare is the root of all legislation made by Congress.
The original law creating PAGCOR was PD 1077 in January 1, 1977. Its operation was still
limited then. However, the government realized that PAGCOR is a good source of revenue. In fact, it was
and still is the third largest revenue-earning agency of the government after BIR and Bureau of Customs.
Thus, the government granted it more powers to operate. Enacting PD 1869 on July 1983 amended its
charter.

PD 1869 mandates the creation of a gaming corporation called PAGCOR, which is possessed of
two (2) characteristics:
1. As a government institution
PAGCOR has a regulatory function. It tries to centralize all forms of gambling in one gaming
corporation.
2. As a corporation
PAGCOR as a corporation is empowered to establish, maintain and operate in any part of the
Philippines (even if such move is objected to by the local government unit). According to the Supreme
Court, public welfare is the objective for establishing this institution.
No local government unit may impose local tax on PAGCOR because it has its own charter. It is
exempt from all kinds of taxes that the local government unit imposes or plans to impose. PAGCOR
remits annually to the National Government or to the Office of the President's Social Fund. It also remits
to the city local government unit where it is situated and that is the local government's share. PAGCOR
also funds projects of certain organizations.
Employees of PAGCOR are still covered by Civil Service Laws but since PAGCOR has a board,
they may be granted other privileges.
LAND TRANSPORATION OFFICE (LTO)

and
LAND TRANSPORTATION AND FRANCHISING REGULATORY BOARD (LTFRB)
The LTO and the LTRRB are under the supervision of the Department of Transportation and
Communication (DOTC)
The DOTC, through the LTO and LTFRB, is mandated to implement laws pertaining to land
transportation under RA 4136 otherwise known as the Land Transportation and Traffic Code.
The LTO has the duty to register vehicles and licensing of drivers.
The LTFRB under E.O. 202, is tasked for the regulation of public utility or for-hire vehicles and the grant
franchises or certificates of public convenience.
Section 458 of the local government Code confers to the LGUs the regulation of operation of tricycles-
for-hire and grant of franchises for the operation thereof, subject to the guidelines issued by the DOTC.
The duty of LTO is not affected by Section 458 of the LGC. Still the LTO is mandated to require the
registration of these tricycles-for-hire. R.A. 4136 mandates the registration of all kinds of motor vehicles
used or operated on or upon any public highway in the Philippines.
Hutchison Ports Philippines Limited v. SBMA

339 SCRA 434

FACTS: SBMA conducted bidding for the operation of container terminal in Subic Bay. Of the 3
bidders, only 2 qualified, ICTSI and HPPL Before the opening of the sealed bidding, HPPL wanted to
disqualify ICTSI since it is the operator of the Manila International Container Port MICP under EO 212,
there is prohibition as to the operation of the same operator of another similar facility.
ICTSI appealed such protest to the Office of the President pending appeal. SBMA awarded the
bid to HPPL. Exec. Sec. Torres recommended the re bidding of the project. HPPL argued that there was
already a perfected contract because the SBMA Board of Directors already awarded the contract to it.
HELD: Petitioner HPPL has not shown that it has a clear right to be declared as the winning bidder with
finality. The award given by the SBMA was not yet final and thus, can still be assailed.
Petitioner HPPL has not sufficiently shown that it has a clear and unmistakable right to be
declared the winning bidder with finality, such that SBMA can be compelled to negotiate a concession
contract. As a chartered institution, the SBMA is always under the direct control of the Office of the
President, particularly, when contracts and/or project undertaking by the SBMA entail substantial amounts
of money.
Specifically. LOI 620 dated October 27, 1997 mandates that the approval of the President is
required in all contracts of the national government office, agencies and instrumentalities, including
GOCC’s involving P2 Million and above, awarded thru public bidding or negotiations. Though the
SBMA Board of Directors, by resolution, may have declared HPPL as the winning bidder, said award
cannot be said to be final and unassailable. The SBMA Board of Directors and other officers are subjects
to the control and supervision of the office of the President. The President may, within his authority,
overturn or reverse any award made by the SBMA Board of Director for justifiable reasons. The
discretion to accept or reject any bid or even recall the award thereof, is of such wide latitude that the
courts will not generally interfere with the exercise thereof by the executive department, unless such
exercise is used to shield unfairness or injustice. When the President issued the memorandum setting
aside the award previously declared by SBMA in favor of HPPL and directing that a re-bidding be
conducted, the same was within the authority of the President and was a valid exercises of his prerogative.
Philosophy at work
“The rest is silence” – robert

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Administrative Law - Atty. Rodolfo E.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW vs. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

2. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW prescribes the limitations on the exercise of governmental powers so as to

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW stresses on the rights of citizens; whereas

ADMINISTRATIVE BODY vs. COURT

1. An ADMINISTRATIVE BODY is composed of persons or individuals who are considered experts in

2. An ADMINISTRATIVE BODY has variety of functions; whereas

Acad com 2007 robert hernandez

TEST TO DETERMINE WHETHER A BODY/AGENCY IS ADMINISTRATIVE OR JUDICIAL

BAR QUESTION: What are the types of administrative bodies or agencies?

They are the following:

SOURCES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

1. Constitutional or statutory enactments creating administrative bodies.

Acad com 2007 robert hernandez

GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES (GRP) vs. NATIONAL

Bacani vs. National Coconut Corporation

Acad com 2007 robert hernandez

Central Bank vs. CA

ISSUE: Whether or not Central Bank is part of the National Government?

To be sure, the CB is a government instrumentality. But it was created as an autonomous body

Acad com 2007 robert hernandez

IRON AND STEEL AUTHORITY (ISA) vs. CA

ISSUE: Whether or not ISA may be properly substituted by the GRP?

SC: ISA is a non-incorporated authority, thus GRP could substitute.

FONTANILLA vs. MALIAMAN

Acad com 2007 robert hernandez

ISSUE: Whether or not NIA is a part of the "Government of the Philippines'"?

Acad com 2007 robert hernandez

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION

Facts: The Bureau of Immigration recognized Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William

Acad com 2007 robert hernandez

Qualitrans Limousine Service, Inc. v. Royal Class Limousine Service

Marina Properties Corp. v. CA and HL Carlos Construction

Acad com 2007 robert hernandez

ISSUE: Which body has jurisdiction over the case?

Solid Homes, Inc. v. Payawal

Acad com 2007 robert hernandez

a) Unsound real estate business and practices

CT Torres Enterprises, Inc. v. Hibionada

FACTS: Petitioners, as agent of Pleasantville Development Corporation sold a subdivision lot on

1. Unsound real estate business practices;

Acad com 2007 robert hernandez

PAL vs. Kurangking,

Padua vs. Ranada

“Man is not what he is but he is what he is not.” – Jean-Paul Sartre

Acad com 2007 robert hernandez

POWERS OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES

Administrative bodies commonly exercise 2 basic powers:

Legislative Power Quasi-legislative Power

Requisites for a valid delegation

Acad com 2007 robert hernandez

Requisites for the validity of Administrative Regulations:

1) Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature.

2) It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature.

3) It must be promulgated m accordance with the prescribed procedure.

Kinds of Administrative Rules and Regulations

Examples: BIR Circulars, CB Circulars

Acad com 2007 robert hernandez

ISSUE: Whether or not such regulation made by an administrative agency is valid?

Acad com 2007 robert hernandez

Federacion Español Profesores vs. Sec. Quisumbing

ISSUE: Whether or not the order is valid?

Find out first the power performed by administrative bodies.

Acad com 2007 robert hernandez