Asian Journal of Social Psychology (1999) 2: 1–19

After the ``crisis'' in social psychology:

The development of the transactional model
of science
Uichol Kim
Chung-Ang University, Korea

This paper reviews the literature on the ‘‘crisis’’ in social psychology. Although
the symptoms of the crisis are various, the basic problem can be identified as the
inappropriate emulation of the natural sciences model. Within this approach,
psychologists attempted to discover objective, abstract, universal laws of human
behavior, but have largely failed to do so. The second part of this paper analyzes
misconceptions that many psychologists have about objectivity and scientific
methods and outlines an alternative perspective. In the third part of the paper, a
comparative analysis of physical, biological, and human sciences are provided.
In the final section, an alternative scientific paradigm – the transactional model,
is presented. In this approach, human consciousness, agency, and creativity, both
at the individual and collective level, are considered as key constructs in
explaining psychological functioning. Subjective elements such as human
consciousness and agency and the influences of context and meaning are
explicitly integrated in the research model in search of dynamic and emergent
properties of human functioning.

Introduction

The founder of psychology as an independent scientific discipline is recognized as Wilhelm

Wundt when he established a psychological laboratory in 1879 at Leipzig, Germany
(Boring, 1950; Titchner, 1921; Wertheimer, 1970). Prior to the establishment of psychology
as an independent discipline, the nature and mechanism of the mind had been widely
discussed by scholars and the general public. At the turn of this century, psychology
departments and courses became established in various universities around North America.
The founding of American Psychological Association and various psychological journals
accelerated the establishment and institutionalization of psychology. Within a short history,
psychology flourished in North America in terms of the number of students, faculty
members, research projects, funding, and professional organizations (Berlyne, 1968; Brandt,
1970; Kim, 1995; Samelson, 1977). With the institutionalization, a group of specialists
began to claim expertise on psychological matters, becoming arbiters of what constituted
‘‘acceptable’’ psychological knowledge (Danziger, 1979). Not only did the discipline of

Address correspondence to Uichol Kim, Dept. of Psychology, Chung-Ang University, Huksuk-

dong, Dongjak-ku, Seoul, 156–756, Korea. E-mail: jylee113@chollian.net

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psychology become institutionalized, but psychological knowledge became defined to the

extent that ‘‘to be taken seriously, psychological ideas must now pass through the prism
formed by the normative and institutional framework of the community of a recognized
specialist’’ (Danziger, 1979, p.28). The phenomenal growth and success of psychology,
however, shielded the discipline from addressing the fundamental paradigmic problems
confronting the discipline until the experience of ‘‘crisis’’ in 1960’s.
From the late 1960’s to late 1970’s several areas of psychology came under attack. The
most active and critical discussion centered around social psychology. Smith (1973)
comments that ‘‘our best scientists are floundering in the search for a viable paradigm. It is
hard to tell the blind alleys from the salients of advance’’ (p. 464). Elms (1975) notes that
‘‘whether they are experiencing an identity crisis, a paradigmatic crisis, or a crisis in
confidence, most seem to agree that a crisis is at hand’’ (p. 967). The ‘‘crisis,’’ however, was
not isolated to social psychology alone. Other areas such as clinical (Albee, 1970; Sarason,
1981), developmental (Kessen, 1979; Wolwill, 1973), personality (Carlson, 1971; Fiske,
1974), experimental (Palermo, 1971), and psychology as a whole (Deese, 1972), are said to
have undergone a similar ‘‘crisis."
The ‘‘crisis’’ represents the general syndrome of discontent with the past
accomplishments and with future uncertainty. The symptoms of the ‘‘crisis’’ have also
been identified. Specifically, social psychology was criticized for being trivial (Allport,
1968; Ring, 1967), artificial (Levine, 1974; Moscovici, 1972), fragmented (Katz, 1967;
McGuire, 1967), reductionistic (Pepitone, 1976; Sherif & Sherif, 1969), isolated as a
discipline (Anastasi, 1972; House, 1977), limited in generalizability (Cartwright, 1979;
Cronbach, 1975), method-bound (Lachenmeyer, 1970; Levine, 1974), culture-bound (Berry,
1978; Murphy, 1965), culture-blind (Berry, 1978; Triandis, Malpass & Davis, 1973),
historically-bound (Gergen, 1978; Samelson, 1977), conceptually and theoretically naive
(Elms, 1975; Tyler, 1970), hampered by over-reliance on statistics (Bakan, 1967; Boulding,
1980), narrowly focussed on individualism (Pepitone, 1976; Sampson, 1978; Tajfel, 1979),
irrelevant for understanding social issues and problems (McGuire, 1967; Smith, 1973),
value-laden (Gergen, 1973; Vallance, 1972), ethnocentrically American (Brandt, 1970;
Cartwright, 1979; Sampson, 1977), ideologically reified (Chorover, 1980), and confounded
with experimental artifacts (Adair, 1973; Orne, 1969; Ronsenthal & Rosnow, 1969).
In the early 1980’s, with the coming of the cognitive revolution, the crisis of confidence
experienced earlier became forgotten. Although psychologists have failed to address the
fundamental issues concerning its scientific status, the continued funding from government
agencies and the increased number of students and faculty members allowed many
psychologists to proceed to a different topic (e.g., cognitivism) without resolving the basic
paradigmic question. On the positive side, however, significant advances in social
psychology have emerged since the ‘‘crisis.’’ In this special issue, eight papers document
these advances. In order to fully appreciate implications of these advances, we must first
understand the scientific basis of the ‘‘crisis’’ and the basis of developing alternative
frameworks.

Background

The cause of the paradigmic crisis in psychology (and social psychology in particular) can
be identified as the inappropriate adoption and myopic emulation of the natural sciences
approach (Bandura, in this issue; Harré, in this issue; Kim & Berry, 1993; Koch & Leary,
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1985). Psychology attempted to become an objective, independent branch of natural

sciences by adopting the basic tenets of natural sciences and emulating their methods.
Having adopted objectivism as a guiding principle, psychology proceeded to tailor its
science to rid of subjectivities: from philosophy, it adopted positivism (especially, logical
positivism); from physics, it adopted operationism; and from mathematics, it adopted
inferential statistics (especially, the analysis of variance). In terms of method, the
experimental method became the sine qua non of psychological research and it has become
the defining feature of psychology (Allport, 1940; Cronbach, 1975; Estes, 1954; Hull, 1943;
Koch, 1985).
Emulating chemistry and physics, psychologists sought to discover abstract, universal
laws of human behavior that transcend individual, social, cultural, and temporal boundaries
(Bandura, in this issue; Harré, in this issue; Sampson, 1978). Basic elementary facts, once
discovered, could then serve as building blocks for understanding complex human behavior.
Psychologists attempted to develop a periodic table of basic human behavior and laws that
govern the formation of complex behavior.
Early in its history, behaviorism provided a paradigmic foundation for institutionalizing
psychology as independent branch of natural sciences by articulating an approach that would
allow psychological phenomena to be amenable to objective, experimental analysis (Koch,
1985). First, behaviorists severed their connection with its founder, Wilhelm Wundt, who
chose introspection and consciousness as the main tool and unit of analysis. Individual
consciousness was deemed subjective and eliminated from the analysis. By eliminating
consciousness as the basic unit of analysis, the differentiation between animals and human
beings was eliminated. Second, by affirming the continuation of species between animals
and human beings, human action, experience, and their social contents were subsumed under
the general study of behavior. Third, analysis of behavior that can be systematically
quantified, observed, and verified was chosen as the basic unit of analysis. Fourth,
behaviorists assumed the existence of elementary behaviors that would serve as the
foundation for understanding complex human behavior. By assuming the existence of
elementary units and the continuation of species, laboratory studies using animals became
justified. The results of these laboratory studies would be then generalized to human
behavior and they would become the basis for explaining complex behavior (Gerard &
Conolley, 1972; Hebb, 1974; Schelenker, 1974).
Behaviorism provided the needed paradigmic direction, method, and substance to the
discipline of psychology. After reviewing the 50-year trend in the principal psychological
journals, Allport (1940) found psychology to be empirical, mechanistic, quantitative,
nomothetic, analytic, and operational. Similarly, Estes (1954) notes that ‘‘the underlying
philosophy is strongly marked by the influence of logical positivism and operationism,’’ and
‘‘the point of view is characterized by an assumption of continuity with physiology and
physics and a tendency to take the experimental and theoretical methods of the physical
sciences as a starting point for approaching the problem of behavior’’ (p. 317). In the middle
of the 1960’s, however, behaviorism experienced a paradigmic crisis and was abandoned due
to limited internal and external validity (Kimble, 1985; Koch & Leary, 1985; Leahey, 1980).

Social Psychology

August Comte (1852) raised a basic dilemma that is central to social psychology and all
social sciences: ‘‘How can the individual be at once cause and consequence of society?’’
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(cited in Allport, 1968, p. 8). This dilemma raises the following generic issue: what is the
relationship between an individual and a collective entity such as a group, society, or
culture?
Popper (1976) argues that individuals constitute the basic unit of analysis. He states that
all collective phenomena are caused by and can be explained in terms of ‘‘actions,
interactions, aims, hopes, and thoughts of individual men’’ and by ‘‘traditions created and
preserved by individual men’’ (p. 86). He has popularized the position of methodological
individualism (O’Neill, 1976). Bhaskar (1979) defines it as ‘‘the doctrine that facts about
societies, and social phenomena generally, are to be explained solely in terms of facts about
individuals’’ (p. 34). Methodological individualism assumes that all groups or holistic
concepts can be, in principle, understood in terms of individual behavior and posits that
‘‘behavior of a group can be defined in terms of behavior in groups’’ (Brodbeck, 1976, p.
290). In other words, the properties of a group are the mere sums of the properties of its
parts. It denies the separate scientific usefulness of holistic entities such as groups,
institutions, and culture.
Psychology has adopted the individual as the basic unit of analysis and affirms
methodological individualism (Pepitone, 1976; Sampson, 1977; Spence, 1985). In social
psychology, Floyd Allport (1924) was the key architect of this development. He argued that
the individual is the most appropriate unit of analysis and rejected the group level of
analysis: ‘‘There is no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely a
psychology of individuals . . . Within his organism are provided all the mechanisms by
which social behavior is explained’’ (p. 4).
One of the most cited definitions in social psychology reflects this individualistic bias.
Social psychology is defined as ‘‘an attempt to understand and explain how the thought,
feeling, and behavior of individuals are influenced by the actual, imagined, or implied
presence of others’’ (G. Allport, 1968, p. 3). The focus of research is to treat social elements
as stimuli and not as distinct entities. As a result of this individualistic position, major
theories in social psychology have focused on the intra-individual processes and neglected
the analysis of collective units (Pepitone, 1976, 1981; Sampson, 1977).
Sampson (1978) points out that results of social psychology are believed to be value-free
insofar as ‘‘it is objective, eliminating the standpoint of the knower from the knowledge that
is obtained so that a realm of pure facts as such is achieved. It seeks principles of
psychological functioning that are abstract, general, and universal’’ (Sampson, 1978, p.1333).
Kruglanski (1975) states that social psychology is a universalistic rather than a particularistic
brand of inquiry. The universalistic approach emphasizes the following aspects: ‘‘(1) an
interest in the abstract meaning of the empirical data; (2) primary attention to the detection of
invariance (or lawful relations between variables); (3) a universal scope of generality,
tentatively claimed for the findings across all sort of varieties of theoretically irrelevant
conditions. This means tentative denial of interactions between the treatment and any of the
background conditions of research; and (4) the absence of interest in any determinants of
phenomena other than the variables currently studied’’ (Kruglanski, 1975, p.105).
If we examine the activities of social psychologists, we can extract several common
features. Social psychological research can be characterized by the following five
characteristics: (1) the use of experimental method, (2) the use of university students, (3)
studies conducted in laboratory setting, (4) the use of statistics, especially analysis of
variance, and (5) the dominance of the US researchers (Kim, 1986). In a survey of articles in
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology published from 1975 to 1983, on the average,
67% used experimental method in a laboratory setting; 65% used university students; 80%
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of the studies were conducted in a laboratory setting; and 87% of the articles were published
by authors affiliated with an US university (Kim, 1986). In a survey of articles published in
four social psychology journals, Higbee, Millard and Folkman (1982) note that in 1979, 77%
articles in the Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94% in the Journal of
Experimental Social Psychology, 66% in the Journal of Social Psychology, and 61% in
Sociometry were experimental.
Gerard and Conolley (1972) defend experimentation, laboratory setting, and use
university students. They state that ‘‘in psychology [empirical] generalizations merely relate
responses to stimulus conditions without considering the intervening organismic processes
that might mediate the stimulus-response relationship’’ and ‘‘the social psychological
‘person’ we are talking about is an idealized entity, constructed by the social psychologist,
that consists of a hypothetical set of parts and internal processes which, because they are
hypothetical, cannot be observed directly’’ (p.238). They also assume that human beings are
essentially the same: ‘‘we have the basic faith that human beings are human beings, and that
social phenomena occurring anywhere, and at any time, can be interpreted within the basic
conceptual framework’’ (p.242). Thus, social psychologists are justified in working with a
convenient group of subjects: ‘‘Given the abiding faith in basic universals of humankind, the
social psychologist might just as well work with a subject population he knows something
about, and that is close at hand – the students in his classes’’ (p.242).

Linear conception of causality

The use of experimentation, laboratory setting, university students, and inferential statistics
reflect the emulation of natural sciences in search of objective, abstract, and universal laws.
In terms of causality, psychology has adopted the direct, single, and linear model of
causality. (See Figure 1). In this model, the goal is to discover objective, abstract, universal
relationship between input variables (observable 1) and the output variables (observable 2)
that transcend individual, social, cultural, and temporal boundaries. Characteristics of
individuals (such as human consciousness, agency, and intentionality) are considered
subjective or as ‘‘noise’’ and eliminated from the research design. Psychological constructs
(such as anxiety, motivation, or emotions) are inferred as intervening variables, or
considered as hypothetical constructs. Classical conditioning, operant condition, and the
information processing approach are examples of the single linear model of causality.

Observable 1 Hypothetical Observable 2

Figure 1. The linear conception of causality

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The goal of this approach is to examine how the input or independent variable (stimulus,
reinforcement, and information) is reacted to, or processed by, an organism to provide an
output or a response (dependent variable) in an attempt to discover a lawful relationship
between the two. Within this approach, the universality of experimental results is asserted
based upon the assumption of homogeneity of organism‘s physiology, or universality of the
central processing mechanism (Bandura, in this issue; Harré, in this issue; Shweder, 1991).
The scientific validity and merit of these assertions and assumptions are, however,
questionable and need to be reexamined.

Identification and analysis of the problem

Objectivity
Modern physics began with the recognition that the physical world is an alien domain where
neither our intuitions, speculation nor our anthropocentric assumptions can be trusted
(Beloff, 1973). Objectivity in science is viewed as a hallmark that separates science from
other disciplines. Objectivism implies efforts to be ‘‘impartial, to have no preferences,
predilections or prejudices, no biases, no preconceived values or judgments in the presence
of the facts’’ (Wirth, 1946, p. xvii–xviii). Our subjective understanding and interpretations
of the physical world have often been speculative and biased, and they have frequently
hindered our understanding of the physical world. Objectivity is viewed as a hallmark of the
natural sciences that eliminates or limits these biases. The method of investigation involves
separating the standpoint of the knower (subject) from the known (object), so that a realm of
pure facts can be attained (Sampson, 1978).
Although an objective stance was necessary in aiding the discovering of physical laws,
human subjectivity (such as intuition and speculation) is inseparable from objectivity, and
through subjectivity seminal works in science have been accomplished (Burke, 1985;
Holten, 1973; Polanyi, 1968). Polanyi (1968) points out that objective and subjective aspects
of science cannot be separated. His analysis of each and every step in scientific enterprise
led him to conclude that the existence of an objective science is not a fact, but a belief. He
states that:

Nothing is more certain in our world than the established results of science. My point is that the
absence of strict criteria on which to base our acceptance of science merely shows that our
confidence in scientific knowledge is based on nonstrict criteria. Science is grounded, and is
firmly grounded, on the kind of indefinable insights which the current view of science regards as
mere psychological phenomena, incapable of producing rational inferences. (p. 27)

Polanyi (1968) demonstrates that the hard criteria of science inevitably rest on the soft
criteria of human judgement. Moreover, it is not possible to eliminate these soft criteria, or
even reduce them to insignificance. As a result, empirical knowledge ends up resting on
subjective rather than objective criteria. Popper (1959) similarly points out the impossibility
of making a science out of elements that are strictly verifiable and justifiable: ‘‘Science is
not a system of certain, or well-established, statements; nor is it a system which steadily
advances toward a state if finality. We do not know, we can only guess and our guesses are
guided by the unscientific faith in laws, in regularities which we can uncover- discover ‘‘ (p.
278)
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Burke (1985) points out that seminal discoveries in science have been made in
irrational and dream-like states. He notes that these discoveries do not proceed in purely
rational and mechanical fashion. He provides the following series of examples. Einstein
revolutionized the fundamental understanding of matter when he saw himself ‘‘riding on
a beam of light’’ in his dream, and concluded that ‘‘if he were to do so, light would
appear to be static’’ (p. 303). August Kekulé realized the structure of the benzene ring
when he was ‘‘gazing into the fire and seeing in the flames a ring of atoms like a serpent
eating its own tail’’ (p. 303). Newton is said to have realized the Law of Gravitational
Attraction when he saw an apple fall to the ground. Archimedes leaped out of his bathtub
yelling eureka when he realized the meaning of displacement. Gutenberg described the
idea of the printing as ‘‘coming like a ray of light’’ (p. 303). Wallace realized the theory
of evolution in a ‘‘delirium.’’ Burke (1985) notes that these ‘‘act of mystical significance
in which man uncovers yet another secret of nature is at the very heart of science’’ (p.
303).
Although science does not progress in a series of purely objective and mechanical
fashion, published scientific reports reinforce the perception that the process of
experimentation and discovery is objective, rational, and transparent. Even in natural
sciences, Gerard Holten (1973), a prominent physicist, points out that although
subjectivity is very much part of the scientific enterprise, scientific publications create
and maintains this ‘‘objective’’ image: ‘‘Most of the publications are fairly
straightforward reconstructions, implying a story of step-by-step progress along fairly
logical chains, with simple interplay between experiment, theory, and inherited concepts.
Significantly, however, this is not true precisely of some of the most profound and most
seminal work. There we are more likely to see plainly the illogical, nonlinear, and
therefore ‘irrational’ elements that are juxtaposed to the logical nature of the concepts
themselves’’ (p. 18).
Holten (1973) notes that scientific geniuses (such as Kepler, Newton, Einstein, Bohr,
Pauli, Born, Schordinger, Heisenberg, and Einstein) all recognized the inseparability of the
subjective and objective aspects of science. The subjective components such as
presuppositions, intuition, insight, methodological judgments, interpretive decisions, and
conceptual leaps are essential and necessary components of science. Albert Einstein noted
that ‘‘science as an existing, finished [corpus of knowledge] is the most objective, most
unpersonal [thing] human beings know, [but] science as something coming into being, as
aim, is just as subjective and psychologically conditioned as any other of man’s efforts’’
(cited in Holten, 1988, p. 6–7). Holten (1973) notes that objective and subjective aspects are
not independent, but they are complementary.
In a similar vein, Levine (1974) argues that in psychology, an experimenter is very much
a part of the phenomena. Similarly, Tyler (1970) states that researchers themselves ‘‘are
interested parties in their own undertakings and not simply disinterestedly engaged in the
pursuit of truth. Their daily endeavors are shaped by internal and external factors. One may
view their scientific paradigms as powerful tools in search of truth, but they can hardly be
viewed as totally impersonal and objective schemata. They, too, were created by and serve a
human master’’ (p. 222). Many scholars state that we can no longer adhere blindly to the
belief in objective science, and that we must recognize the subjectivity in psychology (e.g.,
Crutfield & Krech, 1962; Danziger, 1979; Levine, 1974; Samelson, 1977; Sherif & Sherif,
1969; Tyler, 1970).

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Scientific Method

Boulding (1980) notes that contrary to the popular conception of the existence of a
‘‘scientific method,’’ there is a plurality of methods in science. A particular method, such as
experimentation, cannot be accepted as being scientific from the onset. Boulding (1980)
notes that ‘‘one illusion, held even within the scientific community and by many outside it,
is that there is a single ‘scientific method,’ a touchstone that can distinguish what is
scientific from what is not’’ and ‘‘within the scientific community there is a great variety of
methods, and one of the problems which science still has to face is the development of
appropriate methods corresponding to different epistemological fields’’ (p. 833). He points
out that there are many instances where, although rigorous scientific methods are used, the
results are not deemed to be scientific. For example, alchemists had controlled experiments,
astrologers have careful observation, geomancers, diviners and phrenologists have
controlled observations and measurements, and theologians have logic (Boulding, 1980).
He emphasizes that ‘‘these methods are not peculiar to science and none of them define it’’
(p. 833). Finding a match between a method and a phenomenon is part and parcel of
scientific research.

An alternative framework. At the turn of this century, two constructs that were considered
central in psychology and discussed extensively by prominent psychologists such as
Wilhelm Wundt and William James were consciousness and will (or agency). These two
concepts, along with the influence of context and meaning, were later eliminated from
research design. These four aspects were considered as unnecessary subjective elements or
as ‘‘noise’’ and were eliminated in behaviorists’ search for objective, abstract, and universal
laws. They are, however, essential facets in human functioning. They need to be part and
parcel of psychological research.
In the area of perception, for example, Hagen (1985) has found that experimental
approaches to perception have enormous difficulties in explaining how meaning is acquired.
She points out that traditional approaches in psychology have eliminated meaningfulness of
both stimuli and context and then postulated that meaning is somehow, somewhere added to
physical stimuli through the process of cognition and memory. As a case in point, Hermann
Ebbinghaus initiated the use of nonsense syllables to study memory independent of
meaning. Ebbinghaus believed that meaningfulness of the stimulus word would contaminate
the purity of perception and thus nonsense syllables were used instead (Haber, 1985). Haber
(1985) concludes that these experiments were misconceived: ‘‘we struggled for a half
century before we realized that memory implied meaning and the whole enterprise of
nonsensical memory was nonsense’’ (p.271). Hagen points out that traditional approaches
are unable to resolve how ‘‘meaningless stimulus fortuitously trigger the appropriate
associated meaningful memories’’ (p. 247).
Haber (1985) has found that perception is influenced and often determined by expectation,
motivation, and meaning. Moreover, perception occurs in a context; it cannot be separated
from a task: ‘‘All cognitive activities, including perception, occur in a context – a context of
current stimulation, of assumptions about that stimulation, or prior knowledge about such
displays and tasks, and of procedures of processing and retaining the current stimulation . . .
We need to know the stimulus, the aspects of the stimulus known by the perceiver (especially
the rules which govern its organization), and how those rules are typically used by the same
perceiver. If we as theorists and experimenters attend to only some of those, the analysis can
be incorrect and our understanding of the phenomenon is inadequate’’ (p.271, 273). Similarly,
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Gibson (1985), reviewing 100 years of research in perception, concludes that ‘‘our
experiments have been misconceived. . . We have assumed that the controlling of the
physical variables of stimuli at the sense organs of a perceiver would relate the physical to the
psychical, as if what we need to perceive was physics’’ (p. 230).
Although the four facets (consciousness, agency, meaning and context) cannot be
included in physical sciences, they are essential features in psychology. Since the object and
subject of investigation in human sciences differ from physical sciences (i.e., human beings
versus inanimate objects), the scientific paradigm must take these differences into account.
Consequently, rather than blindly emulating the natural sciences approach, it is important to
develop a scientific paradigm that is appropriate for human sciences.

Comparison of physical, biological, and human sciences

The comparison among physical, biological, and human sciences is depicted in Figure 2. In
all three approaches, the goal of science is to discover the cause of a particular phenomenon
(the ‘‘why’’). These sciences differ in terms of the target or subject of investigation: in
physical sciences, inanimate objects are the targets of investigation; in biological sciences
living organisms are the targets of investigation; in human sciences, human beings are the
targets of investigation.

Figure 2. Comparison of physical, biological, and human sciences

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Inanimate objects do not possess life and they are relatively stable, homogeneous, and
isolatable when compared to animate objects. Physical objects (mass such as salt, NaCl) are
reactive to external stimuli (force such as electrical attraction), and experimental replications
could be performed by using new, identical raw material. In order to explain the cause of the
chemical reaction (the questions of the ‘‘why’’), researchers need to know the nature of the
objects (the ‘‘what’’) and the process of chemical reaction (the ‘‘how’’).
Living organisms, on the other hand, do not simply react to external stimuli. They
interact with, and adapt to, their environment. They possess a central nervous system that
records their experiences and this information is passed on to subsequent generations. In
Darwin’s Theory of Evolution, he was able to explain variations in species by documenting
their adaption to particular ecology (the ‘‘where’’). Similarly, ethologists such as Konrad
Lorenz and Niko Tinbergen, emphasize the need to investigate animals in their natural
habitat. Roeder (1965) comments that ‘‘a tiger’s teeth and a fish’s fins have evolutionary
significance not only in their shape, but also in how and where they are used’’ (italics added,
p. 7). Etholgists contend that animals have adapted to, and their behaviors are meaningful in,
a particular ecological niche (Tinbergen, 1965).
During the descriptive phase, ethologists uncovered stable parameters and isolatable
subsystems (such as fixed action patterns, species specific defence mechanisms, and innate
releasing mechanisms). These units of analysis are then subsequently used for controlled
experimentation. Conceptually, they emphasized a rich diversity of animal life and behavior,
but underlying diversity they saw basic patterns of inherited instincts that are adaptive to
their natural environment.
Like other living organisms, human beings possess reactive and interactive
characteristics. Physiological and biochemical properties that humans possess act in a
reactive way (e.g., the knee jerk reflex). Like other organisms, human beings have adapted
to their ecology to satisfy their basic subsistence needs (Kim, 1994). To fully understand the
interactive nature of humans, like ethology, research need to be conducted in naturalistic
settings.
There is, however, a central difference between human beings and other organisms.
Human beings have the creative and generative potential and they are able to communicate
this information to other people. They possess the ability to understand, explain, predict,
control, and modify their environment (Bandura, in this issue). This reflective and creative
feature allows human beings to not only adapt to their ecology, but to understand it and
control it.
The mating behavior of animals, for example, could be explained in terms of fixed
action patterns (instinct) and innate releasing mechanisms (hormones) that lead to a pattern
of predictable stereotyped sexual behavior (Ford & Beach, 1951). For animals, the mating
partner (the ‘‘who’’) and context (the ‘‘where’’) are relatively unimportant. In human beings,
the most important aspect of sexual behavior is not necessarily instincts and hormones, but
who one mates with and where (Gagnon, 1977). In human sciences, in addition to knowing
the ‘‘what,’’ ‘‘how,’’ and ‘‘where,’’ we need to know the ‘‘who.’’
Figure 2 does not imply that human sciences are more advanced or inclusive than
physical and biological sciences. On the contrary, it is the least developed of the three. The
figure points out the inherent complexity of human psychology: we are both the
investigators and at the same time the investigated and creators and created. Rather than
eliminating essential human qualities (such as consciousness, agency, context, and meaning)
to fit into a narrow mold of natural sciences, we need to develop a scientific model that
could incorporate these essential human qualities.
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Transactional model of science

The need to develop an alternative scientific model for human beings was articulated as
early as 1725 by an Italian philosopher named Giovanni Battista Vico. In his book entitled,
Principles of New Science, he distinguished between the ‘‘outer’’ (physical world) from the
‘‘inner’’ (human world). Vico pointed out that the nature of knowledge possible for the
human world differs qualitatively from the nature of knowledge for physical objects. Also,
theories and methods developed in the natural sciences can provide only a limited
understanding of the human world. The following description of Vico’s work is a summary
of the translation of Vico’s work by Berlin (1976).
Vico noted that knowledge has been traditionally divided into three categories: (1)
metaphysical or religious knowledge (i.e., based on intuition, faith, revelation), (2) deductive
or analytical knowledge (e.g., logic, grammar, and mathematics), and (3) perceptual or
inductive knowledge (e.g., empirical observations or experimentation). Vico articulated the
fourth and more important type of knowledge that focuses on the human world: ‘‘The
knowledge of activities of which we, the knowing subjects, are ourselves the authors,
endowed with motives, purposes, and a continuous social life, which we understand, as it
were, from inside. Here and only here we are not passive observers looking on from the
outside, as when we contemplate the external world, where all we can see are events, or the
‘surfaces’ of things’’ (Berlin, 1976, p. 22).
In the physical world, human beings are mere observers and our knowledge is based on
our senses and perception (empirical knowledge). We can classify the content of this
knowledge into regularities, dissect them, recombine them, simulate them, and superimpose
mathematical techniques on them (analytical knowledge), but the results will only yield
correlations between two events. In other words, we can only describe a table, a tree, and an
ant, and discover physical laws found in physics, botany, and entomology. Such laws can
provide a description of what the objects are and how they function, but they cannot tell us
what it is like to be a table, a tree, or an ant (phenomenological knowledge).
In the human world, we know and can feel what it is like to be a human being. People
have access to their personal and social world. For example, novelists are fully cognizant of
the characters in their novels, the painters, their paintings, and composers, their songs,
because they have created these works of art. Although they may be able to not articulate
this knowledge in an analytic fashion as well as a trained literary, art, or music critics could,
they are nevertheless the creators of these works and have an understanding of these
products beyond what an observer can fathom. Their knowledge and insight, however, could
be communicated, reconstructed, recaptured, experienced and appreciated by others through
their works of art.
In terms of causes of human behavior and thought, we raise phenomenological and
agenetic questions that are not asked in the natural sciences. We ask questions such as:
‘‘Why do men act as they do . . . what mental states or events (e.g. feelings or volitions) are
followed by what acts, but also why, why persons in this or that mental or emotional state
are or are not likely to behave in a given fashion, what is, or what would be, rational or
desirable or right for them to do, and how and why they decide between various courses of
action. In short, we judge human activity in terms of purposes, motives, acts of will,
decisions, doubts, hesitations, thoughts, hopes, fears, and desires; these are among the ways
in which we distinguish human beings from the rest of nature’’ (Berlin, 1976, p. 22).
In the natural world, we do not question the motive, intention, and purpose of inanimate
objects or animals. Such an act would be considered irrational, or a misapplication of
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categories called anthropomorphism or animism. In the human world, the concepts of

agency and intention are essential in explaining a person’s behavior. In the case of the death
of a person, although the outcome is identical (i.e., someone has been killed), we distinguish
the act using the concept of intention (i.e., whether it was premeditated or not) and agency
(i.e., whether the person was sane, or under the influence of alcohol, or responsible for his or
her behavior). Also, the outcome or punishment varies depending on the intention and
agency of the act (i.e., punishment for premeditated murder is immensely different from
involuntary manslaughter and from self-defense). In the natural world, it is meaningless to
classify animal behavior using these concepts, but in the human world, they are essential. In
the natural world, we can ascertain only an impartial, third person understanding. In the
human world, we can ascertain not only impartial, third person perspective, but we can also
obtain the perspective of the actor (i.e., the first person ‘‘I’’) and the second person
perspective through self-report.
Finally, Vico rejected the use of mathematical models to explain the human world. Vico
pointed out that propositions in mathematics are clear, distinct, and certain not because they
are innately so, but because we have created mathematics as such: ‘‘mathematics is indeed
most clear, most rigorous and wholly irrefutable, but only because it is the free creation of
our own minds . . . mathematical propositions are true only because we ourselves have made
them’’ (Berlin, 1976, p. 15). Mathematics, computers, and science are products of our
collective creation, and it would be erroneous to use them as molds for understanding human
beings. They should be considered as creative human products, like works of art. They
should be analyzed to ascertain the nature and process of their creation and to understand the
nature of the creative process.
In the transactional model of science, the continuum between the observable and
inferred is recognized. (See Figure 3). Creativity, which is essential in scientific discovery,
is composed of aspects that are visible and aspects which need to be inferred. The visible
aspect consists our observations of, and experimentations with, the empirical world that
could be verified using our senses. We organize this information into our analytical,

Figure 3. The nature of knowledge and creativity

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theoretical, and epistemological framework and publish them in scientific journals. As

Holten (1973) pointes out, there is the third plane, called the themata, which includes
phenomenological and agentic aspects of science (such as motives, presuppositions,
intuition, insight, methodological judgments, interpretive decisions, and conceptual leaps).
The inferred aspects can become an integral and explicit part of science in the
transactional model. (See Figure 4). Figure 4 is an integration of the triadic reciprocal
causation and dual causal linkage model proposed by Bandura (1997). In this approach,
human agency and intention are considered as central, linking observable input with the
observable output. In this model, human beings are considered as actors, who not only react
and interact with the environment, but create new environments to meet their needs. Since
human beings are conscious of their inner state, this intermediate state could be assessed
through self-report. In contrast to the reactive and retrospective model of human functioning,
this model focuses on the generative and proactive aspects.
Bandura (1997) has empirically and systematically documented the importance of
examining the dual causal linkage (between input-agent, and between agent-output) in
explaining human behavior. For example, intelligence tests (such as Stanford-Binet and
Wechsler) assume that differences in performance could be explained by the degree to
which an individual possesses the innate intellectual ability. In other words, individuals who
possessed the necessary cognitive skill would perform better than individuals who do not in
a simple, direct, and linear fashion.
In the transaction model, it is important to examine generative capabilities of
individuals. In understanding effective functioning, Bandura (1997) stresses the
importance of generative capability known as self-efficacy. He defines self-efficacy as
‘‘beliefs in one‘ s capabilities to organize and execute the courses of action required to
produce given attainments’’ (p. 3). He points outs that ‘‘efficacy is a generative capability in
which cognitive, emotional, and behavioral subskills must be organized and effectively
orchestrated to serve innumerable purposes’’ (p. 37). Collins (1982) found that when
children were equated for ability in mathematics (low, medium, or high), those children who
had higher efficacy beliefs performed significantly better than those who had lower efficacy
beliefs (cited in Bandura, 1997). Thus, efficacy beliefs were able to predict performance
above and beyond cognitive ability.
In the transactional model, human action can be explained in two steps. (See Figure 4).
First, it is important to examine how an individual perceives and interprets an event or
environment (causal linkage 1). This information can be obtained through self-report. The
second step involves assessing individual‘s performance (causal linkage 2). The dual causal
linkage has been systematically analyzed and documented by Bandura (1997). In both
within subject and between subject design, Bandura, Reese and Adams (1982) were able to

Figure 4. The transactional model of science

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increase self-efficacy beliefs of people who are afraid of snakes to a higher level by having
them observe a model cope effectively with the feared object. At this phase, self-efficacy
beliefs of participants were assessed through self-report (causal linkage 1). They have found
that watching a model cope effectively with the feared object increases participants’ self-
efficacy. The second phase involved having the subjects perform the task that they observed
previously (causal linkage 2). The results indicated that modelling raised their efficacy
beliefs (causal linkage 1), which in turn increased their level of performance (causal linkage
2). Bandura et al. (1982) subsequently raised the perceived efficacy to a higher level and
found corresponding improvements in their performance.
In this dynamic model, the successful performance of a task can reverse the flow of
causality, in which the output can now become input. (See Figure 4). Successful completion
of a task can increase the self-efficacy of an individual and this belief can enable the
individual to set a higher goal, or to seek a more challenging event or environment (Bandura,
1997). Similar patterns of results were also observed for failure experiences, which lowered
self-efficacy, and which in turn lowered the goal one set for oneself (Bandura, 1997).
According to Bandura (1997), successful mastery experiences could lead to trans-
formative changes in other aspects of a person’s life. For example, mastery of a snake phobia
reduced social timidity, increased venturesomeness, boosted self-expressiveness, increased
desires to overcome other fears, such as fear of public speaking in some participants. These
results could not be explained by stimulus generalizations or by the single, direct, linear
conception of causality. The results could be explained in terms of a transformative change
in personal belief system (Bandura, 1997); an emergent property not reducible to a single
cause.
The second important aspect of the transactional model is to separate the different levels
of analysis: physiological, psychological, and collective. In psychology, many explanations
of behavior have been reduced to physiological or neurological basis. Although all actions
have a physiological basis, explanations cannot be reduced to the physiological level. Rather
than viewing physiology as a cause or basis of our behavior, it needs to be viewed as given
tools that we use to achieve a desired goal (Bandura, 1997; Harré & Gillet, 1994). For
example, driving skills does not depend on knowing mechanics of internal combustion and
athletic feats can be performed without knowing their corresponding physiology. Harré and
Gillet (1994) point out that ‘‘the brain, for any individual human being, is the repository of
meaning in that it serves as the physical medium in which mental content is realized and
plays a part in the discursive activities of individuals’’ (p. 81). Although, it has been
traditionally assumed that our physiology affects our psychology in a simple, direct, and
linear fashion, Francis, Soma, and Fernald (1993) have shown, in a study of African teleost
fish, that the reverse is also true: social status affects brain physiology and functioning. A
similar pattern of results is found for human beings (Bandura, 1997; Chorover, 1980).
Thirdly, collective entities such as a group cannot be view as a mere sum of individual
characteristics; it is an emergent property of individuals interacting with one another.
Paralleling the concept of agentic self and self-efficacy, Bandura (in this issue) proposed
collective agency and collective efficacy. He points out that ‘‘people’s shared beliefs in their
collective power to produce a desired outcome is a crucial ingredient of collective agency’’
and ‘‘group performance is the product of interactive and coordinative dynamics of its
members’’ (p. 34). Moreover, culture, language, philosophy, and science are not individual
creations, but collectively defined, propagated and generated. The relationship between an
individuals and group need to be viewed as a dynamic, interactive system of mutual
influence. Contributors in this issue (e.g., Hwang, Triandis, Wagner et al., Yamagishi et al.)
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document the dynamics relationship between the individual and collective entities such as
group, society and culture.
Finally, as Vico has pointed out above, regularities and certainties exist in the human
world because we have created our world as such. In mathematics, propositions are true if
and only if we accept its basic axiom. Similarly, there are regularities in human behavior
because we follow rules, roles, and laws that we have created (Harré, in this issue). Unlike
physical laws, human rules and laws are not determinates of behavior and they can be
broken by some individuals or modified due to changing needs. Thus, cause of our behavior
could be explained in terms of the rules, roles and laws that we have created and to the
degree to which we abide by them.
As pointed out by several authors in this issue (Bandura, Harré, Hwang, Triandis,
Yamagishi et al.) cultures have created a different set of rules, roles, laws, and reward and
punishment contingency. Yamagishi and colleagues (1998; in this issue) point out that it
would be erroneous to attribute the collective orientation and ingroup favoritism shown by
Japanese as an individual preference (Japanese like to behave in such a manner –
explanation at the individual level). They behave as such because they have a generalized
expectation that such behavior will be rewarded in Japanese society (social contingency –
explanation at the societal level). Similarly, Sullivan, Suzuki, and Kondo (1986) found that
Japanese employees are more likely to be rewarded when they work together in a group,
whereas US employees are more likely to be rewarded when they work alone. As a result,
they have found that Japanese employees are more likely to work together in a group when
compared to American employees.
Yamagishi, Jin and Miller (1998) point out that uncertainty is a problem faced by all
societies. In Japan, people trust and invest in close ingroups ‘‘since forming a mutually
committed relationship that is largely closed to outsiders is the most easily available
response to problems of social uncertainty’’ (p. 325). In contrast, in the US people invest in
individuals and develop necessary skills to function effectively with outgroup members
(Triandis, in this issue; Yamagishi et al., in this issue).
At the cultural level, liberal philosophy has been developed in the West to provide
direction, coherence, and coordination in social life (Kim, 1994). In East Asia,
Confucianism has been adopted and its philosophical tenets emphasizing human
relatedness are influential. These philosophical traditions provide direction, meaning, and
social coordination. They do not have the same physical force as natural laws and can be
modified to suit the changing needs and conditions (Hwang, in this issue).

Special issue

Although significant advances in social psychology have been made since the crisis, many
psychologists are unaware of these advances. Since we are not likely to interact with those
who do not share a common scientific discourse, the goal of the special issue is to bring
together the diverse perspectives into one issue and to let the audience evaluate the merit of
each approach. Of diverse theoretical and methodological advances, eight approaches are
brought together. It is worthy noting that these advances have originated in different parts of
the world, being influenced by a different academic tradition and social conditions: North
America (social cognitive theory – Bandura; social cognition – Operario & Fiske), Europe
(discursive psychology – Harré; social identity theory – Hogg & Grieve; social
representation – Wagner, Duveen, Farr, Jovchelovitch, Lorenzi-Cioldi, Markova, &
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Rose), Asia (articles by Hwang and Yamagishi et al.), and through international
collaboration (cross-cultural psychology – Triandis)
Articles by Bandura and Harré articulate fundamental paradigm shift from the traditional
model. These two articles represent a brief synopsis of their approach and it would be
informative and useful to read their full description (i.e., Bandura, 1997; Harré & Gillet,
1994).
The article by Operario and Fiske reviews the research tradition that is dominant in
social psychology since the crisis in social psychology, namely social cognition. The article
by Hogg and Grieve reviews the research in social identity theory (tradition introduced by
Henri Tajfel). Social identity theory emphasizes the ‘‘social dimensions’’ in social
psychology and in understanding intergroup relations. The article by Wagner et al.
reviews the current research on social representation (tradition initiated by Serge
Moscovici). This approach emphasizes the importance of understanding the historical,
social, and cultural conditions in which human action occur. In terms of method, it utilizes
and integrates both quantitative and qualitative research techniques.
The last three articles stress the importance of examining cultural and social context.
The article by Triandis reviews the current advances in cross-cultural psychology. Triandis
outlines the cultural dimensions of individualism and collectivism and suggests ways to
incorporate them into social psychological research. The article by Yamagishi et al.
examines concept of trust empirically in the US and Japan. They point out the importance of
examining social environment and contingency that affect the type of trust and social skills
that are developed. The final article by Hwang outlines a Confucian conception of self,
relationship, and society. Compared to the emphasis on individual in the West, in
Confucianism relationship constitute the basic unit of analysis, or methodological
relationalism articulated by Ho (1998).

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