List of Cases on Judicial Ethics

1) In Re: Justice Ong (A,M. No. SB-14-21-J)

A.M. No. SB-14-21-J September 23, 2014

[Formerly A.M. No. 13-10-06-SB]
RE: ALLEGATIONS MADE UNDER OATH AT THE SENATE BLUE RIBBON
COMMITTEE HEARING HELD ON SEPTEMBER 26, 2013 AGAINST ASSOCIATE
JUSTICE GREGORY S. ONG, SANDIGANBAYAN
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
The character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done.
- Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes
This administrative complaint was filed by the Court En Banc after investigation
into certain allegations that surfaced during the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Hearing indicated prima facie violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct by an
Associate Justice of the Sandiganbayan. The investigation was conducted motu
proprio pursuant to the Court's power of administrative supervision over
members of the Judiciary.1
Factual Antecedents
In the middle of 2013, the local media ran an expose involving billions of
government funds channeled through bogus foundations. Dubbed as the "pork
barrel scam," as the money was sourced from the Priority Development
Assistance Fund allotted to members of the House of Representatives and
Senate, the controversy spawned massive protest actions all over the country.
In the course of the investigation conducted by the Senate Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Blue Ribbon Committee),
the names of certain government officials and other individuals were
mentioned by "whistle-blowers" who are former employees of the alleged
mastermind, Janet Lim-Napoles (Mrs. Napoles), wife of an ex-military officer.
These personalities identified by the whistle-blowers allegedly transacted with
or attended Mrs. Napoles' parties and events, among whom is incumbent
Sandiganbayan Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, herein respondent.
Benhur Luy (Luy), a cousin of Mrs. Napoles who had worked for several years
with the Napoleses, filed illegal detention charges against Mrs. Napoles who
accused him of double-dealing. When Luy went public with his story about Mrs.
Napoles' anomalous transactions and before the warrant of arrest was issued by
the court, she reportedly tried to reach out to the other whistle-blowers for
them not to testify against her but instead point to Luy as the one receiving
and distributing the money.
Marina Sula (Sula) executed a Sworn Statement2 before the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI) on August 29, 2013, part of which reads:
32. In the sixteen (16) years that I worked with Ms. Napoles, I witnessed several
personalities visit our offices and join us as our special guests during our parties and
other special occasions. 33. These personalities who would either visit our office or
join our events and affairs are: Senator Franklin Drilon, Senator Jinggoy Estrada and
family, Senator Bong Revilla, Lani Mercado-Revilla, Bryan Revilla, Secretary Rene
Villa, Congressman Pichay and Wife, Congressman Plaza, Congressman Ducut, DAR
Director Theresita Panlilio, Catherine Mae Canlas Santos, Pauline Labayen, Jen Corpuz
(Staff of Senator Sotto), Mayor Rene Maglanque, Atty. Dequina, Justice Gregory Ong,
x x x.
34. Before the warrant of arrest was issued against Ms. Napoles, she told us that that
case could take four to five years to clear. She said, "Antayin niyo munang ma-clear
pangalan ko para makakilos ako at matulungan ko kayo". Sinabi niya na meron na
siyang kausap sa Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.
35. On 28 August 2013 while me and my companions were at the NBI, Janet Lim
Napoles called me. She was crying and ask[i]ng me not to turn my back on her, that
we should stay together. She said "kahit maubos lahat ng pera ko, susuportahan ko
kayo. Hintay[i]n nyo kasi lalabas na ang TRO ko."
xxxx
38. Attorney Tan instructed us to implicate Benhur in case we were asked by the NBI.
He said "wala naman ipinakita sa inyong masama si Madam (Janet Lim Napoles). Siguro
wala naman kayong sama ng loob kay madam, kaya nga idiin ninyo si Benhur na siya
ang nag-utos at saka sa kanya ninyo ibinibigay ang pera."3 (Emphasis supplied.)
The following day, the social news network Rappler published an article by
Aries Rufo entitled "Exclusive: Napoles Parties with Anti-Graft Court Justice"
showing a photograph of Senator Jinggoy Estrada (Senator Estrada), one of the
main public figures involved in the pork barrel scam, together with Mrs.
Napoles and respondent. The reporter had interviewed respondent who quickly
denied knowing Mrs. Napoles and recalled that the photograph was probably
taken in one of the parties frequently hosted by Senator Estrada who is his
longtime friend. Respondent also supposedly admitted that given the ongoing
pork barrel controversy, the picture gains a different context; nevertheless, he
insisted that he has untainted service in the judiciary, and further denied he
was the one advising Mrs. Napoles on legal strategies in connection with the
Kevlar helmet cases where she was acquitted by a Division of the
Sandiganbayan of which respondent is the Chairman and the then Acting
Presiding Justice.4
On September 12, 2013, Sula executed a "Karagdagang Sinumpaang Salaysay "5
wherein she gave details regarding those persons named in her sworn
statement, alleged to have visited their office or attended their events, thus:
63) T: Ayon sa paragraph Nos. 32 at 33 ng iyong sinumpaang salaysay na may
petsang 29 Agosto 2013, nabanggit mo ang mga personalidad na nakikita mong
bumibisita sa inyong opisina o di kaya naman sa tuwing may party o special
occacions si JANET NAPOLES ay may mga special guests kayo na kinabibilangan
ng mga malalaking pulitiko at ang iba naman ay may mga katungkulan sa
gobyerno. Maari mo bang ilahad ang mga pangyayari sa mga bawat pagkakataon
na nakita mo sila sa iyong pagkaka-alala?
S : Opo, iisa-isahin ko po ang mga pangyayari sa mga pagkakataon na nakita ko
po ang mga taong nabanggit ko:
xxxx
w) Justice GREGORY ONG - Isang beses ko po siyang nakitang nagpunta sa office
sa 2501 Discovery Centre, Ortigas at nakita ko po silang magkausap ni Madam
JANET NAPOLES sa conference room.
x x x x6
In her testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee on September 26,
2013, Sula was asked to confirm her statement regarding Justice Ong, thus:
THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Grace.
Isang tanong lang kay Ms. Sula.
Sinabi niyo kanina may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at sinabi niya, "Malapit na
lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa
ltuwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan? MS. SULA. Hindi ko po alam.
THE CHAIRMAN. Your attention is called sa page –
MS. SULA. Sandiganbayan po, sorry. Mayroon po siyang binanggit na ano po –
THE CHAIRMAN. Nandito sa page 20.
MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong, po, Justice Ong po.
THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.
MS. SULA Opo.
THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?
MS. SULA. Opo.
x x x7 (Emphasis supplied.)
In a letter dated September 26, 2013 addressed to Chief Justice Maria Lourdes
P. A. Sereno, respondent meticulously explained the controversial photograph
which raised questions on his integrity as a magistrate, particularly in
connection with the decision rendered by the Sandiganbayan' s Fourth Division
in the Kevlar helmet cases, which convicted some of the accused but acquitted
Mrs. Napoles.
Respondent surmised that the photograph was taken during the birthday of
Senator Estrada in February, either in the year 2012 or 2013, but definitely not
in 2010 or earlier. He explained that he could vaguely remember the
circumstances but it would have been rude for him to prevent any guest from
posing with him and Senator Estrada during the party. On the nature of his
association with Mrs. Napoles, respondent asserted:
(4) I can categorically state, on the other hand, that I have never attended any
party or social event hosted by Mrs. Napoles or her family, either before she
had a case with our court, or while she already had a pending case with our
court, or at any time afterwards. I have never, to use the term of Mr. Rufo in
his article, "partied" with the Napoleses. (Emphasis supplied.)
As to the Kevlar helmet cases, respondent said it was impossible for him to
have been advising Mrs. Napoles, as claimed by Mr. Rufo, as even the article
itself noted that Mrs. Napoles' own brother, Reynald L. Lim, ( a.k.a. Reynaldo
L. Francisco), a co-accused in the case, was convicted by the Sandiganbayan.
He stressed that these cases were decided on the merits by the Sandiganbayan,
acting as a collegial body and he was not even the ponente of the decision.
Respondent thus submitted himself to the discretion of the Chief Justice such
that even without being required to submit an explanation, he voluntarily did
so "to defend [his] reputation as a judge and protect the Sandiganbayan as an
institution from unfair and malicious innuendos."
On October 7, 2013, Chief Justice Sereno wrote the Members of this Court,
citing the testimonies of Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue Ribbon
Committee "[t]hat the malversation case involving Mrs. Janet Lim-Napoles,
Major Jaime G. Napoles, Jenny Lim Napoles, Reynaldo L. Francisco and other
perpetrators was 'fixed' (inayos) through the intervention of Justice Gregory S.
Ong of the Sandiganbayan", to wit:
SEN. ANGARA. Sa inyo, hindi niyo a/am kung inayos iyong kaso na iyon? Kasi
napakaraming koneksiyon, 'di ba?
xxxx Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur.
MR. LUY. Alam ko, inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa
Sandiganbayan
SEN. ANGARA. Okay.
xxxx
THE CHAIRMAN. xxx Sinabi niyo kanina na may tinawagan si Ms. Napoles at
sinabi niya "Malapit na lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte." May kilala pa ba si
Janet Lim Napoles sa huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?
xxxx
MS. SULA. Si Mr. Ong po, Justice Ong po.
THE CHAIRMAN. Gregory Ong.
MS. SULA. Opo.
THE CHAIRMAN. Sa Sandiganbayan?
MS. SULA. Opo.
Xxxx8
Chief Justice Sereno then requested the Court En Banc to conduct an
investigation motu proprio under this Court's power of administrative
supervision over members of the judiciary and members of the legal profession
(referring to notaries public who were alleged to have purposely left their
specimen signatures, dry seals and notarial books with Mrs. Napoles to
facilitate the incorporation of non-governmental organizations [NGOs] involved
in the scam).9
Under our Resolution dated October 17, 2013, the Court En Banc required
respondent to submit his comment and directed the NBI to furnish the Court
with certified copies of the affidavit of Luy. On November 21, 2013, the Court
received respondent's Comment.10 Respondent categorically denied any
irregularity in the Kevlar helmet cases and explained the visit he had made to
Mrs. Napoles as testified by Sula.
On Sula's statement, respondent points out that Sula never really had personal
knowledge whether respondent is indeed the alleged "contact" of Mrs. Napoles
at the Sandiganbayan; what she supposedly "knows" was what Mrs. Napoles
merely told her. Hence, Sula's testimony on the matter is based purely on
hearsay. Assuming that Mrs. Napoles actually made the statement, respondent
believes it was given in the context of massive media coverage of the pork
barrel scam exploding at the time. With the consciousness of a looming
criminal prosecution before the Office of the Ombudsman and later before the
Sandiganbayan, it was only natural for Mrs. Napoles to assure Sula and others
involved in their business operation that she would not leave or abandon them
and that she would do all that she can to help them just so they would not turn
their backs on her and become whistle-blowers. Thus, even if Mrs. Napoles
made misrepresentations to Sula regarding respondent as her "connection", she
only had to do so in order to convince Sula and her co-employees that the cases
to be filed against them would be "fixed."
As to Sula's statement that she personally witnessed respondent at one time
visiting Mrs. Napoles at her office and having a meeting with her at the
conference room, respondent said that at the birthday party of Senator Estrada
where the controversial photograph was taken, Mrs. Napoles engaged him in a
casual conversation during which the miraculous healing power of the robe or
clothing of the Black Nazarene of Quiapo was mentioned. When Mrs. Napoles
told respondent that she is a close friend of the Quiapo Church's parish priest,
he requested her help to gain access to the Black Nazarene icon. Eventually,
respondent, who is himself a Black Nazarene devotee and was undergoing
treatment for his prostate cancer, was given special permission and was able to
drape the Black Nazarene's robe or clothing for a brief moment over his body
and also receive a fragrant ball of cotton taken or exposed to the holy image,
which article he keeps to this day and uses to wipe any ailing part of his body
in order to receive healing. Because of such favor, respondent out of courtesy
went to see Mrs. Napoles and personally thank her. Respondent stressed that
that was the single occasion Sula was talking about in her supplemental
affidavit when she said she saw respondent talking with Mrs. Napoles at the
conference room of their office in Discovery Suites.
Respondent maintains that there was nothing improper or irregular for him to
have personally seen Mrs. Napoles at the time in order to thank her,
considering that she no longer had any pending case with his court, and to his
knowledge, with any other division of the Sandiganbayan at the time and even
until the date of the preparation of his Comment. He thus prays that this Court
duly note his Comment and accept the same as sufficient compliance with the
Court's Resolution dated October 17, 2013.
This Court upon evaluation of the factual circumstances found possible
transgressions of the New Code of Judicial Conduct committed by respondent.
Accordingly, a Resolution was issued on January 21, 2014 stating that:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby resolves to have the instant administrative
matter RE-DOCKETED as A.M. No. SB-14-21-J (Re: Allegations Made Under Oath
at tlze Senate Blue Ribbon Committee Hearing held on September 26, 2013
against Associate Justice Gregory S. Ong, Sandiganbayan), and ASSIGNS the
same to retired Supreme Court Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez for
investigation, report and recommendation within a period of sixty (60) days
from notice hereof.
The Court further resolves to NOTE the letter dated January 7, 2014 of Atty.
Joffre Gil C. Zapata, Executive Clerk of Court III, Sandiganbayan, Fourth
Division, in compliance with the resolution of the Court En Banc dated
December 3, 2013, transmitting the original records of Criminal Case Nos.
26768 and 26769. Atty. Zapata is INFORMED that there is no more need to
transmit to this Court the post-sentence investigation reports and other reports
on the supervisory history of the accused-probationers in Criminal Case Nos.
26768 and 26769.
Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Justice
Justice Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez, a retired Member of this Court, submitted
her report with the following findings and conclusions:
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
1. THE KEVLAR CASE
Two criminal cases were filed with the Sandiganbayan sometime in 2001 -
Criminal Case No. 26768 for Falsification of Public Documents and Criminal
Case No. 26769 for Violation of Section 3(e) of the AntiGraft Law. Charged
were several members of Philippine Marine Corps and civilian employees
including Ms. Janet L. Napoles (Napoles), her mother Magdalena Francisco (now
deceased), her brother Reynaldo Francisco and wife Anna Marie Dulguime, and
her (Napoles') three employees.
These cases are referred to as the Kevlar case because the issue involved is the
same - the questionable purchase of 500 Kevlar helmets by the Philippine
Marine Corps in the amount of ₱3,865,310.00 from five suppliers or companies
owned by Napoles.
The prosecution alleged inter alia that the accused, acting in conspiracy,
released the payment although there was yet no delivery of the Kevlar
helmets; that the suppliers are mere dummies of Napoles; and that the helmets
were made in Taiwan, not in the U.S.A.
Napoles' husband, Major Jaime Napoles, was dropped from the two
Informations in an Order issued by the Ombudsman on March 18, 2002.
Napoles' mother, brother, and sister-in-law were among those convicted for the
lesser crime of Falsification of Public Documents and sentenced to suffer the
penalty of 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional to 8 years and 1 day of
prision mayor and each to pay PS,000.00. They all underwent probation.
Napoles and six members of the Philippine Marine Corps were acquitted in both
cases.
The court ruled that Napoles "was not one of the dealer-payees in the
transaction in question. Even if she owns the bank account where the 14 checks
were later deposited, this does not in itself translate to her conspiracy in the
crimes charged x x x."
xxxx
THE INVESTIGATION
xxxx
I. During the investigation, Benhur testified that he and Napoles are second
cousins. After passing the Medical Technology Licensure Examination in 2002,
he was employed in the JLN (Janet Lim Napoles) Corporation as Napoles'
personal assistant. As such, he was in charge of disbursements of her personal
funds and those of her office. He was also in charge of government transactions
of the corporation and kept records of its daily business activities.
In the course of Benhur's employment at the JLN Corporation, Napoles
mentioned to him the Kevlar case, then pending in the Sandiganbayan, saying
she has a "connect" in that court who would help her.
When asked about his testimony before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
concerning the Kevlar case, Benhur declared that Napoles' "connect" with the
Sandiganbayan is respondent, thus:
Q The question was, Mr. Witness, this is coming from Senator Angara, and I
quote, "Kailan ho lumabas yung decision ng Court sa Kevlar?" And just to refresh
your memory, Mr. Witness, then Ms. Sula answered, "I think 2010. Yun po yung
lumabas po." And then going forward, Senator Angara referred to both of you
this question: "Sa inyo, hindi ninyo alam kung inayos yung kaso na iyon kasi
napakaraming koneksyon, di ba? Baka alam ng ibang whistleblowers kung
nagka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon. Sige, huwag kang matakot, Benhur." Do you
remember that question being asked from you?
xxxx
A Yes po.
Q And now Mr. Witness, about this statement of yours at the Blue Ribbon
Committee that Ms. Napoles has a certain connect sa Sandiganbayan, who was
this connect you were talking about, if you remember?
Witness Luy
A Si Justice Gregory Ong po.
Q How do you know that Justice Gregory Ong was the connect of Ms. Napoles at
the Sandiganbayan?
A Ang sinabi po ... Si Ms. Napoles, pinsan ko po kasi we are second cousins. So
kinuwento talaga sa akin ni Madam kung ano ang mga developments sa mga
cases, kung ano ang mga nangyayari. Tapos po, sinabi niya sa akin mismo na
nakakausap niya si Justice Gregory Ong at ang nagpakilala raw sa kanya po ay si
Senator Jinggoy Estrada.
Benhur further testified that even before the decision in the Kevlar case was
promulgated, Napoles and respondent were already communicating with each
other (nag-uusap na po si!a). Therefore, she was sure the decision would be in
her favor:
Q Do you remember the date when the decision (in Kevlar case) was
promulgated?
A Ano po, the year 2010 po ma' am.
Q And you met him (Justice Ong) in 2012?
A 2012 po, pero prior to that decision, madam, naririnig ko na po kay madam
(Ms. Napoles) kasi kinukwento na po ni madam sa akin na nag-uusap na po sila
ni Justice Gregory Ong.
Q That was after the decision was promulgated?
A Bago po nailabas yung decision, ikinwento po m Ms. Napoles sa akin na nag-
uusap na po sila ni Justice Gregory Ong. Kaya kampante po si Ms. Napoles.
Noong lumabas po yung decision, alam niya na po. Yung ang sabi sa akin ni Ms.
Napoles.
Going back to the hearing before the Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur told
Senator Angara that Napoles fixed the Kevlar case because she has a "connect"
in the Sandiganbayan:
"Baka alam ng ibang whistle blowers kung nagkaka-ayusan sa kaso na iyon
(Kevlar case). Sige huwag kang matakot Benhur."
Benhur Luy: "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa
Sandiganbayan."
On how Napoles "inayos" or fixed the Kevlar case, Benhur said that he kept a
ledger of the Sandiganbayan case wherein he listed all her expenses in the sum
of P 100 million pesos. He was surprised why she would spend such amount
considering that what was involved in the Kevlar case was only ₱3.8 million.
She explained that she gave various amounts to different people during the
pendency of the case which lasted up to ten years. And before the decision in
the Kevlar case was released, she also gave money to respondent but she did
not mention the amount. Thus, she knew she would be acquitted.
Q You answered Senator Angara this way which we already quoted a while ago,
"Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon dahil may connect nga siya sa
Sandiganbayan." You stated that the connect is Justice Ong. Can you explain
before us what you mean, "Alam ko inayos ni Ms. Napoles iyon." What do you
mean by that "inayos"?
A Kasi po ma' am meron kaming ledger ng Sandiganbayan case sa lahat ng
nagastos ni Ms. Janet Napoles, nilista ko po yon lahat. Kasi naririnig ko po kay
Janet Napoles, parang pinsan ko po si Janet Napoles, "Paano nagkaroon ng kaso
ang ate ko? So nadiscover ko na Jang po na yun pala yung Kevlar. So, mahigit
one hundred million na nagastos po ni Ms. Napoles kasi di Jang naman po si sir
Justice Gregory Ong ...
xxx
Q Did you come to know to whom she gave all the money?
A Wala po siyang ... basta ang sabi niya inayos na niya si ... binaggit niya po si
... kasi si madam hindi kasi nagki-keep kasi ako pinsan niya po kasi ako,
nabanggit niya po si Justice Gregory Ong. Sinabi niya nagbigay daw po siya ng
pera kay Justice Ong pero she never mentioned kung magkano yung amount.
xxx
Q Nagbigay ng pera kay Justice Gregory Ong?
A Opo, yung ang sabi niya (referring to Ms. Napoles).
Q To you?
A Yes, madam.
Q Do you remember when she made that kind of statement?
A Bago po ano madam, bago po lumabas yung decision kaya kampante na po si
Ms. Napoles bago lumabas yung decision na acquitted siya. Alam na niya. Sa
Kevlar case.
xxx
Justice Gutierrez
Continue counsel.
Witness Luy
Kasi naikwento po madam ni Ms. Napoles na almost PlOO million na ang
nagastos niya. Tapos ang sabi ko nga po sa kanya: "Madam, P 100 million na sa
halagang ₱3.8 lang na PO (purchase order) sa Kevlar helmet, tapos P 100
million na ang nagastos mo?"
Q Did she tell you or explain to you to whom this P 100 million was paid? How
was it spent?
A Basta ang natatandaan ko ... di ko na po matandaan ang mga dates kasi
parang staggered. May ₱5 million sa ibang tao ang kausap niya. Tapos ito
naman tutulong ng ganito. lba-iba kasi madam, eh.
Q But there was no showing the money was given to Justice Ong?
A Wala po pero nabanggit lang po niya (Ms. Napoles) sa akin na nagbigay po siya
kay Justice Ong, but she never mentioned the amount.
Continuing with his testimony, Benhur declared that in 2012, respondent went
twice to Napoles' office at the Discovery Suites Center, 25 ADB Avenue, Ortigas,
Pasig City. On the first visit, Napoles introduced Justice Ong to Benhur and her
other employees.
Benhur narrated what transpired during that visit. According to him, Napoles
has so much money being placed at the Armed Forces of the Philippines and
Police Savings and Loan Association, Inc. (AFPSLAI) which offered 13% interest
annually. Napoles called Benhur telling him that respondent would like to avail
of such interest for his BDO check of ₱25.5 million. To arrange this, Napoles
informed Benhur that she would just deposit respondent's ₱25.5 million in her
personal account with Metro bank. Then she would issue to respondent in
advance eleven (11) checks, each amounting to ₱282,000.00 as monthly
interest, or a total of ₱3,102,000.00 equivalent to 13% interest. Upon Justice
Ong's suggestion, the checks should be paid to cash. So, Benhur prepared the
corresponding eleven (11) checks, thus:
Q With respect to the Kevlar case, what participation did you have, if there
was any?
Witness Luy
A Noon 2012 po kasi si Justice Gregory Ong po nasa unit 2501, yung office (of
Ms. Napoles), so kami ni Janet Napoles, nandito sa 2502 kasi yun po talaga ang
office namin. Si Ms. Napoles po sinabi niya sa akin, Ben, kasi si Ms. Napoles,
may pera siyang madarni na pine-place niya po sa AFPSLAI at yung AFPSLAI po
ay nagbibigay po sa kanya o nagooffer ng 13% interest annually po. So, ang
nangyari po <loon, sabi ni Janet Napoles, si Justice Ong ho raw, gustong
magkaroon din ng interest parang ganoon. So tutulungan niya. So ang ginawa po
namin x x x. Q Meaning to say, Justice Ong would like to deposit money?
A Opo.
Q So he could get 13% interest?
A Opo, kasi tapos madam ang nangyari po pumunta na po si Ms. Napoles sa
kanyang opisina. Tinawag po niya ako kasi pinasulat na niya sa akin ang checke.
So, ang ginawa po ni Ms. Napoles, yung checke ni .. BDO check po kasi yun. Ang
sabi sa akin ni Ms. Napoles, checke daw po yun ni Justice Gregory Ong. Sa,
BDO. So, di ko naman din po nakita Madam yung nakalagay sa ...
Q So it is the check of Justice Ong, not the check of Ms. Napoles?
A Opo, ang amount po ng check madam ay ₱25.5 million ang amount noong BDO
check na inissue ...
Q That belongs to Justice Ong?
A Opo. Tapos madam, so ang ginawa po namin ni Ms. Napoles, dahil po 13%
interest ang ino-offer ng AFPSLAI, sabi ni Madam ganito na lang, Ben, ipasok na
lang muna natin yung check niya sa personal account ko. Ako na lang muna for
the meantime, mag-iissue ng check sa kanya para maavail ni Justice Ong yung
interest. So, ang ginawa nan1in madam, ₱25.5 million times 13% interest, tapos
divided by 12, lumalabas ₱282,000.00 or ₱283,000.00 or ₱281,000.00 po madam
kasi naground off kami sa ₱282,000.00. So, ang ginawa ni Madam, baga
monthly. So eleven (11) checks ang prinepare namin. Kung hindi po ako
nagkakamali po, JLN Corporation check ang ... Ako pa nga po ang nagsulat at
saka bago po namin isinulat yung payee, inalam pa po namin. x x x So, pumunta
na naman si madam sa 2501 kasi nandoon si Justice Gregory Ong. Noong
bumalik siya, pay to cash na lang daw. So, makikita po sa records namin ni Ms.
Napoles na pumasok ang ₱25.5 million na amount sa kanyang account at the
same time nag-issue siya ng checke na ₱282,000.00 na eleven checks. Nagstart
kami madam 2012, siguro sometime July or August or mga ganoong buwan po.
Basta 11 checks, hindi nalalayo doon. So, siguro tapos na.
Q But what actually turned out was that the money of Justice Ong was
deposited at the bank but the interest was paid in advance by Ms. Napoles, and
actually the bank will pay Ms. Napoles the advanced interest she paid to
Justice Ong, is that clear? Is that the arrangement? Do you understand me?
A Kasi ang nangyari po ma'am ganito e: yung ₱25.5 million ipinasok sa personal
account ni Ms. Napoles dito sa Metrobank. Metrobank kasi po yun e.
On the second visit of respondent to Napoles' office, they just engaged in
conversation. She ordered Chinese food for him which, according to Benhur, is
his (respondent's) favorite.
On cross-examination, Benhur claimed that in his affidavits executed in the
NBI, he did not mention respondent's name. However, in his reply-affidavit
filed with the Sandiganbayan, he alleged that Napoles issued ₱282,000.00 (the
amount stated in each of the 11 checks) but he did not mention the name of
the payee upon instruction of his lawyer, Atty. Baligod. Nonetheless, he knew
that the checks were issued to respondent.
II. Sula, also a whistle blower, testified that she was an employee of JLN
Corporation. Her duties included the formation of corporations by making use
of the forms, applying for business licenses, transfer of properties, purchase of
cars, and others.
Sula corroborated Benhur's testimony that respondent visited the office of
Napoles twice sometime in 2012.
Sula was asked to explain her testimony before the Blue Ribbon Committee
during the hearing on September 26, 2013, quoted as follows:
The Chairman (Senator Teofisto Guingona III)
Sinabi ninyo na may tinawagan si Mrs. Napoles at sinabi niya, Malapit nang
lumabas yung TRO galing sa korte. May kilala pa ba si Janet Lim Napoles sa
huwes sa korte sa Sandiganbayan?
xxx
Ms. Sula
Si Mr. Ong po. Justice Ong po.
The Chairman
Gregory Ong?
Ms. Sula
Opo.
The Chairman
Sa Sandiganbayan?
Ms. Sula
Opo.
The Chairman
Okay. With that, I will just have a closing statement before we leave the
hearing.
Sula explained that the TRO mentioned by Napoles refers to the TRO to be
issued by the Sandiganbayan in the event the case involving the PIO billion
PDAF scam against her is filed with that court; and that Napoles told Sula and
the other employees not to worry because she has contact with the
Sandiganbayan - respondent Justice Ong, thus:
Q Not the illegal detention case?
Witness Sula
A Hindi po, pag nakasuhan na po kami sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Okay, again?
A Sa pagkakaintindi po namin, ang sabi po ni Madam na it takes 4 to 5 years, so
hihintayin niya na maacquit, sabi niyang ganoon, ang pangalan niya para
maluwag na tulungan kami. Ito po ang pagkakaintindi namin na sa
Sandiganbayan.
Q Yung PDAF?
A Opo, yung PDAF sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Pagdating ng kaso sa Sandiganbayan?
A Opo, kasi po ina-ano po niya, siya po tinitira na ni Benhur - si Madam tungkol
sa PlO billion scam. So, pinag-uusapan namin sa bahay niya sa South Garden
Unit na, Madam, paano po yan, pag lahat ng kaso na iyan dadaan sa lawmakers,
dadaan yon sa Ombudsman at saka sa Sandiganbayan? Sabi niya, "Huwag kayong
mag-alala. Meron naman akong mga contact doon." Sabi niyang ganoon sa
Ombudsman at sa Sandiganbayan.
Q Is that in your affidavit?
A Wala po. Pero sinabi ko po doon sa part na yon (her testimony before the
Senate Blue Ribbon Committee) na meron na siyang kilala sa Ombudsman, pero
hindi niya nabanggit ang pangalan. Pero sa Sandiganbayan, ang alam namin
kilala niya si Justice Ong.
Q Yun ang sagot niya kay Chairman Guingona. Di ba I read it a while ago?
A Opo, doon sa Sandiganbayan.
Sula also testified that every time Napoles talked to her and the other
employees, she would say that Justice Ong will help her in the Kevlar case.
Sula's testimony is as follows:
Q x x x you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?
A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin every time po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi
niya na si Justice Ong ang tumulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case
niya.
Sula likewise testified that Napoles told her and the other employees that she
will fix (aayusin) the "PDAF case" in the Sandiganbayan. Then they replied in
jest that her acquaintance in that court is respondent. Napoles retorted, "Ay
huag na iyon kasi masyadong mataas ang talent fee."
xxxx
 III. Aries Rufo, a Reporter of Rappler, testified that he cannot reveal who gave
him the photograph [of respondent beside Napoles and Senator Jinggoy
Estrada] because he is shielded by law and he has to protect his source.
When asked about his comment upon seeing the picture, Rufo said:
Initially, when I saw the picture, since I knew that Justice Ong was one of the
members of the division that handled the Kevlar case, it aroused my curiosity
why he was in that picture. Second, because in journalism, we also get to
practice ethical standards, I immediately sensed though that a Justice or a
lawyer, that he should not be seen or be going to a party or be in an event
where respondent (Ms. Napoles) was in a case under his Division. He should not
be in a situation that would compromise the integrity of his office.
Rufo further testified that on August 27, 2013, he faxed a letter to respondent
to "get his side about the photo." The next day, he went to respondent's office
and showed it to him. Respondent was shocked. He explained that it must have
been taken during one of the parties hosted by his friend Senator Jinggoy
Estrada; that he did not know that the woman in the picture is Napoles because
she did not appear during the hearing of the Kevlar case; and that such picture
must have been taken in one of those instances when a guest would like to
pose with celebrities or public figures.
xxxx
Respondent, in his defense, vehemently denied the imputations hurled against
him.
1. He asserted that he could not be the contact or "connect" of Napoles at the
Sandiganbayan for he never met or came to know her during the pendency of the
Kevlar case;
2. Challenging Benhur's testimony that he fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case,
respondent claimed that it was decided based on the merits by the Sandiganbayan
Fourth Division as a collegial body. The two other members of the court, Justice Jose
R. Hernandez (ponente) and Justice Maria Cristina J. Cornejo, are independent-
minded jurists who could not be pressured or influenced by anybody, not even by
their peers;
3. On Benhur's allegation that respondent received an amount of money from Napoles
prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, respondent deplored the
fact that Benhur was attempting to tarnish his reputation without any proof. And that
it is unthinkable for him to have received money from Napoles considering that her
mother, brother, and sister-in-law were convicted;
4. Respondent admitted he went to Napoles' office twice, sometime in March 2012,
after the decision in the Kevlar case was promulgated in 2010 and narrated what
prompted him to do so, thus:
At the birthday party of Senator Jinggoy Estrada on February 17, 2012, Napoles
approached him and introduced herself. She engaged him in a casual
conversation and thanked him for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Respondent
replied she should thank her "evidence" instead, adding that had the court
found enough evidence against her, she would have been convicted. She talked
about her charity works like supporting Chinese priests, building churches and
chapels in China, and sponsoring Chinese Catholic priests. He was not
interested though in what she was saying until she mentioned the name of
Msgr. Ramirez, former Parish Priest of Quiapo Church.
Respondent became interested because he has been a devotee of the Holy
Black Nazarene since he was a little boy. Napoles told him that Msgr. Ramirez
has with him the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene which has a healing power if
one wears it. Then respondent asked if he can have access to the robe so he
can be cured of his ailment (prostate cancer) which he keeps only to himself
and to the immediate members of his family. Napoles made arrangement with
Msgr. Ramirez until respondent was able to drape the robe over his body for
about one or two minutes in Quiapo Church. He also received a fragrant ball of
cotton which he keeps until now to heal any ailing part of his body. That was a
great deal for him. So out of courtesy, he visited Napoles in her office and
thanked her. That was his first visit.
Thereafter, Napoles kept on calling respondent, inviting him to her office, but
he kept on declining. Then finally after two weeks, he acceded for she might
think he is "walang kwentang tao." They just engaged in a small talk for about
30 minutes and had coffee.
5. Concerning Benhur's testimony that Napoles paid respondent an advanced
interest consisting of eleven (11) checks in the amount of ₱282,000.00 each
and that he issued to her his BDO check of ₱25.5 million which she deposited in
her account, he claimed that "he never issued that check as he did not intend
to invest in AFPSLAI. In fact, he does not have any money deposited there.
Inasmuch as he did not issue any BDO check, it follows that Napoles could not
have given him those eleven (11) checks representing advanced interest. He
further explained that he found from the internet that in AFPSLAI, an investor
can only make an initial deposit of ₱30,000.00 every quarter or Pl20,000.00 per
year. The limit or ceiling is ₱3 million with an interest of 15% or 16% per
annum.
6. The whistle blower's testimony are conflicting and therefore lack credibility.
While Sula testified that Napoles told her that she did not want to approach
respondent (should a case involving the pork barrel scam be filed with the
Sandiganbayan) because his talent fee is too high, however, both whistle
blowers claimed that he is Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan.
With respect to the Rappler Report, according to respondent, Rufo was
insinuating four things: 1. That there was irregularity in the manner the Kevlar
case was decided;
2. That respondent was close to Napoles even during the pendency of the
Kevlar case;
3. That respondent was attending parties of the Napoleses; and
4. That respondent was advising Napoles about legal strategies relative to the
Kevlar case. Respondent "dismissed all the above insinuations as false and
without factual basis." As to the last insinuation that he advised Napoles about
legal strategies to be pursued in the Kevlar case, respondent stressed that the
case was decided by a collegial body and that he never interceded on her
behalf.
EVALUATION
xxxx
It bears stressing that before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee, Benhur
initially testified that Napoles fixed or "inayos" the Kevlar case because she has
a contact at the Sandiganbayan, referring to respondent. Sula corroborated
Benhur's testimony.
Testifying before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee is certainly an ordeal. The
witnesses and everything they say are open to the public. They are subjected
to difficult questions propounded by the Senators, supposedly intelligent and
knowledgeable of the subject and issues under inquiry. And they can easily
detect whether a person under investigation is telling the truth or not.
Considering this challenging and difficult setting, it is indubitably improbable
that the two whistle blowers would testify false! y against respondent.
Moreover, during the investigation of this case, Benhur and Sula testified in a
candid, straightforward, and categorical manner. Their testimonies were
instantaneous, clear, unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth.
In fact, their answers to the undersigned's probing questions were consistent
with their testimonies before the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee. During cross-
examination, they did not waver or falter. The undersigned found the two
whistle blowers as credible witnesses and their story untainted with bias and
contradiction, reflective of honest and trustworthy witnesses.
The undersigned therefore finds unmeritorious respondent's claim that Benhur
and Sula were lying.
. . . respondent insisted he could not have intervened in the disposition of the
Kevlar case considering that Napoles' mother, brother and sister-in-law were
convicted.
Respondent must have forgotten that Napoles' natural instinct was self-
preservation. Hence, she would avail of every possible means to be
exonerated. Besides, respondent's belief that the two members of his Division
are independent-minded Jurists remains to be a mere allegation.
xxxx
With the undersigned's finding that there is credence in the testimonies of
Benhur and Sula, there is no need to stretch one's imagination to arrive at the
inevitable conclusion that in "fixing" Kevlar case, money could be the
consideration ... Benhur testified he kept a ledger (already shredded) of
expenses amounting to P 100 million incurred by Napoles for the Sandiganbayan
during the pendency of the Kevlar case which extended up to ten years; and
that Napoles told him she gave respondent an undetermined sum of money.
Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Benhur and Sula are pure
hearsay, inadmissible in evidence:
Justice Ong
Your honor, since these are all accusations against me by Luy and Sula, and
according to Luy and Sula, these were only told to them by Napoles, always
their statements were ... they do not have personal knowledge, it was only
told to them by Napoles, is it possible that we subpoena Napoles so that the
truth will come out? If. ..
xxxx
Justice Gutierrez
That is your prerogative.
Justice Ong
I am willing to take the risk although I know I am not an acquaintance of
Napoles. Just to clear my name whether I should be hung or I should not be
hung.
xxxx
Atty. Geronilla
I don't think it would be necessary, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez (to Atty. Geronilla)
Discuss this matter with your client, file a motion, then we will see.
However, respondent and his counsel did not take any action on the
undersigned's suggestion. They did not present Napoles to rebut the
testimonies of Benhur and Sula. Significantly, respondent failed to consider
that his testimony is likewise hearsay. He should have presented Msgr. Ramirez
and Napoles as witnesses to support his claim regarding their role which
enabled him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene.
x x xx
Respondent's acts of allowing himself to be Napoles' contact in the
Sandiganbayan, resulting in the fixing of the Kevlar case, and of accepting
money from her, constitute gross misconduct, a violation of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary.
xxxx
That Benhur personally prepared the eleven (11) checks which Napoles handed
to respondent led the undersigned to conclude without hesitation that this
charge is true. It is highly inconceivable that Benhur could devise or concoct his
story. He gave a detailed and lucid narration of the events, concluding that
actually Napoles gave respondent ₱3, 102,000.00 as advanced interest.
According to respondent, the purpose of his first visit was to thank Napoles for
making it possible for him to wear the Holy Black Nazarene's robe. Even
assuming it is true, nonetheless it is equally true that during that visit,
respondent could have transacted business with Napoles. Why should Napoles
pay respondent an advanced interest of ₱3,102,000.0 with her own money if it
were not a consideration for a favor?
Respondent's transgression pertains to his personal life and no direct relation to
his judicial function. It is not misconduct but plain dishonesty. His act is
unquestionably disgraceful and renders him morally unfit as a member of the
Judiciary and unworthy of the privileges the law confers on him. Furthermore,
respondent's conduct supports Benhur's assertion that he received money from
Napoles.
Dishonesty likewise violates Canon 2 (1 and 2) on Integrity of the same Code
providing in part that judges must ensure that their conduct is above reproach
and must reaffirm the people's faith in the integrity of the Judiciary.
Indeed, respondent should not stay in his position even for a moment.
xxxx
...From respondent's end, there was nothing wrong when he visited Napoles
twice in her office considering that the visits took place long after the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case.
Contrary to respondent's submission, such acts also constitute gross misconduct
in violation of Canon 4 on Propriety of the same Code. Section 1 provides that
judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their
activities .
. . . respondent's reason for his first visit was to thank Napoles for her help in
making it possible for him to wear the robe of the Holy Black Nazarene. Instead
of visiting her, respondent could have extended his gratitude by simply calling
her by phone. Worse, he visited her again because she may think he is an
unworthy person. This is an extremely frail reason. He was seen by the whistle
blowers and their co-workers who, without doubt, readily confirmed that he
was Napoles' contact at the Sandiganbayan and that he "fixed" the decision in
the Kevlar case.
Respondent cannot be excused for his unconcern for the position he holds.
Being aptly perceived as the visible personification of law and justice, his
personal behavior, not only while in the performance of official duties but also
outside the court, must be beyond reproach. A judicial office circumscribes a
personal conduct and imposes a number of inhibitions, whose faithful
observance is the price one has to pay for holding an exalted position.
xxxx
On the photograph showing respondent
with Senator Jinggoy Estrada and Napoles.
xxxx
This incident manifests respondent's disregard of the dictum that propriety and
the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge. This exacting standard of decorum is demanded from
judges to promote public confidence in the integrity of the Judiciary.
In joining Senator Estrada and Napoles in a picture taking, respondent gave a
ground for reproach by reason of impropriety. It bears reiterating Canon 4 (1)
on Propriety of the same Code which provides that judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.
Respondent maintained that he did not know Napoles at that time because she
was not present before the Sandiganbayan during the hearing of the Kevlar
case for she must have waived her appearance. Respondent's explanation lacks
merit. That court could not have acquired jurisdiction over her if she did not
appear personally for arraignment.
Of utmost significance is the fact that this is not the first time that respondent
has been charged administratively. In "Assistant Special Prosecutor Ill
Rohermina J Jamsani-Rodriguez v. Justices Gregory S. Ong, Jose R. Hernandez
and Rodolfo A. Ponferrada, Sandiganbayan,'' the Supreme Court found
respondent Justice Ong guilty of violation of PD 1606 and The Revised Internal
Rules of the Sandiganbayan for nonobservance of collegiality in hearing
criminal cases in the Hall of Justice, Davao City. Instead of siting as a collegial
body, the members of the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division adopted a different
procedure. The Division was divided into two. As then Chairperson of the
Division, respondent was ordered to pay a fine of ₱15,000.00 with a stern
warning that a repetition of the same or similar offense shall be dealt with
more severely.
xxxx
...the undersigned cannot hold back her skepticism regarding the acquittal of
Napoles. The Sandiganbayan Fourth Division, of which respondent was the
Chairman, held that Napoles did not conspire with the suppliers in the
questionable purchase of the Kevlar helmets as she was not one of the "dealer-
payees" in the transaction in question and that there was no proof of an overt
act on her part. How could the Fourth Division arrive at such conclusion? The
Decision itself indicates clearly that ( 1) Napoles was following up the
processing of the documents; (2) that she was in charge of the delivery of the
helmets; and (3) the checks amounting to ₱3,864,310.00 as payment for the
helmets were deposited and cleared in only one bank account, Security Bank
Account No. 512-000-2200, in the name of Napoles.
Considering this glaring irregularity, it is safe to conclude that indeed
respondent has a hand in the acquittal of Napoles. All along, the whistle
blowers were telling the truth.
xxxx
RECOMMENDATION
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, It is respectfully recommended, for consideration
of the Honorable Court, that respondent Justice Gregory S. Ong be found
GUILTY of gross misconduct, dishonesty, and impropriety, all in violations of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary and be meted
the penalty of DISMISSAL from the service WITH FORFEITURE of all retirement
 benefits, excluding accrued leave credits, and WITH PREJUDICE to
reemployment to any government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations.
xxxx
The Court's Ruling
This Court adopts the findings, conclusions and recommendations of the
Investigating Justice which are well-supported by the evidence on record.
Based on the testimonies of Luy, Sula and Rufo, the Investigating Justice
formulated the charges against the respondent, as follows:
1. Respondent acted as contact of Napoles in connection with the Kevlar case while it
was pending in the Sandiganbayan Fourth Division wherein he is the Chairman;
2. Respondent, being Napoles' contact in the Sandiganbayan, fixed the Kevlar case
resulting in her acquittal;
3. Respondent received an undetermined amount of money from Napoles prior to the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case thus, she was sure ("kampante")of her
acquittal; 4. Respondent visited Napoles in her office where she handed to him eleven
(ll) checks, each amounting to ₱282,000.00 or a total of ₱3,102,000.00, as advanced
interest for his ₱25.5 million BDO check she deposited in her personal account; and
5. Respondent attended Napoles' parties and was photographed with Senator Estrada
and Napoles.11
Respondent thus stands accused of gross misconduct, partiality and corruption
or bribery during the pendency of the Kevlar case, and impropriety on account
of his dealing and socializing with Napoles after her acquittal in the said case.
Additionally, respondent failed to disclose in his September 26, 2013 letter to
Chief Justice Sereno that he had actually visited Napoles at her office in 2012,
as he vehemently denied having partied with or attended any social event
hosted by her.
Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, unlawful behavior, willful in character,
improper or wrong behavior; while ·"gross" has been defined as "out of all
measure beyond allowance; flagrant; shameful; such conduct as is not to be
excused."12 We agree with Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez that respondent's
association with Napoles during the pendency and after the promulgation of
the decision in the Kevlar case resulting in her acquittal, constitutes gross
misconduct notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of corruption or
bribery in the rendition of the said judgment.
We cannot overemphasize that in administrative proceedings, only substantial
evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. The standard of
substantial evidence is satisfied when there is reasonable ground to believe
that respondent is responsible for the misconduct complained of, even if such
evidence might not be overwhelming or even preponderant.13
The testimonies of Luy and Sula established that Napoles had been in contact
with respondent ("nag-uusap sila") during the pendency of the Kevlar case. As
Napoles' trusted staff, they (especially Luy who is a cousin) were privy to her
daily business and personal activities. Napoles constantly updated them of
developments regarding the case. She revealed to them that she has a
"connect" or "contact" in the Sandiganbayan who will help "fix" the case
involving her, her mother, brother and some employees. Having closely
observed and heard Napoles being confident that she will be acquitted even
prior to the promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case, they were
convinced she was indeed in contact with respondent, whose identity was
earlier divulged by Napoles to Luy. Luy categorically testified that Napoles told
him she gave money to respondent but did not disclose the amount. There was
no reason for them to doubt Napoles' statement as they even keep a ledger
detailing her expenses for the "Sandiganbayan," which reached Pl 00 million.
Napoles' information about her association with respondent was confirmed
when she was eventually acquitted in 2010 and when they saw respondent visit
her office and given the eleven checks issued by Napoles in 2012.
Respondent maintains that the testimonies of Luy and Sula were hearsay as
they have no personal knowledge of the matters they were testifying, which
were merely told to them by Napoles. Specifically, he points to portions of
Sula's testimony indicating that Napoles had not just one but "contact persons"
in Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan; hence, it could have been other individuals,
not him, who could help Napoles "fix" the Kevlar case, especially since Napoles
never really disclosed to Sula who was her (Napoles) contact at the
Sandiganbayan and at one of their conversations Napoles even supposedly said
that respondent's "talent fee" was too high. Bribery is committed when a public
officer agrees to perform an act in connection with the performance of official
duties in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received.14
Ajudge who extorts money from a party-litigant who has a case before the
court commits a serious misconduct and this Court has condemned such act in
the strongest possible terms. Particularly because it has been committed by
one charged with the responsibility of administering the law and rendering
justice, it quickly and surely corrodes respect for law and the courts.15
An accusation of bribery is easy to concoct and difficult to disprove. The
complainant must present a panoply of evidence in support of such an
accusation. Inasmuch as what is imputed against the respondent judge
connotes a grave misconduct, the quantum of proof required should be more
than substantial.16 Concededly, the evidence in this case is insufficient to
sustain the bribery and corruption charges against the respondent. Both Luy
and Sula have not witnessed respondent actually receiving money from Napoles
in exchange for her acquittal in the Kevlar case. Napoles had confided to Luy
her alleged bribe to respondent.
Notwithstanding the absence of direct evidence of any corrupt act by the
respondent, we find credible evidence of his association with Napoles after the
promulgation of the decision in the Kevlar case. The totality of the
circumstances of such association strongly indicates respondent's corrupt
inclinations that only heightened the public's perception of anomaly in the
decision-making process. By his act of going to respondent at her office on two
occasions, respondent exposed himself to the suspicion that he was partial to
Napoles. That respondent was not the ponente of the decision which was
rendered by a collegial body did not forestall such suspicion of partiality, as
evident from the public disgust generated by the publication of a photograph of
respondent together with Napoles and Senator Jinggoy Estrada. Indeed, the
context of the declarations under oath by Luy and Sula before the Senate Blue
Ribbon Committee, taking place at the height of the "Pork Barrel" controversy,
made all the difference as respondent himself acknowledged. Thus, even in the
present administrative proceeding, their declarations are taken in the light of
the public revelations of what they know of that government corruption
controversy, and how it has tainted the image of the Judiciary.
The hearsay testimonies of Luy and Sula generated intense public interest
because of their close relationship to Napoles and their crucial participation in
her transactions with government officials, dubbed by media as the "Pork
Barrel Queen." But as aptly observed by Justice SandovalGutierrez, the
"challenging and difficult setting" of the Senate hearings where they first
testified, made it highly improbable that these whistle blowers would testify
against the respondent. During the investigation of this case, Justice Sandoval-
Gutierrez described their manner of testifying as "candid, straightforward and
categorical." She likewise found their testimonies as "instantaneous, clear,
unequivocal, and carried with it the ring of truth," and more important, these
are consistent with their previous testimonies before the Senate; they never
wavered or faltered even during cross-examination.
It is a settled rule that the findings of investigating magistrates are generally
given great weight by the Court by reason of their unmatched opportunity to
see the deportment of the witnesses as they testified.17 The rule which
concedes due respect, and even finality, to the assessment of credibility of
witnesses by trial judges in civil and criminal cases applies a fortiori to
administrative cases.18 In particular, we concur with Justice Sandoval-
Gutierrez's assessment on the credibility of Luy and Sula, and disagree with
respondent's claim that these witnesses are simply telling lies about his
association with Napoles.
Contrary to respondent's submission, Sula in her testimony said that whenever
Napoles talked about her contacts in the Ombudsman and Sandiganbayan, they
knew that insofar as the Sandiganbayan was concerned, it was understood that
she was referring to respondent even as she may have initially contacted some
persons to get to respondent, and also because they have seen him meeting
with Napoles at her office. It appears that Napoles made statements regarding
the Kevlar case not just to Luy but also to the other employees of JLN
Corporation. The following are excerpts from Sula's testimony on direct
examination, where she even hinted at their expected outcome of the Kevlar
case:
Atty. Benipayo
Q So, Ms. Sula, what were the statements being made by Ms. Janet Lim Napoles
regarding her involvement in the Kevlar case, or how she was trying to address
the problem with the Kevlar case pending before the Sandiganbayan?
Witness Sula
A Ang alam ko po kasi marami po siyang kinaka-usap na mga lawyers na
binabayaran niya para tulungan siya kay Gregory Ong sa Kevlar case. Tapos, sa
kalaunan po, nasabi na niya sa amin na mcron na po siyang nakilala sa
Sandiganbayan na nagngangalang Justice Gregory Ong. Tapos, sabi niya, siya po
ang tutulong sa amin para ma-clear kami. Pero hindi niya sinabi na meron din
pong ma ... sasagot sa kaso. Hindi po lahat, kasi po dalawa sa mga empleyado
niya, bale apat, dalawang empleyado niya, isang kapatid niya at sister-in-law
ang mag-aano sa kaso pati yung mother niya na namatay na ay sasagot din sa
kaso. Siya Jang at saka yung asawa niya ang bale makli-clear sa kaso.
Q So, she told you that two (2) employees, one (1) sister-in-law and one
brother will answer for the case and Janet Lim Napoles and her husband will be
acquitted, is that right?
A Yun po ang aking pagkaka-alam kasi po, nag-petition po kasi sila eh, yung
mga officemates ko. Nagkaroon ng probation. Noong lumabas ang hatol, meron
silang probation period.
xxxx
Q Which you told me that somebody will help in the Kevlar case?
A Opo. Sinabi po niya sa amin everytime po pag nagkukwento siya, sinasabi niya
na si Justice Ong ang tutulong sa kanya para ma-clear po yung Kevlar case niya.
x x x x19 (Emphasis supplied.)
As it turned out, Napoles' husband was dropped from the two informations
while her mother, brother and sister-in-law were convicted in the lesser charge
of falsification of public documents. Apparently, after her acquittal, Napoles
helped those convicted secure a probation. But as stated in our earlier
resolution, the Court will no longer delve into the merits of the Kevlar case as
the investigation will focus on respondent's administrative liability.
Respondent's act of voluntarily meeting with Napoles at her office on two
occasions was grossly improper and violated Section 1, Canon 4 (Propriety) of
the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which took effect on June 1, 2004.
SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety
in all of their activities.
A judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial and
that fraternizing with litigants tarnishes this appearance.20 Public confidence
in the Judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges. A
judge must avoid all impropriety and the appearance thereof. Being the
subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly accept
restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen.21
In Caneda v. Alaan,22 we held that:
Judges are required not only to be impartial but also to appear to be so, for
appearance is an essential manifestation of reality. Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to avoid not just impropriety in their conduct
but even the mere appearance of impropriety.
They must conduct themselves in such a manner that they give no ground for
reproach. [Respondent's] acts have been less than circumspect. He should have
kept himself free from any appearance of impropriety and endeavored to
distance himself from any act liable to create an impression of indecorum.
xxxx
Indeed, respondent must always bear in mind that:
"A judicial office traces a line around his official as well as personal conduct, a
price one has to pay for o ccupying an exalted position in the judiciary, beyond
which he may not freely venture. Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct
enjoins a judge to avoid not just impropriety in the performance of judicial
duties but in all his activities whether in his public or private life. He must
conduct himself in a manner that gives no ground for reproach." (Emphasis
supplied.)
On this score, our previous pronouncements have enjoined judges to avoid
association or socializing with persons who have pending cases before their
court. Respondent cites the case of Abundo v. Mania, Jr.23 where this Court
did not find fault with a judge who was charged with fraternizing with his
lawyer-friend. In that case, we said:
Respondent admits that he and Atty. Pajarillo became close friends in 1989
when they were both RTC judges stationed in Naga City. Since they both
resided in Camarines Norte, Atty. Pajarillo hitched rides with respondent to
Daet, Camarines Norte in the latter's car.
In his Comment, respondent claims that he leaves the door to his chambers
open to lawyers or parties with official court business, whose requests and
complaints regarding their cases he listens to in full view of his staff, who are
witnesses to his transparency and honesty in conducting such dialogues. He also
admits that Atty. Pajarillo has been to his house on several occasions, but only
to make emergency long-distance calls to his children in Metro Manila. He,
however, denies that he and Atty. Pajarillo were frequently seen eating and
drinking together in public places.
We agree with Justice Buzon's finding that the evidence against respondent on
this point was insufficient, viz.:
"On the other hand, the admission of respondent that he attended two public
functions where Atty. Pajarillo was also present; that Atty. Pajarillo had been
in his house twice or thrice and used his telephone; and that he receives
lawyers, including Atty. Pajarillo, and litigants inside his chambers, the door to
which is always open so that [the] staff could see that no under the table
transactions are taking place, is not proof that he is fraternizing with Atty.
Pajarillo. A judge need not ignore a former colleague and friend whenever they
meet each other or when the latter makes requests which are not in any
manner connected with cases pending in his court. Thus, Canon 30 of the
Canons of Judicial Ethics provides:
'30. Social relations
It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges
should live in retirement or seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the
reasonable attention to the completion of their work will permit, they continue
to mingle in social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue their
interests in or appearance at meetings of members at the bar. A judge should,
however, in pending or prospective litigation before him be scrupulously
careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion
that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in
determining his judicial course.'"
The factual setting in Abundo v. Mania, Jr. is not similar to the present case
because Napoles was not a colleague or lawyer-friend but an accused in a
former case before the Sandiganbayan's Fourth Division chaired by respondent
and which acquitted her from malversation charge. What respondent perhaps
want to underscore is the caveat for judges, in pending or prospective
litigation before them, to avoid such action as may raise suspicion on their
partiality in resolving or deciding the case. Thus, he emphasized in his
Memorandum that he "never knew Napoles on a personal level while she was
still on trial as an accused in Kevlar helmet case." Respondent even quoted
Sula's testimony expressing her opinion that she finds nothing wrong with
respondent going to Napoles' office because at that time, the Kevlar case had
already been terminated.
We do not share the view that the rule on propriety was intended to cover only
pending and prospective litigations.
Judges must, at all times, be beyond reproach and should avoid even the mere
suggestion of partiality and impropriety.24 Canon 4 of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct states that "[p ]ropriety and the appearance of propriety are essential
to the performance of all the activities of a judge." Section 2 further provides:
SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and
should do so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves
in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
As we held in Sibayan-Joaquin v. Javellana25
... Judges, indeed, should be extra prudent in associating with litigants and
counsel appearing before them so as to avoid even a mere perception of
possible bias or partiality. It is not expected, of course, that judges should live
in retirement or seclusion from any social intercourse. Indeed, it may be
desirable, for instance, that they continue, time and work commitments
permitting, to relate to members of the bar in worthwhile endeavors and in
such fields of interest, in general, as are in keeping with the noble aims and
objectives of the legal profession. In pending or prospective litigations before
them, however, judges should be scrupulously careful to avoid anything that
may tend to awaken the suspicion that their personal, social or sundry relations
could influence their objectivity, for not only must judges possess proficiency
in law but that also they must act and behave in such manner that would
assure, with great comfort, litigants and their counsel of the judges'
competence, integrity and independence.
In this light, it does not matter that the case is no longer pending when
improper acts were committed by the judge. Because magistrates are under
constant public scrutiny, the termination of a case will not deter public
criticisms for acts which may cast suspicion on its disposition or resolution. As
what transpired in this case, respondent's association with Napoles has
unfortunately dragged the Judiciary into the "Pork Barrel" controversy which
initially involved only legislative and executive officials. Worse, Napoles' much-
flaunted "contact" in the judiciary is no less than a Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, our special court tasked with hearing graft cases. We cannot,
by any stretch of indulgence and compassion, consider respondent's
transgression as a simple misconduct.
During his testimony, respondent acknowledged his violation of judicial ethics
and its serious repercussions, as shown by his answers to the questions from the
Investigation Justice, viz: Justice Gutierrez
What I am thinking Justice, as a Justice holding a very high position, could it
not be possible for you to just go to the Church of Quiapo and ask the priest
there to help you or assist you, no longer through Ms. Napoles?
Justice Ong
You cannot do that, your honor. Ever since when I was a small boy, I never got
near the image of the Mahal na Poon. Nobody can do that, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
No, no. What I mean is that you can just go to the priest in Quiapo and make
the proper request. Why did you not do that?
Justice Ong
I don't know, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
Because you have been suffering from that ailment, mass or whatever, and that
you are a devotee of the Black Nazarene. You could have gone to the Office of
the priest there and had that request for you to wear that robe of the Black
Nazarene?
Justice Ong
Hindi ko po alam na may ganyan, your honor. I was only told by Napoles during
that conversation. Had I known that, siguro po pwede ko pong gawin. Had I
known that there is such a robe, maybe I will do that.
Justice Gutierrez
Okay. It happened already. But just to thank Ms. Napoles, I think Justice you
should have been very, very careful about your actuations. You should not have
been seen in public, you know, with a woman like her who was an accused
before. You could have thanked her simply by calling her. You could have
relayed to her your true feelings that you are so grateful because of her
assistance. Were it not for her, you could not have worn that Holy Robe of the
Black Nazarene. You could have simply called her instead of going to her
office; instead of, you know, going to the Church of Santuario de San Antonio in
Forbes Park. And you should have been more careful not to be seen by the
public with her considering that she was a former accused in that case.
Justice Ong
I will heed to that advice, your honor.
Justice Gutierrez
Q And you admitted a while ago, during the interview conducted by Mr. Aries
Rufo that. "That is a lesson for me; that I should not have associated, you
know, with a former respondent or accused in a case before me." You admitted
that? You said you learned you lesson. Was that the first time you learned that
kind of lesson, Mr. Justice? Or even before you took your oath as a member of
the Judiciary, you already knew that lesson, isn't it or was that the first time?
That is why you associated yourself with Senator Jinggoy Estrada who was
accused before of plunder?
Justice Ong
Your honor, talking about ....
Justice Gutierrez
Q Do you admit you committed a lapse along that line?
Justice Ong
A Yes, your honor. You have to forgive me for that.26 (Emphasis supplied.)
In her report, Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez noted that respondent's purported
reason for visiting Napoles in her office remains uncorroborated, as Napoles
and the Quiapo parish priest were not presented as witnesses despite her
suggestion to respondent and his counsel. On the other hand, Luy's testimony
on what transpired in one of respondent's meeting with Napoles at her office
appears to be the more plausible and truthful version. Expectedly, respondent
denied having issued a BDO check for ₱25 .5 million as claimed by Luy, and
asserted he (respondent) did not deposit any money to AFPSLAI. Unfortunately,
Luy is unable to present documentary evidence saying that, as previously
testified by him before the Senate, most of the documents in their office were
shredded upon orders of Napoles when the "Pork Barrel Scam" controversy came
out.
Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez stated that the eleven checks of ₱282,000.00
supposed advance interest for respondent's check deposit to AFPSLAI were
given to respondent as consideration for the favorable ruling in the Kevlar
case.1âwphi1 Such finding is consistent with Luy's testimony that Napoles spent
a staggering PlOO million just to "fix" the said case. Under the circumstances, it
is difficult to believe that respondent went to Napoles office the second time
just to have coffee. Respondent's act of again visiting Napoles at her office,
after he had supposedly merely thanked her during the first visit, tends to
support Luy's claim that respondent had a financial deal with Napoles regarding
advance interest for AFPSLAI deposit. The question inevitably arises as to why
would Napoles extend such an accommodation to respondent if not as
consideration for her acquittal in the Kevlar case? Respondent's controversial
photograph alone had raised adverse public opinion, with the media
speculating on pay-offs taking place in the courts.
Regrettably, the conduct of respondent gave cause for the public in general to
doubt the honesty and fairness of his participation in the Kevlar case and the
integrity of our courts of justice. Before this Court, even prior to the
commencement of administrative investigation, respondent was less than
candid. In his letter to the Chief Justice where he vehemently denied having
attended parties or social events hosted by Napoles, he failed to mention that
he had in fact visited Napoles at her office. Far from being a plain omission, we
find that respondent deliberately did not disclose his social calls to Napoles. It
was only when Luy and Sula testified before the Senate and named him as the
"contact" of Napoles in the Sandiganbayan, that respondent mentioned of only
one instance he visited Napoles ("This is the single occasion that Sula was
talking about in her supplemental affidavit x x x."27).
The Court finds that respondent, in not being truthful on crucial matters even
before the administrative complaint was filed against him motu proprio, is
guilty of Dishonesty, a violation of Canon 3 (Integrity) of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.
Dishonesty is a "disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud;
untrustworthiness; lack of integrity; lack of honesty, probity or integrity in
principle; lack of fairness and straightforwardness; disposition to defraud,
deceive or betray."28 Dishonesty, being a grave offense, carries the extreme
penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of retirement benefits
except accrued leave credits, and with perpetual disqualification from
reemployment in government service. Indeed, dishonesty is a malevolent act
that has no place in the Judiciary.29
Under Section 11(A), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, a respondent found guilty
of a serious charge may be penalized as follows:
 SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of
the following sanctions may be imposed:
1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may
determine, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public
office, including governmentowned or -controlled corporations. Provided, however,
that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued leave credits;
2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
but not exceeding six (6) months; or
3. A fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding ₱40,000.00. Considering that
respondent is not a first time offender and the charges of gross misconduct and
dishonesty are both grave offenses showing his unfitness to remain as a magistrate of
the special graft court, we deem it proper to impose the supreme penalty of
dismissal.
WHEREFORE, the Court finds respondent Sandiganbayan Associate Justice
Gregory S. Ong GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT, DISHONESTY and IMPROPRIETY,
all in violations of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine
Judiciary, for which he is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of
all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, if any, and with
prejudice to reemployment in any branch, agency or instrumentality of the
government including government-owned or -controlled corporations.
This Decision is IMMEDIATELY EXECUTORY.
SO ORDERED.

2) Barias vs. Judge Marino E. Rubia (A.M. No. RTJ-14,2388, 10 June 2014)

A.M. No. RTJ-14-2388 June 10, 2014

[Formerly OCA IPI No. 10-3554-RTJ]
EMILIE SISON-BARIAS, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE MARINO E. RUBIA, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT [RTC], BRANCH 24, BIÑAN,
LAGUNA and EILEEN A. PECAÑA, DATA ENCODER II, RTC, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF
COURT, BIÑAN, LAGUNA, Respondents.
DECISION
PER CURIAM :
Public trust requires that we exact strict integrity from judges and court employees.
This case emphasizes the need for members of the judiciary and those within its
employ to exhibit the impartiality, prudence, and propriety that the New Code of
Judicial Conduct and the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel require when dealing
with parties in pending cases.
Complainant Emilie Sison-Barias is involved in three cases pending before the sala of
respondent Judge Marino Rubia.
The first case is an intestate proceeding.1 Complainant filed a petition for letters of
administration over the intestate estate of her late husband, Ramon A. Barias. This
was opposed by her mother-in-law, Romelias Almeda-Barias.2
The second case is a guardianship proceeding over Romelias Almeda-Barias.3 Evelyn
Tanael, the guardian appointed by the court, submitted a property inventory report
that included not only the properties of Romelias Almeda-Barias but also properties
forming part of the estate of complainant’s late husband.4
The third case is a civil action5 for annulment of contracts and reconveyance of real
properties filed by Romelias Almeda-Barias, represented by Evelyn Tanael, against
complainant, among others.6
In all these cases, a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
510712 and part of the estate of complainant’s husband was involved.7
Complainant alleged that there was delay in the publication of the notice in the
petition for issuance of letters of administration filed. She was then informed by her
brother, Enrique "Ike" Sison, that respondent Eileen Pecaña, the daughter of his good
friend, was a data encoder in the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial
Court of Biñan, Laguna.8
Complainant, together with her two brothers, Enrique and Perlito "Jun" Sison, Jr.,9
met with respondent Pecaña on February 20, 2010.10 During this meeting,
complainant informed respondent Pecaña of the delay in the publication of the notice
in the petition for issuance of letters of administration. She then asked respondent
Pecaña to check the status of the publication of the notice.11 Respondent Pecaña
asked for complainant’s number so that she could inform her as soon as any
development takes place in the case.12 Enrique13 and Perlito14 executed affidavits
to corroborate these allegations.
Respondent Pecaña asked complainant to meet her again at her house in Biñan,
Laguna.15 Complainant went there with Enrique.16 Respondent Pecaña then informed
complainant that she could no longer assist her since respondent Judge Rubia had
already given administration of the properties to Evelyn Tanael.17
Complainant stated that she was not interested in the grant of administration to
Tanael because these concerned the properties of her mother-in-law, Romelias
Almeda-Barias.18 She was only concerned with the administration of the properties of
her late husband, to which respondent Pecaña replied, "Ah ganun ba? Iba pala ung
kaso mo."19
Complainant alleged that respondent Pecaña sent her a text message on March 2,
201020 asking complainant to call her. Complainant called respondent Pecaña who
informed her that respondent Judge Rubia wanted to talk to her.21 Complainant
agreed to meet with respondent Judge Rubia over dinner, on the condition that
respondent Pecaña would be present as well.22
On March 3, 201023 at around 7:00 p.m, complainant picked up respondent Pecaña at
6750 Ayala Avenuein Makati City. They proceeded to Café Juanita in The Fort,
Bonifacio Global City. Respondent Pecaña said that respondent Judge Rubia would
arrive late as he would be coming from a Rotary Club meeting held at the Mandarin
Hotel.24
Respondent Judge Rubia arrived at Café Juanita around 8:30 p.m. During the dinner
meeting, respondents allegedly asked complainant inappropriate questions.
Respondent Judge Rubia allegedly asked whether she was still connected with
Philippine Airlines, which she still was at that time.25 Complainant was then informed
that respondent Judge Rubia knew of this fact through Atty. Noe Zarate, counsel of
Romelias Almeda-Barias.26 This disclosure surprised complainant,as she was under the
impression that opposing counsel and respondent JudgeRubia had no business
discussing matters that were not relevant to their pending cases.27
Respondent Judge Rubia also allegedly asked her questions about her supposed
involvement with another man and other accusations made by Romelias Almeda-
Barias.28 She was asked about the hospital where she brought her husband at the
time of his cardiac arrest.29
These details, according to complainant, were never discussed in the pleadings or in
the course of the trial.30 Thus, she inferred that respondent Judge Rubia had been
talking to the opposing counsel regarding these matters outside of the court
proceedings.31 The impression of complainant was that respondent Judge Rubia was
actively taking a position in favor of Atty. Zarate.32
To confirm her suspicion, respondents then allegedly "told complainant to just talk to
Atty. Zarate, counsel for the oppositor, claiming that he is a nice person. Complainant
was appalled by such suggestion and replied[,] ‘Why will I talk to him? Judge di ko
yata kaya gawin un.’"33
After dinner, complainant stayed behind to settle the bill. Even before he left, she
alleged that respondent Judge Rubia had made insinuations that she was awaiting the
company of another man.34
From then on, complainant and respondents did not communicate and/or meet
outside the courtroom until August 8, 2010.
In the meantime, complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia acted in a manner
that showed manifest partiality in favor of the opposing parties, namely, Romelias
Almeda-Barias and Evelyn Tanael, as represented by their counsel, Atty. Noe
Zarate.35
On June 15, 2010, counsel for complainant was personally handed a copy of a motion
for consolidation filed by the oppositor, Romelias Almeda-Barias, despite the date of
the hearing on such motion being set on June 18, 2010.36 Complainant alleged that
respondent Judge Rubia did not even consider the comment/opposition to the motion
for consolidation filed by her counsel, which stated that since two of these cases were
special proceedings, they could not be consolidated with an ordinary civil action.
Respondent Judge Rubia insisted on discussing the totality of the different issues
involved in the three distinct cases under one court proceeding.37 As such,
complainant alleged that the main issues of the special proceedings were
consolidated with matters that were properly the subject of a separate civil action.38
Complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia refused to issue Orders39 that
would have allowed her to comply with her duties as the special administrator of her
late husband’s estate.40 This included the order to conduct an inventory of the
properties, rights, and credits of the deceased, subject to the authority of the
administrator.
In addition, complainant alleged that respondent Judge Rubia refused to grant her
request for subpoena duces tecum and ad testificandum that she had prayed for to
compel Evelyn Tanael to produce the documents showing the accrued rentals of the
parcel of land belonging toher late husband.41 As such, complainant raised that
respondent Judge Rubia’s refusal emboldened Evelyn Tanael and oppositor Romelias
Almeda-Barias to interfere in the management of the estate of complainant’s late
husband.42 Because of this refusal, she asserted that respondent Judge Rubia failed
to adhere to the duty of the court to ensure a proper inventory of the estate.43
Complainant enumerated occasions that alleged manifest partiality on the part of
respondent Judge Rubia. She alleged that respondent Judge Rubia failed to require a
timely filing of the pre-trial brief on the part of Evelyn Tanael and Romelias Almeda-
Barias, and despite their noncompliance on four (4) separate pre-trials that were
postponed, Tanael and Almeda-Barias were not declared in default.44 She also
alleged that respondent Judge Rubia stated that the burden to prove ownership of the
property was on complainant, when in fact it was the oppositor, or Tanael and
Almeda-Barias, who had the burden of proof to show that the land was fraudulently
transferred to her late husband.45
Complainant admitted that she did not inform her counsel of the dinner meeting she
had with respondents.46 It was Enrique who allegedly told complainant’s lawyers
about it when he went to the lawyer’s office to pay some bills.47 Complainant said
that her lawyer immediately admonished her for agreeing to meet with respondent
Judge Rubia. Complainant then texted respondent Pecaña on August 8, 2010 on her
lawyer’s reaction concerning the March 3, 2010 meeting. The following exchanges
took place via text message:
COMPLAINANT:
Hi Aileen! Sorry jz feeling bad. . my lawyer jz called me at galit n galit. My brother
went to hm today to pay som bills. Sa kakadaldal na mention s lawyr my meeting wid
u n judge rubia. My lawyr ws mad dat m nt suppose to do dat w/out hs knowledge. I
cnt understand anymore wat he ws sayng kanina kse nga galit. He wil file yata somtng
abt dat n I dnt knwwat? Pls. Help me. (August 8, 2010, 2:31 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]:
Ha? Anong ififile? Bkt xa galit? Bka lalo tayo mapahamak? (August 8, 2010, 3:48 p.m.)
COMPLAINANT
M nt very sure bt he mentioned abt administrative or administratn something. I hav to
talk to hm n person para mas claro. Hirap kse by fon tlaga. He ws mad bcoz f our
meetng nga, dats wat struck hm. Sorry, daldal kse ni kuya. M going to col kuya
tomorrow na. Its 1am na hr, I have to buy foncard pa. (August 8, 2010, 4:18 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]
Admin? Nku d mapapahamak nga kaming 2 ni juj. Pati ikaw mapapahamak pa dn.
(August 8, 2010, 4:28 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]
Bkt xa galit kng mkpg kta ka sminwidout his knowledge. I cnt fathom y wil it end up
filing an admin case. (August 8, 2010, 4:29 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]
Pls Emily do something 2 pacify ur lawyer, juj rubia will definitely get mad wid us.
(August 8, 2010, 4:30 p.m.)48 (Emphasis supplied)
On September 15, 2010, complainant moved for respondent Judge Rubia’s inhibition.
This was denied on October 6, 2010. Complainant then filed a motion for
reconsideration denied in an order49 dated November 15, 2010.50
On November 11, 2010, complainant filed a complaint affidavit51 before the Office of
the Court Administrator charging respondent Pecaña for gross misconduct and
respondent Judge Rubia for conduct unbecoming of a judge, partiality, gross
ignorance of the law or procedure, incompetence, and gross misconduct.52
The Office of the Court Administrator referred the complaint to respondents for
comment.53
In her comment,54 respondent Pecaña did not deny meeting complainant on February
20, 2010 through the introduction of Enrique Sison.55 However, she claimed that the
alleged meeting between complainant and respondent Judge Rubia was merely a
chance encounter.
Respondent Pecaña alleged that "sometime [in the] second week of March 2010,"56
when she was on her way to Makati City to meet her sisters for coffee, complainant
invited her for dinner. Respondent Pecaña hesitantly agreed after complainant had
insisted.57 Complainant picked her up at Starbucks 6750 in Makati City, and they
proceeded to Café Juanita in Burgos Circle for dinner. Upon passing by Burgos Circle,
respondent Pecaña saw respondent Judge Rubia’s car parked near Café Juanita.58
At about past 10:00 p.m., respondent Pecaña said that she saw respondent Judge
Rubia together with some companions walking toward his car.59 She stepped out of
the restaurant and greeted him. Complainant allegedly followed respondent Pecaña
and so the latter was constrained to introduce complainant as an employee of
Philippine Airlines to respondent Judge Rubia.60 After the introduction, respondent
Judge Rubia went to his car and left. Complainant and respondent Pecaña returned to
the restaurant to finish their food and pay the bill.61
Complainant drove respondent Pecaña back to Makati City. During the drive,
complainant allegedly asked her help regarding the cases filed in court and inquired
as to what she could give to respondent Judge Rubia because her lawyers instructed
her to bribe him. Respondent Pecaña only said that respondent Judge Rubia does not
accept money and that he is financially stable.62
After the dinner, complainant allegedly kept on sending text messages to respondent
Pecaña concerning her case filed in court.63 Respondent Pecaña admitted to the
exchanges through text messages she had with complainant on August 8, 2010
regarding the filing of administrative case against her and respondent Judge Rubia.64
Respondent Pecaña denied being an advocate of Atty. Zarate.65 She maintained the
position that she should not be held administratively liable for what she construed to
be primarily judicial matters, such as the bases for respondent Judge Rubia’s
decisions and orders in court.66
Respondent Judge Rubia filed his comment67 on January 17, 2011.
Respondent Judge Rubia claimed that the alleged meeting between him and his co-
respondent Pecaña together with complainant was a mere chance encounter.68 He
denied any pre-arranged dinner meeting, stating that after the brief encounter with
complainant, he had to rush home to attend to his ailing wife.69 He stated that he
was only introduced to complainant because she was an employee of Philippine
Airlines where he was a former executive.70 Respondent Judge Rubia argued that if
the alleged meeting with complainant did take place, it should have been mentioned
in the first motion for inhibition.71 Further, he emphasized that it took complainant
eight (8) months since the alleged dinner meeting to file a motion for inhibition and
an administrative case.72
Respondent Judge Rubia surmised that complainant and her counsel, hoping for a
favorable outcome of the cases filed, initiated contact with respondent Pecaña. The
filing of the administrative case against him was only to compel him to inhibit from
the cases to seek a friendlier forum.73
Moreover, respondent Judge Rubia denied knowledge of any text messages exchanged
between complainant and respondent Pecaña as well as any active advocacy in favor
of opposing counsel, Atty. Zarate.74
As to the allegations of partiality concerning the orders he issued for the cases filed,
respondent Judge Rubia argued that the best forum to ventilate complainant’s
allegations was not through an administrative proceeding but through judicial
recourse.75
Due to the gravity of the charges and the conflicting facts presented by the parties,
the Office of the Court Administrator recommended the referral of the administrative
complaint to a Court of Appeals Justice for investigation, report, and
recommendation.76
On September 12, 2011, this court issued a resolution referring the administrative
complaint to a Justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report, and
recommendation.77 The complaint was assigned to Court of Appeals Associate Justice
Samuel H. Gaerlan.
On December 5, 2011, Atty. Noe Zarate filed a motion for Intervention78 allegedly
due to the implication of his name in the administrative complaint.79
Atty. Zarate argued that the complaint should be dismissed on the ground of forum
shopping because the orders issued by respondent Judge Rubia and mentioned in the
complaint were assailed in a petition for certiorari.80
Further, Atty. Zarate alleged that he did not know respondents personally, and he
was not closely associated with them.81 He asserted that the records were replete
with incidents where he and respondent Judge Rubia engaged in heated discussions on
legal matters.82 He maintained that he did not foster any closeness or personal
affinity with respondent Judge Rubia that would substantiate complainant’s
allegations.83
In addition, Atty. Zarate expressed his agreement with respondents’ narration of the
events on the alleged dinner meeting.84 He argued that if the dinner meeting did
take place, this incident should have been the ground for the motion for inhibition
filed.85
Atty. Zarate stated that, granting arguendo that the dinner meeting happened, there
was nothing "wrong, improper or illegal"86 about it. It could have been reasonably
interpreted as an extrajudicial means initiated by respondent Judge Rubia to assuage
the parties in the contentious litigation.87
The motion for intervention was noted without action by Justice Gaerlan.88
On December 15, 2011, the parties, together with their counsels, appeared before
Justice Gaerlan. It was agreed that respondents would file their respective
supplemental comments and complainant her reply to the comment. Complainant
manifested that she would present three (3) witnesses: herself and her two brothers.
Respondent Pecaña would testify for herself and present Semenidad Pecaña, her aunt,
as witness. Respondent Judge Rubia manifested that he would testify on his behalf
and present respondent Pecaña as witness.89
Respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña filed their respective supplemental comments
dated December 15, 201190 and December 16, 2011,91 respectively. Complainant
filed her consolidated reply on January 17, 2012.92
A second hearing on the administrative complaint ensued on January 10, 2012 where
complainant testified on the dinner meeting on March 3, 2010.
During the hearing, complainant identified a document containing a list of phone calls
showing that she called respondent Pecaña on March 2 and 3, 2010.93 Counsel for
respondent Pecaña stipulated that these calls were made to her.94
The hearing of the administrative complaint continued on January 12, 17, and 24,
2012.
In the January 17, 2012 hearing, respondent Pecaña testified to the allegations in her
comment and judicial affidavit. She alleged for the first time that the dinner meeting
with complainant happened on March 10, not March 3, 2010.
On January 24, 2012, Mr. Rodel Cortez, secretariat of the Rotary Club of Makati
Southwest Chapter, was presented as witness for respondent Judge Rubia. Rodel
testified that the Rotary Club of Makati Southwest Chapter had a meeting on March
10, 2010 at Numa Restaurant in Bonifacio Global City. Respondent Judge Rubia
attended the meeting as shown in the attendance sheet identified by Rodel.
Rodel testified that after the meeting, he, Billy Francisco, and respondent Judge
Rubia walked together toward the parking area. When they were nearing Burgos
Circle where their cars were parked, Rodel allegedly saw complainant and respondent
Pecaña approaching them.95 He then saw respondent Pecaña introduce complainant
to respondent Judge Rubia.96 After the introduction, he saw respondent Judge Rubia
go to his car and drive away.97
Respondent Judge Rubia testified for himself. He identified the comment and judicial
affidavit filed.98 He alleged that the encounter with complainant at Burgos Circle was
on March 10, not March 3, 2010.99
Complying with the order dated January 31, 2012,100 the parties filed their
respective memoranda.
Justice Gaerlan submitted his investigation report dated March 13, 2012.101 In his
report, Justice Gaerlan recommended that no penalty be imposed against
respondents.102 He was "convinced that the meeting at Burgos Circle was just a
chance encounter"103 and found that complainant failed to prove her claim with
substantial evidence that would justify the imposition of a penalty on
respondents.104
Justice Gaerlan relied on the testimony of Rodel Cortez as against the uncorroborated
testimony of complainant.105
Justice Gaerlan emphasized the fact that it had taken complainant eight (8) months
before she filed the administrative complaint.106 He stated that the deliberate
concealment of the meeting was inconsistent with her resolve to prove respondent
Judge Rubia’s alleged partiality toward the counsel of the opposing party.107
As to the other charges against respondent Judge Rubia, Justice Gaerlan stated that
the administrative case was not the proper recourse for complainant.108 The proper
action for her was to pursue remedial action through the courts "to rectify the
purported error"109 in the court proceedings.
The Office of the Court Administrator referred the report to this court.
The issue in this case is whether respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña should be held
administratively liable.
This court must set aside the findings of fact and reject the report of Justice Samuel
Gaerlan. Respondents Judge Rubia and Pecaña should be held administratively liable
for their actions. The findings of fact of an investigating justice must be accorded
great weight and finality similar with the weight given to a trial court judge’s since an
investigating justice personally assessed the witnesses’ credibility.110 However, this
rule admits of exceptions.
In J. King & Sons Company, Inc. v. Judge Hontanosas, Jr.,111 this court held:
Such findings may be reviewed if there appears in the record some fact or
circumstance of weight which the lower court may have overlooked, misunderstood or
misappreciated, and which, if properly considered, would alter the result of the case.
Among the circumstances which had been held to be justifiable reasons for the Court
to re-examine the trial court or appellate court’s findings of facts are, when the
interference made is manifestly mistaken; when the judgment is based on
misapprehension of facts; and when the finding of fact of the trial court or appellate
court is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by
evidence on record.112 (Citations omitted)
These exceptions are applicable in this case. In disregarding the complainant’s
testimony and relying on the testimony of Cortez, respondent Judge Rubia’s witness,
Justice Gaerlan said:
While respondents were able to present a witness to corroborate their version of the
incident on all material points, complainant miserably failed on this regard. The
Investigating Justice who had the untrammeled opportunity to observe the
deportment and demeanor of the respondent’s witness, Rodel Cortez (Cortez) during
the hearing finds his forthright narration of facts credible and rang with truth. The
clear, candid and unmistakable declaration of Cortez that the incident that transpired
along the sidewalk of Burgos Circle was just a chance encounter, absent any ulterior
motive for him to perjure, swayed this Investigating Justice to believe that the dinner
meeting between Judge Rubia and Barias did not [take] place. A testimony is credible
if it bears the earmarks of truth and sincerity and has been delivered in a
spontaneous, natural, and straightforward manner.
Not only that. Cortez’[s] testimony was likewise corroborated by other pieces of
evidence, such as the Program of Meeting and the Attendance Sheet of the Rotary
Club of Makati Southwest which tend to prove that at that particular date and time
Judge Rubia was in a rotary meeting and was not dining with Rubia and Pecaña. These
evidence, when taken together, debase the uncorroborated version of incident as
narrated by Barias. Barias[’] self-serving declarations have no evidentiary value when
ranged against the testimony of a credible witness on affirmative matters.113
(Emphasis supplied)
We cannot agree with Justice Gaerlan’s assessment of the credibility of the witnesses
and the weight given to their testimonies.
Justice Gaerlan placed too much importance on the testimony of Rodel Cortez, the
Secretariat of the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter, and qualified him as a
"disinterested" witness.
A disinterested witness’ testimony is afforded evidentiary weight by his or her lack of
interest in the outcome of the case.1âwphi1 This lack of stake makes the
disinterested witness’ testimony more believable. To actively take part in litigation as
a party or a witness entails willingness to commit to the arduous and exacting nature
of most judicial proceedings. The disinterested witness’ candor and submission to the
proceedings before the court add credibility and believability to the content of his or
her testimony.
To qualify a witness as truly disinterested, courts should analyze the circumstances
that surround his or her testimony.
The record shows that the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter, employed Rodel
in 1989.114 He was appointed Secretariat in 1994 where respondent Judge Rubia was
a former President and remains an active member.115
The finding that respondent Judge Rubia is administratively liable could taint the
reputation of the organization that the witness has been serving for more than 20
years. It would be a definite blow to the reputation of the Rotary Club of Makati,
Southwest Chapter, if its former President were to be found guilty of the offenses
that complainant imputed upon respondent Judge Rubia. The possibility of Rodel
testifying in favor of respondent Judge Rubia as a result of his loyalty to the latter
and the Rotary Club puts into question the characterization that he is disinterested.
The substance of Rodel’s narration of events should also be scrutinized.
Complainant alleged that the dinner meeting set among her, respondent Pecaña, and
respondent Judge Rubia took place on March 3, 2010, as indicated in the investigation
report of Justice Gaerlan. The record shows that the Investigating Justice accepted
the formal offer of Exhibit A, which was complainant’s judicial affidavit establishing
the date of the dinner as March 3, 2010 in Café Juanita.116 Complainant also alleged
in her complaint that respondent Judge Rubia came from Mandarin Hotel in Makati
from the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter meeting.117
The testimony of Rodel and the evidence submitted by respondents alleged that the
chance meeting of respondent Judge Rubia with complainant and respondent Pecaña
took place on March 10, 2010 on the side street of Burgos Circle in Bonifacio Global
City, after the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter meeting and dinner at Numa
Restaurant, on their way to the parking lot. This means that the testimony of and the
evidence presented by Rodel do not disprove the occurrence of the dinner meeting as
alleged by complainant, since the meeting of the Rotary Club and the dinner meeting
alleged by complainant took place on different dates. Assuming that the alleged
chance meeting between complainant and respondent Judge Rubia took place on
March 10, 2010 as alleged by respondents, this does not discount the veracity of
complainant’s allegations. Both the Rotary Club of Makati, Southwest Chapter dinner
and the dinner meeting alleged by complainant took place in the vicinity of Bonifacio
Global City. This could have allowed respondent Judge Rubia ample time to travel to
the dinner meeting after the meeting of the Rotary Club of Makati.
The investigation report stated that the attendance sheet118 and the program of
meeting that Rodel submitted corroborated his testimony. The date indicated on the
attendance sheet and on the program of meeting was March 10, 2010, not March 3,
2010. However, there was nothing to indicate the time of arrival or departure of the
attendees. Neither was there an indication of the time when the meeting began or
ended. The attendance sheet and the program of meeting, by themselves or taken as
corroborative evidence of Rodel’s testimony, do not discount the distinct and tangible
possibility that the dinner meeting as narrated by complainant took place. On the
other hand, we find the allegation that the dinner meeting took place on March 3,
2010 more credible.
Complainant presented a document containing a list of calls she made from January
to March 2010.119 She identified her cellular phone number120 as well as respondent
Pecaña’s.121 Respondent Pecaña admitted that the number identified by complainant
was her number.122 On March 2 and 3, 2010, calls were made to respondent Pecaña’s
number.123 Respondent Pecaña admitted that she had received a call from
complainant before the latter picked her up at 6750 Makati City.124 However, no
calls to respondent Pecaña were recorded on March 10, 2010 in the document
presented.125 On the other hand, the calls made to respondent Pecaña as shown in
the document coincided with complainant’s allegations.
Finally, during the December 15, 2011 hearing, respondent Judge only manifested
that he would testify for himself and present respondent Pecaña as witness.126 He
did not manifest that he would be presenting Rodel or any participant in the Rotary
Club meeting as his witness.
The totality of these circumstances places doubt on the alibi of respondent Judge
Rubia and Rodel’s narration of events.
The differing accounts on the dates and the venues were not addressed in the
investigation report of Justice Gaerlan. The report failed to mention that complainant
alleged that respondent Judge Rubia arrived late precisely because he came from a
meeting of the Rotary Club of Makati. These glaring inconsistencies did not add
evidentiary weight to respondents’ claims. They only put into question the veracity of
the exculpatory evidence.
This court has held:
In administrative proceedings, the quantum of proof required to establish a
respondent’s malfeasance is not proof beyond reasonable doubt but substantial
evidence, i.e., that amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion, is required. Faced with conflicting versions of
complainant and respondent, the Court gives more weight to the allegations and
testimony of the complainant and her witnesses who testified clearly and consistently
before the Investigating Judge.127 (Emphasis supplied; citations omitted)
After scrutinizing the testimony of complainant and the evidence she presented to
support her allegations, we find her account of the event to be genuine and
believable.
Complainant’s narration of the dinner meeting held on March 3, 2010 and her account
of events leading up to the dinner meeting were detailed and comprehensive. The
conversation alleged by complainant that took place with respondents during the
meeting was replete with details.
The strongest corroborative evidence to support complainant’s allegations was the
exchange of text messages between complainant and respondent Pecaña regarding
the dinner meeting. These text messages were admitted by respondent Pecaña.128
However, Justice Gaerlan failed to give any weight to the exchange of text messages.
This fact was not included in his investigation report.129
The content of the text messages of respondent Pecaña belied respondents’ claim
that the alleged dinner meeting in Burgos Circle was only a chance encounter.
AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]
Bkt xa galit kngmkpg kta ka smin widout his knowledge. I cnt fathom y wil it end up
filing an admin case. (August 8, 2010, 4:29 p.m.)
AILEEN PECAÑA [sic]
Pls Emily do something 2 pacify ur lawyer, juj rubia will definitely get mad wid us.
(August 8, 2010, 4:30 p.m.)130 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Pecaña used the phrase, "mkpg kta," which may be translated to "have a
meeting." "Mkpg kta" can in no way mean a chance encounter.
Further, respondent Pecaña’s text messages sent to complainant belied her claim of
an innocent chance encounter. She said that respondent Judge Rubia would get angry
after complainant had informed her that her lawyer might file an administrative case
against them. Respondent Judge Rubia would not have had a reason to get upset
because of the possibility of administrative liability if an innocent and coincidental
encounter happened and not a dinner meeting. However, if the meeting took place as
alleged by complainant, this would have logically led to a hostile reaction from
respondents, particularly respondent Judge Rubia.
In her testimony before Justice Gaerlan, respondent Pecaña gave the following
testimony:
ATTY FERNANDEZ:
In August 2010, you admitted in your comment and your supplemental comment that
you received a text coming from Emilie Barias saying her lawyer is mad with her
because of that meeting, isn’t it?
EILEEN PECAÑA:
Yes, sir.
ATTY FERNANDEZ:
In fact you admitted that there were text messages coming from you and Judge Rubia
in March 2010, isn’t it?
EILEEN PECAÑA:
Yes, sir.
ATTY FERNANDEZ:
And in fact, you admitted that there were [sic] indeed a text message coming from
you and this is: ["]ha anong ipafile baka lalo tayong mapapahamk?["] And another
message says "bakit siya...another...did you do something to pacify her lawyer...so
you affirm these message [sic]? EILEEN PECAÑA:
Yes, sir.
ATTY FERNANDEZ:
Based on those messages of yours, is it correct that you fear....?
EILEEN PECAÑA:
I am not afraid in a way na pinalalabas nila.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
And in fact in your comment and in your supplemental comment you were explaining
the context of these messages?
EILEEN PECAÑA:
Alin po doon?
ATTY. FERNANDEZ
The first one? "bakit sya galit baka lalo tayong mapahamak"
EILEEN PECAÑA:
Ang ipinapaliwanag ko chance meeting outside the street.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ
How about the part where "administrative[. . . .]"
EILEEN PECAÑA:
The reason why I said that is because as employees of the court, whenever an
administrative case is filed against us[,] we will be investigated like this, and our
benefits and promotion chances we will be disqualified.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ
In your text messages you never mentioned to Emilie that it would end up in an
administrative case because you simply thought that it was a chance meeting?
EILEEN PECAÑA:
Ano po sir?
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
You cannot fathom why it will end up as an administrative case because it was only a
chance meeting?
EILEEN PECAÑA:
Immediately on the text messages she knows already what happened why should I
have to explain?
....
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
Did you tell her while exchanging text messages that it was just a chance meeting?
EILEEN PECAÑA:
No more, sir.
ATTY. FERNANDEZ:
So you no longer took it upon you to tell Emilie to advise her lawyer not to get mad
becauseit was only a chance meeting? (No answer from the witness.)131
Respondents also alleged that the chance encounter happened because respondent
Pecaña, while having dinner with complainant, stepped out of the restaurant to greet
respondent Judge Rubia on the side street of Burgos Circle. Since complainant
allegedly followed respondent Pecaña out of the restaurant, the latter introduced
complainant to respondent Judge Rubia.
This allegation is quite implausible after taking into account the following admissions:
1. Respondent Pecaña described her relationship with Judge Rubia as "[w]ala naman
po masyado. My dealing with the Judge is only in relation with my work because
during flag ceremonies he always reminds us not to act as go between or not to be
involved in the cases filed in the court."132
2. Respondent Judge Rubia is not the immediate superior of respondent Pecaña as the
latter is in the Office of the Clerk of Court.
3. Respondent Pecaña was having dinner with complainant whom she knew had a
pending case before respondent Judge Rubia.
4. Respondent Judge Rubia always reminded court employees not to have dealings
with litigants.
There was clearly no reason for respondent Pecaña to go out of her way to greet
respondent Judge Rubia. In fact, after allegedly being repeatedly reminded that court
employees should not have any dealings with litigants, respondent Pecaña should not
have gone out to greet respondent Judge Rubia since she was dining with a litigant.
The odds that complainant and respondent Pecaña would meet respondent Judge
Rubia by pure coincidence are highly improbable. Granted, chance meetings between
persons may take place, but a chance meeting between a litigant in the company of a
court employee who acceded to assisting the litigant in a case and the judge deciding
that case is outside the realm of common experience. The odds of such an occurrence
are, indeed, one in a million. The sheer improbability of such an occurrence already
puts into question the truth of respondents’ allegations.
Based on these considerations, the narrative of complainant is more believable and
must be afforded greater evidentiary weight.
Delay in filing of administrative complaint is not a defense
The investigation report placed particular emphasis on the eight-month period
between the alleged dinner meeting and the filing of the administrative complaint.
The eight-month delay in the filing of the administrative complaint is of no
consequence.
Delay in filing an administrative complaint should not be construed as basis to
question its veracity or credibility. There are considerations that a litigant must think
about before filing an administrative case against judges and court personnel. This is
more so for lawyers where the possibility of appearing before the judge where an
administrative complaint has been filed is high.
Here, respondent Judge Rubia presided over three cases that involved complainant
and her late husband’s estate. He wielded an unmistakable amount of control over
the proceedings.
Filing an administrative case against respondents is a time-consuming ordeal, and it
would require additional time and resources that litigants would rather not expend in
the interest of preserving their rights in the suit. Complainant might have decided to
tread with caution so as not to incur the ire of respondent Judge Rubia for fear of the
reprisal that could take place after the filing of an administrative complaint.
Judges and court personnel wield extraordinary control over court proceedings of
cases filed. Thus, litigants are always cautious in filing administrative cases against
judges and court personnel.
In any case, administrative offenses, including those committed by members of the
bench and bar, are not subject to a fixed period within which they must be reported.
In Heck v. Judge Santos,133 this court held that:
Pursuant to the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that an
administrative complaint against an erring lawyer who was thereafter appointed as a
judge, albeit filed only after twenty-four years after the offending act was
committed, is not barred by prescription. If the rule were otherwise, members of the
bar would be emboldened to disregard the very oath they took as lawyers, prescinding
from the fact that as long as no private complainant would immediately come
forward, they stand a chance of being completely exonerated from whatever
administrative liability they ought to answer for. It is the duty of this Court to protect
the integrity of the practice of law as well as the administration of justice. No matter
how much time has elapsed from the time of the commission of the act complained of
and the time of the institution of the complaint, erring members of the bench and bar
cannot escape the disciplining arm of the Court. This categorical pronouncement is
aimed at unscrupulous members of the bench and bar, to deter them from committing
acts which violate the Code of Professional Responsibility, the Code of Judicial
Conduct, or the Lawyer’s Oath.134 (Emphasis supplied)
If this court saw fit to penalize a member of the bench for an offense committed
more than twenty years prior to the filing of the complaint, then the eight-month
period cannot prejudice the complainant.
The interval between the time when the offense was committed and the time when
the offense was officially reported cannot serve as a basis to doubt the veracity of
complainant’s allegations. This court’s mandate to discipline members of the
judiciary and its personnel is implemented by pertinent rules and statutes. Judges are
disciplined based on whether their actions violated the New Code of Judicial
Conduct.135 Court personnel are also governed by the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel136 and are appointed in accordance with the Civil Service Law, as provided
for in Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. None of these rules for
administrative discipline mandates a period within which a complaint must be filed
after the commission or discovery of the offense. This court determines with finality
the liability of erring members of the judiciary and its employees. The gravity of an
administrative offense cannot be diminished by a delay in the filing of a complaint.
To dismiss the commission of the offense based on this eight-month period is to ignore
the distinct and tangible possibility that the offense was actually committed. The
commission of the offense is not contingent on the period of revelation or disclosure.
To dismiss the complaint on this ground is tantamount to attaching a period of
prescription to the offense, which does not apply in administrative charges.
Respondent Pecaña’s actions amount to violations of the Code of Conduct for Court
Personnel
"Court personnel, regardless of position or rank, are expected to conduct themselves
in accordance with the strict standards of integrity and morality."137
The complaint states that respondents were allegedly acting in favor of Atty. Noe
Zarate, counsel for the opposing parties in the three cases pending in the sala of
respondent Judge Rubia. Because of respondents’ actions, complainant and all who
will be made aware of the events of this case will harbor distrust toward the judiciary
and its processes. For this alone, respondents should be held administratively liable.
For respondent Pecaña, the fact that she allowed herself to be placed in a position
that could cause suspicion toward her work as a court personnel is disconcerting.
As a court employee, respondent Pecaña should have known better than to interact
with litigants in a way that could compromise the confidence that the general public
places in the judiciary. Respondent Pecaña should have refused to meet with
complainant in her home. She should have refused any other form of extended
communication with complainant, save for those in her official capacity as a Data
Encoder of the court. This continued communication between complainant and
respondent Pecaña makes her culpable for failure to adhere to the strict standard of
propriety mandated of court personnel.
Respondent Pecaña admitted to meeting with complainant several times, despite the
former’s knowledge of the pendency of cases in the court where she is employed and
in addition to the text messages exchanged between them. She had a duty to sever all
forms of communication with complainant or to inform her superiors or the proper
authority of complainant’s attempts to communicate with her. Respondent Pecaña
failed to do so. Instead, she continued to communicate with complainant, even to the
extent of advising complainant against filing an administrative case against her and
respondent Judge Rubia.
Respondent Pecaña violated Canon 1 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel:
CANON I
FIDELITY TO DUTY
....
SECTION 3. Court personnel shall not discriminate by dispensing special favors to
anyone. They shall not allow kinship, rank, position or favors from any party to
influence their official acts or duties.
....
SECTION 5. Court personnel shall use the resources, property and funds under their
official custody in a judicious manner and solely in accordance with the prescribed
statutory and regulatory guidelines or procedures.
Respondent Pecaña’s actions constitute a clear violation of the requirement that all
court personnel uphold integrity and prudence in all their actions. As stated in Villaros
v. Orpiano:138
Time and time again, we have stressed that the behavior of all employees and
officials involved in the administration of justice, from judges to the most junior
clerks, is circumscribed with a heavy responsibility. Their conduct must be guided by
strict propriety and decorum at all times in order to merit and maintain the public’s
respect for and trust in the judiciary. Needless to say, all court personnel must
conduct themselves in a manner exemplifying integrity, honesty and uprightness.139
Respondent Pecaña should, thus, be held administratively liable for her actions.
Respondent Judge Rubia committed gross violations of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct
By meeting a litigant and advising her to talk to opposing counsel, respondent Judge
Rubia violated several canons of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
Respondent Judge Rubia failed to act in a manner that upholds the dignity mandated
by his office. He was already made aware of the impropriety of respondent Pecaña’s
actions by virtue of her admissions in her comment. At the time of the referral of the
complaint to the Office of the Court Administrator, respondent Judge Rubia was
already the Executive Judge of Branch 24 of the Regional Trial Court of Biñan,
Laguna.140 As a judge, he had the authority to ensure that all court employees,
whether or not they were under his direct supervision, act in accordance with the
esteem of their office.
Respondent Pecaña even alleged that respondent Judge Rubia made several warnings
to all court employees not to intercede in any case pending before any court under his
jurisdiction as Executive Judge.141 However, nothing in the record shows that
respondent Judge Rubia took action after being informed of respondent Pecaña’s
interactions with a litigant, such as ascertaining her actions, conducting an inquiry to
admonish or discipline her, or at least reporting her actions to the Office of the Court
Administrator.
For this failure alone, respondent Judge Rubia should be held administratively liable.
Furthermore, the evidence on record supports the allegations that a meeting with
complainant, a litigant with several cases pending before his sala, took place.
Respondent Judge Rubia’s mere presence in the dinner meeting provides a ground for
administrative liability.
In Gandeza Jr. v. Tabin,142 this court reminded judges:
Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct requires a judge to avoid not only
impropriety but also the mere appearance of impropriety in all activities.
To stress how the law frowns upon even any appearance of impropriety in a
magistrate’s activities, it has often been held that a judge must be like Caesar’s wife
- above suspicion and beyond reproach. Respondent’s act discloses a deficiency in
prudence and discretion that a member of the Judiciary must exercise in the
performance of his official functions and of his activities as a private individual. It is
never trite to caution respondent to be prudent and circumspect in both speech and
action, keeping in mind that her conduct in and outside the courtroom is always under
constant observation.143 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) Respondent Judge
Rubia clearly failed to live up to the standards of his office. By participating in the
dinner meeting and by failing to admonish respondent Pecaña for her admitted
impropriety, respondent Judge Rubia violated Canons 1 and 2 of the New Code of
Judicial Conduct.
Canon 1 INDEPENDECE
Judicial Independence is a pre-requisite to the rule of law and a fundamental
guarantee of a fair trial. A judge shall therefore uphold and exemplify judicial
independence in both its individual and institutional aspects.
Section 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of
their assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of
the law, free of any extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or
interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
Section 6. Judges shall be independent in relation to society in general and in relation
to the particular parties to a dispute which he or she has to adjudicate.
Section 8. Judges shall exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order
to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary, which is fundamental to the
maintenance of judicial independence.
Canon 2 INTEGRITY
Integrity is essential not only to the proper discharge of the judicial office but also to
the personal demeanor of judges.
Section 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that
it is perceived to be so in view of a reasonable observer.
Section 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the
integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to
be done.
Section 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against
lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have
become aware.
In De la Cruz v. Judge Bersamira,144 this court explained the necessity of a judge’s
integrity:
By the very nature of the bench, judges, more than the average man, are required to
observe an exacting standard of morality and decency. The character of a judge is
perceived by the people not only through his official acts but also through his private
morals as reflected in his external behavior. It is therefore paramount that a judge’s
personal behavior both in the performance of his duties and his daily life, be free
from the appearance of impropriety as to be beyond reproach. Only recently, in
Magarang v. Judge Galdino B. Jardin, Sr., the Court pointedly stated that:
While every public office in the government is a public trust, no position exacts a
greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in
the judiciary. Hence, judges are strictly mandated to abide by the law, the Code of
Judicial Conduct and with existing administrative policies in order to maintain the
faith of the people in the administration of justice.145
In Castillo v. Judge Calanog, Jr.,146 this court held:
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a
whiff of impropriety not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties,
but also to his behavior outside his sala as a private individual. There is no dichotomy
of morality: a public official is also judged by his private morals. The Code dictates
that a judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality
of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times. As we have recently
explained, a judge’s official life can not simply be detached or separated from his
personal existence. Thus:
Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, a judge should freely and willingly
accept restrictions on conduct that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary
citizen.
A judge should personify judicial integrity and exemplify honest public service. The
personal behavior of a judge, both in the performance of official duties and in private
life should be above suspicion.147 (Citations omitted)
In De la Cruz, this court emphasized the need for impartiality of judges:
. . . [A] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all his
activities. A judge is not only required to be impartial; he must also appear to be
impartial. x x x Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by irresponsible or
improper conduct of judges.
. . . In this connection, the Court pointed out in Joselito Rallos, et al. v. Judge Ireneo
Lee Gako Jr., RTC Branch 5, Cebu City, that:
Well-known is the judicial norm that "judges should not only be impartial but should
also appear impartial." Jurisprudence repeatedly teaches that litigants are entitled to
nothing less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. The other elements of due
process, like notice and hearing, would become meaningless if the ultimate decision
is rendered by a partial or biased judge. Judges must not only render just, correct
and impartial decisions, but must do so in a manner free of any suspicion as to their
fairness, impartiality and integrity.
This reminder applies all the more sternly to municipal, metropolitan and regional
trial court judges like herein respondent, because they are judicial front-liners who
have direct contact with the litigating parties.
They are the intermediaries between conflicting interests and the embodiments of
the people’s sense of justice. Thus, their official conduct should be beyond
reproach.148 (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
In the motion for intervention filed by Atty. Zarate before Justice Gaerlan, Atty.
Zarate stated that even if respondent Judge Rubia was present at the dinner meeting,
it was merely an attempt to reconcile the parties and reach an extrajudicial
solution.149
This is telling of a culture of tolerance that has led to the decay of the exacting
nature of judicial propriety. Instead of being outraged by respondent Judge Rubia’s
meeting an opposing party, Atty. Zarate defended respondent Judge Rubia’s actions.
Had it been true that a settlement was being brokered by respondent Judge Rubia, it
should have been done in open court with the record reflecting such an initiative.
As to complainant’s questioning of respondent Judge Rubia’s actions in the issuance
of the orders in her pending cases and the exercise of his judgment, this court agrees
that complainant should resort to the appropriate judicial remedies. This, however,
does not negate the administrative liability of respondent Judge Rubia. His actions
failed to assure complainant and other litigants before his court of the required "cold
neutrality of an impartial judge."150 Because of this, respondent Judge Rubia also
violated Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct on Impartiality:
CANON 3. IMPARTIALITY
Impartiality is essential to the proper discharge of the judicial office. It applies not
only to the decision itself but also to the process by which the decision is made.
Section 1. Judges shall perform their judicial duties without favor, bias, or prejudice.
Section 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court,
maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and
litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.
Section 3. Judges shall, so far as is reasonable, so conduct themselves as to minimize
the occasions on which it will be necessary for them to be disqualified from hearing or
deciding cases.
Section 4. Judges shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before, or could come
before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the
outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall
judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of
any person or issue.
Complainant correctly cited Pascual v. Judge Bonifacio151 where this court held:
Upon assumption of office, a judge becomes the visible representation of the law and
of justice. Membership in the judiciary circumscribes one's personal conduct and
imposes upon him a number of inhibitions, whose faithful observance is the price one
has to pay for holding such an exalted position. Thus, a magistrate of the law must
comport himself at all times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise,
can withstand the most searching public scrutiny, for the ethical principles and sense
of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the people's faith in the
judicial system. This Court does not require of judges that they measure up to the
standards of conduct of the saints and martyrs, but we do expect them to be like
Caesar's wife in all their activities. Hence, we require them to abide strictly by the
Code of Judicial Conduct.
It appears now that respondent has failed to live up to those rigorous standards.
Whether or not he purposely went to the Manila Hotel on November 25, 1998 to meet
complainant or only had a chance meeting with him, his act of trying to convince
complainant to agree to his proposal is an act of impropriety. It is improper and highly
unethical for a judge to suggest to a litigant what to do to resolve his case for such
would generate the suspicion that the judge is in collusion with one party. A litigant
in a case is entitled to no less than the cold neutrality of an impartial judge. Judges
are not only required to be impartial, but also to appear to be so, for appearance is
an essential manifestation of reality. Hence, not only must a judge render a just
decision, he is also duty bound to render it in a manner completely free from
suspicion as to its fairness and its integrity. Respondent's conduct in the instant case
inevitably invites doubts about respondent's probity and integrity. It gives ground for a
valid reproach. In the judiciary, moral integrity is more than a cardinal virtue, it is a
necessity. Moreover, a judge's lack of impartiality or the mere appearance of bias
would cause resentment if the party who refused the judge's proposal subsequently
lost his case. It would give rise to suspicion that the judgment was "fixed" beforehand.
Such circumstance tarnishes the image of the judiciary and brings to it public
contempt, disrepute, and ridicule. Thus, we are constrained to rule that respondent
violated Rule 2.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. His misconduct is not excused but
rather made more glaring by the fact that the controversy involving complainant was
pending in his own sala.152 (Citations omitted)
The totality of the actions of respondent Judge Rubia is a clear manifestation of a
lack of integrity and impartiality essential to a judge.
By meeting with complainant, respondent Judge Rubia also violated Canon 4 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct:
CANON 4. PROPRIETY
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the
activities of a judge.
Section 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of
their activities.
Section 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal
restrictions that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do
so freely and willingly. In particular, judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is
consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.
Section 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the
legal profession who practice regularly in their court, avoid situations which might
reasonably give rise to the suspicion or appearance of favoritism or partiality.
On propriety, this court held in Atty. Raul L. Correa v. Judge Medel Arnaldo Belen153
that: Indeed, the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary exhorts
members of the judiciary, in the discharge of their duties, to be models of propriety
at all times.
....
A judge is the visible representation of the law. Thus, he must behave, at all times, in
such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can withstand the most
searching public scrutiny. The ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are
essential to the preservation of the people's faith in the judicial system.154
Because of the meeting, and the subsequent orders issued after the meeting,
respondent Judge Rubia violated the notions of propriety required of his office.
Respondents have relentlessly stood by their position that the meeting was a chance
encounter, and, thus, no impropriety could be attributed to the meeting itself.
Respondent Judge Rubia’s actions belittled the integrity required of judges in all their
dealings inside and outside the courts. For these actions, respondent Judge Rubia now
lost the requisite integrity, impartiality, and propriety fundamental to his office. He
cannot be allowed to remain a member of the judiciary.
Respondents in this case failed to subscribe to the highest moral fiber mandated of
the judiciary and its personnel. Their actions tainted their office and besmirched its
integrity. In effect, both respondents are guilty of gross misconduct. This court
defined misconduct as "a transgression of some established and definite rule of
action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public
officer."155 In Camus v. The Civil Service Board of Appeals,156 this court held that
"[m]isconduct has been defined as ‘wrong or improper conduct’ and ‘gross’ has been
held to mean ‘flagrant; shameful’. . . . This Court once held that the word
misconduct implies a wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment."157
Both respondents are indeed guilty of gross misconduct. However, respondent Judge
Rubia is also guilty of conduct unbecoming of a judge for violating Canons 2, 3, and 4
of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.
This is not to say that complainant comes to these proceedings with clean hands
either. As a litigant, she is enjoined to act in such a way that will not place the
integrity of the proceedings in jeopardy. Her liability, however, is not the subject of
these proceedings. To ensure that these actions will no longer be committed by any
party, respondents must be sanctioned accordingly, in keeping with the court’s
mandate to uphold a character of trust and integrity in society. WHEREFORE, the
court resolved tore docket the case as a regular administrative matter. Respondent
Judge Marino Rubia is hereby DISMISSED from the service, with corresponding
forfeiture of all retirement benefits, except accrued leave credits, and disqualified
from reinstatement or appointment in any public office, including government owned
or -controlled corporations. Respondent Eileen Pecaña is SUSPENDED for one (1) year
for gross misconduct. This decision is immediately executory. Respondent Judge Rubia
is further ordered to cease and desist from discharging the functions of his office upon
receipt of this decision. Let a copy hereof be entered in the personal records of
respondents.
SO ORDERED.

3) Garay vs. Venadas (A.M. RTJ-06-2000, 16 June 2014)

G.R. No. 179914 June 16, 2014

SPOUSES REYNALDO AND HILLY G. SOMBILON, Petitioners,
vs.
ATTY. REY FERDINAND GARAY AND PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
ATTY. REY FERDINAND T. GARAY, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDGE ROLANDO S. VENADAS, SR., Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:
A judge owes the public and the court the duty to know the law by heart and to have
the basic rules of procedure at the palm of his hands.1
Before us are two consolidated cases: (1) a Petition for Review on Certiorari2 under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the June 13, 2007 Decision3 and the August 8,
2007 Resolution4 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 00477-MIN; and (2) an
Administrative Complaint5 against Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. (Judge Venadas, Sr.)
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malaybalay, Bukidnon, Branch 8, for Grave Abuse
of Authority and Grave Misconduct.
Factual Antecedents
Spouses Reynaldo and Hilly G. Sombilon (spouses Sombilon) were the previous owners
of a 601-square meter property, with two buildings constructed on it, in South
Poblacion, Maramag, Bukidnon.6 The said property, which they mortgaged to the
Philippine National Bank (PNB) as security for their loan, was foreclosed and sold at
public auction on July 15, 1998, where PNB emerged as the winning bidder in the
amount of ₱2,355,000.00.7 Consequently, on August 20, 1998, a Certificate of Sale
was issued in PNB’s name, which was duly registered with the Registry of Deeds for
Bukidnon on August 25, 1999.8 The one-year redemption period lapsed but spouses
Sombilon failed to redeem the property.9
In 2005, spouses Sombilon sought the help of Atty. Rey Ferdinand T. Garay (Atty.
Garay), a Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) lawyer, who was once appointed by the court
as counsel de officio for Hilly Sombilon in a criminal case and who happens to be the
owner of a lot adjacent to the property.10 Spouses Sombilon told Atty. Garay that
they wanted to reacquire11 the property from PNB, but had no money to repurchase
it.12 Thus, they were hoping that he would agree to advance the money and, in
exchange, they promised to sell him the 331-square meter portion of the property,
where one of the buildings is located, for ₱5 million.13
On February 9, 2005, Atty. Garay together with spouses Sombilon went to PNB to
inquire about the status of the property.14 They were informed by the bank that the
property could be purchased at the fair market value of ₱2,938,000.00.15 The
following day, Atty. Garay went to the bank alone and offered to buy the property by
making a down payment of ₱587,600.0016 or 20% of the purchase price.17
On February 14, 2005, upon learning that Atty. Garay intended to purchase the entire
property for himself, spouses Sombilon offered to buy back the property from PNB.18
The bank advised them to make a 10% down payment of the bank’s total claim19 to
formalize their offer.20
On February 15, 2005, a Final Deed of Conveyance was issued in favor of PNB.21
On April 14, 2005, Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 94384 was issued in the
name of PNB.22
On the same date, PNB decided to approve the purchase offer of Atty. Garay23 since
spouses Sombilon failed to make the required down payment.24
G.R. No. 179914
On May 9, 2005, PNB filed an Ex-Parte Petition for Issuance of a Writ of Possession25
before the RTC of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon. The case was docketed as Special Civil
Case No. 375-05 and raffled to Branch 8, presided over by Judge Venadas, Sr.
On June 10, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order26 granting the Petition and, on
June27, 2005, he issued a Writ of Possession27 in favor of PNB.28
On June 22, 2005, PNB informed spouses Sombilon that Atty. Garay’s offer to
purchase the property had been approved due to their failure to pay the full down
payment.29
On July 10, 2005, spouses Sombilon moved for a reconsideration30 of the issuance of
the Writ of Possession arguing that Atty. Garay,31 who was the former counsel of
Hilly, was barred from purchasing the property pursuant to paragraph 5,32 Article
1491 of the Civil Code.
Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
On July 14, 2005, Judge Venadas, Sr. issued an Order33 holding in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession, a portion of which reads:
Although, ordinarily a writ of possession is issued by the court because it is a
mandatory and ministerial duty under Act 3135, x x x there is x x x an exception to
this rule that if the implementation and enforcement of the writ of possession would
work [great] injustice to the registered owner because the petitioner PNB or in this
case Atty. Garay counsel for the Sombilon[s] is not entitled thereto. There is much to
be said about the conduct of Atty. Garay in manipulating that the property in
question was finally bought by him from the PNB not to mention the possible violation
of the [canon] of legal and judicial ethics. However, the court cannot ignore the
version of Mrs. Sombilon. The court will give Atty. Garay [the opportunity] to rebut
the evidence presented by spouses Sombilon and he is directed to appear on August 2,
2005, at 8:30 in the morning. And if this case cannot be accommodated in the
morning[,] it will proceed in the afternoon.
Send proper notice to Atty. Rey Ferdinand Garay for him to appear on said date.
In the meantime, the full implementation x x x of the Writ of Possession is hereby
held in abeyance. Sheriff Claudio C. Bugahod is hereby directed to return all items to
the house of Spouses Sombilon and to restore them in full possession of the property,
if already implemented and enforced.
SO ORDERED.34
Aggrieved, Atty. Garay and PNB elevated the case to the CA via a Petition for
Certiorari with prayer for issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or
Injunction35 under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.
Initially, on August 2, 2005, the CA dismissed36 the Petition for Certiorari for several
procedural defects.37 However, on reconsideration,38 the CA reinstated the
Petition.39
On July 25, 2006, the CA issued a Resolution40 granting the PNB and Atty. Garay’s
application for a TRO. Thus:
Accordingly, let a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) be issued upon the posting of a
Five Thousand Peso (₱5,000.00) bond within five (5) days from receipt hereof
ordering, [petitioners] to:
1. Cease and desist from doing any act which is destructive of, or involves danger to,
or alters the nature and condition of the property;
2. Cease and desist from collecting rent or income [for the use of] the said property;
3. To deposit any rent or income arising from the said property which they may have
already received to the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of the Tenth
Judicial Region, Malaybalay City; and
Furthermore, all tenants are hereby ordered to deposit any rentals arising from the
disputed property to the said Clerk of Court.
SO ORDERED.41
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On June 13, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision42 granting the Petition for Certiorari.
The CA found grave abuse of discretion on the part of Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding in
abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession.43 The dispositive portion of
the Decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari is hereby GRANTED and the assailed July 14,
2005 Order of the court a quo is hereby SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.44
Spouses Sombilon moved for reconsideration45 but the CA denied the same in its
August 8, 2007 Resolution.46
Hence, spouses Sombilon filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari contending
that:
THE [CA] COMMITTED A REVERSIBLE ERROR AND GRAVELY ERRED IN GRANTING THE
PETITIONFOR CERTIORARI OF [ATTY. GARAY AND PNB] AND IN DECLARING THAT THERE
WAS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNT[ING] TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION
COMMITTED BYTHE [RTC], BRANCH [8], MALAYBALAY CITY, WHICH IS CONTRARY [TO]
LAW AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.47
Spouses Sombilon’s Arguments
Spouses Sombilon insist that the CA should have dismissed the Petition for
Certioraridue to the failure of PNB and Atty. Garay to file a Motion for
Reconsideration of the assailed Order.48
They also allege that PNB and Atty. Garay engaged in forum-shopping when they filed
a Motion to Recall Order with the RTC, in addition to the Petition for Certiorari they
earlier filed with the CA.49
As to the assailed Order, they contend that Judge Venadas, Sr. did not commit grave
abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of
Possession because PNB no longer has the legal personality to apply for a Writ of
Possession considering that the subject property had already been sold to Atty.
Garay,50 who they claim is also not entitled to the Writ of Possession as he is
disqualified from purchasing the subject property pursuant to paragraph 5,
Article 1491 of the Civil Code.51
Atty. Garay’s and PNB’s Arguments
Atty. Garay, on the other hand, argues that the CA did not err in granting the Petition
for Certiorari as Judge Venadas, Sr. acted with grave abuse of discretion when he
recalled the Writ of Possession without notice to him and PNB.52 He also emphasizes
that it is a ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession after the
redemption period has lapsed.53
PNB, for its part, asserts that as the registered owner of the subject property, it is
entitled to the Writ of Possession.54 Thus, it was grave abuse of discretion on the part
of Judge Venadas, Sr. in holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of
Possession, which he had earlier issued.55
PNB further avers that it is not privy to the arrangement or relationship between Atty.
Garay and spouses Sombilon.56 In any case, the prohibition in paragraph 5, Article
1491 of the Civil Code does not apply to the instant case as Atty. Garay purchased the
subject property from PNB and not from spouses Sombilon.57
Anent its failure to file a Motion for Reconsideration prior to filing a Petition for
Certiorari, PNB explains that in this case the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration
may be dispensed with as the issue involved is purely one of law, which is an
exception under prevailing jurisprudence.58
Besides, there was no plain, speedy, and adequate remedy available at the time
considering that Judge Venadas, Sr. issued the assailed Order, holding in abeyance
the implementation of the Writ of Possession, without affording PNB the opportunity
to be heard.59
Lastly, PNB denies that it committed forum-shopping claiming that it did not institute
another action simultaneously with the Petition for Certiorari it filed with the CA.60
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
Meanwhile, on November15, 2005, Atty. Garay filed a Verified Complaint61 against
Judge Venadas, Sr., charging him with Grave Abuse of Authority and Grave Misconduct
when he proceeded with the hearing of spouses Sombilon’s motion for reconsideration
of the Order granting the issuance of the Writ of Possession despite lack of notice to
PNB and for holding in abeyance the Writ of Possession he issued in Special Civil Case
No. 375-05.
Atty. Garay’s Arguments
Atty. Garay claims that Judge Venadas, Sr. should be administratively sanctioned for
holding in abeyance the Writ of Possession he earlier issued62 and for ignoring
Sections 4,63 5,64 and 665 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court as he proceeded to hear
the motion despite lack of notice to PNB.66
Judge Venadas, Sr.’s Arguments
In his defense, Judge Venadas, Sr. denies the charges against him arguing that he did
not annul the Writ of Possession but merely stayed its execution and implementation
to prevent any injustice.67 He insists there was no violation of due process because
he immediately scheduled a hearing for PNB to present its evidence.68
Report and Recommendation of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
The OCA, in its Report,69 found Judge Venadas, Sr. administratively liable for grave
abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of procedure.70 Although the OCA did
not touch on the issue of whether Judge Venadas, Sr. should be administratively
sanctioned for holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession as it
was still pending with the CA at that time, it nevertheless found Judge Venadas, Sr.
guilty of blatantly disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court
when he acted on the defective motion filed by spouses Sombilon.71 It also pointed
out that PNB and Atty. Garay were deprived of their rights to due process as no
proper notice was sent to them.72 Thus, the OCA recommended that:
a) the instant administrative complaint be DOCKETED as a regular administrative
complaint;
b) respondent Judge Rolando S. Venadas,Sr. be found guilty of gross ignorance of
procedure; and
c) respondent Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. be ordered to pay a FINE of TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00) with a WARNING that a similar transgression x x x will
be dealt with more severely.73
On November 26, 2007, the Court resolved to consolidate A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000 with
G.R. No. 179914.74
Issues
Stripped of the non-essentials, the issues boil down to: (1) whether Judge Venadas,
Sr. committed grave abuse of discretion in holding in abeyance the implementation of
the Writ of Possession; and (2) whether he should be administratively sanctioned for
holding in abeyance the implementation of the Writ of Possession and for disregarding
Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court.
Our Ruling
G.R. No. 179914
The issuance of a writ of possession is
ministerial upon the court.
A debtor has one year from the date the Certificate of Sale is registered with the
Register of Deeds within which to redeem his property.75 During the one-year
redemption period, the purchaser may possess the property by filing a petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession before the court, upon the posting of a bond.76 But
after the one-year period, the purchaser has a right to consolidate the title and to
possess the property, without need of a bond.77 And once title is consolidated under
the name of the purchaser, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial
on the part of the court; thus, no discretion is left to the court.78 Questions regarding
the regularity and validity of the mortgage or the foreclosure sale may not be raised
as a ground to oppose or hold in abeyance the issuance of the writ of possession as
these must be raised in a separate action for the annulment of the mortgage or the
foreclosure sale.79 The pendency of such action is also not a ground to stay the
issuance of a writ of possession.80
In this case, the redemption period had long lapsed when PNB applied for the issuance
of the Writ of Possession.1âwphi1 In fact, the title over the subject property had
already been consolidated in PNB’s name. Thus, it was ministerial upon Judge
Venadas, Sr. to issue the Writ of Possession in favor of PNB, the registered owner of
the subject property.
Though there are instances when the issuance of the Writ of Possession may be
deferred,81 we find none of these recognized exceptions present in the instant case.
Spouses Sombilon claim that the sale between PNB and Atty. Garay was invalid as it
was done in violation of paragraph 5, Article 1491 of the Civil Code. However, the
alleged invalidity of the sale is not a ground to oppose or defer the issuance of the
Writ of Possession as this does not affect PNB’s right to possess the subject property.
Thus, there was no reason for Judge Venadas, Sr. to hold in abeyance the
implementation of the Writ of Possession. Clearly, he committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed Order holding in abeyance the implementation of the
Writ of Possession because PNB, as the registered owner, is entitled to the possession
of the subject property as a matter of right.
Regarding the failure of PNB and Atty. Garay to move for a reconsideration of the
assailed Order prior to the availment of a special civil action for certiorari, we agree
with PNB that the filing of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed with where
the decision is a patent nullity or where there is violation of due process,82 such as in
the instant case.
All told, we find no error on the part of the CA in granting the Petition for Certiorari.
A.M. No. RTJ-06-2000
As to the Administrative Complaint filed against Judge Venadas, Sr., we agree with
the findings and recommendations of the OCA.
Records show that spouses Sombilon failed to comply with the three-day notice rule
and the required proof of service embodied in Sections 4, 5, and 6 of Rule 15 of the
Rules of Court, thereby rendering the motion fatally defective. Despite this, Judge
Venadas, Sr. still took cognizance of the motion filed by spouses Sombilon, depriving
PNB and Atty. Garay of their right to due process.
To exculpate himself from the charges against him, Judge Venadas, Sr. claims that
the motion was personally served on PNB and its counsel on July 12, 2005 but they
refused to receive the same. However, as aptly pointed out by the OCA, no affidavit
was submitted to substantiate such allegation. Thus, we agree with the Court
Administrator that Judge Venadas, Sr. is guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering
on gross ignorance of procedure for blatantly disregarding Sections 4, 5, and 6, Rule
15 of the Rules of Court.
Blatant disregard of basic, elementary, and well-known rules of procedure and law is
gross ignorance of the law,83 which is classified as a serious charge under Rule 140,
Section 8 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, punishable by
either dismissal from service, suspension for more than three months but not
exceeding six months, or a fine of more than ₱20,000.00 but not exceeding
₱40,000.00.84
Thus, in view of his blatant disregard of the rules and his grave abuse of discretion in
issuing the assailed Order, and considering that this is his first offense, we find Judge
Venadas, Sr. guilty of grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of the law
and is hereby fined the amount of ₱20,000.00. Incidentally, in the April 18, 2007
Resolution in A.M. No. 12600-Ret.,85 the Court approved the application of Judge
Venadas, Sr. for disability retirement but withheld the amount of ₱100,000.00
pending the final resolution of this case. In view thereof, the fine of ₱20,000.00
herein imposed on Judge Venadas, Sr. is to be deducted from the withheld amount of
₱100,000.00.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. No. 179914, the Petition is hereby DENIED. The June 13, 2007
Decision and the August 8, 2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
00477-MIN are hereby AFFIRMED.
In Administrative Matter No. RTJ-06-2000, Judge Rolando S. Venadas, Sr. of the
Regional Trial Court of Malaybalay City, Bukidnon, Branch 8, is hereby found guilty of
grave abuse of authority bordering on gross ignorance of the law and is ordered to pay
a FINE of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (₱20,000.00) to be deducted from the withheld
amount of ₱100,000.00 from his retirement benefits pursuant to the April 18, 2007
Resolution in A.M. No. 12600-Ret.
SO ORDERED.

4) In Re: Kapunan (A.M. No. 13-11-09-SC, 12 August 2014)

5) Re: Verified Complaint of Thomas S. Merdegia against Hon. Vicente S.E. Veloso,
Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, relative to C.A. G.R. SP. No. 119461; IPI No.
12-205-CA-J, 10 December 2013, A.C. No. 10300; Re Resolution dated 8 October 2013
in OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-J against Atty. HomobonoAdaza II.

IPI No. 12-205-CA-J December 10, 2013

RE: VERIFIED COMPLAINT OF THOMAS S. MERDEGIA AGAINST HON. VICENTE S.E.
VELOSO, ASSOCIATE JUSTICE OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, RELATIVE TO CA G.R. SP
No. 119461.
x---------------x
A.C. No.: 10300
RE: RESOLUTION DATED OCTOBER 8, 2013 IN OCA IPI No. 12-205-CA-J AGAINST
ATTY. HOMOBONO ADAZA II.
RESOLUTION
BRION, J.:
On October 8, 2013, we issued a Resolution1 dismissing the administrative complaint
of Tomas S. Merdegia against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente S.E. Veloso.
In this same Resolution, we also directed Atty. Homobono Adaza II, Merdegia’s
counsel, to show cause why he should not be cited for contempt.
After considering Atty. Adaza’s explanation,2 we find his account insufficient, and
find him guilty of indirect contempt.
According to Atty. Adaza, he should not bepunished for indirect contemptas he was
merely performing his duty as Merdegia’s counsel when he assisted him in preparing
the administrative complaint against Justice Veloso. Atty. Adaza asserted that both
he and his client observed Justice Veloso’s partiality during the oral arguments, but
instead of immediately filing an administrative complaint against him, he counseled
Merdegia to first file a Motion to Inhibit Justice Veloso from the case. However, upon
finding that Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself, Merdegia repeated his request
to file an administrative complaint against Justice Veloso, to which Atty. Adaza
acceded. Thus, Atty. Adaza pleaded that he should not be faulted for assisting his
client, especially when heal so believes in the merits of his client’s case.
Atty. Adaza’s explanation, read together with the totality of the facts of the case,
fails to convince us of his innocence from the contempt charge.
As Atty. Adaza himself admitted, he prepared the administrative complaint after
Justice Veloso refused to inhibit himself from a case he was handling. The complaint
and the motion for inhibition were both based on the same main cause: the alleged
partiality of Justice Veloso during the oral arguments of Merdegia’s case. The
resolution dismissing the motion for inhibition should have disposed of the issue of
Justice Veloso’s bias. While we do not discount the fact that it was Justice Veloso
who penned the resolution denying the motion for inhibition, we note that he was
allowed to do this under the 2009 Internal Rules of the Court of Appeals.3 Had
Merdegia and Atty. Adaza doubted the legality of this resolution, the proper remedy
would have been to file a petition for certiorari assailing the order denying the
motion for inhibition. The settled rule is that administrative complaints against
justices cannot and should not substitute for appeal and other judicial remedies
against an assailed decision or ruling.4 While a lawyer has a duty to represent his
client with zeal, he must do so within the bounds provided by law.5 He is also duty-
bound to impress upon his client the propriety of the legal action the latter wants to
undertake, and to encourage compliance with the law and legal processes.6
A reading of Merdegia’s administrative complaint7 shows an apparent failure to
understand that cases are not always decided in one’s favor, and that an allegation of
bias must stem from an extrajudicial source other than those attendant to the merits
and the developments in the case.8 In this light, we cannot but attribute to Atty.
Adaza the failure to impress upon his client the features of our adversarial system,
the substance of the law on ethics and respect for the judicial system, and his own
failure to heed what his duties as a professional and as an officer of the Court demand
of him in acting for his client before our courts.
To be sure, deciding administrative cases against erring judges is not an easy
task.1âwphi1 We have to strike a balance between the need for accountability and
integrity in the Judiciary, on the one hand, with the need to protect the
independence and efficiency of the Judiciary from vindictive and enterprising
litigants, on the other. Courts should not be made to bow down to the wiles of
litigants who bully judges into inhibiting from cases or deciding cases in their favor,
but neither should we shut our doors from litigants brave enough to call out the
corrupt practices of people who decide the outcome of their cases. Indeed, litigants
who feel unjustly injured by malicious and corrupt acts of erring judges and officials
should not be punished for filing administrative cases against them; neither should
these litigants be unjustly deterred from doing sobya wrong signal from this Court
that they would be made to explain why they should not be cited for contempt when
the complaints they filed prove to be without sufficient cause.
What tipped the balance against Atty. Adaza, in this case, is the totality of the facts
of thecasethat,when read together with the administrative complaint
heprepared,shows that his complaint is merelyan attempt to malign the
administration of justice. We note Atty. Adaza’s penchantfor filingmotions for
inhibition throughout the case:first, against Judge Ma. Theresa Dolores C. Gomez
Estoesta of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, who issued an order unfavorable to his
client; and second, against all the justices of the Court of Appeals division hearing his
appeal, for alleged bias during the oral arguments onhiscase. Theseindicators, taken
together with the baseless administrative complaint against Justice Veloso after he
penned an order adverseto Atty. Adaza’s client, disclosethat there was more to the
administrative complaint than the report of legitimate grievances against members of
the Judiciary.
In Re: Verified Complaint of Engr. Oscar L. Ongjoco, etc.,9 we cited a litigant in
indirect contempt of court for his predisposition to indiscriminately file administrative
complaints against members of the Judiciary. We held that this conduct degrades the
judicial office, interferes with the due performance of their work for the Judiciary,
and thus constitutes indirect contempt of court. Applying this principle to the present
case, we hold that Atty. Adaza’s acts constitute an improper conduct that tends to
degrade the administration of justice, and is thus punishable for indirect contempt
under Section 3(d), Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
As a final note, Atty. Adaza’s contemptuous conduct may also be subject to
disciplinary sanction as a member of the bar.10 If we do not now proceed at all
against Atty. Adaza to discipline him, we are prevented from doing so by our concern
for his due process rights. Our Resolution of October 8, 2013 only asked him to show
cause why he should not be cited in contempt, and not why he should not be
administratively penalized. To our mind, imposing a disciplinary sanction against Atty.
Adaza through a contempt proceeding violates the basic tenets of due process as a
disciplinary action is independent and separate from a proceeding for contempt. A
person charged of an offense, whether in an administrative or criminal proceeding,
must be informed of the nature of the charge against him, and given ample
opportunity to explain his side.11
While the two proceedings can proceed simultaneously with each other,12 a contempt
proceeding cannot substitute for a disciplinary proceeding for erring lawyers,13 and
vice versa. There can be no substitution between the two proceedings, as contempt
proceedings against lawyers, as officers of the Court, are different in nature and
purpose from the discipline of lawyers as legal professionals. The two proceedings
spring from two different powers of the Court. The Court, in exercising its power of
contempt, exercises an implied and inherent power granted to courts in general.14 Its
existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings; to the
enforcement of judgments, orders and mandates of courts; and, consequently, in the
administration of justice;15 thus, it may be instituted against any person guilty of
acts that constitute contempt of court.16 Further, jurisprudence describes a
contempt proceeding as penal and summary in nature; hence, legal principles
applicable to criminal proceedings also apply to contempt proceedings. A judgment
dismissing the charge of contempt, for instance, may no longer be appealed in the
same manner that the prohibition against double jeopardy bars the appeal of an
accused’s acquittal.17
In contrast, a disciplinary proceeding against an erring lawyer is sui generis in nature;
it is neither purely civil nor purely criminal. Unlike a criminal prosecution, a
disciplinary proceeding is not intended to inflict punishment, but to determine
whether a lawyer is still fit to be allowed the privilege of practicing law. It involves
an investigation by the Court of the conduct of its officers, and has, for its primary
objective, public interest.18 Thus, unlike a contempt proceeding, the acquittal of the
lawyer from a disciplinary proceeding cannot bar an interested party from seeking
reconsideration of the ruling. Neither does the imposition of a penalty for contempt
operate as res judicata to a subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct.19
Contempt proceedings and disciplinary actions are also governed by different
procedures.1âwphi1 Contempt of court is governed by the procedures under Rule 71
of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the practice of law are governed
by Rules138 and 139 thereof.20
IN THESE LIGHTS, the Court finds Atty. Homobomo Adaza II GUILTY OF INDIRECT
CONTEMPT for filing a frivolous suit against Court of Appeals Associate Justice Vicente
S.E. Veloso, and hereby sentences him to pay, within the period of fifteen days from
the promulgation of this judgment, a fine of ₱5,000.00. The respondent is also
WARNED that further similar misbehavior on his part may be a ground for the
institution of disciplinary proceedings against him.
SO ORDERED.

6) Carbajosa vs. Judge Patricio (A,M. No. MTJ-13-1834, 20 October 2013)

A.M. No. MTJ-13-1834 October 2, 2013

(Formerly OCA l.P.l. No. 12-2541)
JESUS D. CARBAJOSA, Complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HANNIBAL R. PATRICIO, Presiding Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
President Roxas, Capiz, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
This is an administrative case for Gross Ignorance of the Law, Manifest Bias and
Partiality against Judge Hannibal R. Patricio (Judge Patricio), commenced thru a
verified Complaint1 filed before the Office of Court of Administrator (OCA) by Jesus D.
Carbajosa (Carbajosa).
Carbajosa is the private complainant in Criminal Case No. 2540 for grave coercion
against accused Dolores Bieles (Bieles), heard and tried before the Municipal Circuit
Trial Court (MCTC) of President Roxas-Pilar, President Roxas, Capiz, in the sala of
then Presiding Judge Geomer C. Delfin. The charge stemmed from Bieles’ menacing
and intimidating attitude in preventing Carbajosa from bringing to Iloilo City fifteen
(15) sacks of milled corn by removing and unloading the same out of the latter’s Efren
Bus Liner.
In a Decision2 dated August 6, 2002, the MCTC convicted Bieles of the crime charged
and sentenced her to imprisonment of four (4) months and one (1) day of arresto
mayor as minimum to six (6) months of arresto mayor as maximum, and ordered her
to pay: (1) a fine of ₱500.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and
(2) the amount of ₱20,000.00 representing the fifteen (15) sacks of milled corn or its
equivalent value as the first lien on judgment.
On appeal, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Roxas City, Branch 18,affirmed Bieles’
conviction but modified her sentence by increasing the maximum penalty imposed to
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional. 3 This modified
judgment was later affirmed by the Court of Appeals (CA) in a Decision 4 dated
October 26, 2006 and eventually by this Court when Bieles’ petition for review on
certiorari was denied in a Resolution5 dated August 13, 2008 for late filing and for
absence of reversible error in the appealed judgment. Likewise denied was Bieles’
ensuing motion for reconsideration.6 The Court thereafter issued an Entry of
Judgment7 stating that the Resolution of August 13, 2008 has become final and
executory on January 15, 2009. Undeterred, Bieles filed a Motion to Set Aside Entry of
Judgment but the same was denied in the Resolution8 dated June 1, 2009.
Meanwhile, Carbajosa filed a motion before the RTC for the remand of the case to the
court of origin for proper execution. The motion was granted in the RTC’s Order 9
dated December 21, 2009. Carbajosa thereafter filed a Motion for Execution of
Judgment before the MCTC presided by herein respondent Judge Patricio. Bieles
opposed the motion stating that she sent a letter addressed to the Chief Justice,
Honorable Reynato S. Puno asking for a review of her case on the merits. She claimed
that the letter was favorably acted upon as evidenced by the first endorsement dated
January25, 2010 requesting the Clerk of Court of the Third Division to include the
case in its agenda.10
Judge Patricio resolved the conflict by issuing an Order 11 dated April 7, 2010 wherein
he reckoned that it will be best to hold in abeyance the resolution of Carbajosa’s
Motion for Execution of Judgment and await the result of the referral/endorsement
made by the Chief Justice before a ruling on the propriety of the issuance of a writ of
execution is made, viz:
It is the honest belief of the undersigned, that the resolution of the issuance of the
writ of execution, opposition, and objection of the parties in the above-entitled case
be held in abeyance, considering that the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court had
referred to the Clerk of Court of the Third Division the letter of [Bieles].
The holding in abeyance of the resolution is in [deference] to the first endorsement
made by the Chief Justice. The undersigned deemed it proper to first wait the result
of the referral of the Chief Justice before it will rule on the propriety of the issuance
of the writ of execution.12
On April 19, 2010, Carbajosa manifested his objection to the foregoing order and
insisted on the issuance of a writ of execution averring that in the absence of any
restraining order, its issuance is imperative so as not to unduly delay the
administration of justice.13
On May 24, 2010, Judge Patricio issued an Order 14 reiterating his previous stance that
there is a necessity to await the result of the referral made by the Chief Justice to
the Third Division Clerk of Court, thus:
Wherefore, the previous order of this Court granting the holding in abeyance of the
issuance of a writ of execution still stands.
Furnish copy of this order to the offended party, the private prosecutor, as well as
[Bieles] and their counsel for their information.
SO ORDERED.15
Bieles thereafter moved that the property bond she initially posted be substituted by
a cash bond because the former was already needed by her bondsman. The motion
was vehemently opposed by Carbajosa. On May31, 2011, Judge Patricio issued an
Order16 granting Bieles’ motion explaining that the same is not covered by Section 4,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Court prohibiting an accused to put up a bail bond when
there is already a final and executory judgment. Judge Patricio clarified that this is
not a case for the posting of a bond but rather, the substitution of one posted at the
beginning stage of the case.
In the same Order, Judge Patricio disclosed that he sent a query to the OCA regarding
the effect of the Chief Justice’s endorsement of Bieles’ letter to the implementation
of the final judgment of her conviction. In an endorsement dated September 29,
2010, Deputy Court Administrator (DCA)Raul Villanueva referred his query to Atty.
Wilhelmina Geronga (Atty.Geronga), Chief of the OCA-Legal Office for comment.
In a letter17 dated September 5, 2011, Atty. Geronga informed Judge Patricio that the
subject matter of his query is judicial in nature hence, beyond the mandate of the
OCA. Also, as a matter of policy, the OCA refrains from rendering an opinion on
matters that may later on be brought to the Court for judicial determination. Atty.
Geronga suggested that the issue be resolved based on pertinent jurisprudence and
relevant laws.
In the meantime, two (2) motions were awaiting Judge Patricio’s ruling, viz: (a)
Carbajosa’s motion to recall the Order dated May 31, 2011approving the substitution
of Bieles’ property bond by a cash bond; and (b) motion to suspend proceedings filed
by Bieles.
Both motions were resolved in an Order18 dated January 6, 2012.Carbajosa’s motion
was denied for being filed out of time while Bieles’ motion to suspend proceedings
was granted.
In so ruling, Judge Patricio ratiocinated that the motion to recall the Order dated May
31, 2011 can be likened to a motion for reconsideration that must be filed within
fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order sought to be reviewed. Having been filed
two (2) months after June 17, 2011, the date Carbajosa received the Order dated May
31, 2011, the motion to recall is considered filed out of time.
Anent the granting of Bieles’ motion to suspend proceedings, Judge Patricio again
reasoned that any action on the issuance of the writ of execution should await the
resolution by the Third Division of the Supreme Court on Bieles’ letter as endorsed by
the Chief Justice, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the court hereby grants the instant motion to
suspend proceedings filed by [Bieles] until the indorsement made by the then Chief
Justice Reynato Puno for the review of this case had been resolved by said Division.
Furnish copy of this order to the parties and counsels.
SO ORDERED.19
These circumstances prompted Carbajosa to institute the herein administrative
complaint20 imputing gross ignorance of the law, manifest partiality and evident bad
faith against Judge Patricio in continuously deferring the issuance of a writ of
execution for the final and executory judgment in Criminal Case No. 2540.
In his Comment21, Judge Patricio admitted postponing the resolution of Carbajosa’s
motion for the issuance of a writ of execution but he denied that he acted in bad
faith and/or with partiality. He claimed that he was merely abiding by the
endorsement made by the Chief Justice that the letter of accused Bieles be referred
to the Third Division for action.
The administrative case was referred to the OCA for evaluation. In its Report 22 dated
July 24, 2013, the OCA accorded merit to the complaint. The OCA found Judge
Patricio guilty of gross ignorance of the law and recommended that he should be fined
in the amount of ₱21,000.00.
We agree with the OCA’s findings and recommendation.
Any delay in the full execution of a final and executory decision is repugnant to the
ideal administration of justice. Hence the rule that once a judgment attains finality,
it thereby becomes immutable and unalterable. The enforcement of such judgment
should not be hampered or evaded; for the immediate enforcement of the parties’
rights, confirmed by final judgment, is a major component of the ideal administration
of justice.23 Our penal laws and rules of procedure, in particular, enjoin that when
the judgment of conviction is already final and executory its execution is
ministerial.24
Respondent Judge Patricio, however, demonstrated ignorance of the above rule by
repeatedly refusing to execute the final and executory judgment of conviction against
Bieles.
The justification proffered by Judge Patricio is not well-taken. As correctly observed
by the OCA, the Court’s Resolution dated August 13,2008 in G.R. No. 182956 affirming
the conviction of Bieles and the Entry of Judgment dated January 15, 2009 evidently
carried more legal and procedural significance and effect in Criminal Case No. 2540,
as against the endorsement referring the letter of Bieles to the Third Division for
Agenda. The endorsement did not result in a definite action on the part of the Court
as it did not even remotely suggest that G.R. No. 182956 will be re-opened. Hence,
there was absolutely no justifiable reason for Judge Patricio to rely on the latter and
thereby thwart the basic rules on execution of judgment.
The rules on execution are comprehensive enough for a judge not to know how to
apply them or to be confused by any auxiliary incidents. The issuance of a writ of
execution for a final and executory judgment is ministerial. In other words, a judge is
not given the discretion whether or not to implement the judgment. He is to effect
execution without delay and supervise implementation strictly in accordance with the
judgment. Judge Patricio’s actuations unmistakably exhibit gross ignorance of the
law.
Apropos are the following pronouncements in Spouses Monterola v. Judge Caoibes,
Jr.25 where the Court found a judge administratively liablefor gross ignorance of the
law when he unreasonably delayed and refused the issuance of a writ of execution for
a final judgment, viz:
Observance of the law, which respondent ought to know, is required of every judge.
When the law is sufficiently basic, a judge owe sit to his office to simply apply it;
anything less than that is either deliberate disregard thereof or gross ignorance of the
law. It is a continuing pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law
and changes therein. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses
no one ― not even judges ― from compliance therewith. We cannot expect a judge to
deliberately disregard an unequivocal rule on execution and a doctrine laid down by
the Supreme Court. Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that the judge
should be studious of the principles of law.1âwphi1 Canon18 mandates that he should
administer his office with due regard to the integrity of the system of the law itself,
remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under the
sanction of law. Indeed, it has been said that when the inefficiency springs from a
failure to consider a basic and elemental rule, a law or principle in the discharge of
his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving of the position and the
title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in
bad faith and in grave abuse of judicial authority x x x.
While judges should not be disciplined for inefficiency on account merely of
occasional mistakes or errors of judgments, it is highly imperative that they should be
conversant with fundamental and basic legal principles in order to merit the
confidence of the citizenry. Respondent Judge has shown lack of familiarity with our
laws, rules and regulations as to undermine the public confidence in the integrity of
the courts x x x.26 (Citations omitted)
Under A.M. No. 01-8-1 0-SC or the Amendment to Rule 140 of the Rules of Court Re:
Discipline of Justices and Judges, gross ignorance of the law is a serious charge,
punishable by a tine of more than ₱20,000.00, but not exceeding ₱40,000.00,
suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3)
months but not exceeding six ( 6) months, or dismissal from the service. Based on the
attendant circumstances of this case, a fine of ₱21 ,000.00 is the appropriate penalty.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Judge Hannibal R. Patricio, Presiding
Judge, Municipal Circuit Trial Court, President Roxas-Pilar, President Roxas, Capiz is
hereby FOUND GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and FINED in the amount of ₱21
,000.00, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more
severely.
SO ORDERED.

7) Garado vs. Torres (A.M. No. MTJ-11-1778, 5 June 2013)

8) Decena vs. Manlayaon (A.M. No. RTJ-02-1669, 8 April 2013)

9) OCA vs. Necessario (A,.M. No. MTJ-07-1691, 2 April 2013)

10) Anonymos vs. Achas (A.M. No. MTJ-11-1801, 27 February, 2013)

11) In the Matter of the Charges of Plagiarism against Justice del Castillo (A.M. No.
10-7-17-SC, 8 February 2011)

12) Re: Letter of the UP Law Faculty to the SC on allegations of Plagiarism and
Misrepresentations in SC (A.M. No. 10-10-4-SC, 8 March 2011)

13) Habawel vs. CTA (G.R. No. 174759, 7 September 2011)

14) Tormis vs. Paredes (A.M. No. RTJ-13-2366, 4 February 2015)

15) Andres vs. Nambi (A.C. No. 7158, 9 March 2015)

16) Complaint of Parreno against Justices Leagogo, Ybañez, Lazaro-Javier (OCA IPI
NO. 14-220-CA-J, 17 March 2015)

17) Rivera vs. Judge Blancaflor (A.M. No. RTJ-11-2290, 18 November 2014)

18) Lorenzana vs. Judge Austrua (A.M. No. RTJ-09-2200, 2 April 2014)

19) OCA vs. Judge Balut (A.M. No. RTJ-15-2426, 16 June 2015)