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Textual Agency: How Texts Do Things in Organizational Settings

FranÁois Cooren
Organization 2004 11: 373
DOI: 10.1177/1350508404041998

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 Volume 11(3): 373–393
ISSN 1350–5084
Copyright © 2004 SAGE
(London, Thousand Oaks, CA
and New Delhi)

Textual Agency: How Texts Do

Things in Organizational Settings
articles

François Cooren
Université de Montréal, Canada

Abstract. Research on organizational discourse typically reduces it to

what members do when producing and using texts in organizational
contexts, but fails to recognize that texts, on their own, also seem to make
a difference. This essay shows that one way to approach discourse is to
analyze the active contribution of texts (especially, but not only, docu-
ments) to organizational processes, that is, to what extent texts such as
reports, contracts, memos, signs, or work orders can be said to be
performing something. After reviewing what other scholars have been
saying on the question of textual agency, I show how it is possible to
ascribe to texts the capacity of doing something without falling into some
modern form of animism. Having done that, I explore systematically the
different types of action that texts can be said to be performing by taking
up Searle’s well-known classification of speech acts. This review then
leads me to address questions related to the constitution of organizations,
that is, to what extent this reflection on textual agency enables us to
redefine the mode of being of organizational forms. Key words. text;
agency; organization; speech acts; constitution; discourse

For the past 10 years, discourse analysis has become an important

research focus for many scholars in organizational studies (Grant et al.,
1998; Keenoy et al., 1997; Putnam and Fairhurst, 2001). Whether under
the form of critical discourse analysis (Fairclough, 1992, 1995; Litvin,
1997; Mumby and Stohl, 1991; Phillips and Hardy, 1997; Reed, 1998,
2000, 2001), interaction analysis (Courtright et al., 1989; Fairhurst, 1993;

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Organization 11(3)
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Fairhurst et al., 1987), genre analysis (Geisler, 2001; Winsor, 2000;

Zachry, 2000), conversation analysis (Boden, 1994; Parker et al., 1995;
Tulin, 1997; Woodilla, 1998), or narrative analysis (Boje, 1991, 1995; Boje
et al., 1997; Czarniawska, 1997a,b; Gabriel, 1998; Robichaud, 1998, 2001,
2002, 2003; Taylor and Lerner, 1996), studies devoted to this topic unveil
the important role language plays in the constitution of organizations.
Though scholars do not always agree about whether or not discourse can
be considered foundational vis-a-vis organizational forms (Reed, 2001),
the discursive turn shows that the (oral, written, or even iconic) texts
produced by organizational members are consequential regarding issues
of power relationships, effectiveness, or control.
However, despite this growing interest in discourse and its conse-
quences for organizational life, very few studies focus explicitly on the
agency of organizational texts.1 Research on organizational discourse
typically reduces it to what employees or managers do when they
produce and use texts, and fails to recognize that texts, on their own, also
make a difference. This essay focuses on the active contribution of texts
(especially documents) to organizational processes; that is, on the ways
that texts, such as reports, contracts, memos, signs, or work orders,
perform something.
Unlike other approaches reviewed in this issue, this perspective
decenters the focus on agency and human activities by casting texts as a
mode of being of organization. This stance is often invisible because of
the vocabulary that analysts and practitioners use to describe organiza-
tional activities. As Smith (2001: 171) rightly notes, ‘For the most part the
textual dimensions of organization are buried in . . . standard nominal-
izations.’ In other words, most scholars, including those interested in
organizational discourse, take objects such as ‘organization,’ ‘coordina-
tion,’ or ‘institution’ for granted without acknowledging that these pro-
cesses are reconstituted as entities whose origins need explanation (see
Smith, 2001: 168). Reflecting on textual agency consists of adopting a
performative view of organizations (see also Taylor and Van Every, 2000:
157–9), that is, one that highlights how organizational activities become
stabilized and repeated over time (Strum and Latour, 1987).
Organizations and institutions clearly exist, but our task as analysts is
to interrogate their modes of being through questioning what produces
these stabilizing and channeling effects that characterize organizational
life (Latour, 1996b). By focusing on textual performance, we challenge
our overreliance on face-to-face interaction and show that texts contrib-
ute to the local translocation of constraints and abilities (Smith, 1984).
Thus, texts are not foundational; however, they participate, like other
agents, in the daily production of organizational life.
After reviewing writings on textual agency, I discuss how we can
ascribe to texts the capacity of doing something without falling into
animism. Then I use Searle’s (1979) well-known classification of speech
acts to explore the different types of action that texts perform. Finally, I

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 Textual Agency
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return to the constitution of organizations, that is, to what extent textual

agency redefines the mode of being of organizational forms.

Why Organizational Texts Matter: A Brief Literature Review

Even though organizational sciences rarely address the question of tex-
tual agency, several studies on genre analysis explore this topic. Based on
Miller’s (1984) classic essay on genre as social action, some scholars
focus on the organizational role of generic texts such as work orders
(Winsor, 2000), checklists (Bazerman, 1997), records (Schryer, 1993), or
memos (Yates, 1989). Whether designed to control employees’ behavior
(Yates, 1993), coordinate activities from a distance (Law, 1986), or insure
public accountability (Geisler, 2001), the mere presence of these texts
makes a difference in organizational life, often triggering specific behav-
iors. As Bazerman notes:
The airline pilot’s checklist before takeoff structures talk with the copilot,
navigator, and ground crew; enacts directives from the legal and regulating
bodies overseeing flight; establishes a record of actions taken by the flight
crew; and provides a task-oriented frame for interpreting other recordings
of conversation and instrument readings. Further, the checklist regularizes
and structures the procedures of the takeoff, the perception and inspection
of instruments and the physical environment, and the manipulation of the
aircraft and its control. (1997: 296, emphasis added)
Even though Bazerman never addresses the question of textual agency,
we see how he links texts to actions. Checklists structure talk, enact
directives, establish records, provide task-oriented frames, as well as
regularize procedures, perceptions, and manipulations. Organizational
activities, then, are discursively structured, which means that text in all
its forms (written, oral, iconic) can display a form of agency, that is, it can
make a difference.
Similarly, Winsor (2000: 157) shows how the activities of laboratory
technicians are ‘preorganized by engineers through the genre of the work
order.’ Work orders are discursive tools that both activate and conceal the
work that blue-collar technicians do (2000: 157). However, Winsor treats
the work order as a genre, not an agent. In other words, the work order is
primarily an intermediary between the engineers and the technicians and
not an agent that performs actions. Yet textual agency is implicit in her
analyses as she notes:
Everyone in the organization could recognize a work order from that social
action even if the orders were handwritten, say, or the instructions were
bunched into a paragraph. Work orders, then, are aimed at shaping the
technicians’ actions and, by means of those actions, shaping the physical
devices they work on so that data can be gathered. (Winsor, 2000: 169)
Thus, recognizing the role that work orders play amounts to ascribing,
even indirectly, a form of performativity to these documents. Work orders
perform social actions repeatedly through setting the technicians’ tasks.

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Genre analyses in organizational studies then demonstrate how textual

responses are produced and reproduced to address typical organizational
situations (Miller, 1984; Yates, 1993). This work clearly recognizes the
role that texts play in the constitution of organizations, but it does not
develop the extent to which texts display agency.

Action and Agency: A Reconceptualization

Pleading for a concept of textual agency calls into question more than
two thousand years of reflection on the notion of action. But this
reconceptualization can be defended rationally. To demonstrate, I turn to
everyday usage—more precisely, definitions found in the dictionary that
show how this term is used in everyday conversation.
So what lexicon is aligned with the word ‘action’? Eight definitions,
with the oldest recorded meaning coming first, are proposed in the 1993
edition of the Webster’s New Encyclopedic Dictionary:
1: a proceeding in a court of justice by which one demands or enforces
one’s right or the redress or punishment of a wrong 2: the working of one
thing on another so as to produce a change <the action of acids on metals>
3: the doing of something usually in stages or with the possibility of
continuation <the action of singing> 4 a: a thing done: deed b pl: behavior,
conduct c: readiness to engage in daring activity: initiative <a person of
action> 5: combat in war 6: the unfolding of the events of a drama or work
of fiction: plot 7: an operating mechanism <the action of a firearm> 8: an
area or state of vigorous activity <where the action is> (1993: 11)
Interestingly, none of these definitions refers explicitly to the concept of
intention, which several authors use traditionally to define a true ‘action’
(e.g. Austin, Burke, Davidson, and Searle, to name just a few). Moreover,
two definitions (2 and 7) are perfectly compatible with the idea of a
nonhuman agency exerting action, as we speak of ‘action of acids on
metals’ or ‘action of a firearm.’
Besides these nuances, the term ‘action’ refers to the production of
some kind of change (definitions 1 and 2), the doing of something
(definitions 3, 4b, 5, 6, 7 and 8), the result of a doing (definition 4a), or the
initiation of a doing (definition 4c). Whether performed by humans or
nonhumans, ‘action’ in ordinary language refers to the accomplishment
of something under the angle of its transformative (change), durative
(ongoing process), inchoative (beginning), or terminative (ending) dimen-
sions (Greimas and Courtés, 1982). In these cases, we delimit or circum-
scribe something that is currently happening or has happened. Since we
can de-fine it, we can also identify its beginning and its end, i.e. its
inchoative and terminative dimensions. This ‘something’ that we identify
is the production of change, that is, the transformation from one state to
another (Cooren, 2000a,b; Taylor, 1993; Taylor and Cooren, 1997).
An action then is a transformation of state operated by an agent. This
transformation can exhibit reflexivity (e.g. ‘Robert is walking’ or ‘this

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 Textual Agency
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machine is running’), transitivity (e.g. ‘Nancy is eating an apple’ or

‘this acid is attacking metals’), or even ditransitivity (e.g. ‘Denis is talking
to Helen’ or ‘this ATM is providing Garry with $100’) (Taylor and Van
Every, 2000). Although using the term ‘action’ to refer to what an ATM
machine does could be considered hubristic, this exclusion may in fact
explain why analysts have neglected the role that nonhumans play in our
everyday world (Latour, 1993, 1996b, 1999).
To say that nonhumans do things does not mean that human contribu-
tions are passed over. As Latour (1993, 1996b) notes, the key phenom-
enon is hybridicity; that is, the recognition that action has no point of
origin. Arguments for and against gun control in the United States
illustrate this concept. The National Rifle Association’s argument focuses
on the human being who is holding the weapon. For them, people kill
people and guns are reduced to mere instruments, ‘neutral carrier of will’
(Latour, 1994: 31). Advocates of gun control respond with the slogan,
‘Guns kill people’ (1994: 30), which focuses on the difference a gun
makes in somebody’s hands. Without the gun, killing someone becomes
harder. Thus, humans exchange properties with nonhumans. As Latour
points out,
You are different with a gun in hand; . . . the gun is another object because
it has entered into a relationship with you. The gun is no longer the gun-in-
the-armory or the gun-in-the-drawer or the gun-in-the-pocket, but the gun-
in-your-hand, aimed at someone who is screaming. What is true of the
subject, of the gunman, is as true of the object, of the gun that is held.
(1994: 33)

Both humans and nonhumans contribute to what is happening. The gun

and the gunman both make a difference and it is their association that
becomes the origin to action.
Recognizing nonhuman agency does not reduce human agency to an
empirical artifact. On the contrary, it shows how a hybrid association
between humans and nonhumans enables people to do things that they
could not do otherwise. A focus on nonhuman agency paves the way to
recognizing hybrid agency; that is, the way humans can appropriate what
nonhumans do. They exchange properties with each other: the gun is
different in a person’s hand, just as the person is different with the gun in
his hand. Knowledge of this hybrid relationship helps us understand the
role that texts play in structuring organizational settings.

Textual Agency
How can we analyze discursive acts in organizations by focusing on the
agency displayed by the (oral, written, or iconic) texts?2 Even though
other scholars acknowledge the agency role that machines, instruments,
and tools play (Callon, 1986; Callon and Latour, 1981; Callon et al., 1986;
Latour, 1986, 1993, 1994, 1996a,b, 1999; Latour and Woolgar, 1986), this

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article focuses on how this role enables the functioning of texts, espe-
cially as they connect with organizing.
For ordinary language philosophers, the analysis of textuality starts
with human speakers who carry specific intentions and perform particu-
lar discursive actions in a given circumstance (Austin, 1962/1975; Searle,
1969, 1979; Vanderveken, 1990–1). These scholars use hypothetical cases
in which the speakers either meant what they said (direct speech acts) or
used indirect ways to convey their intentions (indirect speech acts) to
account for communication. In other words, these analyses tend to make
texts or utterances almost invisible.
However, if we agree with Latour (1996b) that, when one acts, others
proceed to action, then we should be able to recognize the status of these
‘others’ when people communicate with each other, whether they do this
orally, graphically, or by sign. For example, in a research project that
shadowed a manager’s routine activities, one particularly striking prac-
tice was the number of notes this manager wrote to himself when
something had to be done (for example, calling back a tenant, checking
on the price of something, calling a contractor). As soon as the manager
identified a task ‘to be done,’ he simply wrote a note on a Post-it. Each
time he went back to his office, he reviewed these notes and acted on
some specific task (i.e. calling a tenant, a supplier, or a contractor) while
postponing others. Once the task was completed, the note was simply
dropped in the garbage can.
One interpretation of this practice is that these notes reminded the
manager what needed to be done. Another possible read, as speech act
theorists would claim, is that the manager performed the act of remind-
ing himself. This interpretation, however, overlooks the contribution that
notes make to this process, or the role of nonhuman agency. Certainly, the
manager orients to and functions with his own notes (not the notes
written by someone else). However, the actions of reminding oneself
involve the participation of nonhuman actors, i.e. the notes. If the notes
were not doing anything, they would not make a difference in the
situation, and yet their mere presence is enough to trigger the manager’s
behavior.
Furthermore, saying that the notes remind him what to do is not
incompatible with saying that the manager reminds himself what to do
with the help of the notes. In the second account, the notes function as an
intermediary or a simple tool whose agency is ignored. In this account,
the manager appropriates what the notes are doing. What the notes are
doing (reminding) becomes what the humans who produced them are
doing. The first account, the one I would like to privilege, highlights the
contribution of the notes. Because of their durability (they last, endure,
remain—properties that human memory lacks), notes do things that
managers rely on in their daily activities.
Appropriation and its mirror concept, attribution, are core phenomena
that provide insights into this mundane example. The concern is what is

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done when a text is appropriated by or attributed to someone. In the case

reviewed, the action of reminding attributed to the note can also be
attributed to the manager. Consistent with Latour’s (1994) concept of
hybridicity exemplified in the gun control debate, the manager supple-
mented his limited capacity to recall by associating himself with the
notes he created. By appropriating the agency of the notes, he becomes
more powerful. But this power derives from the capacity of the notes to
do things that humans alone do poorly, that is, reminding or recalling
something throughout space and time. Through this appropriation, the
manager’s memory is increased, which aids in structuring different
activities. In effect, programs of actions can be recalled any time the
manager decides to look at his notes.
This effect of appropriation/attribution goes even further. For instance,
a security system was installed at the entrance of the manager’s building
a few months after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. To access
their offices, all the tenants now have to swipe a card in a machine. If
they go through the security device without using their card, an alarm
automatically goes off to warn personnel. A sign displayed in the hall
says, ‘All visitors must sign in. This building is under TV surveillance.’
Each time a new visitor comes into the building, this sign invites the
person to check in with the concierge of the building. The visitor check-
in consists of (1) explaining the reason for the visit, (2) having a camera
take a photograph of the person’s face, and (3) automatically recording
the sound of the person’s voice when the concierge asks for her name.
That way, if anything happens, anyone who has access to the building
can be identified.
The sign in this situation displays agency in that it invites the visitor to
check in and it indicates to them that the building is under video
surveillance. By implication, the organization that manages the building
can also be said to perform the acts of inviting and indicating. Thus, the
actions of the sign can be attributed to and/or appropriated by the
organization, which co-constitutes the sign. In like manner, organiza-
tional forms function as de-authored texts (Hoskins and McLean, 1998),
in that traces of authorship tend to be erased from these texts. Most
organizational forms that people fill out display the same kind of charac-
teristics: passive sentences, the absence of any reference to ‘I’ or even
‘we,’ and a series of directives that indicate where and how to complete
the form (for more details, see Yates, 1993). This ‘ghost-writing,’ as
Hoskins and McLean call it, reduces the human actor to an intermediary,
thereby reaffirming the existence of the organization. Like forms, the sign
at the building entrance acts on behalf of or in the name of the organiza-
tion, and not necessarily on behalf of the person who produced it. The
inscriptions, documents, and graphs produced in the organization’s name
attest to the identities of collective actors, even when their very existence
is questionable.3

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In some cases, the discourse shifts our attention to the ghost or the
originator of the actions. For example, use of the pronoun ‘I’ is reserved
for human actors and its use shifts our attention away from the text to
whomever appropriates it. When these shifters pop up in a text (whether
orally or in writing), they make us look for the ghost who might
appropriate the speech act. In this case, shifters signal ‘action at a
distance’; they point to the human who is speaking through the text.
This discussion of textual agency incorporates human involvement
into this performance. It shows how the human who produced and
designed texts can act from a distance across space and time. The sign
displayed in the lobby helps the personnel in charge of organizational
entry to instruct visitors without reiterating the same information each
time a new person enters the building. A hybrid agent composed of
security personnel and the sign tells people what to do and gives them
information. Without the presence of personnel to reinforce the injunc-
tion, the sign might be useless or powerless; visitors might disregard it.
Using Latour’s (1994) terminology, the sign-in-the-presence-of-the-
personnel is a more powerful mode of communication and the personnel-
with-the sign reiterates the sign’s injunction.
Recognizing textual agency moves organizational discourse analysts
beyond their preoccupation with face-to-face communication. Instead of
focusing on what members say, we focus on the oral, written, or iconic
texts that they produce and how these texts span space and time.
Furthermore, these texts, especially when they become more autonomous
(such as policies, contracts, forms), reaffirm the identity and existence of
the organization. The sign in the lobby of the building not only acts in the
name of security personnel but also acts on behalf of the organization at
large. Organizations do things not only through human agents (Taylor
and Cooren, 1997; Taylor and Van Every, 2000), but also through their
nonhuman counterparts (documents, machines, technological devices,
etc.). Analyzing nonhuman agency (whether textual or non-textual)
enables us to reconceptualize organizational ontology; that is, the mode
of being and doing of organizational forms. To this end, we address what
textual agency consists of—what texts can or cannot do.

What Texts Can Do and Cannot Do

This section focuses on the kinds of speech acts that texts can perform.

Assertives
For example, using the category of assertives proposed by Searle (1979)
and Vanderveken (1990–1), we can note that documents can inform,
indicate, say, tell, assert, deny, suggest, predict, and even prophesy (see
Table 1). For instance, the sign at the entrance of the building informed or
told visitors that they had to sign in and that the building was under
camera surveillance. Texts can also attest, certify, contradict, refute,

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critique, contest, question, accuse, denounce, or even proclaim, as we see

in Table 1. However, texts are not able to admit, confess, or take pride in
doing something. These last verbs point to a human presence that cannot
be ascribed to texts and documents. In other words, ‘admitting’ is a
Table 1. Assertives: What Texts Can and Cannot Do

Verbs Illustrations

The assertives texts can perform

Inform The bosses’ memo informs us that John finally resigned
Confirm John’s document confirms this hypothesis
Indicate This sign indicates where the exit is
Say This article says that we should not be too afraid of Anthrax attacks
Assert This confidential note asserts that we should be wary of Anthrax attacks
Deny This report denies his participation in this affair
Bemoan His testimony bemoans this intervention
Suggest These guidelines suggest that we should first screw in this piece
Announce This poster announces that Bill will run for presidency
Predict This book predicts that we will all die very soon
Prophesy The Bible prophesies the Last Judgment
Tell This monograph tells the turbulent life of Shakespeare
Remind Bob’s email reminded me that we had a meeting today
Attest This document attests that this property was bought in 1956
Certify This seal certifies that the painting is authentic
Contradict All these reports contradict each other
Refute This essay refutes the theory that it was an accident
Critique This exposé critiques France’s participation in the Gulf war
Contest This decision contests his results
Question This editorial questions the US foreign policy since World War II
Accuse This anonymous letter accuses him of plagiarism
Denounce This chapter denounces his participation in the terrorist attack
Proclaim This manifesto proclaims the independence of the United States

The assertives texts cannot perform

Confess/admit He confessed/admitted that he was there when it happened
Pride oneself She prides herself on being so rich
Boast France boasts of being the world’s leading wine producer
Brag He brags about being so smart

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speech act that only humans can do. The oral or written text produced to
perform this type of act can thus only be said to display some form of
physical agency: it transmits, broadcasts, or serves as physical support. In
comparison, we saw that ‘recalling’ is a speech act that can be ascribed to
a text (a Post-it note for example) to the extent that it also displays a form
of hybridicity; that is, that this text can be identified as coming from some
human or collective agent.
Ascribing agency to documents does not mean that texts are severed
from their human creators. For instance, if the sign informs visitors, it is
because the visitors recognize that organizational members created this
notice for this purpose. Ascribing agency to texts never means that
humans completely disappear from the picture. On the contrary, textual
agency functions to the extent that texts are recognized as being pur-
posely produced for some specific effect. Similarly, if I tell someone that
I received a memo announcing John’s resignation, I ascribe agency to this
memo in that I act as if it is written by someone who is authorized to
initiate this notification. The spectral effect, which Derrida (1992, 1994)
has been analyzing using the pun ‘hauntology,’ never disappears. On the
contrary, it is necessary to the functioning of texts.

Commissives
This ghostly effect becomes even more pronounced with the use of
commissives such as swearing, taking the oath, accepting, agreeing,
consenting, refusing, or betting whose appropriation is denied to docu-
ments (see Table 2). However, texts, like contracts, commit their signat-
ories to do things and guarantee, vouch, or assure specific actions or
advantages to some person or entity—for instance, ‘this signed agreement
promises payment of a sum of money on demand or at a particular time’;
i.e. a promissory note. In other words, commitment is not something that
a text can do for itself. A document cannot really commit itself to do
something, but it can commit for other agents. The agency of such
documents exists if they commit their signatories to a particular action in
the future.
To illustrate, I refer back to the building manager’s daily routines. Each
time a manager and one of his contractors verbally agree about a job for a
tenant, the contractor sends a formal proposal to the manager. This
proposal typically contains details about the pricing, labor costs, and
supplies of the job. This proposal then is communicated to the tenant,
who approves or disapproves the project. Once both parties sign a
contract, this latter commits the contractor and the tenant to specific
actions. The contractor is committed to doing the job for the tenant and
the tenant is committed to paying the contractor when the job is com-
pleted. Saying that the contract commits the contractor and the tenant to
specific actions is consistent with saying that both of them commit
themselves to act through the contract. Both interpretations are compat-
ible, though the first one highlights the agency of the contract. By creating

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Table 2. Commissives: What Texts Can and Cannot Do

Verbs Illustrations

The commissives texts can perform

Commit This signature commits you to payment
Promise This signed agreement promises payment of a sum of money
Guarantee This contract guarantees his participation in the project
Vouch This receipt vouches that you can be reimbursed
Assure This agreement assures her a place on the team
Threaten This anonymous letter threatens him with disclosures

The commissives texts cannot perform

Swear He swore he’d never write again
Taking the oath She took the oath in front of the king
Accept I accept your offer
Agree The participants agreed to let him speak
Consent She consented to his leaving
Refuse I refuse to give up
Bet He betted him $100 that the horse would win

this contract, both parties use this document as a source of agency; that
is, it is a text that binds them to specific actions. If the agreement is
violated and the dispute goes to litigation, the contract indicates or even
proves the respective commitments of both parties.
Directives
If we now turn to directives, some of these discursive actions are
restricted to humans: begging, supplicating, imploring, entreating,
beseeching. However, some specific types of documents (formal invita-
tions, for example) can request someone to do something. Other texts can
also advise, ask, suggest, invite, recommend, warn, but also notify, order,
solicit, demand, press, summon, enjoin, forbid, ban, allow, authorize, or
stipulate (see Table 3 for some illustrations). Certainly, illocutionary acts
such as asking, soliciting, forbidding, banning, allowing, or authorizing
can just be performed by documents that have what we call the ‘force of
law,’ i.e. constitutional, legal or official documents, but note that this also
applies to any human to whom we would be ready to attribute such a
capacity to act. They both need to be recognized.
Work orders fall into this category (Winsor, 2000). For instance, each
time a building manager identifies what one of his employees (i.e. not a
contractor) should do, he contacts him4 verbally and provides him with a
brief description of the task and deadline. The manager then asks a

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Table 3. Directives: What Texts Can and Cannot Do

Verbs Illustrations

The directives texts can perform

Request This invitation requests your presence on Friday morning
Advise This editorial advises us against leaving the territory
Ask I received a letter asking me to appear in court on Friday
Invite This announcement invites a bid for the construction of their building
Suggest This recipe suggests that we use this kind of apple
Recommend This volume recommends that we adopt this method
Warn This sign warns us against the dog
Notify This report notifies us that the structure is unstable
Summon This missive summons us to a meeting tomorrow
Press All the editorials press him to speak about this affair
Compel This circular compels us to stop all negotiations
Solicit This letter solicits our help
Demand This petition demands his resignation
Enjoin This policy enjoins us to work from 8:00 to 5:00
Forbid This ministerial decree forbids any use of cellular phones in the car
Ban The US Constitution bans slavery
Authorize My green card authorizes me to re-enter the USA

The directives texts cannot perform

Beg He begged her forgiveness
Supplicate She supplicated him for pardon
Implore I implore you to let her go
Beseech He beseeched her to stay
Entreat He entreated her to spare his life

secretary to generate a work order with the employee’s name and a brief
description of the task. The secretary then places the work order in the
employee’s work tray while keeping a copy of it in her computer. The
employee takes the work order and brings it back marked ‘completed’
once the work is done. The secretary then enters this information into the
computer.
As this example illustrates, the work order does not initiate the task,
since the verbal interaction between the manager and the employee
performed this action. However, it tells or confirms to the employee what
tasks have to be done and the manager can use it to check what work has

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or has not been completed.5 Interestingly, the introduction of computer-

ized work orders makes the employees more accountable vis-a-vis their
respective tasks. Employees sometimes ignore or lose the written work
orders, claiming that they never received them. Saving the form in the
secretary’s computer, however, serves as proof that the work order exists
and was given to them. This form of control6 shows how a text, like a
work order, makes a difference because it tells, reminds, or confirms to
employees what needs to be done and makes them more accountable.

Declarations and expressives

We could follow the same exercise for what Searle calls declarations (see
Table 4) and expressives (see Table 5), noting that texts can confirm,
ratify, approve, sanction, exculpate, or compliment. In effect, the list of
speech acts typically reserved for human action can be extended (with
some restrictions) to the texts they produce. Moreover, documents have
properties that humans do not have: Derrida (1988) calls this restance,
that is, their ‘staying capacity.’ For example, when a legal document
requests something from someone, this text remains active as long as it is
recognized or not destroyed. Thus, what texts and documents do are
performances of a particular kind, since their actions last as long as they
remain intact or recognized.

Textual Agency and Organizational Constitution

Recognizing the agency of text sets forth a new way to approach organiza-
tional constitution and ontology. Some scholars view discourse as the
only (or at least the main) building block of organizational forms (Mumby
and Clair, 1997; Oswick et al., 2000), whereas others, such as Fairclough
(1992, 1995) and Reed (1998, 2000), refuse to ‘collapse’ materiality into
discursivity (Reed, 2001) and contend that discourse should be analyzed
as shaped by ‘something else,’ usually under the form of power, ideology,
or domination. The epistemological choice these positions offer is either
a socio-constructive approach to reality, in which discourse is seen as a
‘filter’ through which members’ interactions co-construct and co-
constitute the organization, or a materialist approach, which conceives of
discourse as reflecting something already constituted.
However, recognizing that texts display a form of agency leads to the
conclusion that a discursive constitution alone does not make any sense,
nor does a reliance on structure and material relations solve the problem;
that is, both discursive and material foundationalists seem shortsighted.
Rather than addressing the issue as a duality between agency and
structure (Giddens, 1984), we could expand the concept of agency to
acknowledge what nonhumans do. The problem with the term ‘structure’
(as well as nominalizations such as ‘organizations’ or ‘institutions’) is
that it functions as a hodge-podge concept, in which scholars include an

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Table 4. Declarations: What Texts Can and Cannot Do

Verbs Illustrations

The declarations texts can perform

Declare His decree declares a state of emergency
Dismiss This letter dismisses him from the University
Revoke This new law revokes the government’s decision
Approve This decision approves the reform bill
Confirm This document confirms his appointment
Sanction This directive sanctions her decision
Ratify This bylaw ratifies the pre-existing state of affairs
Legalize This edict legalizes their merger
Homologate Their report homologates his world record
Bless His words blessed their union
Condemn This sentence condemns him to silence
Commute This verdict commutes his sentence to life in prison
Pardon This judgment pardons him for blaspheming
Reprieve Their ruling reprieved the prisoner
Exculpate This testimony exculpates him
Excommunicate This encyclical excommunicated Henry VIII
Absolve This verdict absolved her
Postpone This missive postpones the discussion
Adjourn The letter adjourned the session
Abrogate/repeal This decree abrogates/repeals the law against abortion
Bequeath This will bequeaths the castle to him
Disinherit This will disinherits her
Endorse This signature endorses the check

The declarations texts cannot perform

Renounce He renounced his nationality
Resign I hereby resign my position as chairman
Relinquish She relinquished her title to her son
Repudiate He repudiated her
Abjure She abjured Catholicism
Abdicate The king abdicated in favor of his cousin

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Table 4. Continued

Verbs Illustrations

Capitulate He capitulated to Caesar

Disown She disowns her signature
Consecrate He consecrated him to the office of bishop
Curse I curse the day you were born
Damn She damned him with faint praise
Open I declare the session opened
Close I declare the session closed
Retract He retracted his statement
Auction Going, going, gone!
Award I hereby award you the Nobel Prize
Nominate You are officially nominated chairman of the board
Baptize I now baptize you in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Ghost

array of factors, such as material conditions, memory traces, ideologies,

power, and control.
Conversely, the phenomenon of nonhuman agency provides a basis for
explaining such constructs as ‘structure,’ ‘organization,’ or ‘institution.’
For example, we saw how a relatively tight form of control emerges from
the mere existence and accountability of the work order.7 Here, we can
explain what is happening without using the term ‘structure.’ The work
order and its specific form of agency account for why this document aids
in controlling employees’ behaviors. Clearly, a multitude of actors parti-
cipate in the production and application of the work order to insure its
compliance (the manager, the secretary, the computer, the tray); thus, the
Table 5. Expressives: What Texts Can and Cannot Do

Verbs Illustrations

The expressives texts can perform

Compliment The review compliments the actor on his performance in the film

The expressives texts cannot perform

Thank I thank you for coming
Apologize He apologized for being so rude
Congratulate Congratulations on your new home!
Condole He condoled with her
Complain He complained to the management
Boo The audience booed him

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source of control emanates from this chain of actors. We could refer to

this chain of human and nonhuman actors as a structure, but the use
of this term has less explanatory power and conceals the sources of
control.
The textual agency approach suggests that what constitutes an organ-
ization is a hybrid of human and nonhuman contributions. Signs,
memos, and contracts display a form of agency by doing things that
humans alone could not do. Created by human beings, these texts
participate in the channeling of behaviors, constitute and stabilize organ-
izational pathways, and broadcast information/orders. As Smith notes,
The replication of words and numbers or images as texts in multiple local
sites reproduces them across time and space and among people variously
situated. . . . Texts therefore are key devices in hooking people’s activities
in particular local settings and at particular times into the transcending
organization of the ruling relations, including what sociology calls institu-
tions and organizations. The capacity of texts to import the same set of
words, numbers or images into local settings separate in time or space is
essential to how what we call organizations and institutions exist in the
peculiar way in which they do. (2001: 164–5)

Instead of reducing the organization to a discursive construction or to a

structure, we can acknowledge the contributions that both discourse and
texts make to organizational forms.
By developing textual agents, organizational members create ways for
such forms to remain stable throughout space and time. For instance,
organizational members can address directives and determine their sat-
isfaction from a distance. The complete organization (Brunsson and
Sahlin-Andersson, 2000) thus becomes an organization in which docu-
ments state criteria of success (assertives), define objectives (directives),
commit employees and managers (commissives), and sanction or reward
performance (expressives). Certainly, there are ghostly presences or
hybridicity in these texts; humans do not disappear and human appro-
priation always occurs. But textual agency, especially in its written form,
enables delegation through tele-action and tele-communication. By
remaining, these textual agents fabricate relatively fixed spaces and
times; they define objectives; they forbid specific behaviors; and they
invite or enforce humans to follow specific organizational pathways.
Organizing, then, is not simply a process reduced to what human
members do, but rather should be expanded to include the hybrid and
ghostly effects of nonhuman actions. Recognizing what nonhumans do
bridges the gap between the micro and the macro dimension of organiz-
ing, since we saw that action, according to this conception, does not have
any point of origin. Humans are acted upon as well as acting through the
textual and physical objects that they produce. They enter into a chain of
actions that extend beyond their original contributions. Instead of using

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François Cooren

the term ‘structure’ to explain these effects, let us start from agency—in
all its forms.

Notes
An earlier version of this article was presented as a keynote lecture at the
International Conference on Spacing and Timing, Palermo, Italy, 1–3 November
2001.

1 In The Constitution of Society, Giddens (1984: 14) writes, ‘Action depends

upon the capability of the individual to “make a difference” to a pre-existing
state of affairs or course of events. An agent ceases to be such if he or she loses
the capability to “make a difference”, that is, to exercise some sort of power.’
As we see, Giddens’ definition of agency is restricted to what individuals do,
that is, to entities displaying a form of intentionality. What I propose is to
extend this definition to take into account cases in which other types of
entities also appear to make a difference.
2 In this article, I use the term ‘text’ according to the definition proposed
by Smith (2001: 164): ‘definite forms of words, numbers or images that exist
in a materially replicable form.’ Though Smith seems to think mostly in terms
of written texts when she proposes this definition, I think it is not incompat-
ible with the phenomenon of oral texts, given that even these exist in a
materially replicable form (they can be remembered and audio-recorded).
What actually defines the notion of text is, according to Derrida (1988), its
iterability, i.e. its repeatability, whether under the form of quotation or
mechanical reproduction.
3 In that case, we can speak about a tour de force, as for the US Declaration of
Independence, so nicely analyzed by Derrida (1986).
4 All employees under the building manager’s authority were male at the time
of the study. They were mostly painters and carpenters.
5 Though the phenomenon of textual agency is not problematized in Tracy’s
(2000) excellent study of emotional labor practices in cruise ships, she also
shows very well how the cruise staff constantly are reminded of their duties
by two copies of the service credo that are stuck to the inside of their cabin
and bathroom doors. As she writes, ‘The Credo included mandates such as
“We never say no,” “We smile, we are on stage,” “We are ambassadors of our
cruise ship when at work and at play,” and “We use proper telephone
etiquette . . . and answer with a smile in our voice”’ (2000: 107). Not
surprisingly, Tracy notes that these copies of the credo contribute to what she
calls the ‘dispersed emotional control structures’ of the cruise ship.
6 Interestingly enough, the term ‘control’ comes from the Middle-French word
‘contre-rolle,’ which literally means ‘counter-account.’ As Levin’s book (2000)
reminds us, the contre-rolle initially was a register that medieval officials kept
to make tax collectors accountable. As a modern form of control, the work
order used in the manager’s office seems to function literally as a ‘counter-
account.’
7 Here, we could refer to what Hoskins et al. call the accounting-led
organizations—that is, target-focusing organizations, in which ‘success and
failure become identified in terms of target-hitting’ (2001: 15). As these
authors mention, accounting makes organizational processes accountable: it

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creates ways to check performances and the extent to which these perform-
ances meet criteria of success or failure.

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François Cooren is an Associate Professor in the Department of Communication at the

Université de Montréal. His research centers on the organizing properties of
communication as displayed in high-reliability organizations, coalitions, and
board meetings. Recent publications include two articles, ‘Translation and
Articulation in the Organization of Coalitions: The Great Whale River Case’
(2001, Communication Theory) and ‘Acting and Organizing: How Speech Acts
Structure Organizational Interactions’ (2002, Concepts and Transformation), and
The Organizing Property of Communication (2000, John Benjamins). He is the
recipient of the 2002 International Communication Association Young Scholar
Award. Address: Université de Montréal, Département de communication, CP
6128, Succursale Centre-ville, Montreal, Quebec, Canada H3C 3J7. [email:
f.cooren@umontreal.ca]

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