Review

Author(s): R. M. Ogden
Review by: R. M. Ogden
Source: The American Journal of Psychology, Vol. 66, No. 1 (Jan., 1953), pp. 148-153
Published by: University of Illinois Press
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1417991
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 BOOK REVIEWS
Edited by M. E. BITTERMAN, University of Texas

Thinking; An Introductionto its ExperimentalPsychology.By GEORGE

HUMPHREY.London, Methuenand Co., New York, John Wiley and Sons
Inc., 1951. Pp. xi, 331.
In this fine book the authorgives us what is perhapsthe first thorough-
going review of the experimentalpsychology of thinking. To most psy-
chologists, I fancy, the results of the socalled 'WiirzburgSchool' under
Oswald Kiilpe were largelyabortive.In showing that the processof think-
ing was something more and other than an associationof 'sensations,'
'images,'and 'feelings,' the definition of a new 'content of thought' was
both difficultand of waning interestto a psychologythat was ceasingto be
introspective.Behaviorism,which was rising into prominenceat the same
time that the 'School' was flourishing,had no use for 'contentsof con-
sciousness,' while those who remained phenomenalistsbegan to talk in
termsof 'integration'and 'Gestalt'without recourseto conscious'elements.'
As one who participatedduring the first decadeof this centuryin experi-
ments on thought and thinking, both in Wiirzburgand in his own labora-
tory, I was in the midst of the controversywhich ProfessorHumphreynow
describesand evaluates.Quite recently,too, before I knew of Humphrey's
book, I published a memorial on the subject, "Oswald Kiilpe and the
Wiirzburg School," in this JOURNAL(64, 1951, 4-29).
It is the merit of ProfessorHumphrey'scareful study that he has been
able to review the history of the experimentalinvestigationof thinking
from the early work of the Wiirzburgers,Binet, Bovet, Woodworth, and
others, through the reinterpretationsof behavioristand Gestalter,and to
re-point the problemas it concernspsychologytoday. The titles to the ten
chaptersof the book give us the outline of his reviewand his conclusions.
The first chapter deals with Association. In it the concept is reviewed
historically and criticized as an all-embracingexplanation of thinking.
The inadequacyof the doctrine of Association is summarizedin saying
that it is sensationalistand particularwhile thinking is general, it is me-
chanicalwhile thinking is directive, and it is atomisticwhile thinking is
relationaland continuous.
The next three chapters are devoted to the work of the Wiirzburg
Group and a critique of its experimentalstudies, following which there
148

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 BOOK REVIEWS 149

is a chapteron the work of Selz. In additionto the discoveryof thoughtas

an 'imagelesscontent of consciousness,'the Wiirzburgersrelied upon the
Aufgabe, or 'task,' operatingupon reproductivetendencies,to explain the
direction and content of thinking. "It is perhaps in his treatmentof the
Aufgabe," writes Humphrey,"thatSelz has made his greatestcontribution.
Selz's rejection of the associationalscheme implies a correspondingrejec-
tion of the dual action of Aufgabe and reproductivetendencies,with the
former exercising a directive influence over the latter" (p. 137). With
Selz we come closer to an understandingof productivethinking although,
accordingto Humphrey,his explanation"is of too great generalityto pro-
vide any particularpsychologicalunderstandingof the processesinvolved"
(p. 145). "He is," however, "the first psychologistto incorporatean ex-
plicitly non-associationaldoctrineinto an experimentallyinduced psychol-
ogy of thinking" (p. 149).
ChapterVI discusses the 'Gestalt theory of thought' which makes use
of 'tension'and 'disequilibrium'to explain both the directiveand produc-
tive characterof thinking. The Gestalt explanationis sympatheticallypre-
sented, although Humphreyis inclined to believe that too little regard is
paid to associationand habit. "For Gestalt theory,"he remarks,"the mo-
tive force in thinking is the dynamicsof the perceivedproblem-situation.
Is therethen no 'motor'in sheerhabit?" (p. 182).
ChapterVII deals with 'Thought and motor reaction.'In it most atten-
tion is given to the works of E. Jacobsonand G. L. !Freemanon muscular
relaxationand tonus. The disappearanceof thinking with relaxationand
its possible dependenceupon tonus are discussed,but after consideration
of Lashley'sexperimentalanimalsthe conclusionis reached"thatwe have
to do with a central pattern which, to repeat, is prior to the particular
kinaestheticpattern which it engenders in a particularsituation in that
differentmotor patternsmay be the result of the same centralneuralpat-
tern" (p. 202). Experimentalevidence is also adducedto show that think-
ing cannotbe explainedas silent speech.
ChapterVIII is devoted to a further considerationof 'Languageand
thought,' and the idea is developed that there is no problem of meaning
in language. ". .. we perceivethe world directly,without the intermediary
of some tertium quid such as 'sensations'or 'ideas,' the latter giving rise
to the Lockianfallacy, accordingto which we can neverperceivethe world
at all; and that similarlywe imagine the world directly,without the inter-
mediaryof images..." Psychologists,writes Humphrey,have "invented
for themselvesan entirelyspuriousproblem"(p. 226). "The psychological
activities of sensing (something), imagining (something), or talking

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150 BOOK REVIEWS

about (something) (i.e. reactingwith certaineffectorsto a situationcom-

prising another person and something else), depend on the biological
correlatesorganism and environment.The same kind of confusion has
been caused in biology by those who have tried, often unwittingly, to
consideran organismapartfrom its environment"(p. 228).
Humphrey'sconclusion, "There is no Problem of Meaning," is per-
haps the most significantone which his study of the experimentalpsychol-
ogy of thinking has brought forth. He mentions it first in the introduc-
tion to his book and refers to an article with the above title which has
appeared in the Brit. J. Psychol. (42, 1951, 238-45). It would appear
that Humphreywas pursuadedto reach this conclusion in the course of
writing his book. A similar conclusionwas reachedby the reviewermany
years ago from his own experimentson thinking. An article called "The
Phenomenon of 'Meaning'"-published in this JOURNAL(34, 1923,
223-30) and listed in Humphrey's bibliography-contains the follow-
ing passage: "We said that the stimulus-wordis perceived; to the older
view this only meant that it was sensed or felt; the interpretationcame
afterwards,when, through association,it had revived some other content
or contents than itself. According to the newer view, the word itself, as
sensed, is at once the nucleus of the experience,the dispositionalmatrix
being its neurologicalcounterpart.Phenomenally,that is psychologically,
the 'felt' word is already its meaning; for there are no meaninglessex-
periences"(p .227).
It seems strangethat so simple a conclusionshould be so slow in gain-
ing acceptance.Long since, the radicalbehavioristsmade us familiarwith
the denial of 'conscious'contentsas scientificdata.Although, as Humphrey
has shown, we have the same problem of relevancyin an 'objective'psy-
chology that the Wiirzburgerstried to solve introspectively,it might well
clarify our experimentalproceduresif we would exercise a stricterusage
of that ambiguousterm 'experience.'Humphrey does not deal with the
problem of 'consciousness,'as such, and he might not be ready to accept
my statementthat "there are no meaningless experiences,"but his con-
clusion that "there is no problem of meaning" enables him to consider
thinking as an immediateprocesscharacterizedby directionand operating
by virtue of some kind of 'motor,' even though we do not yet know
what kind.
ChapterIX, on 'Generalization,'considersthe problemsof abstraction,
beginning with Kiilpe's pioneeringexperimentsand continuingwith those
of A. A. Griinbaum,S. C. Fisher, E. Heidbreder,and others. Humphrey
concludesthat "the organismmust be such that it discerns,in a measure

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 BOOK REVIEWS 151

graduallyincreasingas evolution advances,similaritiesexistent under the

superficialvariations in its environment. Only by such discernmentof
similarities can the organism survive; without it organic response must
be chaotic in a chaotic-seemingworld. The ability to discernand act upon
similaritieshidden beneathdivergenceis the abilityto generalize,discussed
in this chapter.It is, at bottom, the ability to learn from experience"(p.
307).
In his 'Summaryand conclusion'Humphreypoints up the problemsof
motivation and consequence in thinking. They appear to involve some-
thing more than is accountedfor by 'tasks'and 'determiningtendencies,'
or 'trial and error' proceduresthat lack a clear definition of 'error'and
'success.' In his modest refusal to whip his extensive material into a
theoreticalconclusion,he contentshimself with a 'Generalstatementof the
presentposition'which falls undersixteenheadings:
"(1) Thinking as the term is understoodin this book may be provisionallyde-
fined as what occurs in experiencewhen an organism,human or animal, meets,
recognizes,and solves a problem."A footnote (p. 311) dilates on the ambiguity
of the term 'problem.'It is also remarkedthat "thereis probablyno hard-and-fast
distinctionbetweenlearningand thinking (p. 312).
"(2) A problemis a situation which for some reasonappreciablyholds up an
organismin its effortsto reacha goal.
"(3) The process of thinking involves an active combinationof featureswhich
as part of the problemsituationwere originallydiscrete.
"(4) It involves the use of past experience.The fact is obvious,but the method
by which it comes about is still not decided.
"(5) Not only the methodbut also the form of the impressionof the past into
the present is underdispute. One school maintainsthat the relation between past
and presentis particular(Hull: the 'continuingtheory'), an opposing school that
it is general (Lashley).
"(6) There is ubiquitous'trial and error'during thought-activity,whetherani-
mal or human,overt or covert.. . . The mechanismby which the 'wrong'solutions
are rejectedin overt learningis obscure;it is doublyobscurein thinking.
"(7) For purposes of psychologicalanalysis, motive (motor) may be distin-
guishedas an aspectof thinking. . . . Motive implies a goal. It might thus be said
that for the thinker the problem-fieldbecomespolarizedtowards the goal." In a
footnote the remarkis made that "conceivablythis is the process of 'seeing the
problem.'The problem is perhapsa problembecauseof incompletepolarization"
(p. 313). On the next page, however, we read that "it is entirely possible that
furtherdevelopmentswill renderthe dichotomy[of the 'poles'?} no longeruseful."
One wonders if this recourseto 'polarization'is more than adventitious;at least
Humphreymakes nothing of it.
"(8) In addition there must be postulated some principle to account for the
'direction'of thinking.
"(9) The Wiirzburggroup, underthe directionof Kiilpe, developedthe doctrine
that thought-as-experienced is free from sensorycontentof any kind . . . Since they

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152 BOOK REVIEWS

are stated in demoded terms the Wiirzburg results are unacceptable in their original
form to many modern psychologists. An alternative statement is proposed in the
text.
'"(10) The Wiirzburg psychologists were inclined to underestimate the im-
portance of the image. The image is a form of organization which is part of the
more inclusive process of response.
"(11) The Gestalt theorists . . . have stressed production as against (associative)
reproduction in thinking. At the same time they have developed the notion of the
organism under stress to account for the motor of thought.
"(12) Even when the thinker is overtly still, traces of the matrix of activity in
which thought has grown up still remain in the changes of muscular tonus observed
by many experimentalists. . . . Thus tonus, like muscular activity in general, may
under the right conditions help and under the wrong conditions hinder solution....
'Thinking out' may clearly prevent a disaster that would have been precipitated by
'acting out.' That is why the 'thinking' method has won its evolutionary place."
This is perhaps as close as Humphrey will come to an identification of thinking
with bodily behavior. There remains, however, the somewhat ambiguous 'experi-
ence' of thinking.
"(13) A specialized form of activity is speech, which at least in its derivatives,
such as writing and mathematics, is peculiar to human beings. Clinical, experimental,
and factorial results agree that language cannot be equated with thinking.
"(14) Generalization may be defined as the activity whereby an organism comes
to effect a constant modification towards an invariable feature or set of features
occurring in a variable context. Since all learning involves a context which is to
some extent variable, the process is common to both learning and thinking. Like all
kinds of thinking, generalization does not necessarily involve language, though it is
often improved by language. (Query: Is it ever impeded by language?)
"(15) Thus a number of different grades and kinds of organization are involved
in the total response to a problem-situation; of these (1) images of various
modalities; (2) muscular action, including, in particular, (3) speech, have been
mentioned as such; to this list there should perhaps be added (4) concepts. The
total process is in general facilitated by these organizations, but, apparently, cases
occur where it is hindered by at least (1), (2), and (3).
"(16) An artificial problem of 'meaning' has been created by treating the image
and speech-activity apart from their total context. (Conceivably the same kind of
confusion has been created by treating the 'concept' apart from its environmental
context, thus invoking the 'problem of the Universal.')"
One may hope that Humphrey's book will stimulate experimental studies
calculated to answer the questions he raises. In his article, "There is no
Problem of Meaning," he concludes: ". . . as well as perceiving an object
directly, we may also imagine and think it directly. Are these then three
distinct processes? three mental operations, psychological 'things' we do
to the surrounding world? Probably not. The relation between perception,
imagination and thinking has long been debated; it may turn out that
they form a continuum, along which something like the internal and ex-
ternal 'forces' of the Gestalt psychologists play a greater or lesser relative

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 BOOK REVIEWS 153

part. This also must at present be considereda problemfor the future. At

the present time it looks to be not insoluble" (p. 244).
May it be suggested, however, that before a problem of this sort is
solved it must be more narrowlydefined both as to its theoreticaland ex-
"
perimentaltreatment?"Mentaloperations"and "psychological'things'
even with things in quotes-are what Humphrey, himself, might call
"dangerousterms." In the old days it was a common practiceto declare
oneself an 'interactionist,'a 'parallelist,'or an 'epiphenomenalist.'After
such a commitmentone might have some notion of the possible relations
of "perception,imaginationand thinking" to each other and to "the in-
ternal and external 'forces' of the Gestalt psychologists."Lackingsuch a
declaration,the process of thinking is ill-defined. With Humphrey'scon-
clusion that "there is no psychologicalproblem of meaning per se" the
reviewerhas been for a quartercentury in agreement;but the statement
that "With any philosophical problem that the term meaning may en-
gender, this book does not concern itself" (p. viii) is dismaying.For is
not the philosophical meaning of 'meaning' somehow prior to any psy-
chological postulates of "perception,imagination and thinking," to say
nothing of those ubiquitous"internaland external 'forces' of the Gestalt
psychologists"?
Cornell University R. M. OGDEN

CerebralMechanismsin Behavior.Editedby L. A. JEFFRESS. New York,

John Wiley & Sons, 1951. Pp. xiv, 311.
This book is the edited transcriptof the Hixon symposiumthat took
place at the California Institute of Technology, September25-30, 1948.
It brought together a distinguished group of scientists, most of whom
have contributednotably to researchon the cerebralmechanismsof be-
havior. Those who contributedpapers were: John von Neumann, W. S.
McCulloch,R. Lorentede N6, K. S. Lashley,Heinrich Kliiver, Wolfgang
Kohler, W. C. Halstead, and H. W. Brosin. (Lorente'spaper could not,
unfortunately,be included in the book.) Also contributingto the discus-
sion, which was lively, lengthy and included in the book, were: R. W.
Gerard,H. S. Liddell, D. B. Lindsley,J. M. Nielsen, Paul Weiss, A. van
Harreveld, Linus Pauling, John Stroud, C. A. G. Wiersma, and Lowell
Woodbury.
The readerwill find relativelylittle in the formal papers that is not to
be found elsewherein the books or researchpapersof the contributors.He
will, however, find the principal contributionsof each of the participants
nicely summarized,so that within the covers of one book he may learn

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