SB6 4F Criminal Law Review Sixth Wave Title Seven Book Two

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests
Outline by Fiscal Victoria C. Garcia
REVISED PENAL CODE: BOOK TWO
TITLE SEVEN (ARTICLES 203-245): Crimes Committed by Public Officers
FRANCISCO SALVADOR B. ACEJAS III v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 156643; 156891 | June 27, 2006
TICKLER: Bureau of Immigration; Japanese passport; yakuza big boss
DOCTRINES:
1. The crime of direct bribery exists when a public officer 1) agrees to perform an
act that constitutes a crime in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present;
2) accepts the gift in consideration of the execution of an act that does not
constitute a crime; or 3) abstains from the performance of official duties.
2. Elements of the second kind of bribery: 1) the offender was a public officer, 2)
who received gifts or presents personally or through another, 3) in consideration
of an act that did not constitute a crime, and 4) that act related to the exercise of
official duties.
3. A private person may be held guilty of direct bribery if it was shown that
conspiracy exists between him and the public officer/s who committed direct
bribery.
FACTS: These are consolidated petitions for review assailing the decision of the
Sandiganbayan.
On December 17, 1993, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation Agent

Vladimir Hernandez, together with a reporter went to the house of Takao and Bethel
Aoyagi to serve Mission Order No. 93-04-12. Hernandez told Takao, through his wife
Bethel, that there were complaints against him in Japan that he was a suspected to be
a Yakuza big boss, a drug dependent and an overstaying alien.
Takao showed his passport and signed an undertaking issued by Hernandez,

stating his promise to appear in an investigation at the BID and that as a guarantee of
his appearance, he was entrusting his passport to Hernandez. Bethel called Expedito
Perlas and informed him of the taking of Takao’s passport. Perlas referred them to Atty.
Lucenario of the Lucernario, Margate, Mogpo, Tiongco and Acejas III Law firm.
Following the advice of the latter, they did not appear before the BID.
CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

4F (A.Y. 2017-2018) Acuesta, Baccay, Bajande, Bustillos, Cabuyadao, Cantos, Chua Cheng,
San Beda College of Law Manila Claudio, Cruz, Dieta, Dimaporo, Domantay, Eloriaga, Favoreal, Feraren,
Frando, Gementiza, Intal, Leano, Lezama, Magdamo, Magday,
San Beda College of Law Manila Marohombsar, Ocampo, Oro, Padua, Pallon, Panotes, Parojinog, Penaflor,
Roque, Quintos, Sale, Salor, Sanchez, Santos, Sioson, Soliva, Uy
Meanwhile, Hernandez prepared a progress report and submitted it to the

Chief of Operations and Intelligence Division, Ponciano Ortiz, who recommended that
Takao be placed under custodial investigation.
On December 22, 1993, the Aoyagis met accused Atty. Francisco Acejas and
were informed that Acejas would handle their case. On January 5, 1994, Jun Pelingon
(Bethel’s brother), Perlas, Atty. Acejas, Hernandez, Vic Conanan and Akira Nemoto
met at the Aristocrat Restaurant. Another meeting was set at the Manila Nikko Hotel on
January 8 with Pelingon, Perlas, Acejas and Hernandez attending.
On January 11, on account of the alleged demand of 1million pesos for the
return of Takao’s passport, Pelingon called BID Commissioner Zafiro Espicio of Davao.
The latter referred him to Atty. Angelica Somera, an NBI agent. An entrapment
operation was arranged.
On January 12, Hernandez returned the passport at the coffee shop of the
Diamond Hotel. The NBI team arrested Perlas, Atty. Acejas and Jose Victoriano after
the latter picked up the brown envelope containing marked money.
CRIME CHARGED: Direct Bribery
Sandiganbayan: Hernandez, Conanan, Perlas and Acejas were found GUILTY of

DIRECT BRIBERY. Hernandez and Conanan shall also suffer the p[enalty of special
temporary disqualification. Joise Victoriano is acquitted on the ground of reasonable
doubt.
Motion for New Trial was denied.
CA: N/A
ISSUE: Are the accused guilty of direct bribery?
SC: YES, accused are guilty of Direct Bribery. The crime of direct bribery exists when
a public officer 1) agrees to perform an act that constitutes a crime in consideration of
any offer, promise, gift or present; 2) accepts the gift in consideration of the execution
of an act that does not constitute a crime; or 3) abstains from the performance of official
duties.
Petitioners were convicted under the second kind of bribery, which contained the
following elements: 1) the offender was a public officer, 2) who received gifts o presents
personally or through another, 3) in consideration of an act that did not constitute a
crime, and 4) that act related to the exercise of official duties.

Hernandez took the passport of Takao Aoyagi. On various dates, he met with the
Aoyagi spouses and also Pelingon, regarding the return of the passport. Hernandez
then asked for a down payment on the payoff, during which he directed Bethel to deliver
the money to Acejas.
Even assuming that Acejas negotiated for the return of the passport on his clients
behalf, he still failed to justify his actions during the entrapment operation. The
witnesses all testified that he had received the purported payoff. It would be illogical to
sustain his contention that the envelope represented the balance of his firm’s legal fees.
It was given to Hernandez immediately after the return of passport.
In sum, the Court found that the prosecution proved the elements of direct
bribery. First, the offense was committed by BID Agent Hernandez who extorted money
from Aoyagi for the return of the passport and the promise of assistance in procuring
visa. Second, the offenders received the money as payoff, which Acejas received for
the group and gave it to Perlas. Third, the money was given in consideration of the
return of the passport, an act that did not constitute a crime. Fourth, both the
confiscation and the return of the passport were made in the exercise of official duties.
For taking direct part in the execution of the crime, Hernandez and Acejas are
liable as principals. A conspiracy exists even if all the parties did not commit the same
act, if the participants performed specific acts that indicated unity of purpose in
accomplishing a criminal design.
DECISION: Petitions are DENIED and the assailed Decisions of the Sandiganbayan
are hereby AFFIRMED.
GREGORY JAMES POZAR v COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-62439 | October 23,1984
TICKLER: Application for probation. Envelope with 100-peso bill.
DOCTRINE: The procedure for processing petitioner's application for probation in the
Probation Office at Angeles City was not precise, explicit and clear cut. And since the
accused petitioner is a foreigner and quite unfamiliar with probation rules and
procedures, there is reason to conclude that petitioner was befuddled, if not confused
so that his act of providing and advancing the expenses for whatever documentation
was needed further to complete and thus hasten his probation application, was
understandably innocent and not criminal. There being no criminal intent to corrupt the
Probation Officer, the accused petitioner is entitled to acquittal of the crime charged.
FACTS: Petitioner, an American citizen and a permanent resident of the Philippines,

was charged in an Information, with the crime of Corruption of a Public Official. As

stated in the Information, petitioner "did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously give to the complainant, Mr. Danilo Ocampo, the City Probation Officer, the
sum of one hundred (P100.00) pesos in a paper bill with serial No. BC530309, under
circumstances that would make the said City Probation Officer, Mr. Danilo Ocampo,
liable for bribery.”
Manalo, Clerk at the Probation Office of Angeles City, declared that he started working
at the Probation Office since May 2, 1978 and came to know appellant because the
latter had gone to said office in connection with his application for probation. At about
noontime of December 17, 1979, appellant came to the office looking for Probation
Officer Danilo Ocampo and since the latter was out at the time, appellant gave him a
closed envelope bearing the name of Ocampo for delivery to the latter.
Two days later, he gave the envelope to Ocampo who opened the same in his
presence. The envelope contained some official papers connected with appellant's
application for probation and attached thereto was a hundred-peso bill. Ocampo then
remarked: “This is something bad that the opening of the envelope was done on
December 19, 1979.” Ocampo kept the envelope and its contents, including the one
hundred-peso bill, but within a week's time gave them to him with instructions to give
the same to appellant but the latter never came to the office and so he returned them
to Ocampo.
Although he later saw appellant about two weeks after December 17, 1979, when the
latter came to the office to sign some papers, he never mentioned to appellant the one
hundred-peso bill.
ANOTHER PROSEC WITNESS:

Mrs. Primitiva Francisco, Assistant Probation Officer of the Angeles City Probation
Office, declared that she knows appellant because the latter was one of the applicants
for probation in 1979 and she was the one assigned to investigate appellant's case. As
Assistant Probation Officer in the Investigation of applications for probation and in the
case of appellant, she requested him to submit certain pertinent documents required
by their office, such as barangay, police and court clearances, residence certificate,
etc.
Mrs. Francisco further declared that at the time she saw appellant on December 21,
1979, the latter was asking person to leave for Baguio City but she told him to talk with
Probation Officer, Mr. Ocampo, anent the matter. She then prepared a draft of the Post-
Sentence Investigation report and thereafter had a conference with Ocampo who told
him not to delete the bribery incident from the report. It was first from Manalo and later
from Ocampo that she became aware of the bribery or more accurately corruption of a
public official committed by appellant.
DEFENSE’S VERSION:

The one hundred-peso bill the accused-appellant placed in the envelope delivered to
the Probation Officer was allegedly intended to take care of the expenses in the xerox
copying or reproduction of documents that may be needed by the Probation Office.
BACK STORY:
Accused was convicted of the crime of less Serious Physical Injuries, and the crime of
Oral Defamation of the City Court of Angeles City, Branch 1, and the said accused was
sentenced to an imprisonment of 15 days of Arresto Menor and to pay a fine of P50.00
and to pay the complaining witness the amount of P500.00 as moral and exempt
damages. After he was sentenced, he, on November 28, 1979 filed an Application for
Probation.
After filing the application for Probation, the accused, together with his lawyer Atty.
Reynaldo Suarez, went to the Probation Office purposely to inquire for the requirements
need for his client's petition for probation. Unfortunately, Atty. Suarez and his client did
not reach the Probation Officer Mr. Danilo Ocampo. It was Mr. Manalo, a clerk of the
Probation Office, whom they reached, and they were requested to come back to the
office regarding their inquiry inasmuch as the Probation Officer was not in the office.
He was inquiring from Mrs. Francisco the necessary documents regarding the
application for probation of his client and Mrs. Francisco suggested that he would come
over the office in order to give him all the necessary information.
CRIME CHARGED: Corruption of a public official
RTC: GUILTY as charged
CA: AFFIRMED RTC ruling in toto
ISSUE: Is petitioner guilty of the direct bribery?
RULING: NO, the trial court erred in finding the accused guilty of the crime of Corruption
of Public Official as consummated offense (which is affirmed by the respondent
appellant court) for it is clear from the evidence of the prosecution as recited in both
decisions of the trial and appellate courts, that the complainant Probation Officer did
not accept the one hundred-peso bill Hence, the crime would be attempted
corruption of a public official (to be the correct charge).
However, petitioner was required by the Assistant Probation Officer, Primitive

Francisco, to submit in connection with his probation application the Court Information
(complaint) Court decision, Custody Status (recognizance or bail bond), clearances
from the Police, the Court, Barangay Certificate, I.D. pictures (3 copies), residence
certificate, and told to report once a week on Mondays. when the latter was asking
permission to go to Baguio to submit to the office a copy of his visa and passport. During
all the time he was applying for probation, he made more or less 12 visits in the office
as he was directed to report every Monday at 10:00 o'clock in the morning. He reported
for 6 to 7 consecutive weeks and there were times that he went there unscheduled for
conference and clarification of the various requirements he needed.
From the foregoing, the Supreme Court fairly deduced that the procedure for
processing petitioner's application for probation in the Probation Office at
Angeles City was not precise, explicit and clear cut. And since the accused
petitioner is a foreigner and quite unfamiliar with probation rules and procedures,
there is reason to conclude that petitioner was befuddled, if not confused so that
his act of providing and advancing the expenses for whatever documentation
was needed further to complete and thus hasten his probation application, was
understandably innocent and not criminal. There being no criminal intent to
corrupt the Probation Officer, the accused petitioner is entitled to acquittal of the
crime charged.
DECISION: Accused was ACQUITTED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v JOSELITO C. BARROZO

A.C. No. 10207 | July 21, 2015
TICKLER: Hong Kong letter
DOCTRINE: Elements of Direct Bribery:

1. The offender is a public officer;
2. The offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself
or through another;
3. Such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public
officer with a view to committing some crime, or in consideration of the execution
of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must unjust, or to refrain
from doing something which it is his official duty to do; and
4. The act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected
with the performance of his official duties.
FACTS: Jennie Valeriano, a respondent in several cases for estafa and violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which were assigned to respondent as Assistant Public
Prosecutor of Dagupan City, Pangasinan. According to Valeriano, respondent told her
that he would resolve the cases in her favor in exchange for ₱20,000.00. Valeriano
went to the Office of Regional State Prosecutor to report the matter. The Regional State
Prosecutor introduced her to agents of the NBI, who, after being told of respondents’
demand, immediately planned an entrapment operation. During the operation,
respondent was caught red-handed by the NBI agents receiving the amount of
₱20,000.00 from Valeriano.
Information for direct bribery under paragraph 2, Article 210 of the RPC was filed. The
case, however, was later on indorsed to the Sandiganbayan as respondent was
occupying a position with a salary grade 27 or higher.

Sandiganbayan found respondent guilty beyond reasonable doubt of direct bribery and
sentence him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and
one (1) day of prison correctional maximum, as minimum, to nine (9) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prison mayor medium, as maximum, and to pay a fine of
₱60,000.00. in addition, it imposed upon him the penalty of special temporary
disqualification.
Respondent filed a MR but was denied. Undeterred, respondent filed a Petition for
Review on Certiorari before the SC but was also denied for failure to sufficiently show
that the Sandiganbayan committed any reversible error in its challenged issuances as
to warrant the exercise of the Court’s discretionary appellate jurisdiction. Respondent
thrice moved for reconsideration.
The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) received a letter from Wat & Co. of Hong Kong
stating that its client in Hong Kong received a letter from the Philippines signed by "Atty.
Joselito C. Barrozo," asking for long service payment from the employers of domestic
helper Anita G. Calub who passed away. Upon checking online and discovering that
said person was convicted of direct bribery, Wat & Co. requested the OBC to inform it
if respondent is still a lawyer qualified to practice law.
OBC inquired from the DOJ whether respondent is still connected thereat. The DOJ
informed OBC that respondent had already resigned from his position effective 2005.
OBC wrote Wat & Co. to confirm that respondent was indeed convicted of direct bribery
by final judgment and that the Philippine Court has yet to rule on his disbarment.
Barrozo argued that he did not engage in the practice of law as his act of signing the
claim letter does not constitute such practice. He averred that he signed it not for any
monetary consideration, but out of his sincere desire to help the claimants. And since
there is no payment involved, no lawyer-client relationship was established between
him and the claimants. This therefore negates practice of the law on his part.
Subsequently, upon Order of the Court, the OBC evaluated the case and came up with
its Report and Recommendation recommending the disbarment of respondent.
CRIME CHARGED: Direct Bribery (filed with the RTC, then indorsed to the
Sandiganbayan)
SANDIGANBAYAN: GUILTY as charged.
SC: GUILTY
OBC: Disbarment
ISSUE: Should Barrozo be suspended or disbarred because of his conviction of the
crime of direct bribery?
SC: YES. Under Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, one of the grounds for the
suspension or disbarment of a lawyer is his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude. And with the finality of respondent’s conviction for direct bribery, the next

question that needs to be answered is whether direct bribery is a crime that involves
moral turpitude.
Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private

duties which a man owes to his fellowmen, or to society in general, contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals.
The crime of direct bribery is a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude can be
inferred from the third element. The fact that the offender agrees to accept a promise
or gift and deliberately commits an unjust act or refrains from performing an official duty
in exchange for some favors, denotes a malicious intent on the part of the offender to
renege on the duties which he owes his fellowmen and society in general. Also the fact
that the offender takes advantage of his office and position is a betrayal of the trust
reposed on him by the public. It is a conduct clearly contrary o the accepted rule of right
and duty, justice, honesty, and good morals. In all respects, direct bribery is a crime
involving moral turpitude.
As held, the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely

suspended for a period involves the exercise of sound judicial discretion. Here,
however, the circumstances surrounding the case constrain the Court to impose the
penalty of disbarment as recommended by the OBC.
At the time of the commission of the crime respondent was an assistant public
Prosecutor of the City of Dagupan. His act therefore of extorting money from a party to
a case handled by him does not only violate the requirement that cases must be
decided based on the merits of the parties respective evidence but also lessens the
people’s confidence in the rule of law.
Hence, for committing a crime which does not only show his disregard of his oath as a
government official but is likewise of such a nature as to negatively affect his
qualification as a lawyer, respondent must be disbarred from his office as an attorney.
As a final note, it is well to state that:

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the administration of justice
by requiring that those who exercise this important function be competent, honorable
and reliable – lawyers in whom courts and [the public at large] may repose confidence.
Thus, whenever a clear case of degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet
fragile confidence, [the Court] shall not hesitate to rid [the] profession of odious
members.
DECISION: Atty. Joselito C. Barrozo is DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED

STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys

JESUS TORRES v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 175074 | August 31, 2011
TICKLER: School Principal
DOCTRINES:
1. An accountable public officer, within the purview of Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code, is one who has custody or control of public funds or property by
reason of the duties of his office.
2. Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of misappropriation
of public funds or property, or passively through negligence.
FACTS: Torres was the principal of Viga Rural Development High School. On April 26,
1994, he directed Edmundo Lazado, the school's collection and disbursing officer, to
prepare the checks representing the teachers' and employees' salaries, etc. for the
months of January to March, 1994. Lazado prepared three (3) PNB checks in the total
amount of P196,654.54, all dated April 26, 1994. As usual, Lazado endorsed the checks
and handed them to the accused who later enchased them.
The following day, April 27, 1994, the accused encashed the three (3) checks at PNB,
Virac Branch but he never returned to the school to deliver the money to Lazado.
DEFENSE: After encashing, the petitioner proceeded to the airport and availed of the
flight to Manila to seek medical attention for his chest pain. Two (2) days after, three (3)
armed men held them up and took his bag containing his personal effects and the
proceeds of the subject checks. He reported the incident to the police authorities, but he
failed to recover the money.
CRIME CHARGED: Malversation of Public Funds
RTC: CONVICTED petitioner of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds sentenced

him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from 12 years and 1 day
of reclusion temporal, as minimum, and to 18 years, 8 months and 1 day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; to suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification; and to
pay the fine of P196,654.54 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
CA: DISMISSED outright for lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUES:
1. Did CA have jurisdiction?
2. Was Torres an accountable officer within the contemplation of Article 217?
3. Was his constitutional right violated when he was charged with intentional
malversation and not malversation through negligence?
RULING:
(1) NO. It should have been an appeal to the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final

judgments, resolutions or orders of the regional trial courts whether in the exercise
of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction. It must be
emphasized, however, that the designation of the wrong court does not
necessarily affect the validity of the notice of appeal. However, the designation of
the proper court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal. Otherwise,
Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court would apply which means an outright
dismissal. Here, Torres filed his Notice of Appeal on September 8, 2005.
Petitioner tried to correct the error only on February 10, 2006 when he filed his
Manifestation and Motion.
(2) YES. An accountable public officer, within the purview of Article 217 of
the Revised Penal Code, is one who has custody or control of public funds or
property by reason of the duties of his office. The nature of the duties of the public
officer or employee, the fact that as part of his duties he received public money
for which he is bound to account and failed to account for it, is the factor which
determines whether or not malversation is committed by the accused public officer
or employee. Hence, a school principal of a public high school, such as Torres,
may be held guilty of malversation if he or she is entrusted with public funds and
misappropriates the same.
(3) NO. Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of

misappropriation of public funds or property, or passively through negligence. To
sustain a charge of malversation, there must either be criminal intent or criminal
negligence, and while the prevailing facts of a case may not show that deceit
attended the commission of the offense, it will not preclude the reception of
evidence to prove the existence of negligence because both are equally
punishable under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code. The felony involves
breach of public trust, and whether it is committed through deceit or negligence,
the law makes it punishable and prescribes a uniform penalty therefor. Even when
the Information charges willful malversation, conviction for malversation through
negligence may still be adjudged if the evidence ultimately proves the mode of
commission of the offense.
Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or

the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony.
Even if the mode charged differs from mode proved, the same offense of
malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper.
DECISION: Court of Appeals ruling AFFIRMED.
MAJOR JOEL G. CANTOS v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 184908 | July 3, 2013

TICKLER: Screw driver. P3M missing, safety vault.
DOCTRINE: Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo

or the culpa present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony.
Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of
malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper.
FACTS: Witness Major Eligio T. Balao, Jr testified that on December 21, 2000, he
reported for duty as Disbursing Officer at the 22nd Finance Service Unit (FSU),
Presidential Security Group (PSG), Malacañang Park, Manila. At that time, he did not
notice any unusual incident in the office. He picked up some Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR) forms which he filed with the BIR Office at the Port Area, Manila. He returned to
the office at around 10:00 a.m. At around 12:00 noon, his commanding officer, Major
Cantos, called him to his office and informed him that the money he (Major Cantos) was
handling, the Special Duty Allowance for the month of December, and other
Maintenance Operating Expenses in the amount of more or less P3 Million was missing
from his custody. Shocked, he asked Major Cantos where he kept the money, to which
the latter replied that he placed it in the steel cabinet inside his room. He then inquired
why Major Cantos did not use the safety vault, but Major Cantos did not reply.
Major Balao further testified that Major Cantos asked him to get a screwdriver so he
went out of the office and got one from his vehicle. He gave the screwdriver to Major
Cantos, who used it to unscrew the safety vault. Then, he left the office and handed the
screwdriver to Sgt. Tumabcao. After a few minutes, Major Cantos instructed him to go
to the house of Major Conrado Mendoza in Taguig to get the safety vault’s combination
number. However, Major Mendoza was not around. When he returned to the office at
around 4:00 p.m., the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) personnel took his
fingerprints. He learned that all the personnel of the 22nd FSU were subjected to
fingerprinting. Thereafter, Col. Espinelli tried to force him to admit that he took the
money, but he maintained that he was not the one who took it.
In his defense, Major Cantos testified that on July 2000, he was assigned as the
Commanding Officer of the 22nd FSU of the PSG, Malacañang Park, Manila. His duty
was to supervise the disbursement of funds for the PSG personnel and to perform other
finance duties as requested by the PSG Commander, Gen. Rodolfo Diaz. On December
19, 2000, he received a check from Director Aguas in the amount of P1,975,000
representing the Special Allowance of PSG personnel. Accompanied by two personnel,
he went to the Land Bank branch just across Pasig River and encashed the check. He
placed the money in a duffel bag and kept it inside the steel cabinet in his office together
with the P1,295,000 that was earlier also entrusted to him by Gen. Diaz. Major Cantos
added that as far as he knows, he is the only one with the keys to his office. Although
there was a safety vault in his office, he opted to place the money inside the steel cabinet
because he was allegedly previously informed by his predecessor, Major Conrado
Mendoza, that the safety vault was defective. He was also aware that all personnel of
the 22nd FSU had unrestricted access to his office during office hours.

Major Cantos also narrated that on December 20, 2000, he arrived at the office at around
9:00 a.m. and checked the steel filing cabinet. He saw that the money was still there.
He left the office at around 4:00 p.m. to celebrate with his wife because it was their
wedding anniversary. On the following day, December 21, 2000, he reported for work
around 8:30 a.m. and proceeded with his task of signing vouchers and documents.
Between 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m., he inspected the steel cabinet and discovered that the
duffel bag which contained the money was missing. He immediately called then Capt.
Balao to his office and asked if the latter saw someone enter the room. Capt. Balao
replied that he noticed a person going inside the room, but advised him not to worry
because he is bonded as Disbursing Officer.
In a state of panic, Major Cantos asked for Capt. Balao’s help in finding the money.
Capt. Balao asked him how the money was lost and why was it not in the vault, to which
he replied that he could not put it there because the vault was defective. Capt. Balao
then suggested that they should make it appear that the money was lost in the safety
vault. In pursuit of this plan, Capt. Balao went out of the office and returned with a pair
of pliers and a screwdriver. Upon his return, Capt. Balao went directly to the vault to
unscrew it. At this point, Major Cantos told him not to continue anymore as he will just
inform Gen. Diaz about the missing funds. Major Cantos was able to contact Gen. Diaz
through his mobile phone and was advised to just wait for Col. Espinelli. When Col.
Espinelli arrived at the office, Col. Espinelli conducted an investigation of the incident.
Lt. Col. Al I. Perreras, Executive Officer of the Judge Advocate General Office (JAGO),
likewise conducted an investigation of the incident. His testimony was however
dispensed with as the counsels stipulated that he prepared the Investigation Report, and
that if presented, the same would be admitted by defense counsel.12 It likewise appears
from the evidence that Police Inspector Jesus S. Bacani of the Philippine National Police
(PNP) administered a polygraph examination on Major Cantos and the result showed
that he was telling the truth.
CRIME CHARGED: Malversation of public funds
RTC: GUILTY as charged.
The RTC explained that although there was no direct proof that Major Cantos
appropriated the money for his own benefit, Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, provides that the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public
funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized
officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to
personal uses. The RTC concluded that Major Cantos failed to rebut this presumption.
SANDIGANBAYAN: AFFIRMED RTC ruling.
It held that in the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for conviction is proof that
the accountable officer had received public funds and that he did not have them in his
possession when demand therefor was made. There is even no need of direct evidence

of personal misappropriation as long as there is a shortage in his account and petitioner

cannot satisfactorily explain the same. In this case, the Sandiganbayan found petitioner
liable for malversation through misappropriation because he failed to dispute the
presumption against him. The Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner’s claim that the
money was taken by robbery or theft has not been supported by sufficient evidence, and
is at most, self-serving.
Petitioner argues that mere absence of funds is not sufficient proof of misappropriation
which would warrant his conviction. He stresses that the prosecution has the burden of
establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In this case, petitioner contends that the
prosecution failed to prove that he appropriated, took, or misappropriated, or that he
consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take
the public funds.
ISSUE: Is accused guilty of Art 217?
RULING: YES, he is guilty.
The elements of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code are:
1. That the offender is a public officer;
2. That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties
3. That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was
accountable; and
4. That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through
abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take them.
We note that all the above-mentioned elements are here present. Petitioner was a public
officer occupying the position of Commanding Officer of the 22nd FSU of the AFP
Finance Center, PSG. By reason of his position, he was tasked to supervise the
disbursement of the Special Duty Allowances and other Maintenance Operating Funds
of the PSG personnel, which are indubitably public funds for which he was accountable.
Petitioner in fact admitted in his testimony that he had complete control and custody of
these funds. As to the element of misappropriation, indeed petitioner failed to rebut the
legal presumption that he had misappropriated the fees to his personal use.
In convicting petitioner, the Sandiganbayan cites the presumption in Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, which states that the failure of a public officer to have
duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand
by any duly authorized officer, is prima facie evidence that he has put such missing fund
or property to personal uses.
The presumption is, of course, rebuttable. Accordingly, if petitioner is able to present

adequate evidence that can nullify any likelihood that he put the funds or property to
personal use, then that presumption would be at an end and the prima facie case is
effectively negated.
In this case, however, petitioner failed to overcome this prima facie evidence of guilt. He
failed to explain the missing funds in his account and to restitute the amount upon
demand. His claim that the money was taken by robbery or theft is self-serving and has
not been supported by evidence. In fact, petitioner even tried to unscrew the safety vault
to make it appear that the money was forcibly taken. Moreover, petitioner’s explanation
that there is a possibility that the money was taken by another is belied by the fact that
there was no sign that the steel cabinet was forcibly opened. We also take note of the
fact that it was only petitioner who had the keys to the steel cabinet. Thus, the
explanation set forth by petitioner is unsatisfactory and does not overcome the
presumption that he has put the missing funds to personal use.
Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa

present in the offense is only a modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the
mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is
involved and conviction thereof is proper. All that is necessary for conviction is sufficient
proof that the accountable officer had received public funds, that he did not have them
in his possession when demand therefor was made, and that he could not satisfactorily
explain his failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal misappropriation by the accused
is hardly necessary as long as the accused cannot explain satisfactorily the shortage in
his accounts. To our mind, the evidence in this case is thoroughly inconsistent with
petitioner’s claim of innocence. Thus, we sustain the Sandiganbayan’s finding that
petitioner’s guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.
DECISION: Petitioner is found GUILTY of malversation of public funds
ARNOLD JAMES YSIDORO v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 192330 | November 14, 2012
TICKLER: Four sack of rices. Two boxes of sardines.
DOCTRINE: The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Art. 220 of the
RPC has three elements: a) that the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that
he applies public funds or property under his administration to some public use; and, c)
that the public use for which such funds or property were applied is different from the
purpose for which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance.
FACTS: Municipal Social Welfare and Development Office (MSWDO) of Leyte,

operated a Core Shelter Assistance Program (CSAP) that provided construction
materials to indigent calamity victims with which to rebuild their homes. The
beneficiaries provided the labor needed for the construction.
Sometime in June 2001, Garcia, CSAP Officer-in-Charge, sought the help of Polinio,
an officer of the MSWDO and in charge of the Supplemental Feeding Program (SFP).
Garcia informed Polinio that the beneficiaries stopped reporting for work for the reason
that they had to find food for their families. Garcia feared that for such construction
stoppage, it could possibly result in the loss of construction materials particularly the
cement. Polinio told Garcia that the SFP still had sacks of rice and boxes of sardines in
its storeroom. And since she had already distributed food to the mother volunteers,
what remained could be given to the CSAP beneficiaries.
Polinio and Garcia then went to Ysidoro, Leyte Municipal Mayor, to seek his approval.
After explaining the situation, Ysidoro approved the release and signed the withdrawal
for four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines worth 3, 396 to CSAP.
On August 27, 2001 Doller filed the present complaint against Ysidoro. The Office of
the Ombudsman for the Visayas then accused Ysidoro before the Sandiganbayan of
violation of illegal use of public property (technical malversation) under Art. 220 of RPC.
Defense of Ysidoro:
That he could not be held liable for the offense under the third element of Art. 220
because the four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines he gave the CSAP
beneficiaries were not appropriated by law or ordinance for a specific purpose.
CRIME CHARGED: Violation of Illegal Use of Public Property (Technical Malversation)

under Art. 220 of the RPC
SANDIGANBAYAN: GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt. Finding that Ysidoro’s action

caused no damage or embarrassment to public service, it only fined him P1,698 or 50%
of the sum misapplied. The Sandiganbayan (SB) held that Ysidoro applied public
property to a public purpose other than that for which it has been appropriated by law
or ordinance.
SB denied Ysidoro’s Motion for Reconsideration. Appealed SB decision before the

Supreme Court.
ISSUE: Did the diversion of the subject goods to a public purpose different from their
originally intended purpose amount to technical malversation?
RULING: YES, it did.
The crime of technical malversation as penalized under Art. 220 of the RPC has three
elements: a) that the offender is an accountable public officer; b) that he applies public
funds or property under his administration to some public use; and, c) that the public
use for which such funds or property were applied is different from the purpose for
which they were originally appropriated by law or ordinance.

Ysidoro claims that he could not be held liable for the offense under its third element
because the four sacks of rice and two boxes of sardines he gave the CSAP
beneficiaries were not appropriated by law or ordinance for a specific purpose.
But the evidence shows that on November 8, 2000 the Sangguniang Bayan of Leyte
enacted Resolution 00-133 appropriating the annual general fund for 2001.This
appropriation was based on the executive budget which allocated P100,000 for the SFP
and P113,957.64 for the Comprehensive and Integrated Delivery of Social Services
which covers the CSAP housing projects. The creation of the two items shows the
Sanggunian’s intention to appropriate separate funds for SFP and the CSAP in the
annual budget.
Since the municipality bought the subject goods using SFP funds, then those goods
should be used for SFP’s needs. If Ysidoro could not legally distribute the construction
materials appropriated for the CSAP housing beneficiaries to the SFP malnourished
clients neither could he distribute the food intended for the latter to CSAP beneficiaries.
DECISION: Supreme Court AFFIRMS IN ITS ENTIRETY the Decision of the

Sandiganbayan. The law and this Court, recognize that his offense is not grave,
warranting a MERE FINE.
ALOYSIUS DAIT LUMAUIG v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. No. 166680 | July 7, 2014
TICKLER: Unliquidated cash advance.
DOCTRINES:
1. The acquittal of petitioner in the anti-graft case is not a bar to his conviction for
failure to render an account in the present case. It is undisputed that the two charges
stemmed from the same incident. However, it was consistently held that the same
act may give rise to two or more separate and distinct charges.
2. Prior demand to liquidate is not a requisite for conviction under Article 218 of the
RPC. It is sufficient that there is a law or regulation requiring him to render an
account. Nowhere in the provision (or elements of Art. 218) does it require that there
first be a demand before an accountable officer is held liable for a violation of the
crime. The law is very clear. Where none is provided, the court may not introduce
exceptions or conditions, neither may it engraft into the law qualifications not
contemplated.
FACTS: COA Auditor Paguirigan examined the year-end reports involving the municipal
officials of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao. In the examination, she came across a disbursement
voucher prepared for petitioner, a former mayor of the municipality, as cash advance for
the payment of freight and other cargo charges for 12 units of motorcycles supposed to be
donated to the municipality.
Upon further investigation of the accounting records, it revealed that no payment intended
for the charge was made to Royal Cargo Agencies for the month of August 1994. She
likewise claimed that she prepared two letters to inform the petitioner of his unliquidated
cash advance but the same were not sent to him because she could not get his exact
address despite efforts exerted.
Petitioner admitted having obtained the cash advance during his incumbency as municipal
mayor of Alfonso Lista, Ifugao. This amount was intended for the payment of freight and
insurance coverage of 12 units of motorcycles to be donated to the municipality by the City
of Manila. However, instead of motorcycles, he was able to secure two buses and five
patrol cars. He claimed that it never came to his mind to settle or liquidate the amount
advanced since the vehicles were already turned over to the municipality. He alleged that
he was neither informed nor did he receive any demand from COA to liquidate his cash
advances.
CRIME CHARGED: An Information for violation of Section 3 of RA No. 3019 against

petitioner for having allegedly utilized the cash advance for a purpose other than for which
it was obtained.
SANDIGANBAYAN: Petitioner is ACQUITTED in criminal case for violation if Sec. 3, RA

3019. No civil liability shall be imposed there being no basis for its award. But CONVICTED
of the felony of Failure of Accountable Officer to Render Accounts under Article 218 of the
RPC.
Petitioner filed MR but was denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
1. Is the acquittal in anti-graft case is a bar to his conviction for violation of Art. 218 of
RPC? - NO.
2. Is a prior notice or demand for liquidation of cash advances a condition sine qua
non before an accountable public officer may be held liable under Article 218 of
RPC? - NO.
3. Is petitioner liable for violation of Art. 218? - YES.
RULING:
1. The acquittal of petitioner in the anti-graft case is not a bar to his conviction for
failure to render an account in the present case.
It is undisputed that the two charges stemmed from the same incident. However, it
was consistently held that the same act may give rise to two or more separate and

distinct charges. Further, because there is a variance between the elements of the
two offenses charged, petitioner cannot safely assume that his innocence in one
case will extend to the other case even if both cases hinge on the same set of
evidence.
To hold a person criminally liable under Section 3(e) of RA 3019, the following
elements must be present: (1) That the accused is a public officer or a private
person charged in conspiracy with the former; (2) That said public officer commits
the prohibited acts during the performance of his or her official duties or in relation
to his or her public positions; (3) That he or she causes undue injury to any party,
whether the government or a private party; (4) That such injury is caused by giving
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to such parties; and (5) That the
public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence.
On the other hand, the elements of the felony punishable under Article 218 of the
RPC are: (1) That the offender is a public officer whether in the service or separated
therefrom; (2) That he must be an accountable officer for public funds or property;
(3) That he is required by law or regulation to render accounts to the COA or to a
provincial auditor; and, (4) That he fails to do so for a period of two months after
such account should be rendered.
The glaring differences between the elements of these two offenses necessarily
imply that the requisite evidence to establish the guilt or innocence of the accused
would certainly differ in each case.
Hence, petitioner’s acquittal in the anti-graft case provides no refuge for him in the
present case given the differences between the elements of the two offenses.
2. Prior demand to liquidate is not a requisite for conviction under Article 218 of the
RPC.
Petitioner argued that he was not reminded of his unliquidated cash advances. The
Office of the Special Prosecutor countered that Article 218 does not require the
COA or the provincial auditor to first make a demand before the public officer should
render an account.
It is sufficient that there is a law or regulation requiring him to render an account.

Nowhere in the provision (or elements of Art. 218) does it require that there first be
a demand before an accountable officer is held liable for a violation of the crime.

The law is very clear. Where none is provided, the court may not introduce
exceptions or conditions, neither may it engraft into the law qualifications not
contemplated. Where the law is clear and unambiguous, it must be taken to mean
exactly what it says and the court has no choice but to see to it that its mandate is
obeyed. There is no room for interpretation, but only application.
3. Petitioner is liable for violation of Article 218 of the RPC Section 5 of COA Circular
No. 90-331, the circular in force at the time petitioner availed of the subject cash
advance, pertinently provides for the liquidation of cash advances.
Since petitioner received the subject cash advance sometime in 1994, he was, thus,
required to liquidate the same on or before January 20, 1995. Further, to avoid
liability under Article 218, he should have liquidated the cash advance within two
months from the time it was due, or on or before March 20, 1995. In the case at bar,
petitioner liquidated the subject cash advance only on June 4, 2001. Hence, as
correctly found by the Sandiganbayan, petitioner was liable for violation of Article
218 because it took him over six years before settling his accounts.
HOWEVER, the penalty imposed on petitioner should be modified. Petitioner

argues that assuming that he is liable for violation of Article 218, he should be meted
a lesser penalty considering that (1) he subsequently liquidated the subject cash
advance when he later discovered and was confronted with his delinquency, and
(2) the COA did not immediately inform him of his unliquidated cash advance. In
malversation of public funds, the payment, indemnification, or reimbursement of the
funds misappropriated may be considered a mitigating circumstance being
analogous to voluntary surrender. Although this case does not involve malversation
of public funds under Art. 217 but rather failure to render an account under Art. 218,
the same reasoning may be applied to the return or full restitution of the funds that
were previously unliquidated in considering the same as a mitigating circumstance
in favor of petitioner. xxxxxxxx NOTE: (Imposition of the penalty; indeterminate
sentence law). The prescribed penalty for violation of Article 218 is prisión
correccional in its minimum period or six months and one day to two years and four
months, or by a fine ranging from 200 to 6,000 pesos, or both. Considering that
there are two mitigating circumstances and there are no aggravating
circumstances, the imposable penalty is the penalty next lower to the prescribed
penalty which, in this case, is arresto mayor in its maximum period or four months
and one day to six months.
The Indeterminate Sentence Law, under Section 2, is not applicable to cases where
the maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year. In determining

“whether an indeterminate sentence and not a straight penalty is proper, what is

considered is the penalty actually imposed by the trial court, after considering the
attendant circumstances, and not the imposable penalty.”
NOTE: (Petitioner is not correct in relying in the case of US v. Saberon) Citing

United States v. Saberon, petitioner contends that Article 218 punishes the refusal
of a public employee to render an account of funds in his charge when duly required
by a competent officer. He argues that he cannot be convicted of the crime unless
the prosecution has proven that there was a demand for him to render an account.
Petitioner’s reliance on Saberon is misplaced. As correctly pointed out by the OSP,
Saberon involved a violation of Act No. 1740 whereas the present case involves a
violation of Article 218 of the Revised Penal Code. Article 218 merely provides that
the public officer be required by law and regulation to render account. Statutory
construction tells us that in the revision or codification of laws, all parts and
provisions of the old laws that are omitted in the revised statute or code are deemed
repealed, unless the statute or code provides otherwise.
DECISION: Petition PARTIALLY GRANTED. Sandiganbayan Decision AFFIRMED

with MODIFICATIONS as to penalty.
HENRY T. GO v SANDIGANBAYAN
G.R. No. 172602 | April 13, 2007
TICKLER: PIATCO contracts. Build-operate-transfer scheme.
DOCTRINE: Sec. 9 of RA 3019 buttresses the conclusion that the anti-graft law's
application extends to both public officers and private persons. The said provision,
quoted earlier, provides in part that:
SEC. 9. (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful
acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be
punished with imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more
than fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation
or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and
unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful
income.
FACTS: An Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan charging Vicente C. Rivera,
as then DOTC Secretary, and petitioner Go, as Chairman and President of Philippine
International Air Terminals Co., Inc. (PIATCO), with violation of Section 3 (g) 4 of RA
3019, also known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. This was in connection
with the PIATCO contracts, where the Government awarded in favor of PIATCO the
project for the development of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger
Terminal III under a build-operate-and-transfer scheme. However, these contracts were
later on declared null and void for being contrary to public policy because Paircargo
Consortium, PIATCO's predecessor-in-interest, was not a qualified bidder as it failed to
meet the financial capability requirement under the BOT Law.
CRIME CHARGED: Violation of Sec. 3 (g) of RA 3019.
Go filed Motion for Determination (Re-Determination) of Probable Cause and Motion to

Dismiss and Motion to Quash, contending that Sec. 3 (g) of RA 3019, by its text, cannot
be extended or even enlarged by implication or intendment to bring within its limited
scope private persons. The said provision of law allegedly punishes only public officers
as it penalizes the act of "entering, on behalf of the government, into any contract or
transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the
public officer profited or will profit thereby." As a private person, he could not allegedly
enter into a contract "on behalf of the government," there being no showing of any
agency relations or special authority for him to act for and on behalf of the government.
SANDIGANBAYAN: DENIED the motions.
The allegations that accused Rivera, as DOTC Secretary, in conspiracy with petitioner
Go, entered into the ARCA with petitioner Go/PIATCO, which agreement was
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government, are constitutive of the
elements of the offense charged as defined under Section 3 (g) of RA 3019. In addition,
these matters raised by petitioner Go have to be proved during trial.
ISSUE: Does Section 3(g) of RA 3019 not embrace a private person within its proviso?
RULING: NO. For clarity, Sec. 3 (g) of RA 3019 is quoted below a new:
SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. — In addition to acts or omissions of

public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute
corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:
xxx xxx xxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction

manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public
officer profited or will profit thereby.
As earlier mentioned, the elements of this offense are as follows:

1. That the accused is a public officer;
2. That he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and
3. That such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to
the government.
Contrary to the contention of petitioner Go, however, the fact that he is not a public
officer does not necessarily take him out of the ambit of Sec. 3 (g) of RA 3019. Petitioner
Go's simplistic syllogism, i.e., he is not a public officer ergo he cannot be charged with
violation of Section 3 (g) of RA 3019, goes against the letter and spirit of the avowed
policy of RA 3019 as embodied in Section 1 thereof:
SEC. 1. Statement of policy. — It is the policy of the Philippine Government, in

line with the principle that a public office is a public trust, to repress certain acts
of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt
practices or which may lead thereto.
Sec. 9 of RA 3019 buttresses the conclusion that the anti-graft law's application extends
to both public officers and private persons. The said provision, quoted earlier, provides
in part that:
SEC. 9. (a) Any public officer or private person committing any of the unlawful
acts or omissions enumerated in Sections 3, 4, 5 and 6 of this Act shall be
punished with imprisonment for not less than six years and one month nor more
than fifteen years, perpetual disqualification from public office, and confiscation
or forfeiture in favor of the Government of any prohibited interest and
unexplained wealth manifestly out of proportion to his salary and other lawful
income.
xxx xxx xxx
The fact that one of the elements of Sec. 3 (g) of RA 3019 is "that the accused is a
public officer" does not necessarily preclude its application to private persons who, like
petitioner Go, are being charged with conspiring with public officers in the commission
of the offense thereunder.
DECISION: Petition DISMISSED for lack of merit. Sandiganbayan Resolutions are

AFFIRMED in toto.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v HENRY T. GO

G.R. No. 168539 | March 25, 2014
TICKLER: NAIA Terminal III construction
DOCTRINE: The controlling doctrine is that private persons, when acting in conspiracy
with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent
offenses under RA 3019.

FACTS: This case is an offshoot of the decision in Agan Jr. vs. Philippine International
Air Terminals Co. (PIATCO) which nullified the contracts awarded by the Government
to PISTCO for the construction of the NAIA IPT III. After the finality of said decision, a
certain Cecilia Pesayco filed an information for violation of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act) for entering into a contract grossly disadvantageous to the
government. Among the respondents named were Go who was chairman and president
of PIATCO and DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile. While probable cause was found against
Enrile, he was not included as respondent because he died prior to the filing before the
Sandiganbayan. Thus, only respondent Go was charged. Respondent filed a motion to
quash the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Prosecution opposed and claimed that the
Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over respondent’s case, even if he is a private
person, because he was alleged to have conspired with a public officer. The
Sandiganbayan granted the Motion to Quash.
CRIME CHARGED: Violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019
SANDIGANBAYAN: Information DISMISSED for lack of jurisdiction. Go, the lone

accused in this case is a private person and his alleged co-conspirator was already
deceased long before the case was filed in court.
ISSUE: May respondent be held liable under RA 3019 even if the public officer with
whom he has alleged to have conspired has died prior to the filing of the Information?
RULING: YES. Section 3(g) of RA 3019 punishes those who enter, on behalf of the
Government, “any contract or transaction manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to
the same, whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby.” The elements
of said provision are: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a
contract or transaction on behalf of the government; (3) that such contract or transaction
is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The controlling doctrine
is that private persons, when acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted
and, if found guilty, held liable for the pertinent offenses under RA 3019. Secretary
Enrile’s death does not mean that the conspiracy between them an no longer be proved.
The only thing extinguished by the death of Enrile is his criminal liability. His death did
not extinguish the crime not did it remove the basis of the charge of conspiracy. Further,
the law does not require that a private person in conspiracy with a public officer must,
in all instances, be indicted together. It is not necessary to join all alleged co-
conspirators in an indictment for conspiracy. Conspiracy is a joint offense. The crime
depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons. Yet it does not follow that
one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. Since the act of one is the act of all, the
death of one of the two or more conspirators does not prevent the conviction of the
survivors.
DECISION: Petition GRANTED. The resolution of Sandiganbayan is SET ASIDE. The

Sandiganbayan is directed to proceed with the disposition in the criminal case.

CAROLINA R. JAVIER v. THE FIRST DIVISION OF THE SANDIGANBAYAN and

the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. Nos. 147026-27 | September 11, 2009
TICKLER: Madrid International Book Fair in Spain, Travel Expenses
DOCTRINE: A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by
law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the
creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the sovereign functions
of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual
so invested is a public officer.
FACTS: The Book Publishing Industry Development Act was enacted. It provided for
the creation of the National Book Development Board (NBDB or the Governing Board,
for brevity) Petitioner was appointed to the Governing Board as a private sector
representative. Part of her functions as a member of the Governing Board is to attend
book fairs to establish linkages with international book publishing
bodies. On September 29, 1997, she was issued by the Office of the President a travel
authority to attend the Madrid International Book Fair in Spain on October 8-12,
1997. She was paid P139,199.00 as her travelling expenses. Unfortunately, petitioner
was not able to attend the scheduled international book fair. Resident Auditor Rosario
T. Martin advised petitioner to immediately return/refund her cash advance considering
that her trip was canceled. Petitioner, however, failed to do so. She was issued a
Summary of Disallowances from which the balance for settlement amounted
to P220,349.00. Despite said notice, no action was forthcoming from the petitioner.
Dr. Nellie R. Apolonio, then the Executive Director of the NBDB, filed with the
Ombudsman a complaint against petitioner for malversation of public funds and
properties. She further charged petitioner with violation of RA No. 6713 for failure to file
her Statement of Assets and Liabilities.The Ombudsman found probable cause to for
violation of Section 3(e) of RA 3019. It, however, dismissed for insufficiency of
evidence, the charge for violation of R.A. No. 6713. An Information for violation of
Section 3(e) of RA 3019 was then filed before the Sandiganbayan. The case was
docketed as Criminal Case No. 25867 and raffled to the First Division.
Meanwhile, the Commission on Audit charged petitioner with Malversation of Public

Funds, (Art. 217, RPC) for not liquidating the cash advance granted to her in connection
with her supposed trip to Spain. The Ombudsman found probable cause. Thus, an
Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan, which was docketed as Criminal Case
No. 25898, and raffled to the Third Division.
During her arraignment in Criminal Case No. 25867, petitioner pleaded not
guilty. Thereafter, petitioner delivered to the First Division the money subject of the
criminal cases, which amount was deposited in a special trust account during the
pendency of the criminal cases.

Meanwhile, the Third Division set a clarificatory hearing in Criminal Case No. 25898 in
order to determine jurisdictional issues. Petitioner filed with the same Division a Motion
for Consolidation of the two cases. The People filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Admit
Amended Information. The Third Division granted the consolidation.
Amended Information: That on or about and during the period from October 8, 1997 to
February 16, 1999, or for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a high ranking officer, being a member of the Governing Board of the National
Book Development Board equated to Board Member II with a salary grade 28 and as
such, is accountable for the public funds she received as case advance in connection
with her trip to Spain from October 8-12, 1997, per LBP Check No. 10188 in the amount
of P139,199.00, which trip did not materialize, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously take, malverse, misappropriate, embezzle and convert to her own
personal use and benefit the aforementioned amount of P139,199.00, Philippine
currency, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the aforesaid amount.
(dinagdag yung SG-28)
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Information, averring that the Sandiganbayan has no
jurisdiction to hear Criminal Case No. 25867 as the information did not allege that she
is a public official who is classified as Grade 27 or higher. Neither did the information
charge her as a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a public officer committing an
offense under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. She also averred that she is not a
public officer or employee and that she belongs to the Governing Board only as a
private sector representative, hence, she may not be charged under RA 3019 before
the Sandiganbayan or under any statute which covers public officials. Moreover, she
claimed that she does not perform public functions and is without any administrative or
political power to speak of that she is serving the private book publishing industry by
advancing their interest as participant in the government's book development policy.
The motion to quash was denied.
The First Division accepted the consolidation of the criminal cases against petitioner
and scheduled her arraignment for Criminal Case No. 25898. Petitioner manifested that
she is not prepared to accept the propriety of the accusation since it refers to the same
subject matter as that covered in Criminal Case No. 25867 for which the
Sandiganbayan gave her time to file a motion to quash.
Petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 25898, by
invoking her right against double jeopardy. However, her motion was denied in open
court. She then filed a motion for reconsideration. The Sandiganbayan issued a
Resolution denying petitioners motion.
Petitioner hinges the present petition on the ground that the Sandiganbayan has
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction for not quashing
the two informations charging her with violation of the Anti-Graft Law and the Revised
Penal Code on malversation of public funds. She advanced the following arguments in

support of her petition, to wit: first, she is not a public officer, and second, she was being
charged under 2 informations, which is in violation of her right against double jeopardy.
CRIME CHARGED: Violation of Anti-Graft Law, Malversation of Public Funds
SANDIGANBAYAN: No final judgement yet. Petitioner appealed SB Orders/Resolution

via petition for certiorari under Rule 65:
1. Order denying Motion to Quash Information in Criminal Case No. 25867
2. Resolution denying Motion for Reconsideration and Motion to Quash Information
in Criminal Case No. 25898
3. Order declaring that a motion for reconsideration in Criminal Case No. 25898
would be superfluous as the issues are fairly simple and straightforward.
ISSUES:
1. Is the petitioner a public officer? Yes
2. Did the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction? Yes
3. Was there Double Jeopardy? None
RULING:
1. YES.
The NBDB is the government agency mandated to develop and support the
Philippine book publishing industry. It is a statutory government agency created
by R.A. No. 8047, which was enacted into law to ensure the full development of
the book publishing industry as well as for the creation of organization structures
to implement the said policy. To achieve this end, the Governing Board of the
NBDB was created to supervise the implementation. The Governing Board was
vested with powers and functions.
A perusal of the powers and functions leads us to conclude that they partake of
the nature of public functions. A public office is the right, authority and duty,
created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either fixed by law or
enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with
some portion of the sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by
him for the benefit of the public. The individual so invested is a public officer.
Notwithstanding that petitioner came from the private sector to sit as a member
of the NBDB, the law invested her with some portion of the sovereign functions
of the government, so that the purpose of the government is achieved. In this
case, the government aimed to enhance the book publishing industry as it has
a significant role in the national development. Hence, the fact that she was
appointed from the public sector and not from the other branches or agencies of
the government does not take her position outside the meaning of a public
office. She was appointed to the Governing Board in order to see to it that the
purposes for which the law was enacted are achieved. The Governing Board
acts collectively and carries out its mandate as one body. The purpose of the

law for appointing members from the private sector is to ensure that they are
also properly represented in the implementation of government objectives to
cultivate the book publishing industry.
Moreover, the Court is not unmindful of the definition of a public officer pursuant
to the Anti-Graft Law, which provides that a public officer includes elective and
appointive officials and employees, permanent or temporary, whether in the
classified or unclassified or exempt service receiving compensation, even
nominal, from the government. Thus, pursuant to the Anti-Graft Law, one is a
public officer if one has been elected or appointed to a public office. Petitioner
was appointed by the President to the Governing Board of the NDBD. Though
her term is only for a year that does not make her private person exercising a
public function. The fact that she is not receiving a monthly salary is also of no
moment. Section 7, R.A. No. 8047 provides that members of the Governing
Board shall receive per diem and such allowances as may be authorized for
every meeting actually attended and subject to pertinent laws, rules and
regulations. Also, under the Anti-Graft Law, the nature of one's appointment, and
whether the compensation one receives from the government is only nominal, is
immaterial because the person so elected or appointed is still considered a
public officer.
On the other hand, the Revised Penal Code defines a public officer as any
person who, by direct provision of the law, popular election, popular election or
appointment by competent authority, shall take part in the performance of public
functions in the Government of the Philippine Islands, or shall perform in said
Government or in any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or
subordinate official, of any rank or classes, shall be deemed to be a public officer.
2. Yes
Based on the Amended Information in Criminal Case No. 25898, petitioner

belongs to the employees classified as SG-28, included in the phrase all other
national and local officials classified as Grade 27' and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
3. None.
For a claim of double jeopardy to prosper, the following requisites must

concur: (1) there is a complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient
in form and substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the same is filed before a court
of competent jurisdiction; (3) there is a valid arraignment or plea to the charges;
and (4) the accused is convicted or acquitted or the case is otherwise dismissed
or terminated without his express consent. The third and fourth requisites are
not present in the case at bar.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED. The questioned Resolutions
and Order of the Sandiganbayan are AFFIRMED.

RUPERTO AMBIL, JR. VS SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 175457 | July 06, 2011
TICKLER: Puslit sa Bilibid
DOCTRINE: Elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019:

1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or
official functions;
2. He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence; and
3. His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or
gave any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the
discharge of his functions.
FACTS: An information was filed before the Ombudsman against herein petitioners
Ambil and Apelado, then governor of Eastern Samar and Provincial Jail Warden of
Eastern Samar, respectively, for allegedly ordering and causing the release from the
Provincial Jail of detention prisoner Mayor Francisco Adalim in violation of Section 3(e)
of R.A. No. 3019.
Section. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – x x x x

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any
private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official, administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith
or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees
of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or
other concessions.
The Sandiganbayan, First Division, promulgated the assailed Decision finding

petitioners guilty of violating Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019. The court ruled that in
moving Adalim to a private residence, petitioners have conspired to accord him
unwarranted benefits in the form of more comfortable quarters with access to television
and other privileges that other detainees do not enjoy. It stressed that under the Rules,
no person under detention by legal process shall be released or transferred except
upon order of the court or when he is admitted to bail.
The Sandiganbayan brushed aside petitioners defense that Adalims transfer was made
to ensure his safety. It observed that petitioner Ambil, Jr. did not personally verify any
actual threat on Adalims life but relied simply on the advice of Adalims lawyers. The
Sandiganbayan also pointed out the availability of an isolation cell and nipa huts within
the 10-meter-high perimeter fence of the jail which could have been used to separate
Adalim from other prisoners.
CRIME CHARGED: Violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.

ISSUE: Are petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt?
RULING: Elements of violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. 3019:

(1) The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official
functions;
(2) He must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; and
(3) His action caused any undue injury to any party, including the government, or gave
any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
functions.
As to the first element, there is no question that petitioners are public officers
discharging official functions and that jurisdiction over them lay with the
Sandiganbayan. The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over petitioner Ambil, Jr. is
beyond question. The same is true as regards petitioner Apelado, Sr. As to him, a
Certification from the Provincial Government Department Head of the HRMO shows
that his position as Provincial Warden is classified as Salary Grade 22. Nonetheless, it
is only when none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary
grade ‘27’ or higher shall exclusive jurisdiction be vested in the lower courts. Here,
petitioner Apelado, Sr. was charged as a co-principal with Governor Ambil, Jr., over
whose position the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. Accordingly, he was correctly tried
jointly with said public officer in the proper court which had exclusive original jurisdiction
over them – the Sandiganbayan.
Second, we find that petitioners displayed manifest partiality and evident bad faith in
transferring the detention of Mayor Adalim to petitioner Ambil, Jr.s house. Petitioners
were unable to establish the existence of any risk on Adalims safety.
Third, it suffices that the accused has given unjustified favor or benefit to another in the
exercise of his official, administrative or judicial functions. The word unwarranted
means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized or without
justification or adequate reason. Advantage means a more favorable or improved
position or condition; benefit, profit or gain of any kind; benefit from some course of
action. Preference signifies priority or higher evaluation or desirability; choice or
estimation above another.
Without a court order, petitioners transferred Adalim and detained him in a place other
than the provincial jail. The latter was housed in much more comfortable quarters,
provided better nourishment, was free to move about the house and watch
television. Petitioners readily extended these benefits to Adalim on the mere
representation of his lawyers that the mayors life would be put in danger inside the
provincial jail.
DECISION: Petitions are DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 25892 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATION.

VENANCIO R. NAVA v RODOLFO G. PALATTAO, ET AL.

G.R. No. 160211 | April 28, 2006
TICKLER: Public bidding is lame. Overpriced private negotiations ftw.
DOCTRINE: To sustain a conviction under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, it
must be clearly proven that 1) the accused is a public officer; 2) the public officer
entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and 3) the contract
or transaction was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
FACTS: Sandiganbayan found Petitioner guilty of violating Section 3(g) of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act:
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the public officer profited or
will profit thereby.
P603,265.00 was released to the DECS Division of Davao del Sur for distribution to
newly nationalized highschools. Petitioner Venancio Nava, as DECS-Region XI
Director, called a meeting among his seven (7) school division superintendeds and
persuaded them to use the money for the purchase of Science Laboratory Tools and
Devices (SLTD). However, instead of publicly bidding for the said purchase as required
by procedure, Petitioner Nava opted to purchase the same through negotiation from
Joven Trading. As a result, the prices of the SLTDs exceeded the prevailing market
price ranging from 56% to 1,175% based on the mathematical computation done by the
COA audit team. Thus, on the basis of the COA Report, the COA of Region XI, Davao
City, recommended the filing of criminal charges before the Office of the Ombudsman
in Mindanao. Special Prosecution Officer II Evelyn T. Lucero-Agcaoili recommended
the dismissal of the foregoing Information on the ground, among others, that there was
no probable cause. However, the Ombudsman Desierto disapproved of the
recommendation, and the Sandiganbayan subsequently convicted him of violating
Section 3(g) of RA 3019.
The Sandiganbayan argued: 1) petitioner had not conducted a public bidding in

accordance with COA Circular No. 85-55A; 2) it found the evidence adduced by
petitioners co-accused (who were acquitted), Superintendent Ajatil Jairal, to be
enlightening, manifesting an intricate web of deceit spun by petitioner and involving all
the other superintendents in the process
However, petitioner argued: 1) the COA Circular was merely directory, not mandatory;
2) the pieces of evidence to support the charges were insufficient i.e. the COA Special
Audit Report was fraudulent and incomplete, and thus there is no competent evidence
to determine the overprice; and 3) in justifying the negotiated purchase without public

bidding, petitioner claims that any delay in the enrichment of the minds of the public
high school students of Davao del Sur is detrimental and antithetical to public service.
CRIME CHARGED: Violation of Section 26(b), Article II (Attempted Sale of Dangerous

Drugs) of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165)
SPECIAL PROSECUTION OFFICER: RECOMMEND DISMISSAL
OMBUDSMAN: PROBABLE CAUSE
SANDIGANBAYAN: GUILTY
ISSUE: Is petitioner guilty of violating Section 3(g) of RA 3019?
RULING: To sustain a conviction under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, it must
be clearly proven that 1) the accused is a public officer; 2) the public officer entered into
a contract or transaction on behalf of the government; and 3) the contract or transaction
was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
From the foregoing, it is clear that the Sandiganbayan did not err in ruling that the
evidence presented warranted a verdict of conviction. Petitioner is a public officer, who
approved the transactions on behalf of the government, which thereby suffered a
substantial loss. The discrepancy between the prices of the SLTDs purchased by the
DECS and the samples purchased by the COA audit team clearly established such
undue injury. Indeed, the discrepancy was grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to
the government.
On his disavowal of responsibility for the questioned procurement, he claims that the
transactions emanated from the Division Office of Digos headed by Jairal. However, in
the administrative case. filed against petitioner before the DECS, it was established that
he gave the go signal. that prompted the division superintendents to procure the SLTDs
through negotiated purchase. This fact is not disputed by petitioner, who quotes the
same DECS Decision in stating that his acts were justifiable under the circumstances
then obtaining at that time and for reasons of efficient and prompt distribution of the
SLTDs to the high schools.
In justifying the negotiated purchase without public bidding, petitioner claims that any
delay in the enrichment of the minds of the public high school students of Davao del
Sur is detrimental and antithetical to public service. Although this reasoning is quite
laudable, there was nothing presented to substantiate it.
Executive Order No. 301 states the general rule that no contract for public services or
for furnishing supplies, materials and equipment to the government or any of its
branches, agencies or instrumentalities may be renewed or entered into without public
bidding. The rule however, is not without exceptions. Specifically, negotiated contracts
may be entered into under any of the following circumstances:

a. Whenever the supplies are urgently needed to meet an emergency which may
involve the loss of, or danger to, life and/or property;
b. Whenever the supplies are to be used in connection with a project or activity which
cannot be delayed without causing detriment to the public service;
c. Whenever the materials are sold by an exclusive distributor or manufacturer who

does not have subdealers selling at lower prices and for which no suitable substitute
can be obtained elsewhere at more advantageous terms to the government;
d. Whenever the supplies under procurement have been unsuccessfully placed on bid
for at least two consecutive times, either due to lack of bidders or the offers received in
each instance were exorbitant or non-conforming to specifications;
e. In cases where it is apparent that the requisition of the needed supplies through
negotiated purchase is most advantageous to the government to be determined by the
Department Head concerned;
f. Whenever the purchase is made from an agency of the government.
Unfortunately for petitioner, there was no showing of any immediate and compelling
justification for dispensing with the requirement of public bidding. We cannot accept his
unsubstantiated reasoning that a public bidding would unnecessarily delay the
purchase of the SLTDs. Not only would he have to prove that indeed there would be a
delay but, more important, he would have to show how a public bidding would be
detrimental and antithetical to public service.
We must emphasize however, that the lack of a public bidding and the violation of an
administrative order do not by themselves satisfy the third element of Republic Act No.
3019, Section 3(g); namely, that the contract or transaction entered into was manifestly
and grossly disadvantageous to the government, as seems to be stated in the
Resolution of the Sandiganbayan denying the Motion for Reconsideration. Lack of
public bidding alone does not result in a manifest and gross disadvantage. Indeed, the
absence of a public bidding may mean that the government was not able to secure the
lowest bargain in its favor and may open the door to graft and corruption. Nevertheless,
the law requires that the disadvantage must be manifest and gross. Penal laws are
strictly construed against the government. IF the accused is to be sent to jail, it must be
because there is solid evidence to pin that person down, not because of the omission
of a procedural matter alone. Indeed, all the elements of a violation of Section 3(g) of
Republic Act No. 3019 should be established to prove the culpability of the accused. In
this case, there is a clear showing that all the elements of the offense are present. Thus,
there can be no other conclusion other than conviction.
Lastly, the principal evidence presented during trial was the COA Special Audit Report
(COA Report). The COA is the agency specifically given the power, authority and duty

to examine, audit and settle all accounts pertaining to the revenue and receipts of, and
expenditures or uses of fund and property owned by or pertaining to the government. It
has the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination and to
establish the required techniques and methods.
Thus, COAs findings are accorded not only respect but also finality, when they are not
tainted with grave abuse of discretion. Only upon a clear showing of grave abuse of
discretion may the courts set aside decisions of government agencies entrusted with
the regulation of activities coming under their special technical knowledge and training.
It was therefore incumbent on petitioner to prove that the audit team or any of its
members thereof was so motivated by ill feelings against him that it came up with a
fraudulent report. Since he was not able to show any evidence to this end, his
contention as to the irregularity of the audit due to the discrepancy of the dates involved
must necessarily fail.
We note, however, that petitioner was sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) years
and one (1) day as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day as maximum. Under
Section 9 of Republic Act 3019, petitioner should be punished with imprisonment of not
less than six (6) years and one (1) month nor more than fifteen years. Thus, we adjust
the minimum penalty imposed on petitioner in accordance with the law.
DECISION: Petition DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution are AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION as to the penalty imposed.
OFELIA C. CAUNAN v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. Nos. 181999 & 183001 | September 2, 2009
TICKLER: Joey Marquez. Walis tingting.
DOCTRINES:
1. For a charge under Section 3(g) to prosper, the following elements must be
present: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract
or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or
transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
2. In criminal cases, to justify a conviction, the culpability of an accused must be

established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proof is on the
prosecution, as the accused enjoys a constitutionally enshrined disputable
presumption of innocence. The court, in ascertaining the guilt of an accused,
must, after having marshalled the facts and circumstances, reach a moral
certainty as to the accused guilt. Moral certainty is that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind. Otherwise, where there is
reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted.

FACTS: Mayor Joey Marquez and Caunan, along with four (4) other local government
officials of Paranaque City and private individual Antonio Razo (Razo), were charged
under five (5) Informations of violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019 or otherwise
known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Petitioners were charge of the said
crime for an alleged over price procurement of 142,612 walis ting-ting in the total
amount of P1,302,878.00.
The five (5) Informations were filed based on the findings of the Commission on Audit
(COA) Special Audit Team that there was overpricing in certain purchase transactions
of Paranaque City. In March 1999, a Special Audit Team composed of Fatima
Bermudez (Bermudez), Carolina Supsup, Gerry Estrada, and Yolando Atienza, by
virtue of Local Government Audit Office Assignment Order No. 99-002, audited
selected transactions of Paranaque City for the calendar years 1996 to 1998, including
the walis tingting purchases.
In connection with the walis tingting purchases audit, the audit team gathered the
following evidence:
1. Documents furnished by the Office of the City Mayor of Paranaque City upon
request of the audit team;
2. Sample walis tingting with handle likewise submitted by the Office of the City
Mayor of Paranaque City;
3. Samples of walis tingting without handle actually utilized by the street sweepers
upon ocular inspection of the audit team;
4. Survey forms accomplished by the street sweepers containing questions on
the walis tingting;
5. Evaluation by the Technical Services Department of the reasonableness of
the walis tingting procurement compared to current prices thereof;
6. A separate canvass by the audit team on the prices of the walis tingting,
including purchases thereof at various merchandising stores; and
7. Documents on the conduct and process of procurement of walis tingting by the
neighboring city of Las Pinas.
Parenthetically, to ascertain the prevailing price of walis tingting for the years 1996 to
1998, the audit team made a canvass of the purchase prices of the different
merchandise dealers of Paranaque City. All, however, were reluctant to provide the
team with signed quotations of purchase prices for walis tingting. In addition, the audit
team attempted to purchase walis tingting from the named suppliers of Paranaque City.
Curiously, when the audit team went to the listed addresses of the suppliers, these were
occupied by other business establishments. Thereafter, the audit team located, and
purchased from, a lone supplier that sold walis tingting.
The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict petitioners and the other local
government officials of Paranaque City for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
CRIME CHARGED: Violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019?

SANDIGANBAYAN: GUILTY
ISSUE: Are the petitioners guilty of violation of Section 3(g) of RA No. 3019?
RULING: NO. For a charge under Section 3(g) to prosper, the following elements must
be present: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract or
transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or transaction is
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
The presence of the first two elements of the crime is not disputed. Hence, the threshold
question that we should resolve is whether the walis tingting purchase contracts were
grossly and manifestly injurious or disadvantageous to the government.
We agree with petitioners that the fact of overpricing is embedded in the third criminal
element of Section 3 (g) of R.A. No. 3019. Given the factual milieu of this case, the
subject contracts would be grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government
if characterized by an overpriced procurement. However, the gross and manifest
disadvantage to the government was not sufficiently shown because the conclusion of
overpricing was erroneous since it was not also adequately proven. Thus, we grant the
petitions.
In criminal cases, to justify a conviction, the culpability of an accused must be

established by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. The burden of proof is on the
prosecution, as the accused enjoys a constitutionally enshrined disputable presumption
of innocence. The court, in ascertaining the guilt of an accused, must, after having
marshalled the facts and circumstances, reach a moral certainty as to the accused guilt.
Moral certainty is that degree of proof which produces conviction in an unprejudiced
mind. Otherwise, where there is reasonable doubt, the accused must be acquitted.
In finding that the walis tingting purchase contracts were grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government, the Sandiganbayan relied on the COAs finding of
overpricing which was, in turn, based on the special audit teams report. The audit teams
conclusion on the standard price of a walis tingting was pegged on the basis of the
following documentary and object evidence: (1) samples of walis tingting without
handle actually used by the street sweepers; (2) survey forms on the walis tingting
accomplished by the street sweepers; (3) invoices from six merchandising stores where
the audit team purchased walis tingting; (4) price listing of the DBM Procurement
Service; and (5) documents relative to the walis tingting purchases of Las Pias City.
These documents were then compared with the documents furnished by petitioners
and the other accused relative to Paranaque Citys walis tingting transactions.
Notably, however, and this the petitioners have consistently pointed out, the evidence
of the prosecution did not include a signed price quotation from the walis
tingting suppliers of Paranaque City. In fact, even the walis tingting furnished the audit
team by petitioners and the other accused was different from the walis tingting actually

utilized by the Paranaque City street sweepers at the time of ocular inspection by the
audit team. At the barest minimum, the evidence presented by the prosecution, in order
to substantiate the allegation of overpricing, should have been identical to the walis
tingting purchased in 1996-1998. Only then could it be concluded that the walis
tingting purchases were disadvantageous to the government because only then could
a determination have been made to show that the disadvantage was so manifest and
gross as to make a public official liable under Section 3(g) of R.A. No. 3019.
DECISION: Petition GRANTED.
LILIA ORGANO v SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 133535 | September 9, 1999
TICKLER: BIR employees; plunder; SG 27.
DOCTRINE: Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the crime of plunder unless

committed by public officials and employees occupying the positions with Salary Grade
"27" or higher.
FACTS: In 1996, an Information dated On August 15, 1997 was filed with the
Sandiganbayan against Dominga S. Manalili, Teopisto A. Sapitula, Jose P. Marcelo,
Lilia B. Organo, being then public officers and taking advantage of their official positions
as employees of the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the crime of plunder as it was
alleged that they stole P193,565,079.64 from the government.
Organo filed a motion to quash alleging that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over
the case pursuant to Republic Act No. 8249 which provides that the Sandiganbayan
has no jurisdiction over government employees who do not belong to Salary Grade 27.
Organo was able to prove that her position in the Bureau of Internal Revenue does not
belong to Salary Grade 27.
The Sandiganbayan denied her motion. It insisted Republic Act No. 7080 which defines
and penalizes the crime of "plunder" vests in the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction thereof,
and since it is a special law, it constitutes an exception to the general law, Republic Act
No. 8249.
CRIME CHARGED: PLUNDER; Information filed by Special Prosecutor to

Sandiganbayan
ISSUE: Did Sandiganbayan at the time of the filing of the information on August 15,
1997 have jurisdiction over the case, in view of the enactment on February 5, 1997 of
Republic Act No. 8249 which vested it the jurisdiction over offenses and felonies where
the accused holds a position with salary grade "27" and higher?

RULING: NO. The Sandiganbayan cannot try cases where the accused is below Salary
Grade 27.
Republic Act No. 7080, Section 3 provides:
"Until otherwise provided by law, all pro-sections under this Act shall be within the
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan."
The crime of "plunder" defined in Republic Act No. 7080, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, was provisionally placed within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan "until
otherwise provided by law." Republic Act No. 8429, enacted on February 5, 1997 is the
special law that provided for the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan "otherwise" than that
prescribed in Republic Act No. 7080.
In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary
Grade 27 or higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and
PNP officers mentioned above, exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in
the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions
as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction over the
crime of plunder unless committed by public officials and employees occupying the
positions with Salary Grade "27" or higher.
DECISION: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition for certiorari and
ANNULS the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan, dated November 20, 1997, and April
28, 1998, in Criminal Case No. 24100.
The Court orders the Sandiganbayan to forthwith refer the case to the court of proper
jurisdiction.
JOSE JINGGOY E. ESTRADA v SANDIGANBAYAN

G.R. No. 148965 | February 26, 2002
TICKLER: Related to impeachment of Joseph Estrada.
DOCTRINES:
1. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the members of his
family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates
or other persons, amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a
combination or series of overt or criminal acts as described in Section 1(d)
hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished
by reclusion perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said

public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder

shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the
degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and extenuating
circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be considered by
the court.
2. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that each accused
agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that each
misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused ordered
the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive
commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from
commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their
individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for
former President Estrada.
FACTS: In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against

Joseph Ejercito Estrada, five criminal complaints against the former President and
members of his family, his associates, friends and conspirators were filed with the
respondent Office of the Ombudsman. On April 4, 2001, the respondent Ombudsman
issued a Joint Resolution finding probable cause warranting the filing with the
Sandiganbayan of several criminal Informations against the former President and the
other respondents therein. One of the Informations was for the crime of plunder under
Republic Act No. 7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose Jinggoy
Estrada, then mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal
Case No. 26558, the case was assigned to respondent Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan. The arraignment of the accused was set on July 10, 2001 and no bail
for petitioners provisional liberty was fixed. On April 24, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion
to Quash or Suspend the Amended Information on the ground that the Anti-Plunder
Law, R.A. No. 7080, is unconstitutional and that it charged more than one offense but
the respondent Ombudsman opposed the motion.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for petitioner and
his co-accused and they were subsequently placed in custody of the law. On April 30,
2001, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that: (1) no probable
cause exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it appearing that he was
only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a series or combination of overt or
criminal acts as required in R.A. No. 7080; and (2) he is entitled to bail as a matter of
right. Petitioner prayed that he be excluded from the Amended Information and be
discharged from custody. In the alternative, petitioner also prayed that he be allowed
to post bail in an amount to be fixed by respondent court.

On June 28, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose Jinggoy
Estradas Motion To Fix Bail On Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An
Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts Charged In The Information Do Not
Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As To Him. On July 3, 2001, petitioner filed a Motion
to Strike Out So-Called Entry of Appearance, To Direct Ombudsman To Explain Why
He Attributes Impropriety To The Defense And To Resolve Pending Incidents.
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying

petitioners Motion to Quash and Suspend and Very Urgent Omnibus Motion. Petitioners
alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing after arraignment of all accused. The
following day, July 10, 2001, petitioner moved for reconsideration of the
Resolution. Respondent court denied the motion and proceeded to arraign
petitioner. Petitioner refused to make his plea prompting respondent court to enter a
plea of not guilty for him. Hence, this petition.
CRIME CHARGED: Violation of Section 26(b), Article II (Attempted Sale of Dangerous

Drugs) of Republic Act No. 9165 (RA 9165)
RTC: Laylo and Ritwal GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of violations of RA 9165.
CA: AFFIRMED the decision of the RTC.
ISSUES:
1. Did respondent Sandiganbayan err in not declaring that R.A. No. 7080 is
unconstitutional on its face and, as applied to petitioner, and denying him the
equal protection of the laws?
2. Did the Sandiganbayan act without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in not holding that the
Plunder Law does not provide complete and sufficient standards?
3. Did the Sandiganbayan err in sustaining the charge against petitioner for alleged
offenses, and with alleged conspirators, with which and with whom he is not
even remotely connected - contrary to the dictum that criminal liability is
personal, not vicarious - results in the denial of substantive due process?
4. Should the petition for bail be granted?
RULING:
1. NO. A careful examination of the Amended Information will show that it is divided
into three (3) parts: (1) the first paragraph charges former President Joseph E.
Estrada with the crime of plunder together with petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada,
Charlie Atong Ang, Edward Serapio, Yolanda Ricaforte and others; (2) the
second paragraph spells out in general terms how the accused conspired in
committing the crime of plunder; and (3) the following four sub-paragraphs (a) to
(d) describe in detail the predicate acts constitutive of the crime of plunder
pursuant to items (1) to (6) of R.A. No. 7080, and state the names of the accused
who committed each act.
Pertinent to the case at bar is the predicate act alleged in sub-paragraph

(a) of the Amended Information which is of receiving or collecting, directly or
indirectly, on several instances, money in the aggregate amount
of P545,000,000.00 for illegal gambling in the form of gift, share, percentage,
kickback or any form of pecuniary benefit x x x. In this sub-paragraph
(a), petitioner, in conspiracy with former President Estrada, is charged with the
act of receiving or collecting money from illegal gambling amounting to P545
million. Contrary to petitioners posture, the allegation is that he received or
collected money from illegal gambling on several instances. The phrase on
several instances means the petitioner committed the predicate act in
series. To insist that the Amended Information charged the petitioner with the
commission of only one act or offense despite the phrase several instances is to
indulge in a twisted, nay, pretzel interpretation.
It matters little that sub-paragraph (a) did not utilize the exact words combination
or series as they appear in R.A. No. 7080. For in Estrada v. Sandiganbayan,
we held that where these two terms are to be taken in their popular, not technical,
meaning, the word series is synonymous with the clause on several instances.
Series refers to a repetition of the same predicate act in any of the items in
Section 1 (d) of the law. The word combination contemplates the commission of
at least any two different predicate acts in any of said items. Plainly, sub-
paragraph (a) of the Amended Information charges petitioner with plunder
committed by a series of the same predicate act under Section 1 (d) (2) of
the law.
Similarly misleading is petitioners stand that in the Ombudsman Resolution of

April 4, 2001 finding probable cause to charge him with plunder together with the
other accused, he was alleged to have received only the sum of P2 million, which
amount is way below the minimum of P50 million required under R.A. No.
7080. The submission is not borne out by the April 4, 2001 Resolution of the
Ombudsman, recommending the filing of charges against petitioner and his co-
accused, which in pertinent part reads:
xxxxxxxxx
Respondent Jose Jinggoy Estrada, the present Mayor of San Juan,

Metro Manila, appears to have also surreptitious collection of
protection money from jueteng operations in Bulacan. This is gleaned
from the statements of Gov. Singson himself and the fact that Mayor
Estrada, on at least two occasions, turned over to a certain Emma
Lim, an emissary of the respondent governor, jueteng haul totalling P2
million, i.e., P1 million in January, 2000 and another P1 million in
February, 2000. An alleged listahan of jueteng recipients listed him as

one Jingle Bell, as affirmed by Singson [TSN 8 & Dec. 2000 SICt/17
Oct. 2000 SBRC/SCI].
Hence, contrary to the representations of the petitioner, the Ombudsman made

the finding that P2 million was delivered to petitioner as jueteng haul on at least
two occasions. The P2 million is, therefore, not the entire sum with which
petitioner is specifically charged.
2. NO. Petitioner, however, overlooks that the second paragraph of the Amended
Information charges him to have conspired with former President Estrada in
committing the crime of plunder. His alleged participation consists in the
commission of the predicate acts specified in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information. If these allegations are proven, the penalty of petitioner cannot be
unclear. It will be no different from that of the former President for in conspiracy,
the act of one is the act of the other. The imposable penalty is provided in Section
2 of R.A. No. 7080, viz:
Section 2. Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with the

members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business
associates, subordinates or other persons, amasses, accumulates or
acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or
criminal acts as described in Section 1(d) hereof in the aggregate amount
or total value of at least Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00) shall be
guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua to death. Any person who participated with the said public
officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder
shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties,
the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall
be considered by the court.
The Amended Information, in its first two paragraphs, charges petitioner and his
other co-accused with the crime of plunder. The first paragraph names all the
accused, while the second paragraph describes in general how plunder was
committed and lays down most of the elements of the crime itself. Sub-
paragraphs (a) to (d) describe in detail the predicate acts that constitute
the crime and name in particular the co-conspirators of former President
Estrada in each predicate act. The predicate acts alleged in the said four
sub-paragraphs correspond to the items enumerated in Section 1 (d) of
R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (a) alleged the predicate act of receiving, on
several instances, money from illegal gambling, in consideration of toleration or
protection of illegal gambling, and expressly names petitioner as one of those
who conspired with former President Estrada in committing the offense. This
predicate act corresponds with the offense described in item [2] of the
enumeration in Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080. Sub-paragraph (b) alleged the
predicate act of diverting, receiving or misappropriating a portion of the tobacco

excise tax share allocated for the province of Ilocos Sur, which act is the offense
described in item [1] in the enumeration in Section 1 (d) of the law. This sub-
paragraph does not mention petitioner but instead names other conspirators of
the former President. Sub-paragraph (c) alleged two predicate acts - that of
ordering the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) and the Social
Security System (SSS) to purchase shares of stock of Belle Corporation, and
collecting or receiving commissions from such purchase from the Belle
Corporation which became part of the deposit in the Jose Velarde account at the
Equitable-PCI Bank. These two predicate acts fall under items [2] and [3] in the
enumeration of R.A. No. 7080, and was allegedly committed by the former
President in connivance with John Does and Jane Does. Finally, sub-paragraph
(d) alleged the predicate act that the former President unjustly enriched himself
from commissions, gifts, kickbacks, in connivance with John Does and Jane
Does, and deposited the same under his account name Jose Velarde at the
Equitable-PCI Bank. This act corresponds to the offense under item [6] in the
enumeration of Section 1 (d) of R.A. No. 7080.
From the foregoing allegations of the Amended Information, it is clear that all the
accused named in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d), thru their individual
acts, conspired with former President Estrada to enable the latter to amass,
accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth in the aggregate amount of
P4,097,804,173.17. As the Amended Information is worded, however, it is not
certain whether the accused in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) conspired with each
other to enable the former President to amass the subject ill-gotten wealth. In
light of this lack of clarity, petitioner cannot be penalized for the conspiracy
entered into by the other accused with the former President as related in the
second paragraph of the Amended Information in relation to its sub-paragraphs
(b) to (d). We hold that petitioner can be held accountable only for the predicate
acts he allegedly committed as related in sub-paragraph (a) of the Amended
Information which were allegedly done in conspiracy with the former President
whose design was to amass ill-gotten wealth amounting to more than P4 billion.
We hasten to add, however, that the respondent Ombudsman cannot be

faulted for including the predicate acts alleged in sub-paragraphs (a) to (d)
of the Amended Information in one, and not in four, separate
Informations. A study of the history of R.A. No. 7080 will show that the law was
crafted to avoid the mischief and folly of filing multiple informations. The Anti-
Plunder Law was enacted in the aftermath of the Marcos regime where charges
of ill-gotten wealth were filed against former President Marcos and his alleged
cronies. Government prosecutors found no appropriate law to deal with the
multitude and magnitude of the acts allegedly committed by the former
President to acquire illegal wealth. They also found that under the then
existing laws such as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Revised
Penal Code and other special laws, the acts involved different transactions,
different time and different personalities. Every transaction constituted a
separate crime and required a separate case and the over-all conspiracy

had to be broken down into several criminal and graft charges. The
preparation of multiple Informations was a legal nightmare but eventually, thirty-
nine (39) separate and independent cases were filed against practically the
same accused before the Sandiganbayan. R.A. No. 7080 or the Anti-Plunder
Law was enacted precisely to address this procedural problem. This is pellucid
in the Explanatory Note to Senate Bill No. 733, viz:
Plunder, a term chosen from other equally apt terminologies like

kleptocracy and economic treason, punishes the use of high office for
personal enrichment, committed thru a series of acts done not in the
public eye but in stealth and secrecy over a period of time, that may
involve so many persons, here and abroad, and which touch so many
states and territorial units. The acts and/or omissions sought to be
penalized do not involve simple cases of malversation of public
funds, bribery, extortion, theft and graft but constitute plunder of an
entire nation resulting in material damage to the national
economy. The above-described crime does not yet exist in Philippine
statute books. Thus, the need to come up with a legislation as a
safeguard against the possible recurrence of the depravities of the
previous regime and as a deterrent to those with similar inclination to
succumb to the corrupting influence of power.
There is no denying the fact that the plunder of an entire nation resulting in
material damage to the national economy is made up of a complex and manifold
network of crimes. In the crime of plunder, therefore, different parties may
be united by a common purpose. In the case at bar, the different accused and
their different criminal acts have a commonality to help the former President
amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten wealth. Sub-paragraphs (a) to (d) in the
Amended Information alleged the different participation of each accused in the
conspiracy. The gravamen of the conspiracy charge, therefore, is not that
each accused agreed to receive protection money from illegal gambling, that
each misappropriated a portion of the tobacco excise tax, that each accused
ordered the GSIS and SSS to purchase shares of Belle Corporation and receive
commissions from such sale, nor that each unjustly enriched himself from
commissions, gifts and kickbacks; rather, it is that each of them, by their
individual acts, agreed to participate, directly or indirectly, in the
amassing, accumulation and acquisition of ill-gotten wealth of and/or for
former President Estrada.
3. NO. The crime of plunder is punished by R.A. No. 7080, as amended by Section
12 of R.A. No. 7659, with the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Under our
Rules, offenses punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment
are non-bailable when the evidence of guilt is strong. Section 13, Article III of the
1987 Constitution mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses
hinge on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is
strong. This requires that the trial court conduct bail hearings wherein both the

prosecution and the defense are afforded sufficient opportunity to present their
respective evidence. The burden of proof lies with the prosecution to show
strong evidence of guilt.
This Court is not in a position to grant bail to the petitioner as the matter requires
evidentiary hearing that should be conducted by the Sandiganbayan. The
hearings on which respondent court based its Resolution of December 20,
2001 involved the reception of medical evidence only and which evidence was
given in September 2001, five months ago. The records do not show that
evidence on petitioners guilt was presented before the lower court. Upon proper
motion of the petitioner, respondent Sandiganbayan should conduct hearings to
determine if the evidence of petitioners guilt is strong as to warrant the granting
of bail to petitioner
Additional notes:
It is enough to allege conspiracy as a mode in the commission of an offense
in either of the following manner: (1) by use of the word conspire, or its derivatives
or synonyms, such as confederate, connive, collude, etc; or (2) by allegations of basic
facts constituting the conspiracy in a manner that a person of common understanding
would know what is intended, and with such precision as would enable the accused to
competently enter a plea to a subsequent indictment based on the same facts.
The allegation of conspiracy in the information must not be confused with
the adequacy of evidence that may be required to prove it. A conspiracy is proved
by evidence of actual cooperation; of acts indicative of an agreement, a common
purpose or design, a concerted action or concurrence of sentiments to commit the
felony and actually pursue it. A statement of this evidence is not necessary in the
information.
In the case at bar, the second paragraph of the Amended Information alleged
in general terms how the accused committed the crime of plunder. It used the
words in connivance/conspiracy with his co-accused. Following the ruling in Quitlong,
these words are sufficient to allege the conspiracy of the accused with the former
President in committing the crime of plunder.
DECISION: Petition DISMISSED.


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CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW Case Digests

Outline by Fiscal Victoria C. Garcia

REVISED PENAL CODE: BOOK TWO

TITLE SEVEN (ARTICLES 203-245): Crimes Committed by Public Officers

FRANCISCO SALVADOR B. ACEJAS III v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

TICKLER: Bureau of Immigration; Japanese passport; yakuza big boss

On December 17, 1993, Bureau of Immigration and Deportation Agent

Takao showed his passport and signed an undertaking issued by Hernandez,

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

Meanwhile, Hernandez prepared a progress report and submitted it to the

CRIME CHARGED: Direct Bribery

Sandiganbayan: Hernandez, Conanan, Perlas and Acejas were found GUILTY of

Motion for New Trial was denied.

ISSUE: Are the accused guilty of direct bribery?

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

GREGORY JAMES POZAR v COURT OF APPEALS

TICKLER: Application for probation. Envelope with 100-peso bill.

FACTS: Petitioner, an American citizen and a permanent resident of the Philippines,

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

ANOTHER PROSEC WITNESS:

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

CRIME CHARGED: Corruption of a public official

RTC: GUILTY as charged

CA: AFFIRMED RTC ruling in toto

ISSUE: Is petitioner guilty of the direct bribery?

However, petitioner was required by the Assistant Probation Officer, Primitive

DECISION: Accused was ACQUITTED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v JOSELITO C. BARROZO

TICKLER: Hong Kong letter

DOCTRINE: Elements of Direct Bribery:

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

Moral turpitude is defined as an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private

As held, the determination of whether an attorney should be disbarred or merely

As a final note, it is well to state that:

DECISION: Atty. Joselito C. Barrozo is DISBARRED and his name is ORDERED

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

JESUS TORRES v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

TICKLER: School Principal

CRIME CHARGED: Malversation of Public Funds

RTC: CONVICTED petitioner of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds sentenced

CA: DISMISSED outright for lack of jurisdiction.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final

(3) NO. Malversation may be committed either through a positive act of

Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or

DECISION: Court of Appeals ruling AFFIRMED.

MAJOR JOEL G. CANTOS v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

TICKLER: Screw driver. P3M missing, safety vault.

DOCTRINE: Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

CRIME CHARGED: Malversation of public funds

RTC: GUILTY as charged.

SANDIGANBAYAN: AFFIRMED RTC ruling.

CAVEAT: NOT FOR REPRODUCTION. USE AT YOUR OWN RISK.

of personal misappropriation as long as there is a shortage in his account and petitioner

ISSUE: Is accused guilty of Art 217?

RULING: YES, he is guilty.

The presumption is, of course, rebuttable. Accordingly, if petitioner is able to present

Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa

DECISION: Petitioner is found GUILTY of malversation of public funds

ARNOLD JAMES YSIDORO v PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

TICKLER: Four sack of rices. Two boxes of sardines.