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legitimizers within the international and periodicity over the past century
community.5 In the period after 1920, and a half. Looking first at secular
membership in the League of Nations or trends, contrary to what might have
the United Nations was used as an al- been expected, no trend, either upward
ternate criterion in some cases. The or downward, is evident. That is,
adoption of such a scheme results in a whether we concentrate upon frequen-
extra-systemic wars reflect only the war ex- battle deaths and nation months.
148 THE ANNALS OF THE AMERICAN ACADEMY
TABLE 1- n (Continued)
always present; there are distinct and tion to &dquo;forget&dquo; the last bloody con-
periodic fluctuationsin the amount of flict.8 It must be remembered that such
that violence. The twenty-year cycle in 8. See, for example, Frank H. Denton, "Some
the amount of nation-months of war Regularities in International Conflict, 1820-
under way can be seen in the graph in 1949," Background 9, no. 4 (February, 1966),
Figure 1. 283-296; Frank H. Denton and Warren Phil-
Others have discerned similar cycles lips, "Some Patterns in the History of Vio-
lence," Journal of Conflict Resolution 12, no.
which could be related, among other 2 (June, 1968), 182-195; Edward R. Dewey,
things, to the time needed for a genera- The 177 Year Cycle in War, 600 B.C.-A.D.
150
FIGURE 1. ANNUAL AMOUNT (IN NATION MONTHS) OF INTERNATIONAL WAR UNDER WAY
1816-1965
wars, 64began in either spring or among the nations, and whether, indeed,
autumn and only 29 in summer and certain nations, or certain classes there-
winter. Moreover, this pattern does of, are more prone to war involvement
not change much over time; for exam- than others.
ple, 11 of the 21 wars fought since 1920 In terms of the sheer number of in-
began in autumn. As for specific ternational wars, France and England
months, April and October saw the initi- lead the field with 19 each, Turkey par-
ation of 28 of the 93 conflicts, while ticipated in 17, Russia 15, and Italy (in-
long and bloody wars tended to begin in cluding its predecessor, Sardinia) 11.
July and September. No one season or All of these nations were members of the
month stands out when it comes to the system for the full 150 years. Spain,
termination of war. This latter finding, which fought in 9 wars, and the United
when compared to the onset patterns, States, which fought in 6, are two other
lends credence to the thesis that policy charter members of the system with sig-
makers are influenced by the season nificant war experience. Those with a
when they consider a war/no-war de- shorter tenure are led by Austria-Hun-
cision, but that once the war is under gary with participation in 8 wars, Greece
way, more nonrational factors militate and Japan with 7, and Germany (in-
against weather or supplies playing such cluding its predecessor, Prussia) with 6.
a crucial role. Of course, much of this As might be expected, many of these
is conjecture. Before we can attest nations also sustained the most battle
with certainty to the proposition that deaths, with Russia, Germany, China,
weather and climate weigh heavily with France, Japan, England, Austria-Hun-
the decision-maker, we must compare gary, Italy, and Turkey, in that order,
similar sets of crises, which did and did all suffering 750,000 or more. More-
not terminate in war, with specific sea- over, 39 percent of all the system’s na-
sonal variables. tion months of war were accounted for
by 5 nations-France, England, Turkey,
THE WAR PRONENESS OF NATIONS
Spain, and Russia-whereas 39 of the
Whereas systemic patterns of interna- 43 extra-systemic wars were fought by
tional violence are most interesting to 7 states-England 12, France 7, Tur-
the political theorist, the record of indi- key 6, Russia 5, Spain 4, Holland 3, and
vidual nations’ martial activities has Austria-Hungary 2.
long fascinated historians. Many have Obviously, major powers were the
argued that some nations (perhaps dur- most war-prone, with Turkey, Spain,
ing certain periods) are more aggressive and Greece the only non-majors to ap-
than others, or that some ethnic groups pear in this firmament.9 No major
are naturally warlike whereas others are powers were able to escape this scourge,
naturally pacific. At the same time, which may, in fact, turn out to be a
repeated involvement in war may not prerequisite for achievement of that ex-
necessarily relate to any innate charac- alted status. On the other hand, most
teristic but merely to the misfortune of of the smaller states, and especially
being geographically proximate to preda- 9. Our major powers (reflecting the histori-
tory powers. By computing the number ans’ consensus) were England 1815-1965,
and severity of wars experienced by France 1815-1940, 1945-1965, Germany 1815-
each nation during its tenure in the 1918, 1925-1945, Russia 1815-1917, 1921-1965,
obtain a more accurate Austria-Hungary, 1815-1918, Italy 1860-1943,
system, we can
United States 1899-1965, Japan 1895-1945, and
indication of the distribution of wars China 1950-1965.
152
or worse yet, it could tempt a third nation (s) which made the first attack on
power which felt it could easily defeat an opponents’ armies or territories.
the nation whose military record was Clearly, initiator and aggressor are not
less than impressive. The data upon always identical, as a participant might
which one might base such generaliza- provoke its adversary into military ac-
tions are offered in Table 2, which shows tion by mobilization or other aggressive
each nation’s record of victories and diplomatic or economic actions. But the
defeats in all international wars, fol- designation of the initiator of military
lowed by its record for interstate wars aggression should nevertheless provide
only.tO Experiences in the one stalemate some tentative clues as to the relative
(the Korean war) have been excluded belligerency of system members.
from this tabulation. In examining the 49 interstate wars in
Thanks to their choice of enemies and which we were able to make this desig-
allies, as well as their military capabili- nation, we find that Italy was the actual
ties and skills, most of the major powers initiator(or on the side of the initiator)
have done rather well. The nine na- on occasions, France played that role
8
tions which were at one time or another on occasions, Germany and Japan on
6
major powers hold six of the first seven 5, and Austria-Hungary, Russia, and
positions and eight of the first thirteen Bulgaria on 4Y But when we turn
in terms of won-lost records. The one from sheer number of initiations to the
major power absent from this galaxy, frequency of initiation compared to the
China, achieved its poor record while it total number of war experiences, some
was a minor power-since 1950 China of the nations on this infamous list look
has won two wars and tied in another. a little less bellicose. Whereas Italy
Turkey, as was expected, has a dismal initiated or fought on the side of the
history in this realm, but the Italians, initiator in 8 of her 10 interstate wars,
often maligned for their legendary mili- Germany in 5 of her 6, Japan in 5 of
tary ineptitude, nevertheless emerged her 7, Austria-Hungary in 4 of her 6,
victorious in eight of their eleven en- and Bulgaria in all of her 4, France ini-
gagements. tiated only 6 of her 12 interstate wars
and Russia only 4 of her 10. Among
THE INITIATION OF INTERSTATE WAR
those nations with significant war ex-
A history of involvement in interna- perience which are absent from this list
tional war is a necessary but not suffi- and therefore, perhaps, more pacific,
cient indication of a nation’s bellicosity. are: the two &dquo;sick men&dquo; of Asia, Tur-
The determination of the initiator of key and China; three Balkan states,
military conflict, however,may tell us a Greece, Rumania, and Yugoslavia; and
bit more about a nation’s aggressive the two Anglo-Saxon major powers, Eng-
proclivities. When we speak of initia- land and the United States.
tion here, we are merely identifying the The decision to initiate hostilities is
related, in part, to the expectation of
10. In some cases, the distinction between victory. Few governments would move
victor and vanquished was difficult to make,
but in the end we "declared" a victor in all
first militarily unless they expected that
but one of the wars. For our purposes, na-
tions like Poland and Belgium in World War 11. The one case which we did not include
II, while defeated in the initial stages of the in this analysis was the Navarino Bay inci-
war, were considered victors since they dent of 1827. In several other wars, the label-
emerged at war’s end on the side of the win- ing of one side as initiator came only after
ning coalition. long and troubled consideration.
154
such preemption had a high probability or ally with, one another. Moreover,
of victory or, at least, of national sur- the experience of conflict against or alli-
vival. Not surprisingly, then, we find ance with a state in one war should
that initiators emerged victorious in 34 affect future relations with that state in
of the 49 interstate wars although they other wars and crises. In the Statistics
lost 14 times and experienced one stale- of Deadly Quarrels, Richardson reported
mate. As for battle fatalities, in 36 of that 48 percent of the pairs who fought
those 49, the initiators lost fewer men on opposite sides in all wars from 1820
than their opponents, and they were vic- to 1949, fought against each other on
torious in 6 of those 13 wars in which more than one occasion. But he also
their losses were greater than their op- found that 29 percent of those pairs who
ponents’. This is an impressive record had been allies in one war had already
when one considers that an attacking fought against each other in an earlier
force is generally assumed to lose more experience .13 Looking at our more re-
men than a defending force in a given stricted set of wars, we find somewhat
engagement. less evidence for the prevalence of his-
Of course, in almost 40 percent of the torical enmities and alliances.
cases, the initiator turned out to be a Of the 209 pairs who fought opposite
major power attacking a minor power. each other in our 50 interstate wars,
Of the 19 wars which saw such a one- only 19 percent had fought against each
sided confrontation, the major power other before, while 21 percent had been
initiated hostilities on 18 occasions and allies in an earlier war. As for those
won 17 of those 18 contests. 12 When pairs with more than one experience in
minors fought minors, the initiator won war (136), of the 95 pairs with some
14 times and lost 7, but when majors experience as opponents, 77 of them also
fought majors, the initiators won 3 fought at least once on the same side.
times and lost 5. Thus, initiation of Thus, in terms of war experience, few
hostilities appears to have been a major friendships or enmities have held up
advantage to the combatants, but an throughout our 150-year period. When
advantage which decreased in impor- we look only at those nations with 3 or
tance when the two sides were more more experiences as allies and none as
nearly equal in power. opponents in that period, we find that
France and England have been partners
TRADITIONAL ENMITIES AND
on 6 occasions, Greece and Yugoslavia
FRIENDSHIPS
on 4, and Belgium, England and France,
A nation’s record of participation, as Greece and England, Holland and Eng-
well as of success and of failure, in war land, and the United States, England,
has something to do with its historic and France on 3. As for historical en-
long-term relationship to other nations. mities, those with 3 or more experiences
Historians and political scientists have as opponents and none as allies are Rus-
written about the importance of tradi- sia and Turkey with 5 conflicts, Austria-
tional enmities and friendships between Hungary and Italy, and China and Ja-
nations, and speculated as to whether pan with 4, and Germany and France
similar governments, religions, ethnicity, with 3. While these listings conform to
or stages of economic development affect the historians’ generalizations, the large
the propensity of nations to war against, number of possible dyadic relationships
requires us to conclude that the notion
12. In 17 of these wars, the major power
shared a border with the minor power. 13. Richardson, op. cit., 196-199.
155