Jurado, Alexiss Mace L Judge Ramon Paulino Makasiar, Ret.

1C-JD5 Jurisdiction
People vs. Go, 719 SCRA 704, G.R. No. 168539 March 25, 2014

Doctrine:
The Sandiganbayan is a special criminal court which has exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019 committed by certain
public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by R.A. 8249. This
includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the said public officers. In the instant case, respondent is
being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, in conspiracy with
then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both respondent and Secretary
Enrile should have been charged before and tried jointly by the
Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter, this can no
longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does not follow
that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of and the
case involving herein respondent. To rule otherwise would mean that the
power of a court to decide a case would no longer be based on the law defining
its jurisdiction but on other factors, such as the death of one of the alleged
offenders.

Facts:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Resolution1
of the Third Division2 of the Sandiganbayan which quashed the Information
filed against herein respondent for alleged violation Republic Act No. 3019
(R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
A certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the Office of the
Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019.
Among those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman
and President of PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC
Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary Enrile) in entering into a contract which is
grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause
to indict, among others, herein respondent for violation of R.A. 3019. While
there was likewise a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he
was no longer indicted because he died prior to the issuance of the resolution
finding probable cause.
Thus, in an Information dated January 13, 2005, respondent was charged
before the SB as follows:
On or about July 12, 1997, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Pasay
City, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the late ARTURO ENRILE, then Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC), committing the offense in
relation to his office and taking advantage of the same, in conspiracy with
accused, HENRY T. GO, Chairman and President of the Philippine
International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO), did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully and criminally enter into a Concession Agreement, after the project
Jurado, Alexiss Mace L Judge Ramon Paulino Makasiar, Ret.
1C-JD5 Jurisdiction
for the construction of the NAIA IPT III which awarded to PIATCO, which
Concession Agreement substantially amended the draft Concession
Agreement covering the construction of the NAIA IPT III under Republic Act
6957, as amended by Republic Act 7718 (BOT law), specifically the provision
on Public Utility Revenues, as well as the assumption by the government of
the liabilities of PIATCO in the event of the latter's default under Article IV,
Section 4.04 (b) and (c) in relation to Article 1.06 of the Concession Agreement,
which terms are more beneficial to PIATCO while manifestly and grossly
disadvantageous to the government of the Republic of the Philippines.4
The SB ordered a resolution which provided the prosecution a period of ten
(10) days within which to show cause why this case should not be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the
accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged
co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this case.5
The prosecution complied with the above Order contending that the SB
has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of
his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when
he posted bail. The prosecution also argued that the SB has exclusive
jurisdiction over respondent's case, even if he is a private person, because he
was alleged to have conspired with a public officer.
Henry T. Go went to quash the information.
SB issued its assailed Resolution that the lone accused in this case is
a private person and his alleged co-conspirator-public official was already
deceased long before this case was filed in court, for lack of jurisdiction over
the person of the accused, the Court grants the Motion to Quash.

Issue:
DOES THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED ON THE GROUND THAT
IT HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF RESPONDENT GO.

Ruling:
The Court finds the petition meritorious.
Section 3 (g) of R.A. 3019 provides:
Sec. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions
of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to
be unlawful:
xxxx
(g) Entering, on behalf of the Government, into any contract or transaction
manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the same, whether or not the
public officer profited or will profit thereby.
The elements of the above provision are:
(1) that the accused is a public officer;
(2) that he entered into a contract or transaction on behalf of the government;
and
Jurado, Alexiss Mace L Judge Ramon Paulino Makasiar, Ret.
1C-JD5 Jurisdiction
(3) that such contract or transaction is grossly and manifestly
disadvantageous to the government.11
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when
acting in conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer
any public officer with whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A.
3019. It does not mean, however, that the allegation of conspiracy between
them can no longer be proved or that their alleged conspiracy is already
expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile is his
criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the
basis of the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, among others, is that such private person must be
alleged to have acted in conspiracy with a public officer.
x x x [a] conspiracy is in its nature a joint offense. One person cannot conspire
alone. The crime depends upon the joint act or intent of two or more persons.
Yet, it does not follow that one person cannot be convicted of conspiracy. So
long as the acquittal or death of a co-conspirator does not remove the bases
of a charge for conspiracy, one defendant may be found guilty of the offense.19
Once an express or implied conspiracy is proved, all of the conspirators
are liable as co-principals regardless of the extent and character of their
respective active participation in the commission of the crime or crimes
perpetrated in furtherance of the conspiracy because in contemplation of law
the act of one is the act of all.
It is in this light that conspiracy is generally viewed not as a separate
indictable offense, but a rule for collectivizing criminal liability.
Private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for
Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well
settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking
affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction
of the court.27
Thus, it has been held that:
When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by
virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of
his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the
court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives
bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits,
he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person.
Verily, petitioner’s participation in the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan was not confined to his opposition to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest but also covered other matters which called for respondent
court’s exercise of its jurisdiction. Petitioner may not be heard now to deny
said court’s jurisdiction over him. x x x.28
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the
instant case involves a contract entered into by public officers representing
Jurado, Alexiss Mace L Judge Ramon Paulino Makasiar, Ret.
1C-JD5 Jurisdiction
the government. More importantly, the SB is a special criminal court which
has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of R.A. 3019
committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended
by R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-
principals, accomplices or accessories with the said public officers. In the
instant case, respondent is being charged for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019, in conspiracy with then Secretary Enrile. Ideally, under the law, both
respondent and Secretary Enrile should have been charged before and tried
jointly by the Sandiganbayan. However, by reason of the death of the latter,
this can no longer be done. Nonetheless, for reasons already discussed, it does
not follow that the SB is already divested of its jurisdiction over the person of
and the case involving herein respondent.
Jurado, Alexiss Mace L Judge Ramon Paulino Makasiar, Ret.
1C-JD5 Jurisdiction
Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. United Salvage and Towage
(Phils.), Inc., 729 SCRA 113, G.R. No. 197515 July 2, 2014

Doctrine:
Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) shall have the power to promulgate rules and
regulations for the conduct of its business, and as may be needed, for the
uniformity of decisions within its jurisdiction.—Under Section 8 of Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 1125, the CTA is categorically described as a court of record. As
such, it shall have the power to promulgate rules and regulations for the
conduct of its business, and as may be needed, for the uniformity of decisions
within its jurisdiction. Moreover, as cases filed before it are litigated de novo,
party-litigants shall prove every minute aspect of their cases. Thus, no
evidentiary value can be given the pieces of evidence submitted by the BIR, as
the rules on documentary evidence require that these documents must be
formally offered before the CTA. Pertinent is Section 34, Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence which reads: SEC. 34. Offer of evidence.— The
court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The
purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.

Facts:
FACTS:
Respondent is engaged in the business of sub-contracting work for service
contractors engaged in petroleum operations in the Philippines.During the
taxable years in question, it had entered into various contracts and/or sub-
contracts with several petroleum service contractors, such as Shell
Philippines Exploration, B.V. and Alorn Production Philippines for the supply
of service vessels.
In the course of respondent’s operations, petitioner found respondent liable
for deficiency income tax, withholding tax, value-added tax (VAT) and
documentary stamp tax (DST) for taxable years 1992,1994, 1997 and 1998.
Particularly, petitioner, through BIR officials, issued demand letters with
attached assessment notices for withholding tax on compensation (WTC) and
expanded withholding tax (EWT) for taxable years 1992, 1994 and 1998.
On January 29, 1998 and October 24, 2001, USTP filed administrative
protests against the 1994 and 1998 EWT assessments.
On February 21, 2003, USTP appealed by way of Petition for Review before
the Court in action (which was thereafter raffled to the CTA-Special First
Division) alleging, among others, that the Notices of Assessment are bereft of
any facts, law, rules and regulations or jurisprudence; thus, the assessments
are void and the right of the government to assess and collect deficiency taxes
from it has prescribed on account of the failure to issue a valid notice of
assessment within the applicable period.
During the pendency of the proceedings, USTP moved to withdraw the
aforesaid Petition because it availed of the benefits of the Tax Amnesty
Program under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9480.Having complied with all the
Jurado, Alexiss Mace L Judge Ramon Paulino Makasiar, Ret.
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requirements therefor, the CTA-Special First Division partially granted the
Motion to Withdraw and declared the issues on income tax, VAT and DST
deficiencies closed and terminated in accordance with our pronouncement in
Philippine Banking Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
Consequently, the case was submitted for decision covering the remaining
issue on deficiency EWT and WTC, respectively, for taxable years 1992, 1994
and 1998.
CTA-Special First Division declared that the right of petitioner to collect the
deficiency EWT and WTC, respectively, for taxable year 1992 had already
lapsed pursuant to Section 203 of the Tax Code. Thus, in ruling for USTP, the
CTA-Special First Division cancelled Assessment Notice Nos. 25-1-00546-92
and 25-1-000545-92, both dated January 9, 1996 and covering the period of
1992, as declared in its Decision.

Issues:
Does the Expanded Withholding Tax Assessments issued by petitioner against
the respondent for taxable year 1994 was without any factual and legal basis?

Does the petitioner’s right to collect the creditable withholding tax and
expanded withholding tax for taxable year 1992 has already prescribed?

Held:
It is clear from the foregoing that a taxpayer must be informed in writing of
the legal and factual bases of the tax assessment made against him. The use
of the word "shall" in these legal provisions indicates the mandatory nature of
the requirements laid down therein.
In the present case, a mere perusal of the FAN for the deficiency EWT for
taxable year 1994will show that other than a tabulation of the alleged
deficiency taxes due, no further detail regarding the assessment was provided
by petitioner. Only the resulting interest, surcharge and penalty were
anchored with legal basis. Petitioner should have at least attached a detailed
notice of discrepancy or stated an explanation why the amount of P48,461.76
is collectible against respondent and how the same was arrived at. Any short-
cuts to the prescribed content of the assessment or the process thereof should
not be countenanced, in consonance with the ruling in Commissioner of
Internal Revenue v. Enron Subic Power Corporation.
We disagree. The advice of tax deficiency, given by the CIR to an employee of
Enron, as well as the preliminary five-day letter, were not valid substitutes for
the mandatory notice in writing of the legal and factual bases of the
assessment. These steps were mere perfunctory discharges of the CIR’s duties
incorrectly assessing a taxpayer. The requirement for issuing a preliminary or
final notice, as the case may be, informing a taxpayer of the existence of a
deficiency tax assessment is markedly different from the requirement of what
such notice must contain. Just because the CIR issued an advice, a
preliminary letter during the pre-assessment stage and a final notice, in the
Jurado, Alexiss Mace L Judge Ramon Paulino Makasiar, Ret.
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order required by law, does not necessarily mean that Enron was informed of
the law and facts on which the deficiency tax assessment was made.
The law requires that the legal and factual bases of the assessment be stated
in the formal letter of demand and assessment notice. Thus, such cannot be
presumed. Otherwise, the express provisions of Article 228 of the NIRC and
RR No. 12-99 would be rendered nugatory. The alleged "factual bases" in the
advice, preliminary letter and "audit working papers" did not suffice. There
was no going around the mandate of the law that the legal and factual bases
of the assessment be stated in writing in the formal letter of demand
accompanying the assessment notice.
We note that the old law merely required that the taxpayer be notified of the
assessment made by the CIR. This was changed in 1998 and the taxpayer
must now be informed not only of the law but also of the facts on which the
assessment is made. Such amendment is in keeping with the constitutional
principle that no person shall be deprived of property without due process. In
view of the absence of a fair opportunity for Enron to be informed of the legal
and factual bases of the assessment against it, the assessment in question
was void
Applying the aforequoted rulings to the case at bar, it is clear that the assailed
deficiency tax assessment for the EWT in 1994disregarded the provisions of
Section 228 of the Tax Code, as amended, as well as Section 3.1.4 of Revenue
Regulations No. 12-99 by not providing the legal and factual bases of the
assessment. Hence, the formal letter of demand and the notice of assessment
issued relative thereto are void.
Jurado, Alexiss Mace L Judge Ramon Paulino Makasiar, Ret.
1C-JD5 Jurisdiction
Miramar Fish Company, In.c vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 724
SCRA 611, G.R. No. 185432 June 4, 2014

Doctrine:
Section 7 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 1125, which was thereafter amended by
RA No. 9282, clearly defined the appellate jurisdiction of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA).—Section 7 of RA No. 1125, which was thereafter amended by
RA No. 9282, clearly defined the appellate jurisdiction of the CTA: Section 7.
Jurisdiction.—The Court of Tax Appeals shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction to review by appeal, as herein provided. (1) Decisions of the
Collector of Internal Revenue in cases involving disputed assessments,
refunds of internal revenue taxes, fees or other charges, penalties imposed in
relation thereto, or other matters arising under the National Internal Revenue
Code or other law or part of law administered by the Bureau of Internal
Revenue.

Facts:
Petitioner is a duly organized corporation under Philippine laws. It is
registered with the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and Board of Invest-
ments (BOI). Miramar filed its administrative claim for refund in years 2003
and 2004 with the BIR. The latter did not take action on the claims, hence
Miramar filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) on
March 30 2004.
The CTA denied the petition stating that Miramar failed to imprint the word
“zero-rated” on the invoices or receipts.

Issue:
Is Miramar entitled to the issuance of a tax credit certificate (TCC)?

Held:
The SC ruled that petitioner filed its judicial claim for refund insofar as to the
four quarters of taxable year 2002 beyond the 30-day period. The Court
explained:
“We summarize the rules on the determination of the prescriptive period for
filing a tax refund or credit of unutilized input VAT as provided in Section 112
of the 1997 Tax Code, as follows:
“(1) An administrative claim must be filed with the CIR within two years after
the close of the taxable quarter when the zero-rated or effectively zero-rated
sales were made.
“(2) The CIR has 120 days from the date of submission of complete documents
in support of the administrative claim within which to decide whether to grant
a refund or issue a tax credit certificate. The 120-day period may extend
beyond the two-year period from the filing of the administrative claim if the
claim is filed in the later part of the two-year period. If the 120-day period
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expires without any decision from the CIR, then the administra-tive claim may
be considered to be denied by in action.
“(3) A judicial claim must be filed with the CTA within 30 days from the receipt
of the CIR’s decision denying the administrative claim or from the expiration
of the 120-day period without any action from the CIR. “(4) All taxpayers, how-
ever, can rely on BIR Ruling No. DA-489-03 from the time of its issuance on
10 December 2003 up to its reversal by this Court in Aichi on 6 October 2010,
as an exception to the mandatory and jurisdictional 120+30 day periods.”
In denying the Petition for Review on Certiorari, the Court stressed:
“By way of reiteration, the CTA has no jurisdiction over petitioner’s judicial
appeal covering its refund claim for taxable year 2002 on the ground of
prescription, consistent with the ruling in the San Roque case. While as to its
refund claim for taxable year 2003, the same shall likewise be denied for
failure of petitioner to comply with the mandatory invoicing requirements
provided for under Section 113 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended,