Very Roman Coup

A Very Roman Coup: The Hidden War of Imperial Succession, AD 96-8
Author(s): Andrew Berriman, Malcolm Todd and Malcom Todd

Source: Historia: Zeitschrift für Alte Geschichte, Bd. 50, H. 3 (3rd Qtr., 2001), pp. 312-331
Published by: Franz Steiner Verlag
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/4436620
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A VERY ROMAN COUP: THE HIDDEN WAR OF IMPERIAL
SUCCESSION, AD 96-8
(i) Introduction
The reign of Nerva stands as a bridge between two dynasties: after Domi-
tian, the last of the Flavians and before Trajan, first of the so-called "adoptive
emperors". It is a transition that, uniquely, saw the throne pass out of the hands
of an apparently well-established family and into another's, without the inter-
vention of a civil war. Add to that the myth, diligently established by contempo-
raries, of the glorious contrast between the degenerate and vicious rule of the
last Flavian and the Golden Age inaugurated by Trajan, and it is no wonder that
the means by which this apparent transformation came about are the subject of
repeated enquiry and speculation.
Yet explanations both for the accession of first Nerva and then Trajan to the
throne, and for the development and persistence of the accompanying historical
myth, have been lacking in completeness. In this article, building on the results
of earlier scholarship, an explanation is offered for the events of 96-8 along
with a plausible model for the political background to the reign of Nerva, the
accession of Trajan and the demonization of Domitian. Along the way, we hope
to shed light on two much-discussed, but often misunderstood topics: the
identity (and the role) of the so-called "Ignotus" of Syria in Pliny, Ep. 9.13.1 1;
and the Praetorian Revolt of 97, in particular the role of Casperius Aelianus.
Our analysis of, and emphasis on evidence relating to the Roman army will help
to shed greater light on this murky transition than has hitherto been possible.
(ii) Nerva's Background
To begin, however, at the beginning. When several individuals within

Domitian's household conspired to assassinate their master, they deemed it
advantageous to have ready a replacement, to take the vacant throne. That is not
hard to understand. There was every chance of success for a decisive move to
impose a new leader before the panic and confusion that an imperial assassina-
tion must bring could subside; while their own position, as virtual parricides,
would be untenable if they could not put their own man, obliged to them for his
position, in the place where he could best protect them. What is harder to
explain is their choice of M. Cocceius Nerva. It is generally assumed that he
Historia, Band L/3 (2001)

C Franz Steiner Verlag Wiesbaden GmbH, Sitz Stuttgart
A Very Roman Coup: the Hidden War of Imperial Succession, AD 96-8 313
was not a key political player and had not sought the succession or been
considered a potential rival by Domitian. He is seen, scornfully, as a quiet,
unassuming servant of the emperors from Nero to Domitian, who in the words
of Syme, "practised that discretion which men called 'quies' if they approved,
otherwise 'inertia' or 'segnitia"'.1 This is improbable. Nerva was not, after all,
the senate's choice (a fiction that seems often to be implicitly assumed by
modern scholars, though it is never stated). He was approached by the conspir-
ators, whose reasons for settling on a successor in advance we have already
seen. His elevation was at least approved by the Praetorian prefects.2 In 1978,
C.T.H.R. Ehrhardt argued that Nerva was in fact an important figure behind the
scenes at the imperial court for over thirty years.3 In truth, Nerva leaves
remarkably little impact on the historical record in this period. What there is,
however, is suggestive and not easily explained away.4 He is highly honoured
by three emperors. First Nero, after the suppression of the Pisonian conspiracy,
rewarded the then praetor-elect with honours that placed him on a par with
Sofonius Tigellinus, the loyal praetorian prefect who was instrumental in
saving Nero's throne.5 A few years later, having survived the turmoil of 68/9
without leaving a trace, Nerva emerges as consul ordinarius, as colleague of the
emperor Vespasian, in 71 - the only time that Vespasian shared the fasces with
anyone but his own sons. Vanishing once more from all historical record, Nerva
appears once more as an eponymous consul under Domitian: and not in any
normal year, but in 90, the year after Saturninus' unsuccessful revolt, when
Domitian's need to reward the loyal - or to conciliate the dubious - was so great
that the list of consuls was more than one-and-a-half times as great as in any
other year of his reign. We might notice in passing that one M. Ulpius Traianus,
who had demonstrated his loyalty by rushing with his army from Spain to
confront the usurper on the Rhine, had to wait until the following year to
receive his consulship.
All this can hardly be explained away as normal rewards for "caution and
loyalty to the government, whatever the government might be".6 Garzetti,
recognising a problem, takes Nerva's good character and reputation for granted
1 R. Syme, Tacitus (Oxford 1958), vol. I., p. 1.

2 Though A. Garzetti (Nerva, Rome 1950, p. 32) in claiming that Nerva was "without
doubt" chosen by the prefects, goes too far.
3 C.T.H.R. Ehrhardt, "Nerva's Background", Liverpool Classical Monthly 12.2 (Feb. 1978),
18-20. Ehrhardt went so far as to speculate that Nerva was the head of a sophisticated
intelligence network, indispensable to successive emperors and unassailable by any rivals
at Rome. If it was true that Nerva had no enemies, it was not because he was "colourless"
but "because none dared offend him" (p. 20, against Garzetti, Nerva [as in n. 2], p. 24 and
by implication Syme, loc. cit. n. 1).
4 For what follows, see Ehrhardt, art. cit. n. 3, 19-20.
5 Tacitus, Annals 15.72.1-5.
6 Thus Syme, Tacitus (as in n. I), I 2.
314 ANDREW BERRIMAN - MALCOLM TODD
and suggests that Nero was seeking to co-opt that reputation as a cloak of
respectability for his continued rule; and that Vespasian's selection of Nerva as
consular colleague was "an act of deference towards the senate", in choosing
one of its more distinguished but "politically more colourless" members.7 For
the second consulship, Garzetti offers no explanation. Clearly, Nerva's signifi-
cance has been underestimated, as Ehrhardt argues. Equally clearly, he was not
a militarily significant figure. We have no evidence that he ever held a military
command and Syme notes that there is no evidence of any links between the
future emperor and the leading army generals.8 It must, therefore, be a question
of the influence that he could bring to bear at Rome, among the "civilian"
senators and perhaps in other quarters. In this context, we might note that when
Nerva comes to the fore, it is often in a context where events at Rome, rather
than or as well as among the armies in the provinces, have a particular rele-
vance. Thus, the conspiracy of 65 was specifically centred on the Rome-based
elite and the Praetorian Guard. In 69, although Vespasian won the throne by the
might of his legions, he must have been anxious to ensure that his claim would
be accepted as quickly as possible in the City, before he himself could arrive,
particularly given the ambiguity of Primus' position during the campaign to
oust Vitellius.9 In 89, Domitian left Rome in a hurry to lead an army against the
usurper Saturninus: one might ask who minded the store for him in Rome at this
crucial moment. Most notably, of course, in 96, it was a palace conspiracy,
backed by the Praetorian Prefects, that removed Domitian and finally placed the
behind-the-scenes manipulator on the throne. We might also ponder Pliny's
comment, that Nerva "even as a private citizen took note of whatever was done
in the public interest".10 Clearly, Nerva had some active, if unofficial, role in
political life at the capital.
(iii) Opposition to Nerva
The general consensus is that Nerva's government was well-intentioned,

but essentially weak.11 Few would follow Garzetti's generous portrayal of
Nerva as emperor and reformer - though it is regrettable that few have picked
7 Garzetti, Nerva (as in n. 2), 23f.

8 Syme, Tacitus (as in n. I), I 3.
9 Tacitus, Hist. 3.7; 3.4-9; 3.52-3; 4.39; 4.80. Suetonius, Vesp. 25, says that there were
repeated conspiracies against Vespasian. C. Dio 64.9.4 claims that the Danube legions'
opposition to Vitellius stemmed solely from their desire to pillage Italy.
10 Ep. 7.33.9: nam privatus quoque attendebat his quae recte in publicofierent.
11 See, e.g., D.C.A. Shotter, "The Principate of Nerva: Some Observations on the Coin
Evidence", Historia 32 (1983), 215-226. R.P. Longden, "Nerva and Trajan", in C.A.H.
XI (1936), 188-222, portrayed Nerva's government as "a small cabal of elderly nobles".
up his assertion that Nerva was himself every bit as autocratic as Domitian.12
The tendency is to accept the myth, developed by Pliny and Tacitus, that
Nerva's reign represented a reversion to senatorial government, though it is
widely accepted that Trajan was every bit the autocrat with a benevolent face. 13
It is now widely accepted, however, that Nerva's reign, at least down to the
time of Trajan's adoption, was a period of great political instability at Rome and
abroad.14 The prime evidence is from Pliny and Dio; and the chief manifestations
are the alleged plot of Calpurnius Crassus against Nerva's life; the concerns
reported by Pliny about an unnamed governor in the East in the first half of 97;
and of course, the revolt of the Praetorian Guard later in the same year.'5 This
revolt should not be seen as coming out of a clear blue sky, however; and it is
important to see the discontent of the Praetorians in the context of army attitudes
in general, as revealed in Suetonius' report of reaction to Domitian's death:
"The people received the news of his death with indifference, but the
soldiers were greatly grieved and at once attempted to call him the Deified
Domitian; while they were prepared also to avenge him, had they not lacked
leaders. This, however, they did accomplish a little later by insistently
demanding the execution of his murderers."'6
Nerva, as any emperor would have done at the outset of his reign, but especially
given the circumstances in which he came to the purple, did his best to assert his
authority with the provincial armies. That they were a cause for concern must
be indicated by the appearance (for the first time since 69/70) of coins bearing
the legend CONCORDIA EXERCITVVM.17 The obvious comparison with 68/
9 (the "Year of Four Emperors") is frequently drawn and not wholly invalid.
However, as Garzetti pointed out, Nero's downfall and death came after the
start of the Civil War (the revolts of Vindex and Galba).'8 There had not been a
12 Garzetti, Nerva (as in n. 2), 98f.

13 Longden (as in n. 11), C.A.H. XI 201; Syme, Tacitus (as in n. 1), I 3ff. (by implication);
Shotter (as in n. 11), Historia 32, 224f; K.H. Waters, "Tralanus Domitiani Continuator".
A.J.Ph. 90 (1969), 385-405, at 386.
14 See especially Syme, Tacitus (as in n. 1), I chapter 1 and Introduction, p. xiii. For an
extreme view, idem, "The Imperial Finances under Domitian, Nerva and Trajan", J.R.S.
20 (1930), 55-70 [=Roman Papers vol. I (1979), 1-17].
15 Crassus: Dio 68.3.1; Pliny, Ep. 9.13, Pan. 5.6-6.4, 9.1f., see also Dio 68.1.3 on infighting
at Rome.
16 Suet., Dom. 23 (Loeb, trans. J.C. Rolfe). Philostratos, V.S. 1.7.2, and Aurelius Victor, de
Caes. 11, also provide evidence for army disaffection with Nerva's replacement of Domi-
tian, though not too much weight should be placed on these late and less reliable sources.
17 BMC Nerva 4-9. See Syme, Tacitus (as in n. 1), I 7, 10. Garzetti cannot be right when he
claims that: "Un opposizione tra Nerva e gli eserciti non e da trovare." (Nerva [as in n. 3],
101).
18 Nerva (as in n. 3), 39f.
comparable build-up to the death of Domitian, so it should not be surprising that

there was no immediate military reaction. Supporters among the governors may
have been found. The army in Pannonia, which with four legions contained the
largest legionary contingent of any province, campaigned against the Suebi and
sent laurels proclaiming victory to Rome in the autumn of 97.19 It would be
reasonable to take this as a sign that this province (under its governor, possibly
Pompeius Longinus), was willing, on the surface at least, to back Nerva. The
campaign would serve to link the legions involved with the new emperor, under
whose auspices the campaign was fought.20
There were other ways in which an emperor created at Rome (without the
military prestige or connections that would help to gain acceptance) might hope
to lessen the potential for opposition to his rule. His consular appointments now
take on a crucial significance. Verginius Rufus, now over eighty years old,
became consul ordinarius with Nerva at the beginning of 97. A figure made
famous at the outset of a civil war in 68, it cannot be coincidental that he should
come to the political forefront (in spite of his infirmity) at this particular time. The
legions, and their commanders, were expected to take notice - and the legions on
the Rhine in particular (since Verginius Rufus was commander of Upper Germa-
ny when he belatedly withdrew his support for Nero). Another action of Nerva at
this time, again not likely to have been without a political motive, was the belated
award of a triumphal statue to the former commander of Lower Germany,
Vestricius Spurinna, for victories achieved probably in the early years of Domi-
tian - as inferred from Pliny, Ep. 2.7.2. These actions, together with the fact that
Trajan was the governor of Upper Germany when he was adopted by Nerva, and
also that Licinius Sura (governor of Lower Germany sometime between 95 and
9821) is recorded by a late source as having been the power behind the throne
(urging Trajan to seize it22), focus on the Rhine legions. This again is not likely to
be coincidental. At the prospect of losing Domitian to the machinations of a rebel
in 89, the Lower Rhine legions (I Minervia, X Gemina, XXII Primigenia and VI
Victrix) had mobilised and defeated the legions of Moguntiacum in battle. They
were rewarded with the honorific titles - pia fidelis Domitiana. In 96, these four
units comprised two-thirds of the legionary force on the Rhine.23 Legions which
had shed blood to save Domitian in 89, might feel particularly angry (and worried
19 Pliny, Pan. 8.2; Dio 68.3.4.

20 See A.P. Berriman, Domestic Politics and the Movement of Roman Legions, from Gaius
to Trajan (PhD thesis, Nottingham 1998), Chapter 7, "Nerva to Trajan".
21 C.P. Jones, "Sura and Senecio", J.R.S. 60 (1970), 98-104.
22 Epit. De Caes. 13.6.
23 There were now three legions in each of the German provinces, instead of the previous
four, with XXII Primigenia moving to the Upper Province in 92, where the two other
legions, VIII Augusta and XI Claudia, had not supported Saturninus but had received no
credit for opposing him.
about their status under a new regime) after his murder in 96. Although there is
specific testimony (albeit from an unreliable source) that at least one unnamed
Danube legion was mutinous after Domitian's murder,24 it must be remembered
that, by their actions in 89, the four legions then in Lower Germany had made a
particular commitment to that emperor. Moreover, successful in battle, these
legions would be confident enough to refuse to toe the line, if another potential
emperor appeared with the backing of another army group, or if an emperor was
made at Rome to whom they took exception. Their proximity to Rome also made
them a proposition to be reckoned with (a factor that the governor of Syria, if he
wanted to make a claim, would have to consider25).
During other crisis periods under the Principate, the Rhine legions had
played crucial roles. Their loyalty to the commander of the Upper Province,
Gaetulicus, had concerned Gaius. There was pressure on them to rebel after
Claudius came to power. The empire stood and watched, after the revolt of
Vindex in 68, to see how the Rhine legions would behave. Historically, there
was an expectation that the legions on the Rhine frontier would exert influence
in crisis periods such as came about after the assassination of Domitian.
Successful in fighting in 89 (again committing itself in a crisis period), a weight
of expectation would be on them in 96/7.
For the Danube legions, a different impression emerges. Victorious in some
wars fought under Domitian (initially in 86, in 88 and 89), but defeated in some
instances (in 85, 86, and at least initially in 92), they might not have the same
level of confidence in their ability to influence political events as would those
on the Rhine (in spite of the fact that there were more legions on the Danube
frontier than on the Rhine - nine as opposed to six). The successful campaign
undertaken by the four legions of Pannonia in 97 (against the Suebi) may well
have been motivated not just by the expediency of such a campaign in military
terms, but also by a desire on Nerva's part to build up the confidence and
reputation of the Pannonian legions, as a counterweight to the confidence of the
legions on the Rhine. With a comparable level of self-belief, the new emperor
could hope that the Pannonian legions would not just follow the same course of
action as the Rhine legions. In this way, Nerva hoped to deter a military
challenge to his rule.
(iv) A Governor in the East
At this point, a short digression: discussion of potential challenges for the

throne at this time usually centres not on the Danube, but on the eastern
provinces, particularly Syria. The chief suspect is the so-called "rival of Trajan"
24 Philostratos, Vit. Soph. 1.7.1.

25 See below, section (iv).
known from Pliny, the much-discussed "Ignotus" of Ep. 9.13.26 This is what
Pliny - in a letter written some years after the event and published still later27 -
has to say: a consular friend, warning Pliny against making powerful enemies,
"named someone who was then in the east, at the head of a powerful and
celebrated army, and about whom some serious though unconfirmed rumours
were circulating".28
There are further hints of troubling events in Syria, in the epigraphic record.
Syme identified an important clue long ago, in the curious career of A. Larcius
Priscus, cos. suff 110. While still a mere quaestorian senator, this Priscus
became legionary legate of IV Scythica, based in Syria, and acting governor of
the province.29 Given the known date of his consulship and his likely birth soon
after 70, Priscus must have been in Syria in the late 90s.30 It appears not to have
been unusual for the commander of IV Scythica to deputise for the governor in
the latter's absence - but it was highly unusual at this time for the man given
this important command to be of less than praetorian rank.31 Indeed, as Priscus'
previous post was as quaestor of Asia, it seems likely that he moved directly
from that province to his irregular command. Nor is this the only unusual
appointment around this time. C. Julius Proculus (cos. suffJ 109) was legionary
tribune of IV Scythica after being q[uaestor] Augustorum.32 "That," says Syme,
"is so anomalous as to appear improbable."33 There was also another, nameless
senator, who held two legionary commands in succession, while still of quaesto-
rian rank: with XVI Flavia in Cappadocia under Nerva, and with VI Ferrata in
Syria, under Trajan.34
Clearly, some sort of political tension must underlie this very unusual
combination of transfers and appointments. Both the absence of a regular
26 See W. Eck, "Jahres- und Provinzialfasten der senatorischen Statthalter von 69/70 bis
138/9, 1. Teil", Chiron 12 (1982), 281-362 at 324; R. Syme, "Governors Dying in Syria",
Z.P.E. 41 (1981), 125-144 at 137ff.; G. Alfoldy & H. Halfmann, "M. Cornelius Nigrinus
Curiatius Maternus, General Domitians und Rivale Trajans", Chiron 3 (1973), 331-373 at
361 ff., with reference to earlier discussions at p. 363 n. 145 and p. 365 n. 155.
27 The 'book date' for Book 9 is reckoned by Sherwin-White to be 106-108, with publication
possibly as late as 110. A.N. Sherwin-White, The Letters of Pliny: a Historical and Social
Commentary (1966), 41, 56. Sherwin-White dismisses earlier doubts that Ep. 9.13 was
composed significantly earlier than the general run of letters in Book 9, though in another
context he appears to offer a possible reason for believing that it was (see note 51 below).
28 Ep. 9.13.1 1: Nominat quendam qui tunc ad orientem amplissimum <et famosissimum>
exercitum non sine magnis dubiisque rumoribus obtinebat (Loeb, trans. Radice).
29 ILS 1055; Ann. ep. 1908, nr. 237.
30 R. Syme, "A Governor of Syria under Nerva", Philologus 91 (1936), 238-245, at 238ff.
31 Ibid. 241.
32 ILS 1090.
33 Syme, Tacitus (as in n. 1), II 631.
34 ILS 1020 - cf. Syme, ibid.
governor and the transfer of several junior senators from neighbouring provinc-
es to take up senior positions demand some attempt at explanation. There are
many and various reasons why a governor might not be available - death in
Syria, even without military action, was not uncommon. Yet that would not
account for the wholesale replacement of his senior staff. For Syme, "it is idle
and frivolous to toy with conjecture when a well-attested fact of the year 97 is
ready to hand.",35 After the transfer of power was completed in 98, "It may now
have been advisable for Trajan to displace some of the army commanders,
rivals actual or potential." Syria's governor "was suppressed or removed - or
perhaps, on hearing that the Roman world had a master at last, he departed in
some precipitation to make his peace with Trajan."36
But who was this alleged rival of Trajan? Much effort over the years has
been devoted to identifying the "someone" referred to by Pliny (above). For
many years, the favourite candidate was Javolenus Priscus, an eminent jurist
under Trajan, who crops up elsewhere in Pliny's correspondence and was
governor of Syria (which is generally taken to be the home of the "powerful
army in the east") at about this time.37 In recent years, this has been disputed -
partly out of a reluctance to accept that Priscus, known as a jurist and member
of Trajan's consilium rather than a military man, could have contemplated a
challenge for the throne, much less that he would have remained in favour with
Trajan thereafter;38 and partly out of the appearance of an enticing alternative
figure, also a governor of Syria around this time, but unknown until twenty-five
years ago. M. Cornelius Nigrinus was introduced to the world by Geza Alfoldy
35 Syme, Philologus 91 (as in n. 30), 243.

36 Ibid. Syme returns to the argument in Tacitus (as in n. 1), 1 16, describing the "exception-
al" appointment of Larcius Priscus as "denot[ing] a state of emergency".
37 ILS 1015. For discussions of the date of Priscus' tenure, see Eck, Chiron 12, 316; Syme,
Z.P.E. 41 (as in n. 26), 141f.; idem, Tacitus (as in n. 1), 11 632; idem, Philologus 91 (as in
n. 30), 243f.; Sherwin-White, Letters of Pliny (as in n. 27), 173ff. An alternative candi-
date would be the governor of Cappadocia, who was at that time Pomponius Bassus,
known to be a friend of Trajan (Syme, Tacitus [as in n. 1], I 16 with n. 1). The possibilities
raised are intriguing, but it seems improbable that Bassus' two legions would be de-
scribed as "amplissimum exercitum" when his neighbour, the governor of Syria, com-
manded three.
38 Thus, Syme, Tacitus (as in n. 1), II 631 f.; cf. idem, "Domitian: the Last Years", Chiron 13
(1983), 121-146 at 144: "Imprudent political ambitions will not lightly be ascribed to
jurists"; W. Eck, Senatoren von Vespasian bis Hadrian (Munich 1970), 150 with n. 161;
above all, Alfoldy and Halfmann (as in n. 26), Chiron 3, 365: "Wir wissen von ihm [sc.
Priscus], daB er unter Trajan - wahrscheinlich im Amtsjahr 101/2 - zum proconsul
Africae aufstieg, zumindest um 106/107 sogar fur das consilium principis herangezogen
wurde und auch spater noch als beruhmter und hochangesehener Jurist offentlich tatig
war; eine derartige Stelle im offentlichen Leben fur einen ehemals gefahrlichen poli-
tischen Rivalen Trajans ware kaum anzunehmen."
and Helmut Halfmann in 1973.39 There is much to commend the reconstruction

of his career put forward in their article and Syme - who had embraced
Javolenus as the unnamed governor in the 1930s, but strongly doubted it by the
late 1950s - eagerly adopted Nigrinus for the role in the 1980s (though not
without acknowledging the "chance to be conceded that Nigrinus, although
prepollent on the known evidence, is not the Ignotus").40
There are problems with either identification, but the case for Priscus, we
would argue, has been too quickly set aside. Much depends on two further
letters of Pliny. Ep. 2.13 is addressed to a "Priscus", identified as the command-
er of an exercitum amplissimum, whom Pliny approaches to provide a post as
tribune for his protege, Voconius Romanus. The letter is variously dated to 97
or to about 100. If the former, there is simply no 'Priscus' available who could
have been in command of a significant army for some time (as it is clear from
Pliny's introductory remarks that this Priscus had been), except Javolenus. If
the later date is correct, a much more plausible candidate, with whom Pliny
certainly had connections, is L. Neratius Priscus, governor of Lower Germany
at this time.41 However, as Sherwin-White argued in 1966, such a late date for
Ep. 2.13 is hardly tenable.42 Pliny secured senatorial status for Voconius at the
very beginning of Trajan's reign,43 yet it is clear from the testimonial in Ep.
2.13 that he is at this point of no more than equestrian status. The letter must
therefore date to Nerva's reign and the recipient can hardly be anyone other
than Javolenus. Therefore, his governorship of Syria must fall in Nerva's reign.
(There is room for Nigrinus to have held Syria in 92/3-95/6, immediately
before Priscus.44)
39 See reference, note 26 above.

40 For Javolenus, Philologus 91 (as in n. 30), 243f.; doubts, Tacitus (as in n. 1), 1 8, II 632;
for Nigrinus, Z.P.E. 41 (as in n. 26), 140, Chiron 13 (as in n. 38), 145/6. The latter
identification is also accepted by Eck, Chiron 12 (as in n. 26), 324. cf. idem, "Jahres- und
Provinzialfasten der senatorischen Statthalter von 69/70 bis 138/9, 2. Teil", Chiron 13
(1983), 227.
41 Syme, Z.P.E. 41 (as in n. 26), 141f; Chiron 13 (as in n. 38), 143.
42 Sherwin-White, Letters of Pliny (as in n. 27), 28f., 173f., 179f. Sherwin-White is doubtful
about the implications for the identity of the Ignotus, however.
43 Ep. 10.4. At this point, it is true, the grant of senatorial status had not been confirmed and
Syme (Tacitus [as in n. 1], II 632) uses this to get around the difficulty, asserting that
Trajan refused to confirm the grant. However, as Sherwin-White (Letters [as in n. 27],
28f, 173f., 179f.) argued, this is quite incredible: the matter had been agreed in principle
by Nerva and awaited only technical confirmation. Would Trajan - who was willing in
another case to bend his own rules in a liberal direction to oblige a client of Pliny (Ep.
10.5-7, the Alexandrian doctor, Arpocras) - really risk causing offence by overturning a
decision in principle made by his predecessor, and that at the very beginning of his reign?
44 Denied by Alfoldy and Halfmann, Chiron 3 (as in n. 26), 361 f.; however, Syme, Z.P.E. 41
(as in n. 26), 144, allows for a gap in this period, into which he proposes to insert
Javolenus Priscus. Nigrinus would fit just as well.
Some weight is also placed on Ep. 6.15 - a letter addressed to Voconius

Romanus, and containing the one certain reference to Javolenus in Pliny's
correspondence. It is pointed out that Pliny is markedly critical of Javolenus in
this letter (he questions the consular's sanity, no less), which makes it hard to
believe that the man was a friend or patron of Pliny.45 However, this need not be
a serious obstacle.46 It is clear that the commander Priscus of Ep. 2.13 is not a
particular friend or regular patron, on whose favour Pliny could expect to
presume. You have, says Pliny, had "a long time, in which to confer benefits on
your own friends. Turn to mine - they are not many."47 This looks like a bit of
a long shot from Pliny - perhaps even an attempt to build a relationship with a
man too powerful to risk as an enemy. The negative tone of Ep. 6.15 (especially
as the recipient was Romanus) and the sly reference in 9.13, if Priscus is the
"Ignotus", may indicate that the attempt was not successful.48
The chief objection to Nigrinus, apart from some reservations recorded by
Syme about his apparent lack of pedigree, is the total silence about him in the
literary record. Syme reminds us that even well-known individuals can vanish
from historical view; while Alfoldy and Halfmann suggest that the silence is
deliberate, reflecting a fall into disgrace as a failed rival of Trajan.49 However,
this is most unlikely. Pliny, for one, is not afraid to disparage his opponents,
especially if they can be portrayed as opponents of the deified Nerva or the
lionised Trajan - provided that they are safely out of the way.50 His reticence in
the case of the "governor in the east" makes more sense if it refers to Priscus,
precisely because the latter continued to enjoy the favour of the emperor and
the respect of his peers. Certainly, it would be inadvisable to remind people too
openly that his loyalties in the crucial year 97 had been questionable.51
45 Thus Sherwin-White, Letters of Pliny (as in n. 27), 175.

46 Indeed, Stephane Gsell, Essai sur le regne de l'empereur Domitien (Paris 1894), 354f.
cites it in support of the identification of Javolenus as the unnamed governor.
47 Ep. 2.13.2 (Loeb, trans. Radice).
48 It may seem a risky time to have sought a posting for a friend, to a difficult region, under
a governor of questionable loyalty. However, Pliny claims (in Ep. 9.13) to have exposed
himself to unwelcome attention in his attack on Publicius Certus in the Senate and the
implication is that Certus was an ally of the unnamed governor. It would be typical of
Pliny to seize whatever opportunity presented itself to mend his fences. The circumstanc-
es also make Priscus' apparent rebuff of his advances readily understandable.
49 Syme (as in n. 38), Chiron 13, 146; Alfoldy & Halfmann (as in n. 26), Chiron 3, 366f.
50 See Sherwin-White, Letters (as in n. 27), 55, for the list. Most are dead or (in the case of
Regulus, Pliny's favourite target) clearly spent forces by the time of the Letters' publica-
tion. In Javolenus' case, there is some doubt whether he is criticised by name in his
lifetime (Ep. 6.15), due to uncertainty about the dates both of the publication of Book 6
and of the jurist's death.
51 This provides the justification mentioned above (note 27) for doubting that Ep. 13 is
contemporary with most of Book 9. The letter may well have been composed and even
read publicly, much earlier in Trajan's reign, with the sly reference contained, but
In any case, much of the discussion of the Ignotus has been misguided,
because so much attention has been devoted to his identity and too little to the
role that he played in events. There is in fact no justification for describing him,
as Alfoldy and Halfmann do, as a "rival of Trajan". It is important to bear in
mind the date of the incident described by Pliny. The absence of any reference
to the Praetorian revolt must mean that it had not happened yet (it could hardly
be ignored in the context), while a clearer (if still imprecise) indication of date
is given by the reference to Domitius Apollinaris as "consul designate".52 The
debate must therefore have taken place between January of 97 and the begin-
ning of Apollinaris' term as suffect, which was some time between May and
August of that year.53 The only emperor at that time, of course, was Nerva, and
the governor must have been seen as challenging his position. Not necessarily,
however, as a claimant on his own behalf - Pliny does not say that. Any
possible claimant to the throne from outside Rome would need to make sure of
the backing (or at least the compliance) of a significant section of the army,
such as the large force in Syria and the adjoining provinces. Whatever the
governor of Syria was doing, it could easily have been in support of another
pretender, more conveniently placed in relation to Rome.
Syme is likely to be right (above), that the vacancy in Syria is related to the
crisis in 97. But it is quite possible that the Syrian governor left his province
before the succession, or even the adoption of Trajan, perhaps in order to confer
with other leading military men on their reaction to the new regime, or else
simply to remove himself as a potential rival to Trajan in anyone's eyes, and
thus facilitate a united army stand against Nerva. This is an attractive hypothe-
sis for a number of reasons. It would fit with Pliny's testimony, which is likely
to date from the early part of the year (since Domitius Apollinaris may have
been consul as early as 1 May). Indeed, it may have been the very act of the
governor in leaving his province which gave rise to the rumours at Rome: the
senators might well wonder what he was up to. Furthermore, we should note
that Julius Proculus and Larcius Priscus (like Javolenus) continued to rise high
under Trajan, becoming consuls in 109 and 1 10, respectively. Note, though,
that this rise is not at a meteoric rate. The people who were put into positions of
authority in Syria, probably in 97, were of quaestorian rank. The message was
being given that the province would not be a threat (either to Nerva or to
Trajan). The fact that there was no abnormal improvement in the careers of A.
withheld from publication as too indiscreet at that time (as Sherwin-White almost sug-
gests, Letters [as in n. 27], 55). This would also allow Priscus to be dead by the time the
letter criticising him by name (Ep. 6.15) was published, while explaining why he is not
named in a letter published later. Alternatively, it may still have been too indiscreet to
name an ally of Trajan in such a context, even though the man himself was dead.
52 Ep. 9.13.13.
53 Syme, Tacitus (as in n. 1), II 641.
Larcius Priscus, or of C. Julius Proculus, supports the impression that there was
no dirty work to be done (no opponents to be removed) in Syria, and that a
voluntary exodus of senior staff is more likely. Moreover, there are no other
tell-tale signs that people of dubious loyalty had been removed. Neither Larcius
Priscus nor Julius Proculus receives the military decorations which might be
expected had they had to remove opponents.54
These appointments, we have argued, followed the exit of the governor of
Syria, and at least some of the senior military hierarchy of the province. It is a
matter of conjecture whether A. Larcius Priscus was chosen by Nerva, by
Trajan, or by the Ignotus on exiting his province (depending on just how much
the generals resisted the authority of Nerva prior to his adoption of Trajan). As
it appears to have been a privilege for the governor of the province to have a
relative in charge of IV Scythica, this precedent may have been called on almost
to legitimise his appointment of Larcius Priscus to this position (if this man was
related to the Ignotus, although this is a long shot55). The departing governor
would then have someone he could rely on in charge of the Syrian legions. If he
was not connected to the governor, the fact that Larcius Priscus was of quaesto-
rian rank, and therefore would not be seen as a threat, was the most important
consideration in his appointment.
Our hypothesis accounts for the fact that Larcius Priscus continued to do
well under Trajan. It also answers the question which has perplexed many
before now:56 what happened to the alleged danger from the governor in the
East? Perhaps, he did not die or fade away, but, having removed himself as a
possible perceived threat to Trajan, threw in his lot with other leading generals
in a combined challenge to Nerva's position.
54 In 42, the tribunus laticlavius of VIII Augusta (then in Pannonia), was given military
decorations revers(us) ex castr(is), a vague title strongly suggesting a security operation to
do with the revolt of Camillus Scribonianus, governor of Dalmatia, in that year, see L.J.F.
Keppie, "Legio VIii Augusta and the Claudian Civil War", Britannia 2 (1971), 154; another
tribunus laticlavius, this time of the British legion, 11 Augusta, received, after the civil war
of 69, military decorations in triplicate (normally reserved for legionary legates), suggest-
ing he played a role in the defection of this legion (and Britain) to Vespasian - see E.B.
Birley, "The Adherence of Britain to Vespasian", Britannia 9 (1978), 243-5. Another
tribunus laticlavius, of legio I Minervia received decorations, during Domitian's reign, ob
beilulm Germanicum] - Ann. Ap. 1950, 66 - possibly a fudge for his role in suppressing
Saturninus' revolt. Decorations awarded to Gaius Julius Karus, commander of an auxiliary
unit in Britain, are likely to be connected with the obscure circumstances in which the
governor of Britain, Sallustius Lucullus, was killed under Domitian - Ann. tp. 1951, 88;
R.W. Davies, "Military Decorations and the British War", Acta Classica 19 (1976), 115-
21; P. Conole & B.W. Jones, "Sallustius Lucullus", Latomus 42 (1983), 629-633.
55 As suggested tentatively by Syme (as in n. 30), Philologus 91, 244.
56 E.g. Alfoldy and Halfmann (as in n. 26), Chiron 3, 367; Syme, Tacitus (as in n. 1), I 10,
16.
(v) The Praetorian Revolt
That the government was vulnerable to challenge is shown by the events at

Rome of autumn 97. After apparently being quiescent for a year, the Praetorian
Guards rose up and forced Nerva to hand over the murderers of Domitian (his
own supporters) for them to execute, brushing his resistance aside. Petronius
and Parthenius, involved in the plot against Domitian and still active in the
emperor's court, were killed and the emperor was made to thank the Guards for
this deed, in front of an assembled mass of people. His standing broken, Nerva
was compelled to adopt Trajan as his heir and partner in power. On the whole,
this revolt has been taken to be a more or less spontaneous event, or one
fomented by the leader of the guard, Casperius Aelianus, for personal reasons.
Any involvement of Trajan - or any force outside Rome - in these matters is
usually emphatically denied. There is still widespread acceptance even for the
"authorised version" of events: that far from Trajan being implicated in the
revolt or even seeking to profit from it, his adoption was an act of political
acumen that rescued Nerva's government and put an end to strife.57
Yet there are good reasons for disbelieving this seeming innocence and
serendipity and perceiving instead a far more co-ordinated and sinister pattern
to events. As Syme (in a characteristic aside) conjectured: "The whole thing
could have begun as conspiracy, designed not to rescue Nerva, but to supplant
him," adding in a footnote: "Indeed, nothing proves that Trajan was not the
candidate of the Prefect of the Guard".58 Earlier in the same chapter, he had
noted that after the Praetorians' revolt, "the profit went to others. It seems
accident, there may be plan and design somewhere in the transaction."59 Yet
Syme seems never to have developed these ideas comprehensively. A quarter-
century later, he admitted: "there are clear temptations... [to] discover design
where chance or accident operates", but drew back from committing himself.60
57 Garzetti, Nerva (as in n. 2), 81-90; Syme, Tacitus (as in n. 1), I Chapters 1-2; idem,
"Guard Prefects of Trajan and Hadrian", J.R.S. 70 (1980), 64-80 at 64; idem (as in n. 38),
Chiron 13, 141; Shotter (as in n. 1I), Historia 32, 224; W. Kuhoff, Gnomon 63, 421.
Syme, who at times - for convenience's sake, perhaps - appeared to accept the standard
view of events (e.g. Tacitus [as in n. 1], I lOf.), simultaneously entertained more sinister
possibilities. Hence, he refers to the "friends and allies who extorted that appointment"
[se. of Trajan as heir] (ibid. I 14). In the former passage, he says: "Casperius Aelianus
exploits the trouble (if he does not instigate it)". In 1980, he was more emphatic:
"Casperius fomented riot and emergency", but still hedged on his relationship to Trajan
(J. R.S. 70, 64). See further below.
58 Tacitus (as in n. I), I 35, with n. 4.
59 ibid. I 13.
60 (as in n. 38), Chiron 13 (1983) 141.
There is one bold exception to the prevailing consensus: Dietmar Kienast

offers a radical reinterpretation of events,61 which would have Nerva as the
willing agent of the deaths of Domitian's assassins. The so-called Praetorian
Revolt, for Kienast, was an invention of Trajan and his apologists (notably
Pliny, in his Panegyricus) to explain away an incident which had seriously
undermined relations between Nerva and the Senate. Kienast's article goes a
long way towards explaining some of the incongruities that we seek to tackle in
this article. However, it suffers from a singular failing, in that it offers no
convincing alternative explanation for Nerva's decision to adopt Trajan - an act
for which, Kienast suggests, the removal of Parthenius and company paved the
way.62 His explanation - the threat from the eastern army commander and the
need for alternative military underpinning for his regime63 - is unconvincing, as
it fails to account for the almost complete disappearance of this alleged threat
from our sources, or for the evident coolness of relations between Nerva and
Trajan before the latter's succession. Kienast's is an interesting and plausible
interpretation of events, but less likely than the scenario that we offer below.64
Let us consider, first, the timing of the Revolt: the delay of up to a year after
Domitian's death suggests less a spontaneous expression of anger than a care-
fully planned rising. If the Praetorians were acting as part of a wider conspiracy,
the delay is easily explained: the legionary commanders, distributed around the
empire, required time to confer and plan.65 Notice, too, the association in the
sources of Trajan's adoption with the arrival at Rome of laurels heralding a
military victory over the Suebi.66 This circumstance has led the latest biogra-
pher of Trajan to assume, against the weight of the literary evidence, that Trajan
commanded the Pannonian legions.67 Neither Pliny nor Dio make this link, and
61 D. Kienast, "Nerva und das Kaisertum Trajans", Historia 17 (1968), 51-71.

62 Ibid. 62.
63 Ibid. 59.
64 Kienast's article should, however, have received more attention than it has done.
(as in n. 13), A.J.Ph. 90, mentions the article without giving any hint of the radical
of its argument; Karl-Heinz Schwarte, "Trajans Regierungsbeginn und der 'Agric
Tacitus", Bonner Jahrbucher 179 (1979), 139-176 rejects his central contention w
citing Kienast and refers to a minor point in Kienast's argument only to reject it (p.
62, 152 n. 80). Karl Strobel, "Zu zeitgeschichtlichen Aspekten im 'Panegyricu
jungeren Plinius", in K. Strobel & J. Knape, Zur Deutung von Geschichte in Anti
Mittelalter (Bamberger Hochschulschriften 11, 1985), provides a detailed critic
Kienast at pp. 32ff., but otherwise his hypothesis has been largely ignored.
65 As Syme noted in discussion of the latter days of Domitian's reign, "for a
proclamation, distance and time hampered consensus among the legates" ([as in
Chiron 13, 138). But if they were patient, these need not be insuperable obsta
Syme goes on to accept in the context of the revolt against Nerva (ibid. 141).
66 Pliny, Pan. 8.2; Dio 68.3.4.
67 J. Bennett, Trajan. Optimus Princeps (London 1997), 45-6.
the Byzantine chroniclers who claim Trajan was the victorious commander
have obviously taken the natural step of telescoping their information, since the
account in their sources is awkward.68 One wonders whether the threat posed to
Trajan's chances of succeeding Nerva by the success gained by the Pannonian
legions may be what sparked the mutiny of the Praetorian Guard, and the
subsequent adoption of Trajan, whose supporters at Rome decided that this
threat had to be faced.
Suetonius may be hinting at this, in the passage quoted earlier: the soldiers,
he says, were waiting for a leader, or rather, "leaders".69 It seems usually to be
assumed that by this Suetonius refers to Casperius Aelianus, who led the revolt
after becoming Prefect of the Guard. Yet this in itself raises a number of
questions. Firstly, why was Aelianus appointed to the post? He had held the
position under Domitian, but lost it, and was re-appointed by Nerva, some time
in the months after his accession.70 This move has been interpreted as a
conciliatory gesture to the Praetorian Guards,71 and an attempt to induce them
to accept the new regime. This is probably correct, but one can go further in
placing Aelianus in a political, factional context.
The Prefect is not usually seen as part of any wider conspiracy or faction in
Roman politics. However, the testimony of Suetonius, Dom. 23, combined with
the evidence previously discussed for discontent among the troops, supports the
suggestion that the Praetorian Guard, in securing the deaths of the murderers of
Domitian, were acting in response to external pressure, or possibly on some
specific instruction from an army commander or a powerful supporter. It would
not have been safe for Suetonius to suggest that the order came from Trajan
himself, given the fact that it was an act which weakened his predecessor and
adoptive father, Nerva, and would also have emphasised the fact that Trajan
was very much Domitian's man. The guardsmen were no doubt inclined to that
course of action in any case, but the fact that they acted only in autumn of 97,
about a year after Domitian's murder, suggests a concerted effort to undermine
Nerva's position, in preparation for an emperor who was acceptable to the
army, or to an army group which was able to assert its candidate over the others.
It may seem surprising to claim that, in effect, the Praetorians' Revolt was a
successful coup against Nerva. The adoption of Trajan is more normally por-
trayed as an effective counterstroke by Nerva to regain control of the situation
68 Cedrenus/Leo, Comp. Hist. 433.20 - 434; Georg., Mon. Chron. Breve. 3. 338.
69 Suet., Dom. 23, cf. above, p. 315.
70 Dio 68.3.3.
71 E.g. by R.P. Longden (as in n. 1i), C.A.H. XI 196, to be preferred to A. Garzetti, Nerva
(as in n. 2), 83f., where it is suggested that his appointment partly resulted from a need to
find someone with sufficient authority to control the Praetorians. Surely another man with
sufficient authority (on whom Nerva could depend) could have been appointed?
in Rome72 (albeit he may have had little freedom of manoeuvre in his choice);
while there is rarely any discussion of the aims of the Revolt beyond the known
(successful) demand for the heads of Domitian's assassins. Garzetti stresses
that "between the [Revolt] and the adoption of Trajan... it does not appear that
Casperius exercised more than his functions as praetorian prefect", and argues
that he did not view his own actions as "an attempt to subvert the state".73
However, it is hardly credible that the rebels' demands were so limited. They
cannot have expected the Emperor to sacrifice the authors of Domitian's death,
thus calling into question the legitimacy of his own succession, without seeking
to restore his own authority thereafter. If Nerva remained in charge, and the
military backed him, the position of the leading Praetorians would have been
extremely perilous. Casperius and his officers can hardly have neglected to
consider their own position in the aftermath - they had, after all, a year in which
to prepare.74
The Praetorians' leaders must at least have planned to make themselves
safe from reprisals: the immediate aftermath of the revolt suggests that they
were successful. Reference is often made to the notice in Dio that Trajan "put
[Casperius] out of the way"75 - although Dio's language does not support the
usual claim that Trajan had him killed.76 But even this is problematic. It seems
clear from Dio's account that Trajan acted only after he had succeeded to the
throne - which means that for up to three months after Nerva allegedly regained
control of the situation, Casperius remained unmolested at Rome. For all we
know, he even continued in his post.77 Even if Dio has misplaced the event, and
the removal of Aelianus actually fell shortly after the events of the autumn,
while Nerva was still alive, an obvious question is raised: why, if Nerva
Augustus was still in power, did he not dispose of his disloyal prefect himself,
rather than waiting for his new Caesar to summon the man to his doom?
Whichever chronology is preferred, a further aspect of the affair demands
attention: that Trajan "sent for Aelianus and the Praetorians who had mutinied
against Nerva, as if he were going to employ them for some purpose" (X5 ica't
XpTa6piev6q t- a6rno6iq, Dio 68.3.4). What need for subterfuge, if Nerva's
72 Thus Kuhoff, Gnomon 63, 421, in an unjustified criticism of an aside in Wiedemann's

The Julio-Claudian Emperors (as in n. 57): the adoption of Trajan "war keine Reaktion
auf einen drohenden Putsch der Rheinarmee, sondern eine SchutzmaBnahme Nervas
gegenuber den aufruhrerischen Pratorianern."
73 Nerva 85.
74 Compare the careful preparation of the assassins of Domitian, who made sure they had
imperial protector ready to put in place before they acted (albeit his protection turned o
to be inadequate).
75 Dio 68.3.4.
76 An assumption made e.g. by Shotter (as in n. 1 1), Historia 32, 224, and even
(Tacitus [as in n. 1], 1 17).
77 As Garzetti appears to have assumed - Nerva 85 (quoted above, n. 2) and 90.
position was secure and Aelianus a public adversary? And why did Aelianus
and his followers fall for it? They must have expected some reward for their
actions, or at least a profitable career advancement.
It is not credible that Aelianus was so naive as to believe that his actions the
previous autumn did not amount to "an attempted subversion of the state"78 and
if Nerva and Trajan did not consider it to be such at the time, it is difficult to see
why Trajan would change his mind three months later. The whole sequence of
events is only explicable if Aelianus, far from being a lone agent or seeking
power on his own behalf, was in fact Trajan's man.79 There must have been
negotiations prior to Nerva's public adoption of his heir80 - but it is difficult to
see how this could have been achieved while the emperor was a virtual hostage
of his Guard, unless Aelianus and his men were the very conduits for that
negotiation and the adoption of Trajan was the ulterior demand of the rebels. In
this context, it is hardly surprising that Aelianus remained secure in his position
during the transitional period, nor that he went willingly and unsuspectingly to
meet Trajan on the Rhine.
The fact that his reward was not at all what he expected need cause little
difficulty. There is no lack of parallels for Emperors being jealous and distrust-
ful of men who have been instrumental in securing their elevation to the throne,
especially if they are of inferior standing.81 An Emperor should not be obliged
78 As argued by Garzetti, Nerva (as in n. 2), 85, on the grounds that Aelianus went willingly
to Trajan's camp on the Rhine, obviously not expecting to be punished.
79 The centrality of Aelianus' role has received increasing recognition in more recent
scholarship, but a connection with Trajan is still vehemently denied. Schwarte (as in
n. 64), Bonner Jahrbucher 179, 147ff., hypothesises that the Prefect was in the pay of the
Governor of Syria, with the aim of forcing Nerva to rescind the damnatio memoriae of
Domitian and pave the way for the Governor to succeed Nerva - a manoeuvre ultimately
thwarted by the adoption of Trajan. This theory was enthusiastically supported by
Strobel, Zur Deutung von Geschichte (as in n. 64), 41f. and implicitly endorsed by A.R.
Birley, Hadrian: the Restless Emperor (London, 1997), 35. However, the theory depends
on the common assumption of rivalry between Trajan and the Governor of Syria, whose
identification as Nigrinus it adopts unquestioningly; and again fails to offer convincing
explanations either for Trajan's absence from Rome throughout 97 and 98, or for the
remarkable survival of Casperius Aelianus under Nerva.
80 Cf. Garzetti, Nerva (as in n. 2), 84f.; Syme (as in n. 38), Chiron 13, 141 f.: "In 97 army
commanders had time to weigh their chances and enter into negotiation anterior to a
provocative crisis in the government."
81 Gaius Caligula tolerated for only a few months the continuing presence of Tiberius'
prefect, Macro, who had been instrumental in ensuring that Gaius was recognized as sole
emperor and Gemellus effectively disinherited; Claudius - possibly under compulsion -
executed the assassins of Caligula (Jos., A.J. 19.268-273; Suet., Claudius 1 1. 1; C. Dio
60.3.4); Vespasian overthrew the client king Antiochus IV of Commagene, after that
monarch had been one of the first to support his claim to the Empire (Tac., Hist. 2.81; D.
Magie, Roman Rule in Asia Minor [Princeton Univ. Pr. 19501 I 550, IT 1408). He was also
to anyone too importunate for his very position. In any case, Aelianus could
easily have become an embarrassment, as Trajan sought in his turn to build
bridges and establish himself in the public perception as the loyal and legiti-
mate successor of Nerva. Aelianus - who may well have continued to fill a vital
role in the transitional period, as Trajan's eyes and ears in Rome and guarantor
of the deal with Nerva - could now be sacrificed in the name of reconciliation.
(vi) Trajan Augustus
There are two rather ambiguous comments in Pliny's Panegyric - the

source of much of the orthodox view of the events of 97/8. Nerva's adoption of
Trajan, Pliny suggests, was hardly different from an abdication; while many
people said that Trajan would have become emperor anyway, even if Nerva had
not chosen him.82 The remarks may be read quite innocently - Pliny could
hardly have composed them otherwise - but there is a sinister undertone.
There is no lack of evidence suggesting that relations between Nerva and
Trajan were less than fulsome after the latter's adoption. It is doubtful that
Trajan's stay in the German provinces, even after his adoption,83 has anything
to do with military threats from beyond the Rhine.84 There is no evidence for
such activity. While Nerva was still alive (and the accounts of his adoption of
Trajan point to the conclusion that Nerva only adopted him with great reluc-
tance), Trajan found it more expedient to stay in the German provinces and with
the troops on whose support he could rely. He could cement this support if he
now took the opportunity to show himself to the legions of Lower Germany,
where he had the support of the governor, Licinius Sura. Intrigue by other
provincial governors would also be deterred. He would be safe as well from any
machinations that Nerva might contrive if he presented himself, without his
legions, in Rome.85
The fact that Trajan, after news of Nerva's death, did not travel straight to
Rome, but visited the Danube legions must be regarded as significant. Pliny's
quick to sideline Primus, whose role in 69 had been ambiguous - Hist. 4.80. Note also
Vitellius' execution of 120 people who demanded rewards for their part in overthrowing
Galba: Tacitus actually states that he did this in order to secure his position - Hist. 1.44.
82 Pan. 7.6: quem constet imperaturum fuisse etiamsi non adoptasses; 8.4: nam quantum
refert, deponas an partiaris imperium?
83 Eutropius 8.2;.Epit. 13.2.
84 Contra Bennett, Trajan (as in n. 67), 49. Still less credible is Garzetti's assertion (Nerva
[as in n. 2], 90) that Trajan's failure to come to Rome, either before or soon after his
accession, proves that all was tranquil both at Rome and in the empire.
85 Syme speculated about the possibility of a sort of diarchy: a "civilian ruler at Rome" and
a military man on the Rhine (Tacitus [as in n. 1], 1 12) - but he is rightly sceptical of the
durability of any such arrangement.
statement that Trajan paid particular attention to the discipline of the troops
gives credence to the view that the main motive for this tour was to ensure that
the armies were loyal to him.86 The strength of their support for him is
debatable, but only necessity (most likely in terms of army loyalty) would have
kept him from coming straight to the capital after Nerva's death. A political
motivation behind Nerva's campaign against the Suebi has been suggested. An
entire winter (note - outside the campaigning season) was to be spent with the
legions of Moesia. By attention to the Danube legions, he would avoid the
possibility of creating odium by neglecting that frontier (such as is likely to
have been responsible for the rebellion of Saturninus in Upper Germany in 89)
- a more useful angle in which to view the Dacian Wars which Trajan under-
took within a few years of becoming sole emperor than the notion of Trajan's
personal desire for glory.87 But after Domitian's assassination, the choice of
successor had been made by the men who perpetrated the killing. The support-
ers of Domitian among the army (both officers and the rank and file) needed to
be assured that Trajan was going to continue along the lines of Domitian. The
Danube frontier had been the centre of Domitian's military activity. It was
much more important to ensure that this army was bound to him (by making it
clear that his frontier policy here would be strong and also that the Danube
legions would receive no less in terms of benefactions than the legions which
had backed him on the Rhine) than it was to appear at Rome.
As for Pannonia, the evidence from a study of the activity of the legions
which had been based there in 97 supports the notion that their support for
Trajan had not been beyond doubt.88 Legio XIV Gemina, a defeated rebel legion
of 89, was unlikely to sympathise with the legions that had defeated it. At some
point in Trajan's reign, moreover, legio I Adiutrix received the title piafidelis,
indicating that its loyalty had been tested. Events of 97/8 are most likely to
explain this. Two other legions of the province, XIII Gemina and XV Apolli-
naris, left Pannonia permanently during the course of his reign, the former
going to Dacia (a province to be founded by Trajan), the latter to Cappadocia.89
They were replaced by two legions from the Rhine frontier, namely X Gemina
(an active opponent of XIV Gemina in 89) and XI Claudia - a legion which XIV
Gemina may have despised all the more if it failed to aid the revolt of that year.
This activity does not lead to the conclusion that the Pannonian legions had
been keen supporters of Trajan in 97. The change in composition of the garrison
is highly significant, when legionary bases were becoming static. The two
86 Plin.Pan.18.1.
87 Dio68.7.5; 17.1.
88 See A.P. Berriman, Politics and Legions (as in n. 20), 342ff.
89 Moreover, whereas the Danube legions generally just sent vexillations to Trajan's Parthi-
an war, legions I Adiutrix and XV Apollinaris (although the latter may well have been in
the east) were selected to take part as whole units. This is not coincidental.
Rhine legions could have been sent to Dacia and Cappadocia. That two of the
Pannonian legions were replaced, and four legions uprooted, rather than two,
can only suggest doubts about the loyalty of the legions of that province.
Yet, whatever doubts and rivalries may have existed, they did not lead in
the event to civil war. The evidence points very much to a carefully negotiated
compact between the leading military men of the empire, who were not pre-
pared to accept the old Palace manipulator, Nerva, as their master, but were
willing to submerge personal ambition and unite behind a single candidate to
take the helm.90 This should not be too hard to accept: the Roman horror of civil
war was deep and genuine; the memories of 68/9 would still have been quite
fresh; and the discipline and loyalty that Domitian insisted on, from soldiers
and senators alike, may well have had a beneficial effect. Care was doubtless
also taken to ensure that honour and ambition were satisfied: hence Trajan's
concern for the Danube legions and, perhaps, a part of the impetus behind the
expansionist imperial policy he followed throughout his reign. If one still
wonders why Javolenus Priscus, if he was the "governor in the east", failed to
make a claim for the throne and appears as a trusted adviser to Trajan in later
years, the answer may be found here. Priscus' senior position and offices of
honour are the reward for agreeing to support the claim of Trajan and avoid a
trial of armed strength. This, then, was the true beginning of Trajan Optimus
Princeps: not a modest, loyal soldier, who bit his tongue to serve a tyrant and,
when called upon by the best of emperors, saved the seat of empire from unruly
rebellion; but a usurper, who conspired against an aged and insecure emperor,
welding an alliance with his peers at the head of the armies and provoking
disquiet and disorder at Rome to wrest from Nerva, in all but name, the
succession to Domitian's throne.
University of Nottingham Andrew Berriman

Malcolm Todd
90 Cf. Syme, Tacitus (as in n. 1), 1 15: "the adoption of Trajan, coming as it did late in the
year, may have precluded troop movements in certain areas, with a respite for negotiation
- if what was expedient had not already been done... The adoption abated all disturbance
and, so far as known, repressed all rivalry."

Very Roman Coup

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A Very Roman Coup: The Hidden War of Imperial Succession, AD 96-8

Author(s): Andrew Berriman, Malcolm Todd and Malcom Todd

(ii) Nerva's Background

To begin, however, at the beginning. When several individuals within

Historia, Band L/3 (2001)

1 R. Syme, Tacitus (Oxford 1958), vol. I., p. 1.

(iii) Opposition to Nerva

The general consensus is that Nerva's government was well-intentioned,

7 Garzetti, Nerva (as in n. 2), 23f.

12 Garzetti, Nerva (as in n. 2), 98f.

comparable build-up to the death of Domitian, so it should not be surprising that

19 Pliny, Pan. 8.2; Dio 68.3.4.

(iv) A Governor in the East

At this point, a short digression: discussion of potential challenges for the

24 Philostratos, Vit. Soph. 1.7.1.

35 Syme, Philologus 91 (as in n. 30), 243.

and Helmut Halfmann in 1973.39 There is much to commend the reconstruction

39 See reference, note 26 above.

Some weight is also placed on Ep. 6.15 - a letter addressed to Voconius

45 Thus Sherwin-White, Letters of Pliny (as in n. 27), 175.

(v) The Praetorian Revolt

That the government was vulnerable to challenge is shown by the events at

There is one bold exception to the prevailing consensus: Dietmar Kienast

61 D. Kienast, "Nerva und das Kaisertum Trajans", Historia 17 (1968), 51-71.

72 Thus Kuhoff, Gnomon 63, 421, in an unjustified criticism of an aside in Wiedemann's

(vi) Trajan Augustus

There are two rather ambiguous comments in Pliny's Panegyric - the

University of Nottingham Andrew Berriman

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