BOĞAZİÇİ UNIVERSITY

HISTORY DEPARTMENT

Klara Volarić

OTTOMAN ADMINISTRATION, MODERNIZATION AND KEEPING THE “TRADITIONAL ORDER”

Tanzimat was always taken by school definition as an Ottoman state attempt to save the
empire and to answer to the world changes and development. In other words, what state
tried to do was to transform an empire to the modern state in accordance with the
European trends. That also meant including the state into the modern economic system.

In this paper I will focus on the state driveway through the process of modernization and the
difficulties that it had to overpass in that process; incorporation into the capitalist system is
one of them.

1. TANZIMAT

Before the 19th century military affairs and tax collection were the only preoccupation of the
state regarding its subjects. In that sense Tanzimat really brought reorganization and new
order. The Ottoman endeavour in centralization, modernization and ottomanization brought
state to become more than ever involved in its subjects’ lives. The main aims of this new
order defined in two edicts from 1839 and 1856 were, among others, the promotion of
equality of both Muslims and non-Muslims in front of a state, i.e. state intention was to
eliminate Muslim’s privilege in administrative and military system and even more important,
to bring non-Muslims back under Ottoman control since in reality they were not just
subordinated citizens who paid extra taxes, but they were also protégées of European states
who knew how to take advantage of the capitulatory system.1

According to Quataert, Ottoman state in the 19th century could be divided into three phases.
The first phase was between 1808 - 1839 with the clear dominance of Sultan Mahmut II; the
second phase (Tanzimat period) was between 1839 - 1876 with supposed subordination of
the sultans to the central government; and the last phase was between 1878 - 1908 which

1
QUATAERT, Donald. "The 19th Century” in The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922, New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2000, 66
refers to Sultan Abdulhamit II’s autocracy. The interesting question is could we speak about
sultans subordination to the central administration during Tanzimat period? Who
constituted this central administration and what was the role of the sultan in it? The rapid
interest of the state in subjects’ affairs that grasped almost every pore of the Ottoman
society resulted in the growth of the state bureaucracy which was in charge of the Tanzimat
reforms implementation. From almost 2 000 civil officials at the end of 18th century, the
number grow at approximately 35 - 50 000 in 1908. 2 The 1864 provincial law that set the
reorganization of the provincial administration in that sense tried to centralize the Ottoman
bureaucracy which now became hierarchically established with central government and
sultan on the top. It is difficult to say who was subordinated to whom in the central
government, but the relationship between these “men of the Tanzimat” is very important.
Their mutual relations, plots and conspiracies and perpetual fight for affection of the sultan
influenced the creation and implementation of reforms for sure. 3 This was not the only
problem that faced central government in Istanbul. How to finance the vast Tanzimat
bureaucracy and reforms they performed was another big issue. First what state tried to do
was naturally to increase the tax revenues, so for that purpose they reorganized the tax
system.

2. TAX SYSTEM AND FOREIGN DEBTS AS A WAY OF INCREASING STATE REVENUES

In the earlier centuries the disintegrating timar was replaced by iltizam system which proved
to be subjected to misuse of tax collectors that auctioned for that right. Due to the fact that
tax collectors had right to accumulate tax only for two or three years, their tendency to
collect as much money as they could and by doing so they deprived the peasants’ standard,
the state eventually introduced new malikane system. In this system the possessors kept the
right to collect tax until they died, but they also had to pay attention to the peasants’
conditions. However, the price which they annually paid to the state treasury was fixed so in

2
QUATAERT, Donald. "The 19th Century” in The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922, New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2000, 62-65
3
RIEDLER, Florian. “Opposition and Legitimacy in the Ottoman Empire”, London and New York:
Routledge, 2011, 44-50; CEYLAN, Ebubekir. “Ottoman Centralization and Modernization in the
Province of Baghdad, 1831-1872”, 281
the time of inflation the state was in lost. 4 The system was abolished in the 1840s when it
was replaced by muhassıls, appointed state officials who collected taxes in the name of the
state. So what state tried to do was to take this right from the hands of the local notables,
i.e. former tax collectors, and appoint someone who will directly collect taxes and transfer it
to the Central treasury. Although it seemed that there was an established penal code for any
misuses in the system, this did not stop these officials to behave in an old-school manner.
The state decision to replace muhassıls and put their responsibilities into the hands of
provincial governors spoke for itself. It was obvious that state experimented with different
attempts in order to introduce the system that would be most suitable, but still we must ask
what happened with the previous system that was present in the state for centuries. It
seems that it was abolished, at least in theory, but what about the practice? What happened
with local notables and other tax collectors who were involved in the malikane system?

It seems that several tax systems were practised in the same time. However, we should not
say that this was clear defeat of the Tanzimat system, rather we should be aware that
naturally it took time to convey all the reforms into practice, particularly if these reforms
meant abolishment of the old system and replacement with the new one. 5 It could not be
expected that everything that was proclaimed in 1839 would immediately take effect in
1840, especially if we take into account all the problems that central government had faced
with, from lack of financial means and trained personnel who were in charge of
implementing the reforms, to the still powerful members of the old system who fought
against Tanzimat to secure their privileged positions. After experimenting with the tax
revenues that did not bring much profit to the Treasury, by the mid of the 19th century
Ottomans were forced to take first foreign loan. Naturally, one loan led to another and that
became regular funding for modernization in Ottoman bureaucratic, military and economic

4
‘ABDUL RAHMAN, ‘Abdul Rahim & NAGATA, Yuzo. “The Iltizam System in Egypt and Turkey” in
Studies on the Social and Economic History of the Ottoman Empire, Izmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1995,
69-70
5
İNALCIK, Halil. “Application of the Tanzimat and its Social Effects” in Archivum Ottomanicum 5, 1973,
102-107. See also, İSLAMOĞLU, Huricihan. “Politics of Administering Property: Law and Statistics in
the 19th Century Ottoman Empire” in Constituting Modernity, Private Property in the East and West,
London: Tauris, 2004, 302-04
spheres. According to Quataert, this led to foreign capital control over the Ottoman
economy.6

3. MODERNIZATION, CAPITALISM AND THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE IN THE POLITICAL

ARENA

The transformation of the Ottoman Empire toward modernization was well present before
the introduction of the Tanzimat reforms. The reasons for such transformation should not be
found only in external circumstances such as the response to the foreign policy, but they
should be found in the Ottoman state itself, in its structure and society. According to Karpat,
transformation of the state began when it was unable to follow development of its subjects,
or, in other words, the Ottoman society was changing but Ottoman bureaucracy stood in a
place. So, Tanzimat should not be seen as a consequence of Eastern Question and reply to
the European Powers, but rather as an administrative attempt to catch up with the
development of the Ottoman society, to place them under control and to respond to their
needs.7

Nevertheless, it is a question how much Karpat view is accurate. İslamoğlu rightly points that
separation of the state and society cannot lead to understanding of neither of these entities.
We cannot say that society was evolving while state was left behind. These two entities are
intertwined so all their actions should be seen from this perspective, with state affairs as a
political arena were all the actors, including the central government and local notables and
population, are confronting each other and negotiating in order to secure their own interests.
It is true that state’s control over its vast area vas subjected to changes, but it was always
aware how the provinces breads. How much control it had over them and how much it was
able to impose its own power is another question, question that depends on current
historical context and political arena where different actors are contesting each other. In
that matter, all state proclamations should be seen as a process that is continuously
negotiated among different powers, both on local and state level. In that environment state
is trying to encompass different interests and keep its dominant position, sometimes with

6
QUATAERT, Donald. "The 19th Century” in The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922, New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2000, 72
7
KARPAT, Kemal. “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908” in International Journal of
Middle East Studies 3, 1972, 243-45
more and some time with less success. Thus, this leads to the fact that one state law is in
different environments implemented in a different way, not just depending on the state
position in a certain province, but also depending on the province itself. For instance, 1858
land code is differently perceived and implemented in the Balkans and in the Arab provinces
not just because the state power is not the same in them (although Tanzimat tried to change
that), but they are completely different provinces in which the same law would not function
properly.8

How could state reconcile completely different and opposed interests of different groups
and still be able to enforce itself as a predominant power? In my opinion, the only solution
was a compromise in which all of the contesting parties would abandon or modify their
claims. In what extent and how were they doing so? It was almost a non-ending procedure
which outcome depended on current power position of all contested actors. In that sense,
state i.e. central government was not there just to mediate between actors, its main aim was
to actually impose its own policy. Of course, state could negotiate about the terms of its own
policy, but surely main goal was to implement the basis of it. Thus, the state could negotiate,
but to the certain limit.

3.1. STATE vs. CAPITALISM

What was the Ottoman bureaucracy position in the world capitalist system? According to
Keyder, Ottoman state accepted the Western models in reforming the state, as long as these
European models recognize Ottoman role in the reforming as a crucial one, or in other words,
as long as these models do not jeopardize its position. This is a view which Pamuk also
supports. In their opinion state was ready to give up on the Ottoman traditional order as
long as incorporation into the world capitalism system sees state bureaucrats as dominating
class. However, the policy that state pursued on its way of incorporation into world
capitalism system at the end brought precisely to the disruption of the traditional order.
Import of cheap foreign goods that overwhelmed the market and export of raw materials
which brought the increase in the price of these materials resulted with unemployment in
manufacturing. Some manufacturing and merchant groups were eliminated while other new

8
İSLAMOĞLU, Huricihan. “Politics of Administering Property:
Law and Statistics in the 19th Century Ottoman Empire” in Constituting Modernity, Private Property in the East
and West, London: Tauris, 2004, 277-81
groups emerged from the new system, namely Christian bourgeoisie that was in privileged
position and on which state could not impose new taxes.9 That led to rivalry between state
administration as a representative of traditional order and the new class that represented
the new capitalist order. That rivalry even placed Ottoman bureaucracy in more difficult
position because restructuring and modernizing the state also seek increasing funding which
state did not have, so it turned to the European loans even more. That means that at the
end it found itself at the mercy of the European states who exploited such situation by
seeking for example concessions in the process of modernizing the state, and even the
creation of Public Debt Administration (PDA) that controlled the fiscal policy of the
government and placed it into subordinate position toward foreign lenders. Direct foreign
investment and penetration of the foreign capital into public spheres also stressed this
notion. In this situation where state lost its legitimacy among subjects, it became difficult to
preserve traditional order in which the state bureaucracy had the main role.10 Thus, there
are three mechanisms of Ottoman integration in the capitalist system: trade, debt and direct
investment, and all of them brought to peripheral position of the Ottoman economy in the
world capitalist system. Even worse, the main role in this new system did not have the state
but mainly Christian bureaucracy which directly opposed to the traditional order that state
administration tried to preserve. That made implementation of the state envisioned reforms
more difficult because in that conduction it had to face with these new elite that tried to
preserve the privileged status acquired in the capitalist penetration. 11

According to this mainstream view, Ottoman incorporation into the world capitalism system
was seen as something that was not under Ottoman control but under the control of
different capitalist powers that made out of it peripheral economic state. In what extent is
this right? Toksöz, at least in the Ottoman local level, shows that this approach was not
entirely true. The Çukorova region (Turkey) was an example how path of transformation of
the Ottoman Empire to the modern state (in combination with foreign investment) does not
mean that local population passively received modernization inputs from above, but very

9
KEYDER, Çağlar. “The Process of Peripheralization” in State and Class in Turkey: A Study of Capitalist
Development, London: Verso, 1987, 29-33
10
KEYDER, Çağlar. “The Process of Peripheralization” in State and Class in Turkey: A Study of Capitalist
Development, London: Verso, 1987, 36-41
11
KEYDER, Çağlar. “The Process of Peripheralization” in State and Class in Turkey: A Study of Capitalist
Development, London: Verso, 1987, 47
much itself participated in such an action and became active in world capitalist system.
According to Toksöz, to argue that modernization in provincial parts of an empire is just a
consequence of state endeavours or world investment would be false because regional
element in this story is the crucial one, especially if we take into account that much of that
state endeavours did not reach some provinces, or if they did, it was only in a limited
scope.12 Therefore, it is quite difficult to generalize about the Ottoman Empire and its
position in the world economy. For sure, state policy was one thing, but what was actually
going on in the ground was something completely different. Ottoman provinces were
different among each others. Some had better chances, according to its position, materials,
population etc., to be incorporated into the world capitalism system.

CONCLUSION

Some authors argue that Ottoman middle class like merchants and artisans was never
powerful enough to challenge the traditional bureaucratic order. Their influence on
bureaucratic matters always stayed limited. According to them, the only threat to the
Ottoman administration was local notables, but they again did not pose such threat in the
capitalist terms because their main preoccupation was tax-collection. 13 It seems that the
main aim of the Ottoman bureaucracy was to keep its traditional power and dominant
position in the society. In that way it was ready to tolerate penetration of capitalism and
economic development as long as its traditional position was kept. State only occasionally
intervened and mainly it left to the market to follow natural path, but what Ottoman
bureaucracy could not allow was accumulation of the capital and creation of a new class that
could pose a serious threat to its traditional order. 14 In other words, Ottoman bureaucracy
was flexible and pragmatic enough in a sense that it was ready to negotiate to different

12
TOKSÖZ, Meltem. “Nomads, Migrants and Cotton in the Eastern Mediteranean: The Making of the
Adana-Mersin Region in the Ottoman Empire, 1850-1908, Leiden: Brill, 2010, 3-6; 8-9
13
PAMUK, Şefket. “Institutional Change and the Longevity of the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1800” in
Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 30 (2), 2004, 246
14
PAMUK, Şefket. “Institutional Change and the Longevity of the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1800” in Journal of
Interdisciplinary History, 30 (2), 2004, 236-38
powerful groups within the state and allow institutional changes, but only to a certain point.
That was the reason of its longevity.15

However, when we speak about the traditional order of the state, on what exactly do we
mean? That state was an entity that lived in the past and did everything in its power to keep
traditional position? Or more likely, that it was an entity ready to negotiate with different
groups in the empire and by that keep its dominant position? Through centuries it was
obvious that Ottoman state and its administration was changing. In this sense it is a question
on what can we reduce the keeping of the traditional order; was it keeping miri land as an
ultimate state property, although many argued that what 1858 land code did was precisely
abolishment of state property and introduction of the private one; or was it something else?
By this else I mean middle class that Pamuk characterized as something that had limited
affect on the Ottoman bureaucracy. However, in the lines above it was mentioned that
Ottomans had great fear of Christian middle class that by the 19 th century became powerful
bourgeoisie that threatened state traditional order. In that sense, there are many questions
that need to be clear up when we speak about Ottoman modernization and capitalism. In
that matter perhaps one of the most intriguing questions is: was capitalism imposed on the
Ottoman state? According to the authors below, I got the notion that it is so.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

NAGATA, Yuzo. “The Decline of the Ottoman Empires Doctrine of State Landownership: the
Development of Çiftlik Type of Landownership” in Studies on the Social and Economic History
of the Ottoman Empire, Izmir: Akademi Kitabevi, 1995

‘ABDUL RAHMAN, ‘Abdul Rahim & NAGATA, Yuzo. “The Iltizam System in Egypt and Turkey”
in Studies on the Social and Economic History of the Ottoman Empire, Izmir: Akademi
Kitabevi, 1995
QUATAERT, Donald. "The 19th Century” in The Ottoman Empire, 1700-1922, New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2000
15
PAMUK, Şefket. “Institutional Change and the Longevity of the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1800” in Journal of
Interdisciplinary History, 30 (2), 2004, 228-29
KEYDER, Çağlar. “The Process of Peripheralization” in State and Class in Turkey: A Study of
Capitalist Development, London: Verso, 1987

İSLAMOĞLU, Huricihan. “Politics of Administering Property:

Law and Statistics in the 19th Century Ottoman Empire” in Constituting Modernity, Private
Property in the East and West, London: Tauris, 2004

İNALCIK, Halil. “Application of the Tanzimat and its Social Effects” in Archivum Ottomanicum
5, 1973, 102-107. See also, İSLAMOĞLU, Huricihan. “Politics of Administering Property: Law
and Statistics in the 19th Century Ottoman Empire” in Constituting Modernity, Private
Property in the East and West, London: Tauris, 2004, 302-04

TOKSÖZ, Meltem. “Nomads, Migrants and Cotton in the Eastern Mediteranean: The Making
of the Adana-Mersin Region in the Ottoman Empire, 1850-1908, Leiden: Brill, 2010,

PAMUK, Şefket. “Institutional Change and the Longevity of the Ottoman Empire, 1500-1800”
in Journal of Interdisciplinary History, 30 (2), 2004

KARPAT, Kemal. “The Transformation of the Ottoman State, 1789-1908” in International

Journal of Middle East Studies 3, 1972