HENK J. M.

SCHOOT

Publications of the Thomas lnstituut te Utrecht

CHRIST THE 'NAME' OF GOD
Editorial Board

Prof. dr. H.A.G. Braakhuis (Catholic University, Nijmegen) THOMAS AQUINAS ON NAMING CHRIST
f. dr. F.J.A. de Grijs (Catholic Theological University, Utrecht)
'rof. dr. K.-W. Merks (Catholic Theological Faculty, Tilburg)

New Series, Volume I

PEETERS
LEUVEN
1993
 TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION 1

CHAPTER I
CHRIST, THE MYSTERY OF GOD 9

1. ". , . among you stands the one whom you do not know," . . . . , . . . , . 9
2, Aquinas' use of the word 'mysterium' , ... , .. , .... ' .. ' . , . , ., 11
2, 1 Explanations of the word 'mysterium' . , . . . . , . . . . , . . . , ' 13
2,2 'Mysterium' and the articles of faith: hidden in propositions . , . , '16
2.3 Biblical hermeneutics 'secundum mysterium' ' . . . . . . ,..... 23
2.4 Christ's hidden presence in the mystery of the eucharist ., ... , 28
2.5 The mystery of God in Christ . .. , ... , .. , .... , . , . ' . ,. 35
Conclusion ... , . . . . . . . , , ... ' , .. , .. , .. , .... , . , . , .' 38
g'l$"qD
. N1. CHAPTER IT
S3f, THE SEMANTICS OF NAMING CHRIST . , .. , . ' . " 41

l'l9'i 1. Modes of Signification and signifYing the Divine . , .. , . . . . . . , . " 45

o SD"SOI"S b z... 2. Modes of Supposition and referring to the Divine . , . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
2, 1 The distinction between signification and supposition . . . . . . . , 55
/
2.2 Aquinas on supposition as a mode of signification , . , . . . . . .. 57
2,3 Aquinas on supposition as denotation , , .. , .... , . , . , . , ., 60
3, Theory ofpredication . . . . . . . . , ... , , .. , .. , .. , . , . , . , .. , 64
4. The logic of reduplicative statements " " " " " , .. , . , . , . " , 67
Conclusion . , ... , ... , . . . . . . . . , , . . . . . . . . . . , . , . ' . '. 71

I CHAPTERITI
THE NAMES OF CHRIST NAMING THE 'NAME' OF GOD 74

1. The names of Christ, the one who is the 'name' of God . . , . . . , . , " 74
1.1 Some historical notions .. , ... , .. ,' .. ,., .... ,.,... 75
1.2 Names of Christ in the 'Tertia Pars' , . . . . . . . ,., .... ,.. 77
1,3 'Mediator'" .. , .... , ... , ... ,." .. , . , . , . , ... , 80
1.4 'Jesus' . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . , .. ,., .. , . , . , . , . 82
1. 5 Names of Christ hidden in Isaiah . . , . . . . . , . . . . . . , . , . . 85
1.6 Names of Christ, the 'name' of God ., ... ,., ... , ..... , 87
1. 7 Names and love, praise and promise .. , . . , . . , . , . , . , . ,. 88
2, The names of Christ and the treatises on naming God ..... , . , . . .. 90
2.1 Aquinas and Peter of Lombard .. , .. , .. , .. , . , .... , , ., 90
2,2 Aquinas and Pseudo-Dionysius ... , ... , . , , . , . , . , , , . ,. 95
Conclusion , . . . . . . . , " .. , . , .. , .. , ..... , .... , . , . ,. 104

Appendix: Translation of the names of Christ mentioned . , . , ... ,. 107

© Stichting Thomas Fonds - Nijmegen

ISBN 90-6831-511-0
D, 1993/0602/63
 CHAPTER IV
mE NAMING OF mE UNITY OF CHRIST INCARNATE
1. Aquinas' doctrine of the hypostatic union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
1.1 Some historical notions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
1.2 The key-terms of the discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . III
1.3 The main points of Aquinas' doctrine of the hypostatic union .. 117
1.4 The analysis of the three 'opiniones' of Peter of Lombard . .. . 124
2. Analogies of the hypostatic union . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
2.1 Garment, Body and Soul, One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
2.2 The hierarchy of unions between God and creatures; the theory
of a mixed relation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
2.3 The logical relation of supposition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
2.4 Simple or composed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
3. The rule of the 'communicatio idiomatum' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152
CHAPTER V
BEING AND THE NAMING OF CHRIST
1. Names signifying Christ's being . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
2. Being and supposition of language about Christ . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
3. The false concept of 'human subsistent being' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
4. Predicating 'being a creature' of Christ . . . . . . . . ' . . . . . . . . . . .
CHAPTER VI
THE HYPOSTATIC UNION AND mE UNION OF NAMING GOD
1. The union of the Word of God with the knowledge of his human soul .
1.1 "What are you looking for?" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.2 The knowledge of the Word of God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.3 The knowledge of the human soul of Christ . . . . . . . . . . . . .
1.4 The union of the Word of God and Christ's human knowledge .
2. The analogy between unions with God . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Conclusion .....................................
GENERAL CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ABBREVIATIONS OF BffiLICAL BOOKS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
BffiLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
INDICES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
110
INTRODUCTION
... ut consolentur corda ipsorum, instruct; in charitate, et in omnes
divitias plenitudinis intellectus, in agnitionem mysterii Dei Patris et
Christi Jesu: in quo sun! omnes thesauri sapientiae et scientiae
abscondit; .
..... to console their hearts, instructed in charity and in all richness of
the fullness of understanding, so that they have knowledge of the
mystery of God the Father and Christ Jesus, in whom all the treasures
of wisdom and knowledge are hidden." (Col 2.2-3)
Human understanding is fulfilled by knowing Christ, Saint Thomas Aquinas
(1224/5-1274) says'. AJI treasures of wisdom and truth, the infmite and eternal
156 knowledge of all things, are hidden in Christ. God sprinkles this wisdom over his
works, and in this sense the treasures are turned into the wisdom that makes human
157 beings one with God. Such is the office of Christ, to be the treasure to be effused,
160 and to effect a new union of human beings with God. The treasures are hidden,
162 because the human power of understanding is weak, and because the treasure is
164 obscured by a double veil. The veil of creation, which cannot be more than a
certain similitnde of its Creator, and the veil of the 'flesh' of Christ. Our God is a
hidden God, Aquinas says, hidden in Christ. Christ is like the one book that
169 contains all the knowledge and all the wisdom there is, and therefore we should not
seek wisdom elsewhere.
170 Aquinas' thoughts on the hiddenness of God in Christ animate this stndy. It does
170 so, in focusing upon the relation between the Word Incarnate and human words for
173 this Word; in focusing upon the mystery of faith that this relation is, and upon the
179 mystery of faith that is the object of these human words. We stndy Aquinas on the
183 mystery of Christ, and on human ways of signifying him. Human ways of
185 signification are essential to the kind of theology that Aquinas purports to exercise,
189 because it offers him both the means of investigating and affirming the truth about
Christ, and the means of confessing that all human understanding and signification
192 fails to reach Christ as he is.
In this introduction I will offer three things. First I will elaborate the co-ordinates
200 that determine the investigation in this book. Recent interpretations and discussions
201 of the work of Aquinas will be mentioned, and. my position with regard to them
215 will be explained. Next I will give an overview of the book. The third and last
section contains some technical information.
1) In his commentary on this letter of Paul to the Colossians, RCL II 1. Abbreviations can be
found on p. 200 and p. 201;
 lNI'RODUCTlON
2
(1) In recent years, much attention has been given to Aquinas' thoughts on the
function of language in theology2. In a certain respect, there is a long tradition of
studying Aquinas' treatises on naming God. Both his classical theory of the role of
metaphors in theology, and especially his analysis of the analogous use of a certain
type of names, i.e. Dames such as 'wise'. 'just' and 'good', signifying created
perfections, have provoked a large and continuous reflection'. The interests
animating this reflection are diverse. Possible interests are the justification of
proper theological language about God, or the affirmation of a pre-theological
philosophical foundation of theological reflection, or the apparent 'agnostic' flavour
of Aquinas' discussion. Moreover, Aquinas' several discussions of the same subject
of analogy and analogous language are not easily harmonized or systematized, and
thus some of the finest minds have attempted to distil the basic structure of
Aquinas' theory.
Receht interpretation has both continued the tradition and changed the perspective
of it'. Ralph McInerny has argued that analogy is not in the first place an
ontological term, describing that which God and creation have in common, but a
logical term, focusing upon the irmer relation between names, between concepts 5 •
David Burrell' and Klaus Muller' have argued convincingly that the history of
interpretation and Aquinas' discussion itself show that Aquinas did not possess, and
did not want to possess a theory of analogy. Burrell offered a new interpretation of
divine simplicity, and the so-called divine attributes (perfection, goodness, infInity,
ubiquity, inunutability, eternity, unity), considering them as 'formal features', i.e.
not part of a positive description of God, but part of the description of the
inadequacy of human language vis-a-vis God'. Kathryn Tanner formulated the
2) The classical work on Aquinas and language has become of interest again: Pranz
Manthey, Die Sprachphilosophie des hi. Thomas von Aquin, und ihre Anwendung auf Probleme
der Theologie, Paderborn 1937. Cf. Albert Ke1ler, 1974;
3) A bibliography can be found in K. Milller, 1983. A good introduction to the questions at
hand can be found in: H.W.M. Rikhof, 1988;
4) Most of this recent interpretation has been the fruit of the application of analytical
philosophy to the work of Aquinas. Cf. Gabriel JOssen, 1975. Apart from the literature mentioned
elsewhere in this introduction, see the work of P.T. Geach, Norbert Bathen, 1988; F.J.A. de
Grijs, 1985; Anthony Kenny, 1959; H.W.M. Rikhof, 1987 and 1990b; Rudolf Teuwsen, 1988;
5) Logic oj analogy. An interpretation oj St. Thomas, 1961; Studies in analogy, 1968; nThe
analogy of names is a logical doctrine", 1986; "Metaphor and analogy", 1971;
6) Analogy and philosophical language, 1973; Exercises in religious understanding, 1974;
Aquinas. God and action, 1979; Knowing the Unknowable God. Ibn-Sina. Maimonides. Aquinas.
1986;
7) Thomas von Aquins Theorie und Praxis der Analogie, 1983;
8) "Compositeness, of course, is not properly speaking a feature at all. It is not something
we could discover aU things to possess by examining each one individually. Rather it is what
Wittgenstein called a 'formal feature': not patient of description yet displayed in the form of
discourse itself", 1979, p. l4ff. "The best way I know to put this is to remind ourselves that
simpleness is not an attribute of God, properly speaking, so much as a "formal feature" of
divinity. That is, we do not include 'Simpleness' in that list of tenus we wish to attribute to God-
classically, 'living', 'wise', 'willing'. It is rather that simpleness defines the manner in which such
lNI'RODUcnON 3
basic rules implied in Aquinas' approach of language in divinis, and in so doing
displayed that the application of this approach is of greater interest than the
theoretical account of it'. Millier explicitly attempted to show that Aquinas' actual
theological methods in fact are more telling than his theoretical accounts of it. And
so the perspective shifted from the examination of the theory to the theory-at-work,
the actual exercise of naming God lO •
Another shift has been effected in bringing the changes in our cultural and religious
climate to bear upon the processing of Aquinas' writings. Over the past thirty or
more years, the growing dissatisfaction with easy answers to uneasy questions. and
the growing awareness of social and psychological tasks of theology, together with
its growing factual irrele,(ance, have been a major influence in theology. Initial
discussions of secularisation have been replaced by discussions of the hiddenness of
Godll. To many it seems that the decline in the number of those that consider
themselves Christians, indicates a growth of the hiddenness of God. I do not think
that the hiddeoness of God depends upon the number of believers, but I do think
that often the two are thought of as connected. In the course of these developments.
many have blamed Aquinas for being the source of all the easy answers12.
Aquinas indeed was the fountain from which most (neo-Thomist) handbooks
sprang, and, so it seemed, the keeper of eternal truth 13 • No wonder that most of
properties might be attributed to God. When we say God is simple, we are speaking not .abo~t
God directly but about God's ontological constitution~ just as when we say that ElOise IS
composite, we are not predicating anything about her in any of the nine recognizable ways of
Aristotle. So it would be putting the cart well before the horse to think of Simpleness as a
constituent property of God whose very "existence is a necessary condition of [God's] existence."
"Ponnal properties" are not so much said of a subject, as they are reflected in a subject's very
mode of existing, and govern the way in which anything whatsoever might be said of that
subject", 1986, p. 46ff;
9) God and creation in christian theology. Tyranny or empowerment, 1988;
10) Let me note in passing, that I consider E. Jungel's evaluation of the discussion of analogia
entis and anaiogia fidei to be definitive, so that I will not once again thematize it in this study.
Jungel says (1977. p. 383t): "Das verwirrende in [dem] Streit [urn die Analogie] besteht darin,
dass von seiten evangelischer Theologen an der als genuin katholisch geltenden Lehre von der
sogenannten analogia entis in der Regel genau das beanstandet wurde, wogegen diese Lebre sich
doch seiber richtete";
11) Pars pro toto: lise N. Bulhof and L. ten Kate (ed.), Ons ontbreken heilige namen.
Negatieve theologie in de hedendaagse cultuurfilosofie, 1992;
12) Cf. Richard E. Creel's characterization of the work of Aquinas: "Everything you always
wanted to know about God, and more", 1980, p. 195;
13) Cf. David Tracy, The Analogical Imagination. 1981, p. 413: "Where analogical theologies
lose that sense for the negative, that dialectical sense within analogy itself, they produce not a
believable harmony among various likenesses in all reality but the theological equivalent of "cheap
grace": boredom. sterility and an atheological vision of a deadening univocity. Some such loss
seems to have occurred in the Thomist tradition's later invention (in Cajetan) of a "doctrine of
analogy": a "doctrine" historically unfaithful to the pluralistic uses of analogy and the sense for
the importance of negations in Aquinas' own extraordinarily fruitful theological analogical
4 INTRODUCI'lON
theology turned to other 'fathers' and 'mothers' of the Church. However, for some
the perspective of the study of Aquinas changed, no longer regarding him as the
answer to the problems of our days, but as the one whose rare combination of
theological gifts is still inspiring. It .seems possible, to be both a negative and a
speculative theologian at the same thoe. It seems possible to be inspired by the
hiddenness of God and at the same time not to drop a sound sense of truth and
falsity. It seems possible to affirm both the lack of human words vis-a-vis God, and
their origin in the one perfect Word of God. Aquinas proves to be relevant to
present-day theology because of this very combination of gifts, and such a view has
been the inspiration for the second shift in the orientation of the study of his views
on language and theology.
Apart from these two major shifts, i.e. from theory of analogy to practice of
analogy, and from divine hiddenness as a problem for which Aquinas is the
sol~tion to divine hiddenness as an inspiration for which the study of Aquinas is
frUItful, there are three other developments in the study of Aquinas in general that
should be noted.
First there is the discussion about the plan or general structure of the Summa
Theologiae, which in fact is a discussion of Aquinas' theology as SUCh14. The ST
is divided into three parts, the second of which consists of two parts. The prima
pars deals with the existence and 'properties' of the one God, with the Trinity and
with creation (angels, human beings). The second part is the moral part, the prima
secundae discussing the ultimate goal of human existence, and then human action
in general, leading or not leading to beatitude. The latter portion contains general
examinations of virtues and vices, sin, law, and grace and merit. The secunda
secundae discusses morals in particular. The tertia pars is devoted to Christ and
the sacraments. The ST is unfinished, not treating some of the sacraments and the
eschatology as such. However, this rude representation does. little justice to
Aquinas' intentions. And what could? A scheme that considers the first two parts to
b~ ge~eral, necessary. meta~hysical even, and the third part particular, contingent,
hlStoncal? Or a representatlOn that considers the first part to correspond to the
imagj~tion. For the l~er Th~~istic ."doctrine of analogy" proved fateful in its consequences for
Cathohc theology by Its antidIalectIcal (and, finally its antianalogical) stance. That doctrine
ultimately yielded in the neo-Scholastic manuals to the clear and distinct, the all-too-ordered and
certain,. the dea.dening, u~disclosive ~d untransformative world of the dead analogies of a
~u~hst . Thomlsm comnutted to certitude, not understanding, veering towards univocity. not
umtY-lD-chfference" ;
14) M.-D. Chenu, 1939; M.-D. Chenu, 1950', pp. 255-276; A. van Kol, 1947; E. Gilson,
1951; H. (E.) Schillebeeckx, 1952, pp. 1-18; A. Dempf, 1954, p. 281; Th. A. Audel, 1962; P.E.
Persson, 1958; Y. M.-J. Congar, 1957; 1958, p. 282ff; 1963; A. Hayen, 1960; G. Lafonl, 1961;
U. Horst, 1961; H.D. Gardeil, 1962; A. Patfoort, 1963; D. Eickelschulte, 1963, pp. 160-165; M.
Seckler, 1964, pp. 33-47; G. Martelel, 1964; U. Kiihn, 1965, pp. 30-43; O. Pesch, 196511978;
1967, pp. 918-935; 1988, p. 37, p. 388ff; M. Arias Reyero, 1971, pp. 126-130; R. Heinzmann,
1974 and 1974; M. Corbm, 1974, pp. 800-802; W.G.B.M. Valkenberg, 1990, p. 18;
INTRODUCI'lON 5
exitus, the emanation of all things from God, and the second and third part to the
general and particular return, the reditus of all things to their principle and goal?
Or a presentation that shows the third part to be the top of the pyramid, examining
Christ as the climax and turning-point of history? The discussion itself has been
and still is a lively debate, because it touches upon the very essence of theology.
Should theology be christocentric? Should it be epistemological, i.e. concentrated
upon the question 'how do you know'? Should it be historical? Should it be
speculative? Each answer to the question what the structure of the ST is,
shoultaneously answers the question what the essence of theology should be. This
makes the discussion of the plan of the ST both relevant and liable to anachronism.
When theology shifts from speculation to history, the ST is shown to be essentially
focused upon the history of,salvation. When theology shifts from a metaphysical to
a positive bent, the ST is shown to be essentially christologicai. Yet one need not
evaluate this in a negative way, because at the same time such developments show
the continuing relevance and the permanent flexibility of Aquinas' theological
writings. Moreover, one common result of all the discussions has been to critique
the common assumption that the basic thrust of the ST is to impose a general
philosophically biased conception upon the whole of theology, upon the whole of
history. On the contrary, Aquinas works his way to the fmal consideration of
Christ as the one who is both the author of the exitus and the author of the reditus,
and this entails Christ's presence in all of the supposedly 'general' parts preceding
Aquinas' christology. At the same thoe however it is the one God and all things
related to God that is the subject of theology, and that entails that the ST can never
be understood to be essentially christocentric 15 .
The second development that I want to note, is closely related to the discussion of
the structure of the ST. If the philosophical, necessary, disciplinary bent of the ST
is not as strong as many have thought, then Aquinas being magister in Sacra
15) Especially O.H. Pesch (1965n4, pp. 415-425) hasattempled 10 strike a balance between
christo centrism on the one hand and a non-salvation historical reading of the first two parts of the
ST on the other. Pesch mentions 10 christological points that are essential to the first two parts
("ohoe sie die Gedaokenfolge der Ia und I1a Pars nicht in Gang ldime oder im Entscheidenden
unvollstandig bliebe", o.c. p. 417): a) Christ is the Way on which the reditus takes place (STI 2
proemium); b) the discussion of the mission and inhabitation of the divine persons mentions the
visible mission of the Son (ST I 43); c) Christ is mentioned in the discussion of human being's
original state of i1ll1ocence (ST 197.1 ad 3); d) to deny original sin makes belief in salvation
through Christ senseless (ST I-II 81.3); e) Christ is the aim of the Old Law (ST I-II 91.5 ad 2,
98.1-6; 99.6; 101.2-4); f) Christ is the leacher of the New Law (I-II 106-108); g) Christ is the
foundation of the justification of the si1ll1er (ST I-II 113.4 ad 3; 112.1 ad 1-2); h) To believe in the
incarnation is necessary for the salvation of all at all times (ST II-II 2.7-8); i) Adam and righteous
people from the Old Testament believed in Christ explicitly (ST II-II 2.7; I-II 98.2 ad 4); j) The
era that Christ has initiated is the era of the Church, the last before the final judgment (ST I-ll
112.1 ad 1-2; 106.4; 108.2; 111.4). Cf. also Eugene TeSelle, 1975, who elaborates the relevancy,
for the subject at hand, of the question whether Christ would have incarnated if no sin bad
occurred;
6 INTRODUcnON
Pagina comes into focus again. Some have shown that there is a development in
Aquinas' writings to a type of theology that is more and more biblical l '. Others
studied once again his theoretical account of the function of Scripture in
tbeologyl7, and someone even analyzed on large scale Aquinas' actual practice of
'employing' Scripture l •• The common assumption that the role of Scripture in
Aquinas' theology was merely rudimentary, and purely aimed at the collection of
arguments in a scholastic debate of much greater importance, has thus been
falsified.
Such new developments have been greatly enhanced by the ongoing study of
medieval history and medieval scholarly texts, especially in the field of the arts:
dialectic (logic), grammar and rhetoric. Key medieval texts on the doctrine of the
properties of terms (logic/semantics) and on logical and speCUlative grammar have
recently become available in critical editions 19 . Their study can profit the
interpretation of the great scholastic theologians, like Thomas Aquinas, a great
dea120 •
Thus I have listed five things that I consider to be the most important co-ordinates
of this book:
renewed interpretation of Aquinas' views on language in theology
the negative and apophatic lluust of Aquinas' views
the intrinsic connection between the supposedly general arid particular in
theology, between the rest of the ST and its christo logical part
the rediscovery of Aquinas being magister in Sacra Pagina
the enhanced knowledge of medieval grammar and logic.
(2) These co-ordinates delineate the subject of this book. It studies Aquinas on
theological language about Christ, in order to verify and further develop new
insights concerning his practice of analogy. It investigates whether Aquinas'
negative approach, especially attached to the attention given to modes of
signification, is present in his theology of God the Saviour as well. In so doing it
16) Corbin, 1974;
17) A.o. M. Arias Reyero 1971; Cf. the bibliography in Valkenberg 1990;
18) Valkenberg, 1990;
19) E.g. works from Boethius of Dacia (fl. 127S), Garlandus Compotista (fl. 11th cent.), John
Duns Scotus (c.126S/1308), John of Dacia (fl. 1280), Lambert of Auxerre (fl. l1S0), Martin of
Dacia (d. 1304), Nicholas of Paris (fl. 12S0), Peter Abelard (1079-1141), Peter Helias (fl. 1140),
Peter of Spain (Pope John XXI, d. 1277), Robert Bacon (d. 1248), Roger Bacon (c. 1214-1292/4),
Robert Kilwardby (d. 1279), Siger of Courtrai (d. 1341), Simon of Faversham (c.1260-130617),
Thomas of Erfurt (fl. 1300), William Ockham (c.128S-1347/9), William of Conches (c.1080-
c.llS4), William of Sherwood (c. 1200/1O-c.1269) and several anonymous logical compendia and
commentaries on logical and grammatical works;
20) As has been shown e.g. by Lauge Olaf Nielsen, and especially by Mark D. Jordan,
Ordering wisdom. The hierarchy of philosophical discourses in Aquinas, 1986;
INTRODUcnON 7
attempts to recover the relation between the supposedly general treatises on naming
God, and the supposedly particular naming of Christ, if thought to be present in
Aquinas at a1l21 . It searches for names of Christ in Aquinas' commentaries on
Scripture. on Peter of Lombard and on Pseudo-Dionysius' De Divinis Nominibus,
and studies the ways in which these are employed. And in doing so this treatment
applies new insights concerning the medieval theories of properties of tenns to
Aquinas' christology.
The five co-ordinates just mentioned are present in each chapter of this book, but
each chapter highlights one of the co-ordinates especially. The negative lluust of
Aquinas' christology is shown in chapter I, which is devoted to the employment of
the term mysterium in Aquinas' theology. The enhanced knowledge of medieval
grammar and logic informs chapter II, dealing with Aquinas' use of the concepts of
signification, supposition, predication and reduplication. The results of chapter II
are applied in chapter !II and IV. In chapter III Aquinas, as a biblical theologian, is
shown to employ and recognize many of the biblical names of Christ. The concept
of signification is especially important here. In chapter IV and V this fresh
interpretation of Aquinas' views on langnage in theology is developed in the
direction of his employment of the concepts of supposition, predication and
reduplication in voicing the unity of Christ. Chapter VI finally establishes the
connection between naming God and naming Christ, thus adding an important
aspect to the knowledge of the plan of the ST as well.
(3) In this book the emphasis is on Aquinas' texts themselves, and secondary
literature is indicated only when necessary either to give an overview of existing
studies or to mention the source of particular insights. The text contains many
references to Aquinas' texts, in order to indicate the passages on which my
interpretation is founded. Only in chapter II are these references meant to be
exhaustive. indicating all the texts where Aquinas talks about modes of signification
and modes of supposition.
The method that was employed in studying Aquinas' texts, i.e. a method that takes
their mutual chronological order into account, is often not recognizable in this
book. I have chosen to write a book, instead of a chronological report of my study.
So, when no major development in Aquinas' thought was discovered, either by me
or by modern interpreters, I quote texts regardless of their chronological position,
taking my point of departure in the Summa Theologiae. In those cases where
Aquinas evidently changes his views because he says so himself (e.g. the acquired
knowledge of the soul of Christ) and in those cases where there is possible
21) I. d'Hert says that "Christology plays no essential role in his (i.e. Aquinas' ~ hs) language
about God", 1975, p. 38. E. JUngel denies Aquinas' conception of analogy any christological
orientation, deems this to be its essential deficiency. and therefore implicitly passes negative
judgment on it, Gott als Geheimnis der Welt, 1977, pp. 368-408. Cf. K. Miiller, 1983, p. 273f.
and H.W.M. Rikhof, 1990a:
8 INTRODUCTION
development (e.g. the evaluation of Peter of Lombard's three views of the
hypostatic union, the name Verbum as a unified/essential divine name, the
substantial human being (esse) of Christ, the structure of the treatment of God the
Saviour as such), I deviate from this general pattern and do pay attention to the
chronology of texts, inasmuch as that can be done.
The titles of Aquinas' works are abbreviated, employing the abbreviations used by
R. Busa. The list of abbreviations can be found in the bibliography. References
employ Roman and Arabic numbers. Roman numbers refer to the chapter of a
biblical or other book (except Peter of Lombard's) commented upon; e.g. REI I 2
refers to Aquinas' commentary on the first chapter of the Gospel of John, second
lecture. Roman numbers are also used in referring to the several major parts of the
ST and other writings. Arabic numbers indicate questions, articles, sub-questions,
lectures, distinctions, and sections. E.g. ST III 17.2: Summa Theologiae, quaestio
17, articulus 2; 3SN 6.1.2.1: Scriptum, distinctio 6, quaestio I, articulus 2,
quaestiuncula 1. If concerning questions and articles no further reference is given
(to obiectum .,' sed contra (.. ), ad .. , expositio textus, or proemium), reference is
made to the corpus or solutio, or to the question/article as a whole. If numbers
between [square brackets] occur, the numbers of the edition of R. Busa are meant.
If these numbers are [1], [25] or a multiplication of 25, the text meant can be
found e.g. between [25] and [50], or from [25] onwards, if [25] is given as
reference.
Whenever I quote Aquinas, I do so from text-critical editions, if available. The
translations are either mine or from existing translations. or a combination of both.
Scriptural quotations are from the Vulgata (note the different enumeration of the
Psalms) or from the New Jerusalem Bible (sometimes adapted to the Vulgate-text
quoted). The latter's abbreviation of Scriptural books is employed.
In footnotes only incomplete reference to secondary literature is given. With the
help of years, indicating the year of publication, full reference can be found in the
bibliography.
CHAPTER I
CHRIST, THE MYSTERY OF GOD
1. "... among you stands the one whom you do not know. "
Why do you baptise, when you are not the Christ, nor Elijah, nor the Prophet,
Pharisees asked John the Baptist. John responds with words that are an occasion
for Aquinas to explain Christ as a mystery of faith: " ... but standing among you -
unknown to -you - is the one who is coming after me, but who was made before
me; and I am not fit to undo the strap of his sandal" (In 1.26-27)'. Ever since
Gregory the Great' explained the strap of the sandal in a mystical way as the
relationship of union between human and divine nature, that cannot be undone nor
comprehended by any human being, this interpretation is part and parcel of any
medieval exegesis of this text. The text is understood to confess the mystery of the
hypostatic union in Christ. The Baptist expresses, according to Aquinas, the
immensity of Christ's excellence first by drawing attention to the preaching of
Christ that surpasses his own preaching as the perfect surpasses the imperfect and
as the example surpasses that which is made according to it. Secondly by drawing
attention to Christ's dignity. The Baptist is understood to say: compared to him I
am nothing, there actu~lly is no comparing. In this respect the Baptist is just like
Abraham (Gn 18.27) and Job (Jb 52.5) and Isaiah (Is 40.17). Gregory's mystical
exposition adds to this literal exposition the likening of the sandal to the human
nature that the Son of God assumed, and the strap to the union of divinity and
humanity, which is such that man is made God and God man. The mysterium
incarnationis cannot be understood fully and perfectly, even though John and other
preachers imperfectly understood this union, Aquinas says).
1) ... mediUf autem vestrum stetit, quem vos nescitis. Ipse est qui post me venturUf est, qui
ante me jactUf est: CUiUf ego non swn dignUf ut solvam eiUf corrigiam calceamenti;
2) Corrigja calceamenti est ligatura mysterii. Joannes itaque solvere corrigiam calceamenti
eiUf non valet, quia incarnationis eiUf mysterium nee ipse investigare sujficit, qui hanc per
prophetiae spiritum agnovit, in: XL Homiliarum in Evangelia, hom. 7, n. 3 (Patroiogia Latina,
ed. J.P. Migne, Paris 1844-1864, Vol. 76, l102A). Peter of Lombard gives a silent quotation:
lila autem unio inexplicOOilis est, adeo ut etiam Joannes, '00 utero' scmctijicatUf, se non esse
dignum jateatur 'solvere corrigiam calceamenti' lesu, quia illiUf unionis modum investigare
aliisque explicare non erat sUfficiens, in: Sententiae in N libris Distinctae, III 2.2.2. Peter
finishes his christology with a sentence which makes allusion to this authority: Haec de corrigia
calceamenti Domini sufficiant ... , ibidem, 22.4.3;
3) REI I 13; Aquinas mentions (ibidem. [250]) an alternative reading that takes the Baptist to
refer to the levirate marriage, Ot 25.5-10: a husband's brother should marry the wife of his
deceased brother in order to perpetuate the brother's name; if the husband's brother refuses
someone else related to the deceased, willing to receive the woman, should take the husband's
brother's sandals as a sign of his resignation. By saying that he is not worthy to undo the strap of
the sandal, the Baptist means that he is not worthy to be called the groom of the church, but that
10 CHRIST, THE MYSTERY OF GOD
The character of mystery that the incarnation bears is said to consist in the human
incapability to understand the union completely. Christ is revealed to be God, to be
the one who was expected to come, and yet the way in which God is present in this
human being escapes human categories. This double aspect of the incarnation is
articulated more fully by Aquinas' exegesis of John's medius autem vestrum stetit,
quem vos nescitis. Aquinas lists the interpretations given by the fathers of the
church. Gregory, Chrysostome, and Augustine take this to refer to Christ's being
human among other human beings, Christ's social intercourse not only as a human
being, but even as a servant (Lk 22.27). But you cannot understand that God has
come to be man, you do not know that he is great according to the divine nature
that hides in him. While these three fathers take this saying to refer to Christ's
humanity, Origen interprets it as referring to Christ's divinity. Medius vestrum
means in medio omnium rerum, in the middle of all things, where Christ, the Word
through which from the beginning all is created, stands. The Word fills heaven and
earth, but the world does not know, does not recognize him. The order of the
universe and its origin in an operation of an intelligent, word-producing agent, is
not recognized. A third explanation stems from Origen as well. The words mean
that the Word of God is the cause of all light and wisdom in human beings; all
human wisdom is a participation of divine wisdom. The in medio refers to the
heart, which is the seat of wisdom and intelligence. But the wisdom of the world
did not recognize this, just as the darkness did not comprehend the light shining in
it (In 1.5). A fourth and last explanation, whose author Aquinas leaves
unmentioned, takes these words to refer to the prophetical prediction of Christ. The
Pharisees, whose profession it is to study the Scriptures of the Old Testament, are
told that they have Christ in their midst, i.e. in the Scriptures that they always have
with them, but do not recognize him there. Their heart is hardened and their eyes
are blind, not seeing that the one they think is coming is the one present.
Aquinas does not favour anyone of these possible readings. Whether Christ's
presence that is not understood should be interpreted to be his human presence, or
the divine presence in him, or the cosmic presence of the Word. or the hidden
presence of Christ in the Old Testatuent, these are all features of Christ's presence
and none of them is recognized by the Pharisees. There is no compelling reason to
make a choice. Aquinas' explanation favours the richness and abundance of this
Biblical text, instead of trying to argue for only one meaning.
I have devoted attention to this piece of Aquinas' commentary on John\ because
this text exemplifies some essential features of Aquinas' use of the word
mysterium, some features to be recognized in an overall study of his use of the
word. The mystery of our faith is first and foremost the mystery of the incarnation
of the Son of God. It is first a mystery since its essentials carulOt be understood
perfectly. It is a mystery and yet very public for those who have the eyes of faith.
It is a mystery, since in this man from Nazareth there is a hidden presence of God.
the church belongs rightfully to Christ who baptises with the Spirit;
4) REI! 13 [250];
CHAPTER ONE 11
Secondly. it is a mystery since the Word that is incarnate has a hidden presence in
the cosmos as well, being its plan, its plan of creation and of recreation. It is
thirdly a mystery since Christ is the Word of God, hidden as a human inner word
is hidden in the heart of the one who speaks, in order to signify this inner word
with his outer words. And fourth, it is a mystery because the Old Testament
predicts his coming and thereby contains his presence in a veiled way, only to be
unveiled by those who participate in the grace of the light of faith.
The word mysterium always has two aspects paradoxically combined: disclosure
and hiddenuess, hiddenness and disclosure. Things, taken in the broadest sense,
have a very special signification when they signify mysteriously. This, according to
each of its aspects. will be shown now in detail in examining Aquinas' use of the
word.
2. Aquinas' use of Ihe word 'myslerium'
To use the word mystery in the context of the knowledge of faith is quite common,
at least among Roman Catholic authorsS . Karl Rahner once even complained that
this widespread idiom was used too indiscriminately for anything, especially
propositions, that belongs to the content of faith'. He advocated a program that
should develop a hierarchy of mysteries, in order to determine what is more and
what is less central in matters of faith.
The tendency to call every part of the content of faith a mystery is present in
studies of Aquinas as well. It is quite common to talk about the mystery of God
triune, or about the mystery of the church. Aquinas only rarely does so. For him
mysterium is a christo logical word, a word that is used almost exclusively in the
5) Gerhard Ebeling sees a difference between Rome and the Reformation concerning the use
of the word Geheimnis. E.g. the word is not mentioned in RGG and EKL, whereas LThuK does
pay attention to it. "In religiOser Verwendung wird ·das Wort "Geheimnis" erst recht verdachtig.
Es scheint der Flucht aus der Helle des Denkens in das Halbdunkel der Gerohle Vorschub zu
leisten, geistige Mooigkeit onder gar intellektuelle Unredlichkeit reIigiOs zu rechtfertigen und
gegen eine Theologie des Wortes den Weg der Mystik zu empfehlen: Gatt zu suchen im
Transzendieren der Sprache in die Schweigezone des Unsagbaren hinein .... dies (ist) richtig, dass
der Begriff des Geheimnisses zum Schlupfwinkel von Tendenzen werden kann (unci auch
geworden ist). die das christliche Reden von Gott verfiilschen und die Unterscheidung zwischen
Glauben und Aberglauben verwischen." ("Profanitat und Geheimnis". 1968, p. 82) Ebeling
proposes to distinguish between mystery as a veiled state of affairs which is a human product, and
mystery as something which is unmade, confronts human kind and with which human kind has to
deal in some way or another. Only in the second sense the concept is acceptable and fruitful
according to him;
6) Karl Rahner, "Uber den Begriff des Geheimnisses in der Katholische Theologie",
Schriften zur Theologie IV. 51~99, p. 65f. Cf. "Fragen zur Unbegreiflichkeit Gottes bei Thomas
von Aquin", Schriften zur Theologie xn, 306-319; "tiber die Verborgenheit Gottes", ibidem,
285-305;
12 CHRIST, mE MYSTERY OF GOD
context of the senno de Christo'.
I suggest two reasons for this. First, in the New Testament, .where it ?CCU~S
especially in the Pauline letters, the word is almost exclUSively apphed m
christological contexts'. Aquinas' exegesis of these texts acknowledges this. Paul
speaks about the mystery of the divine plan of salvatio~', .that is Go~'s wisdo,:"
mysteriously hidden in his heareo, and revealed m his mcamatlon . What IS
hidden in the heart of the Father is revealed in the incarnation, escapes perfect
human understanding and formulation, and is the inexhaustible source of all
knowledge and wisdom. Therefore, since Christ is the hidden Word of God, who IS
and executes the divine plan of salvation, depends on God's hidden will alone, and
became incarnate to this end, the word mysterium has its proper context in the
senno de Christo.
A second reason, in addition to the adherence to biblical usage of the word, may
well be what can be called the unique mode of signification of Christ. This is not
Aquinas' way of describing Christ's unique mysteriousness, ,but mine. ~ ~e c~urs.e
of this book I hope it will become clearer why the phrase mode of slgruficatlOn ,
is highly apt to apply to Aquinas' interpretation of Christ. Christ is the unique
revelation of God, his mode of signifying God is unique. It is uni~ue ~ince C~ist
is God and since Christ's humanity and all that comes With It (paSSIOn,
resurrection, ascension, second corning) is a sign of God's being. However, this
mode of signification is hardly plain. flore is it out in the open for everyone. One
needs the eyes of faith, and being graced with it, the first and the last that one
knows is God's eminence, God's exceeding all human intellective powers. Since
the word mysterium possesses this double aspect of disclosing and veiling, of being
the thing signified and that which signifies, the word should be first and foremost
7) It is also qUite common to talk about the 'mysteries of the life of Christ'. It dat~s back to
the earliest fathers of the church; cf. A. Grillmeier, 1969 and L. Scheffczyk, 1985. Aqumas never
does so, despite the title of Lohaus' book: Die Geheimnisse des Lebens Jesu in. der ~
Theologiae des heiligen Thomas von Aquin, 1985. Lohaus says that, although 'mystenes of Chnst
as a technical term for the events of Christ's life is of later date (?) than Aquinas, Iter meint
sachlich dasselbe" (p. 13). I doubt that. Compare the beginning (de ipso incarnationis mysterio,
III prol.) and end (incarnationis mysterio, III 59.6 ad 3; mysteria Verbi Incarnati, III 60
proemium) of the Senno de Deo Salvatore of ST III: the mystery of Christ, having many aspects,
is one. We will return to this;
8) The Vulgate translates the Greek 'musterion' into mysterium or sacramentum: Mt 13.11;
Mk 4.11; Lk 8.10; Rm 11.25; 16.25; ICo 2.7; 4.1; 13.2; 14.2; 15.51; Ep 1.9 (S); 3.3 (S); 3.4;
3.9 (S); 5.32 (S); 6.19; Col 1.26; 1.27 (S); 2.2; 4.3; 2Th 2.7; ITm 3.9; 3.16 (S); Rv 10.7; 17.5;
9) CRO XI 4 [I]; XVI 2 [175J; RIC XV 8 [25J; REP I 3 [100]; III I [200]; VI 5 [75]; RCL
I 6 [100];
10) CIC II I [250]; RIC XIII I [150]; REP TIl 2 [100] [175J; REP 1II 3 [25J; RCL II I [100];
RTI III 3 [125J;
11) REP 1II I [125]; RCL II I [100]; RTI III 3 [125];
CHAPTER ONE 13
reserved for the context of christology, as Aquinas in fact does".
The nature of the Biblical usage of the term mysterium, as well as the unique mode
of signification of Chtist, call for a restricted use of mysterium for the serma de
Veo Salvatore". Aquinas' usage of the term may further explain and corroborate
this. I will give first Aquinas' direct explanations of the word, and propose to
distinguish between the connotation and the denotation of it.
2.1 Explanations of the word 'mysterium'
The explanations that Aquinas offers are contained in his commentaries on the
Biblical usage of the word. Aquinas explains mysterium to be a secret14 • and
speaks about the secretum,}ncarnationis divinae (secret of the divine incarnation),
as synonymous to mysterium incarnationis divinae l5 . He also says that to speak,
as Christ does, in mysterio means to speak in aUquo occulto, vel verba vel signo 16
(in something concealed, either a word or a sign). The words that Christ speaks
and the signs that he performs possess an aspect of concealment. The term
12) A.M. Hoffmann (1939, p. 59f) talks about a 'double' character of hiddenness: "Der
Grundcharakter des Mysteriums ist sein Verborgensein, und die mit Mysterium bezeichnete
Wirklichkeit ist darum verborgen, wei! sie die Fassungslcraft des menschlichen InteUektes
iiberragt. Diesem, der iibernatiirlichen Wirldichkeit eignenden Verborgenheitscharakter muss die
Fonn der Mitteilung wenigstens im Pilgerstande entsprechen; auch diese Form der Mitteilung muss
Verborgenheitscharakter tragen. Es gibt nun eine doppelte Art, den Verborgenheitscharakter trotz
der Mitteilung des Mysteriums zu wahren: die Wirklichkeit kann kundgegeben werden einmal
under dem Schleier des Wortes und zweiteos unter dem Schiefer eines Zeichens. eines Symboles.
So bleibt sie wenngleich offenbart, doch verhiillt und verborgen" (p.39). "Die Offenbarung des
Mysteriums besagt also nicht seine vollige Enthiillung; es bleibt, wenn auch offenbart, unter dem
Schleier des Symbols verborgen. Wenn wir auch urn seine Existenz wissen, so bleibt uos doch
sein innerstes Wesen verborgen; aIIerdings auch auf diese deutet der verhiillende Schleier hin". A
summary of Hoffmann's study can be found in C. Spicq, 1944, p. 208;
13) The term mysterium occurs 689 times in Aquinas' writings, quotations excluded. 181
times it concerns the combination mysterium incarnationts, which together with other
combinations indicate a dominant christo!ogical usage. Cf. Hoffmann, 1939, p. 44.
In the Summa Theologiae Aquinas also talks about mysterium Christi, mysterium carnis. mysterium
divinitatis eius, mysterium humanitatis Christi, mysterium resurrectionis, mysterium redemptionis
generis humani and mysterium salutis. From his other works one can add: mysteria Christi et
ecdesiae, mysterium crucis, mysterium ascensionis, mysterium reparationis. mysterium
exaltationis. mysterium nativitatis Christi, and mysterium unionis. The only combination that is not
directly related to Christ (to which I do reckon the combinations occurring in the treatment of the
sacraments), but only indirectly, is the combination mysterium Trinitatis, which occurs eight times
in the Summa Theo{ogiae (I 32.1 ad I; II-II 2.8; II-II 171.3; II-II 174.6; II-II 180.4 obieclum 3;
m 16.1 obiectum 2; III 17.1 obiectum 5 and ad 5);
14) CRO XVI 2 [175J; CIC IV I [025]; cf. REP !II 2 [100) [175], 3 [025]; cf: mysteria, id
est secreta, a mystim, quod est secretum, uc incarnationem ... , passionem .... et multa aUa, CIS
pro\. 2 [75J;
15) CRO XVI 2 [175J;
16) CICn I [250);
 CHRIST, THE MYS1ERY OF GOD
14
occultus, concealed. is used quite often to explain mysteryI7. To speak wisdom in
mysterio Aquinas says somewhere else, is to present a hidden, abscondita,
wisdom'B, The mystery that has been hidden for ages and generations, and which
is to be preached by Paul, is the Word of God".
From this we conclude that the connotation of the Biblical mysterium according to
Aquinas is a secret. something concealed, something hidden. It denotes something
contained in God's heart as an inner word, and now brought out into the open;
contained also in the Old Testament as an outer word spoken by God, and now
fulfilled. The concept of mystery goes hand in glove with speaking, preaching,
signification, inner and outer words, and revelation. . .'
The latter aspect becomes even more apparent if one takes mte consIderation the
Vulgate-translation of the Greek 'musterion' not only into mysterium bm into
sacramentum as well. When this occurs, Aquinas gives the same explanatIons as
mentioned above", but adds two well-known definitions of the ecelesial
22
sacrament: sacrum secreturrr l , sacred secret, and sacrae rei signum , sign of a
23
sacred thing, both derived from Augustine . Moreover, the text last mentioned,
17) RIC XIII I [l50J; XIV I [225J; XV 8 [25J; RCL II 1 [IOOJ; RTi III 2 [l75J; cf. R2T II 2
[IJ;
18) REP III 2 [175J; cf. IU 3 [175J;
19) RCL 16 [100J; cf. REP III I [l25J;
20) REP 13 [75J; III 2 [175J, III 3 [175J; RTlIII 3 [125J; RCL III [IOOJ;
21) REP I 3 [75J; RT11II 3 [125J; cr. ST IU 60.1 and OSS 2 [IJ;
22) REP V 10 [50J; cf. ST III 60.2 and OSS 2 [IJ;
23) De Civitate Dei X 5; In the prologue to lCo Aquinas neatly distinguishes between two
meanings of sacramentum, one being in line with mysterium, and one applicable to the ecclesial
sacraments only: Sacramenti nomen dupliciter accipi consuevit. Nam quandoque sacramentum
dicitur quodcumque secretum, et praecipue de rebus sacris; quandoque sacramentum dicitur
sacrae rei signum, ita quod et eius imaginem gerat, et causa existat, secundum quod nos dicimus
septem sacramenta Ecclesiae ... In qua quidem signijicatione sacramenti etiam prima significatio
continetur; nam ~in his Ecclesiae sacramentis, divina virtus secretius operatur salutem", ut
Augustinus dicit, CIC prol. [I} D. O'Connor (1969, p. 209) uses this text to corroborate his
interpretation that signum does n6t enter the definition of mysterium according to Aquinas. He
does not mention however that Aquinas' exegesis of Ep 5.32 does speak of 'sacrae rei signum',
without taking sacramentum in the second sense mentioned above, but as an example of reading
the Old Testament secundum mystenum (cf. however p. 276f). Reading secundum mysterium
corresponds with Signification of (the) mystery (of Christ). O'Connor's basic point, Le. that
Aquinas would only subscribe to the first part of the common definition "a truth which was once
hidden - but is now revealed", is well taken. Revelation does not enter the very definition of
mystery (p. 208). O'Connor's denial of the function of signification as an aspect of being a
mystery (p. 209), however, is one step too far: it is quite possible to have a sign without that
which is signified being revealed or not yet revealed. Cf. Rv 17.5: Et in frante eius nomen
scriptum: Mysterium: Babylon T1J!lgna ... The name itself is not hidden, but its meaning is (p. 262,
note 3).
O'Connor makes a fundamental error in applying conclusions drawn from Aquinas' exegesis of
Paul's use of mystery to Aquinas' own use of the word without studying the hitter. It may be the
case that Paul does not possess an overall concept of mystery, and that Aquinas acknowledges
this, but that doesn't necessarily prevent Aquinas from having one of his own. On the basis of
CHAPTER ONE 15
REP V 10, seems to say that Paul gives attention to a special mode of
signification, i.e. reads a text from Genesis secundum mysterium.
Aquinas explains the word mysterium as connoting something hidden, something
secret, something concealed. This he says in regard to the Biblical concept. The
content of what is hidden, i.e. that which the tenn denotes, may differ. Sometimes
it is evil (2Th 2.7), sometimes the knowledge of faith (ITm 3.9), sometimes the
message of the Gospel (Ep 6.19), sometimes the marriage of Christ with the
Church (Ep 5.32), sometimes the resurrection of all (ICo 15.51), sometimes the
conversion of the Gentiles (Rm 11.25; 16.25), sometimes the presence of the
Kingdom of God (Mt 13.11). Most of these instances, however, retain their unity
in their divine origin, their origin in the wisdom and love of God, in the Word of
God. They are closely related to those instances where what is hidden refers
directly to the mystery that Christ is: the wisdom of the teaching of Christ (1 Co
2.7), the spiritual testimony of Christ (lCo 4.1), the divine wisdom (lCo 13.2;
14.2), the incarnation according to its origin in the will of God, its moment in
time, and its effect in bringing all together under the head of Christ (Ep 1. 9), the
magnitude, . the inexhaustible sapiential richness of Christ and the sal vation of the
faithful (Ep 3.3; 3.4; 3.9), the Word of God concerning the incarnation or the
conversion of the Gentiles (Col 1.26-27), the Word of God in God's heart (I Tm
3.16), in sum; Christ (Col 2.2). The content of what is hidden is formed by
different aspects of one reality; Christ, the Wisdom and Word of God.
Mysterium, when it indicates some divine hiddenness, denotes, according to
Aquinas' exegesis of these texts, the mystery that Christ is.
The mode of being, a mode of being for human beings, is described, connoted by
'mystery'. Mystery describes the way in which, according to the capacity of hUman
intellect, Christ is in God. The bible is not that explicit about the nature of this
hiddenness. A meaning for the word mysterium more precise than 'something
hidden' cannot be found. Theology, however, reflecting upon the nature and
sources of human knowledge of God, must be more explicit on this subject.
Aquinas' own use of the word mysterium reveals an articulated awareness of this
mode, and thus of the connotations of the word. He uses it in four different
contexts, which reflects four different aspects of hiddenness of Christ. The study of
these aspects serves our understanding of mysterium as such. The nexus, the bond
between these aspects, promotes in turn the understanding of each one of them.
That is what we will now undertake. We will discover that the mode of being
hidden, in each of the contexts to be described, is or resembles a mode of
signification. These modes of signification are ordered analogously ...
Aquinas' independent writings more can be said on the connotation of the word mystery than that
it signifies 'something hidden';
16 CHRIST. THE MYSTERY OF GOD
The following four aspects are to be distinguished":
a) mysterium connotes the mode of our knowledge of Christ: mysterium and the
articles of faith;
b) it connotes the mode of our reading of Scripture: biblical henneneutics
secundum mysterium;
c) it connotes the mode of signification of the sacrament of the eucharist:
Christ's hidden presence in the mystery of the eucharist;
d) it connotes the hidden mode of being and mode of 'signification' of Christ,
i.e. his person and work: the mystery of God in Christ;
2.2 'Mysterium' and the articles of faith: hidden in propositions
Aquinas attaches the word mysterium in a special way to the articles of faith. The
articles of faith summarize the knowledge of faith, principally derived from and
contained in Scripture. Mysterium summarizes the summary: the twelve articles
revolve around the two basic mysteries of Christian faith, so Aquinas says. These
two basic mysteries are the true knowledge of God and the incarnation of Cluist
(ST II-II 174.6). On the one hand, the knowledge of the unity of God, God the
Father, God the Son, God the Spirit, and his works of creation, sanctification and
resurrection. On the other hand, the confession of the incarnation or conception of
Christ, his birth from the Virgin, his passion, death and burial, his descent into
hell. his resurrection. his ascension, and his coming to deliver judgment. There are
two times seven articles2S , each group of them headed by the word mysterium.
Each article expresses a truth about God. The occultum divinitatis (ST II-II 1.8)
regards God himself (de ipso Deo tantum, 3SN 25.1.2), the contemplation of whom
is beatific. The mysterium incarnationis Christi (ST II-II 174.6), the mysterium
humanitatis Christi (ST II-II 1.8) regards God in respect of the human nature that
the Son of God assumed (de Deo ratione naturae assumptae, 3SN 25.1.2). Both
concern knowledge of what is hidden, what is concealed (occultum. mysterium), but
the term mysterium is reserved for the mystery of Christ, for the totality of the
26
salvific operation of Christ when he was among US . From this we learn as well
24) I have adopted this sequence of aspects despite the fact that according to a logical order
the fourth aspect comes first. In fact, the three other aspects are to be adduced in order to clarify
Aquinas' rather short~hand use of the term mysterium, and in order to explain its richness in
meaning, instead of the usual tacit interpretation that it is just a technical term, expressing
marginal modesty. In saying this I do not oppose O'Connor's opinion that 'mystery' is a modal
word for Aquinas, connoting "the (hidden) manner of something without indicating the nature of
the thing in question", and not a content~word. (1969, p. 273). The richness in meaning I intend
is the richness of its theological usage and the weight of its importance;
25) Aquinas acknowledges the fact that there are twelve articles, symbolically tied to the
twelve apostles, but states that in these twelve articles fourteen credibilia are to be distinguished.
3SN 25.1.2; ST II-II 1.8:
26) Illam autem beatificantem cognitionem circa duo cognita Dominus consistere docuit,
~cilicet circa divinitatem Trinitatis, et humanitatem Christi; unde ad Patrem loquens dicit: nHec
CHAPTER ONE 17
that whenever Aquinas talks about the mysteria Christi, or about the mysteria
gratiae. he denotes the chief aspects of Christ's salviflc operation21 • So, if there is
one word to be found in Aquinas' writing that' is able to characterize the nature of
the knowledge of faith, it is the word mysterium. It summarizes the summary of
faith, the creed.
Having established that faith and hiddenness go together for Aquinas, we are now
in the position to ask how they do. A number of questions are pertinent. Is the
object of faith a mystery in itself? Is God a mystery? Is the incarnation, taken in a
broad sense, a mystery? Are the formulations of faith secret formulations? Do the
propositions in which faith is formulated reflect the mysterious character of faith?
Is faith identical with propositions? Are the mysteries still mysteries, or do they
stop being mysteries when revealed? These questions themselves may illustrate the
complexity of the matter. To say that a Christian believes two principal mysteries
is a highly complex if not multi-faceted enunciation.
I do not intend to give a full treatment here of Aquinas' discussion of the
knowledge of faith. The study of this topic was brought forward because we are
trying to understand the connotation of the word mystery in Aquinas' writing, and
because we encountered a central context in which Aquinas uses the word, i.e. his
treatment of the virtue of faith. So we will study now only those aspects of his
treatment that are pertinent to the further determination of the connotation of
mysterium. The questions formulated above will serve as guide.
First of all it is important to see how Aquinas discovers the word 'object'. in the
phrase 'the object of faith', to be ambiguous. He distinguishes between the material
side and the formal side of the object of faith (ST II-II 1.1). It seems that the First
Truth, i.e. God himself, cannot be the object of faith, since faith is also concerned
with other things (e.g. what belongs to Christ's humanity, the sacraments of the
Church, things belonging to creation, all things contained in Scripture), and since
faith shares its object with charity, the latter being aimed at one's neighbour as
well. This calls for a distinction between that through which one knows something,
and the somethmg one knows. Borrowing an example from science Aquinas says
that the conclusions of geometry form the material object of knowledge, but the
est vita aetema, ut cognoscant te verum Deum, et quem misist; Iesum Christum n (In 17.3). Circa
hec .ergo duo totafidei cognitio versatur: scilicet circa divinitatem Trinitatis, et circa humanitatem
r::hn~ti: ?ec mirum, quia Christi humanitas via est qua ad divinitatem pervenitur. Oportet igitur et
In vla wam cognoscere, per quam possit pervenire ad finem; et in patria Dei gratiarum actio
~uJ!iciens non. esset, nisi vie per quam salvati sunt cognitionem haberent, OTT I 2; cf. In prjmis
Igltur vos sCire oportet quod tota fides christiana circa divinitatem et humanitatem Christi
versatur, OSS 1 [1];
27) The most explicit confinnation of this can be found in Aquinas' commentary on Psalm 8
(RPS VIII 5 [SO]): Possunt et haec ad beneficia gratiae referri: et tunc in his omnia mysteria
Christi ~um.erantur. Primo incarnationis ... Secundum est passionis ... Tertium est beneficium
resurrecnoms ... Quartum mysterium est ascensionis ... Quintum mysterium est adventus ad judicium;
 CHRIST, THE MYSTERY OF GOD
18
media demonstrationis, the media of the demonstration, are that through which
what is demonstrated is known, i.e. the fannal object of knowledge. Elsewhere
Aquinas compares the form of the object with light, through which the matter. of
the object. the colour. is seen (3SN 24.1.1). In the same vern It IS God. the FIrst
Truth who is the formal object of the knowledge of faIth. SIDce It IS through his
revel~tion that we come to know. What we come to know is that First Truth, but
also many other things in their relationship with it. In a certai,n sen.se then, ~e
First Truth is also the material object of the knowledge of faIth. smce nothing
belongs to that knowledge unless it has to do with God. Aquinas takes a
remarkable stand: it is God and nothing but God and all things related to hlm that
is the object of faith. Even the humanity of Christ only forms part.of the
knowledge of faith inasmuch as it is united with the Son of God and onentates
human kind to the First Truth".
Now. this First Truth is absolutely simple. absolute intelligence. absolute act. In
God there is no potency. there is nothing to be learned. there is nothing unknown.
nothing inadequate. God's act of understanding is simply identical with what he
understands and with his intellect".
So. if what faith is about consists of mysteries. consists of things hidden and
therefore of things that partly are not what they seem to be. things composed
instead of simple. things partly dark instead of absolute light. then the word
mystery cannot be a word used to describe God or the First Truth. but only a word
used to describe God as he is in our intellect. as we understand hlm. as he has
revealed himself to us. Hiddenness does not concern the object, the fannal object,
of the articles of faith. but the object of the articles of faith as their objects. as
their material objects. To answer the question formulated above, is the Object of
faith a mystery in itself! No. the object of faith is only a mystery inasmuch as it is
believed (in this life). but not in itself.
This entails that any multiplicity that might occur in the things we believe cannot
but be part of the human mode of knowledge that faith is. But from Aquinas'
discussion of the articles of faith we learned that there is a multitude of mysteries,
to be reduced to two. but never to something absolutely simple. It is another sign
of the fact that the mysteries as such constitute not the fonnal. but the material
object of faith.
Aquinas puts this rather straightforwardly when he compares the First Truth.
simple as it is, with the complexity or compositeness of the propositions of faith,
28) ST II-II 1.1 ad 1; Cf. however the third reason that Aquinas gives in favour of the real
presence of the body of Christ in the sacrament of the eucharist: .. .hoc competit perfectioni fidei,
quae, sicut est de divinitate Christi, ita est de eius humanitate: secundum illud ln 14.1: 'Creditis
in Deum, et in me credite'. Et quia fides est invisibilium. sicut divinitatem suam nobis exhibet
Christus invisibiliter. ita et in hoc sacramento carnem suam nobis exhibit invisibili modo, ST III
75.1;
29) ... in Deo intellectus, et id quod intelligitur. et species intelligibUis. et ipsum intelligere,
sUn! omnino unum et idem, ST I 14.4;
CHAPTER ONE 19
e.g. the ones from the Creed (ST II-II 1.2). How can it be that these propositions
express true knowledge of God when their very structure contradicts the One
spoken about? In order to understand this. one should know that Aquinas.
following AristotieJO • distinguishes two operations of the human inteIlect: one by
which concepts as such are understood, and another in which the intellect passes
judgment in putting together (componere) or denying (dividere) a predicate-term of
a subject-term. Only the products of the second operation can be true or false. and
since faith is sometimes described as a kind of assent, which involves judgment and
truth. only a true proposition can form the content of the knowledge of faith. Now.
since in understanding the human intellect has nothing but itself, it cannot but
proceed by way of composing and dividing. Anything the inteIlect has knowledge
of (whether it be things c"",posed. its connatural object. or something simple) is
present in the mind of the one who understands not according to its own mode, but
according to the mode of the mind of. in this case. the one who believes.
Taking up the question about the relationship between composed propositions of
faith. and God's simple being. Aquinas proposes two approaches. Considered from
the side of the formal object of faith. the object of faith is simple. Considered from
the side of the one who believes. the (material) object of faith is not simple but
composed. The structure of the expression -of divine truth in words and
propositions contradicts what is expressed, but it follows the mode of
understanding. This of course does not only regard the multiplicity inherent in one
proposition. but the mUltiplicity of words and the multiplicity of propositions as
well. The First Truth exceeds" the human mode of knowing and if there were
one word to express it. it would be the Word of God".
30) CPE 11.1-2: CAN III 11:
31) excedere is associated several times with mysterium, e.g. QDV9.1 ad 9~ CDNprol.; QDM
16.6 ad 2:
32) Similiter etiam intellectus noster secundum diversas conceptiones repraesentat divinam
perfectionem, quia unaquaeque imperfecta est: sl enim perfecta esset, esset una tantum, sicut est
unum tantum Verbum intellectus divini, QDV2.1;
Bruce Marshall (1989, 1992) has argued that the object of faith (from the point of view of
believers) as something complex, in the form of a statement, should not be taken to refer to the
material, but to the formal object of faith. His position forms part of a theological position on the
nature and justification of religious truth, which is the subject of debate between so-called
revisionists (D. Tracy, J. Gustafson), Thomists (the late C. O'Neill, L. Roy, F. Crosson) and
confessionalists (G. Lindbeck). M. has argued that Lindbeck's conception is compatible with
Aquinas's. To this end he studies Aquinas' treatise on faith and denies that Aquinas allows for
some sort of neutral vantage-point from which the truth of Christian faith can be judged. To
consider the articles of faith as belonging to the material, and not to the formal object of faith.
forms part of a traditional and apologetic reading of Aquinas, M. says. However, I do not think
that to regard the articles as part of the material object of faith entails or is necessarily linked with
a purely supra-linguistic conception of the formal object of faith. On the contrary, and in this
study I will show why. The least one can say is that Aquinas is not explicit in ST II-II 1.2,
perhaps on purpose. On the one hand, God excels all linguistic embodiment of the First Truth he
is, and therefore propositions can be said to belong to the material object of faith. On the other
20 CHRIST. THE MYSTERY OF GOD
We are engaged in a further articulation of the connotation of the word mysterium.
It is quite clear now, not only that 'mystery' describes the human mode of knowing
the object of faith. rather than the object in itself, but also that any multiplicity of
mysteria and any multiplicity of our words with which we express these mysteries.
belongs to the mode of knowledge of faith. not to the First Truth".
On the one hand the propositions that the faithful formulate are deficient inasmuch
as they do not succeed in building a parallelism between the (complex) structure of
their speech, and the (simple) mode of being of God. The mode of signification is
deficient. On the other hand the very mode of signification of propositions is quite
telling about the understanding that it expresses, about the material object of faith
and so about the connotation of mysterium. When the faithful confess their belief in
the incarnation, they cannot be understood to say credo incarnationem, but they
must be understood to say credo incarnationem esse/fuissi?4. If the first were to
be true, anyone who knows what the word incarnatio means should be reckoned
among the faithful. No, the confession does not express simple understanding, on
the first level of the operation of the intellect; but expresses a judgment, an assent.
on the second level of the operation of the intellect. This judgment is on the one
hand inadequate, but on the other hand quite fitting, since the faithful do not know
what God is, do not know the essence or quiddity of the First Truth, do not know
and cannot prove the reasons for the incarnation nor the nature of the hypostatic
union, but only that the First Truth exists, only that the Son of God did become
hand, there is no justification of religious judgments outside the linguistic rules of Scripture and
articles of faith, embodying the formal object of faith. There is no access to the First Truth but
through the articles of faith (the summary of Scripture), just as there is no access to the First
Truth that the Son of God is, but through his human nature.
It seems to me a peculiar instance of historical paradox that in one age (say the age of the
developing sense fOf history) it was quite 'progressive' or 'liberal' to insist that dogmatic
formulations are part of the material object of faith, so as to prove all dogma's to be subject to
historical development, whereas in our days it is considered to be liberal Of postmodem to insist
on them belonging to the formal object of faith, so as to prove Scriprure and articles of faith to
function as an absolute linguistic paradigm for the just.ification of Christian truth;
33) Several scholars have paid attention to this very important part of Aquinas' doctrine of
faith. Both Chenu and Walgrave have located this part as the point where Aquinas shows himself
to be a theologian with a dynamic conception of faith, leaving essential space between God and
the formulations of faith. In Symbolo tanguntur ea de quibus est fides inquantum ad ea terminalur
actus credentis: ut ex ipso modo loquendi apparet. Actus autem credentis non terminatur ad
enuntiabile,' sed ad rem: non enim jormamus enuntiabilia nisi ut per ea de rebus cognitionem
habeamus, sicut in scientia ita et in fide, is the answer of Aquinas to an argument that defends
that the Symbolum does not state enunciations but res (ST II-II 1.2 ad 2). Aquinas' concept of
revelation cannot be a concept in which revelation is understood to reveal propositions, to be
'eternally' adhered to. Cf. J.H. Walgrave, 1972, p. 99ff.; M.-D. Chenu, 1923; H.D. Simonin,
1935; G. Nuchelmans. 1982;
34) depending on the point in history that they speak, i.e. in the days of Christ or afterwards~
CHAPTER ONE 21
incarnate3s • The existence of something is always expressed by way of composing
or dividing (3SN 24.1.2).
What Aquinas in fact says is that the articles of faith are inadequate, since they do
not fit in with the simplicity of the formal object of faith; yet they express that
inadequacy quite adequately, inasmuch as they do not try to express a composite
and multiple understanding in a simple way. The inadequacy of human language
fits the inadequacy of human understaoding quite well, whereas the inadequacy of
human understanding expresses the eminence and excess of divine truth over all
human truth. The mode of signification of the judgments of faith hides the truth
that they want to express, and rightly does so because in so doing they express the
mysteries of faith, as faith's material object, perfectly".
From this we are allowed to'infer the reason why Aquinas denies that mysteries of
faith stop existing as mysteries when they are revealed. The reason is that, in this
life, no knowledge better than the knowledge of faith can be had. This knowledge
is not inconsiderable, quite the contrary (3SN 24.2.3); yet the object of this
knowledge is the First Truth, that shall never be comprehended and in this life
never shall be seen31 • The fact that something about God, or something in its
relation to God, is revealed does not remove the hiddenness of it, but on the
contrary. the fact that we can only know it through revelation entails L'lat it is
revealed as a mystery. The material object of faith, for example, is that God exists
in three persons, but we cannot know, in the sense that we cannot define or prove
35) Aquinas may have learned this from Albert the Great. The reportatio of Albert's course
on Pseudo-Dionysi~s' De Divinis Nominibus, put down by his student Thomas Aquinas, gives
exactly the same view. Super Dionysium de Divinis Nominibus, Opera Omnia Alberti Magni, T.
XXXVII. P. I, II 701-702. p. 88f;
36) In the next chapter we will deal with this aspect of the medieval theory on the semantics
of pro~~sitions. also cal~ed ~eory of predication, i.e. the theory about the proper- analysis of
prOpOSitIOns and the relatIOnship between propositions and the reality signified;
37) The essentials of Aquinas' teaching on the nature of human knowledge of God are these:
: God ~ incomprehensible, i.e. the human intellect will never, by natural reason, or by faith, or
m patna~ be able to know all about God that there is to know, to literally comprehend Him, to
define Him: All knowledge of God's essence expresses merely a kind of approach. instead of
comprehensIOn. .
- God is invisible, i.e. cannot be seen with human corporeal eyes, neither now or ever.
- God's essence will be visible inpatria, in an intellecrual way and immediately.
This swnmary can be found in REM V 2 [6001; REI I 11 [1J. On the interesting history of the
development of this view, see note 32 on page 182.
William J. Hoye, 1~88, m~es ~ plausible case for the interpretation that the deficiency of human
knowledge of God .m Aqumas IS not to be understood as a pious remark in the margin, but the
very essence of thiS knowledge: to know that God is greater than anything understood. To a
certain extent this confirms the interpretation of G.P. Kreling, who says: "Heeft ooit het
agnosticisme met sterker woorden [dan Thomas - hs] het ongenaakbare van het goddelijk geheim
vastgelegd?", "Het Goddelijk Geheim in de theologie p. 259~
h
,
 CHRIST, THE MYSTERY OF GOD
22
it, what that means". The material object of faith, for example, is that the Son of
God has suffered, but we cannot know, similarly, what that means. The reasons for
the incarnation originate in the divine love and are hidden there". 'Hidden in
God' is just a metaphOr'" with which our deficient mode of knowing and
signification is described.
From the use of mysterium in the context of the articles of faith. we learn that the
connotation of mysterium not only contains the hiddenness, the concealment of
something. It also signifies the eminence of that which is concealed, and its unity,
despite the multiplicity of mysteries and the multiplicity of the verbal expressions
and confessions of them. All mysteries of faith originate in the First Truth, the
proper object of faith, and when the mysteries themselves are called the objects of
faith, it is meant that the mode of knowledge proper to faith is an inadequate,
deficient mode. Moreover, in this life these mysteries are not rendered void in
being revealed, but revelation is revelation of mysteries. The verbal expression of
the mysteries through the articles of faith. their composite mode of signification, is
a perfect sign and parallel of the weakness of the knowledge of faith, neither
knowing the essence nor the reasons, but only knowing that God is and that his
Son became incarnate.
In drawing attention to the character of hiddelUless of the articles of faith, Aquinas
draws attention to their special mode of signification. This mode of signification
38) Cf. ST I 32.1: ... impossibile est per rationem naturalem ad cognitionem Trinitatis
divinarum personarum pervenire. Whoever tries to do so dishonors faith quantum ad dignitatem
ipsius fidei. quae est ut sit de rebus invisibilibus. quae rationem humanam excedunt... Et
Apostolus dicit: "Sapientiam loquimur inter perfectos, sapientlam vero non huius saeculi. neque
principium huius saeculi; sed loquimur Dei sapientiam in mysterio. quae abscondita est~ (lCo
2.6). The mystery of the Trinity universally exceeds the cognition of all human beings (ST II-II
171.3), is above and beyond reason, and may even seem to repugn it (ST II-II 180.4 obiectum 3),
calls for special rules of predication (ST III 16.1 ad 2; cf. 17.1 obiectum 5, ad 5), is in a certain
sense contained in the mystery of the incarnation (ST IT-II 2.8) and fully revealed by the Son of
God (STII-II 174.6).
These are all the occurrences of mysterium Trinitatis in the Summa Theologiae;
39) Cf... .notandum est quod sunt quaedam rationes mysteriorum gratiae (Otam creaturam
excedentes, et huiusmodi rationes non sunt inditae mentibus angeiorum, sed in solo Deo occultae
sun!, REP III 3 [1751. So great, Aquinas says, is God's compassion, that it cannot be understood
nor investigated (REP III 2 [100]); Cf. REP III 5 [125]: Et ideo scire charitatem Christi, est scire
omnia mysteria incarnationis Christi et redemptionis nostrae, quae ex immensa charitate Dei
processerUflt, quae quidem charitas excedit omnem intellectum creatum et omnium scientiam, cum
sit incomprehensibilis cogitatu.
This entails that in christology no proofs can be given, but only grounds for fittingness, cf.
Lobous, 1985, p. 223ff;
40) I use the word 'metaphor' in the sense in which Aquinas employs it, i.e. as a word that
includes in its mode of signification something corporeal and that, when used of God, has the
same signification that it has when used in its original context. When used of God, it is said
improperly, as opposed to words that are used analogously, such as 'good' or 'wise'. STI 1.9 and
13.3;
CHAPTER ONE 23
hides the First Truth, and signifies its multiple hiddenness in the mind of the
believer.
2.3 Biblical hermeneutics 'secundum mysterium'
When the disciples ask him why it is that he talks in parables (Mt 13.10), Jesus
answers that they are granted to understand the mysteries of the kingdom of
heaven, but that the crowds do not share the same gift. This fulf1ls Isaiah's
prophecy about those who listen but never understand, and look but never perceive
(Is 6.9-10), Jesus says. Some more parables follow, and after having recorded four
of them, Manhew states: "In all this Jesus spoke to the crowds in parables; indeed,
he would never speak to them except in parables. This was to fulf1l what was
spoken by the prophet: "I Will speak to you in parables, unfold what has been
hidden since the foundation of the world"." (Mt 13.34-35; Ps 78.2). Aquinas'
exegesis of these texts is important for our purposes, not only because this is the
only evangelical text (together with its parallels in Mk 4.11 and Lk 8.10) in which
the word 'musterion' is used41 , but also because it portrays Jesus' teaching as
based upon a spiritual reading of Scripture. and because it shows that there is a
basic analogy between the mode of signification of Jesus' teaching, and the senses
of Scripture. I will return to this last point at the end of this section, but now I
focus upon the first: Jesus' teaching is shown to be based upon a spiritual reading
of Scripture. When Matthew writes that by using parables Jesus fulf1ls the words of
the psalmist, Aquinas comments; "Therefore Christ before his passion has spoken
in parables, so that those who hear would understand that things said in the Old
Testament were said in figure of other things, although they were things past"".
41) An interesting question that Aquinas raises here is the question why Jesus used many
parables in stead of only few. The second reason he gives is: quia spiritualia semper sunt occulta;
ideo per temporalia non plene manifestari possum, ideo per diversa habent manifestari. Then
Aquinas quotes Jb 11.5: "If only God would speak with you, open his lips for you and show you
the secrets of his wisdom. ( ... Can you claim to comprehend even the traces of God, can you
reach the limit of the perfect omnipotent?)", REM XIII 1. This qualifies the Apostles'
understanding as well: Aquinas quotes Jn 16.12 "I still have many things to say to you but they
would be too much for you to bear now.", when answering an objection saying that the depths of
wisdom are only explained to the perfect (apostles) and not to the imperfect (crowds). The Lord
did not reveal all profundities of his wisdom, not to the crowds but neither to the apostles (ST III
42.3 ad 2). In general Aquinas' view is that all things that Jesus taught in parables, are taught to
the Apostles without disguise but in plain speech (ST 11142.3, REM XIII 1 [450]);
42) REM XIII 4 [325]: Unde Christus ante passionem in parabolis locutus est, Ul auditis his
intelligant ea, quae in veteri testamento dicUntur, esse dicta in figura aliarum rerum, lice! essent
res gestae. Aquinas' stress on the fact that it is not the words of Scripture that beside a literal
sense have a spiritual sense as wen, but that realities signified have spiritual signification, reminds
of ST I 1.10 ad 1: Sensus isti non multiplicantur propter hoc quod una vox multa signijicet; sed
quia ipsae res sign(jicatae per voces, aliarum rernm possum esse signa. This mode of signification
is unique, and possible since God is the author of both Scripture and of the realities Signified
(ibidem, corpus);
24 CHRIST. THE MYSTERY OF GOD
The psalmist had said "I will speak to you in parables", but according to Matthew
the psahnist shows hhnself to be a prophet, and Jesus shows himself as the
fulfihnent of the prophecy. According to the spiritual sense, the "I" refers to
Christ. Aquinas explains that Jesus is well aware of this: and teaches the way he
does on purpose. But to this he adds a more general pomt, namely that Jesus, III
fulftIling the hidden prophecy, teaches the way in which the Old Testament should
be read. The words in the Old Testament mean what they lIterally mean, but many
times that which is referred to has the function of signifying other things. To these
'other things' belongs in this case Christ's mode of teac~g in parables. . '
We are in good position now to menUon the second pomt of the connotation of
mysterium to be elucidated in this section: the word mysterium is connected both to
this mode of signification and interpretation of Scripture and to 'the other things'
that in this way are prefigured by it. The mode of signification and interpretation is
sometimes called a mode secundum mysterium. The things signified are somethnes
called mysterium. I intend to show how both are intrinsically connected, and to
explain why they are signified with the same noun.
In the course of his writing Aquinas many times gives explanations of Scriptural
texts, prefacing his explanation with mystke. My~tice means that the t~xt is
understood to have, apart from a literal mearung, a hIdden, mysterIous mearun~ as
well. The phrase, etymologically tied to the same roor", secundum myster/um,
has this same function. Most of the time the reader has to amplify this into e.g.
secundum mysterium legiturlostenditurlexponitur etc. Since Aquinas has a vast
knowledge of the writings of the fathers of the church, and since they are masters
of an allegorical reading of Scripture, the introductions mystice/secundum
mysterium are often tied to yet another authoritative interpretation44 . In medieval
theology, as is well_known4s , this type of interpretation is called a 'spiritual'
reading of Scripture, according to its 'spiritual sense'. Aquinas distinguishes a
twofold sense of Scripture (ST I 1. 10). The historical or literal sense of the words
of Scripture indicates the relationship between voces and res signified. The spiritual
sense refers to the signifying relationship of the res literally signified, to other res.
The spiritual sense itself is subdivided in three: the sensus allegoricus, the sensus
moralis, and the sensus anagogicus. What is signified in the Old Testament
signifies what is described by the New Testament, and this is the allegorical sense.
What is signified by Old and New Testament signifies how Christians should act,
and this is the moral sense. What is signified can also signify eternal glory, and
43) Cf. the quotation from CIS prol, given above, note 14. Cf. also the definition of the
'ancient' use of mystice that Congar, following L. Bouyer, formulates (1957, p.73): "moment de
la realisation du plan salutaire du Dieu, annoncant et preparant sa realisation pIeniere";
44) Cf. Aquinas' ex.planation of Jerome's introduction to his ex.position of the Gospel of
Matthew, REM prot;
45) Cf. C. spicq. 1944; B. Smalley, 1952; H. de Lubac, 1959-; W.G.B.M. Valkenberg,
1990;
CHAPTER ONE 25
this is the anagogical sense. The introduction secundum mysterium indicates a
spiritual sense of a Scriptural passage to be explained".
Mysterium, however, is not only connected with the spiritual mode of signification,
but also with that which is spiritually signified. The largest number of occurrences
in the ST of mysterium directly related to spiritual sense" is in a part of the
treatise on what is called 'the old law'. This treatise consists of a part on the old
law itself (I-II 98) and a part on the several classes of precepts belonging to it
(ibidem, 99-105): the moral precepts, the ritual precepts and the judicial precepts.
All of the eight occurrences of mysterium concern the ritual precepts. These are
precepts which are divinely instituted and regard exterior human works belonging
to the worship of Gnd (99.3). The character proper to them is that they are not
only instituted to direct worshippers in the days of the old law, but that God has
instituted them to have spiritual meaning as well. Unlike judicial precepts, ritual
precepts do not have an indirect and consequential, but a direct and immediate
spirirual, i.e. implicit and hidden, meaning. That meaning is the way to the divine
truth (101.2), divine mysteries (101.2 ad 1), the mystery of Christ (101.3; 101.3
ad 1; 102.4; 102.6; 103.1), Christ (102.2; 103.1). Remarkably thougb, neither the
phrase secundum mysterium nor equivalents of it appear in this treatise. The term is
reserved for the thing signified spiritually, and not used for the mode of
signification these precepts have. In this treatise the word used is figuro. Time and
again Aquinas gives first the 'literal' meaning of-a precept, and second its ratio
figuralis. It is however quite clear that a spiritual sense is meant, since Aquinas
46) In the ST this is clear from III 40.2 ad 3 (the spiritual meaning of the number 'forty', the
forty days and nights of Christ's stay in the desert), III 41.2 (the spiritual meaning of Christ's stay
in the desert, which is according to Ambrose to deliver Adam, who was thrown into the desert,
from his exile), III 53.2 (the spiritual meaning of the two nights and one day of Christ's death,
which is according to Augustine that by the light of his own deatn Christ destroyed the darkness,
brought about by sin, of the death of body and soul), III 70.3 ad 3 (the spiritual meaning of
circumcision on the eighth day: Christ's spiritual circumcision, i.e. the lifting from qUilt and
punishment in the eighth age, the age of those who resurrect; cf. ST I-II 102.5 ad 1).
Other examples of usage of secundum mysteriwn: RPS V 1 [25]; XVIII 1 [1]; XIX 1 [1]; XXVIII
5 [25]; REM XV 3 [150]; XVI I [75]; XX 2 [400]; XXVII 3 [25]; REI XII I [250]; XX I [300].
What I said about secundum mysterium applies to other phrases as well: non vacat a mysterio,
meaning: this is not without spiritual meaning (e.g. orr I 236 [73]; REM I 4 [400]; REI II 1
[75]; 11 2 [300]; XIX 3 [225]; XX 4 [125]); competere / congruere / convenire mysterio (e.g: ST
II-II 147.7; RPS xxxvm I [I]; REM I 4 [400]; XXVI 7 [I]; XXVII 2 [525]; xxvm lect.un.
[75]; REI I IS [475]; I 16 [75]; II I [100]; vm I [25]; XII I [100]; XVIII 2 [75]; XIX 4 [I]); ad
mysterium pertinerelre!erre (4SN 33.1.3.3 ad 3; RPS VI I [25]; XVII 5 [I]; XX 7 [I]; XXIX I
[I]; XLI I [II; REM II 4 [125]; IV 2 [300]; XXIV 3 [200]; XXVI 4 [75]; REI XIX 3 [300]; XXI
5 [75]); propter mysterium (4SN 33.1.3.3 ad 3; ST III 70.3 ad 3; RPS LI I [25]; REM II 4 [50];
REI IV I [200]; VIII 2 [450]); and mysterio (ST III 41.2);
47) Eight out of a total of eleven occurrences of mys/erium (secundum mys/erium and
equivalents of it excluded): I-II 102.3 ad I; 101.3 ad I; 102.4; 102.5 ad 5; 102.6; 103.1; 104.2;
104.3; II-II 93.1; 110.3 ad 3; III 27.6;

26 CHRIST, mE MYSTERY OF GOD
even indicates his subdivision of spiritual senses: "Secondly, their reasons may be
assigned according to their purpose in prefiguring Christ. In this respect, their
reasons are figurative and mystical, whether they concern ChrISt and the Church -
the allegorical sense, or the way of life of the Christian people .- the moral sense,
or the state of future glory to which we are brought through ChrISt - the anagogl.cal
sense "". Ritual precepts signify spiritually the one mystery of ChrISt, accordmg
to the several aspects of that mystery reflected in the several kinds of spiritual
signification. . . . .
Ritual precepts are distinguished accordmg to the four things mvolved. m the
worship of God: sacrifices, sacred things, sacraments and observances. I WIll gIVe
examples of the spiritual meaning of the first two.
Sacrifices, Aquinas says (HI 102.3), like all cere~oni~s of the old law, have. both
a literal and a mystical meaning. The literal mearung IS that lTI offenng sacrIfices
one ~ecognizes that all one has is a gift from God. A sacrifice honours God as fi,fst
principle and ultimate goal of creation. At the same time, the precept that fo~blds
offering to other gods keeps hmuan beiugs away from idolatry. The greatest gift of
God to human kind, however, was the gift of his Son (In 3.15), and so the
principal sacrifice is the one through which Christ gave himself up "as an offering
and a sweet smelling sacrifice to God." (Ep 5.2; Ex 29.18). In cltmg Paul's
quotation from the precepts for the ordination to the p.ri~sthood. contain~ in
Exodus, a text that Paul himself choose to apply to ChrISt s saenfice, Aqumas
makes the implicit statement that his way of explaining Scripture does not differ
from the one offered by Paul. Because Christ's sacrifice is the greatest of all, and
compares to all the others as perfect to imperfect, all the others serve to sym?olize
this one sacrifice, this one mysterium redemption is humanae faetae per Chrzstum.
From this general principle all concrete symbols concerning sacrificial prescriptions
are deduced: the bull-calf symbolizes the power of the cross, the lamb the
innocence, the ram the authority, the buck the appearance of the flesh of sin, the
turtle-dove and pigeon the union of both natures, or the turtle-dove chastity and the
pigeon charity. Most of these explanations are traditional, this time borrowed from
a gloss (102.3 ad 2). This is the symbolical meaning of the precept that only three
kind& of four-footed animals may serve as sacrificial animals, and from the birds
only turtle-doves, pigeons and sparrows.
To precepts containiug sacred things belong those that regard the tabernacle, the
temple, and all artifacts placed in it. Although God who created the world and all
in it cannot be confined to a corporeal place, the literal meaning of tabernacle and
temple intends that those who gather together at a place destined for the worship of
God may approach with greater reverence. The symbolical function is to signify the
48) I-II 102.2: Alio modo possunt eorum rationes assignari secundum quod ordinantur ad
figurandum Christum. Et sic habent rationes figurales et mysticas; sive accipiantur ex ipso Christo
et Ecclesia, quod pertinet ad allegoriam, sive ad mores populi Christiani, quod pertinet ad
moralitatem; sive ad statum futurae gloriae. prout in eam introducimur per Christum. quod
pertinet ad anagogiam;
,
•
CHAPTER ONE 27
excellence of the divinity and hmuanity of Christ. In the temple dwells the name of
God, i.e. the knowledge of God will be made manifest by things done and said
there, while because of the solemnity of the place prayers will be more audible
(102.4 ad I). Many concrete symbols are indicated. I mention only one for its
peculiarity: shouldn't any temple that is devoted to the worship of God, the first
mover who is associated best with the east from where the first movement comes,
be oriented towards the east instead of towards the west? No, the holy of holies is
west, literally to avoid the idolatry of the sun, but spiritually to symbolize the death
of Christ: "Who ascends above the west, the Lord is his name" (Ps 68.5; 102.4 ad
5}49.
Scripture signifies the mystery of Christ. This is the spiritual sense of Scripture.
Scripture does so in a hldden way. One could say that Scripture, the Old
Testament, hides the mystery of Christ. The mystery of Christ is hidden in the Old
Testament. The things that Scripture signifies literally, refer mysteriously to the
mystery of Christ. The mystery of Christ is signified mysteriously, a signification
that becomes apparent in the events described in the New Testament.
The teaching of Jesus is based upon this same hermeneutics of the Old Testament.
The fact IMt he teaches in parables is a fulfiiment of Scripture, and shows that
Scripture should be read according to its spiritual sense50 .
Mode and content of Scripture, like that of Jesus' teaching, are intrinsically related.
The mystery is signified mysteriously. What is signified mysteriously is a mystery.
The reason for this is the principle that the mode should conform to the things
spoken about. "And because the mode of teaching must fit the mode of doctrine,
therefore it is said that he speaks of her [wisdom] mysteriously, i.e. hidden in
something, either a word or a sign" SI , is part of Aquinas' comment on Paul's "but
we speak of the wisdom of God mysteriously (in mysterio), [the wisdom] that is
hidden, which God predestined to be for our glory before the ages began." (lCo
49) If one were to trace all relations of Signification that Aquinas' doctrine of the senses of
Scripture suppose,' one would discover a highly complex scheme. It would be possible to make
such a scheme on the basis of what Aquinas says, in different parts of his writings, about the
mystery of the salvation of the Gentiles. One could line up Aquinas' literal explanation of Jacob's
lie (Gn 27) with his spiritual interpretation of it (ST II-II 110.3 ad 3); with his statement that
Paul's preaching to the Gentiles fulfilled a mystery, i.e. something mysteriously signified in the
Old Testament of which Paul himself was aware (STI 117.2 ad 1); with his interpretation of Rm
11.25 (CRO XI 4 [ID and Rm 16.25 (CRO XVI 2 [175]), where he acknowledges the salvation of
the Gentiles as a mystery, a sacrament hidden in God according to his interpretation of Ep 3.9
(REP III 2 [175]; cf. III 3 [200]);
50) Moreover, the mode of signification of Jesus' teaching is analogical to the mode of
signification Scripture is said to have. Jesus teaches in parables, but to the apostles in plain speech
as well, just as Scripture signifies spiritually, but nothing necessary for faith is .contained in this
spiritual signification that is not signified literally elsewhere (ST I 1.10 ad 1);
51) CIC II 1: Et quia modus docendi et doctrinae debet esse conveniens. ideo dicitur quod
loquitur eam in 'mysterio', id est in aliquo occulto. vel verbo vel signa;

28 CHRIST, 11IE MYSTERY OF GOD
2.7). Paul's mode of signification should conform to what he signifies, his mode of
teaching should conform to his doctrine. From other texts that we have quoted thus
far we know that this wisdom which is for our glory, is the mystery of Christ, the
same wisdom which is both hidden in God's heart and hidden in Christ. The
reasons for the mystery of Christ are hidden in God, in the inscrutable depths of
the richness that is his Son, and all of the Old Testament is needed to' mysteriously
signify it". That which is hidden in God is also signified in a hidden way, with a
spiritual mode of signification. Just as there is conformity between the mode and
the teaching of Paul, there is conformity between the mode and content of the
teaching of Jesus, and between the spiritual mode of signification of Scripture and
that which it spiritually signifies.
From this we conclude, that there is one more aspect to be added to Aquinas' use
of the word mysterium: it serves to describe a unique mode of signification of
Scripture. Christ is hidden in the Old Testament. At the same time it is the mystery
of Christ that is hidden in the Old Testament. This gives us reason to think that the
word mysterium when applied to Christ connotes the way he is symbolized in the
Old Testament. This may well be the more precise reason why mysterium in
Aquinas is a christological word: it is Christ who is spiritually signified in the Old
Testament. Fulfilment" and the mystery of Christ, according to Aquinas, belong
to each other.
2.4 Christ's hidden presence in the mystery of the eucharist
We have enriched the connotation of mysterium as something hidden with the
hiddenness of the propositions of faith and also with the hiddenness of the spiritual
signification of Scripture. Now a third dimension is focused upon: the hiddenness
in the eucharistic species.
Aquinas quite regularly uses the phrase sacra mysteria. not to refer to sacraments
52) cr. I.B.M. Wissink (1986, p. 59): "De geestelijke Iezing is niet uit op het
vermenigvuldigen van bijbelplaatsen die letterIijk een messiaanse betekenis hebhen. Ze vindt haar
grand in het geheim van Jezus Christus. Oat geheim is onuitputtelijk, dat heel het Oude Testament
en heel de geschiedenis van IsratH gesteld worden totfigura van Jezus Christus. Alles van Israel is
nodig am de rijkdommen van Hem uit te zeggen. Hij laat zich belichten door heel het Oude
Testament, dat door Hem verlicht wordt";
53) Because of this connection between the mystery of Christ and the spiritual interpretation of
the Old Testament, Aquinas can use words as expleo and impleo in contexts that do not explicitly
call for the relationship between the Old Testament and the events recorded in the New
Testament. E.g . ... incarnationis mysterium non est impletum per hoc quod Deus sit aJiquo modo a
suo statu immutatus in quo ab aeterno nonJuit, ST III 1.1 ad 1; ... mysterium regni Dei, quod est
impletum per Christum ... , ST I 64.1 ad 4; cf. also ST I-II 103.3 ad 2; III 45.2; III 54.2;
CHAPTER ONE 29
in general, but to the sacrament of the eucharist". In fact the form .of the
sacrament i.e. the words that are spoken during the consecratIOn, contalUS the
expressio~ as well: Hie est calix sang.uinis mei. ~ovi e~ ~etemi testamenti,
rnysterium fidei, qui pro vobis et pro mutus effundetur m r~ml~slOnem peccat?rum.
The first five words, according to Aquinas (ST III 78.3), slgrufy the conversIOn. of
the wine into the blood of Christ, the blood being the prime symbol of the passIon
of Christ. The words that follow indicate three aspects of the power of the blood
(the passion) of Christ. a. po~er at work. in ~e sacrament. "<?f the ~~w ~nd e~rnal
testament" signifies that It gaIns eternal inhentance for the fatthful. Which will be
shed for you and for many for the remission of sins" signifies that it takes away the
sins that may impede either the participation in the eternal inhentance or the
justification by faith. This justification by faith is what the words "mystery of
faith" signify. Aquinas quotes the text from Rm 3.25-26 "whom God putforwa~d
as an expiation by his blood, to be received by faith .. ' to prove that he himself IS
righteous and that he justifies him who has faith in Christ." The Latin .of the
Vulgate makes more clear why Aquinas deems thIS text to. be apphcable:
.. .propitiatorem per fidem in sanguine eius ... : those ,,:ho put fatth III the. blood that
was shed in the passion of Christ, i.e. those who belIeve that that paSSIOn has the
power to expiate and consequently believe that that. po~er works through the
sacrament of the eucharist, those will be saved by theIr falth. The parallel text m
the SN acknowledges a precise order of these aspects of the power of the blood: the
vision of eternal things is the ultimate goal at which the sacrament is aimed,
whereas justification by faith is the means through which the effect, remission of
sins, is conveyed (4SN 8.2.2.3 ad 5). To call the blood, the paSSIOn, a mystery of
faith, is to emphasize the importance of faith in the power of the passIOn. The
passion enables those who believe in it to be justified before God. . .
Now we understood the fidei of mysterium fidei, but why mystenum? Reference IS
made, Aquinas says, either to the passion itself, or to the blood that is contain~d. in
the sacrament. The passion is a mystery, since it is "something concealed, hldm?
in the faith of all the faithful of Christ, and especially of the old, among whom It
was mysteriously and secretly symbolized in various ways. ,,55 The blood
contained in the sacrament is a mystery because nit hides under the speCIes, and
54) Hoffmann, 1939, p. 54, thinks that Aquinas' mode of speech in this respect is traditional.
This is correct to the extent that the fathers and the acts of councils that he quotes refer to the
eucharist and sometimes to all sacraments as (sacra) mysteria. In the treatise on sacraments of the
ST this can be found in III 68.9 ad 1 (Augustine); 79.1 (Chrysostome); 81.2 sed contra
(Chrysostome); 82.6 obiectum 1 (Gregory the Gr~t); 83.6 ad 1 (Cou~cil of Toledo); cf. 7~.5
(Eusebius, Augustine) and 82.5 sed contra (A~gustme) . .However, I. thl~ there are th~loglCal
reasons to be found for Aquinas' adoption of thIS expreSSIOn, emplOYing It for the eucha[1st, and
those I intend to elaborate in this section;
55) 4SN 8.2.2.3: ... quae est mysterium fidei, ut occultum qu~ latens i? fid~ o~ium
Christi jidelium, et praecipue antiquorum, apud quos erat in mysteno abscondlte dlvemmode
figurata;
30 CHRIST, mE MYSTERY OF GOD
takes the greatest difficulty to be believed. ,,50 Both explanations of mysterium are
of great interest. The first confirms the two aspects of its connotation discussed
above, i.e. hiddenness in faith and hiddenness in the Scriptural mode of
signification, but combines them in such a way that signification secundum
mysterium is seen as a preparation of or a first form of the Christian faith. The
passion is a mystery because it was mysteriously signified. However. it is not only
hidden in this Scriptural mode of signification but in Christian faith as well. To be
hidden in faith connotes the togetherness of hiddenness and disclosure, disclosure
and hiddenness". The second explanation, concerning the blood of Christ, is
more directly related to the content of the sacrament. Only the eyes of faith
recognize the real presence of body and blood of Christ under the species of bread
and wineS8 . Aquinas adds to this explanation that to name this presence a mystery
does not prevent it from being a real presence. Someone may think of Christ's
presence secundum mysterium in the Old Testament, which is a presence in the
sense that he is signified, in the sense that it contains many signs of him. The
sacrament of the eucharist contains Christ secundum mysterium and trulyS9. The
phrase mysterium fidei is placed here, Aquinas says, not to exclude the truth of his
presence, but to show that this presence is hidden. He adds "the blood of Christ is
present in this sacrament in a hidden way, and the passion of Christ was prefigured
in a hidden way in the Old Testament. "60
The background of the referral to the mode of signification of the Old Testament is
its interpretation of prefiguring Christ, and especially his passion. In the last
section above I have drawn attention to the ritual precepts concerning sacrifices,
56) ibidem, ... quod quidem late! sub speciebus, et maximam habet difficultatem ad
credendum;
57) Cf. ST III 80.2 ad 2: Sacramenta autem proportionantur fidei, per quam veritas videtur
Hin speculo eUn aenigmate~ (ICo 13.12).
58) Cf. ST III 78.3 ad 6: dicitur sacramentum [the Piana-edition reads mysterium - HS] fidei,
quasi fidei obiectum: quia quod sanguis Christi secundum rei veritatem sit in hoc sacramento, sola
fide tenetur. Ipsa etiam passio Christi per fidem iustiji.cat. Cf. ST III 76.7 on the impossibility to
see this body and blood with corporeal eyes;
59) 4SN 8.2.2.3 ad 4: ... nihil prohibet id quod est in aliquo occultatum et figuratum,
secundum veritatem ibidem esse; et ideo frivolum iuvamentum sui erroris accipiunt qui negant
Christi sanguinem secundum veritatem in altari esse, propter hoc quod est ibi etiam secundum
mysterium. On the difference between the sacramentS of the old and of the new law, see ST III
62.6. According to Aquinas the sacraments of the old law do not have a sanctifying power of their
own, but' only in the sense that their hidden meaning has been the object of faith: Et tamen per
fidem passionis Christi iustiji.cabantur antiqui Patres, sicut et nos. Sacramenta autem veteris legis
erant quaedam mius fidei protestationes inquantum signiji.cabant passionem Christi et effectus
eiltS .... sed solum signijicabantfidem, per quam iustijicabantur.
60) ST III 78.3 ad 5: mysterium hie ponitur, non quidem ad excludendum rei vericatem, sed ad
ostendendum occultationem. Quia et ipse sanguis Christi occulto modo est in hoc sacramento, et
ipsa passio Christi occulte fuil figurata in veteri Testamento. On mysteriumfidei see also III 80.3
obiee/um 2; III 83.4;
CHAPTER ONE 31
sacred things, sacraments and observances. Many times in his treatment of the
sacrament of the eucharist, as of the other ecclesial sacraments, Aquinas
acknowledges this relationship of hidden signification and fulfilment, and applies it
in both directions, either to explain the sense of the sacrifices and sacraments of the
old law, especially these, or to explain the sense of the eucharist. This takes place
on two levels: the explicit level of mutual explanation, and the mostly implicit but
more fundamental level of analogous modes of signification of Old Testament and
eucharis(il.
To the ftrst level belongs, for example, an argument of fittingness in favour of the
real presence of the body of Christ: the sacrifices signified by the Old Testament
contain the sacrifice of the passion of Christ in figura, and since the new law is
perfect, and real presence is more perfect than symbolic presence, it is fitting that
this sacrifice of the new law has something more than just symbolic presence: it
should contain Christ himself, not merely as by a sign or figure but in actual reality
as we1l62 •
Consider another example as well: the interpretation of the sacrament of the eating
of the paschal lamb, which according to Aquinas is the most important figure of
the eucharist63 . The lamb is eaten with unleavened bread, is inunolated but
innocent, and its blood protected the children of Israel from the destroying angel
and delivered them from Egyptian captivity. These three things correspond with the
very structure of the sacrament of the eucharist. This structure is threefold and
consists of something which is 'only a sigu'" (the bread in this case), something
which is 'the thing signified but a sign as well' (the true body of Christ), and
something which is 'only a thing signified' (the effect of the sacrament, i.e. the
deliverance from the death of sin). This correspondence of the meaning of the
paschal lamb and the meaniog of the eucharist elucidates both, and serves to
identify the hidden meaning of the book Exodus and to understand the essential
features of the sacrament of the eucharist'S.
61) Cf. 4SN 1.1.1.1: AUquando etiam [sacramentum] includit tantum signijicationem
praedictarum consecrationum, sieut sigmun sanitatis didtur sanum; et hoc modo sacramenta
veteris legis, sacramenta dicuntur, inquantum significant ea quae in Christo sunt gesta, et etiam
sacramenta novae legis.
62) ST!Il75.1;
63) ST11I73.6;
64) Sacramentum tantum. The general meaning that sacramentum in his treatise has, Aquinas
stipulates, is signum rei sacrae, in quantum est sanctificans hominem (ST III 60.1; 60.2). For this
reason it may sometimes help to translate it with 'sign', although in the case of the eucharist the
sign (tantum) not only effects what it Signifies, but partly becomes what it signifies as well (ST III
73.1 ad 3);
65) Other examples of mutual explanation in the discussion of sacraments of ST III are: 60.2
ad 2 (signs and sacraments of the Old Testament and the ecclesial sacraments), 61.3 and 62.6
(visible signs in the days of the Old Testament, of the ecclesial sacraments), 66.2 (the termination
of symbolical sacraments in the ecclesial sacraments), 72.1 ad 2 (confirmation has no symbol in
the Old Testament), 73.6 (Melchizedek, manna, the Feast of Expiation), 74.4 (the use of
unleavened bread), 74.6 ad 1 (Melchizedek) etc.;
 r,
!
32 CHRIST, mE MYSTERY OF GOD
Next to this first level of mutual explanation there is the more fundamental level of
correspondence of the structure of signification. Aquinas distinguishes. as shown
above, between the sacramentum tantum, the res et sacramentum and the res
tantum. This structure of signification applies to all sacraments, but especially to
the sacrament of the eucharist, since only in the eucharist is the 'thing signified
which is a sign as well' not something in the one participating in the sacrament
(e.g. the character in the one baptised), but 'something' really hidden in the
species of the sacrament. It is Christus totus, the whole Christ. The body and blood
is present as an immediate result of the sacramental sign (quasi ex vi sacramentl),
and the human soul and divinity of Christ are present because, after the death of
Christ, they can never be separated from body and blood. The latter are thus
present by a natural concomitance (ex lUlfurali concomitantia, ST III 76.1). The
fonn and matter of the sacrament, i.e. the words spoken and the species of bread
and wine, are the sacrament, 'the sign only'. They signify the true body and blood
of Christ, and effect what they signify. The 'signified thing only' is called the
mystical body of Christ: the unity in Christ and among one another of all who
participate in the sacrament, the love that unites the faithful as members of a body
to the one mystical body of Christ and the Church".
Thus, considered from the viewpoint of these three elements, the sacrament of the
eucharist has a double mode of signification: the signification that form and matter
have, and the signification that body and blood have. ThiS corresponds with the
double mode of signification of Scripture: of words and of things signified. The
correspondence serves to bring out the differences: unlike things signified in the
Old Testament, the things signified in the eucharist by bread and wine are identical
with its sign. The aspect of veiling, however, is common to both: Christ's presence
in the thing signified by Scripture is just as veiled and concealed, and an object of
faith only, as Christ's presence in bread and wine.
The double mode of sacramental signification is embedded in a broader triple mode
of sacramental signification. One of these three modes is the double mode. This
66) texts in ST III where Aquinas uses the threefold distinction in regard of the eucharist are:
. .. ipsum corpus Christi verum, quod est res et sacramentum ... corpus mysticum, quod est res
tantum in Eucharistia (73.1 obiectum 2); .. .in sacramento Eucharistiae id quod est res et
sacramentum. est in ipsa materia; id autem quod est res tan/um, est in susdpiente. scilicet gratia
quae confertur. In baptismo autem utrumque est in suscipiente: et character, qui est res et
sacramentum; et gratia remissionis peccatorum, quae est res tantum (73.1 ad 3); Res sacramenti
est unitas corporis mystici ... (73.3); ... id quod est sacramentum tanlUm, scilicet panis et vinum; et
id quod est res et sacramentum, scilicet corpus Christi verum; et id quod est res tantum, scilicet
effectus huius sacramenti (73.6) ; ... ipsum sacramentum, et rem sacramenti (... J Res autem huius
sacramenti est caritas... (79.4); ... ld quod est sacramentum est signum eius quod est res
sacramenti. Duplex autem est res huius sacramenti ... una quidem quae est significata et contenta,
scilicet ipse Christus; alia autem est significata et non contenta, scilicet corpus Christi mysticum,
quod est societas sanctorum. (80.4); ... Chrisms, qui est res huiUS sacramenti. et caritas eius ...
(80.8);
CHAPTER ONE 33
double mode, as we have seen, concerns the signification of that whi~h the matter
and form of the sacrament effect in the present. But the sacrament IS not only a
signum demonstrativum of present sanctifica?on; .it is .also a signu~ rememo~atlvum
(commemorative sign) of the cause of sanCtification, l:e. the passl~n of .ChrISt, and
a signum prognosticum / praenuntiativum (prognostic I foretellmg sIgn) of the
ultimate goal of sanctification, which is life eternal (ST III 60.3). .
This broader triple mode of signification corresponds WIth the tnple mode of
signification secundum mysterium of Scripture, i.e. ~e allego~cal. moral and
anagogical senses. The hidden signification of the passIOn of ChrISt, of the moral
situation of God's people, and of the ultimate end of eternal hfe, resembles the
sacrament of the eucharist in its signification of the mystery of the paSSIOn, of the
mystery of body and bloo<\.. and its mystical union with the faithful, and of eternal
life. . .
The different names of the eucharist express this triple signification. It IS called
sacrificium since it commemorates the passion of the Lord ,:hich w~s. ~ true
sacrifice communio since it points to. the unity of the Church. I.e. the Jo.mmg to
Christ b~ sharing his flesh and divinity and through him to ?n~ at:,other, viaticu,:,
since it keeps the faithful on the way to heaven, and euchansfla, I.e. bona gralla
since (Rm 6.23) "the free gift of God is eternal life" (ST III 73.4).
The triple mode of scriptural spiritual significatio.n bea:s even more resemblance t?
the symbolic mode of signification of bread a~d wme as such: of the past It
signifies the separation of body and soul of ChrISt (all~go~lc~I), of the pre~ent It
signifies spiritual nourishment (moral) and of the future It slgrufies the salvatIOn of
the body and the soul (anagogical). Of the present the one bread conslstmg of many
grains signifies the unity of the Church, and the mlxmg of the wme WIth water the
unity of the mystical body". . . . .
The aspect of veiling, once again, is common to both tnple .mo.des of slgrufic~.t1on,
i.e. of the sacrament and of Scripture. The presence of ChrISt, of the moral hfe of
belonging to the mystical body, and of eternal life, in the things signified by
Scripture, is just as veiled and an object of faith, as the true presence of Chnstus
passus", and the union with him in one (mystical) body on the road to eternal hfe
in the sacrament of the eucharist.
Despite all the different aspects that can be discerned in modes of signification and
things signified, however, it is one and only one 'thing' that bo.~ Scripture and
sacrament signify. Above, in the last section, we saw that Aqumas stresses. the
unity of the double and the triple mode of signification secundum mystenum,
namely a unity in the object to be signified: the mysterium Christl·'. Now we can
67) This can be found in ST III 74.1; 74.6; 76.2; 79.4; 79.5; Cf. 79.1 ad 3: ... sacramenta
operantur secundwn similitudinem-per quam significant ... ;
68) STIlI 73.5 ad 2: 75.1; . .. .
69) ST I-II 102.2; 102.4; Cf. ST III 62.6 ad 2: ... ritum vetens legls, qUi totus ordmabatur ad
figurandum passionem Christi ... ;
34 CHRIST, THE MYSTERY OF GOD
see Aquinas doing exactly the same thing. Whether it be past, present or future, the
sacrament signifies sanctification (ST III 60.3); whether it be the body and blood of
Christ, the mystical body or eternal life, the sacrament signifies first of all Christus
totus, the sanctifying and loving Christ (ST III 80.8), present really but hidden in
faith. "Because in this sacrament the whole mystery of our salvation is comprised,
therefore it is perfonned with greater solemnity than the other sacraments "70.
For this reason the sacrament offers some profound analogies with the ontological
constitution of Christ's person itself, whom it imitates. Just as in the mystery of
incarnation the Word of God is united to sensible flesh, so in the sacraments words
are combined with matter, here the species of bread and wine71 . Just as there is a
union of divinity with hUman nature in Christ, though a personal union, so in this
sacrament a union of Christ with those who participate is effected72 • a spiritual
union through faith and charity73. Just as the hypostatic union, which is a union
that consists in a certain habitudo, a certain relation, so the identity of bread and
wine with body and blood of Christ is a certain habitudo. This relation possesses
the same characteristics: the divine person neither depends upon nor is changed
through that which he assumes, and this resembles Aquinas' view that the body and
blood of Christ does not cease to be under the sacrament because of any ceasing-to-
be on the part of Cluist, nor because of any local movement, but because the
sacramental species have ceased to be74 . . signified, that is the perfection of the imperfect unity of both in the signification of
This section has taught us the theological reasons that Aquinas may have had for
referring to the sacrament of the eucharist as sacra mysteria. One reason is that
this sacrament represents the mystery of Christ's passion. A second reason is that
the passion that it signifies was mysteriously signified by the Old Testament. These
two reasons are closely coonected. A third reason is that the body and blood of
Christ are contained in the species of bread and wine in a hidden, invisible and
spiritual way. A fourth reason is that this principal sacrament of the new law was
mysteriously signified by the Old Testament. These two reasons are tightly
connected as well. The four reasons share with each other that they express objects
70) ST III 83.4: ... quia in hoc sacramento totum mysterium nostrae salutis comprehenditur,
ideo prae ceteris sacramentis cum maiori so[emnitate agitur;
71) 4SN 1.1.3, ST III 60.6; Aquinas does not apply this only to the eucharist, but to all
sacraments. However, not all sacraments have matter (matrimony, confession), and unlike the
other sacraments the sacrament of the eucharist contains the res et sacramentum in itself, which
entails that the union of form and matter in the eucharist is greatest of all. Cf. ibidem, ad 3: ...
sicut Augustinus dicit, alia debent esse sacramenta rei praesentis, et alia rei futurae. Sacramenta
autem veteris legis praenuntia erant Christi venturi. Et ideo non ita expresse signijicabant
Christum sicut sacramenta novae legis, quae ab ipso Christo efjluunt, et quandam similitudinem
ipsius in se haben!... ;
72) STIll 79.5; cf. 80.4;
73) STIll 82.1 ad 2; cf. 80.4 ad I;
74) ST III 76.6. One recognizes some fundamental aspects of the doctrine of the relatio mixta,
which will be discussed in chapter IV;
CHAPTER ONE 35
of faith, hidden in the faith of those who believe.
Moreover, we have studied the relation of signification and fulfilment between the
hidden signification of the Old Testament and the signification of the sacrament of
the eucharist. On a first level this relationship proved to be an important way to
explain mutually the meaning of sacraments of Old and New Testament. The
hiddenness in faith of the things signified is what they have in conunon. On a
second level this relationship showed correspondences and differences between
Scripture and sacrament regarding the modes of signification and things signified.
Once again, despite their differences, the concept of mystery was what they had in
common, both as to their mode of signification and to the things signified as well.
Their unity was traced to the one mystery of Christ, with the emphasis on both
mystery and Christ.
The question to be dealt with now is whether this study of the use of mysterium can
come up with further coonotations of mysterium, to be added to the ones already
found. The answer is affirmative: the hiddeoness of the body and blood of Christ in
this sacrament, which Aquinas shows, involves the hiddenness of Christus totus in
this sacrament. To the connotation of mysterium, sacramental, Le. invisible,
spiritual presence can be added. This presence entails the identity of sign and thing
the things signified in the Old Testament. Since the structure of the ecclesial
sacraments, and. especially the eucharist, contains analogies to the person of Christ,
the unity of signum and res will be an important aspect to be considered when we
now start reflecting upon the meaning of the word mysterium in the context of
speech about Christ.
2.5 The mystery of God in Christ
The task of explaining the meaning of Aquinas' principal use of mysterium, i.e. in
the context of the sermo de Christo, is considerably lightened now that three
connotations have been established. We now know that mystery is a qualification of
the material object of the articles of faith, and that 'material object' in this context
indicates the object as believed in. We now know that 'half of the signification of
Scripture concerns an object that is hidden in the literal mode of signification, and
that 'object' in this context indicates the object as mysteriously signified. We also
know that the signification of the sacrament of the eucharist principally concerns
two 'things' that are hidden in the visible species of bread and wine. In all cases
the object is Christ effecting God's love for his people, diversified by the many
different aspects of his life incarnate and its salviflC meaning. To those who share
in the grace of Christian faith Christ is a mystery, since they have knowledge of
the unique character of his person and work and yet cannot fully explain the
reasons for it, which are hidden in God, nor capture the essence of his person.
This faith they share with those for whom the coming of the saviour was still
merely an event in the future, which faith they expressed in their faithful
36 CHRIST. mE MYSTERY OF GOD
recognition of hidden signs of his coming and passion, which they consequently put
down in Scripture. They were justified by this faith, just as those living after Christ
are justified by their faith. However, the latter are justified also by their faith in the
continuing presence of Christ in the principal mysteries that they celebrate, in
which a new hidden signification continues and surpasses the hidden signification of
Scripture, in effecting its signification of the true Christus passus and the unity of
belonging with Christ to one mystical body.
If we turn now to Aquinas' actual mode of speech, we are able to recognize all
three connotations of mysterium, together expressing the unity of Christian life.
Plural expressions we encounter. such as mysteria, mysteria gratiae. mysteria regni
Dei, mysteria humanitatis Christi, mysteria Christi, mysteria redemptionis,
spiritualia mysteria, mysteria salutis and mysteria fidei. all indicate some one or
more of the following singular expressions: mysterium incarnationis, mysterium
unionis, mysterium passionis (et monis) and the consequent mysterium
redemptionis/salutis, mysterium resurrectionis, mysterium ascensionis and
mysterium adventus ad iudicium. This list of singular expressions corresponds to
the seven elements that form half of the articles of faith, the descent into hell
excluded. The articles of faith are Aquinas' hidden agenda behind his use of
mysterium. This conclusion, in the face of Aquinas' extremely manifold use of the
expression, is a rather simple one, but its simplicity lends it a great deal of
plausibility as well.
Mysterium incarnationis forms part of this list because sometimes it denotes in
general the advent of the Son of God, sometimes his conception and/or virgin
birth, and sometimes it has the same denotation as mysterium unionis and refers to
the ineffable mode of unity of man and God in Christ". On the other hand it is
used to denote all seven elements together, just as the other singUlar expressions,
mysterium Christi and mysterium humanitatis eius.
Mysterium passionis and mysterium redemptionis/salutis belong together since they
denote the act of passion and death, and its general effect (salus) or one of the
modes through which the passion reached this effect (redemptio).
The seven elements of the articles of faith provide the order for this quite diverse
use of words. It proves that all the things denoted are objects of faith and
consequently are known in the manner appropriate to the knowledge of faith.
However, this is not the only reason why these things are called mysterium. In
75) The combination of mysterium with incamatio is by far the most frequent: 181 out of a
total number of 689 occurrences.
The eqUivalence of the denotation of mysterium unionis and mysterium incarnationis can be
gathered from this detail: mysterium unionis is only used 'once by Aquinas, in REM III 1 [768],
where he explains why the Baptist says that he is unworthy to undo the strap of Christ's sandal,
and where he mentions Gregory's mystical interpretation of the strap for the union. In the texts
quoted in the beginning of my chapter, Aquinas in his comment;:uy on John, explaining the same
thing, refers to it as the mysterium incarnationis (REI I 13 [250]);
CHAPTER ONE 37
general this can be shown from some characteristics that Aquinas gives from books
from Scripture76 • The four great prophets can be put into an order provided for. by
the way in which they signify Christ. Isaiah has fore~old the mysterlum
incarnationis (and that is why in the liturgy of the eccleslal year he IS read
especially during Advent), Jeremiah foretold the mysterium passionis (and that is
why in the liturgy he is read especially during Lenten season), EzekIel foretold the
mysterium resurrectionis (since he finished his book. ,,:ith the r~surrecti?~ ~f the
bones and the restoration of the temple), and Darnel s focus IS the dIVUUty of
Christ. These four great prophets correspond with the four evangelists, not only in
number but in the way they signify Christ as well. The three synoptIcs have m
COIIUl10~ that they concentrate on the mysteria humanitatis Christi, whereas Joim,
sometimes pictured as all eagle, devotes attention especially, although not
exclusively, to his divine nature. Matthew is sometimes pictured as a human ~en:g.
because his focus is the mysterium incarnationis, Mark as a calf (a sacnficlal
animal) because his focus is the mysterium passionis, and Luke as a lion, because
his foc~s is the mysterium resurrection is . These characteristics not only confirm
what I said about the denotation of the terms used, but illustrate quite well the
relation of prefiguration/foretelling and fulfilment that the term mysterium
connotes. There are many examples of texts in which Aquinas uses the expressIOns
just mentioned, where the use of mysterium intensifies the notio? of fulfilmen~ of
what was mysteriously SignifIed in the Old Testament. For Instance, Aqumas
formulates a question about why Moses and Elijah were present as Witnesses of the
transfiguration on the mount (ST III 45.3). The meaning of the event as such is that
Christ, in showing the brightness of his future glorious body, kindles the human
desire for the glory of eternal bliss. Witnesses both from those that precede and
those that follow Christ are present, because salvation is sought by all. But why are
not all prophets present, since all of them bore witness to Christ? Aquinas mentions
a number of reasons for the ,presence of Moses and Elijah, borrowed from Jerome
and Hilary. Moses is portrayed as the legislator whose law proclaimed Christ. and
Elijah as the prophet who prophesied Christ. And why are not all the disciples
present? Aquinas says: "sublime mysteries should not be explained to everyone
innnediately, but should be handed down through superiors to others in their proper
turn. ,,77 From the general conclusion about the denotation of mysteria in
christological contexts given above, we may infer that mysteria here denotes the
seven mysteries, of which in this context especially the mystery of the passion ~nd
the mystery of the resurrection are relevant. These truths Aquinas calls mystenes,
not only because they are truths of faith, but also because they are truths of the
faith of the giver of the law and of the prophet, the mysteries contained in the old
law and the prophecies. The text quoted just now says exponendae, i.e. to explain
or even to interpret, and implies the sign to be there already: in Christ and in the
76) OTC 2 [150](300]; REI proi. [225];
77) alta mysteria non sunt omnibus exponenda immediate, sed per maiores suo tempore ad
alios debent devenire, STIlI 45.3 ad 4;
38 CHRIST, 11IE MYSTERY OF GOD
Old Testament, but still hidden18.
All these mysteries are mysteries because they are celebrated and supply the object
of worship as well, especially the mystery of the passion in the sacred mysteries,
the sacrament of the eucharist. This also should be regarded as an element of the
connotation of mystery in the context of christology. It may serve to remind the
reader of the fact that this is not merely history. nor some mysterious object of
knowledge from long ago, nor some object to be unriddled by archaeologists. It is
ever present to the ones who take part in these same mysteries, who listen, pray
and communicate. This aspect of the connotation of mystery. when denoting
Christ, in the writings of Aquinas, betrays the spirituality of its writer. The liturgy
of the ecclesial year in general, that served to explain the proper object of two of
the four prophets and of the sacrament of the eucharist in particular, guides this
theologian. Pange, lingua, gloriosi corporis mysterium, sanguinisque pretiosi... 79.
Conclusion
Summing up the results of our investigation, we may say that for Aquinas
mysterium is:
something hidden (2.1), voiced truly but inadequately (2.2), spiritually signified by
the Old Testament and now fulfilled (2.3) in Christ (2.5) and the sacrament of the
eucharist (2.4).
And so we see that Aquinas, in employing the word mysterium, employs this basic
78) Cf. ST III 44.4 ad 3: ", 'divisum est velum' (Mt 27.51) ad ostendendum reserationem
mysteriorem legis.,,; CRO V 6 [28J: ... tamen mysteria legis erant in oeeuito.;
Not only the Old Testament has a double mode of signification, the New Testament has one as
well. In fact we have seen a sample of that kind of exegesis just now: the explanation of the
transfiguration. Aquinas says that there is an intrinsic connection between the baptism of Christ
and his transfiguration on the mount. The first he calls the mysterium primae regenerationis, the
second the sacramentum ·secundae regeneration is , using sacramentum as a synonym of mysterium.
Aquinas underlines the trinitarian character of the two events. During Christ's baptism the words
spoken indicated the Father, the dove symbolized the Holy Spirit, in this baptism of the incarnate
Son. At the transfiguration the whole Trinity appeared again; the Father in the words spoken, the
Son in this man and the Holy Spirit in the bright cloud. Both are connected to each other in that
the baptism mysteriously signifies the innocence bestowed in the sacrament of baptism, the first
rebirth, and in that the transfiguration mysteriously signifies the brightness of glory and the
consolation that awaits the faithful, the second rebirth. Aquinas interprets the story of Christ's
baptism and of Christ's transfiguration to have a spiritual meaning, one moral and one anagogical.
The acts of Christ, and that which he undergoes, have a hidden, spiritual meaning. His humanity
and that which he in the human world undertakes reveals the God that he is as the future of
human kind;
79) From the liturgy of Corpus Christi, probably composed by Aquinas, DSG I n.3; cf. I n.6;
IV n.5; VIII n.6;
CHAPTER ONE 39
analogy80:
Al Prima Bl Christus8L Cl Verbum 01 Christus
Veritas82 Incarnatum Passus
mysterium
A2 Propositions B2 Old Law C2 His D2 Bread
of Faith Human Nature and Wine
The relations between A, B and D are the ones that we have explained in indicating
correspondences and differences. Al is related to A2 as Bl is related to B2, and as
Dl is related to D2. Each separate relation, between I and 2, is thonght of as a
relation between the thing signified and the mode of signifying it". Now we have
added Cl and C2, the mystery of the union in Christ. The full meaning of this
addition, the core of which still is mysterium signifying a relation of signification,
must remain unsaid for now. We have attempted to show above what the
differences and correspondences are between each member of this analogy, and
have intimated some between the mystery of the union and the others. For the
moment this must suffice, since we have first to obtain some understanding of what
signification is to Aquinas, and of the way in which he approaches the hypostatic
union.
In his commentary on the gospel of John, Aquinas employs the symbol of a cloud
to refer to Christ's humanity as such. Just as a bright (Mediterranean) sun that is
invisible and exceeds the human visual faculty because of its brightness is made
'visible' when a cloud floats in front of it, so the 'flesh' of Christ makes the Word
of God ·visible'. For this reason John the Evangelist can say "And we saw his
glory ... "". Christ's humanity is a sacrament, a mystery of God, because it
reveals and hides his Word. This we may call Christ's unique mode of
signification, the prime element e:f the analogy meD:tioned above, to the explanation
80) Cf. Y. Congar (1958, p. 279): "Presence de Dieu ou Temple constituent un 'mystere'
selon les trois sens, nullement heterogene d'ailleurs, qu'on peut donner a ce mot: sens theologique
de verite dont I'intelligence creee ne peut epuiser Ie contenu; sens paulinien et patristique de
dessein de Dieu se devoilant et se realisant progressivement; sens liturgique. entin, d'une
celebration reelle ou d'un memorial efficace des grands actes du salut accomplis par Dieu, en vue
de leur consommation eschatologique";
81) K. Muller (1983, p. 53), referring to Augustine's De utilitate credendi tiber, states that
... bei den iateinischen Kirchenviitern kennzeichnet sie [der AnalogiebegriffJ das Verhiiltnis von
Altem und Neuem Testament;
82) Cf. Aquinas' refutation of the position non est eiusdem scientiae considerare res et
nomina: Sed dicendum quod, ut supra dictum est, theologia, inquantum est principalis omnium
scientiarum, aliquid in se habet de omnibus scientiis; et ideo non solum res, sed nominum
signijicationes pertractat: quia ad salutem consequendam non solum est necessaria fides de
veritate rerum, sed etiam vocalis con/essio per nomina. Rm 10.10: "Corde creditur ad justitiam;
ore autem confessio fit ad sa/utem. n lSN 22 expositio textus~
83) Cf. Hans-Georg Gadamer. 1960, who, on p. 382, talks about ... das Mysterium der Einheit
[von Wort und SacheJ;
84) In 1.8; REI I 8 [25]. This interpretation stems from Chrysostome;
40 CHRIST, THE MYSTERY OF GOD

of which we devote the rest of this book.

 CHAPTER II

THE SEMANTICS OF NAMING CHRIST

In the preceding chapter we have, on the basis of a study of Aquinas' use of

mysteriwn, established the importance of modes of signification in christology. In
the fmal analysis we proposed to take a look at Aquinas' christology from the
viewpoint of Christ himself as a 'mode of signifying' God. A first impression was
given of such a reading, in which Christ's' human nature appeared as both hiding
and revealing the God that Christ is. We will now begin a more profound
examination of this analogy. First, in tills chapter, we will study Aquinas' general
analysis of modes of sign'lfication. Chapters three and four will be detailed studies
of the two major aspects of this general analysis, signification and supposition, in
the context of christology.

Over the last four decades of this century, our knowledge of medieval theory of
meaning has grown considerably. Key texts of twelfth, tillrteenth and fourteenth
century grammar and logic. both from anonymous and known authors, were
critically (re-)edited, and for the first time attempts were made to give a survey of
medieval linguistic logic!. Much remains to be investigated, and among this we
reckon studies in which the results of the current analysis of medieval linguistic
logic are compared to the writings of the great theologians of the thirteenth
century. This book, to a certain extent, fills one of these gaps.

One of the main features of medieval logic is their proponents' awareness of the
fact that in order to give a proper analysis of the meaning of words used, written
or spoken, one should not only pay attention to the signification of separate words,
but to their supposition, in the context of especially p~opositions, as well.
Signification and supposition are the major properties of terms, studied in logical
treatises that are named treatises of 'terminist logic', These treatises concentrate
especially on supposition, and in their mature state are found from about 1175 until
1250. In the thirteenth century this terminist logic is connected with the names of
William of Sherwood (120011210-1266/1272), Peter of Spain (Pope John XXI, d.
1277) and Lambert of Auxerre (fl. 1250)'.
The distinction between signification and supposition was discovered to be a
medieval parallel of the twentieth-century distinction between connotation and

1) Notably J. Pinborg, Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter, 1972, and The Cambridge History
of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny and Jan Pinborg, 1982;
2) See in general: P. Boehner, 1952; E.A. Moody, 1953; I.M. Bochenski, 1956; L.M. de
Rijk, 1962-1967; D.P. Henry, 1972; J. Pinborg. 1972; H. W. Enders. 1975; The Cambridge
History of Later Medieval Philosophy. the first five chapters, 9-382; A. Broadie. 1987; C. A.
Dufour. 1989;
42 SEMANrICS OF NAMING CHRIST
denotation, meaning and reference, Sinn and Bedeutung. or intensional and
extensional values3 • The importance of this distinction can be shown by an
example of what turns out to be a fallacious argument. 'Socrates is a human being;
Human being is a species; Therefore Socrates is a species'. The first part of the
syllogism takes 'human being' in a way different from the second part. The
signification of the word is identical, but its supposition differs, because in the
second part it stands simpliciter for, or merely signifies, the concept of humanity or
human nature as such rather than a concrete subsistent member of the species
humanity.
English marks this difference by adding an (indefinite) article, but Latin does not
have articles, which also must have prompted logicians to develop their theory of
supposition.
The distinction between signification and supposition plays an important role in
medieval theology, with its scholastic emphasis on distinctions, definitions and
argument. There is more to it however. especially in Aquinas. Aquinas is famous
for his metaphysical distinction between essence and existence. This distinction
expresses the metaphysical analysis that anything that has concrete independent
existence shares its essence, what it is, with other concrete things of the same kind.
Each concrete existing thing is composed of essence and existence, corresponding
respectively to the answer to the question what a thing is, and to the question
whether a thing is or exists. This distinction Aquinas used in his reflection upon
God, in arguing for the position that human beings can establish God's existence
and yet do not know what God is, but rather how he is not. It also colours
Aquinas' basic outlook on reality, i.e. a reality that in its existence is totally
dependent on God, who does not have existence but is being itself, the source of all
perfections known in creation. God is said to be simple rather than composed. This
most fundamental metaphysical distinction of all is reflected in the distinction
between signification and supposition, and between predicate-tenns and subject-
terms in a proposition. The mode of our signifying created reality reflects the
fundamental mode .of created things, i.e. their mode of being. Taking not only the
mode of signification and the mode of being into consideration, but the mode of
understanding, mediating between the two, as well, Dufour offers a scheme to
elucidate this parallelism4 :
universale
['~~' C essentia
~
modus modus modus
significandi essendi intelligendi
existentia
SUPPOSlt!O
C singulare
3) Cf. Enders 1975, p. 180f;
4) Dufour, 1989, p. 77. Cf. below p. 71;
CHAPTER1WO 43
At this point that other major development of late medieval linguistic logic comes
to the fore: the logical analysis of universal structures of grammar, called
'speculative' or 'modist' grammafi. This grammar is called 'speculative' because it
studies not the concrete grammatical phenomena of a particular language, but the
general and structural features of language as such. Grammar was to be a science,
and science occupies itself with what is universal and necessary, according to the
then prevailing conception of science. It is called 'modist', because those who are
considered to be speculative grammarians wrote treatises called de modis
significandi, on modes of signification. The first known treatise of this kind is the
one written by Martin of Dacia (d.1304) around 1270. John of Dacia (fl. 1280),
Boethius of Dacia (fl. 1275) and Thomas of Erfurt (fi. ca. 1300) are all speculative
grammarians. Their approach to grammar came to a sudden death when nominalist
logicians attacked what th~y took to be its naive semantic presuppositions. In the
decades before 1270 'pre-modis!' scholars such as Robert Kilwardby (d. 1279) and
Roger Bacon (ca. 1214-1292/4) initiated this approach to grammar. Thomas
Aquinas probably did not know any of the actual modist treatises, but must have
been familiar with its initial stage6 • Medieval developments in the arts that were
not caused by the discovery or translation of ancient texts were gradual
developments. The basic conviction that drives the work of the modists is a
conviction that Aquinas shares: a fundamental parallel exists between modes of
signification, modes of understanding and modes of being7. All the particular
problems that a treatise as the one on naming God (ST I 13 - de nominibus Del)
presents for a modern interpreter are likely to cause a certain blindness to this basic
conviction that motivates the question itself: how should we cope with the fact that
this basic parallelism between modes of signification and understanding on the one
hand. and modes of being on the other. cannot characterize our naming and
understanding God, the one who does not share the creaturely modes of being?8
The whole treatise on naming God is not motivated by a proto-modern critical and
sceptic approach to language, but on the contrary by a basic trust in its function of
conveying a proper understanding of creation. This basic trust analyzes how one
should cope with speaking about God when he transceods created modes of being'.
Aquinas did not develop a theory of modes of signification, and he probably did
not know of its advanced state in modist grammar. Th~ basic conviction that he
shared with speculative granunarians. however, was articulated in his theological
5) In general see: M. Grabmann, 1926, 104-146; F. Cunningham, 1961; G.L. Bursill-Hall,
1971; I. Rosier, 1983; J. Pinborg, 1967 and 1982;
6) So says Jan Pinborg, 1967, p. 48 and 69 (note 69); Pinborg says that he believes "dass
man Manthey [1937, p. 183, cf. p. 198] gegenuber Grabmann Recht geben muss .... " This is
corroborated by the fact that key-terms of modist grammar do not appear in Aquinas' writings;
7) The best visual representation of this isomorphism that I know of can be found in: H.
Roos, 1952, 153-159. A more philosophical treatment of the same: F. Crowe, 1961;
8) This point is elaborated especially in: L.G. Kelly, 1988;
9) lowe the distinction between a trusting and a critical approach to language to P.H.
Verburg, 1951. p. 69 and passim;
44 SEMANTICS OF NAMING CHRIST
analyses, especially in trinitarian theology. This is connnon knowledge. What is
new, however, is the two-fold thesis that I will develop: not only trinitarian
theology, but christology is a major field of application as well, and what is applied
is the tenninist logic of supposition in a way that concords with the basic modist
approach to the relation between language and reality. It is one thing to recognize
terminist logic and pre-modist grammar in Aquinas' writings. and yet another to
fmd out why Aquinas thinks he can employ both in a harmonious way, and
especially how he does so. Verburg once considered the presence of terminist logic
in Aquinas to be that of an intruder lO , and there certainly is something to that
observation, but at least one major reason in support of Aquinas' use will be
developed in this srudy: it fits in with his search for linguistic tools in theology that
are more than just tools, but in fact contain an analogy with the way we must speak
about the one Christ, the one Word Incarnate.
Let us consider the presence of pre-modist grammar and tenninist logic in Aquinas.
First I will address Aquinas' use of the term modus signijicandi. I will argue that
in most instances a distinction is expressed that is one of the basic distinctions of
the theory of supposition as well. In fact, there is reason to believe that Aquinas
considers supposition to be a mode of signification as weIlll. Next we will discuss
10) In Dutch he says: "een vreemde eend in de bijt", something that contradicts the general
approach. Verburg says: "De suppositieleer was meer een kolfje naar de hand van de
nominalistische taal-critiek, omdat ze daarmede de vinger kon leggen op discrepanties tussen het
bedoelenderwijs gedachte en het betekenenderwijs gedachte. Ze begon met een kennis-criti~k; en
omcIat de taal als kennis-<iraagster fungeerde impliceerde deze een kenniscritische taal-critiek.
Thomas staat heel anders tegenover de kennis en dus tegenover de taal" (p. 43). Later on in his
book Verburg admits that 13th century Terminist Logic is not that sceptical at all, but he insists
"c'est Ie ton qui fait la musique" (p. 70). De Rijk would not agree with Verburg, just like he
disagrees with Erwin Arnold (Zur Gesehiehte der Suppositionstheorie. Die Wurzeln des modernen
europiiisehen Subjektivismus, Freiburg/Munchen 1952) on'the link between nominalism and theory
of supposition. According to De Rijk both realists, e.g. Walter Burley (ca. 1275-1344/5), and
nominalists used the theory of supposition. Cf. De Rijk, 1970b, p.3.
Verburg's interpretation is one example out of many, of an interpretation of 13th century logic in
the light of the 14th century logic, i.e. Ockbam's logic. Not only linguists like Verburg, but
logicians as well, like B.A. Moody and A. Broadie, suffer from the same one-sidedness. Jean
Jolivet, 1981, parallels the differences on the subject of the relationship language-reality between
Aquinas, Duns Scotus and Ockham with their different positions concerning the grammatical modi
signifieant/i;
11) In fact, if one were to accept Aquinas' authorship of the De Fallaeiis ad quosdam nobiles
artistas, the fact that supposition belongs to the consideration of modes of signification could be
shown immediately. In the part on theJallaciafigure dietionis (Ch. IX), the author says in general
that unde Jallacia figure dietionis est deeeptio proveniens e;( eo quod aUqua dietio. similis alteri
dietioni, videtur eundem modum signifieandi habere, eum tamen non habeat. The author continues'
with the distinction of three kinds of this fallacy, the third of which is summarized as: Et ad hune
modum reducitur omnis deeeptio proveniens e;( variata suppositione terminorum, ut eum dicitur:
Homo est species,
Sortes est homo,
CHAPTER TWO 45
a reconstruction of Aquinas' theory of supposition that I make on the basis of his
scattered applications of it. I will underline its christological importance, and do so
especially when discussing two corollaries of the theory of supposition: the theory
of predication and the logic of reduplicative statements.
1. Modes of Signification and signifying the Divine
The phrase 'mode of signification' goes back to Boethius (480-524)". It took the
modists, however, to put the tenn in the centre of grammatical and semantic
reflection. Grammatical it is, since modes of signification are what distinguish the
traditional eight classes of words: noun, verb, participle, pronoun, interjection,
preposition, adverb and cenjunction. All the different ways of signifyin~ th~t
constitute the differences between the classes are dermed. Semantic reflection IS
connected with these modes in the sense that they reflect to a certain extent the
categories of being: just as any thing belongs to one of the ten categories that
Aristotle discerned because of certain properties, so any word belongs to one of the
eight classes of words because of certain properties or modes 13 • Besides this the
modists distinguish between essential and accidental modes. These terms refer to
the essence and accidents of words qua words. There are essential general modes,
the ones that some classes of words have in common; and essential specific modes,
the ones that define only one class of words. The accidental modes comprise, for
instance, syntactical features (such as case and inflexion) causing the congruence of
words and the unity of a sentence, and features that are 'consignified': time,
number, gender etc. In fact, the notion of consignification or secondary meaning,
as Pinborg shows, is to a certain extent quite similar to the notion of mode of
signification. The semantic relevance of all these modes appears when one asks
questions such as: "can we signify things without using modes?" or "are these
modes properties of words or properties of things signified?". Modists differ
among each other as to the answers to be given, but they all address similar
ergo Sortes est species;
hie enim proeeditur a simpUci suppositione ad diseretam. et mutatur Quale quid in hoe aliquid.
H.F. Dondaine prefaces the critical Leonina-edition of the De Jallaeiis with: " ...dans I'etat actuel
de notre information, it n'apparait pas exclu que Saint Thomas puisse etre a l'origine de
l'ouvrage" (vol. 43 of Aquinas Opera Omnia, Commissio Leonina, Roma 1976, p. 386b). Cf. J.
Weisheipl, 1974, pp. 34, 35 and 386. For this reason we have only included references to the
relevant texts from this work (DP3) , and do not use it in our argumentation;
12) On the history of modus signifieandi cf. Jan Pinborg, 1967, p. 30-45 and Muller 1983,
98-101. Keep in mind the warning voiced by Jakob Wimpheling, paraphrased by Grabmann,
1926, p. 142: " ... wenn aus diesen modi significandi eine Frucht herauswachst, dieselbe doch ror
Knaben nichts sei und von diesen nicht verdaut werden Mme. 1m weiteren Verlauf berichtet
Wimpheling, dass die ubermassige Beschaftigung mit den modi significandi schon gereifte und
sonst gel~hrte Manner ganz verriickt gemacht hat";
13) Cf. Wilhelm Totok, Handbueh der Gesehiehte der Philosophie, vol. II, Frankfurt am
Main 1973, p. 462;
46 SEMANTICS OF NAMING CHRIST CHAPTER TWO 47

questions. All answers concern the relationship between words and things, i.e. 7) the distinction between absolute and relative modes of signification of
semantic relationships. This semantic interest culminates in a last type of modes words23
that I would like to mention: modi significandi aclivi and passivi. In the version of 8) the distinction between form and subsistence as expressed in words 24
Boethius of Dacia: the latter are considered to be aspects of things. the former 9) the distinction between affirmation and negation25
aspects of words, and their concordance constitutes the success of language: it 10) the distinction between active and passive modes of verbs26
works. 11) the distinction between different cases27 .
Except for the ODes last mentioned, all of these modes in one way or another are 12) the compositeness of a proposition is its peculiar mode of significatiorr8
already present in the fifties of the thirteenth century. and some of them even are 13) the distinction between words that imply a certain iulbitudo or relatio and
much older". This is to be recognized in Aquinas' employment of the word. those that do not"
14) the distinction between property, substance and relation as expressed in
Aquinas' actual use of the terms modus significationis and modus signi}icandi words 30
reveals a wide spectrum of contexts and meanings. The employment that medieval 15) the distinction between words that imply change, and those that do not"
grammarians make of Priscian's well-known defmition of nomen, leads Aquinas to 16) the distinction of number"
the observation that there is a mode of signification that grammarians discern: 17) the distinction between prepositions such as per and ab that imply a relation,
signijicare substantiam cum qualitate l5 • This feature distinguishes a noun from a and those that do noe3
verb and a participle. A verb expresses an action, and an action is always of 18) the distinction between relation and accident as expressed in words 34
someone or something, and therefore never exists by itself or is thought to exist by 19) the distinction between substance and essence as expressed in words 35
itself, and thus is never signified as such. Nouns differ from verbs and participles, 20) the distinction of all ten Aristotelian categories as expressed in words 36
but they also differ from demonstrative and relative pronouns l6 . Apart from these 21) the distinction between signifying as a whole, and as a part, resulting in
basic distinctions between modes of signification of separate grammatical classes of predi£ation recto and obliquo37
words, Aquinas knows of at least 23 other distinctions between modes of 22) the distinction between substantive and adjective terms 38
signification. 23) the distinction between operation and fonn as expressed in words 39
1) the distinction between male, female and neutral words 17
2) the distinction between substance and accident as expressed in words 18 One is tempted to distinguish those instances where the phrase "as expressed in
3) the distinction between different times of a verb" words" is used from the rest, and to make two separate lists: grammatical and
4) the distinction between potency and act as expressed in words20
5) the distinction between an operation and its object or result as expressed in
words 21 23) ISN 23.1.3 ad sed contra; 32.1.1 ad 1; ST I 29.4; QDP 9.6 ad 2; REEl 1 [796J; cf. QDP
6) the distinction between concrete and abstract nouns22 9.4;
24) ISN26.1.1 ad 3; 34.1.2 sol, ad 1; cf. STIlI 2.2 ad 1; STI 40.3;
25) negationem)~ ST I
lSN 34.3.2 ( ... cum convenientissimus modus signijicandi divina sit per
13.12 ad 1;
14) Cf. M.·D. Chenu, 1935-36; 26) ISN 40.1.I ad I (Panna-edition); 2SN 35.1.1 ad 5; 4SN 38.2.3.1 ad 2; ST I 41.I ad 3;
IS) CPE I 1+4+5: ISN 9.1.2; 22.1.1 ad 3; 3SN 6.1.3; ST I 13.1 ad 3; III 78.5. Some say 54.1 ad 3;
that as early as the twelfth century signijicare substantiam, part of the mode of signification of a 27) ISN 41.1.5 ad 3;
noun, in fact means: to supposit, to stand for the individual thing. The quality signified would 28) STI 13.12 ad 2+3;
then be the meaning, connotation of the word. Cf. L. de Rijk, 1982, p. 163f; 29) STI 19.2 ad 1;
16) STI 13.1 ad 3; ISN22.1.1 ad 3; 30) ISN23 expositio textus; STI 40.1; cf. STI 41.1 ad 2; QDP 8.2:
17) ISN 9.1.1 obiecturn 2, ad 2; DP3 10; cf. STI 31.2 ad 4; STIIII7.1; 31) STI 45.2 ad 2;
18) ISN 9.1.2; 22.1.1 ad 3; QDP 7.4 ad 1,2; 8.2; 32) ST III 3.7 ad 2;
19) lSN9.2.2 ad 2; 22.1.1 ad 3; more regularly called consignijicatio; 33) QDP 1.1 obiectum 5, corpus and ad 1 +6;
20) ISN 18.1.2: . 34) QDP 8.2; cf. DP3 10;
21) ISN 10.1.2 ad 3: STI 37.1 ad 2; 41.4 ad 3; QDV23.1 ad 7+11; cf. QDV23.4 ad 7; cf. 35) QDW 1.I1 ad 4; cf. DP3 10;
1SN 18 expositio textus;
36) DP3 10;
22) ISN 4.1.2; 22.1.2 ad 4; 24.2.2 ad 2; 33.1.2 sol, ad 4; 3SN 4.2.2 ad 2; ScG I 30.3; ST I 37) lSN2S.1.1 ad 3; QDL 2.2.2 ad sed contra;
39.4; 39.5 corpus, ad 3; III 16.5 ad 1; QDP 7.2 ad 7; 8.3 ad 10; REI I 1 [5571: OCE I 4 [751; 38) ISN 9.1.2; STI 39.3; cf. 3SN 5 expositio textus; ST I 39.5 ad 5;
CMP VII 1.8-12; cf. QDP 8.2 ad 7; CPE I 4.5; 39) ISN32.2.1;
48 SEMAN11CS OF NAMING CHRIST
logical modes of signification. As a matter of fact, Aquinas himself distinguishes a
logical from a grammatical understanding of the categories. The proper under-
standing is the one held by the logician, and the grammatical understanding is
accepted quantum ad modum significandi. Whiteness is grammatically a substance,
but logically an accident"'. But to distinguish a grammatical meaning from a
logical meaning of a word is not the same as distinguishing a grammatical mode of
signification from a logical mode of signification. In fact, there is no such thing as
a logical mode of signification. All modes of signification belong to grammatical
analysis. Some modes of being (the ones which the logician discerns and expresses)
are reflected in the grammatical modes of signification, and others are not. Some
grammatical modes of signification reflect modes of being while others do not. For
instance, some passive verbs reflect real 'passion' of the subject of the verb, but
others do nor l , There is no 'passion' in something that is known (scitur) by
someone, or in someone predestined (praedestinatur) by God. It is not the job of
the grammarian nor of the logician, but of the philosopher or the theologian, to
40) ISN 22.1.1 ad 3; cf. 2SN 35.1.1 ad 5 and STl 41.1 ad 3; cf. 4SN 38.2.3.1 ad 2 and DP3
8·
41) lSN 40.1.1 ad 1 (Parma-edition); 4SN 38.2.3.1 ad 2; ST I 41.1 ad 3. It seems to me that
Aquinas shares in the (pre-)modist confusion as to the nature and extent in which modes of
signification represent, through modes of understanding, modes of being. Pinborg appears to be
unable to give a clear picture. He mentions a fonnal mode-consideration and, a material property-
consideration, the first of which emphasizes the (sometimes defective) mode of receiving
knowledge and the second of which the properties of things expressed in the modes of
signification: "Zwischen diesen beiden Aspekten, die fonnalen "Modus"-Betrachtung und der
materialen "Proprietas"-Betrachtung, schillert die ganze mittelalterliche Theorie .... Dennoch
scheint der Thomismus [= Thomas - hs] die "modus"-interpretation vorgezogen zu haben." (1967.
p. 42). On the one hand all modes are derived from real properties of things, on the other hand
there is no perfect or complete isomorph relation: "Jede Sache wird von ihrem Wesen und ihrem
modus essendi, d.h. der Weise, auf die sie ihr Wesen hat, konstituiert. In derselben Weise ist
jedes Wort aus einer Bedeutung und einen modus significandi konstituiert; beide elementen
entsprechen die Konstitution des Seins. Wenn der modus significandi geatldert wird, wird die
ganze Bedeutung des Wortes geandert, ebenso wie eine Sache, die aus einer Kategorie in eine
andere "iibertragen" wird. nichtmehr dieselbe S'ache ist. So besteht eine gewisse Obereinstimmung
zwischen den wichtigsten ontischen Kategorien und den wichtigsten modi significandi, die die
Wortklassen konstituieren, obwohl die.se Kongruenz nicht vollstfuldig ist. "(1967, p. 40). But:
"Man kann also eine Sache mit einem Wort einer Klasse bezeichnen, die dem Wesen der Sache
nicht entspricht. Daher kann man aus der Wortform nicht' auf die Kategorie der bezeichneten
Sache schliessen, obwohl die Wortkiassen als Bedeutungsjormen aus den realen Kategorien
abgeleitet sind." (1967, p. 48). And: "Das be.sagt nieht, dass ein natiirliches Verhilltnis zwischen
modus essendi und modus significandi besteht. sondern nur, dass die Struktur der Sachen in die
Struktur der Sprachen wiedergegeben wird; jedem modus essendi entspricht ein bestimmter modus
significandi. Umgekehrt gilt auch. dass jedem modus significandi ein bestimmter modus essendi
i~
entspricht." (1967, p. 82). On the other hand, Boethius of Dacia says: idem conceptus mentis per
omnes partes orationis potest signijicari, for instance dolorldoleoldolenterlheu have different
modes but the same meaning (Modi Signijicandi sive Quaestiones super Priscianum Maiorem, ed.
J. Pinborg - H. Roos, Hauniae 1969, q. 14, 60)~
CHAPTER TWO 49
determine whether modes of being are reflected in modes of signification or nor'2.
The list is impressive. It reflects the interest that Aquinas takes in language.
However, in cases where talk about God is at stake, and those are most cases
mentioned above, there is a special interest as well.
Almost every instance in which Aquinas uses the phrase modus significandi
represents this kind of activity: to map the differences between God and our
deficient mode of signifying him and his operations. Aquinas, as Jolivet says",
transposes the grammatical theory of modes of signification to the discourse about
God. In a very general way this is done where Aquinas discusses the use of
metaphors and analogical names CST I 13). But concrete examples can be found
throughout his texts. For e~ample: the prepositions per and ab in sentences such as
Operatio divina est ab essentia divina and Deus operatur per essentiarn suam imply
a relation between divine operation and divine essence, contrary to divine
simplicity, but this only belongs to the human level of thinking and the human way
of speaking44. Another example is that the grammar of 'to create' and 'to make' is
the same, but the latter implies change, whereas the fonner does nors. An
example from trinitarian theology: when talking about the divine persons, we
employ substantive terms that have a substantive mode of signification, implying
substances, whereas there are not three substances in God but only three
relations". These are only three examples out of many instances in which
Aquinas calls attention to the modes of signification in order to determine where it
is that our language in divinis fails, and which rules should be followed in order to
give a true interpretation of authoritative statements41 • In general one should say,
according to Aquinas, two things at the same time: one is that our modes of
signification, fitting as they are for talk about created modes of being, are deficient
when used of God; and the other is that one cannot escape these human modes and
42) So Aquinas would agree with Boethius of Dacia, cf. Pinborg, 1967, p. 79~
43) Jean Jolivet, 1981, p. 149-150: "Certes les modi signijicandi ici evoques sont ceux qui
interessent un theologien plutot qu'un grammairien: it ne s'agit pas d'etudier les faeons differentes
iI de signifier une m~me realite qu'ont Ie verbe it court et Ie nom course, pour reprendre un
exemple usuel. Toutefois Ie prinCipe d'analyse ·est bien Ie ni~me: it faut distinguer entre ce que
signifie un mot et Ia maniere dont HIe signifie; que la difference ici ne soit pas entre deux parties
II
!
du discours, mais soit fondee sur la distance de la creature au Createur, cela importe quant au
contenu de la doctrine, mais non quant a sa forme .... C'est tout cela que Thomas d'Aquin
exprime par cette conception de l'analogie, qui en somme transpose dans Ia speculation
theologique Ia th60rie grammaticale des modi signijicandi";
44)
45)
QDP 1.1 obiectum 5, corpus and ad 1 +6;
STl 45.2 ad 2;
46) ISN 23. 1.3 ad sed contra; STI 29.4;
47) For instance, when Augustine says that persona signifies a substance, Aquinas interprets
him as saying that it signifies per modum substantiae, not substance itself; ISN 23.1.3 ad 1; cf.
OCEI4;
 I'
i
50 SEMANTICS OF NAMING CHRIST
that even the discourse about God has to obey its rules 48 • Therefore most of the
particular modes of signification that grammarians distinguish have a theological
bearing".
Aquinas' procedure usually takes the form of a semantic distinction between what
is realiter/secundum remire the case, and how this state of affairs differs from the
state that our mode of signifying or our mode of thinking suggests: secundum
modum signijicandi and rationis tantumlsecundum rationem/rationrfO. Of the same
object we can have e.g. physical, geometrical and grammatical knowledge, and so
it is that we need different concepts and different words to understand and express
this object. In this respect our knowledge and speaking is never perfectS I, When
we try to understand God, and speak about him, we are faced with a similar
problem. Moreover, all our language bears the marks of a language apt for
signifying creation, and so our mode of signifying always importat conditiones
48) An example of the latter, that will be discussed below, is the proper interpretation of the
name Deus;
49) It seems to me that Muller is quite mistaken in his interpretation of the use of modus
signijicandi in ST I 13: "Bei Thomas' ins Theologische gewendeten modi dagegen fehlt jegliches
Beispiel. Er bietet keines, wei! er keines bieten kann .... "Modus significandi" wird damit von
einer auf konkretes Sprachmaterial anwendbaren grammatisch-semantischen Kategorie zu einer
abstrakten strikt-semantischen transformiert .. " Die modi significandi in diesem theologischen
Zusammenhang als real und empirisch qualifizierende Kategorien aufzufassen, unterstellt letztlich
den zum Misslingen verurteilten Versuch, fiber das zu sprechen, wortiber man schweigen muss."
(1983, p. 99f). This tacit reference to Wittgenstein's Tractatus is misplaced, since the very first
question after question 13 shows how Aquinas, according to the rules set, in a very concrete way
distinguishes the mode of signification and the signified thing in predicating 'knowledge' (scientia)
of God: quia peifeetiones procedentes a Deo in creaturas, altion modo sun! in Deo. ut supra
dictum est. oportet quod. quandoeumque aliquod nomen sumptum a quaeumque peifectione
creaturae Deo attribuitur. secludatur ab eius signijicarione omne ilIud quod pertinet ad
imperfeetum modum qui competit ereaturae. Unde sdentia non est qualitas in Deo vel habitus. sed
substantia et actus purus (ST I 14.1 ad 1). Remember the definition of nomen: nomen signijicat
substantiam cum qualitate (ST I 13.1 ad 3). This approach is repeated many times in the course of
the ST:
50) 'This displays Aristotle's basic tenet that our words signify concepts, which signify things:
voces SUn! signa intellectuum, et intellectus sun! rerum similitudines, STI 13.1; cf. CPE 12. The
human mode of Signifying follows the human mode of 'receiving' God's perfection in the created
world: lSN 22. 1.2 sol, ad 1; ST.I 13.3;
Indicating the importance of the semantical distinction between res and ratio or modus, Aquinas
says: Respondeo dicendum, quod sicut supra dictum est, sapientia et bonitas, et omnia huiusmodi,
sunt omnino unum re in Deo. sed differunt ratione; et haec ratio non est tanlum ex parte ipsius
ratiocinantis, sed ex proprietate ipsius rei. Ad euius rei evidentiam, ut diligenter explicetur, quia
ex- hoc pendet totus intelleetus eorum quae in I libro dicuntur, quatuor oportet videre (lSN 2.1.3).
All of our understanding of what is contained in Peter of Lombard's first book, depends on
understanding the distinction between res and ratio, ratio being a name of second imposition, i.e.
a name for a human concept of a thing in safar as it represents a human intention: names like
genus, definitio, or suppositum;
51) ISN35.1.1 ad 2; cf. ISN2.1.3; STI 13.4;
CHAPTER1WO SI
cotporaies, involves bodily conditions, such as time and compositenessS2. E.g.
words such as father or principle with which we signify God are always taken from
our discussion of creation. -And so Aquinas distinguishes the mode of signification,
which in this case is the general feature of being taken from creation-talk, imponere
a quo, from what we intend in using these words, the result of imponere ad
quem".
In order to signify God, we have to fulfil an impossible task: to transcend the very
mode in which we speak:. Aquinas sums it all up for us in this argument from a
discussion of divine simplicity: "The mode of signification of lexemes that we
impose on things follows the mode of understanding, because lexemes signify
conceptions of the intellect, as is said in the beginning of Perihermeneias. Our
intellect understands being according to the way it is found in the lower things that
it apprehends, in which being is not subsistent but inherent. Reason however finds
out that some being is subsistent, and therefore, although that which they call being
is signified with the mode of concretion, the intellect in attributing being to God
transcends the mode of signification: it attributes to God only that whicb is
signified, but not the mode of signification" .S4
Apart from explaining how the attention to modes of signification fits in with a
typical theological outlook, the list of modes is given here because of this twenty-
fourth and final mode of signification which Aquinas discerns, and which
underlines a basic characteristic of most of the modes earlier mentioned:
52) ST I 13.3 corpus + ad 3;
53) Some names signify that from which they are taken, and in that case they are taken
directly from the essence of the thing to be signified. Some' however are taken only from a
property or a superficial aspect of the thing to be signified, and in that case etymology and
signification are not identical. All names for G'od are taken from creation, so all of them belong to
the second category. Note that this distinction from imponere a quolimponere id cui is also used
to distinguish signification (a quo) from supposition (id cui) in lSN 2 expositio textus and 3SN
6.1.3; lSN22.1.2; 22 exp.textus; 23.1.2 ad 1; 24.2.2 ad 2; 25.1.2 sol + ad 3; 29.1.1 ad 1; 34
exp.tatus; SeG I 30.3; ST I 13.2 ad 2; I 13.6; I 13.8; I 13.11 ad 1; I 33.2 ad 4; QDP 7.4 ad
1 +9; CPE I 4.9; cf. STII-II 1.6 ad 3; II-II 92.1 ad 2; CDN [ 1.029;
54) QDP 7.2 ad 7: Modus significandi in dictionibus quae a nobis rebus imponuntur sequitur
nwdum intelligendi; dietiones enim significant intellectuum conceptiones, ut dicitur in principio
Periher. Intelleetus autem noster hoc modo intelligit esse quo nwdo invenitur in rebus inferioribus
a quibus scientiam capit, in quibus esse non est subsistens, sed inhaerens. Ratio autem invenit
quod aliquod esse subsistens sit: et ideo licet hoc quod dicunt esse, signijicetur per modum
concretionis. tamen intellectus attnbuens esse Deo TRANSCENDlT modum signijicandi, attribuens
Deo id quod significatur, non autem modum signijicandi; Cf. Pinborg (1982, p. 257): "The term
'lexeme' seems to be the nearest modern equivalent to the modistic dictio, which is a highly
abstract tenn, including under one head not only all fiexional fonns and all occurrences of a word
but even derivational fonns". Dictio occupies the place in the middle between a Significative sound
on the one hand, and a pars orationis, part of a sentence, on the other;

52 SEMANTICS OF NAMING CHRIST
24) the distinction between being signified as a suppositum and as a form".
Each nature is individuated by tuatter. SUch a nature is the form of the individual,
and the individual is the suppositum of the fortu. Socrates is a suppositum of
human nature, and therefore when we say 'Socrates is a human being'. human
nature is the form of Socrates. 'Human being' however is not the form itself, nor
does it have the mode of signification of a form, although 'human nature' does.
For obvious reasons we cannot say 'Socrates is human nature'. But can we say
'Socrates is of human nature'? Only when an adjective is added, as in sentences
such as ista mulier est e g reg i a e formae or iste homo est per fee t a e
virtutis. A thing that has a certain fortu can only be signified to be of a fortu
when a special determination is added. This is a mode of being of created things
that is reflected in our mode of signlfying: the subject-term is signified as the thing
having a form, and the predicate as the form that is had. The subject-term stands
for the thing having a form, and this thing-as-being-signified, as actually referred
to, is called suppositum. It is a creational mode of signification that we cannot but
follow, indeed have to follow, when we think about the relationship between the
three divine persons. The Council of Nicea endorsed homoousion, and Aquinas
approves of its Latin translation as unius essentiae, employing the line of
argumentation just mentioned. Aquinas takes the isomorphy of language and reality
very seriously. and does not simply accept a phrase that seems to put the real state
of affairs upside down: a nature does not have the individual, but the individual has
a nature. Therefore, without special determination, persona est essentiae (note the
shorthand-character of this phrase) is not admitted, whereas essentia est personae
isS6 •
Being signified as a suppositum means being signified as something having a
nature, or as something perfonning a certain kind of actionS7 • Being signified as a
suppositum is a certain mode of signification. When a word has supposition,
something is signified as a suppositum. Something being a suppositum means that it
is signified by a word that has suppositions8.
55) ISN 33.1.4 sol, ad 4; ST 139.2: 140.1 ad 2+3; cf. ST 132.2 ad 2; 140.2, 140.3; cf.
also QDP 8.2 ad 7 where per modum suppositi is distinguished from in abstracto;
56) ST I 39.2;
57) ST I 40.1 ad 3; the phrase actiones sunt suppositorum is axiomatic in Aquinas and
onmipresent;
58) The main arguments for accepting suppositum both as an "ontological subject", the
common view, and as a result of a rational operation, are these:
a) Aquinas' clearly demonstrated presupposition of the isomorphy of language and reality, a
presupposition demonstrated by the very process of distinguishing the res from the modus, and by
the very discussion of the appropriateness of human modes of signification in divinis. Basic texts
concerning propositions are ST I 13.12 and 85.5 ad 3. Cf. lSN 4.2.1 ad 1 on the conformity of
our composed propositions with God who is simple: intellectus noster deficit a cognitione divinae
maiestatis, similiter etiam et enuntiatio deficit a significatione perfecta,' nihilominus tamen est
veritas, inquantum intellectus fonnans enuntiationem accipit duo quae sun! diversa secundum
modum et idem secundum rem. Unde secundum diversitatem rationum format praedicatum et
subiectum. et secundum identitatem componit. The answer to the question concerning God's
CHAPTER1WO 53
Looking back now upon all the modes that we encountered in Aquinas' writings.
we recognize the distinction between being signified as a suppositum or as a fonn
in at least fifteen other distinctions. The driving force behind them all is to
determine a way of speaking that conforms to the thing spoken about: is it a
subsisting thing or an aspect of such a thing? This makes supposition belong to the
heart of the theological use of the doctrine of the modes of signification".
Historically spoken terminist logic and speculative grammar are two separate
things, but a theologian who uses all the tools he can get, links them together in
applying them to talk about God.
And so it seems there exists a link between modes of signification and the theory of
supposition, and that supposition can be defined as a mode of signification. Being a
mode of signification, the laws of supposition should both be respected in divinis
and be provided with a disclaimer: it does not imply any composition in God, it
does not imply that God's mode of being concords with the modes of being implied
by the mode of signification supposition is. It leaves us with a burning question,
though: If supposition is a mode of signification, and if modes of signification form
part of the larger concept of signification, how does Aquinas account for the
difference between supposition and signification?
2. Modes of Supposition and referring to the Divine"
One and the same word may have different meanings in different contexts. When
interpretating Scripture, fathers or other written sources, or when employing proper
reasoning one needs to be alert. One reason may be that the signification or ratio
nominis is equiv.ocal or analogical61 . Another reason may be that a different mode
knowledge of _propositions is similar: sieut [Deus] scit materialia inunaterialiter et composita
simpliciter, ita scit enuntiabilia non per modum enuntiabilium, quasi scilicet in intellectu eius sit
compositio vel divisio enuntiabilium; sed unumquodque cognoscit per simplicem intelligentiam (ST
I 14.14). The requirement of a certain isomorphy is met in the isomorphy between God's being
and created being: compositio enuntiabilis signijicat aliquod esse rei; et sic Deus per suum esse,
quod est eius essentia, est similitudo omnium eorum quae per enuntiabilia significantur (ibidem,
ad 3). Cf. QJJV2.7;
b) Several texts indicate that Aquinas accepts suppositum as a nomen secundae impositionis, a
secondary intention, Le. concept of a concept, existing only in the mind, even though there may
be, or even should be, afundamentum in re; lSN2.1.3; 26.1.1 ad 3; 3SN6.1.1.1; STI 29.2;
QJJI2; DPG 6 [328];
59) Please note that the survey of modes of signification that I have given covers only those
texts in which Aquinas himself explicitly uses the phrase modus significamii/signijicationis. There
are many texts in which he distinguishes per modum x from per modum y which seem to be
pertinent to the theory;
60) It should be noted that all lists of texts that are given in this section are intended to be
exhaustive, unless indicated otherwise;
61) I have chosen not to elaborate Aquinas' position on metaphors, which he thinks are to be
distinguishe(1 from words used analogously. It could be shown, as some have done, that one of the
differences between metaphors and words used analogously is to be articulated using the theory of
54 SEMANI1CS OF NAMING CHRIST
of signification causes a different mode of supposition. E.g. alius and aliud have
the same meaning. i.e. alietas, dissimilarity. but a different mode of signification,
and therefore a different mode of supposition, which causes Pater est alius a Filio,
the Pather is someone different from the Son, to be true, but Pater est aliud a
Filio, the Father is something different from the Son, to be false62 • Burnana
natura and homo have the same meaning, but one signifies abstractly and the other
concretely. Therefore Deus assumpsit hominem, God assumed a man, is false,
since it implies that the hypostatic union took place by way of adoption of an
already existing individual, but Deus assumpsit humanam naturam, God assumes a
human nature, is true 63 • This illustrates the basic necessity to develop doctrines of
signification. modes of signification and modes of supposition64 • Quite regularly
one fmds Aquinas giving a reverent exposition of some auctoritas while prohibiting
one to extend speech in such a way65. Also quite regularly one finds Aquinas
detecting a fallacy in the opponent's argument, based on a different signification or
a different supposition66 • Deus assumpsit humanam naturam also illustrates that
signification and supposition should be distinguished. Because humanam naturam
does not have (personal) supposition. but only signifies the fonn or nature as such,
such a proposition truly expresses the personal unity in Christ. Because there is
only a difference in supposition between Deus generat, God brings forth, and Deus
est genitus, God is brought forth, and not in signification, they do not express that
Pather and Son are different Gods. Because only the supposit which is denoted by
homo in Iste homo est Christus is different from the one denoted in Iste homo est
Socrates, and not its signification, Christ's human 'nature is the same nature as the
supposition: when a word is used of God improperly and metaphorically, its meaning does not
change, only its supposition, Cf. ST 113.6. Cf. H.W.M. Rikhof, 1988, p. 142: "Het aparte van
analoog taalgebruik ligt dus op het niveau van de betekenis .... Het aparte van metaforisch
taalgebruik ligt dus op het niveau van de verwijzing". David Burrell and Klaus Muller (1983, pp.
230-250) have shown however that despite the differences "analogous expressions inevitably retain
a touch of metaphor" (1979, p. 63);
62) ISN 9.1.1 ad 2;
63) ST III 4.3 corpus + ad 2 and 4.4;
64) Aquinas occasionally talks about nwdus supponendi: Sed differunt (relatio and hypostasis)
secundum mcdum signijicandi, qui fundalur in re, quia utrumque nomen habet veram
significationem suam in Deo; et ideo differunt edam quantum ad modum supponendi. quia
supposito uno non supponitur aliud. Sicut enim dicimus quod Deus generat et deitas non generat:
ita dicimus quod hypostasis distinguitur et relatio dWinguit; ISN26.1.1 ad 5; cf. ISN 5 expositio
textus;
65) One example out of many: Pope Itmocentius UI has said about the Son of God: persona
consumpsit personam, but since no existing person was assumed in the incarnation, this can only
be understood as improper use of words; the words mean that the human nature that was assumed
did not have a personality of its own; Aquinas says: Unde non est ex hoc extendendum, 3SN 5.3.3
ad 4;
66) One example out of many: this is a jallacia figurae dictionis vel accidentis: Deus est
ingenitus, Filius est Deus, ergo Filius est ingenitus; in the first proposition Deus supposits for the
Father, whereas in the second proposition Deus signifies the divine nature; secundum rem person
and nature are identical in God, but not secundum modum signijicandi; ST III ).6 ad 3;
CHAPTER TWO 55
one all human beings participate in67 •
In fact, the whole of christology is built on the distinction between signification and
supposition, as we shall discover below. If homo in Homo est Deus were to signify
and supposit the same, the result would be an identiflcation of both natures. Homo
signifies human nature, but supposits for the individual that has human nature, Le.
the Son of God. If Deus in Deus est homo were to signify and supposit the same,
the distinction between the three divine persons would be lost. Deus signifies divine
nature, but in this case supposits for one of the individuals that 'have' divine
nature, Le. the Son of God.
2.1 The distinction between signijicatjon and supposition
To keep signification and Supposition apart is of major interest. But does not the
fact that, as has been shown, supposition is at the heart of Aquinas' usage of modes
of signification, blur this distinction? I do not think so. In fact the word supposition
has (in this respect) two different meanings, say both William of Sherwood and
Lambert of Auxerre68 : one indicates a certain mode of sigrrification, and the other
what nowadays is called denotation or extension.
Sherwood gives definitions of four proprietates terminorum, properties of terms
(5.0.1-5.0.2):
signijicatio praesentatio alicuius formae ad intellectum
suppositio ordinatio alicuius intellectus sub alio
copulatio ordinatio alicuius intellectus supra alium
appellatio praesens convenientia termini, i.e. proprietas, secundum quam
signijicatum termini potest did de aliquD, mediante hoc verbo 'est J69
He draws attention to the fact that supposition and copulation dicuntur multipliciter,
sicut multa huiusmodi nomina, aut secundum actum aut secundum habitum70 • The
definitions just given are defmitions of actual supposition71 and copUlation,
67) This is expressed by: Diversitas suppositioms non jacit aequivocationem. sed diversitas
significationis: 3SN 6.1.3 ad 1; cf. ScG IV 49.12; QJJP 9.4 ad 6; QJJI2 ad 4; QJJL 3.2.2 ad 1;
cf. also ST I 13.9; orr I 211 [137J;
68) Peter of Spain is less explicit, but H. Braakhuis has shown that Peter employs the word
supponere in a twofold sense: "namely of,: rei substantive representare (p.8OS) and of: to stand
(said of a substantive term) for something (p.80 14-IS)", 1977, p. 138, note 79;
Peter of Spain, Tractatus, 1972; William of Sherwood, Introductiones in logicam, 1983; Lambert
of Auxerre, Logica (Summa Lamberti), 1971 (as tacitly corrected in H. Braakhuis 1977);
69) "signification: the presentation of some form to the intellect; supposition: the ordering of
some concept under another; copulation: the ordering of some concept above another; appellation:
present convenience of a term, i.e. a property, according to which the signified of the tenn can be
said of something copulated by the word is";
70) H •••are said in multiple ways like many such names either according to act or according to
habit". ibidem;
71) When I use the phrase 'actual supposition' I abstract from the question whether that what
is actually supposited for actually exists or not. This makes my employment different from e.g.
Manthey's;
56 SEMANTlCS OF NAMING CHRIST
whereas the following are definitions of habitual supposition and copulation:
suppositio signijicatio alicuius ut subsistentis. Quod enim tale est, naturn est
ordinar; sub alio.
copulatio signijicatio alicuius ut adiacentis. Quod enim tale est, natum est
ordinari supra aliud.72
It is quite clear that habitual supposition is a mode of signification73 • Sherwood
gives further clarification of this point by linking supposition with substantives,
pronouns and words used substantively oniy. All words that can supposit have
signification, but not all words that have signification can supposit: only those that
significant rem ut subsistentem et ordinabilem sub alio. When Sherwood continues
with his exposition of the varieties or modes of supposition, it is not in the sense of
habitual supposition, i.e. as a mode of signification, that he uses the word, but in
the sense of actual supposition.
Lambert of Auxerre points out that signification is prior to supposition. since
supposition is the property of terms that already have signification. Both are fu~er
distinguished inasmuch as signification only regards the understandmg of the thing
to be represented by a word. whereas supposition regards also the supposita
conlenta sub ilia re, i.e. the things of which the word can truly be said14 •
Lambert continues by pointing out that the word supposition has different
meanings. two of which are relevant here.
suppositio substantiva rei designatio vel signatio
suppositio acceptio termini pro se sive pro re sua, vel pro aliquo
supposito contento sub re sua vel pro aUquibus suppositis
contentis sub re sua. 75
The first kind of suppositio he calls quaedam signijicatio specialis termini et non
termini proprielas, some special signification of a term and not its property,
whereas the second kind is the one to be investigated by the logician76 •
What Sherwood caIls suppositio secundum habitum, Lambert calls signijicatio
termini substantivi, and what Sherwood calls copulatio secundum habitum, Lambert
calls signijicatio termini adiectivi. The same distinction, though less explicit, can be
72) "Supposition: the signification of something as subsistent. That which is such, is fit for
being ordered under something else. Copulation: the signification of something as adjacent and
that which is such is fit for being ordered above something else", ibidem;
73) H. Braakhuis, against De Rijk, has shown that this is the correct view, 1977;
74) Verbi gratia, signijicatio hominis solum extenditur ad hominem, non ad contenta sub
homine: "homo~ enim signijicat hominem, non Sortem nee Platonem. Potest tamen "homo~
supponere pro Sorte et pro Platone et pro homine, o.c. 206;
75) "Supposition: the substantive designation or signation of a thing; Supposition: the
interpretation of a tenn for itself or for its thing (Le. the thing that it signifies), or for some
supposit contained under its thing or for some supposits contained under its thing";
76) Dividitur autem suppositio eommuniter dicta in suppositionem proprie dictam et
copu[ationem. Communiter enim loquendo supponunt tennini substantivi et adiectivi; sed proprie
loquendo suppositio con venit tenninis substantivis, et copulatio tenninis adiectivis. Et est
suppositio proprie dicta acceptio tennini rem fixam et per se stantem representantis secundum
quam teneri potest pro re sua vel pro supposito vel suppositis contentis sub re sua; o.c. 207;
CHAPTER TWO 57
found in Peter of Spain. This leads to the conclusion that the thirteenth century
logic of supposition draws a sharp distinction between signification and supposition
as two meanings of the term supposition. One focuses upon the mode of
signification with its implication (be it right or wrong) of a certain mode of
being77. the other upon the denotation or reference of terms actually used78 .
2.2 Aquinas on supposition as a mode of signification
Aquinas is not primarily a logician, but a theologian. He neither gives an
independent defmition of signification79 , nor one of supposition. What comes
closest to a distinction between the two of them, is mentioned above (p.54)
concerning the supposition of homo used to refer to Christ and Socrates. If
someone were to say that homo is used equivocally, Aquinas answers that
equivocation (or univocation or analogous use of words for that matter) belongs to
the semantic level of signification and not to the semantic level of (personal)
supposition. Equivocation is caused by a diversity of signification and not by a
77) Lambert says: .. si quera! aliquis quare suppositio approprietur substantivis, copulatio
adiectivis, ex dietis quid sit dicendum patet: supponere enim est per se stantis et rem suam jixam
representantis. Per se autem stare et rem suam jixam representare proprium est substantivorum;
copulare vero est adiectivis et rem dependentem representantis: adiaeere vero et rem dependentem
representare proprium est adiectivorum: ideo proprie loquendo suppositio est substantivorum,
copulatio vero adiectivorum, o.c. 208; I cannot but read this as stating there to be a parallelism
between the mode of signification and the thing to be signified, which to my mind should also be
the proper interpretation of this passage from Peter of Spain: Signijicationis alia est rei substantille
et habet fieri per nomen substantivum, ut 'homo'; alia est rei adiective et habet fieri per nomen
adiectivum vel per verbum, ut 'albus' vel 'currit'. Quare proprie non est signijicatio substantiva
vel adiectiva, sed aliquid significatur substantive et aliquid adjective, quia adiectivatio vel
substantivatio sunt modi rerum que significantur, et non significationis; o.c., Tr. VI.2, p. 79/80;
78) Aquinas mentions neither Peter, nor William, nor his fellow~Dominican and probably
feIlow~inhabitant of St. Jacques in Paris, Lambert of Auxerre, these three being the authors of the
three most famous compendiums of logic in the thirteenth century. All of them seem to share a
common tradition of 12th and 13th century logic, instead of being dependent the one on the other
(e.g. Peter on William of Sherwood);
At present only a few minor historical indications are certain:
~ there is a striking resemblance between Peter's tract on fallacies and Aquinas's, that is if
Aquinas is the author, which seems to suggest a common source (De Rijk);
- Aquinas' De propositionibus modalibus, that is if Aquinas is the author, seems to be dependent
on the work of William of Sherwood (Prantl, Grabmann, Kretzmann, H.P. Dondaine);
- Aquinas uses the tenn suppositio naturalis which can be found in Peter of Spain's Tractatus and
in the Logica of Lambert of Auxerre, but not in William of Sherwoods lntroductiones in logicam;
the Swnma Lamberti however was not published before 1260, whereas Aquinas already in his
commentary on Peter of Lombard's N Libri Sententiarum (1254-1256) mentions the tenn.
Cf. also note 85;
79) Cf. his commentary on Peri Hermeneias. first five lessons; the definition that Lambert
gives comes closest to the one given by Aristotle: Signijicatio tennini est intellectus rei ad quem
intellectum rei vox imponitur ad voluntatem instituentis, o.c. 205;
58 SEMANTICS OF NAMING CHRIST
diversity of supposition.
This however does not reveal whether the word supposition itself has two meanings
in Aquinas' writings. For this, we have to take a look at the theory of supposition
'at work'. Aquinas' conception of the distinction is embedded in his trinitarian
theology and christology.
A large number of more than 2500 instances of mentioning supposition, is devoted
to indicating the supposition of Deus: does it stand indistincte for divine persons,
or distincte for one or more of them? The logic of supposition is especially needed
to provide a glimpse of understanding of the mystery of the Trinity: how can the
Nicene Creed say Deurn de Deo (geniturn) and not imply that the divine essence
was brought forth (essentia genuit essentiarn) or fall back into polytheism?
Aquinas' first distinction is between the signification of Deus and its supposition.
Deus signifies the divine essence, but it stands, in an indistinct, undetermined way,
for the divine persons. Aquinas prefaces his solution with these words: "But
concerning the properties of speech, attention should be given not only to the thing
signified, but to the mode of signification as well 1180 • The mode of signification of
Deus is concrete, Le. it signifies the divine nature as possessed by an individual,
just as homo signifies a person of human nature. In general the proper supposition
of Deus is a standing for an individual of divine nature, a property the term owes
to its concrete mode of signification.
Aquinas' partners in discussion subscribe to the opinion that only the context of a
predicate which belongs to one or more persons, a 'notional' predicate, makes
Deus to stand for a person. By its nature (proprie secundum suam naturam) it
stands for the divine essence. Both in Scriptum and Summa Theologiae, Aquinas
mentions this position, and both times he respectfully yet finnly rejects its!.
Divine simplicity means that God's essence and God's subsistence are one, unlike
anytping else we know of. But human modes of signification are fit to talk about
what we know of, i.e. created things. That means that divine simplicity cannot be a
reason for bypassing the property that the term Deus as a concrete nOlIn in our
language has. A concrete noun normally stands for an individuated nature and not
for a nature or essence as such. Theology apparently should speak as logically as
possible, with the accent on both 'logical' and 'as possible'. Logic demands that a
certain kind of supposition follows upon a certain mode of signification, while the
limitations of our speech demand that we leave room for the unique and unknown
God, in whom essence and supposit are identical.
We may conclude that while Aquinas distinguishes signification and supposition of
80) Et haec opinio processisse videtur ex consideratione divinae simplicitatis, quae requirit
quod in Deo idem sit habens et quod habetur: et sic 'habens deitatem', quod signijicat hoc nomen
'Deus', est idem quod 'deitas'. Sed in proprietatibus locutionum, non tantum attendenda est res
significata; sed edam modus significandi. Et ideo, quia hoc nomen 'Deus' significat divinam
essentiam ut in habetUe ipsam, sicut hoc nomen 'homo' humanitatem significat in supposito; alii
melius dixerunt quod hoc nomen 'Deus' ex modo significandi habet ut proprie possil supponere
pro persona, sicU! et hoc nomen 'homo'. ST I 39.4;
81) Et haec opinio videtur verior esse, lSN4.1.2; alii melius dixerunt, STI 39.4;
CHAPTER TWO 59
words 82 , he must also show how this distinction often fails to obtain in divinis.
Yet a theologian must respect it, lest theological howlers occur. This is made quite
obvious in the twin-question of the one that we have just discussed (Deus genuit
Deum?): Essentia genuit Essentiam? The term essentia in this proposition is a
shorthand term for all those nouns that have the abstract mode of signification and
express some aspect of God that is of God's essence, and not distinctly of a divine
person. The rejected reasoning is simple: if there is an identity of essence and
supposit in God, then the terms expressing each are interchangeable as well. The
interpretation of Essentia genuit Essentiam would then be: Pater genuit Filium, the
Father brings forth the Son. Aquinas rejects this view, since essentia does not have
the mode of signification which would make the predication of personal properties
possible.
The same kind of argument can be found in Aquinas' christology8J. 'Given that
the Son of God has suffered, and Son and divine nature are identical, divine nature
can be said to have suffered', is unacceptable since it does not respect' the different
modes of signification of Filius and divina natura84 •
82) Other texts where the distinction between supposition and signification is made: lSN 4.1.2
sol + ad 2; 5 expositio textus; 32.2.2.1 ad 1; 3SN 6.1.3; 7.1.1 ad 2,4,5; QDP 8.4 ad 6; ST I
39.4 ad 1: III 3.6 ad 3; 11I 16.1: 11I 16.9 ad 3; REP [1 [134J: orr [ 211 [[41J; cf. JSN9.1.1 ad
2·
This corresponds with another distinction: predicates are taken formaUter and subject-tenns
materialiter: lSN 21.1.1.2; 21.2.1 obiectum 4; 3SN 1.2.5 ad 5~ 5 expositio textus~ 6.1.3 ad 3;
6.2.1 ad 7; 11.2 ad 3; 22.1.2; ST I 13.12; I 31.3 ad 2; III 16.7 ad 4 (terminus in subiecto positus
tenetur materialiter, idest pro supposito; positus vera in praedicato, tenetur formaliter, idest pro
natura signi/icata); STill 16.9; 11I 16.10; 11I [7.1 ad 3; cf. ISN21.2.1 ad 1: ST[ 3.3: QDP 9.4;
CMP [X 11.4; REII 1 [868J;
Apart from these, there are many texts in which Aquinas discerns truth-conditions of propositions,
where ratione significati is distinguished from ratione suppositi or ratione identitatis; e.g. ISN 23
expositio textus; 3SN7.l.1 ad 5; 7.2.1 ad 4; 12.1.1; STI 39.4 obiectum 2; REP 11 [135];
The whole logic of reduplicative statements (Christus secundum quod x est y) depends on this
distinction, as we will show below: 3SN 10.1.1.1 solutio + ad 2+3; 10.1.1.2 sed contra 1 +
solutio; STIlI 16.10 corpus + ad 2; I1116.1l~ III 16.12;
83) Cf. ST III 16.1: Nomen enim significans naturam communem in concreto pot est
supponere pro quolibet contentorum in natura communi: sicut hoc nomen 'homo' pot est
supponere pro quolibet homine singulari. Et ita hoc nomen 'Deus', e x ips 0 mod 0 sua e
s i g n ifi cat ion i s pot est supponere pro persona Filii Dei, ut in Prima Parte (39.4)
habitum est. De quolibet aU/em supposito alicuius naturae potest vere et proprie praedicari nomen
significans illarn naturam in concreto: skut de Socrate et Platone proprie et vere praedicatur
'homo '. Quia ergo persona Filii Dei, pro qua supponit hoc nomen 'Deus', est suppositum naturae
humanae, vere et proprie hoc nomen 'homo' potest praedicari de hoc nomine 'Deus', secundum
quod supponit pro persona Filii Dei;
84) Aquinas expresses the verdict on this kind of argumentation with the denial of the rule:
each predicate which truly is said of a subject, can stand for the subject (omne quod vere
praedicatur de aliquo potest supponere pro ipso); this rule does not apply, since the predication of
an essence of one of the divine persons, is not a nonnal predication in accordance with the
common modes of signification: supposito uno, non supponitur aUud. For example, Deus genuit is
true, but Deitas genuit is not, even though Deus est Deitas. lSN 4.2.2 ad 5; 5.1.1 obiectum 2;
60 SEMANTICS OF NAMING CHRIST CHAPTER TWO 61

We wanted to know whether Aquinas uses supponere in a twofold sense. The first The varieties of supposition that Aquinas uses in his theology can be taken together
part of the answer can now be given: Aquinas uses supponere in the sense of mode in this scheme88 :
of signification. There is one major difference with the logicians that we have
discussed. Aquinas links supposition not so much with substantive terms. as SUPPO~
opposed to copulation and adjective terms, but with concrete tenus, as opposed to
abstract ones. Aquinas is familiar with the distinction between supposition and MATERlALIS FORMALlS
copulation, a theory that he attributes to the saphistae", but from the frequency ~
that he mentions the distinction between abstract and concrete signification in DISCRETAISINGULARIS COMMUNIS
connection with supposition we may gather that he deems this distinction more ~
suitable for his purposes86 •

2,3 Aquinas on supposition as denotation

NATURALIS

SIMPLEX
-------............ ACClDENTALlS

PERSONALIS
~-----............
DETE:::;:IS~BILlS
Terminist logicians such as Peter of Spain, William of Sherwood and Lambert of
Auxerre treat modes of supposition as modes of denotation i.e. a tenn is
interpreted to stand either for itself, or for the concept/nature it signifies, or for
individual(s) that participate in the nature signified. The latter two even explicitly
say so, as we have seen. Their treatment of supposition consists of the construction This scheme should be read in a vertical way, such that e.g. personal supposition is
of a 'tree', in which pairs of modes are ordered hierarchically. accidental, common and formal as well, and can be either determinate, or confused
Aquinas is well acquainted with the technical names for each of the modes, used in and inunobile, or confused and mobile. Examples from the texts of Aquinas
the Logica Modernorum, even though we can only fmd a few texts in which he elucidate this scheme. They concern examples of the varieties mentioned in the left
employs these terms explicitly. On the basis of his usage of these terms, however, part of it (together with suppositio nwbilis. however cf. note 94), since those
we are able to reconstruct a scheme of varieties of supposition which is quite mentioned in the right part admit of further distinction.
similar to a scheme of medieval logic in general, reconstructed by Spade on the
basis of manuals of logic87 • suppositio materialis: cur r 0 est verbum, running is a verb89

26.1.1 ad 5; 3SN 6 prologus [157]; ScG IV 38.8; ST I 39.1 ad 2; I 39.5 ad 4; QDI1 ad 12; cf.
also the reverse: ST III 16.1; OTT I 211 [144];
85) On the distinction between suppositio and copulatio see 3SN 6 prologus [229]; 7.1.1 ad 5;
7.2.2; 12.1.1; STI 39.5 ad 5 and especially QDP 9.4.
Aquinas mentions the sophistae four times: ... sicut dicunt sophistae dictio exclusiva immobilitat
terminwn cui (ldiungitur ratione negationis implicitae. (1SN 21.1.1 ad 2); ... quia, ut sophistae
dicunt, dictio exclusiva iminobilitat terminwn cui adiungitur. ut non possit fieri sub eo descensus
pro aliquo suppositorwn. (ST I 31.3 ad 3); ... quia, ut sophistae dicunt, terminus singularis idem
signijicat et supponit (ST I 39.4 obiectum 1); ... unde sophistae dicunt quod nomina substantiva
supponunt. adiectiva vero non supponunt. sed copulant. (ST I 39.5 ad 5). So it seems that Aquinas
intends the tenninist logicians when he says sophistae;
86) The distinction between concrete and abstract modes of signification is omnipresent in
Aquinas' christology. Concrete signification is also called (in ST III): significare ut totum,
significare hahens naturam, significare in supposito, significare per modum subsistentis,
significare prout est in aliquo supposito, significare prout est in singularibus, significare quiddam
per se subsistens;
87) P. V. Spade, 1982; The distinction conjusa tanlumldistributiva, given by Spade as a
subdivision of conjusa, I have left out. The tenn conjusa tantum Aquinas does not use, and
distributive is mentioned in six texts albeit only in a general sense (STI 31.4 ad 2; 2SN 40.1.5 ad
7), or as a characterization of syncategoremata (omnis, ubique, semper; 3SN 5 expositio textus;
CMP V 21.24; ISN 37.2.3 ad 2);
88) I have found one other attempt to reproduce Aquinas' usage of the logic of supposition,
Enders. 1975, p. 79. However. Enders forms two trees, and only on the basis of the research of
Manthey and Bochenski. Enders needs two trees, since he thinks that Aquinas uses the tenns
'formal' and 'material' in opposed ways, fonnal supposition indicating sometimes suppositio
simplex and sometimes suppositio personalis. However, in those texts, and they are many, in
which the first meaning is used, Aquinas does not talk about sup p 0 sit i 0 Jonnalls, but
about teneriJormaliter, which indicates signification rather than supposition. We will return to this
when discussing the logic of reduplication. Enders omits the distinction between
discretalsingularis-communis and immobilislmobilis, and he reverses naturalislaccidentalis;
89) CPE I 5.6; other examples are:
-scioistum currere ISN38.1.5 ad 4
-dicoSocratem currere (ibidem)
-dicosolem moved (ibidem)
- hoc es t co rp us meum lCo 11.55 and Mt 26.26 - SF III 78.5; RIC XIS
[402]; REM XXVI 3 [298];
-de trah e sp 0 I i a, p ra eda re Is 8.1- CIS VIII 1 [48]
- non sci 0 e u m In 8.55 - REI VIII 8 [355]
-Socratem currere ZSN41.1.5
Aquinas does not mention the tenn suppositio materialis/formalis, but uses the phrase sumere
62 SEMAN17CS OF NAMING CHRIST
suppositio discreta: Pater et Filius sunt unus D e US, Father and Son are
one God"
suppositio naturalis: D e u s est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus, God is
Father and Son and Holy Spirit'l
suppositio simplex: D e u s creal, God creates92
suppositio determinata: D e u s generat, God brings forth"
immobiliter: Solus D e u s creat, Only God creates"
materialiter/formaliter: the distinction between a term standing for itself and a term having
supposition on the basis of its signification;
90) Compare ST 139.3 with I 39.4 obiectum 1 and its answer, and lSN 4.1.2 ad 3 where
Aquinas uses this example; the term Deus is both a common or universal and a singular term; due
to it being a singular term it is not used in plural in the example given. On the distinction between
terminus communis and terminus singularis/discreta see further lSN 21.2.1 ad 4; 3SN 1.2.4 ad 6;
cr. ST I 13.9; DP3 10; cf. supposition of Christus, e.g. 3SN 11.2 sed contra 1; 4SN 15.4.6.2 ad 1
and of iste homo, e.g. ST III 16.10-12; from this we gather that other examples might be:
-/ s t e hom 0 est Deus;
- C h r i stu s est Deus;
91) 3SN 1.2.4 ad 6; other examples are:
- Iste solus hom 0 est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus (ibidem)
- "Regi saeculorum, immortali, invisibili, soli D e o~ etc. (lTm 1.17 - STI 39.4)
- "Unus solus verus D e u sIt (Augustine - 3SN 1.2.4 ad 6)
- Hic est D e u s, et non aestimabitur alius ab ilio" (Ba 3.36 - ibidem)
Cf. also ST I 39.5; ST III 4.3; III 17.1; III 16.1; REI, I 1 [550]; these are all texts where
naturaliter is used in connection with supposition; the first text mentioned is the only text in
which suppositio accidentalis is used;
92) ST I 39.4; another example is the unusual interpretation of
Hom 0 Jactus est Deus (STIlI 16.7), and
Hom 0 est species (ST I 39.4 ad 3; DP3 10)
On the distinction between suppositio personalis and suppositio simplex see the texts mentioned,
and STI 39.6 ad 1 as well;
93) ST I 39.4 ad 3; another example gives us the exact difference:
- Pater et Filius sun! unump r inc ip i u m, ergo aut unump r inc ip i u m quod
est Pater, aut unum p r inc i p i u m quod non est Pater;
The first time principium has confused supposition, but the second and third time determinate
supposition. Therefore the argument is fallacious (ST I 36.4 ad 4, cf. ad 5 and 6). This distinction
between detenninata and confusa very much resembles the distinction between distinde and
indistincte, adduced in trinitarian contexts discussing the supposition of Deus: 1SN 4.1.2 sol. and
ad 1+2; 4.2.2 ad 4+5; 5.1.2 sol + ad 1; 21.2.2 ad 3; 24.2.2 ad 2; 29.1.4 ad 2; 3SN 1.2.4 ad 6;
STI 39.4 ad 3: III 17.1 corpus and ad 4: OCE 1.4 [63];
Sometimes the word confuse indicates the absence of the influence of a consignified time upon the
actual supposition which results in supposition for things past, present and future: 18N 43
expositio tex/us, ST I 25.5 ad 2 (both: Deus non potest facere nisi quod ius tum est); cf. also
38N 3 expositio primae partis textus; REM XXIV 3 [40]; REI XVI 6 [52];
94) STI 31.3 ad 3; ISN21.1.1 ad 2; another example:
- Salus homo est animal rationale mortale; (ibidem)
Propositions with immobile supposition do not admit of any descent to singulars, like "Only the
Holy Spirit creates" or "Only Socrates is a rational mortal animal". Aquinas doesn't give
examples of mobile supposition (Spade, 1982, p. 196: "Every man is an animaI");
CHAPTER TWO 63
I think it is justified to take natural SUpposlUon to be a part of this scheme of
varieties of actual supposition: the denotation of words used in a certain context.
The instances in which Aquinas uses this concept show that it is not merely virtual
or potential supposition, on the basis of the substantive mode of signification a
word has, abstracted from the context of the proposition in which it is used95 •
Deus in Deus est Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus actually stands for all the
'individuals' that 'participate' in the divine namre signified by the word.
This all sbows that Aquinas is well-versed in the logic of supposition and that he
employs it throughout his theology. More than merely one of his logical
instruments, it is an essential instrument. This may be illustrated from his christo-
logy.
The mystery of the Incarnaflon revolves around the nature of the union of God and
man. How is it possible that Christ is truly God and truly man? Faced with three
ways of accounting for the hypostatic union, Aquinas adheres to the second opinion
which Peter of Lombard discusses", yet which Aquinas avers to be the truth: the
same suppositum, the same person 'has' both natures. Aquinas is well aware of the
fact that the divine nature is not literally had by the Son of God. He also states
clearly that suppositum, literally meaning some sort of subordination, does not
apply literally to God". So his rational account has its limits too. The other two
opinions, however, are clearly false: one posits only an habitual union of both
natures which would endanger human salvation, while the other holds that there is
one person but two supposita. which is unthinkable. If there is one person in
Christ, there must be one and only one suppositum as well.
What is interesting here is that both opinions that Aquinas rejects can be and are
formulated in terms taken from the theory of supposition. Those who defend the
theory of an habitual union accept a signlfication of the term homo which is only
equivocal, since they deny, for fear of teaching some sort of adoption of a man and
thus endangering Christ's unity, that body and soul are mutually united. Moreover,
they think that the term Deus when used in the proposition Deus est homo only
copulates, and does not have supposition, just as Hoc album est homo, This white
thing is a man98 • This expresses in logical categories what may in metaphysical
categories be called a denial of the presence of a substantial human nature in the
Son of God Incarnate.
95) This (merely virtual) is the interpretation that De Rijk in 1971 put forward ("The
Development of 'Suppositio naturalis' in Mediaeval Logic"), following Boehner and to a certain
extent Moody. A rewritten version of this article appeared in his Middeleeuwse Wijsbegeerte.
Traditie en vernieuwing, 1977, in which he altered his interpretation of this variety that can be
encountered in Peter of Spain and Lambert of Auxerre and made a 'choice for natural supposition
indeed as a variety of actual supposition;
96) Sententiae in N Libris Distinctae, III, distinctio 6. Cf. Chapter IV 1.4;
97) ISN 34. 1.1 ad 3; cf. 3SN5.2.1 ad 3+4; STI 39.1 ad 3:
98) 3SN7.1.1 ad 5; this would also run counter to the accepted teaching that only adjectives
copulate, not substantives;
64 SEMANI1CS OF NAMING CHRIST
CHAPTER TWO 65

The other opinion says that there is only one person in Christ, but two supposits.
signified by the subject-expression? From the exposition on signification and
Thus the so-called Assumptus-Homo theory verifies the proposition Deus est homo
supposition however, we know that we cannot simply talk about signification in
as: the one who is God is the same as the one who is man. Aquinas however thinks
general, but have to ask whether it is connotation or denotation that we indicate. So
that the proper interpretation should be: the one who is God subsists essentially in a
this is another way of presenting what a theory of predication is about: does the
human nature. The predication of homo is not per identitatem but per
predicate have only signification or actual (personal) supposition as well? These
infonnationem essentialem99 .
two theories touch upon important logical and semantico-metaphysical problems.
Moreover. only the suppositum receives the predication of operations and natural
To this I must add: they touch upon important theological problems as well.
properties. and if there were a suppositum in Christ other than the eternal one, we
The logical problem that is at stake here is the problem of the relation between
would no longer be able to read Holy Scripture and predicate divine actions and
genus and species, and all that comes with it. If in a sentence homo est animal,
properties of (Chrisms) homo, nor human actions and properties of (Christus)
~nimality is regarded to inhere in the man signified, it seems that the proper order
Deus. In fact, we could no longer uphold Christ's unityHlO.
IS reversed. A genus does not inhere in a species, but a species inheres in a
genus lOI . "-
We wanted to know whether Aquinas uses supponere in a twofold sense. The first
The sem~ntico-metaphys~cal .problem which both theories exemplify is nothing less
part of the answer has been given: Aquinas uses supponere in the sense of mode of
than reahsm versus norrunahsm. If according to a nominalist view all propositions
signification. The second part may be concluded from his usage of the technical
in w~ch universal concepts are signified are to be analyzed in such a way that their
terms involved in the distinction of varieties of actual supposition: Aquinas also
truth IS based upon the world of the individuals, the proper way to do so seems to
uses supponere in the sense of a property of a (concrete) word to stand for or
reduce the universal predicate to a class of individual properties. i.e. to look for a
denote either itself, its conceptual content, or individual(s) that participate in the
denotation of the predicate.
nature signified. Supponere in Aquinas means both a certain mode of signification
There are at least two theological problems linked with the theories of
and actual denotation.
predicationlO2 • One concerns the applicability of theological propositions to God:
if propositions of the type mentioned always indicate some sort of inherence how
3. Theory of predication
can such propositions fittingly be said about God or how can God be said to 'know
these propositions, since God is simple, i.e. his being and nature are identical and
I have drawn attention above to Aquinas' analysis of the actual supposition of
since God's knowledge is not composed but simple, i.e. not discursive' but
words in the context of propositions. To those who are experts in these matters it
immediate? This kiod of question betrays in yet another way Aquinas' general
may have seemed strange that in the course of my exposition I have only taL'<:ed
about the actual supposition of words used as a subject-expression, and not about
approach to human knowledge about God: how should we cope with the fact that
our mode of signification (forming propositions of subject-term plus predicate-term)
the sup~osition of words used as a predicate-expression. They may have gathered
and our mode of understanding (by way of composing and dividing, a discursive
from thIS that the author of this book deems Aquinas to subscribe to the so-called
way) does not have the required isomorphy with God's mode of being that it does
inherence-theory of predication. They are right. Before I justify this position, let
me briefly outline the importance of this.
The theories of predication just mentioned can be presented in different ways both
of which are adequate. One could say that such a theory concerns the function of 101) The medieval definition of homo is animal rationalist in which definition animal indicates
the copula in any categorical affinnative proposition: does it state the identity of the genus and rationalis the specific difference. Together they offer a definition of the species
that which is signified by both subject- and predicate-term, or does it state the homo;
Enders attributes this 'failure' to a confusion of grammatical features with logical features (1975.
inherence of that which is signified by the predicate-expression in that which is
p. 177);
102) A third theological relevance of the logical and semantical analysis of est concernes the
99) 3SN7.1.1; cr. the textual variant given in the Moos-e<iition, p. 262, and ad 5: Et hoc est theology of the Word of God. Compare what below will be said on God's knowledge of
singuLare in materia ista, quia nunquam alibi invenitur quod sit suppositum unum essentialiter in propositions, with t~is statement of Lonergan (1967b, p. 201): "As there is an analogy of ens and
duabus naturis subsistens. Cf. par. 3 below; ~sse, so ,also t~ere IS an analog~ ~f the intelligibly proceeding est. In us est is just a thought, a
100) . ST III 2~3; cf. the demand of Cyril, bishop of Alexandria, quoted by Aquinas: Si quis Jud~ment. ~ut I? God ,not only IS lp'Sum. esse the ocean of all perfection, comprehensively grasped
persoms duabus veL subsistentiis, eas quae sun! in EvangeLicis et ApostoLicis Scripturis impartitur by lps~m zntelltgere. m complete Identity, but also perfectly expressed in a single word. That
~oees, aut de Christo a Sanetis dietas aut ab ipso de se, et quasdam quidem velut homini. praeter
word IS thought, definition. judgment and yet of the same nature as God whose substance is
IlLud ex Deo Verbum specialiter intelleeto applieat. quasdam vero velut Deo dicibiles, soli ex Deo intellect." We will discuss part of this in chapter IV on the est of christological propositions and
Patre Verbo: anathema sit; (cf. STIIII6.4 and SeG IV 38.8); part of this in chapter VI, on the theology of the Word.
A fourth point will be elaborated in Chapter V, on the being of Christ; .
66 SEMANTICS OF NAMING CHRIST
have with created modes of being? So the first theological problem concerns the
proper analysis of and the conditions of possibility for talking about God.
The second· theological problem concerns human speech about God Incarnate.
Christology elaborates these central propositions: Deus est homo and Homo est
Deus. A proper theology of the hypostatic union can only be reached when a
proper analysis of the truth-conditions of both propositions is given. The three
theories of the hypostatic union that the twelfth and thirteenth century work with all
contain such an analysis. These theories will be explained in chapter IV. For now
let it suffice to say that if one endorses the theory of identity, according to
Aquinas, one should accept the existence of two supposits in Christ. If Deus stands
for that which is God, and if homo stands for that which is a man, and if Deus est
homo thus says that that which is God is that which is a man, and if that is all that
the proposition says, the analysis is defective to the extent that it does not offer
what it should, namely rational reflection upon the unity of Christ. One is left with
two supposits that cannot but be related accidentally to each other. Thns there
would not be one person in Christ, but a union similar to the union between a man
and his clothes. Such an account of the union would endanger the very redemption
Christ brought about, since one could no longer uphold that the Son of God has
suffered (because it would equally be nonsensical to say that a man is red because
his clothes are, and maintain that one is not speaking figuratively)103. In the
course of his christological discussion Aquinas never gives the impression that he is
developing a unique logic for Christ, a special kind of analysis of propositions.
If Aquinas were to endorse an identity-theory, it would make him the very neo-
Nestorian heretic that he wants to refute. Moreover, Aquinas does not consider the
supposition of predicate-tenns to be relevant for the verification of
propositions 104 • This leads us to believe that his view on the function of the
copula is that that which is signified by the predicate-term inheres in that which the
103) My account is not only based upon ST 1II 2.6, 16 and 17, but especially on 3SN 6.1.3 ad
3 and 7.1.1;
104) From this general rule are excluded statements that express divine simplicity. E.g. lSN
5.1.1 ad 3, where Aquinas talks about the supposition of Pater in Essentia est Pater.
Consider also Aquinas' rejection of the statement Christus est solus homo: termini in praedicato
positi tenentur jormaliter, in subiecto vero materialiter. Unde hoc nomen 'homo' supponit
suppositum aeternum quod subsistit in duabus naturis et tribus substantiis, praedicat vero tanturn
naturam humanam. Unde si diceretur quod est tanturn homo, excluderetur natura omnis alia ab
humana,· et propter hoc non concedltur quod sit tantum homo (3SN 6.1.3 ad 3): Aquinas does talk
about the supposition of predicate-terms, but this supposition is not relevant for the verification of
the proposition at stake. For the supposition of predicate-terms see also 3SN 7.1.1 ad 5. However,
it does occur that pan of a predicate must be said to have supposition that indeed is relevant for
verification. Aquinas says so concerning Beata Virgo est Mater Dei (3SN 4.2.2; ST III 35.4 ad
3): Dei supposits for one of the divine persons, i.e. the Son of God. The proposition cannot be
verified as saying that either the Father or the Spirit, or divine nature were born from Mary. A
similar analysis would apply to Deus genuit D e u m (= Deus est genitor Del), or even Christus
est Filius Dei. This analysis is compatible with my view on Aquinas' predilection for the theory
of inherence since no identity results from the supposition itself of parts of these predicates;
CHAPTERIWO 67
subject-tenn stands for. Aquinas uses a theory of inherence. In this I agree with
Enders, Geach, Pinborg and Moody, and disagree with De Rijk, Malcolm and
Muller, who either say that Aquinas adheres to an identity-theory (Muller), or that
Aquinas sometimes uses the one, and sometimes the other (De Rijk, Malcolm)'os.
When we discuss the logic of reduplication in the next section, another important
argument in favour of the theory of inherence will be brought to the fore: Aquinas'
general rule that predicates should be taken formally, i.e. significative only, and
subject-terms materially. i.e. 'suppositing'.
4. The logic of reduplicative statements
One of Aquinas' most fre'luent axioms when dealing with propositions about God
or Christ is that praedicata tenentur !ormaliter, et subiecta materialiter (see note
82). Some have interpreted this as fonnal and material suppositionl06 • I doubt the
correctness of this interpretation. The axiom is used most regularly when the
employment of christological reduplicative statements is to be considered, and its
function consists in distinguishing between the signification and the (personal)
supposition of the reduplicative term. The logic of reduplication therefore forms an
important connection between christology and the discernment of modes of
signification. It corroborates an important connection between christology and one
of the origins of the theory of supposition as well: the treatment on fallacies '07 •
A reduplicative term is a term that totally or partly repeats the form or nature
signified by the subject-term of a proposition. E.g. 'A human being in so far as it
is human is a rational being', or . A human being in so far as it is animal is
endowed with senses'. The reduplicative term, 'in so far as it is x', fulfils the
function of specifying the signification of the subject-term and of indicating the way
in which the predicate-term is related to the subject-term.
The definition just given presupposes that the proper interpretation of a
105) H. Enders, 1975, pp. 103-107: P.T. Geach, 1950: J. Pinhorg, 1972, p. 53 and 88f: E.A.
Moody, 1953, p. 36f; L.M. de Rijk, 1970h; 1. Malcolm, 1979: K. Muller, 1983, pp. 9611491205:
See on the same object: J. Trentmann, 1968; C. Dufour, 1989, p. 60ff; M.M. Tweedale, 1982;
Both Pinborg and De Rijk consider the explanation of the function of the copula to be the nucleus
of any theory of supposition: "Die Suppositionsiehre ist demnach nieht mehr und nieht weniger als
ein Versuch, die Probleme der Bedeutung der Kopula 'est' in kategorischen bejahenden Satzen
und dadurch die pradikativen Beziehungen von Subjekt und Priidikat zu bewaltigen." (De Rijk,
1970h, p. 5f).
The position that I adopt now is different from the one I assumed in my article "The ineffable
being ofChrist...", 1991;
106) Enders, 1975, p. 79; Manthey, 1937 p. 85 and 184: Bochensld, 1956, p. 189:
107) Cf. DP3 11 and the Tractatus of Peter of Spain, VII, 120·, (p. 157ft). Both authors (cf.
however note 11) devote attention to what they call the fallacy secundum quid et simpliciter. There
is a striking resemblance between the two works, and examples used in Aquinas' 3SN are to be
found in these works as well (Aethiops secundum dentem est album; Homo secundum capiUos est
crispus);
68 SEMANTICS OF NAMING CHRIST
reduplicative term is always a 'formal' and not a 'material' one. It means that
ordinarily the reduplicative term repeats (part of) the form signified by the subject-
term. However, it is possible that sometimes it should be accepted as material, i.e.
as denoting that which is denoted by the subject-term. This occurs e.g. when a
demonstrative is added to the reduplicative term: Socrates in so far as he is this
human being is an individual.
So, when a reduplicative term is properly interpreted, it is taken formally. In that
case a per se nota-relationship between subject-term/reduplicative term and
predicate-term is posited, i.e. the predicate is subsumed under the definition of
what is signified by the subject-term. E.g. 'rational' is part of the defutition of
'human being', and for this reason the first example mentioned above is an
example of a proper reduplicative proposition. A sign of this 'properness' is that
the proposition is true even without the reduplicative term added: a human being is
a rational being.
There are however reduplicative statements that are only true because they contain
a reduplicative expression. Whiteness can absolutely be said of a man, and it can
also be said of his hair. If one wishes to express the latter, one says: This man
according to his hair is white. Without the reduplicative expression the meaning of
the statement alters. For this reason this statement is improper and only figurative.
There also is no per se nota-relationship between predicate-term and subject-
term/reduplicative tenntOs.
Christology discusses all reduplicative forms mentioned, and the first task for the
logic of reduplication therefore is to present each reduplicative statement with its
own logical value and to distinguish the one from the other. E.g. Christus
secundum quod homo est Deus is false, because the reduplicative term should be
interpreted as formal, and of the human nature of Christ divinity cannot be
predicated. The union of both natures in Christ would be a natural union instead of
a personal union. On the other hand Christus secundum quod iste homo est Deus is
true, because the demonstrative 'pulls' the reduplicative term to its supposit, the
supposit of Christ per se being God (ST III .16.11). If the demonstrative is lacking,
a material interpretion is possible, but less proper (ST 16.10).
The enunciation Christus secundum quod homo habet gratiam unionis, Christ in so
far as he is human possesses the grace of the union (ST III 16.11 ad 1), is proper
and true, because it is Christ's human nature that is ordered to the personal union
108) On the per se nota-relationship between subject-tenn and predicate-tenn see also 3SN
10.1.1.2 and 10.1.2.3, in which Aquinas gives the following overview:
Homo ratiocinatur per se
Iste Homo est Deus per se
Homo est animal album non per se
Homo albus est animal per se.
The predicate-tenn need not fit all that is in the subject-tenn. All that is in the predicate-tenn
however should fit the subject-tenn. Consider also 3SN 11.4 ad 6: reduplicatio exigit locutionem
per se veram;
CHAPTER TWO 69
with the Son of God. And yet this proposition differs from e.g. Christus secundum
quod homo est animal, because it does belong to the definition of homo to be
animal, but it does not belong to the defutition of h011W to be endowed with the
grace of the union. Besides, one has to say that grace does not come to a nature
but to a person, just as a nature cannot be said to perform an operation, but only a
person who subsists in a certain nature is said to do this or that. The reduplicative
tem of the proposition just mentioned does not indicate a per se nota-relationship
between the reduplicative term and the predicate-term, but indicates the ground for
the attribution of something to Christ. The words used are ratione naturae
humanae or divinae. As a human being Christ possesses all that belongs to the
definition of humanity, and besides that some things (think of e.g. preaching, being
in a certain place at a certain time etc.) are said of Christ according to his human
nature. In the last case we are not dealing with a predicate that is logically
consequential to the affIrmation of Christ's true humanity, but with a concrete
historical fact, e.g. Christus secundum quod homo est passus.
On the other hand we encounter true but improper reduplicative statements as well.
Christus secundum quod homo est creatura is the best example. The statement
would be false without reduplicative term. On the other hand Christus secundum
quod h011W est natus would be true even without reduplicative term (3SN 11.2 ad
5). What is the difference? It is the same difference that exists between Aethiops est
albus, secundum dentem and Homo est crispus, secundum capillos. The first
without reduplicative tenn is false, since no dark person is white. The second can
be true even without reduplicative tenn, since it is a matter of course that curling
never applies to a human being as such, and that it is implied that we are talking
about someone's hair when we say that a man is curling. The same goes for Christ:
since some did imagine that Christ was a creature, as the Arians did, the predicate
'created being' can be thought to fit both the person of Christ and his human
nature .. To a certain extent, inasmuch as being created is something absolute,
somethmg that concerns the act of being as such, it would even be more likely to
predicate it of a person than to predicate it of a nature. Being in this sense is only
said of a nature in so far as the supposit subsists in that nature (3SN 11.2). For this
reason creatura is not like crispus but like albus, and the proposition Christus
secundum quod honw est creatura is a true but improper and figurative
reduplicative statement109 .
109) . There is more at stake here however, as Aquinas indicates in 3SN 11.2 ad 2. The being of
somethmg does not belong to the definition of its nature, to its quiddity. Therefore being is not a
concept that is 'superior' to the concept of humanity, in the sense that humanity is contained in the
concept of being, like humanity is contained in the concept of animality. So, if the reduplicative
tenn usually only repeats (part of) the fonn signified by the subject-expressio~, and being carulOt
belong to any fonn, the least we should say about this proposition is that it contains a quite
unusual reduplication. In Aquinas' exposition this is part of the argument why he subscribes to
Peter of Lombard, who says that this is a figurative and improper enunciation. Cf. chapter V;
70 SEMANTICS OF NAMING CHRIST
So the first function of the logic of reduplication is to distinguish fonnal and
material reduplicative terms, and proper and improper reduplicative statements.
Using this method one can prevent the wrong interpretation of biblical
erlUociations. and one can prevent arguments from being fallacious llO .
There is a second function as well, and this function is typically christological ll1 :
it has to do with the logic of discourse about Christ. Theologians search for
possibilities of indicating that a certain property or a certain operation is not
predicated of Christ according to this nature, but according to that nature. If they
do not possess a logic of reduplication, the temptation will be to impart the subject-
term with this function. Theologians start sorting out subject-terms according to
their signification: 'Jesus' means the human nature, 'Son of God' divine nature,
'Son of Man' human nature, 'Christ' both etc. Whatever Aquinas can say with
Christus secundum quod homo est creatura, they will say with Filius hominis est
crealUra. Perhaps some of the theologians will even start speaking about substantial
and accidental supposition of the subject-tenns. The substantial supposition of
Filius hominis will be the individual human nature of Christ, and the accidental
supposition the divine person and the divine nature of Christ. From this only a very
small step separates these theologians from positing a double suppositum in Christ.
All of this in fact did happen during the second half of the twelfth and the first half
of the thirteenth century, as we will see below, chapter IV. Aquinas, on the
contrary, sticks to the identical supposition of all SUbject-terms with which Christ
can be named ll2 , and because of that does not run the risk of losing Christ's
unity. The logic of reduplication offers him the opportunity to exclude any mixing
of the natures, to express the abiding distinction between Creator and creation, and
yet hold on to Christ's personal unity ll3.
110) The best example of this in the writings of Aquinas is his conunentary on 'one of the first
sentences of Paul's letter to the Romans, in which he determines the meaning of the qui est
praedestinatus using the theory of supposition and the logic of reduplication, and in which he
raises questions in which fallacious arguments are exposed (CRO I 3 [225]). If one compares 3SN
7, that deals with est. Jactus est. praedestinatus est, with the conunentary on Romans, one
discovers inunediately that the apparent independent logical treatment of the Scriptum is in fact an
exegesis of this part of the letter to the Romans;
111) Here I follow W. H. Principe, 1963, p. 132;
112) ST III 35.4: Omne nomen significans in concreto naturam aliquam, potest supponere pro
qualibet hypostasi illius naturae. Cum autem unto incarnationis sit Jacta in hypostasi, ....
manifestum est quod hoc nomen Deus potest supponere pro hypostasi habente humanam naturam
et divinam. Et ideo quidquid convenit divinae naturae vel humanae, potest attribui illi personae:
sive secundum quod pro eo supponit nomen stgnijicans divinam naturam; sive secundum quod pro
eo supponit nomen signijicans humanam naturam. Cf. ST III 3.6 ad 3;
113) Quamvis igitur non distinguantur ea quae praedicantur- de Christo, distinguuntur tamen
quantum ad id secundum quod utrumque praedicatur. Nom ea quae sunt divinae naturae,
praedicantur de Chris/U secundum divinam naturam,' ea autem quae SUn! humanae naturae,
praedicantur de eo secundum humanam naturam STIlI 16.4;
CHAPTER TWO 71
Conclusion
In the begimting of this chapter I gave a scheme designed by Dufour. It fulfilled
the. ne~ of an initial .schem~, but now we are in a position to formulate the way in
which It should be adjusted m order for it to be applicable to Aquinas' situation.
C universale
modus
signi-
ficandP
[-sigm-
ficandi2
[Sigmficatio
suppositiol .....
,
-"
essentia
existentia
] modus
essendi
modus
inteIligendi
suppositio 2
C singulare
:,-quinas in fact employs two concepts of supposition. One is virtual supposition,
I.e. the concrete mode of signification of a substantive term makes the word fit to
stand for one or more of the individuals of the class of things that cOnfonn to the
definition of the meaning, the connotation of the word. This is supposition(I).
Whether this vi;tual supposition becomes actual (personal) supposition depends
upon the act of Judg~ent of the speaker and the context within the proposition of
the word. The vtrtualtty tS expressed by the broken line. Supposition(2) concerns
the ac~~l s~pposition of a term that either stands for a nature or concept
(sUpPOSltlO Simplex, not expressed in the scheme) or for individuals contained in
the class signified. A fitting mode of signification, just as signification itself, is
presupposed. for this semantic function.
There is yet another adjustment to be made, that is shown in the scheme by
expressmg two mearungs of modus signijicandi. Sometimes Aquinas employs this
t~rm In a concrete way to indicate grammatical modes of signification: e.g. the
dIfferences between word-classes, the consignification of words, the difference
between concrete and abstract, and the difference between subject-and predicate-
te~ (the. latter being a logical distinction as well). To this employment of 'mode of
stgmficatlO~' belongs the distinction between signification and supposition(l). This
IS modus slg~ijicandl(2). However, being the theologian he is, Aquinas transposes
£I:e .gr~mmaUcal co~ceptlon of modes of signification to the human faculty of
Slgrufymg as ~uch, m the face of the impossible task to speak adequately about
God. SUpposltlOn(2) belongs to this faculty, since it articulates one element of it.
This transposition has the immediate result of exposing the 'accidentality' of human
speech about God, and brings out the distinction between all modes of signification
and GOd: the res signijicata. Th: proper way to do theology is to put the awareness
of this dlstmctlOn to work; not m the sense that one could 'take a look' at the res
and discover fitting words for it, since it is impossible to step outside the world of
human understanding and signification, but in the sense that human. speech about
72 SEMANTICS OF NAMING CHRIST CHAPTER TWO 73

God should always be accompanied by and founded on the negation for God of all treatment de nominibus Christi, focusing upon 'meaning', and consequently we will
that cannot fit the perfect beginning and end of all things. That starts with the attend to Aquinas' doctrine of the hypostatic union, focusing upon 'reference' in
negation of the implication of plurality and distinction that the multiple and the the serrno de Christo.
distinctive use of words has. There is only one word that perfectly expresses God;
it is the Word of God itself. The semantic property of supposition fulfils a special
role here, because it is the one element in meaningful language that focuses upon
the designation of that which is unique, which is' singular. Aquinas' general
treatment of divine names, concentrating on similarity and dissimilarity between
names for God and names for created things, does not explicitly focus upon
uniqueness as such. However. that treatment is familiar with the notion of
supposition to the extent that both supposition and analogous use of language in
final analysis depend upon the intentionality of the one speaking. There is no apt
speech of God without the love of the union of grace, without its being grounded in
a movement of faith (back and) forth to God, without an attentive, intelligent,
reasonable and responsible judgment (Lonergan) 1l4. Supposition focuses on this
judgment, since it studies the truth-conditions of propositions. the logical function
of the copula, and the correspondence between est and ipsum esse. The uniqueness
of the One talked about and to be talked about requires the study of the semantics
of supposition, and in Aquinas we recognize this best in his senno de Christo. The
Son of God and human nature ar~ one in this singular event, in this singular
person. The logic of supposition teaches one, on the level of reflection upon
linguistics, how to deal with this slngularity.

In chapter I we drew attention to Aquinas' all-pervading notion of mysterium, and

discovered that it expresses an analogy of mode of signification and res signijicata,
at work in contexts as different as the articles of faith, the sacrament of the
Eucharist, (the spiritual reading of) Scripture and christology. Now we have
studied the distinction in its own right, trying to understand what Aquinas has to
say about modes of signification in a grammatical and a logical vein, and how he
puts this to work in the atelier of theology. We have, up till now, only dwelt on
the latter inasmuch as it was necessary for the understanding of the grammatical
and logical theories themselves. The next two chapters will be devoted entirely to
their christological employment. First we will discuss what I would like to call the

114) cf. Burrell, 1979, p. 67: "Whether we use perfection expressions· properly when we use
them of God depends on an acquired skill: knowing how to respect the grammatical difference
which logic demands for discourse in divinis. Genuinely learning how to respect these
difference[s], however, is more than just a matter for logic. That task requires the disciplines
traditionally associated with religious living and practice. For attending to differences, we must
call upon the metaphorical resources of analogous tenus. And the formation of apt metaphors is a
matter for sensitivity, not for science. At this point rules other than grammatical ones are needed.
Of these Aquinas has nothing to say. He exhibits his adherence to them, however, by his manner
of pursuing the questions he raises, and especially by not raising certain others. Aquinas displays
his religious diSCipline most clearly by the ease with which he is able to endure so unknown a
God";

CHAPTER III
THE NAMES OF CHRIST NAMING THE 'NAME' OF GOD
In this cbapter we now focus upon the role of 'meaning' in signifying Christ.
First I will show that in Aquinas' writings there is an implicit practical dealing with
the names of Christ. The same rules that are used in the treatises on naming God,
i.e. concerning the analogical usage of names, are applied. Second, I will study the
two major sources Aquinas had for his treatises on naming God, Peter of Lombard
and Pseudo-Dionysius, and show how the names of Christ form part of their
discussions. This will enable us to discover the presence of Christ in Aquinas'
treatises as well. We will discover the importance of the first biblical reference in
the treatise on naming God: "What is his name, and what is the name of his Son;
do you know?" (Pr 30.4)'.
1. The names of Christ, the one who is the 'name' of God
Let me first give some initial distinctions that may help the reader to understand
what follows.
a) In Aquinas' writings, e.g. in the Summa Theoiogiae, ther.e is a distinction
between trinitarian theology and christology. Trinitarian theology is examined in
the Prima Pars (qq. 27-43), and christology in the Tertia Pars (qq. 1-59). This
entails that some names of Christ are treated in trinitarian theology (e.g. Word,
Image, Son of God), and some in christology (e.g. Mediator, Lamb, Son of man).
The first type of name is attributed to Christ by reason of the divine person he is,
and the second type by reason of his human nature. There also is a third type of
name, i.e. those that are predicated of Christ because of his divine nature; they are
names that are not bound to the person of Christ but are applied to the divine
nature as such (e.g. Wisdom, Saviour, Lord). Some of these names may be said to
be "appropriated" to the person of Christ, since they especially fit the proper work
of this person (e.g. Wisdom, Saviour), whereas others are merely names that Christ
shares with the Father and the Spirit (e.g. Lard). It is important to keep these
distinctions in mind, because they bring home how parts of the full picture of
Christ are introduced at different places in Aquinas' theology, so to concentrate
solely on what is called Aquiuas' christology' would be insufficient. For example,
when Christ is called doctor, one has to pay attention to the teaching of Christ to
the crowds and the disciples, but one has to have recourse to the idea of divine
truth and its relationship to human truth as well. The term 'christology' is
misleading to the extent that the part of the ST that usually is identifIed with it
1) STI 13.1 obiectum 1;
2) My employment of the word 'christology' does not limit its range to the examination of
the person of Christ, but is extended to his work as well;
CHAPTER THREE 75
contains only part of the answer to the question 'who is ChriSt'?3 As we will see,
however. it does not mean that only names pertinent to Christ's life on earth are
mentioned in the tenia pars.
b) Having explained the differences between signification and supposition, and
especially the differences between the supposition of words for themselves (Le.
self-reference), and for things contained in the class they signify (suppositio
materialis Le. self-reference and suppositio personalis). the reader will be familiar
with the manifold interpretation of enunciations like: "Jesus is the name of God".
Such an enunciation may be true because Jesus refers to itself as a name, has
material supposition. In fact the better way to write it would be: "Jesus is the name
of God": God is Jesus. Such an enunciation may also be true because Jesus refers
to the person of Christ, has personal supposition. In that case the enunciation says
that Christ reveals who G~d is. The word 'name' has turned into a metaphor, for
which reason the better way to write it would be: "Jesus is the 'name' of God".
Such an enunciation may also be interpreted to attribute the meaning of Jesus, i.e.
'Saviour', either to the name Jesus itself, or to Christ. In the first case the
interpretation would go along with material supposition: "Saviour is the name of
God". In the second case it would combine with personal supposition: "This
saviour is the 'name' of God" .
In sum:
"Jesus is the name of God":
material supposition: 1) Jesus is the name of God
2) Saviour is the name of God
personal supposition: 3) Jesus is the 'name' of God
4) This Saviour is the 'name' of God
This distinction will be needed when we study Aquinas' discussion of the names of
Christ, who is presented as the 'name' of God.
1.1 Some historical notions
To some it may come as a surprise, but there is a long and steady-flowing tradition
of attention given to the names of Christ. I know of only one, albeit impressive,
monograph on the subject, apart from some modern ones: Fray Luis de Leon's De
los nombres de Christo'. This Spanish Augnstinian friar (1528-1591), one of the
great minds of the Spanish humanist renaissance of the 16th century, wrote a three
3) ct. the prologue of the Tertia Pars: ...primo considerandum occurrit de ipso
Salvatore ... Circa primum duplex consideratio occurrit: prima est de ipso incarnationis mysterio,
secundum quod Deus pro nostra salute Jactus est homo; secunda de his quae per ipsum
Salvatorem nostrum, idest Deum incarnatum. sun! acta et passa (ST III proi). The Tertia Pars
considers the names related to his incarnation and to the history of his life on earth, not those
related to his person or divinity. The latter are presupposed in this treaunent;
4) published in Salamanca, 1583 and 1585; Ed. de Cristobal Cuevas. Madrid 1977. English
translation: The Names of Christ, translation and introduction by Manuel DurAn and William
Kluback, Ramsey/London 1984;
76 NAMES OF CHRIST
volume dialogue on the subject. However, the study of this brilliant work has
shown that it is the culmination point of a tradition that dates back to the early
Christian writings of the fathers of the church'. The fathers, with their predilection
for an allegorical or typological reading of Scripture, were very much mterested In
the many names of Christ that are identified in Scripture, especially in the Old
Testament. This exegetical interest was not isolated. It served the purpose of
theology. i.e. of understanding person and work of Christ, and the pu~ose of
apologetics, in refuting heretical opinions about Christ. It also ser~ed f:he mte,rests
of prayer, because it provided the church with words for address~ Its SaVIOur,
and the interests of catechesis, since the names are good summarIes of essential
features of Christ. Walter Repges mentions many fathers who have, in one way or
another, discussed names of Christ, some of whom were very influential in the
Middle Ages: Origen (c.185-c.254), John Chrysostome (c.345-407), Hilary of
Poitiers (c.315-367), the Decretum Gelasianum, Ambrose (c.339-397), Jerome
(331137-419/20), Augustine (354-430), Fulgentius of Ruspe (467-533), ?rego~ the
Great (c.540-604) and Isidor of Sevilla (c.560-636)'. The one last mentIOned listed
some sixty biblical names of Christ. Apart from this, a number of early Christian
prayers and hymns is known that contains remarkable series of names of Christ'.
In the Middle Ages Bernard of Clairvaux (d. 1153) delivered a sermon called de
varUs Christi nominibus on the occasion of the feast of Christ's circumcision, and
another sennon entitled De nominibus Salvatoris 8• Scholastic theology addresses
names of Christ in the wider context of divine names, whereas medieval spirituality
produced several liturgical hymns9, prayers lO , inscriptions and blessings in which
5) Walter Repges, 1959. Cf. also Colin P. Thompson, 1988, p. 17lf.;
6) Repges, 1959. pp. 226-315;
7) Repges, 1959, pp. 235-243;
8) resp. PL 183, 136-137 and 183,676-<>77;
9) This sequence entitled De nominibus Dei was widely known in the 11th century:
Alma chorus domini nunC panga! nomina summi: Alleluia.-
Messias soter, emmanuel, sabaoth, adonai,
Est unigenitus. via, vita, manus, homousion,
Principium, primogenitus, sapientia, virtus,
Alpha, caput, finisque simul vocitatur et est 0,-
Fons et origo boni, paraclitus ac mediator,
Agnus, ovis, vitulus, serpens, aries, leo, vennis,-
Os, verbUm, splendor, sol, gloria, lux et imago,
Panis. fios, vitis, mons, janua, petra lapisque,-
Angelus et sponsus, pastorque propheta, sacerdos,
Athanatos, kyrios, theos, pantocrator, iesus,-
Salviflcet nos, sit cui saec{u]la per omnia doxa.
Cited in Repges, 1959, p. 324;
10) Cf. the so-called prayer of the seventy-two names of God, also called the prayer of the
seventy-two names of Christ, which is already alluded to in Perceval (Chretien of Troyes, s~nd
half twelfth century) and in an anonymous novel called Flamenca (Provence, France), and which
is found in Italian, Latin, French and German versions: Domine Jesu Christe, flU Dei, miserere
mei et defende me N. famulum tuum hodie et cotidie, omni nocte et omni tempore ab omnibus
CHAPTER T1lREE 77
a specific consideration of the names of Christ occurs. From the beginning of the
fifteenth century dates a litany of the Name of Jesus (Bembardin of Sienna or John
of Capestrano?), that on January 16, 1886 was approved of by Pope Leo XIII for
use by the entire church11 •
1.2 Names of Christ in the 'Tertia Pars'"
The New Testament itself contains very many names of Christ. Depending upon
the way one lists synonyms, the number runs above seventy. Taylor13
distinguishes among the most prominent names and titles and the rest. The most
prominent, i.e. the ones that are mentioned many times and/or in a prominent way,
and by many or all wri~rs, are: Jesus, Filius Joseph, Filius Mariae, Rabbi
(Magister, Praeceptor), Propheta, Christus, Filius David, Filius Hominis,
ServuslPuerlFilius, Dominus, Filius Dei (Unigenitus)14. The rest Taylor
subdivides in a category of messianic titles, a category of messianic and communal
names, a category of soteriological titles, and a category of christological titles
proper. Messianic titles are: Rex, Qui venturus est, Sanctus, Justus, Iudex, Leo de
Tribu Juda, Radix et Genus David, Stella splendida et matutina, Qui habet clavem
David. Messianic and communal names are: Sponsus, Pastor, AuctorlPrincipium,
Lapis, Caput, Vitis vera. Soteriological titles are; Salvator, Mediator,
PontifexlSacerdos, AgnuslPascha, ParaclelUS, Propitiatio. Christological titles
proper are: Imago Dei, Splendor Gloriae, Lux Mundi, Panis Vitae, Ostiumllanua
Ovium, Resurrectio et Vita, Via- Veritas-et- Vita, Primogenitus, Virtus et Sapientia
dampnis et perditionibus + Sother + Emmanuel + Sabbaoth + Adonay + Panthon + Crathon
+ Thetragramaton + Yslkros + Agyos + ymas + eleyson + 0 Theos + Athanatos + Alpha et
Omega + Vermis + Vimlus + Leo + Ovis + Aries + Agnus + Homo + Usyon + Scorpius +
Primus + Novissimus + Summus pater + Filius + Sother + (Spiritus) Sanctus + Trinl{S +
Creator omnium rerum + Deus sanctus + et eternus, principium. finis, salva me ab omnibus
malis et adversitatibus. Amen. This is an abbreviated version cited in Repges, 1959, p. 331;
11) in these words: Jesu, fiU Dei vivi; J, splendor Patris, J, candor lucis aeternae, J, rex
gloriae, J, sol lustitiae, J, flU Mariae Virginis, J, amabilis, J, admirabilis, J, Deus fortis, J, pater
futuri saeculi, J, magni consilii Angele, J, potentissime, ], obedientissime, J, mitis et humilis
corde, J, amator castitatis, J, amator noster, J, Deus pacis, J, auctor vitae, J, exemplar virtutum,
J, zelator animarum, J. Deus noster, J, rejugium nostrum, J, pater pauperum, J, thesaurus
fidelium, J, bone pastor, J, lux vera, J, sapientia aeterna, J, bonitas injinita, J, via et vita nostra,
J, gaudium Ange[orum, J. rex Patriarcharum, J, magister Apostolorum, J, doctor Evangelistarum,
J, fortitudo Martyrum, J, lumen Confessorum, J, puritas Virginum, J, corona Sanctorum omnium.
Repges, 1959, p. 3351;
12) i.e. ST III qq. 1-59. The names that I will mention serve the purpose of giving an
impression of the way in which they figure in Aquinas' reflection. Therefore all lists given in this
chapter do not pretend to be exhaustive;
13) V. Taylor, 1953;
14) For brevity's sake I skip the Greek version of the names, and their English translations,
but mention the names as Aquinas read them. Sometimes the Vulgate and the Greek original
differ. These differences are dealt with implicitly. A list of names mentioned and translated into
English can be found in the appendix to this chapter, p. 107ff;
78 NAMES OF CHRIS7
Dei. Novissimus Adam, Alpha et Omega, Primus et Novissimus, Principium et
Finis, Dilectus, Verbum. Amen.
This list, however, is not complete. Mussner" adds at least the following:
Nazare(n)us, Deus, Secundus Homo de Caeloleaelestis, Spiritus, Apostolus, Figura
Substantiae, Episcopus, Messias, Advocatus, Rex Regum et Dominus Dominantium,
Testis fidelis, Verus, Fidelis et Verax.
These lists give an impression of all the substantive and adjective terms and all the
descriptive phrases that can be considered to be names of Christ. Most of these
names have a certain background in the Old Testament and! or the literature from
the intertestamental period and/or the oral tradition. Whoever studies these names
today travels the same road that the writers of the New Testament took when they
searched for words for this unique person. All names indicate the fulfIlment of the
promise.
What would Aquinas say of this list and this classification? The classification would
certainly not be his. We will return to this later, but it is clear that names such as
Verbum and Imago Dei are most of all trinitarian names of him, and 'messianic' in
its typical historical meaning is not a category that we would encounter in Aquinas.
On the basis of the names that Aquinas mentions in the Tenia Pars, we can
suppose that Aquinas would criticize the list for omitting Filius Abrahae, Oblatio et
Hostia, Fundamentum (Ecclesiae), Consummator, Emmanuel, and he would insist
on names that in the strict sense are not nouns: Praedestinatus, Dextera Patris. If
we compare the names that Taylor and Mussner mention, totalling to a number of
about seventy, with the names that Aquinas in the Tertia Pars mentions, we
discover that Aquinas quotes more than fifty of these in his expositions! Some
names he omits. Episcopus, Magister, Paracletus and Spiritus are omitted,
probably for obvious reasons of confusion. Hebrew names are omitted as well:
RabbilRabbouni, Messias. Some names are treated elsewhere: Imago Dei. And of
some (almost) synonymous expressions, only one is mentioned and the other not:
Secundus Homo and Novissimus Adam, Primogenitus and Praecursor. The only
names the absence of which seems to be important are Sponsus and all names taken
from the book of Revelation. However, Aquinas' commentary on Isaiah
compensates for this l6 .
The most important difference between the names of Christ that Aquinas in fact
uses in the Tertia Pars and the names that Taylor and Mussner come up with, are
the names of Christ that are the fruit of Aquinas' spiritual reading of the Old
Testament, independent of the spiritual reading which the writers of the New
Testament themselves have done. In chapter I we emphasized the importance of
this reading secundum mysterium, i.e. secundum mysterium Christi, and now we
15) F. Mussner, s.v. Jesus-pradikate, LexikonfUr Theologie und Kirche;
16) Alpha" Omega: ClS XLI [45J and XLIV [48J: Amen: ClS XXV [IDOJ: Primus et
Novissimus: as LlII [150J: Sponsus: as VII 2 [250J: XLI [175J; LXII [25J. All occurrences are
quotations from the New Testament;
CHAPTER THREE 79
encounter one of its fruits: Doctor, Redemptor, Sol Iustitiae, Ascensor Caeli et
Auxiliator Tuus, Fons Sapientiae, Colonus, Viator, Admirabilis, Consiliarius,
Fortis, Pater futuri Saeculi, Princeps Pacis, Accelera spolia detrahe festina
praedari, Oriens. The names of Christ are not only the ones mentioned in the New
Testament, but the ones mentioned in the Old Testament as well.
All names are not of equal importance to Thomas. The Tenia Pars is headed under
the names Salvator (the Latin translation of Jesus) and Via Veritatis (cf. the
prologne). In the Tertia Pars itself Aquinas employs mostly Filius Dei, Filius
Hominis, Verbum Dei, Verbum Incarnatum, 'Jesus, Chnstus and Dommus. The
names Filius Dei and Filius Hominis are, conforming to Patristic use, reserved for
the signification of the- ~son of Christ according to his divine nature and his
'human nature respectively. The doctrine of two natures, examined in the beginning
of the Tertia Pars, is to be considered as an explanation of both names, and of the
name Verbum Incarnatum as well. However, this is only implicitly the case. In fact
there are several ways in which the names of Christ are examined:
a) discussion of the fittingness of the imposition of a name. This only occurs
when the name Jesus is examined in ST III 37.2;
b) discussion of the meaning of a name imposed. This occurs frequently. Many
questions centre around a certain biblical name of Christ: Caput (III 8), Deus and
Homo (III 16), Sacerdos, Pontifex, Hostia, Propitiator, Agnus (III 22),
Praedestinatus (III 24), Secundus homo (ex Adam) (III 31.1), Filius Abrailae, Filius
David (III 31.2), Filius Joseph, Filius Mariae (III 31.3), Primogenitus (III 37.3),
Iudex (III 59), Doctor (III 7.7, 42), Redemptor (III 48.5), Propitiatio (III 47.3;
48.2), Ianua (III 49.5), Ascensor Coeli et Auxiliator Thus (III 57.2). Sedens ad
dexteram Dei Patris (III 58), Propheta (III 7.8) and Auctor et Consummator Fidei
(III 7.3).
c) discussion of an aspect of Christ's person and work. part of which is
signified by a certain biblical name. In this case biblical quotations that contain a
certain name function as a key to the answer of the question, but one cannot say
that the name itself is the object of investigation.
We will first pay attention to the second way mentioned. in considering the name
Mediator, and continue with Aquinas' explanation of the fittingness and
signification of the name Jesus l1 . This will lead us to consider the very special
way in which the names of Christ emerge in the commentary on the Psabns and on
Isaiah. This provokes an examination of Christ as the 'name' of God and of the
connection between names of Christ and love, praise and promise.
17) The third type of examination of the names of Christ I will not elaborate by studying
examples from the Tertia Pars. but will be elucidated in my discussion of those names in Aquinas'
commentary on Isaiah, cf. below p. 85ff.;
80 NAMES OF CHRIST
1.3 'Mediator'
The examination of Christ's function of mediator (ST III 26), starts out with a
telling phrase: "Next we consider the fact that Christ is called the mediator between
God and human beings."18 If the vantage point is not clear enough, the argument
sed contra, the determinatio and the third answer of the first question will end all
doubt: "... and there is only one mediator between God and human beings, himself
a human being, Christ Jesus" (!Tm 2.5); "Christ is mediator" says the Gloss on Ga
3.20. The vantage point is formed by a name of Christ mentioned in the New
Testament. Of this name Aquinas asks two questions. The first is whether the
function of mediator is something particular to Christ, the second whether this
name is to be attributed to Christ because of his human nature. Leaning on Paul's
enunciation that only one is mediator between God and human beings, namely
Christ, Aquinas answers the first question affirmatively: according to the full,
perfect signification of the word only Christ is called mediator. Only Christ,
through his death, has united and reconciled God and humankind. Others are said
to be mediator as well, but only according to a certain aspect of the meaning of
that word, only in a certain respect, i.e. dispositive et ministerialiter. in the manner
of preparation and not principally. Prophets and priests of the Old Testament can
be called mediators, inasmuch as they have foretold and prefigured the perfect
mediator. The priests of the New Law can be called mediators because they are
servants of the one mediator. and dispense his sacrament.s in his stead. Angels-, in
the ontological hierarchy occupying a place in the middle between God and human
beings, and serving Christ, can be called mediators too. Part of the office of
mediator is to intercede for us with God,. and this the Holy Spirit does as well (cf.
Rm 8.26). Unlike the prophets, the priests and the angels, however, the Holy Spirit
cannot be called mediator, because the Spirit, unlike Christ according to his human
nature, is in all things equal to God.
This calls for the second question, whether the name is attributed to Christ
according to his human nature. It illustrates the function that the doctrine of two
natures has concerning the names of Christ: to explain the way in which these
names apply. To be a mediator, Aquinas says, involves two things: to be in the
middle, and to be invested with the office of binding together, which consists in
conferring upon the other what belongs to the one. Neither will suit Christ
according to his divine nature. According to his divine nature the Son does not
differ from the Father or the Spirit. neither in essence nor in power. On the other
hand, Father and Spirit do not differ from the Son to the extent that the latter
would be able to give something that does not belong to him but only to Father and
Spirit. So both aspects of what it is to be the mediator can only be fitting to Christ
according to his human nature. According to his human nature Christ is in the
middle between God and human beings. since this nature is human and not divine.
18) Deinde considerandum est de hoc quod Christus dicitur mediator Dei et hominum, ST III
26 proemium;
CHAPTER THREE 81
and since his human nature in dignity. grace and glory excels the human nature
possessed by other human beings. This mediator mediates. by bestowing upon
humankind the precepts and gifts from God and by satisfaction and intercession.
This answer may seem to be nothing more than a logical procedure, a trick learned
from the study of reduplicative logic. Moreover, it seems that it hurts the unity of
Christ by establishing only an extrinsic connection between both of Christ's
natures. Aquinas was well aware of this, for which reason he continues with an
answer that concerns the very unity of Christ. Saying only that Christ is mediator
according to his human nature is not enough. According to his human nature Christ
exceeds all of humankind because of the union of this nature with the Son of God,
a union that bestows a unique fullness of grace upon him, and makes him closer to
God than any human being ever. The doctrine of the two natures. in combination
with reduplicative logic, is 'an adequate means to verify the predication of mediator
of Christ, but it must be employed in the proper way: not by dividing Christ, but
by preserving the personal unity, and articulating the respect in which the name is
applied to him.
This one example enables us to ascertain some typical features of the analysis of
names applied to Christ. According to the fullness of its meaning the name is
applicable to one only. In order to detennine the meaning of the word, one should
consult the meaning it has when applied to priests, prophets and angels. The word
turns out to be used analogously, i.e. all the aspects that constitute the meaning of
the word when used for priests, prophets and angels are present when applied to
Christ, but only Christ is the perfect mediator. This approach reminds one of the
approach sketched in ST I 13.6, where Aquinas says that for words used
analogously it is necessary that they are all said with respect to one prior meaning.
This prior meaning is the one repeated in all other usages of the word. In the case
of naming God, words are taken from created perfections and attributed to the
perfect cause of these perfections. According to their imposition these words are
per prius said of created perfections, but according to the thing signified the words
are per prius said of the perfect cause of the perfections, the Creator himself.
Prophets and priests especially are said to be mediators in respect of their
relationship of prefiguring 19 • foretelling and acting in virtue of the one mediator.
Prophets and priests to a certain extent mediate between God and humankind but
there is only one who effects reconciliation and redemption. This perfectio~ can
19) Let me just note here, in view of the conclusion of Chapter I, that the relationship of
signification secundum mysterium, that exists between Old Testament and New Testament,
between the mediators of the Old Law, and the Mediator of the New Law, constitutes the
proportion because of which Mediator is used analogously. In terms of the analogy fonnulated
there:
Christus Mediator
mysterium ------
Lex Vetus mediatores;
82 NAMES OF CHRIST
only be approached by taking the other examples into consideration: it cannot be
fully comprehended. If it were comprehended, It would be P?sslble to speak
univocally concerning Christ'S office of mediator, and of ChriSt. In. the fntal
analysis, even though the word mediator is applied to Christ accordmg to his
human nature, the exact defInition of the word exceeds human understandmg. It ~s
the mystery of the hypostatic union that causes this excess, a mystery that IS
articulated but not comprehended by the doctrine of the two natures. Moreover,
Aquinas' employment of the idea of ana.logous usage of words turns. out to be
meant as a hermeneutical instrument, auned at the true understandmg of ~e
application of 'mediator' to Christ. The question is. not how to get lang~age In
divinis to be successful, as an epistemologically biased readmg of the Idea of
analogous usage of words would have it, but how this successful language should
be interpreted.
The example of the word 'mediator' is typical, since it typifies Aquinas' han~ling
of names of Christ. Typical are the two features that we have emphaSIzed. ~e
names are used analogously, and the names afe verified accordin? to t~e ~octr~ne
of the two natures. The names, when applied to Christ. have a umque slgmficatlon
or meaning. First, because the word is said of a divine person. Second, because
that which is known to human beings does not suffice to understand and express
the fullness of what the word signifies.
A similar reserve can be detected in Aquinas' examination of the word Jesus.
1.4 'Jesus'
The only explicit discussion of the fittingness of the imposition. of ,a ~ame o~
Christ, in the Tertia Pars, concerns the name Jesus. To examme fi~tmgness
(convenientia) expresses the strategy typical o~ the di~course about thing~ that
totally depend on God's will, to which the m:arnatlOn belongs: there IS no
possibility for demonstration by proof, only for trymg to understand the ~easons. of
what in fact happened". To examine the fittingn~s~ of the name Jesus IS to give
reasons because of which it would become mtell1glble that this name was gIven,
and why it is a good name; in short: how it fits into ?od's saving ec?nomy.
The name Jesus. Aquinas says, means Salvator, saVIOur, and IS fittmg for the one
who saves all human beings in a universal and spiritual way (ST III 37.2 ad 2).
God bestowed this name upon Christ, even before his birth from Mary. The angel,
20) Aquinas on the fittingness of the incarnation in general: Dicendum. quod ad e~ quae fidei
sunt, ratio demonstrativa haberi non pOlest, cum fides de no~ appar~ntlbus. esse. dreatur. (Heb
11.1), et praecipue in illis quae ex mera Dei voluntate provemum, cUlusmodl est Incarna:lO. ~t
ideo ad incarnationem probandam, ratio demonstrativa haberi non potest, nec etiam In
contrarium; quia cum demonstratio scire faciat, scientia autem. non nisi ~erorum sit, oporte! omne
quod demonstratur, verum esse et eius contrarium falsum. Et Ideo suffictt defendere quod n?n est
impossibile incarnationem esse, quod in 1 art. ex parte factum est, et ostendere atlquam
congruentiam ad incarnationem, quod ad hunc articulum pertinet. 3SN 1.1.2;
,
CHAPTER mREE 83
according to the Gospel of Matthew (1.21), instructs Joseph to call the child by this
name. The angel does not impose the name, but rather calls him by this name, not
imponere but vocare". According to Luke the angel foretells the name to Mary,
the name that Jesus will be called at his circumcision.
EVen though we are dealing here with a proper name, the signification or meaning
of it should match properties of the one named with it. Aquinas has recourse to the
Aristotelian semantic law that was so dominant in his days: words signify concepts,
and concepts have a similarity with that which is conceived; the conceptual content
that a word signifies is the definition of the thing signified22 • The same semantic
law was invoked in the beginning of the treatise of the divine names in ST I 13.1.
Common names signify the essence of the thing signified. To a certain extent
however, proper names do,the same thing: they link up with a property of the one
who receives the name. This property may be the day one is born, which provides
one with the name of the saint whose death is commemorated on that day. It may
be the name of the parents one has, or a certain event in which one is involved
(Manasse, Go 41.51), or a conspicuous mark (Esau, Gn 25.25). Names that are
imposed by God always mean a certain gracious gift (Abraham, Peter), and this
applies to Jesus as well: the gracious gift of salvation. Because through him all are
saved, the name Jesus, i.e. Saviour, is a fitting name.
Aquinas' examination of the name Jesus shows the same bent as his examination of
the name mediator: he takes the relationship between Old and New Testament into
consideration. Veritas enim evangelica debet praenuntiationi propheticae
respondere, for the evangelical truth should agree with the prophetical foretelling
(ST III 37.2 obiectum 1). Why does Matthew in his story of the birth quote Isaiah
(7.14) who foretells that the virgin shall give birth to a son who will be called
Immanuel! Why doesn't Isaiah mention the name Jesus? Why isn't Jesus called
Immanuel? The prophets mention other names as well, such as Accelem, spolia
detrahe, festina praedari (Is 8.3), and Admirabilis, Consiliarius, Deus, Fortis,
Pater futuri Saeculi, Princeps Pads (Is 9.16), and Oriens (Zc 6.12); what is the
relationship between Jesus and these names? Moreover, the name Jesus is not a
new name at all, others are called Jesus as weB. but doesn't Isaiah say that "you
will be called a new name with which the Lord's mouth shall name you" (62.2)?
Some of these questions are put in Aquinas' commentary on Matthew's gospel,
some in the treatment in the S'fl3. In his commentary on Matthew Aquinas says
that Matthew had good reasons for quoting Isaiah. In so doing, the evangelist could
show that the whole of the Old Testament signifies this Christ, and could facllitate
the faith in Christ by revealing that he is the one who was foretold. In so doing,
Aquinas again says, Matthew could emphasize the conformity, the unity of the Old
21) cr. REM [ 5 (251:
22) Cf. note 50 in chapter II. Voces sunt signa intellectuum, et in!ellectus SUn! rerum
similitudines .... ratio enim quam signijicat nomen, est definitio. Cf. Aristotle's Peri henneneias I
c.l n.2 (l6a3) and Metaphysica III c.7 0.9 (1012a21-23);
23) [esp. REM [ 5 and ST III 37.2 ad 1 and ad 2;
84 NAMES OF CHRIST
with the New Testament. Doesn't Paul in his letter to the Colossians (2.17) say that
the law is a shadow of what was coming, the reality of Christ?
Isaiah mentions the name Immanuel, which is different from Jesus, but Aquinas
says that both have a similar meaoing. That God is with us means that God saves
us. In Christ are to be discerned four aspects of the way in which God is with us.
In Christ God has assumed human nature (I), a nature that is equal to ours in all
respects (2). Moreover, God is with us in a bodily way (3) and in a spiritual way
(4). The last words of Christ that Matthew (28.20) reports, which are the last
words of the Gospel as well, are these: 'I am with you always, yes, to the end of
time". It means, Aquinas says, that the whole of the good news begins (1.23) and
finishes (28.20) with Deus nobiscum, with lnunanuel (REM 15 [100]).
In the ST Aquinas is even more explicit regarding the nature of the relationship
between the names given in the Old Testament with this name Jesus given in the
New Testament. All the names mentioned above share this primary meaning that
all of them in one way or another express: saviour. Immanuel means the cause of
salvation, namely the union of divine and human nature in Christ; God-with-us has
caused the salvation of humankind, through which humankind is one with God.
Accelera, spolia detraha, festina praedari indicates the one from whom we are
liberated, namely the devil. Admirabilis, Consiliarius, Deus, Fortis, Pater futuri
Saeculi, Princeps Pacis mean the way and the end of the salvation: through the
wondrous counsel and strength of divinity the saved are led to the inheritance of
the future world, in which they, the children of God, will live in perfect peace with
God as their prince. Oriens means the same as Immanuel, namely the mystery of
the incarnation: "For the honest he is risen as a light in the dark" (Ps 112.4). All
of these names share the same principal meaning that is principally expressed by
the name Jesus: saviour. The relationship that exists between them and the name
Jesus is a relationship that reminds one of the relationship between words used
analogously. The meaning of the principal use of the word recurs in the same word
in its secondary use. Here the words are not the same, but their significations are
linked to one another by way of analogy.
The words just mentioned all have identical supposition, i.e. they all refer to the
one person of Christ. When Aquinas answers the question whether this name Jesus
is really the new name that Isaiah foretold, he deals with the differences in
signification of the same word Jesus when applied to different referents. This
concurs most with Aquinas' consideration of mediator. Others who bear the name
Jesus have brougbt at most a particular and temporal salvation, whereas the
working of spiritual and universal salvation is proper of Christ, and for this reason
the name Jesus is a new name for a new and singular kind of salvation.
This name Jesus is the name of God. Aquinas sometimes interprets the biblical
expression "the name (of the Lord)" to signify the name JesUl?'. For example, in
the 54 Psalms that Aquinas comments upon, he associates "the name of the Lord"
24) Cf. the beginning of this chapter on names in material supposition, p. 75;
CHAPTER roREE 85
(or "Your name") three times with Jesus. Jesus is the name of the Lord, Aquinas
says, because m the Son God shows himself to be the saviour, the true hope for
eternal salvation (RPS XXXIX 2 [251, vs. 5), the salutary good to be expected
(RPS LI 5 [25). vs. 11), the goodness that will grant forgiveness of sins and
salvation. This goodness of divine salvation is best expressed in the divine name
Jesus (RPS XXN 9 [II, vs. 11). "The name of the Lord" means salvation, beatific
vision and forgiveness of sins. Christ bears that name, and rightly so, because he
forgives, he saves, and he leads the children of God to the beatific vision. That
name is a name "which is above all other names", a text from Paul's letter to the
Philippians (2.9) that Aquinas quotes so often, and the name at which every knee
will bend (Ep 3.14) and that every tongue shall confess (Ph 2.11)25.
1.5 Names of Christ hiilden in Isaiah
I have already drawn attention to the fact that a large number of the names of
Christ that Aquinas mentions in his Tertia Pars are the fruit of a spiritual reading
of Scripture. The examples I have mentioned, however, should be compared to the
approach that Aquinas takes in the commentary on Isaiah. The study of this aspect
of the commentary may put the 'spiritual' names of Christ into perspective, both as
to the considerable attention which Aquinas devotes to them and to the theological
fruitfulness of this attention.
In ~s commentary Aquinas mentions a total number of about ninety names of
ChrIst. More than forty of these are not contained in the New Testament. These
forty names are the result of spiritual reading, a reading secundum mysterium:
Frater, Ductor/Dux, Parvulus, Speculator, (Pro)pugnator, Cibus Peregrination is,
Pretium Redemptionis, Praemium Remunerationis, Satis/actor, Dominator, Flos,
Minister, Radius, Fluvium, Nubes Levis, Urbs Fortitudinis, Nomen Domini Lilia
Victor, Medicus, Fortis, Foedus, Bracchium, Accelera Spolia Detrahe Festi';'
Praeda~i, Virga, Novissimus, Vir DoLorum, Liberalis, Formosus, Mons, Vir Unus,
Patruells, Pavor Vester, Terra Vester, Admirabilis, Consiliarius, Pater Futuri
Saeculi, Princeps P~cis, Restaurator, Murus, Consolator, Qui ab Aquilone, QUi ab
Orzente, Prllnus, Trzumphator, Germen Domini, Fructus Terrae.
Concerning the names of Christ, Aqninas here employs two methods. The first
method ~s the one adopted in .the part of the commentary that deals strictly with the
explanatIon of the text of Isatah. The second method is contained in the other part
of the commentary that consists of what are called collationes. These seem to be
preaching-schemes, collections of short authoritative texts that are grouped in order
25) Cf. Aquinas' exposition of the exaltation of Christ in which these three biblical elements
a~e. exp~essed: Quae, quidem exaltatio in tribus consistit, scilicet in notina cordis, secundum quod
dIcItur. nomen super omne nomen ~ accepisse, quia nomen de re notitiam facit; item in reverentia
corp?n~, quantum ad genujlexionem,' item in confessione oris. et hoc est quod dicit Apostolus: etH
Otnrua lzngua conjiteatr,lr... H, 3SN 18.4.3, cf. ad 2 as well;
86 NAMES OF CHRIST
to explain a word or a phrase26 • The ftrst method considers names that Isaiah
predicates of certain persons (e.g. Cyrus, the servant, Eliakim, the son of Isaiah).
Each of these persons mysteriously signifies Christ, and so these names are
spiritual names of Christ. Some names are contained in a straightfo~~rd
foretelling of the messiah, and they signify Christ as well. Whereas the supposItIOn
of these names is identical, i.e. the person of Christ, their meaning is diverse. In
order to determine this meaning, Aquinas studies other texts from Scripture. The
second method, adopted in the development of the collationes, is partly different.
In the whole commentary there are about 126 collationes, 28 of which regard
names of Christ, e.g. panis, flos. agnus etc. Sometimes Aquinas interprets a name
given by Isaiah by adducing authoritative texts 27 • and this concurs with the
approach of the first method. But sometimes he will apply something Isaiah says to
Christ by adducing names contained in authoritative expressions28 • and sometimes
he will explain a name by adducing other names". This technique appears to be
based upon the use of a concordance, e.g. all biblical mentioning of Jlos (CIS XI
[75])30.
Isaiah's prophecy of the birth of Immanuel Aquinas mentioned already in his
reflection upon the name Jesus and in his commentary on Matthew. The
examination in his commentary on Isaiah of this name (Is 7.14) and the ones
connected with it (9.5) reflects both methods I mentioned above. There is a straight
commentary in which Aquinas explains the connected names, and a collatio in
which he associates the name Immanuel with other names contained in other
authoritative texts. I will discuss now both.
The Latin translation of Is 9.5 contains six names. Aquinas divides them into two
categories: the first, third and fifth name concern the divine; the others, the human
nature of Christ. Admirabilis means that God's knowledge and wisdom, that is
expressed i~ all of his works, are wondrous and too wondrous to be comprehended
by human beings (Ps 139.6). This, Aquinas says, applies especially to the personal
union of both natures. Consiliarius expresses the human wisdom of Christ; he adds
26) Cf. Editio Leonina, o.c., p. 16ff (H.-F. Dondaine);
27) E.g. the name Admirabilis is explained by adducing Ps 139.6: "Such amazing knowledge
is beyond me, a height to which I cannot attain n ;
28) E.g. how Christ supports the faithful: as Victor, Medicus, Advoeatus etc. - CIS XLI [175];
29) E.g. Immanuel is explained by texts containing other names: Frater, Sponsus, Salvator,
Dux, CIS VII 2 [250];
30) Aquinas keeps the spiritual reading, the potential of which seems to be enonnous, in
check, by taking the spiritual reading by the writers of the New Testament as a nonn. E.g. in CIS
VIII 1 [125] he rejects a detailed spiritual reading of a passage that contains the name Aeeeiera,
spolia detrahe festina praedari, 'Speedy-spoil-quick-booty' (8.3) by appealing to the absence of a
similar New Testament-interpretation: Haec autem expositio non est tantae auetoritatis, sicut
superior, quae fuit supra VII, de alio signo (Le. the Immanuel-prophecy-hs), quia magis extorta
est et ex seripturis non habet auetoritatem, sieut ilia Matth.I. Because Matthew interprets the
prophecy of Immanuel to be a prophecy of Christ, one is, justified in reading this passage from
Isaiah spiritually;
CHAPTER mREE 87
counsels to the precepts, and is an adviser like only one out of a thousand (Si 6.6).
Deus and Fortis express the divine and human power of Christ. On the one hand,
Christ's power is the power of the true hidden God, hidden in Christ (Is 45.15),
whereas, on the other hand, Christ's power is the power of his virtuousness. Pater
futuri Saeculi and Princeps Pads give knowledge of the abundance of goodness in
Christ, for whom and through whom everything exists, who brings the children of
God to glory, who became the leader of their salvation by accomplishing his
suffering (Heb 2.10), and who will be as a father to the inhabitants of Jerusalem (Is
22.21); he is the prince of peace, who made Jews and Gentiles into one entity (Ep
2.14) and who, as a prince of God among us (Gn 23.6, Abraham), is mediator.
Once again, the doctrine of the two natures helps to identify the meaning and
application of these names. Isaiah, according to Aquinas, speaks here about the
divine and human wisdom, pOwer and goodness of Christ, that in him are ineffably
one.
The second methnd, the method of the collatio, teaches the many ways in which
Christ as Immanuel is with us. He is with us as Frater (Sg 8.1) through his
participation in human nature, he is with us as Sponsus, through the bond of love,
the love for him that is expressed in our fulfilment of his precepts (In 14.15), he is
with us as Salvator, through his help against fear (Jr 30.10), he is with us as Dux
(Dt 32.12), through his work that serves us as an example. The names that Aquinas
mentions are sometimes contained in the biblical passage that he quotes, and
sometimes the biblical passage quoted serves to explain the name that Aquinas
chose from Scripture independently31.
1.6 Names of Christ, the 'name' of God
Aquinas' love for the names of Christ that the collationes in the Commentary on
Isaiah bespeak, is founded on the book Isaiah itself. Isaiah mentions the declaration
of (12.4), the desire for (26.8), the memory of (26.13), the confession of (25.1)
and the invoking of (12.4; 64.7; 65.1) "the name (of the Lord)". Isaiah prophesies
the coming of the name: "See, the name of the Lord comes from afar" (30.27).
Aquinas says (CIS XXX [300]) that this explains where Isaiah's love for the names
of Christ comes from: they are names of the "name of the Lord", who has come
from afar. The Son of God, according to Aquinas, is the 'name' of the Lord,
firstly because through him the Father is revealed, and because through him the
name of the Father is revealed (In 17.6); secondly because through him the Father
is honoured ("Our Father. .. hallowed be thy name .. " Mt 6.9); and thirdly because
through him the Father is invoked ("anything you ask from the Father he will grant
in my name." In 16.23). The Son of God reveals the name of the Father, honours
and invokes him. The name of the Father signifies who the Father is, and his Son
31) Compare this explanation of Immanuel with the one given in REM I 5 [100], above p. 84.
There are major differences;
88 NAMES OF CHRIST
reveals it, is his 'name,32.
The idea that Christ in some way is the 'name' of God (and now I do not mean
that 'Christ' is the nanie of God, cf. the beginning of this chapter), is contained in
Aquinas' explanation of the Gospel of John as well. Jesus prays: "Father, glorify
your name!" John continues: "a voice came from heaven, 'I have glonfied and I
will again glorify it" (In 12.28). A shnilar prayer is voiced in In. 17.1-: "Father,
the hour has come: glorify your Son so that your Son may glonfy you; so .that, Just
as you have given hhn power over all hurnanio/, he may gIve eternal hfe to all
those you have entrusted to hhn. And eternal hfe IS this: to know you, the only
true God and Jesus Christ whom you have sent. I have glOrIfied you on eanh by
finishing 'the work that you gave me to do. Now, Father, glorify me with that glory
I had with you before ever the world existed. I have revealed your name to those
whom you took from the world to give me.( ... ) I have made your name known to
them and will continue to make it known, so that the love WIth WhIch you loved
me may be in them, and so that I may be in them." Aquinas interprets (REI XII 5
[175]) the word name in In. 12.28 to have a double meanmg. Secondly It means
the knowledge of the Father that the So~ h~s rev~led t? humankind. But fi~stly i~
means the person of Christ hinIself. ChrISt IS the name of the Father, the name
of God because he has revealed the name of the Father to humankind. The Word
of God', the perfect self-expression of who he is, was bestowed upo~ mankin,d,
became incarnate and thus became the 'name' of God. The Father glOrIfies ChrISt
the 'name', inasn'mch as the faithful know hhn in their heart, revere hhn with their
genufiecting body, and confess hhn with their mouth (3SN 18.4.3, cf. note 25).
1.7 Names and love, praise and promise
Names of the 'name' of the Father, of the Son, reveal who God is, God-with-us.
Those names are anything but small pieces of infonnation, tracks for someone who
finally wants to know ... No, the names of Christ are embedded in a larger whole
of honour and prayer, of praise and worship. For Aquinas the names of Christ are
situated in the life of love for Christ, which consists in his imitation. It is as the
love of the seven women who will catch hold of one man, saying to him: "We will
eat our own food, and wear our own clothing, but just let us b~ar your name." (Is
4.1). This passage from Isaiah, Aquinas says, expresses the deSIre or the prayer of
the church for the love " .. that concerns the appropriation of the Christian name ( .. )
so that we may be, after Christ, called Christians"". For, the One who has
offered his Son as his 'name', and the Son who has brought this name, will bestow'
32) So, if one compares Aquinas' exegesis of Nomen,Domini in IS,30.27 to, his e~egesi~ of
this term in the Psalms, there is a difference. The exegesIS of the first IS: Jesus IS the name of
the Lord; the exegesis of the second: Jesus is the name of th: Lord. Put otherwise: in Isaiah the
phrase Nomen Domini is a name of Jesus, in the Psalms Jesus IS a name of the Lord;
33) ... quae est de consecutione christiani nominis (... J ut a Christo dicamur christiani, CIS
IV 2 [125]. cr. ST III 7.5 sed contra;
CHAPTER lliREE 89
upon those who are in this love a new name34 . The Lord says: "To those who
observe my Sabbath, and choose to do my good pleasure and cling to my covenant,
I shall give them in my house and within my walls a monument and a name better
than sons and daughters; I shall give them an everlasting name that will never be
effaced" (Is 56.4-5). Aquinas (CIS LVI [100]) recognizes the connection between
the promise of a new name and love for the name of God. The name that the saints
will receive is imposed on them through divine predestination by a God who has
called them from their mother's womb (Is 49.1), through the capacity, given by
God, to love hhn and be called children of God (Un 3.1), through the infusion of
grace through which the saints hold on to God's narne (Rv 2.13), and through the
renewal of the human mind, expressed in the new name that the saints will receive
(Rv 2.17). In Isaiah the new ,name is promised to those who love the name of God.
That love is aroused, Aquinas says, for the name of God should be feared as a
great name (MI 1.11), should be honoured as a holy name (Lk I, magni/icat... ),
should be meditated graciously (Is 26.13), the name that is abundant in compassion
(Sg 1.2), that is steadfast in intercession (In 15.7), powerful in saving (Ac 4.12)
and hidden for knowleqge: "What is his name, and what is the name of his Son; do
you know?" (pr 30.4).
Aquinas sketches the connection between the Son of God who is the 'name' of the
Father, and the name with which those who love him will be named. This same
connection Aquinas brings to the fore when he examines the name Christus, the
anointed one. Isaiah says (61.1-): "The Spirit of the Lord my Lord is on me, for
the Lord has anointed me. He has sent me to ... ", and Luke (4.17) applies this to
Christ. Aquinas does so as well, and gives a double explanation (CIS LXI [50]).
He explains in the first place what the meaning of this anointing is, and in the
second place he indicates the way in which the anointed one hhnself anoints his
devoted servants. Christ is anointed with the oil of priestly dignity, offering
sacrifices like a sacerdos (priest); with the oil of royal dignity, in order to rule like
a rex (king); with the oil of hnmense fortitude (oil used for greasing a shield), to
deliver combat like a puguens (one who fights); and with the oil of sublime delight,
as someone has who is liberalis ad miserendurn (generous to have mercy). The
anointed one anoints his followers with the (invisible) tears of the sting of
conscience, with the perfume of devotion, with the oil of pure intention and with
the oil of praise and a life of gifts of grace.
Being bound by the love of Christ means the proclamation of his name, of this
name Christ. In his prologue to the letters of Paul, Aquinas employs this thought to
typify the person and work of Paul (CRO prol.). Aquinas compares the letters of
Paul to the psalms of David. Both are the work of someone to whom a special
forgiveness is imparted. Better than anyone else, they can attest to God's
compassion. Paul is called a vas electionis, a chosen instrument "to bring my name
before gentiles and kings and before the people of Israel" (Ac 9.15), a vessel filled
with the costly oil of the name of Christ (Sg 1.2). He knows that Christ is the
34) Is 62.2; CIS LXII [25]; Aquinas quotes Rv 2.17;
90 NAMES OF CHRIST
name of God. He not only knows what God's name is, but he loves it as well:
nothing can separate him from the love of Christ. He not only knows the name,
and loves Christ, but his life is the life of the name as well. It is his office to carry
out this name that because of sin and darkness of mind is remote from humankind.
He carried out that name in a bodily way, in imitating the conduct of life and
suffering of Christ. He carried it out orally, in proclaiming the name that means
compassion, like the bird of Noah that brought the olive branch. He carried it out
scripturally as well, in writing letters that explained the hidden meaning of
Scripture: Christ. All of Paul's letters have only one subject: the name of Christ,
just as all of Paul's person is oriented only at one thing: the knowledge, love and
conduct filled with the name that means compassion and salvation.
The names of Christ answer those who ask: who is he? but, according to Aquinas,
are meaningful above all to those who ask: how shall I praise thee?, or how shall I
love thee? In other words, these names are names that voice the experience of the
grace of faith, hope and love, and are offered to Christ as a sacrifice of praise. We
neither know the name of God, nor of the Son; they are obscure for our
understanding. or better, OUf understanding obscures them. At the same time,
however. we fear his name, worship his name, reflect upon his name, and invoke
his name, because the name is abundant in mercy and has worked our salvation.
Those who call upon the name and worship it are themselves about to be named
anew. In the presence of this name, no name can stand. Naming Christ is,
according to Aquinas, embedded in praise, preceded by the 'name' that Christ is,
and contains the promise of new names.
2. The names of Christ and the treatises on naming God
Now that we know that for Aquinas Christ is the 'name' of God, that Jesus and
Salvator as names of Christ are fitting names for God, that Aquinas devotes
considerable attention to the names of Christ, and that these names originate in the
'name' that Christ himself is, we are prepared to take into consideration the general
treatises on divine names. Would it be conceivable that these general treatises do
not bespeak the ground on which they stand?
Attention will be devoted to the three authorities from which Aquinas, in this
respect, learned most: Peter of Lombard, Pseudo-Dionysius and Albert the Great.
We will discover that traditionally the names of Christ belong to the treaiment of
divine names, and we will see how this can be recognized in Aquinas as wen.
2.1 Aquinas and Peter of Lombard
The theological tradition that comes down to Aquinas through Peter of Lombard (c.
1095-1160), acknowledges that the names of Christ form part of the general
problem concerning divine names, and that the discussion of speech about Christ
and speech about God form one integral whole.
CHAPTER THREE 91
In his general treatment of the divine names Peter of Lombard mentions two
traditional divisions of these names. He mentions divisions proposed by Augustine
and Ambrose. Each of these divisions is threefold. Peter harmonises these two
divisions, and adds to the threefold division another three categories, so that he
proposes to distinguish a sixfold division of divine names. The different modes of
signifying the divine are these: names that are said exclusively of a divine person
(e.g. Generatio, Filius, Verbum); names that are said of the divine essence, and
thus can be said of God and of each of the divine persons (e.g. Sapientia, Virtus,
Veritas); and figurative names (Splendor, Character, Speculum). To this Peter adds
three more modes: names that are said temporally of God, signifying a relation to
creation (e.g. Dominus, Creator, Refugium, Donatus, Datus, Missus); the unique
name Trinitas; and "there are also some names that temporally suit God but do not
signify a relation, such as ;humanized' (humanatus), 'incarnate' (incarnatus) and
the like"Js.
Indeed, many of these names are names of Christ: 12 out of 18".
Commenting upon this division. Aquinas acknowledges that other divisions are
given by Pseudo-Dionysius and John of Damascus (lSN 22.1.4 solutio and ad 4
and 5). However, all divisions given can be reduced to the one given by Ambrose:
figurative or symbolical names, proper names signifying the three persons in
common, and proper names signifying singular persons separately. Aquinas regards
the three categories added by Peter only as specifications of the three categories of
Ambrose. Peter's category containing the single name Trinitas really belongs to the
third category of Ambrose (proper personal names). The other two categories that
Peter adds partly belong to the second and partly to the third category of Ambrose.
Some of the names that are said temporally are said of the three persons in
common (e.g. Dominus), some are said only of one distinct person (e.g.
Incamatus).
However. the reason for which Peter distinguished between Dominus and the like,
and Incarnatus. and the like. was other than this. Peter emphasizes that the one
signifies a relation, and the other does not. Aquinas agrees with this: Dominus and
the like are said relative secundum nomen, whereas Incarnatus and the like non
referuntur ad aliud secundum nomen (ibidem, ad 4). This, however, does not alter
the initial division, since this distinction is a subdivision of the second (proper
essential names) and the third (proper personal names) category alike: cf.
respectively Dominus (temporal relative essential) and Creator (temporal non-
relative essential), Missus (temporal relative personal) and Incarnatus (temporal
non-relative personal).
Before we pursue these temporal names, let us conclude the overview of the basic
traditional distinctions. Names of Christ are contained in all three basic categories,
35) Peter of Lombard, Sententiae in IV Libris distinctae, III, distinctio 22;
36) Character and Speculum were not mentioned before. On the first see ST III 63.2 obiectum
1 where Aquinas says it is a Greek word translated by Figura in Heb 1.3. Speculum is a spiritual
name of Christ, ct. Ws 7.26;
92 NAMES OF CHRIST
and the examples that Peter of Lombard gives (from Ambrose or independently)
are predominantly applicable to Christ.
Lombard's sixth category is of special interest to us, since it deals with names
pertinent to the incarnation. Aquinas' analysis of this kind of name is important. As
we have seen, he agrees with Peter that some temporal names are relative
secundum nomen, others are not. What does Aquinas mean? How can incarnatus
not signify a relation? Shouldn't one say that the person of the Son of God is
related to the human nature that he assumes, or at least say that his human nature is
related to the Son of God? Is it possible to sayan the one hand that incarnatus is
not a relative secundum nomen, and on the other hand imply that incarnatus
signifies a temporal relationship between the Son of God and his human nature (as
Aqninas in fact does in ibidem,ad 3)?
The solution is found in the expositio textus: concerning what Peter says about
incarnatus and humanatus one should distinguish between explicitly (secundum
nomen) and implicitly signifying a relation. Neither explicitly signifies a relation,
but of course they include in their signification the union of human and divine
nature, and therefore they implicitly signify a relation".
This remark Aquinas makes is extremely important for our purposes. It brings into
focus that everything which is said about names (hnplicitly) signifying relations
between God/the divine persons and creation, applies to a principal category of
names of Christ. The sole fact that a name implicitly signifies a relation does not
make a certain name unfit for predication of God, and this resembles the fact that
the wondrous union of natures in Christ does not alter the divine nature or person
of Christ. To name God Creator does not imply that God depends upon creation,
nor that God changes insofar as he becomes creator. To say that the Sonof God
'became incarnate' does not imply that the Son of God depends upon his human
nature, nor that the Son changed insofar as he became human. (In technical terms
this is expressed in saying that temporal relations are not realiter in God, but
secundum ralionem, intentional, whereas what is related to God is really related to
him.) This entails that the hypostatic union itself is envisaged when names that
implicitly signify a temporal relationship are examined.
Equally important is another consequence of Aquinas' position: it brings into focus
those names of Christ that do not signify (in the strict sense) something divine but
co-signify the same mixed relation, the same union. Consider homo for instance ...
could it be one of the divine names? In order to be able to examine this
37) Hoc dicitur, quia secundum nomen ad aliud nomen non rejeruntur; quamvis implicitam
relationem contineant, secundum quod unionem in suo intellectu includunt, lSN 22 expositio
textus.
The paraliel of the distinction in STI 13.7 ad 1 between relativa secundum esse/reiativa secundum
diet (that can be found in SN as well, e.g. lSN 30.1.2) is NOT the SN-distinction between
secundum nomen re/errilsecwuium nomen non rejern, but the SN-distinction between secundum
nomen rejerri/relatio implicita continui. In other words: what Aquinas calls secundum nomen
rejerri, he calls a relativumlreferri secwuJum esse elsewhere. Cf. Manthey, 1937, p. 123f;
CHAPTER THREE 93
consequence. we have to pay attention to Aquinas' analysis of the question whether
the names that are said temporally of God, signify the divine essence (lSN 30.1.2).
This question covers a wide array of names but in the [mal analysis seems to be
designed to answer a more specific question: do names that are said 'ex tempore
incarnationis' of God, signify the divine essence and/or the divine person of the
Son of God? The names that serve as examples are not only incarnatus. but homo
as well. Aquinas concentrates on words that, directly or indirectly, signify a
relation, a habitudo between God and creation. He distinguishes between creation
being related to God as to its principle, and creation being related to God as to its
end. In the first case all names signify the divine essence. Either a word directly
signifies a relation, but indirectly signifies the essence or operation upon which this
relation is founded (e.g. Dominuslpotestas coercendl), or a word directly signifies
something essential or some operation, but indirectly signifies a relation that exists
on account of this (e.g. Creatorlactio creandt). Inasmuch as a relation is signified,
it is not realiter, but secundum rationem in God: it implies no change in God. The
burden. however, is on the second type of creation-being-related-to-God: being
related to God as to its end. Unlike the other type of relation the analysis of this
type should take into account that something may either be related to the divine
essence, or to a divine person. Aquinas thinks that God's acting ad exIra is always
an acting that is common to all persons, whereas God's being the goal of
something created may make a difference between the persons. There are three
kinds of final relation: secundum operationem, secundum exemplaritatem,
secundum esse. Examples of each of these are given, but the last kind is a category
with only one member. Secundum operationem: to understand and to name God or
divine fatherhood, both of them operations, puts the subject into a relation with
God or the Father as end. Secundum exemplaritatem: things are created on the
model of divine perfections, and charity is infused on the model of the procession
of the Holy Spirit; this means that the divine perfections and the Holy Spirit are
examples and ends of created things and the love of the faithful. Secundum esse:
in fact the third 'kind' is not a kind at all, since there is only one final relation
according to being: the hypostatic union in Christ38 . Human nature is assumed to
the being and the unity of the divine person of the Son.
So each relation between something created and God admits of a twofold analysis.
Each relation relates to God as a principle, and to God as an end. The latter aspect
admits of a difference between the divine persons.
Now, in the case of the hypostatic union.this same twofold analysis applies. The
hypostatic union is a relation to the divine essence. inasmuch as God works the
incarnation to come about. In this respect the name incarnatus signifies a relation
with all three divine persons a§" its principle. The hypostatic union is a relation to
the person of the Son as well, inasmuch as only the Son became human. In this
respect the name incarnatus signifies a relation with only the Son as its end. All
38) iste modus est singularis in incarnatione, per quam humana natura assumpta est ad esse et
unitatem divinae personae, non autem ad unitatem divinae naturae, 1SN 30.1.2;
94 NAMES OF CHRIST
three persons assume human nature, but only the Son assumes human nature to
himself".
Once again we have to acknowledge that. the hypostatic union is involved in the
very discussion of divine names. In fact, Aquinas draws a hierarchy of three kinds
of union, the greatest of which is the hypostatic union, in order to be able to give a
proper analysis of the meaning and application of words like. incarnatus4f!. . adding this, Aquinas makes an important move. He brings the hypostatic union
The most striking aspect of this whole question, however. IS the fact that Aqumas
introduces homo as a divine name. God is called 'human being'. This name is said
temporally of God, as all other names that signify a relation of something created
with God. It seems, however, that this name falsifies, the objection says, the
overall argument of the question, since obviously enough homo signifies (in the
strict sense) human nature and not the divine essence. All names that are said
temporally of God directly or indirectly signify the divine essence, and homo seems
to be the exception that falsifies the rule. Aquinas does not agree with the
conclusion of the argument. Despite the fact that homo does not signify the divine
essence, it does indirectly signify the total Trinity. God is called homo inasmuch as
the Son, the supposit of divine nature, subsists in human nature because of the
hypostatic union. This union is a kind of relation that exists really in the assumed
created thing. This created human nature is related to the Son as to its end, and
related to the total Trinity as to its cause or principle41 . When said of God, the
name homo implicitly signifies a relationship; this relationship puts the nature
signified into a relation with the total Trinity as its principle, and with the Son of
God as its end. In this respect homo does not differ from incarnatus.
Summing up this section we conclude that the treatment of divine names that Peter
of Lombard proposes contains many names that are names of Christ. There are
symbolic names of Christ, proper essential names of Christ, and proper personal
names of Christ. Peter even adds a category consisting of names relating to the
incarnation. Aquinas acknowledges this. He hannonizes the basic divisions of
divine names proposed by Augustine, Ambrose, Peter of Lombard, John of
Damascus and Pseudo-Dionysius. He does not need a special category for names
relating to the incarnation, but subsumes these names under names that are said
temporally about God, and consequently places these temporal names under the
39) Sicut patet, cum dicitur incarnatus, hoc tantum FWo competit, quia ad solam personam
Filii incarnatio terminata est, quam tamen tota Trinitas fedt, ibidem;
40) We will return to this highly important 'hierarchy' in chapter IV;
41) Deus dicitur esse homo inquantum suppositum divinae naturae, scilicet Filius, subsistit in
humana natura per unionem. Haec autem unto relatio quaedam est, realiter in creatura assumpta
existens; quae quidem considerata secundum habitudinem ad terminrun, sic terminatur ad
personam Filii, in qua est facta unio; sed secundum habitudinem ad prindpium, sic reJertur ad
totam Trinitatem, quae unionem fecit, ibidem, ad 4. Cf. sr m 16.1 ad 4: hoc nomen 'homo'
praedicatur de Deo ratione unionis in persona: quae quidem unio relationem importat. Et ideo'
non sequitur regulam eorum nominum quae absolute praedicantur de Deo ab aeterno, i.e. that it
should be predicated of the whole Trinity;
CHAPTER THREE 95
basic categories of proper essential and proper personal names. He adds to Peter of
Lombard's view of incarnatus, i.e. that it does not signify a relation, that one
should distinguish between signifying a relation explicitly (what incarnalus does not
do indeed) and signifying a relation implicitly. The latter should be said about
incarnatus and the like, since the name implicitly signifies the hypostatic union. By
under consideration when discussing the' divine names. This union is considered to
be a relation, and is explicitly compared with other relations between created things
and God. What is said in general about these relations (re/alio realis, re/alio
rationis) applies to the union as well, and what the union teaches about the relation
between the TrinityIthe Son of God and the human nature of Christ, is highly
relevant for the other relations between created things and God as well. Moreover,
without being provoked to'tltis by Peter of Lombard, Aquinas brings the name
homo into the examination, and acknowledges it to be a divine name. Names that
signify Christ's human nature and anything belonging to it or founded on it, fall
under the general treatment of divine names to the extent that all of them, when
factually applied to Christ, implicitly signify a temporal relation, a relation 'ex
tempore incarnationis' .
What does it mean that words that directly signify something human in Christ,
through the union they imply are to be said of the Son of God as well? Part of this
we already discovered when attending to Aquinas' explanation of Mediator and
Jesus, but we will discover more when focusing upon Pseudo-Dionysius' De
Divinis Nominibus and Aquinas' explanation of it.
2.2 Aquinas and Pseudo-Dionysius
Pseudo-Dionysius' De Divinis Nominibus (DDN) is a work of major importance for
medieval reflection upon the divine names. Not only because of what the book
teaches, but also because its author was still regarded to be Dionysius the
Areopagite, the Greek converted by Paul in Athens (Ac 17.34): a writer with
special authority, higher than which only Scripture ranks". Just like his teacher
Albert the Great (c. 1200·1280), Aquinas wrote a commentary on DDN.
Some of Dionysius' basic distinctions are reflected in the work of Aquinas. For
example the distinction between symbolic or metaphorical names on the one hand,
and conceptual names (nomina intelligibilia) on the other. De Divinis Nominibus
only deals with the latter. Aquinas draws a similar distinction between metaphors
that are said improperly, and other names that are said properly of God (cf. ST I
13.3). The proper names are distinguished into the names that belong to the
theologia unita and the Iheologia discrela, the first being the names that all divine
persons have in common and the second the names that are proper to one person
42) Its author is unknown, whereas the work itself probably dates from the end of the fifth or
the beginning of the sixth century;
 96 NAMES OF CHRIST
distinctly. Aquinas adopts the same distinction (ISN 22.1.4). These two
distincti~ns. ~owever, Dionys.ius ~hares with other patristic writers (cf. above p.
9Ift). DlonyslUs exerted specIfic influence on Aquinas because of his proposal to
distinguish a triple gradation in speaking about God: the positive way, the negative
way and the eminent way. Aquinas does not work literally according to this model.
Howe~er, he gives a positive evaluation of it and the way he develops his analysis
of dlvme names used analogously reflects the model to the extent that it confirms
that .all one says about God should be negated of God as well, since each perfection
slgmfied can never be understood nor signified according _to the way it is in
God4J •
Apart from other points on :vhich Dionysius influenced Aquinas'., let me finally
menlton the fact that DDN IS very strong on embedding the divine names in a
larger whole of praise and worship. We saw the presence of this in Aquinas'
conunentary on Isaiah, but DDN is even stronger on this point. Dionysius states
that all speaking about God should begin with prayer, so that we will not as it were
pull God down to the created perfections on the basis of which we speak about
God, but "by divine reminders and invocations we may commend ourselves to it
[that divine power] and be joined to it.""
Does DDN mention names of Christ, and thus add up to the contention that names
4~) .cf. ISN 22.1.1 ad 2; QDP 7.5 ad 2: ISN 3 divisia primae partis textus, CDN I 1.8.
DlOnyslus' doctrine is contained in his De Caeiestiae Hierarchia II, Mystica Theaiagia I and DDN
II, III and VII.
C~. M~rk D. Jordan (1986, p. 166): "So it is that one gets the three-step dialectic of Ps-
OlOoySlUS. One first affirms the names of God with the understanding that there is something like
~oodne~s or justice in God. But secondly, one has then to negate the names, since what is in God
IS n~t hke what human language means by such terms. In the third step, one negates the mode of
sigrufication implicit in the names while affirming what they intend to signify One begins that is
to predicate the names of God 'supereminently'''; " ,
44) Cf. J. Duranlel, 1919; A. Feder, 1926;
45) DD~ III .1.6800; English ,translation from Pseudo-Dionysius: The Complete Wotb, trans!.
by Colm LUlbherd, New York/Mahwah 1987. The Latin translation as contained in the Marietti-
edition of Aquinas' commentary, reads: sed slcut divinis me~rationibus et invocationibus
nosipsos ipsi tradentes et unientes (86).
w,tten Oionys~us s~ys: "We are raised up to the enlightening beams of the sacred scriptures, and
~1th these to tllununate us, with our beings shaped to songs of praise, we behold the divine light,
In .a manner befitting to us, and our praise resounds for that generous Source of all holy
enlIghtenment, a S?urce which has told us about itself in the holy words of scripture" (DDN I 3
589~; my emphasls-hs), Aquinas associates this immediately with the knowledge of faith that
COnsists of the adherence to Scripture and of being formed by the names that are mentioned in it·
the names .that rev~l the gifts and the giver. Biblical names are praises because they immediatel~
~peak o~ gifts a~~ giver (CDN I 2.45). Cf. the Latin translation of this passage: ad illucentes nobis
Insanetls eloq~tls sp'len~ores extendimur et ab ipsis illuminamur ad thearchkos hynmos, ab ipsis
supermundane lllumznatl. et ad sa~ctas hyr;morum enuntiationes figurati et ad videndum per ipsos
comm~n:u~ate data nobls thearehlea lununa et laudandum principium universae sanetae luminis
apparuwnls, quod donal bonum, sieut ipsum de seipso in sanetis eloquiis tradidit. (11);
CHAPTER THREE 97
of Christ are part of the tradition that diScusses divine names? The answer is
affmnative.
Symbolic names are not examined in DDN. but proper names are. As we have
seen. there are two categories of proper names of Christ: those that are said of the
entire Godhead and those that are said of Christ only.
The first category of essential or 'unified' names is examined explicitly in chapter
II. Aquinas explains that Dionysius does not take for granted that all 'unified'
names. i.e. the names that are considered in theologia unita, apply to the entire
Godhead, and thus to the person of Christ as well. A long list of Scriptural texts
that contain names of Christ is adduced in order to prove that the Son shares in the
same goodness, the same being, the same life, the same lordship, the same beauty,
the same wisdom etc. (CDli II 1.116-121). The fact that all these names of Christ
prove that Christ is divine by nature, seems to justify the hnplicit use of these same
names, outside chapter II, when talking about God. This hnplicit presence of names
of Christ is rather remarkable. In words used above, we can say that DDN (and
Aquinas' commentary) exhibits a theological practice that agrees with the view that
Christ is the 'name' of God. Dionysius reads texts in the Old Testament spiritually.
He reads texts in the New Testament that say something about Christ. Both kinds
of texts contain names that are names of Christ. And yet, again and again, their
original context is left out, and the names are applied to what the divine persons
have in common. The view that Christ is the 'name' of God, is hnplicitly accepted
by the author, and he confidently quotes from what is said not only about Christ,
but even from what Christ says about hhnself, and attributes it to God. For
instance. when Dionysius discusses Vita, or Sapiens, or Salvatio as names of God,
he quotes from In 11.25 and 14.6, from Col 2.3, and from Mt 1.21. Aquinas
endorses this type of examination46 .
Thus Dionysius abides by another rule that he formulated in the beginning of the
work, namely that all speaking about God should use only the conceptions and
names that Scripture provides47 . The union with God that a believer reaches
46) In CDN I 3.97-98 Aquinas provides the long list of divine names that Dionysius gives
with Scriptural auetoritates that often contain names originally (included those read secundum
mysterium) applied to Christ. Aquinas acknowledges this approach in Dionysius; citing the text of
DDN and identifying its examples: Et non solum laudatur in Scripturis Deus ut innominabilis sed
etiam ut 'multorum nominum skut quando' ipse Deus inducitur dicens HEgo sum qui sum" (Ex
3.4), et HVita et Veritas~ (In 14.6), et "Lumen" (In 8.12), et HDeus H (Ex". 3.6: nEgo sum Deus
Abraham n), CDNI 3.97;
47) "... we must not dare to resort to words or conceptions concerning that hidden divinity
which transcends b~ing, apart from what the sacred scriptures have divinely revealed", DDN I
588A. The Latin translation has: Igitur universaliter non est audendum dicere aliquid nee etiam
cogitare de supersubstantiale et oeculta Deftate, praeter ea quae divinitus nobis ex sanctis eloquiis
sun! expressa (4). Cf. CDN I 1.1l~ I 2.64; II 1.125, in which cases Aquinas adds words and
conceptions grounded in Scripture: Signanter autem non dicit 'in sanetis eloquiis', sed 'ex sanetis
eloquiis', quia quaecumque ex his quae eontinentur in Sacra Scriptura elid possunt, non sunt
aliena ab hoc doctrina, lieel ipsa edam in Sacra non contineantur Scriptura (CDN I 1.11). It
appears that Aquinas intends the fathers of the church (CDN II 1.125), and apostolic teaching
98 NAMES OF CHRIST
surpasses the power of human reason and intellect; it is a union with the ineffable
and the unknown. Elsewhere Aquinas quotes a similar passage often (cf. ST I 12.13
obiectum 1), and in the commentary on DDN he says that the doctrine of faith
offers unknown and unspeakable things to humankind. The faithful have no
knowledge (in the strict sense) of them, nor can they perfectly voice and explain
them, even though their attachment is more certain than in the case of any natural
knowledge".
Apart from the unified names, DDN mentions personal or discrete names of Christ:
names that signify the Son of God according to the divine person he is, and names
that signify the Son of God according to his human nature. Both belong to the
theologia discreta.
The subject of DDN, Aquinas explains, is not primarily discrete theology of
Christ"'. The book intends to examine those names of God that are names of
created likenesses, and this excludes discrete names50 . Nevertheless, in his own
writings about Christ Aquinas acknowledges up to three times the importance of
DDN. In the Tertia Pars he refers to DDN in order to prove that almightiness
cannot be predicated of Christ according to his human nature, because this nature
does not share in the divine limitlessness (ST ill 13.1). In the Quaest.Disp. De
Veritate the help of DDN is enlisted in showing that the name Verbum implies (by
way of consequence) a relationship with creation, inasmuch as the name signifies
that God imparts his wisdom and reason (4.5 sed contra 5). Finally there is a very
important text from DDN that Aquinas in his Quest.Disp. De Unione Verbi
Incarnati employs to express that which constitutes the mystery of the incarnation:
"The divine composition. i.e. the union, of Jesus for our sakes [or: with us] cannot
be told in words nor grasped by any mind, not even by the leader of the most
dignified of the angels. "51 The union of human nature with God is unspeakable
and exceeds any understanding; it is an occultum mysterium, a dark mystery (CDN
transmitted outside Scripture (CDNI 2.64);
48) CDN I 1.7: Sed in doctrina fidei proponuntur quaedam homini ignota et indicibilia quibus
habentes fidem inhaerent, non cognoscendo aut perjecte verbo exp/icando, licet certius eis
inhaereant et a/tior sit huiusmodi inhaesio quam aliqua cognitio naturalis. In doctrina igitur fidei
non possumus inniti principiis humanae sapientiae. cf. I 1.8;
49) CDN I 2.63: Et quia de mysterio Incarnationis plura did possent, quae ad praesens
omittit, quia non est de hoc principalis intentio ... ; cf. II 4.190;
50) as opposed to another hook written by Dionysius, De Divinis Hypotyposibus, that
examines those things of God. that concern his unity and distinctions, i.e. discrete names. Cf.
Aquinas' prologue and his discussion of unified and discrete names in CDN II 1, in which
Aquinas invokes a 'magisterial rule'; Et ex hoc potest accipi regula magistralis quod omnia
nomina designantia effectum in creaturas, pertinent ad divinam essentiam (ibidem, 126). Cf. CDN
III 1.227;
51) ~Jesus secundum nos divina compositio~, idest unto. net ineffabilis est verbo omni. et
ignota menti,' tamen et ipsi primo dignissimorum angeJorum", QDI 1, citation from DDN II
9.648A. Cf. CDN II 4.188 where Aquinas favors a reading that corresponds to the translation in
brackets;
CHAPTER THREE 99
II 4.188).
This text that Aquinas cites is one of the five passages dealing with the incarnation
that DDN contains. even though names involved in the incarnation are not its
subject52 • Each time these passages serve as an explanation of the divine name
Benignus, loving-kind. God's loving-kindness appears in the Son becoming human
in order to be a peace-offering for the sin of humankind. It seems as though
Dionysius has a special predilection for Paul's letter to Titus: "But when the
kindness and love of God our Saviour for humanity were revealed ... "". The
incarnation and all that comes with it manifest the divine loving-kindness. Its
treattnent is the place in theology where, besides trinitarian theology, the%gia
discreta is exercised. All that is predicated of the Incarnate One is predicated of the
Son of God, and constitutts the proper predication of the Son that is not shared
with the other divine persons. None of the passages that deal with the incarnation
refiect upon explicit divine names, except the unified names Benignus and Pax''.
Implicitly the discrete name Incarnatus. as an explanation of the name Benignus.
seems to be involved.
I will now discuss these five passages and present, when called for, Aquinas'
comment on it.
(a) Employing a kind of language that breathes praise and awe, Dionysius brings
up for worship God's love for humankind: the Son truly shared in what is OUIS,
and thereby the Trinity issued a call to rise us up to itself. There are no words
appropriate for voicing the way in which Jesus, the one who is simple, became
composed, or the way in which Jesus, the one who is eternal, assumed temporality,
or the way in which Jesus, the one who excels all natural order, came to be of our
nature without change and without confusion (DDN I 4.592B). Aquinas emphasizes
that the very name Benignus expresses what no other name mentioned by Dionysius
in this context (Unitas, Trinitas, Causa, Sapiens, Pulcher) does. The name signifies
God's communication in the incarnation, God's true sharing in all that is essential
to human nature. Aquinas accepts the invitation that Dionysius' words seem to
issue: he brings up his understanding of the doctrine of the hypostatic union
52) I 4.592B; II 3.640C; II 6.644C; II 9.648A tim 649A; XI 5.953B;
53) Tt 3.4: Cum aurem benignitas et humanitas apparuit Saivatoris nostri Dei...;
54) DDN XI 5.953A: "Now there is no need to tell of the loving-kindness of Christ, bathed as
it is in peace. But we must learn from it to cease from strife within ourselves, against each other
and against the angels. We must work together and with the angels to do the things of God, and
we must do so in accordance with the Providence of Jesus "who works all things in all," making
that Peace which is ineffable and was foreordained from eternity, reconciling us to himself and in
himself to the Father." The Latin translation has: Quid dicat quidem aliquis de benignitate pacem
ejfundente secundum Christum? Secundum quam non iam didicimus bellum facere neque nobis
ipsis neque aliis neque Angelis, sed et cum ipsis divina secundum virtutem operabimur secundum
providentiam lesu omnia in omnibus cooperantis, sed et facientis pacem ineffabilem et ex saeculo
praediffinitam et reconciliantis nos sibi ipsi in Spiritu et, per ipsum et in ipso. Patri (420). This
chapter discusses the unified divine name Pax;
100 NAMES OF CHRIST
(confronted with heretical positions) and with it he explains Dionysius' words".
(b) The perfect and unchangeable being of Jesus-among-us, and the personal
mysteries of his loving-kindness, belong to the predicates of the Son of God, to
discrete theology (DDN II 3.640C; CDN II 1.127). Aquinas explains that Dionysius
takes names such as Father, Son and Spirit, and the names of the operations that go
with them, such as to generate, to be generated and to proceed, to be discrete
names. The mystery of the incarnation and all the mysteries of the life of Christ
belong to discrete theology.
(c) The incarnation and all that the Incarnate One does and suffers according to his
human nature, can only be predicated of the Son. The Father and the Spirit share
in that one benevolent and loving divine will that initiated the incarnation, and
share their immutable nature with the Son who performed this ineffable act of God,
but they had no share in the assumption and the passion. Conception, birth. eating.
drinking, sleeping, crucifixion, death, Aquinas adds, are all attributed to the Son
alone (DDN II 6.644C; CDN II 3.168).
(d) The most evident idea in theology, namely the hypostatic composition or mtion,
cannot be articulated in words nor grasped by any mind, Dionysius says (cf. above
p. 98). That the Son undertook to be a man is entirely mysterious. How was he
formed from a virgin's blood? How could he, with the weight he had, keep his feet
dry, walking on water? Dionysius' agenda for a negative christology contains at
least three (types of) subjects: Christ's union or composition, his conception, and
the miracles he performed. Aquinas shows how these three points are listed on an
agenda that covers both the hidden things, things that exceed human understanding,
according to Christ's divine nature and the person that he is, and according to his
?uman nature". The subjects mentioned belong to the second category. Aquinas
Independently remarks, by way of conclusion, that this excess of human
55) Et ne aUquis crederet quod ita communicaverit nostris, secundum inhabitationem solam, ut
Nestorius dixit, sed secundum veram unionem in persona et hypostasi ut, scilicet, Ipse, qui est
Deus, vere sit homo, subiungit: "ex qua", scilicet Deitate operante vel "ex qua", idest secundum
quam humanitatem, "Iesus", qui est Hineffabiliter simplex", secundum Deitatem, Ipse idem
hypostasi "est compositus" secundum humanitatem; "et" qui est "aetemus", secundum Deitatem,
"acceptt praesentationem temporalem ", idest U! sit temporalis in hoc praesenti tempore, secundum
hUmanam naturam; "et qui", secundum Deitatem, "supersubstantialiter" excellit "omnem ordinem
secundum omnem naturam, factus est intra nostram naturam ", vere honw sub specie humana
contentus sicut et coeteri homines; per quae omnia dat intelligere qucd idem est suppositum Deus
et Homo.
Et ne a/iquis perverse intelligeret quod Deus factus sit homo secundum aliquam conversionem
deitatis in camem vel in animam vel etiam secundum aliquam commassationem ut sic esset una
natura Dei et Hominis, ut Eutyches confinxit. subiunxit: "cum intransmutabili et inconfusa
collocati?~e.", idest finna s~lvatione ."proprlorum", idest proprietatum utriusque naturae, quia
neque DlVlmtas con versa est In humamtatem neque humanitas in Divinitatem, CDNI 2.61-62;
56) . ,"Deind~. cum dicit "omnia enim ... " assignat rationem quare in rebus divinis sint quaedam
mystlca, quae mtellectum nostrum excedunt; et circa hoc, duo facit: primo, manifestat hoc ex
parte deitatis; secundo ex parte humanitatis Christi, CDNII 4.174;
CHAPTER THREE 101
understanding applies to all of our knowledge of Jesus".
(e) The last text in DDN that considers the incarnation contains a long quotation
from a certain Hierotheus, an historical or fictitious figure. When Hierotheus
praises, according to Aquinas, ftrst the divinity and then the humanity of Christ
the paradoxical. c?~ection b~~een. names of Christ ~nd Christ's 'innominability:
emerges. The dIvImty of ChrIst IS VIewed as the fulftlhng cause of all, i.e. it brings
everything into existence and fills it with perfections. Christ is the cause of the
essence of all thiugs created, and of their example, namely their measure their
perfection, and thirdly their understanding and speaking". This third aspe~t that
Aquinas discerns means that Dionysius compares the divine nature of Christ with
created intellect and speech, showing that it is inexpressible and ineffable
exceeding all mind and all life. Aquinas associates that ineffability with th;
impossibility of either incomplex or complex speech, i.e. words taken by
themselves or fonned into an enunciation. expressing the truth of that nature
adequately. Divine nature escapes the human mode of signification that consists in
usin~ simple words or complex statements. so reflecting the intellectual operations
of slD1ple apprehension and compositionldivisions9 . Nor is speech about the
57) . Et eadem ratio est in omnibt1.5 aliis quaecumque pertinent ad cognitionem Jesu, quae
excedll naturale lumen aut naturalem rationem. CDN II 4.188. Cf. below p. 102f, where we
discuss Albert the Great's commentary on this text from DDN;
58) "The divinity of Jesus is the fulfilling cause of all. and the parts of that divinity are so
related to the whole that it is neither whole nor part while being at the same time both whole and
part. Within its total unity it contains part and whole, and it transcends these too and is antecedent
to them. This perfection is found in the imperfect as the source of their perfection. But it also
trans~ds pe~fection, and ~n t~e perfect it is manifest as transcending and anticipating their
perfectlon. It IS the form whIch IS the source of fonn for the formless. But it also transcends form
among t?e fanned. It is the ~eing pervading all beings and remains unaffected thereby. It is the
supra-bemg beyond every bemg. It sets the boundaries of all sources and orders and yet it is
ro?ted above ~very ~ource and order. It is the measure of all things. It is eternity and is above and
pn~r to eter~llty. It IS .abundance where there is want and superabundance where there is plenty. It
IS mexpresslble and meffable, and it transcends mind, life. and being. It is the supernatural
possessor of the supernatural. It is the transcendent possessor of transcendence" DDN II
1O.648CD. Latin translation: Omnium Causa et adimpletiva est Iesu Deitas; quae part~s totalitati
~onso~as salvat ~t. neque pars est neque totum et totum et pars, sicut omnium et partem et tolum
tn selp~a .coa~clplens .et superhabens et praehabens. Peifecta quidem est in impeifectis, sicut
peifectloms pnnceps, lmpeifecta autem in peifectis, sicut superpeifecta et praepeifecta. Forma
formam faciens i~ car~ntibus fo~, .sicU! formae princeps; sina forma in formis, skut supe~
formam .. Substantla, tOtlUS substantlls unmacuiate superveniens et supersubstantialiter ab universa
sub~tantlG segregata. Tota principia et ordines determinans et super omnem principatum et
or~lJlem collo.cata. Et mensura est existentiwn et aevum super aevum et ante aevum; et plena in
nunus ~bentlbus, superp~ena in plenis. IndicibiJis, ineffabilis, super mentem, super vitam, super
substantlam,. supernat~ra[lter habet supernaturale. supersubstantialiter supersubstantiale (61-69);
59) .. Tertlo, ostendlt eam per comparationem ad intellectum et locutionem quae sunt extra rem
et dIC!t, quod e~t ~indicibilis" et ,,"ineffabilis ", quia neque sermone complexo, neque incompiexo,
su.ffi~l~nter expTlml potest; et est super mentem" et ~super" O11Uiem "vitam", quia excedit omnem
cognltlonem et omnem actum vitae, CDN II 5.205;

102 NAMES OF CHRIST
humanity of Christ exempt from this fundamental deficiency. As Hieroteus
continues with the praise of the incarnation60 • viewed as the implementation of
divine benignitas. Aquinas recognizes yet another list of subjects for an agenda of
negative christology. The Son of God has accepted what is proper for our nature,
but even in those human things he was supematuraie et supersubstantiale.
Fonnulated in this way, such language is ambiguous. Are we talking about Christ's
divine nature which does not change. or are we talking about Christ's human
nature which excels the nature of all other human beings? We are talking about
neither of them taken singly, but about both of them together. On the one hand,
there is the hypostatic union which exceeds the order of created things, and which
is such that no change, no mingling and no confusion is present. On the other
band, there is Christ's human nature, whose flesh has greater power and greater
dignity, whose soul has greater dignity as well, and whose operation was unified
with divine operation. This means that Christ's human nature and operatio,Q. are
dignified to an extent which is unknown, though not as such but because they are
the human nature and operation of Christ.
There is yet another list of subjects for an agenda of negative christology: Christ's
divine nature, the hypostatic union, Christ's body, soul and human operation. We
have names for all of these, and yet they wiII never succeed in expressing perfectly
what they signify.
Some elements of this commentary can be found in Albert the Great's commentary
on DDN as well. This commentary has come down to us in the lecture notes taken
down by his student, Thomas Aquinas. Albert's comments on the Dionysian
passages d) and e) (DDN II 9.648A and II 1O.648C-649A) contain the foIlowing,
which both parallels aud clarifies Aquinas' own commentary6i. The fact that
Christ Incarnate is called 'composed' gives the impression that Christ's incarnation
makes him to be like created thiugs, all of which are composed as well. It seems to
reserve the ineffability of Christ to his divine nature and the person that he is.
60) "And out of love he has come down to be at our level of nature and has become a being.
He, the transcendent God, has taken on the name of man. (Such things, beyond mind and beyond
words, we must praise with all reverence.) In all this he remains what he is - supernatural,
transcendent - and he has come to join us in what we are without himself undergoing change or
confusion. His fullness was unaffected by that inexpressible emptying of self, and, most novel of
all, amid the'things of our nature he remained supernatural and amid the things of being he
remained beyond being. From us he took what was of us and yet he surpassed us here too". DDN
II 1O.648D/649A. The Latin translation: Unde. quoniam et usque ad naturam a benignitate venit,
et vere substantia Jactus est et vir superdeus existitit - propitiatione autem sin! a nobis haec super
men/em et rationem laudata - quamvis et in istis habet supernaturale et supersubstantiale, non
solum secundum quod invariabiliter et inconfuse nobis communicavit, nihil passus ad superplenum
ipsius ab indJabili exinanitione. sed quontam et, quod est omnibus novis magis novum, in
naturalibus nostris supernaturaliter erat, in substantialibus supersubstantialiter. omnia nostra
super nos habens (70);
61) Super Dionysium de Divinis Nominibus, Opera Omnia Alberti Magni, T. XXXVII, P. I, II
69-82;
1.4.
CHAPTER THREE 103
None of this is true however, since this composition is Unlike any composition that
we know of. It does not imply auy potentiality nor does it mean that a third
(in effect neither God nor man) has come into existence. We can only
knowledge of Christ by employiug incomp/exa (e.g. Christus manens in
naturis) Of complexa (Filium Dei assumpsisse humanam naturarn in unitatem),
first being a simple concept and the second being a proposition that can be
false. Both kinds of knowledge, however, only answer two of the four
that should be answered. We know that (quia) and we know whether
Christ we do not know what (quid), nor why (propter quid). Two
natures in one hypostasiS really is too much to comprehend. The in,:arnalio[
mystery. And even more, while we do comprehend human nature and
the mysteriousness of this,union in which human nature is united to the Son
affects our understanding and speaking about Christ according to his human
as welI. We know e.g. what hunger is, but since it is Christ who has hung"""
do not exactly know what it is in this case. In the union the creator stays
and created things remain created. but at the same time we believe that
natures enfold each other and that human aud divine properties are cOInmlun,cat
in the same person.
Aquinas shares with Albert his emphasis on the deficiency of the human mode of
signification (incomplexa and complexa)62 and on the mystery of the incarnation as)
the root of all verbal inadequacy even regarding Christ's human nature. The names
of Christ that are to be cherished have to be submitted to a certain critique as well.
In sum: De Divinis Nominibus contains names of Christ. Since the major goal of
the work is the treatment of unified names that apply to all three divine persons in
common, Dionysius attends to the unified names of Christ that apply to the entire
Godhead. He defends that they in fact do apply, and employs those names in his
entire book in an appropriate malUler. We summarized this in the phrase that for
Dionysius Christ is the 'name' of God. The unified name benignus is the name that
calls for praising the incarnation and alI that comes with it. In so doing, Dionysius
highiights the fact that all understanding and naming of Christ fails to do so
perfectly; indeed, quite the contrary. There is a double reason for this: on the one
hand, the fact that the Son of God shares in the same ineffable supremacy as the
entire Godhead, and on the other hand, the mystery of the incarnation, the personal
union of both natures. The latter affects all discrete naming of Christ, even the
predication of things according to his human nature. Aquinas does not disagree
with this, but, on the contrary, endorses it. He employs the same method
concerning unified names of Christ as Dionysius does, implying that for him also
Christ is the 'name' of God. With the help of the doctrine of the two natures he
articulates what Dionysius says about the incarnation, and at the same time
corroborates his convictions concerning the total ineffability of Christ, concerning a
negative christology.
62) Cf. 3SN24.1.2, commented on in Chapter I, p. 21;
104 NAMES OF CHRIST
Conclusion
Many of the names of Christ that the New Testament employs are mentioned and
discussed by Aquinas. If one examines the Tertia Pars of the Summa Theologiae
from the viewpoint of the names of Christ, it turns out that a large part of Aquinas'
treatment of the person and life of the Word Incarnate is devoted to a discussion of
names. It proves that Aquinas' linguistic bent is present in his christology as well.
Sometimes he focuses on the fittingness of a name, sometimes on its meaning and
application, and sometimes he invokes them to sustain his argument. Typical of the
first and second approach mentioned is the attention given to the priority with
which Christ is called such and such. According to their full meaning the names of
Christ have only one singular application, and in order to understand that full
meaning, one has to have recourse to their analogous use. In this respect the
spiritual reading of the Old Testament is highly important. It teaches that there are
many more names of Christ than the ones from the New Testament alone, and it
teaches that the names that Old and New Testament have in common are used
analogously. On this score Aquinas' commentary on Isaiah is highly relevant. The
so-called collationes that this commentary contains attest to Aquinas' predilection
for the names of Christ, for the modes of signifying Christ. This predilection is
founded on the conviction that Christ is the 'name' of God, that he reveals the
name of the Father and as such is glorified. On the one hand Jesus, i.e. Saviour, is
one of the most prominent names of God, whereas on the other hand Jesus is the
'name' of God, i.e. he has revealed God to be forgiving and saving. Thus, there is
nO reason for surprise at the fact that names of Christ exemplify a type of speech
that breathes love, praise and promise: the love of the faithful that consists in the
fulfihnent of the commandments, the praise of the faithful who glorify their
saviour, and the promise of new names to the faithful.
Aquinas shows himself to be quite familiar with the conviction that Christ and the
names of God are intrinsically connected. This familiarity may have been promoted
by his spiritual reading of Scripture, but it was certainly promoted by the
authorities on the divine names that he studied and commented upon. Both Peter of
Lombard and Pseudo-Dionysius pay attention to names of Christ in their general
treatises on divine names. Names of Christ are to be found in all three basic
categories they discern: metaphors or symbolic names, proper cornman or es~ential
names, proper personal names. The second category can also be called the category
of unified names, the third category the category of discrete names. From Aquinas'
commentary on Peter of Lombard we learn that Aquinas considers names that
signify the incarnation itself (incarnatus, humanatus) or names that signify Christ
according to his human nature (honw) to be divine names that are discrete. Since
they signify the hypostatic union implicitly, and since the union is a kind of
relationship, these names are considered as names that implicitly signify a temporal
relationship. From Aquinas' commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius (DDN) we learn
that names attributed to Christ in Scripture, are often to be considered as (unified)
names for God. This supposes the view that Christ is the 'name' for God.
CHAPTER THREE 105
Moreover, one of the most important unified divine names, Benignus. gives reason
to develop all that is (discretely) said of the Word Incarnate. Once again, this
entails that the general treatment of divine names takes the union into consideration
as well. In explaining DDN the doctrine of two natures appears to be a
hermeneutical instrument of major importance. It helps to explain that some names
apply to Christ according to his human nature, and some according to his divine
nature and personality. At the same time, however. because the doctrine regards
the hypostatic union, it serves to qualify our understanding of the meaning of the
names that are said according to Christ's human nature: since they are said of
Christ, i.e. the divine persoll of the Son of God, they too escape full
comprehension and are part of an hradequate and deficient mode of signification of
Christ.
In view of the study of mysterium in chapter I, it has become apparent that the
reading of Scripture secundum mysterium is intrinsically connected to the names of
Christ. The same relationship of hiding and revealing, of promise and fulfilment,
of imperfection and perfection, of mode of signification and thing signified, i.e. the
same relationship of analogy, accounts both for the discovery of names of Christ in
the Old Testament and for the elucidation of names employed in the New
Testament. The revealing cannot be had without the hiding, the fulfilment hides as
it were in the promise. which is essential to understanding it as a fulfilment.
Moreover, in chapter I we talked about Christ's mode of signification. We did so
in order to come up with an initial understanding of the way in which Christ
himself (person and work) is a mystery, i.e. God hidden in Christ. Now we are
ahle to articulate this. From the study of the names of Christ we infer that the fact
of Christ himself being a mystery is rooted in Christ's being the 'name' of God.
Christ reveals God, the God that he is. The God that Christ is will be named with
the names of Christ. A perfect understanding of God can only be God himself, the
Word of God, yet all the names for this 'name' are human names. The human
nature of Christ, as it were, shares its humanity with our mode of signifying
Christ. On the other hand, however, Christ's human nature is united to God in a
way that utterly exceeds the union of our names with God. Our names of God are
closest to him when they signify the human nature of Christ. Then our words
perform a task for which they were designed, i.e. signlfy created things. But
through the union of human nature to the person of the Son of God, our words that
signify this nature supposit for the eternal person of the Son. And this unique
supposition affects our understanding of their meaning. Here we see, in view of
what we developed in chapter II, that to concentrate solely on the meaning of the
words used in christology leads to severe difficulties. It wonld obscure the fact that
it is of equal importance to fmding the right words to pass judgment on their
unique application. It would obscure the fact that the doctrine of two natures is a
doctrine of the hypostatic union. It would make Christ's human nature into a mere
device, and it would fail to acknowledge that the truth of Christ's humanity does
not entail that names pertinent to that nature are necessarily used univocaUy.
106 NAMES OF CHRIST

This may, finally, serve to establish the link between the discussion of names of Appendix: Translation oj the names oj Christ mentioned
Christ and the general treatment of divine names. This link consists, first, of
(except the ones mentioned in 1.1)
Aquinas' conviction that Christ is the 'name' of God. Second, of the application of
the conception of analogy to names of Christ. Third, of the fact that the hypostatic Accelera spolia detrahe
union is actively presupposed in these treatises, inasmuch as all names of Christ festina praedari Speedy-spoil-quick-booty
that concern Christ Incarnate impliCitly signify temporal relations, and belong to Admirabilis Wonderful
the category of temporal relative names". Advocatus id
Agnns Lamb
Alpha et Omega id [Beginning and End]
We have concluded that a simple consideration of the meaning of names of Christ id [Truth i.e. Fulfilment of the Promises]
Amen
will not do. Let us therefore turn to their supposition, and discuss the semantics Apostolus id
involved in the doctrine of the hypostatic union. Ascensor eaeH Rider of Heaven to Your Help
Auxiliator Tuus
Auctor (Vitae, Salutis. Prince of Life, Leader of Salvation
Fidei) Leader of Faith
Bracchium Arm
Caput Head
Character Impress, Symbol
Christus id [Anointed One]
Cibus Peregrinationis Food for the Journey (on Earth)
Colonus Agricultural Labourer on Foreign Soil
Viator Traveler on Earth
Consiliarius Counsellor
Consolatar id
Conswnmator Completer
Deus God
Dextera Patris Sitting on the Right Hand of the Father
Dilectus Beloved
Doctor id
Dominator Lord
Dominus Lord
Ductor Leader
Dux Leader
Emmanuel id [God·with-Us]
Episcopus Guardian
Fidelis et Verax Trustworthy and True
Figura Substantiae Symbol/Impress of (God's own) Being
Filius Abrahae Son of Abraham
Filius David Son of David
Filius Dei Son of God
Filius Hominis Son of Man
Filius Joseph Son of Joseph
Filius Mariae Son of Mary
Flos Flower
Fluvium Stream
Foedus Covenant
Fons Sapientiae Fountain of Wisdom
63) As such, this link proves that the divine names are primarily names contained in Scripture, Fonnosus . Beautiful
and that all analysis executed in the treatises on divine names first and foremost serves as an Fortis Mighty
henneneutical instrument in reading Scripture. This affects a reading of e.g. ST I 13 as part of the Frater Brother
praeambula fidei;
108 TRANSLATION OF NAMES APPENDIX CHAPTER TIiREE

Fructus Terrae Fruit of the Earth Qui ab Aquilone He that comes from the North
Fundamenturn (Ecclesiae) Foundation (of the Church) Qui ab Oriente He that comes from the East
Gennen Domini Bud of the Lord Qui habet clavem David He that has the Key of David
Homo Human being Qui venturus est He that will come
Humanatus Humanized One Rabbi id
hnago Dei Image of God Radius Ray
Incarnatus Incarnate One Radix. et Genus David Root and Offspring of David
Iudex Judge Redemptor Redeemer
lustus Just Restaurator Restorator
Jesus id [Saviour] Resurrectio et Vita Resurrection and Life
Lapis Stone Rex King
Leo de Tribu Juda Lion of the Tribe of Judah Rex Regum et Dominus King of Kings and Lord of Lords
Liberalis Generous Dominantium
Lilia Lilies Testis fidelis Faithful Witness
Lux Mundi Light of he World Sacerdos Priest
Magister Master Saivator Saviour
Mediator id Sanctus Holy
Medicus Physician Satisfactor Satisfier
Messias id [Anointed One] Secundus Homo de Second Man from Heaven
Minister id Caelo/caelestis
Mons Mountain / Spiritus id
Murns Wall Servus/Puer/Pilius Servant
Nazare(n)us id [Holy One, or Full of flowers/Twig-like] Sol Iustitiae Sun of Justice
Nomen Domini Name of the Lord Speculator Watchman
Novissimus Last Speculum Image
Novissimus Adam Last Adam Splendor Gloriae Radiance of the (Divine) Glory
Nubes Levis Bright Cloud Sponsus Bridegroom
Oblatio et Hostia Sacrifice and Victim Stella splendida et Bright Morningstar
Oriens The Orient rnatutina
Ostium/Ianna Ovium Door of the Sheep Terra Vester Your Land
Panis Vitae Bread of Life Triumphator Triumphant
Paracletus id Unigenitus Only-begotten
Parvulus Little Urbs Fortitudinis Fortress City
Pascha id Verbum Word
Pastor Sheperd Verus True
Pater futuri Saeculi Father of the World to Come Via-Veritas-et-Vita Way, Truth and Life
Pavor Vester Your fear Victor id
Pontifex High Priest Vir Dolorum Man of Sorrows
Praeceptor Teacher Vir Unus One Man
Praedestinatus Predestined Virga Rod
Praemium Remunerationis id Virtus et Sapientia Dei Power and Wisdom of God
Pretium Redemptionis Price of Redemption Vitis vera True Vine
Primogenitus Firstborn
Primus First
Primus et Novissimus First and Last
Princeps Pacis Prince of Peace
Principium Beginning
Principium et Finis Beginning and End
Propheta Prophet
Propitiatio id
(Pro )pugnator Defender

CHAPTER IV
THE NAMING OF THE UNITY OF CHRIST INCARNATE
Up till now we have only discussed the signification of the Dames of Christ. Every
now and then we had to speak about their application to Christ as well. This brings
their supposition into focus. The signification of the names of Christ that directly
signify the union, and especially the supposition of the names of Christ in general
will be the subject of this chapter. We will discover that Aquinas' doctrine of the
hypostatic union rests upon a fundamental analogy between the human mode of
signification on the one hand. and the personal union of Christ on the other. This
fundamental analogy results in the articulation of- a rule for analyzing what is
actually said about Christ: the theory of the interchange of attributes (communicatio
idiomatum). In the final analysis: to state that there is one supposit in Christ (and
not two) is equivalent to stating that in any· proposition about Christ the words used
as sUbject-expression may possess a different signification yet have the same
personal supposition.
The first section will deal with Aquinas' doctrine of the hypostatic union. The
second section -focuses upon its logical and linguistic status, which is elaborat~ in
the third section concerning the rules of the interchange of attributes.
1. Aquinas' doctrine oj the hypostatic union
First we will devote attention to the historical background of Aquinas' position
(1.1). Next an overview of the meaning of the key-tenns of the discussion is given
(1.2). An examination of the structure of several of Aquinas' discussions of the
union leads to the presentation of the main points of Aquinas' doctrine of the
hypostatic union (1.3). Finally we examine the details of Aquinas' analysis of three
views on the union that were the subject of scholastic debate (1.4). As it turns out,
Aquinas' main focus in discussing Christ Incarnate is the personal unity.
1.1 Some historical notions
The history of the interpretation of Christ's person leaves its traces in Aquinas'
thought in a special way. A large part of Aquinas' discussion results in
henneneutical rules for the reading of Scripture and the fathers of the church. The
discussion itself is embedded in the confrontation and explanation of their
enunciations. Besides this, Aquinas was engaged in a rapprochement of the
churches of West and East. A papal request to study the Greek fathers led to a
unique familiarity with Greek theology, a familiarity that can easily be recognized
in Aquinas' christologyl. John of Damascus (d. 754), one of the Greek Fathers,
1) Cf. I. Backes, 1931;
CHAPTER FOUR III
not only interests Aquinas because of his theology, but also because of th~
information he provides on the eucumenicaI councils. In fact, Aquinas was the firsl
western theologian in the middle ages who possessed a more than margina·
knowledge of the definitions of the council of Cha1cedon (451), and was the first tc
quote from its documents2 . Theologically this mean~, among other ~ing~, that th(,
face of monophysitism can be drawn in greater detaIl.' and that Aqumas IS the ~r~
to put the question whether the union is a natural UDlon3• Mor~over. charactensw
of Aquinas' discussions is a certain historical consciousness regarding .thOSf
interpretations of the mystery of the incarnation, recent or remote, the falSIty 0:
which has been established by the church. His commentary on In 1, for example
is replete with connections between John's words and misrep~esentatiom
concerning Christ, which John is taken to have foreseen ~d answ~re~ m adv~ce
In his systematic works Aquinas always starts out his exammatlons wlth ;:
discussion of errors4 • Again, Aquinas was the first to subject Peter of Lombard'!
highly influential presentation of three types of theories of the union to a systematic
analysis. He knows that one aspect of one of the theories. had met witl
condemnation by Pope Alexander III (what later was to be called christologica
nihilism): as a human being Christ was not a .something, non est·aliquicf.
1.2 The key-terms of the discussion
In the doctrine of the hypostatic union a number of terms occurs whose meaning i:
decisive for whether one does justice to the union or not. For example, whoeve:
2) Cf. G. Geenen, 1952; I. Backes, 1953;
3) Backes, 1953, p. 935;
4) The Summa contra Gentiles for example, a~er h~vjng establ~sh~ some principal point:
contained in Scripture, treats errors made by Eblon, I.e. the EblOmt~,. C~rmthus, Paul 0
Samosata and Photinus (Christ is God not by nature but only by partICipatIOn, IV 28), thl
Manicheans (Christ did not have a real but only a fake body, IV 29), Valentine (Christ did no
receive his body from Mary but had a heavenly body, IV 30), Apollinaris (The .Wo.rd part.l:
changed into flesh, IV 31), Arius (Christ did not have a hu~an soul, IV 32), Apolhnans (ChriS
did not have a rational soul. IV 33), Origen (The soul of ChrISt was created before the world was
IV 33), Theodore of Mopsueste and Nestorius (Christ was God not by na~re bu.t bec~~s: of al
accidental relation of inhabitation, IV 34), Eutyches (Christ had one nature III which dlVI~lty ani
humanity were mixed, IV 35), Macarius of Antioch (In Christ there ~s only one operatIOn ani
will, IV 36), Posteriores (Christ's body and soul were not mutually umted, but bo~ of them hal
an accidental relation with the Word, IV 37) and Alii (others, There are two mstead of on
supposits in Christ, IV 38); . . .
5) This condemnation. by the fonner theologIan Rolandus B~dlllelh who h~d now becom
Pope, was voiced in two letters from 1170 and 1177 that probably Incorrectly, attributed the erro
to Peter of Lombard. Cf. H. Denzinger, 1991, 7491750; Cf. 3SN 6.3.1 ~ STIlI 2.6 sed contra.
Aquinas seems to have had knowledge of the. fact that Gilbert of ~oitiers (c: 107~MI154), at th
occasion of a special consistory in 1147 at Relms, was forced to wlth~raw ,hiS ~emal of the trot
of the proposition Divina natura est incarnata. At least he knew of Gtlbert s Withdrawal of oth~
trinitarian errors, cf. STI 28.2. Cf. L.O. Nielsen, 1982, pp. 30-39;
112 NAMING THE UNlTY OF CHRIST
offers a distinction in meaning between suppositum and persona, other than that
persona unlike suppositum signifies rationality as well. will end up in a doctrine
that posits an accidental union instead of a substantial one. An accidental union
makes it impossible to predicate one of the other, which in christology (Deus est
homo, Homo est Deus) is imperative. Another example: whoever thinks that every
individual substantial nature needs to be a suppositum will end up in a doctrine that
states there to be two supposits in Christ. Consequently this union will be
accidental as well. So it is important to consider the meaning of the keywtenns.
They are: substantia, natura, persona, suppositum. hypostasis, individuum, essentia
and esse6 •
Everything that exists is subsumed under one or more of the ten categories that
Aristotle distinguished. The primary category is the category of substance. Under
this category fall those things that exist of their own right and independently of
anything else. The nine other categories concern aspects of substance, such as
quantity, quality and relation. In each thing tMt exists by itself (subsists per se),
one can distinguish what is essential to the thing from the thing itself. For there is
no essential difference between the humanity of Plato and the humanity of Socrates,
but both are different individuals. Therefore.the word substance has two meanings.
In the first place, it signifies something that exists by itself in a certain nature or
essence, and that comprises all the aspects it contains. Any word signifying
substance in this sense can never be a prediCate-expression in a proposition, and
can only serve as a subject-expression7 • In the second place, substance means the
essential nature of a thing that exists by itself, without which it would not belong to
the species it does. This man is a substance (1) and the substance (2) of this man is
humanity8.
This principal distinction between first and second substance corresponds with the
distinction between several meanings of 'to be' (esse). First one has to distinguish
between the being that can be said of the ten categories, and logical being. Logical
being is the being of the cOimection between subjecHerm and predicate-term by
6) i.e. substance, nature, p.erson, supposit, hypostasis, individual, essence and being;
7) The exception to this rule is any proposition that intends to articulate divine simplicity,
such as Divino essentia est Deus and Divina essentia est Filius, cr. on the latter e.g. ISN 4.2.2
solutio + ad 1 and 5.1.1 ad 3;
8) cr. ScG IV 49.11; QJJP 9.2 ad 6 (magis est divisio analogi quam generis); QJJL 3.2.2 ad
1; ST 129.2; III 2.6 ad 3. It is quite important to see that 'to be by itself is not a definition of the
word substance, because per hoc non demonstratur quidditas eius, sed eius esse; et sua quidditas
non est suum esse, 4SN 12.1.1.1 ad 2. QJJP 7.3 ad 4 adds: Ens per se non est dejinitio
substantiae, ut Avicenna dicit. Ens enim non potest esse alicuius genus, Ul probat Philosophus,
cum nihil possit add; ad ens quod non parricipet ipsum; differentia vero non debet participari
genus. Sed si substantia possit habere dejinitionem, non obstante quod est genus generalissimum.
ent eius dejinitio: quod substantia est res cuius quidditati debetur esse non in aliquo. Cf. sr I 3.5
ad 1;
CHAPTER FOUR 113
way of the copula, the union est. It expresses the truth of the proposition regardless
of the real being of its subject, and first and foremost indicates a connection
understood in the human mind9 •
Apart from logical being, there is being that can be said of each of the ten
categories. Here being is said analogously i.e. per prius et posterius. First because
such being cannot be defined, simply because it would have to include a specific
difference, which would cause anything else to which the specific difference does
not apply to belong to non-being. Second because being in its true and proper sense
is said primarily of anything that exists by itself, i.e. of first substance. From this
meaning the meaning of being when signifying the being of second substance (Le.
substantial fonn) and the nine other categories is derived. In this way is the being
in something else that exists by itself signified lO •
Being in this sense of substantial (1) being compares to essence or quiddity as
perfect to imperfect, as act to potency. Being itself is the greatest perfection of all.
and 'Thomas a Creatore' (Chesterton) knows of no being as a minimum, as 'just'
being-there. Being comes from God, Qui est (Ex 3), and is the ultimate perfection
of anything that is, comprising all of it. Nothing that exists exists because of itself,
but has received it, participates in it. Only to God it is essential to be, whereas any
creature fmds its origin outside itself in Ipsum Esse Subsistens.
So the primary distinction between first and second substance, corresponds to
distinctions of being. It corresponds to the distinction between being and essence or
accident, and it corresponds to the distinction between the proper signification and
the derived signification of to be (Le. the act of being of that which exists by itself
and the act of being of that which exists in something else, be it essence,
substantial form or accidents).
Finally, as Aquinas says, it is important, when speaking in the most general sense
possible about 'what there is', to be aware of the level on which one is speaking.
Sometimes words signify concepts as representing and describing something extra-
mental, sometimes words signify concepts as concepts, or words as words. The
latter is founded on the former, but their level or status differs, since the latter
strictly belongs to the science of logic or granunar. The fonner are called first
intentions or names of first imposition, the latter second intentions or names of
second imposition li .
9) Consider for example: 'Blindness is x'. Cf. 3SN6.2.2; QJJL 9.2.2; CMP V 9.11-12. Cf.
ST 48.2 ad 2: Alio modo dicitur ens, quod signijicat veritatem propositionis, quae in
compositione consistit, cuius nota est hoc verbum 'est';
10) Esse proprie subsistentis est ... forma aUlem et natura dicitur esse ex consequenti. Non
enim subsistit, sed inquanJum in ea suppositum subsistit dicitur esse.... accidentia autem non
dicuntur esse nisi per accidens, 3SN 8.2. Esse aUlem simpliciter et per se est suppositi
suhsistentis; alia vero dicuntur esse, inquanJum suppositum in eis subsistit, vel essentialiter, sicut
forma et materia et natura ipsa dicitur esse; vel accidentaliter, sicut accidentia dicuntur esse, 3SN
11.2. Esse ergo proprie et vere non attribuitur nisi rei per se subsistenti, QDL 9.2.2;
11) Cf. R.W. Schmidt, 1966;
114 NAMING THE UNITY OF CHRIST
This succinct overview contains the principal distinctions that Aquinas operates
with when determining the meaning of key-terms in his theology of the hypostatic
union.
The definition of natura when used in christology is: nature is second substance,
i.e. the quiddity or essence of a thing, expressed by the thing's defmitionl2.
According to this definition natura and essentia are equivalent. In material things
the nature comprises both matter (in a certain respect) and form: the soul of a
human being together with a fitting body form human nature. In immaterial things
nature and form coincide.
All other key-terms do not signify the quiddity or essence of a thing, that through
which something exists (esse quo or (id) quo est), but in one way or another its
individuality or singularity (esse quod or -rid) quod est)13, They do so in different
ways. Tenns such as singularis, particularis and individuum signify the
individuality of a thing regardless of whether the thing exists by itself or not i.e.
regardless of the category under which the thipg falls. In this sense Socrates' hand
is an individual, and Socrates himself tool4. Names such as hypostasis, persona
and suppositum signify only individual things from the category of subs~nce
(V 5 , only things that exist by themselves, things that most properly are saId to
12) quod quid erat esse, idest quidditas et essentia quam signijicat dejinitio cuiuslibet rei,
prout signijicatur nomine 'ousia', 3SN 5.1.~; quidditas rei quam signijicat sua dejinitio, 3SN
5.1.3; essentia speciei. quam signijicat dejinitio (... J natura signijicat essentiam, vel quod quid
est, sive quidditatem speciei, ST III 2.1; natura significat essentiam speciei quam si~nificat
dejinitjo, ST III 2.2; essentia speciei quam significat dejinitio natura vocatur, QDI 1; Item et
a/iquando natura dicitur quod quid est rei, continens ea quae ad specie; pertinent integritatem, sic
em'm dicimus naturam humanam communem esse omnibus hominibus ScG IV 41.2;
13) Esse [Ens? - hs] enim subsistens est quod habet esse tanquam eius quod est, quamvls sit
naturae vel formae quasi eius quo est. Unde nee natura rei nee partes eius dicuntur propn,e esse,
si esse praedicto modo [= actus entis - hs] accipiatur; similiter autem nec accidentla, sed
suppositum completum [est], quod est secundum omnia ilia. Untie etiam Philosophus dicit in II
Met. quod accidens magis proprie est entis quam ens, 3SN ~.2.2;. . .
14) Sometimes the hand of Socrates is called substantia partlcuians. In that case substantia
particularis has a meaning equivalent to individuum, cf. OCG 6 [225];
IS) ... designans particulare in genere substantiae ... secundum respectum ad proprietates et ad
naturam communem. 3SN 6.1.1; cf. QDI2 and QDL 9.2.1; hypostasis significat substantiam
particularem non quocumque modo, sed prout est in suo complemento, and for this reason the
hand of Socrates is not a hypostasis, ST III 2.3 ad 2; /rypostasis enim nihil aliud est qumn
individua substantia, quae etiam signijicatur nomine suppositi, QJJI2; unumquodque eorum (Le.
hypostasis, persona, suppositum, res naturae - hs) significat aliquid ut subsistens, QDL 9.2.1;
suppositum signifies the individuum subsistens in natura (= essentiam speciei quam significat
definitio - hs) illa; dicitur suppositum secundum quod est subsistens, ST III 2.2; dicitur ...
suppositum in quantum per se subsistit, QDI 1. Sometimes Aquinas speaks about 'something
complete' or 'something integral' as that which is signified by these words, e.g. orr 1211 [1]:
(persona, hypostasis, suppositum) ... designant int~gnun quoddam;
CHAPTER FOUR 115
·be I6 •
These words, however, are Dot synonymous. Some of them signify the individual
itself, as related to the common nature to which it belongs (persona, hypostasis)
whereas others Signify primarily this relation itself (individuum, suppositum). The
fonner are words of first imposition while the latter are words of second
imposition, i.e. they do not signify something extra-mental immediately but at most
indirectlyl7. The latter directly signify the logical/grammatical relations between
concepts or words. Suppositum is sub-positum, Le. the individual is signified as
something placed under a common nature18 • Persona on the one hand, and
hypostasis/suppositum on the other, differ inasmuch as the first can only be said of
something existing by itself in a rational nature, whereas the second are said of all
things that exist by itselfl9.
Many of the key-tenns focus upon individuality. In the decades preceding Aquinas,
theologians wrestled with this very aspect, and were confused as to the proper
meaning of the tenns indicating it20. William of Auxerre (c. 1140/1150-1231),
Alexander of Hales (c. 1185-1245), Hugh of Saint-Cher (1190-1263) and Philip the
Chancellor (c. 1160/1185-1236) all refute christological niliilism21 • It is not the
case, according to them, that the union of body and soul results in· a human
individual in such a way that there would be two individuals in Christ.
Christological nihilism thought it did, and therefore taught that there is no. mutual
union of body and soul in Christ, but only of each of them with the Word.
Consequently, it lost Christ's true humanity to save his unity22. The theologians
mentioned wanted to forestall this consequence. They even more wanted to prevent
16) Est autem substantiae proprium ut per se et in se subsistat; accidentis autem est in alio
esse. Et ideo illa nomina quae pertinent ad individuationem substantiae (i.e. persona, hypostasis,
suppositum) in illis solum locum habent quae per se et in se subsistunt. QD12;
17) cr. sicut genus est quaedam intentio quam intellectus ponit circa formam intellectam, ita
etiam differentia et omnia quae significant secundas intentiones. Tamen hulc intentioni intellectae
respondet natura quaedam quae est in particularibus; quamvis secundum quod est in
particularibus non habeat rationem generis vel speciei, 3SN 5.3,1 ad 1. In QDI 2 Aquinas
distinguishes between significare res· ipsas and significare intentionem individualitatis;
18) Hoc vero nomen, suppositum, est nomen secundae impositionis signijicans ipsam
habitudinem particularis ad naturam communem, inquantum subsistit in ea, 3SN 6.1.1.1; cr. QDI
2-
19) ... quod est dictum de supposito, intelIigendum est de persona in creatura rationali vel
intellectuali, quia nihil aliud est persona quam 'rationalis naturae individua substantia', secundum
Boethium. ST III 2.2; cf. 3SN 5.1.3 and 6.1.1, and QDll; persona supra hypostasim non addie
nisi determinatam naturam, scilicet ratjonalem, ST m 2.3; individuum in genere substantiae
dicitur hypostasis, in substantiis autem rationalibus dicitur etiam persona, ScG IV 41.3;
20) Its history in the twelfth and early thirteenth century is elaborated in: A.M. Landgraf,
1953: V. "Die spekulativ-theologische Erorterung der Hypostatische Vereinigung";
21) Cf. W.H. Principe. 1963; 1967; 1970; 1975;
22) It does not even save Christ's unity however. as Aquinas shows (see below), since such a
union is accidental;
116 NAMING THE UNITY OF CHRIST
the alternative: a union of body and soul that indeed did result in two individuals in
Christ. In order to do so, they distinguished between several aspects of personality.
To say there is only one person in Christ meant, according to them, that human
and divine nature of Christ had one personal individual 'dignity' in common.
However, other parts of personality (singularity and incommunicability) they did
not share23 • In Christ there is not only a double quo est, but there also seems to
be a double quod est while only personal dignity is one.
Aquinas, however, does not consider it useful to distinguish several aspects of
personality, but rather distinguishes several aspects of individuality. Christ's human
nature is an individual nature, and therefore its individuality belongs to what is two
in Christ, not to what is one. This kind of individuality is not the type that is
connected to being by itself. The latter type of individuality can only be one in
Christ. According to Aquinas the most important aspect of suppositum or quod est
is not the way in which it differs from persona, but the type of individuality both
have in common: subsistent individuality. He understands the distinction between
quod est and quo est as a distinction between esse substantiale (1) and esse
substantiale (2). That which makes a human being to be a subsistent individual is
its esse substantiale (1). This substantial being, this subsistence is the absolute
actuation of essence and accidents. The u'nity of Christ is the unity of this type of
being. Aquinas distinguishes between subsistent individuality and non-subsistent
individuality. The first is subsumed under esse, the second under essentia 24 • In
other words: the most important aspect Of suppos}tum and persona is not the
individuality that they signify, since individuality admits of further distinction, but
the aspect of independent being by itself, of subsistence. What persona and
suppositum have in common is more important than that by which they differ.
The list of key-terms contains six words with which individual subsistance can be
indicated, and this reflects the intensity of the intellectual effort invested in
accounting for the unity of ChrisfS. Some words with which individuality is
23) This is most apparent in William of Auxerre, the father of the distinction between aspects
of personality, cf. Principe, 1963, pp. 46-47, 82-87. William, according to Principe, thinks his
persolUllitas as "a new additional fonn or 'id quo' coming as the final perfection to the 'id quod',
itself already constituted as an individual, .. by a special individuating fonn" (1963, p, 87f). The
dignitas seems to be a combination of a juridical concept of personality (right, power, dignity)
with an ontological one (to be and act independently, perseitas).
My presentation prescinds from the many mutual differences that exist between the four
theologians;
24) Quite regularly Aquinas remarks that the one subsistence of Christ non est aliquid
positive. Therefore, if the union would cease to be, Christ's human nature would become
subsistent by itself. See 3SN 5.3.3 ad 3; 3SN 6,1.2 ad 5; QD12 ad 10; QDL 9.2.2; Is this a
remnant from the days of William of Auxerre, or does it express that esse substantiate (1) is not
essential, not definable?
25) Consider also the questions that Aquinas fonnulates in his QDI: the first four of a total of
five questions deal with Christ's unity: una persona, una hypostasis, unum suppositum, unum
esse;
CHAPTER FOUR 117
indicated can only be said of subsistent individuality, and of this there is in Christ
only one: one esse substantiale (1), one persona, one suppositum, one hypostasis.
Other key-tenus such as singularis, particularis, and individuum are said both of
subsistent and non-subsistent individuality. Because of this Christ can' be called
both one individual and in possession of many individual things26.
The unity of Christ is located exactly in that which does not admit of any defmition
or description, in that which does not belong to the range of essence, It is located
in what is most perfect of all.
1.3 The main points oj Aquinas' doctrine oj the hypostatic union 27
In his systematic works Aquinas has left us five discussions of the hypostatic
union 28 • Despite great differences there is a pattern common to the elaborate
treatments, i.e, the ones in Scriptum, Summa contra Gentiles and Summa
Theologiae. Each of these works contains a part that first examines the union, next
the person that assumed human nature, and consequently the nature that is
26) 3SN 6.1.1.1: Et sic pOSSU11UlS dicere Christum unum individuum, et tamen in eo duo vel
plura individua, sicut etiam de quolibet alio homine contingil, Et eadem ratio est de singulan' el
particular;' 3SN 6.1.1.3: in Christo sunt duo individUfl, non tamen per se subsistentia .. et ipse
Christus est unum individuum subsistens;
27) I have chosen not to burden this presentation with the later controversies concerning
whether Aquinas subscribes!O a 'modus-theory', an 'existence-theory' or a 'pure union'. Cf. O.
SchWeizer, 1957;
28) 3SN 1-32, ScG IV 2?-55, OTT I 199-245, QDI, ST III I-59, The parts of these treatments
that consider the hypostatic union display considerable mutual differences in structure, choice of
themes and depth. The cause of this should be sought in difference of genre and aim of the works,
and not in doctrinal development. There is indeed at least one question that receives a different
answer, Aquinas says explicitly (on the acquired knowledge of the (human) soul of Christ, ST III
12,2), and some judgments may indicate a growing severity (whether God would have become
incarnate if man had not sinned, ST I 3; jUdgment on two of the three theories of the hypostatic
union presented by Peter of Lombard, STIlI 2.6). But overall Aquinas does not change his views
of the central elements of faith concerning Christ (not even concerning the esse of Christ, as I will
explain in chapter V). Some differences due to genre and aim are: SN is a commentary, which
results in a relatively high redundancy; it employs logical and granunaticai skills to a great extent;
the QDI is limited in subject, since it principally treats the union itself, but the questions are
analyzed in great detail; both QJ)! and OTT seem to be more engaged in actual problems, since
both of them contain a relatively large discussion of Christ's unity as endangered by 'modem'
semi-nestorianists; OTT is the least technical and the most engaged in showing the mysterious
character of the knowledge of faith concerning Christ; ScG is distinguished by the extensive
refutation of ancient and recent errors, and by placing the discussion of the fittingness of the
incarnation at the end of the christology instead of at its beginning,
Of all treatises the ones from SN and ST are most comparable. There are no questions in ST that
are not formulated in SN (except ST III 4.4, utrum Filius -Dei debuerit assumere naturam
hurru:mam abstractam ab omnibus individuis, 'but cf. 3SN 2 expositio textus), Conversely all
questions of 3SN 5 on the union return in ST III 2-4 (except 3SN 5.3.2 utrum anima separata sit
persolUl, cf, however STIlI 2.5);
118 NAMING THE UNITY OF CHRIST
assumed. This common pattern can be articulated as follows:
1. union a) the mode of the union (natural, personal)
b) what is the union
2. who assumes person, nature
3. what is assumed nature, person.
I will now discuss each of these points, except the question what the union is, the
examination of which is postponed to section 2.1 of this chapter.
(1) Aquinas' method (in ST III) in presenting his answer to the question about the
personal or natural mode of the union, is basically negative in character. First he
shows the impossibility of some answers given, and next he concludes that only
one solution is not impossible. Aquinas goes about this problem in a way that
agrees with his general view on the scientifIc character of, the kno~ledge about
Christ, which is so weak that theology should~ be content wIth reflectmg upon the
fittingness of what in fact happened, instead of proving it. It also agrees with the
fact that the union is the core of the mysterium of the incarnation. The method that
Aquinas uses displays that we are dealing with a mystery. . .
First Aquinas rejects the union on the level of both natures. Such a umon IS
unacceptable for many reasons. It would not result in real unity but would resemble
the unity of a pile of stones or the parts of a house. Or it would imply that God
changed and contributed to the genesis of a third that neither is divine nor human,
and of which it is to be expected that the divine would as it were swallow up the
human. Or it would state that divine nature is perfected and imply God to be part
of a whole that as such is more perfect than God. In this case the critique that the
result of such a union would neither be God nor man applies as well.
In refuting the natural union, Aquinas considers the Chalcedonian definition to be
relevant and directive. The definition is in the negative mode: the natures are
united in such a way that they are unmixed, unaltered, undivided and inseparable,
the difference between them never affected". If the union is considered to have
taken place on the level of the natures, either the one negation (unmixed and
unaltered) or the other (undivided, inseparable) would be violated.
Since anything that exists is composed of esse quo (= nature) and esse quod (=
suppositumlpersona), both have to be disce:ned in Christ as well. Only God IS not
composed, but this is not applicable to ChrISt Incarnate smce he subSISts ill human .
nature. Already the very fact of him having a body excludes the absolute
predication of divine simplicity. And so, if the unI?n on. the one ~evel is
impossible, only the other is left. If human nature IS not m ChrISt because m some
29) Confitemur in novissimis diebus Filium Dei unigenitum inconjuse, immutabiliter, indivise,
inseparabiliter agnoscendum, nusquam sub/ata differentia naturarum propter unionem: ST III 2: 1
sed contra., The second part of the definition follows in the sed contra of the next article: Non In
duas personas partitum aut divisum, sed unum et eundem Filium unigenitum Dominum nostrum
lesum Christum confitemur;
CHAPTER FOUR 119
way it belongs to his divine nature, only the alternative of a union with the divine
person is left. Aquinas concludes: "If, then, the human nature is not united to the
Word in person, it would not be united at all. To hold that would be to abolish
belief in the incarnation and to undermine the entire Christian faith. Since,
therefore. the Word has a human nature united to himself, and this nature does not
form part of his divine nature, it follows that this union was effected in the person
of the Word, not in the nature"".
The two alternatives reflect the basic distinction between being and essence,
between supposition and signification. The unity of Christ is sougbt in the realm of
that which does not admit of definition. in that which indicates or demonstrates
instead of describes. The unity is a personal unity, a unity of suppositum, i.e. that
which is supposited for is one, even though the words expressing understanding of
this one are diverse. Both natures can be described, can be signified to a certain
extent, but their union as such does not correspond with words signifying it.
Aquinas approaches the union through the rejection of how it is not, it is not a
natural union, just as he approached God's nature through a consideration of how it
is not31 •
This union is a unique union, and Aquinas in his discussion of the personal unity
(ST III 2.2) articulates this uniqueness when answering some objections. Doesn't
personality belong to the dignity of each human being, and if so, why doesn't
Christ possess a human personality? Aquinas' answer will be familiar to the reader
who negotiated section 1.2. Personality means subsistence, independent being
instead of being in something else'; Christ's human nature is the human nature of a
person, i.e. of someone with being per se. Yet this being per se has a dignity even
greater than that of any human person. since it is a divine person. However, this
does not yet eliminate what in fact should be eliminated: the thought that
personality is a natural perfection. It is not. Being and essence, supposition and
signification, are distinct. The first perfects the second, but it does not perfect the
second according to the mode of the second. It is neither a natural, nor a
'significational' perfection. Just as the employment of significative words in
propositions (in which words can have supposition) does not add to the (strict)
signification of the words used, the nature (in the strict sense) of anything does not
change because of it being real. Conversely, if a personality that normally agrees
with human nature is lacking, this does not affect the natural perfection of the
nature. "The assumed nature does not have its own proper personality, not because
some perfection of human nature is wanting, but because something surpassing
30) Si ergo humana natura Verbo -Dei non unitur in persona, nullo modo ei unitur. Et sic
totaliter tollitur incarnationis fides: quod est subruere totam fidem christianam. Quia igitur
Verbum habet naturam humanam sibi unitam, non autem ad suam naturam divinam pertinentem,
consequens est quod unio sitJacta in persona Verbi, non autem in natura, STm 2.2;
31) ST I 2 proemium, 3 proemiwn. Below we will see that Aquinas brings divine simplicity
into consideration in his christology several times;
120 NAMING THE UNITY OF CHRIST
human nature is added, i.e. union to a divine person"32. Aquinas insists. And so
this personal union does not imply that Christ's humanity is less perfect than
normal, and it does leave open the possibility of being human even WIthout a kind
of personality that normally concurS with it".
The distinction between being and essence is decisive. Its linguistic parallel is the
one between supposition and signification. The human mode of signification fits ~e
created mode of being since both bear a similar distinction. God, however, IS
simple; to God this distinction is not relevant. In God being and essence, person
and essence are identical. This entails that God one and triune falls outside of the
human mode of signification. Doesn't this affect the account of the hypostatic
union? For, if nature and person are identical in God, why bother about the
question whether the union is natural or personal? If ~t is ?oe, di:ine .sim~lici~
entails that it is the other as well, doesn't it? How cruclal this question, unphed m
ST III 2.2 obiectum 1, really is, and how telling Aquinas' answer! Aquinas
confirms that in God nature and per~on are not really (secundum rem) distinct.
However, human beings understand (secundum rationem intelligendi - corpus
ibidem) human beings signify both of them in a distinct way. Persona significat
per mOdum subsistentis, 'person' signifies in a mode that fits something subs~stent,
and because the Son subsists in his human nature, one should defend the umon to
be personal. The human mode does not correspond to the divine mode, and yet,
although it is inadequate, the human mode is the pattern for ~e soluti?n to. the
question. One should not, if one could, put the human mode of slgmfICatIOn aSIde,
and pretend there to be some sort of a direct access to God. There is no such
access. On the contrary, one should take the human mode, the only one available,
extremely seriously, and use all of its potential to approach the divine, to approach
the mystery of the union. The basic distinction of supposition and signification, a
very human mode, serves for approaching the union. The union is not natural, and
the only alternative left is a personal union34 • . . . .
So, one finds Aquinas here defending the human mode of slgrufication. It IS both
inadequate yet the only mode human beings have. Moreover, as we hav.e s~en ~nd
will examine in greater detail in section 2, the very human mode of slgruficatlOn
32) naturae assumptae non deest propn'a personalitas propter defectwn alicuius quod ad
perfectionem humanae naturae penineat, ST III 4'.2 ad 2; , .
33) Note that to speak of a kind of personalIty actually Impbes more th~n can be account~d
for, Personality, as Aquinas understands it, has more than anything else thiS one mark that ~n
itself it is not essential, not describable at all: being there by itself. Whoever approaches .thls
account of the union with modern conceptions of personality should leave most of them behmd.
Cf. Edouard-Henri Weber, 1988, p. 234ff;
34) This argument concerning divine simplicity, i.e. that it can never be abused .to rummage
among mocles of signification, recurs quite frequently in the christology of the Tertia Pars. cr.
3.2 ad 3; 3.3 ad 1; 3.6 ad 3; 16.2 ad 2; 16.5 ad 1. Cf. ST III 3.7 ad 2: Quia nominibus est
utendum secundum quod sun! ad significandum imposita. Quod quidem est ex consideranone
eorum quae apud nos sunt. Et ideo oponet, circa modum signijicandi et consignijicandi,
considerare ea quae apud nos sunt;
CHAPTER FOUR 121
itself serves as an analogy for Christ Incarnate.
(2) Having dealt with the first major aspect of Aquinas' doctrine of the hypostatic
union (its mode), we proceed to the second: who is it that assumes human nature?
Most of what Aquinas says is identical to what he said concerning this name of
Christ: incarnatus, and we discussed this in chapter III (p. 92ft). In fact this is a
problem of trinitarian theology: how are the divine nature and the divine persons
related to this assumption of human natore. Just as the theological grammar of the
name incarnatus that Aquinas developed in 1SN and DDN, he now gives one of
assumere, to assume. Any action or operation is best predicated of a person,
something that subsiSts, and not of a nature that is signified abstractly. Only that
which subsists can perform actions, and 'person' signifies per modum subsistentis
(ST III 2.2 ad 1; 3.2 obiectum 3). And so it is proper to say that a person, the Son,
brings the incarnation about, brings it about that human nature is assumed. On the
other hand, however, all that the divine person does in this respect is done in virtoe
of divine nature35 •
The theological grammar of assumere however, just like the one of incamatus, is
not limited to its being more properly predicated of persona divina than of divina
natura, though both are equally true. Once again, Aquinas distinguishes between
the principle and the term of the assumption (cf. above concerning incarnatus, p.
92ft), which is a distinction between bringing the assumption about, and taking
human nature to oneself. Inasmuch as 'to oneself, as a reciprocal, refers back to a
divine person other than the Son (as in Pater ad se sumpsit humanam naturam), it
is said improperly. Inasmuch as 'to oneself refers back to divine nature, which is
identical \to a divine supposit (divine simplicity!), Divina natura ad se sumpsi!
humanam naturam is acceptable. In 3SN Aquinas adds a third aspect of the
grammar of assumere: assume to oneself and in oneself. In that case Divina natura
assumpsit humanam naturam is false 36 •
Divine natore, i.e. Father, Son and Spirit bring the assumption about, but only the
Son is involved in the term of the assumption, the union itself, which is a personal
union.
In his discussion of the second major aspect of his doctrine of the hypostatic union,
35) In ST III 3.2 ad 3 Aquinas explicitly refers to divine simplicity. Now this referral provides
him with an argument in favour of the exchangeability of Divina nature and Persona divina as
subject-expressions with the complement of ... assumpsit humanam naturam (cf. ST III 2.1 ad 3).
The same appears when concrete and abstract expressions for God are used as predicate-
expressions in Chrisms est Divina natura/Deus, cf. ST III 17.1. Above we saw the reverse
concerning the personal union itself, even though Divina natura est incarnata is true like Filius
Dei est incarnatus is true, cf. STIlI 2.1 ad 3;
36) Dicendum quod assumere dicitur tripliciter. Uno modo, communiter pro sumere; et sic tota
Trinitas assumpsit humanam naturam Filio. Secunda [modo] dicitur proprie, quasi ad se sumere ut
sibi quocumque modo uniatur; et hoc modo natura divina in persona Filii assumpsit humanam
naturam. Tertio dicitur propriissime, quasi ad se et in se sumere,' et sic convenit lantum personae,
in quajacta est unio, 3SN 5.2.2;
122 NAMING THE UNITY OF CHRIST
Aquinas employs all the tools available from logic and grammar. Analysis of
signification (in the strict sense) of assumere, and analysis of the modes of
signification: on the one hand the modes of verbs, concrete and abstract terms, on
the other hand the modes of signification of and supposition for divine simplicity.
(3) The questions related' to the third major point of Aquinas' doctrine of the
hypostatic union, i.e. the nature assumed, concern to a large extent the
individuality of it. This individuality, Aquinas says, cannot be a personality, either
because this human person has to be destroyed in effecting the union (which is
unacceptable because the assumption of a person would then be to no purpose, and
God never does anything to no purpose, frustra); or there would be two persons in
Christ, which would mean that no real unity was brought about. Because of this the
assumed nature has to be accounted for as something individual that 'before' the
union did not have any subsistence. This is not a defect of the human nature
assumed, as was explained above, but the lack of something less perfect instead of
which something more perfect, that exceeds human nature, is added: the union with
the divine person (ST III 4.1 and 2).
Aquinas repeats the grammar of assumere, i.e. its distinction between principle ~d
term, and indicates that, with a certain understanding of assumere, the person IS
only the term of the assumption (ST III 4.2)37. Human nature is not the term of
the assumption, but is presupposed to it. And so it is not proper to say that the Son
of God assumed a man. For the noun homo ~ignifies human nature in a concrete
mode, and this entails being in a supposit. But the Son of God did not assume a
supposit, and therefore one cannot say that he assumed a man".
However, this time Aquinas adds one more element to his grammar of assumere: a
reflection upon the. ending -bile of assumptibile (ST III 4.1). Would it be possible
to say that because human nature was. assumed, human nature is assumable, i.e. apt
for being taken up by a divine person? At this very spot Aquinas shows that
arguments ex convenientia are weak arguments. To this question one can only
answer with a clear negation plus a positive answer that depends on a negative
comparing of human nature to other natures: human nature does not have the
obstacles to a personal union that other natures have.
The clear negation regards the view that 'assumability' is a passive natural power
or potency. This cannot be the case, since the personal union of created human
37) Aquinas impliCitly broadens the extension of his former argument. First he said that the
person of the Son only is involved in the term of the asswnption, and not di,vine nature, Now he
says that the person of the Son only is involved in the term of the assumptIon, and no (human)
person is involved in its beginning;
38) This is one of those texts that we mentioned in chapter II, that talk about virtual
supposition linked with a concrete mode of signification: Hoc autem nomen 'homo' signijicat
humanam naturam prout est nata in supposito esse. quia. ut dicit Damascenus, sicut hoc nomen
'Deus' signijicat 'eum qui habet divinam naturam', ita hoc nomen 'homo' signijicat 'eum qui
habet humanam naturam " ST III 4.3. Cf. ibidem ad 2: hoc nomen 'homo' significal naturam
humanam in concreto, prout scilicet est in aliquo supposito. Cf. ST III 4.4 ad 3;
CHAPTER FOUR 12~
nature with God is not something that belongs to the natural order, but somethiDl!
that transcends natural order. An aptitude for something transcending the natural
order can never be a natural aptitude. And so what is left is merely the fact of the
assumption, and the possibility of indicating its fittingness. Aquinas gives two
aspects. One agrees with the dignity of human nature, and one with the need for
salvation of human nature. Both aspects serve to distinguish between the aptitude oj
human nature on the one hand, and the lack of it in angelic and irrational nature on
the other. In fact, Aquinas' procedure is once again negative: human nature lacks
some obstacles for a personal union that do exist in angelic and in irrational nature.
Human nature is rational and intellectual and so its reach can in some way attain
the Word of God. Human nature is capax Dei, has a capacity for God, namely for
attaining him through knowledge and love. Therefore human nature does not have
the obstacle that irrational creatures have: their very incapacity for knowing and
loving. The second aspect concerns human nature, because of original sin, being in
need of repair. Angels that have sinned, however, cannot be restored, so this is
their obstacle for a personal union. The grammar of assumptibile contains the
negation of a natural aptitude for personal union, the negation of obstacles that
angelic and irrational nature have, for human nature, and the confinnation of man
being created in the image of God, entailing the capacity of knowing and loving
God. There is no natural capacity for personal union; there is one, however, for a
union in knowing and loving. Together with the need and possibility of repair, the
latter makes only human nature assumptibile, even though it is not a .natural
property, but only some sort of congruence. In section 2 we will return to the
nature of this congruence.
Once again-, when discussing the third main point of Aquinas' doctrine, we
recognize Aquinas' employment of the analysis of signification (assumptibile), and
his employment of the theory of modes of signification (concrete and abstract
modes, virtual supposition).
Having examined human nature's non-natural aptitude for a personal union with
God, we are now in good position to mention something that belongs to the second
main point of Aquinas' doctrine of the union: the non-natural aptitude of the Son of
God for being the term of the personal union. Aquinas gives some reasons of
fittingness for why it was the person of the Son, and not the Father nor the Spirit,
that became incarnate. These reasons cannot but concern a non-natural aptitude or
congruence, since the incarnation does not depend on God's nature, but upon
God's will: God chose to bring the incarnation about. Aquinas links the reasons
that he gives with two discrete names of Christ, i.e. those that apply only to him:
Verbum and Filius. Aquinas combines these names with a unified name that is
appropriated to the Son: Sapientia. Thus he gives three reasons of fittingness,
linked with three names of Christ (ST III 3.8). Christ as the Word of God is like
the mental word of God the craftsman, fashioning the world according to his
eternal conception. As any product of an idea, the world bears a likeness to the
Word. And so, if the world is damaged and repair is needed, it is the Word that
124 NAMING mE UNITY OF CHRIST
should be involved. The personal union of the inuuobile Word with mobile creation
answers the need to repair the ordering of the mobile to its eternal inuuobile
perfection. But because of the rationality of human nature, there is a special
likeness of it with the Word that expresses God's wisdom. Participation in the
Word is that through which human beings reach perfection. And so, for the
finished perfection of human beings it was appropriate that it was the Word that
joined human nature personally. Aquinas derives a second reason of
appropriateness from the name Filius: the purpose of the union is to implement
predestination and bestow the heavenly inheritance upon the adopted sons. These
adopted sons are fittingly brought to this by the Father's natural Son. A third
reason is taken from the name Sapientia: original sin was committed out of a
disordered craving for knowledge of good and evil, and so this original sin is
fittingly removed by the Word who is God's true wisdom.
This concludes the presentation of the main points of Aquinas' doctrine of the
hypostatic union concerning the mode of the union, the one who assumed, and the
nature assumed. We have noticed the logical and granunatical skills involved.
Aquinas' analysiS of the three 'opinions' formulated by Peter of Lombard shows
one logical skill especially; the logic of supposition, and to this we now attend.
1.4 The analysis of the three 'opiniones'af Peter of Lombard
Peter of Lombard presents three theories of the hypostatic union (o.c. III 6), and
calls them opiniones, indicating a fundamental reserve towards their veracity. More
than hundred years later Aquinas shows the progress of reflection. The second of
the three opinions "should not be classified as an opinion, but as the teaching of
Catholic faith. Similarly the first, i.e. that there are two hypostases, and the third,
Le. that the union is accidental, are not to be termed opinions, but heresies
condemned by councils of the church"". This judgment by Aquinas is not a
historical one, but he gives the result of his theological investigation: these theories
repeat the errors that the councils of Ephesus, Chalcedon and Constantinople n
rejected40 .
In the beginning of the twentieth century these opinions were labelled the
39) ... non est dicenda opinio, sed sententia Catholicae fidei. Similiter etiam prima opinio,
quae ponit duos hypostases, et tertia, quae pontt unionem accidentalem. non sunt dicendae
opiniones. sed haereses in Conciliis ab Ecclesia damnatae. STIlI 2.6;
40) It seems that Aquinas in 3SN was less severe in his judgment. He treats many questions by
listing the answers to be given according to each of the theories. Of the first opinion he says that
it non est heretica, but unintelligible, for which reason it non sustinetur (6.1.2). He also notices
that this view non tenetur modo ab aUquo (6.1.1.1). On the third opinion he rema.rks et ideo haec
opinio tertia non solum est jaisa, sed haeretica, et in Concilio a Papa Alexandro condemnata
(6.3.1), and et ideo cum neget veritatem articulorum condemnata est quasi haeretica (6.3.2);
CHAPTER FOUR 12~
Assumptus-theory (AT), the Subsistence-theory (ST) and the Habitus-theoT)
(HT)41, according to the most distinctive feature of each of them. AT teaches tha
in the union the Son of God assumed a man, ST that the Son of God subsists iI
hwnan nature, and HT that hwnan nature relates to the Son as a habitus, (
garment.
Aquinas' endorsement of ST reflects the general choice made in his days. Th,
condemnation of (part of) HT took it from the agenda of theology. The sam,
condemnation caused AT to be the one theory to be dealt with. Even though mon
and more theologians, in the course of the century between Lombard's book an,
Aquinas' analysis of it, endorsed ST, AT had a steady influence (as is clear fo:
example in William of Auxerre, Alexander of Hales, Hugh of Saint-Cher, am
Philip the Chancellor, see below). However, for Aquinas and his contemporaries i
had become clear that the only useful function of AT was to serve as backgroum
for articulating ST. Aquinas himself, being the first to give such a detailed analysi:
of Peter of Lombard's presentation, contributed much to this status quaestionis.
In 3SN 6 Aquinas gives a detailed analysis of the three views. First he gives th,
correspondences and the differences. Next he investigates the .most importan
features with the technique of the quaestio, and he finishes with an extensiv(
textual criticism of the text of Peter.
All views, according to Aquinas, have the following in common:
in Christ there is one divine person (contra Nestorius, who posited two)
in Christ there are two natures and three 'substances'" (contra Eutyches
who posited one nature)
two hwnan 'substances' were assumed (contra the Manicheeans, wh<
questioned the veracity of the body)
that which is assumed does not temporally but only logically precede th,
union (contra Origen, who posited a pre-existent soul).
Next Aquinas gives the mutual differences between the views, regarding th,
relation between body and soul (mutually united or not), and regarding the relatiOJ
I.
between body and soul on the one hand and the divine person on the othe
(accidental or substantial union; this man as quid subsistens versus human natun
without subsistence; 'permanent' divine simplicity versus composition).
Then follows a long list of features of each of the theories. The questions tha
Aquinas formulates in his commentary implicitly indicate which of these feature
are primary. These I mention:
41) B. Barth, "Bin neues Dokument xur Geschichte der frtihscholastischen Christologie"
The%gische Quartalschrift 100 (1919) 423;
42) In SN Aquinas still uses the term' substance' to refer to body, soul and divinity of Chrisl
However, this employment soon becomes obsolete, probably because neither body nor soul at
subsistent, and because neither body nor soul alone form the essence of man. I will indicate thi
employment using 'substance';
126 NAMING THE UNITY OF CHRIST
ASsumptus-Theory (AT)
1) there are two supposita and two hypostases in Christ, united in one person;
hie homo signifies a human suppositum;
2) the Son of God assumed a human being, and not merely a human nature,
because he assumed two 'substances' that were mutually united and thus
constituted a subsistent human being;
3) homo signifies only what is composed from body and soul without co-
signifying divinity; in other words: homo does not supposit for the divine
person;
Subsistence-Theory (ST)
1) Christ is one suppositum and one persona and one hypostasis
2) Christ has one being; human nature is not a quid subsistens, but an
individual concrete composition of body and soul that subsists in the divine
person; the divine Son subsists in the divine and the human nature; the union
is a substantial relation;
3) after the incarnation the Word is composed, and not merely simple;
Habitus-Theory (HT)
1) body and soul are not something composed, because that would give human
nature subsistence; the predicate homo means that Christ 'has' body and
soul, without mutual uniori43 ;
2) homo predicates an accident of the Son of God; the union is an accidental
relation.
After this list another mutual comparison follows. AT and ST say that homo is
predicated 'in quid', and not, as HT says, 'in quomodo se habet'. ST and HT posit
one supposit, though differently, and not two (AT). AT and HT stick to the
permanent simplicity of the Word, whereas ST says that human nature is going to
belong to the personalitas of the Word.
In giving this mutual comparison Aquinas in fact identifies two subjects that are
decisive for the evaluation of the theories:
1) the true humanity of Christ. To Aquinas the word homo, when predicated of
Christ, is said equivocally when it implies that body and soul are not mutually
united. HT denies Christ true humanity. The problem that bothers HT is solved in
the wrong way: the union of soul and body does not necessarily entail a subsistent
43) According to W, Principe (1963, note 55, p. 204f) the view that HT taught a lack of
mutual union of body and soul, a critique first encountered in the work of Hugh of Saint-Cher, is
false. It seems to be that at least some theologians adhered to HT not because it denied the mutual
union, but because it denied a qUid subsistens resulting from it. An assessment of the historical
accuracy of Aquinas' presentation of HT is given by Principe, 1974, pp. 398-405. Cf. also N.M.
Haring, 1951. In general it should be said that the three opinions do not represent fixed positions
that can be verified historically, but rather collections of tendencies;
CHAPTER FOUR 12".
human being.
2) the unity of Christ. To Aquinas any theory should meet the requirement of,
union per se, a substantial union, and not teach an accidental one that cannot bea:
the core ·expressions Deus est homo and Horno est Deus. The human nature 0
Christ must be thought to belong, in some way or another, to Christ's personality
and Christ Incarnate must be thought to be a composite (even though we do no
know what we say when we say that, cf. below). Essentially both the first and thl
third theory are neo-Nestorian, because they either imply or explicitly teach al
accidental union". Already the name Habitus-Theory itself is proof of it. A1
implies it, since the only thing left in which a human supposit and a divine persOl
can unite is a certain kind of dignity, which is an accident, and this entails at
accidental union.
Papal intervention took care qf the first decisive subject. But the second subject
however, as W. Principe has shown, remained a source of debate and confusion
Theologians did not want to adhere to AT, but in refuting it they lacked the logica
rigour needed. The result was that most of them adopted elements from AT the)
should not have adopted. Aquinas applies new metaphysical and logical insights t(
the problem. The core of it is his fundamental distinction betw~en. suppositum ane
natura, between supposition and signification. Christ is one in two, i.e. om
supposit in two natures. This is displayed by the fact that in propositions abou
Christ, of one and the same subject-term. predicate-expressions signifying eacl"
nature may be predicated. E.g. The Son of God is passible, The Son of God i,
impassible. It is also displayed by ·the fact that in propositions about Chris
different subject-terms, each signifying different natures, may be used, tha
personally supposit only for one suppositum. E.g. The Son of God created thl
stars, The Son of Man created the stars. This I will explain first in the nex
section, in which I show how Aquinas has found a linguistic analogy for thl
hypostatic union, and then in the last section, in which I focus upon the linguisti<
formulation of the doctrine of the hypostatic union, i.e. the theory of thl
interchange of attributes.
2. Analogies of the hypostatic union
The section just concluded has set down the interior frame of Aquinas' doctrine 0
the hypostatic union. We did so in as succinct a manner as possible. which rna)
have caused the reader to wonder whether this is the work of the same theologial
that we saw at work with the names of Christ. It seems to be set on the pure logil
of the matter. using a technical and univocal vocabulary. Appearances an
deceptive, however.
Christ is truly man and truly God. When Aquinas starts discussing the person 0
Christ, this basic affirmation serves him as a point of departure. As we have seeI
44) HT contains not only a neo-nestorian tendency, but has similarities with other heresies a
well. as ScG IV 37.10 shows;
128 NAMING THE UNITY OF CHRIST
in the preceding chapter. the name homo and the name Deus, when used for
Christ, imply the hypostatic union they do not directly signify. This affects their
meaning. Nevertheless those names are not to be considered as metaphors or names
used analogously in the strict sense. If one were to say this, one would cast a doubt
on the true humanity and the true divinity of Christ, as Aquinas explains. There is
yet another demand concerning the basic affirmation about Christ. Not only should
the names signifying each nature and all that belongs to it be analyzed in their
correct meaning, but the names signifying the union itself should also be examined.
Moreover, the affirmation as affirmation should be analyzed properly as well. The
first concerns the proper meaning of et in Christus est vere homo et vere Deus. The
second concerns the proper verification of est in Christus est vere homo et vere
Deus, or the est in Deus est homo, and Homo est Deus, 'God is a human being'
and ' A human being is God'. These affirmations should be verified in a way that
gives a proper account of the union between God and man, of the est of the
propositions4s • Aquinas' emphasis regards the core of the Christian belief
concerning the person of Christ. For, Christ's humanity could be 'seen' by
everybody, but the faith of Thomas the Apostle concerns the belief that in this man
God is mysteriously presenr6• The judgment of faith expresses this with an est, a
yes to the et in Christus est vere Deus et vere homo. Inasmuch as this judgment of
faith is the prime object of Aquinas' investigations, the analysis of est is implied in
it as we1l47 •
In this section parts 2.1 and 2.2 will be devoted to names signifying the union, the
et of the proposition mentioned. We will study the extent to which these names rest
upon analogies from created things in general, from types of union with God, and
from relations. Parts 2.3 and 2.4 are devoted to the study of expressions that at
first sight seem to be names, i.e. unum suppositum, and persona composita, but on
closer scrutiny turn out to be prescriptive verifications of the proposition
mentioned, Le. of the est of it. They are analogical in a different sense, because
they reflect the way in which human modes of signification, i.e. supposition and
signification, both are and are not able to mirror the unity of Christ.
45) Cf. ST III 16.1: ... dicimus esse veram hanc propositionem et propriam 'Deus est homo';
non solum propter veritatem terminorum, qUia scilicet Christus est verus Deus et verus homo, sed
etiam propter ven'tatem praedicationis. This is the very structure of Aquinas' discussion in this
article: first the truth of the terms, then the truth of the proposition. Aquinas' examination of
ancient and recent errors concerning Christ in ScG IV 28-38 has this same semantical pattern:
Homo, Deus, Unio;
46) Cf. ST II-n 1.4 ad 1: Aquinas quotes Gregory the Great: Thomas ~aliud videt et aliud
credidit. Hominem videt et Deum credens confessus est, cum dixit: Dominus meus et Deus meus H
;
47) Cf. Aquinas' introduction to the question: et primo quaeritur de locutionibus
exprimentibus unionem per hoc verbum 'est' simpliciter (3SN 7.1). In 3SN 24.1.2 one can find the
cOJUlection between the est of the propositions about Christ, and the judgment of faith. Aquinas
elaborates the difference between Credo incarnationem and Credo incarnation em esse vel fuisse;
CHAPTER FOUR 129
2.1 Gannent, Body and Soul, One
Aquinas. som~times employs examples and analogies in order to approach the
hyp~stat~~ umon. In general however, Aquinas is quite sceptical about their
applIcabilIty. Every now and then he tones down his own employment of them, and
that of others as well. For .exampl~, Paul says about the Son of God that he was
"in habit found as a man .. 48. Aquinas interprets habit both as one of the accidental
categories and as a garment. Paul likens the assumption of huri1.an nature to the
putting on of.a garment, which involves an accidental unity of the subject and his
garment. Aqumas first quotes John Damascene in order to reduce the weight of this
text that serv~ a~ chief witness. for HT: "Examples need not be wholly and in
every respec~ s~lar, for v:'hat IS perfectly similar is the same thing and not an
example. ThIS IS ~~ espeCially ~hen dealing with divine reality. It is impossible
~erefore to ~d s~l1ar examples In Theology (Le. in the godhead of Persons) and
m Economy .(l.e; ~ tt:e mystery of the Incarnation) "49. There is indeed, Aquinas
says, a. ce~~ snmlarlty between the human nature of Christ and a garment. The
Word IS VISible by reason of human nature, just as man is by reason of his
clothing. Another point of similarity is that a garment is changed since it is shaped
according to the one wearing it, but it is not the case that a garment changes the
~hape of ~e. o~e wearing. it . (unless it is too tight). However, the example is
madeq~ate If It ~s meant to mdicate the mode of the union, because it only indicates
an ac~ade~tal umon ~.etween th~ garment and the one we~ring it. One cannot say •A
man IS his garment (except In commercials) in the way one can say Deus est
homo. Moreover, whatever is predicated of the garment cannot be said of the one
wearing it. A man is not wounded because his garment is torn. One can, however,
say Deus est passzdO.
The traditional analogy of the union is the union of body and soul through which a
human being comes about. Ever since Pseudo-Athanasius adopted it in his
symbolum Quicumque, and probably before that as wens l , it has racked many
brains, because it contains both striking similarities and troublesome dissimilarities
48) .This is the literal translation of habitu inventus (est) ut homo, Ph 2.7. In the Vulgate this
translation of the Greek 'schema' has the COJUlotation of something extrinsic. For Aquinas it is
both the name of the tenth category of Aristotle and the name of one of the prime examples of
what belongs to this category: 'having' (the modification of a substance coming from something
extrinsic) and 'garment' or 'clothing';
49) De Fide Orlhodoxa III 26: non necesse autem omnifariam et indefective assimilari
exempla: quod enim in omnibus simile, idem utique eril, et non exemplum. Et maxime in divinis:
im.possibil~ eni~ sim.ile exem~lu~ inven~re. et in Theologia (idest in deitate Personarnm) et in
Dlspensatlone (ldest In mysteTlo mcarnatloms), between brackets Aquinas' explanation ST III 2.6
ad 1; ,
50) ScGIV 37.7 and 8;
51) Cf. J.N.D. Kelly, The Athanasian Creed, The Paddock Lectures for 1962-3 Londor
1964, who mentions, among others, Augustine (Commentary on the Gospel of Joh~, Tract.
LXXVII. 3). p. 29ff;
130 NAMING mE UNITY OF CHRIST
as well. Out of body and soul a personal unity comes about. and only in this
respect there is a similarity: there is one person that subsists in body and soul. But,
out of body and soul a nature comes about as well, since the soul is the fonn of the
body. The divine nature, however, can never be the form of a body. To start with,
it would put divine nature on a par with something created, and it would take part
in its z.
Examples53 and analogies are useful in approaching the hypostatic union, but one
has to be aware of their limitations, and one has to know which elements of it are
and which are not applicable. This would seem to be rather simple and self-
evident, but it is not at all. For. if one has a good understanding of something for
whose explanation one uses an example, such a procedure is clear and easy. Things
change, however, when such an understanding is not available. Such is the case
regarding the mystery of the incarnaiion. Regarding this mystery one should have
as many examples and analogies as possible,' because it is the denial of those
elements that are not applicable that paves the way for at least some sort of
understanding. This is in fact what Aquinas does when he envisages the different
meanings of unum, in order to approach the way in which God and humanity in
Christ are one.
Several meanings of 'one' are brought to the fore, and once again Aquinas is not
52) ST III 2.1 ad 2; in ScG IV 41.10 (in omnibus autem rebus creatis nihil invenUur huic
unioni tam simile sicut unio animae ad corpus; Cf. OCG 6 [125] nullum convenientius exemplum)
Aquinas is more elaborate on this analogy. He shows that human nature is some sort of organ or
instrument for the Word. that nevertheless is not extrinsic to it (like a pick-axe, or like saints are
instruments of God), and that cannot be united to the Word as matter is to fonn. Aquinas
mentions some exampies of an instrument that are naturally proper without that to which it is
proper being the fonn of it: the way in which the' tongue is the instrument of the intellect; the way
in which a sixth finger belongs to a human individual.
On the vast literature concerning instrumentality cf. Th. Tschipke, 1940 and T.M. Schoof. 1974.
However, Aquinas continues: Praedicta tamen exemp[a non sic posita sunt ut omnimoda similitudo
sit in his requirenda. Intelligendum est enim Verbum Dei multo sublimius et intimius humanae
naturae potuisse uniri quam anima quaUcumque proprio instrumento; praecipue cum toti humanae
naturae. mediante intellectu, coniundum dicatur. Et, licet Verbum Dei sua virtute penelret omnia,
utpote omnia conservans etportans, creaturis tamen intellectualibus. quae proprie Verbo perjrui
possum et eius participes esse, ex quadam similitwiinis affinitate et eminentius et ineffabilius
potest uniri. Cf. also QDI 1: Sed tamen omnia huiusmodi exempla sunt dejicientia, quia unio
instrumenti est accidentaJis; sed haec est quaedam unio singulan·s supra omnes modos unionis
nobis notis. Sicut enim Deus est ipsa bonitas et suum esse, ita etiam est ipsa unitas per essentiam.
Et ideo. skut virtus eius non est limitata ad istos modos bonitatis et esse qui sunt in creaturis sed
patest jacere novos mOOos bonitatis et esse nobis incognitos, ita etiam per infinitatem suae virtutis
pottiit facere novum modum unionis. ut humana natura uniretur Verba personaliter, not tamen
accidentaliter. Quamvis ad hoc in creaturis nul/um sufficiens exemp/um inveniatur;
53) Another example used is the example of marriage, cf. 3SN 3.3.1.1 sed contra 2. Relevant
to the comparison with the union of body and soul, is the re-assumption of the body by the soul in
the resurrection. Aquinas compares the hypostatic union to this re-assumption in ST III 2.6 ad 2.
Cf. M.-V. Leroy, 1974, p. 219ff;
CHAPTER FOUR 131
only set on finding analogies, but on modifying their applicability as weI154 ; none
of these modes of unity agrees completelY with the ineffable union of God to man.
However, some are less inapplicable than others. The least applicable is the union
of two things resulting in a third (1). It would make God a part of something else,
and it would represent God as incomplete, imperfect. The union of two things
which is not a mutual union, but a union of two things in a thing that is one has
some applicability (2). Do not think of the union of Plato and Socrates in one
species, or of the union of man and donkey in one animality, or of the union of
substance and quality in one analogous concept of being. An example of this type
of union would be numericar identity: one trunk having one natural branch and
another branch through grafting, so that two branches are united in one trunk. A
mutual union of two things without uniting into something that is one per se, has
some applicability as well (3). Aquinas mentions the union of subject and accident,
because such a union does not result in some one thing of which the subject and
accident are parts. The divine person would be the subject of human nature,
without being part of a larger whole. Of course this analogy is defective since
human nature is not an accident of Christ: it would entail an accidental rather than
a substantial union, and it is impossible that the Son of God would have accidents.
The example of a union of two branches in one tree is defective for the same
reason: to God nothing can be added; this is not a substantial union either, for one
cannot say 'This Golden Delicious is a Golden Rennet', nor the other way around
(if one branch from the 'old' tree is left), as one can say Deus est homo and Homo
est Deus (3SN 1.1.1).
In the ST we encounter a text that does the same, i.e. it takes into consideration the
different meanings of unum (III 2.1). Yet this consideration rather differs from the
one in the SN that we discussed just now, because Aquinas only considers it in the
framework of the question whether the union is on the level of natures, to which
the answer must be negative. This makes the consideration of unum even more
negative. There is no question of a union that is similar to a uni(~m of two perfect
things that remain unaffected, like a pile of stones, or a house made of stones and
timbers (1). Such a form is an accidental form, and it does not make the thing to
be absolutely one but one only in a certain respect. Moreover, the thing effected is
something artificial, and not natural. There is also no question of a union of two
perfect things where change does occur, like a compound made up from elements
(e.g. flesh and its components) (2), for God is immutable. The result would no
longer belong to the 'kind' of any of the composing parts: Christ would be neither
human nor God. The inflnite distance between both natures would cause the human
nature to be swallowed up by the divine like a drop of water in a bottle of wine.
Finally a union of imperfect things without change is also out of the question (3).
54) Et quia. ut dicit Hi/arius: ~comparatio terrenorum ad Deum nulla est", nec exemplum
sufficiens rebus divinis ratio humana praestabit. sciendum est quod ·nullus istorum modorum
compet;! ex toto ineffabili unioni qua Deus homini unitus est; sed tamen aliqui istorum nwdorum
quantum ad aJiquid repraesentant ilium modum unionis. 3SN 1.1.1;
132 NAMING THE UNfIT OF CHRIST
Here Aquinas mentions the analogy of the union of body and soul. As we
mentioned above, Aquinas thinks this analogy is only acceptable to the extent that
it is applied to personal unity. and not to natural unity. From body and soul one
nature comes to be, but this is not the case in Christ. Only the fact that a human
person consists of body and soul can serve as a similarity, since the Son of God
subsists in human naturess . , limits.
In discussing Christ's existential· unity, Aquinas uses the analogy of integral parts.
This is an analogy that seems to belong to the kind of union last mentioned: a
union from two imperfect things that does not imply change. "Should it happen,
after the appearance of Socrates as a person, that he should acquire hands or feet
or eyes, then from none of these would he acquire a new existence. There would
be added simply a relation to these new parts inasmuch as Socrates would now ~e
said to exist not merely in respect of what he fonnerly possessed, but also ill
respect of his new acquisitions "56. Integral parts are parts that belong to the
integrity of a nature. but the absence df which does not entail the absence of ~e
nature altogether, so they may be predicated of the person. The employment of tins
analogy serves some aspects of the umon: the unity of existence and the coming to
be human without change. Its disadvantages are multiple as well, as can be
gathered from what was said aboveS1 , (In the next chapter we will examine this
analogy in greater detail.) ,
So when Aquinas approaches the hypostatic union by analyzing the me~mngs of
unum, it becomes evident that there are no perfect examples or analogIes to be
found in the created world. not even ones that are nearly perfect, There are only
partial similarities, The unity of Christ ,is a unique unity,. for a ~ty of perfect
things that is not at the same time accidental. a non-accidental umty of perfect
things that does not imply change at the same time, a unity of imperfect things that
does not consist of a certain commingling and does not result in the coming to be
of a third of a different kind and the parts of which are not parts. can nowhere be
found. Aquinas employs a procedure that we are acquainted with: his analys~s of
words used analogously of God, whose meaning is taken from created perfections.
The unity that occurs in the created world is used to understand a~d .ex~r~ss the
unity of the Son of God with his human nature. However, all. suniiantI~s ~re
indeed nothing but similarities. That is what happens to words that mtend to Sigrufy
something that is one -- unmixed, unaltered, unchanged, and inseparated. Even
55) Other discussions of unum are to be found in 3SN 5.1.1.2, orr I 206 and ScG IV 3~. A:ll
these discussions, just as the one from the ST, are contained in the refutation of a natural umty In
Christ;
56) ST III 17.2: ... si contingeret quod, post constitutionem personae Socratis, adv~nir~nt
Socrati manus vel pedes vel oculi, sicut accidit in caeco nato, ex his non accresceret Socrall aillui
esse, sed solum reiatio quaedam ad huiusmodi: quia scilicet diceretur esse non solum secundum ea
quae prius habebat, sed edam secundum ea quae sibi postmodum advenerunt;
57) Cf. C.B. O'Neill, 1965, p. 225: "If a perfect parallel were to be found he,re for. ~he
mystery of the Incarnation it would have to be propose~ that a new. s~bstantial ~ture •. In ~ddlt1on
to the human nature already there, be united to Socrates person. ThiS IS clearly Impossible ;
CHAPTER FOUR 133
though that relation of union is something created (cf. below), it is unique and
escapes the significative content of human words. Christ is called 'one', and such
an affirmation belongs to faith, but we have to know that we do not exactly know
what we say when. we say he is one. Analogous use of words shows that there are
2.2 The hierarchy of unions between God and creatures; the theory of a mixed
relation
One can run up against the same limits but from a different direction. Such an
approach teaches different things about that which is not reached. Aquinas sketches
an hierarchy of unions between God and creatures. and it is instructive indeedss .
At the top of this hierarchy is placed the personal union in ChrisP9. At the bottom
of it is the union of God or the Word with creation: God dwells in creation by
essence, presence, and power. All that exists God has created, bestowing being,
which is most intimate to each existing thing. upon it. Nothing falls outside of his
providence or is hidden from his eyes. Everything that exists falls under his
58) The basic text is ISN 37.1.2: Coniungitur autem creatura Deo tripliciter. Primo modo
secundum similitudinem tantum, inquantum invenitur in creatura aJiqua similitudo divinae
bonitatis, TUm quod attingat ipsum Deum secundum substantiam: et ista coniunctio invenitur in
omnibus creaturis per essentiam, praesentiam et potentiam. Secundo creatura attingit ad ipsum
Deum secundum substantiam suam consideratum, et non secundum similitudinem tantum; et hoc
est per operationem: scilicet quando aiiquis fide adhaeret ipsi primae veritati, et charitate ipsi
summae bonitati: et sic est alius modus quo Deus specialiter est in sanctis per gratiam. Tertio
creatura attingit ad ipsum Deum non solum secundum operationem, sed etiam secundum esse: non
quidem prout esse est actus essentiae, quia creaJura non potest transire in naturam divinam: sed
secundum quod est actus hypostasis vel personae, in cuias unionem creatura assumpta est: et sic
est ultimus modus quo Deus est in Christo per unionem. Another basic observation is the fact that
Aquinas deems it necessary to mention the threefold union in the very beginning of the ST: I 8.4
ad 4'
59)' orr I 211: modus quo sibi univit humanam naturam Christi (.. .) est nobis ineffabilis, et
excellens omnem aUam unionem Dei ad creaturam; ST III 1.1: Unde ad rationem summi boni
pertinet quod summo modo se creaturae communicet. Quod quidem maxime fit per hoc quod
'naturam creatam sic sibi coniungit ut una persona fiat ex tribus, Verbo, anima et carne', sicut
dicit Auguslinus; REI I 8 [200]: Consequenter cum dicit "Plenum gratiae et veritatis", ipsam
gloriam Verbi determinat ... Possunt autem haec verba exponi de Christo tripliciter. Primo
secundum unionem: ad hoc enim aJicui datur gralia, ut per ipsam un/atur Deo. llIe ergo gratia
plenus est qui peifectissime Deo unitur. Et alii quidem coniunguntur Deo per participationem
similitudinis naturalis ... Alii per fidem ... Alii per caritatem ... Sed omnes isti modi particulares
sunt: quia neque per participationem naturalis similitudinis per/ecte a/iquis Deo coniungitur,
neque videtur Deus per fidem sicuti est, neque per caritalem diligitur, quantum diligibilis est ... In
Christo autem, in quo humana natura est unita divinitati in unitate suppositi, est invenire plenam
et peifectam coniunctionem ad Deum: quia taUs fuit illa unio, ut omnes actus tam divinae quam
humanae naturae essent actus suppositi ... ;
134 NAMING THE UNITY OF CHRIST
rule60 • Between the personal union and the general union there is the bond of
knowledge and love, now and in the Kingdom of God, of the faithful with God: the
union through operation. The proportion between these unions is analogical:
'union' is said per prius et posterius. primarily and secondarily. secundum
peifectum et diminutum, according to perfection and diminution61 • It means that
from the presence of God in the world and in the faithful we can learn something
about God's presence in Christ, but that the union of Christ is the greatest, and the
meaning of the name 'union' in the other employment is considered to be derived
from the union of Christ62 , We owe these unions to God's grace, but the grace of
the union is the greatest of all gifts of grace. Moreover. it means that whoever has
the greatest kind of union possesses all there is to have63 • and that this greatest
kind of union serves as an example for us and provides us with the belief that a
union through operation indeed is possible64 • Of the personal union Aquinas says:
60) ST I 8.3; REI I 5 [250]: explaining "Verbum ... in mundo erat" (In 1): ... Deus vero
operatur in omnibus ut interius agens, quia agit creando. Creare autem est dare esse rei creatae.
Cum ergo esse sit ;ntimum cuilibet rei, Deus, qui operando dat esse, operatur in rebus ut intimus
agens. In mundo ergo erat ut dans esse mundo. Consuetum est autem dici, Deum esse ;n omnibus
per essentiam, praesemiam et potentiam ... per potentiam quia omnia eius potestati subduntur ...
per praesentiam vero quia "omnia nuda et aperta sum oculis eius" (Heb 4.13) quae sunt in mundo
... per essentiam autem, quia essentia sua intima est omnibus rebus: oportet enim de necessitate
omne agens, inquantum agens, immediate coniungi suo effectui, cwn movens et molUm oporteat
simul esse. Deus autem actor est et conservator omnium secundum esse uniuscuiusque rei. Unde,
cum esse rei sit infimum in qualibet re, manifestum est quod Deus per essentiam suam, per quam
omnia creat, sit in omnibus rebus.
On the corresponding texts in SNcf. FJ.A. de Grijs, 1967, pp. 65·71 and 447-451;
61) 3SN 10.3.2: Et hae duae uniones non sunt uniltS rationis, sed se habent secundum prius et
posterius, et perfectum et diminutum. Cf. 3SN5.1.1.2, STIll 2.9: ipsa unio est maxima unio;
62) In ScG IV 34.6 Aquinas is quite clear about the fact that the personal union has to be
different from the union through operation. If it were not, it would entail for instance that all of
the faithful are incarnations of God. Many arguments against the nestorian vision of the
incarnation are arguments against the view that the union is a union through inhabitation and
arguments in favour of the uniqueness of this persona] union, cf. ScG IV 34 (6. 7, 24. 25, 26. 27,
28, 29. 32). In ST III 2.10 ad 2 Aquinas mentions an opinion. without conunenting upon it, that
all three modes of the union are aspects of divinity'S dwelling in Christ; the second type of union
is identified with sanctifying grace;
63) This is Aquinas' most important argument to deny that Christ merited the beatific vision,
instead of enjoying it from ,the very beginning: gloria animae consistit in hoc quod anima ipsi Deo
unitur per visionem et amorem. Et quia posterior unio praesupponit priorem, sicut hoc quod Deus
est in sanctis per gratiam praesupponit hoc quod est in omnibus per essentiam, praesentiam et
potentiam; ideo eadem ratione unio quae est in persona • quae est ultima et completissima -
praesupponit omnem aUam unionem ad Deum. Unde ex hoc ipso quod anima Christi erat Deo in
persona coniuncta, debebatur sibi fruitionis unio, et non per operationem aliquam est ei facta
debita. 3SN 18.4.4. Cf. 1SN37.1.2 ad 3;
64) Therefore it is one of the reasons for the fittingness of the incarnation: Datur etiam per
hoc homini _quoddam exemplum Wius beate unionis qua intellectus creatus increato spiritui
intelligendo unietur. Non enim restat incredibile quin intellectus creatus Deo uniri possil eius
essentiam videndo, ex quo Deus homini unitus est naturam eius assumendo, orr I 201. Cf.
CHAPTER FOUR 135
"But the union of incarnation, a union in personal existence, transcends the union
of any beatified mind to God, a union through the act of the one at joyous rest in
God"6s.
Here we are dealjng with the same relation between the Son of God and his human
nature that we approached in the preceding section, where we saw how Aquinas
studied all created modes of union in general. Now he compares this personal
union to other kinds of union with God. Aquinas no longer takes into consideration
the several meanings of the word used to signify that relation (unus or unto),
determined by different created modes of identity, but now focuses on the
meanings of 'one with ,God' determined by different modes of God's dwelling in
the world. In both cases, however, we are dealing with an analogous use of words,
because the summit of the hierarchy is the cause of that which the hierarchy
contains and primarily (per prius) applies to it, yet understanding of the prima
analogate can only be had by investigating the lower parts of the hierarchy66.
In this case we can discern something that all unions with God mentioned in the
hierarchy have in common. All unions are relations, with the personal union
explicitly included67 • This means that all that is said in general about the relation
between God and the world, and all that is said in general about the names
Augustine's "Factus est Deus homo, ut homo fieret Deus", quoted e.g. in ST III 1.2. In ScG IV
55.2 Aquinas says: homo secundum ordinem ~uae naturae habet ipsum Deum pro fine, et natus est
ei per intellectum uniri; cuius unionis exemplum et documentum quoddam fuit unto Dei ad
hominem in persona. In the preceding chapter Aquinas mentioned as first ground for fittingness
the fact that the incarnation fosters hope in those who despair about the distance between God and
humankind: perfecta beafitudo hominis in immediata Dei visione consistil. Posse! autem alicui
videri quod homo ad hunc statum nunquam possil per!ingere quod intellectus humanus immediate
ipsi divinae essentiae uniretur ut ;ntellectus intelligibili, propter immensam distantiam naturarum;
et sic circa inquisitionem beatitudinis homo tepesceret, ipsa desperatione detentus. Per hoc autem
quod Deus humanam naturam sib; unire voluit in persona, evidentissime hominibus demonstratur
quod homo per intellectum Deo potest unir;, ipsum immediate videndo. Fuit igilur
convenientissimum quod Deus humanam naturam assumeret ad spem hominls in beatitudinem
sublevandam, ScG IV 54.2. Cf. the penetrating discussion of this argument by P. Engelhardt,
1988:
65) Unio autem incarnationis, cum sit in esse personali, transcendit unionem mentis beatae ad
Deum, quae est per actumfruentis; STTII 2.11. Cf. ST III 6.1 ad 1; 6.4 ad 3; 6.6 ad 1;
66) Another text that mentions the hierarchy of the unions is OCG 6 [100]: Quia ergo
secundum quantitatem virturis quam Deus exercet in creaturam, magis et minus dicitur creaturae
uniri, manifestum est quod cum efficacia divinae virtutis humano intellectu comprehendi non
possit, sublimiori modo potest Deus creaturae uniri quam intelLectus humanus capere possil.
Quodam ergo incomprehensibili et ineffabili modo dicimus Deum fuisse unitum hUllumae naturae
in Christo non solum per inhabitationem, sicU! ceteris sanetis, sed quodam singu!ari modo, ita
quod hwnana natura esset quaedam Filii Dei natura;
67) This personal unio est relatto quaedam. e.g. in ST TIl 16.6 ad 2, ST III 2.7 and 3SN
5.1.1.1. It is the most important argument in answering the question whether the proposition Deus
Jactus est Iwmo is true. Cf. 3SN 7.2; eRO I 2 [200J; STIII16.6 and 7;
136 NAMING mE UNITY OF CHRIST
signifying (implicitly or explicitly) the relation between God and the world, applies
to the hypostatic union as well. Not only are names such as incarnatus and homo,
implying the union and therefore implying a relation of God with the world. at
issue here (as we saw in the preceding chapter), but the core of the doctrine of the
hypostatic union, together with the way it is signified, figure as well. Aquinas
reflects upon this relation as a 'mixed relation',
Such a relation between God and the world, the faithful. and this human nature
cannot be a relation that makes God dependent upon these others. A relation of
dependency pulls God as it were inside the order of creation, whether we are
dealing with the created world as such, with those who are united with God in faith
and love, or with this human nature68 • Therefore a relation between father and
son is not a good example. A relation which is purely the product of rational
operation is out of the question as welL If I say for instance that 'this is identical to
itself, I state a relation which is pure.!>' rational. The same goes for a relation
between being and non-being, and for mtentional relations such as genus, species
and, indeed, supposit. Yet none of these examples of logical relations are good
examples, because they also would put God and the world once again on the same
level, albeit the level of rationality. The best examples are relations between things
that belong to a different order, Le. between the order of rationality and the order
of reality. Aquinas' prime example always is the relation between someone
knowing and something known. The object of knowledge has no real relation with
someone knowing; it is not something in the object that would change the object or
make it dependent upon the one knowing. The reverse is the case with the one
knowing. This relation tradition has called a mixed relation, a relation between the
differing orders of rationality and reality. It could be called a semantic relation as
well. This category of relations Aquinas employs to approach the relation between
God and the world, God and the faithful, and God and this human nature.
The mixed relation forms one of the most frequently recurring themes in his
theology, for it is employed in Aquinas' discussion of temporal relative divine
names, the relation between the Holy Spirit and the faithful (missio), creation,
grace, the hypostatic union and the sacrament of the eucharist. As the discussion of
grace in general as well as the discussion of the grace of the union make evident,
this relation is not meant to keep God aloof from the world. It answers the question
whether God changes in being creator or becoming human69 • It also answers the
question whether God's transcendence is properly understood either when we put
God and creation on a par, or in orders absolutely aparfo. It is primarily meant to
68) In my understanding this element of dependency is the most important element in Aquinas'
teaching on the relation between God and" the world. Cf. for example QDV 4.5. This is shown
magnificently by Thomas Weinandy. 1985;
69) 3SN7.1.2; ST1II16.6 ad 2; srllI 17.2; QDL 1.2.1; cf. JSN2.2.2.3 ad 2; . secundum exemplaritatem, sicU! in creatione rerum est terminatio in similitudinem essentialium
70) Cf. R. Sokolowski, 1982, p. 35ff: "The Council of Cha1cedon, and the councils and
controversies that led up to it, were concerned with the mystery of Christ, but they also tell us
about the God who became incarnate in Christ. They tell us first that God does not destroy the
natural necessities of things he becomes involved with. even in the intimate union of the
CHAPTER FOUR 137
account for a divine involvement which is freely chosen and not dependent on
anything whatsoever71 •
2.3 The logical relation of supposition
The two approaches that I have discussed thus far have one thing in common:
analogy. Whenever unum is said of the incarnate Son of God it is used
analogously. We do not know exactly what it means when we say that Christ is
one, but his unity does have similarities with created kinds of unity. Whenever the
hypostatic union is called unio the signification of the word is also determined by
the signification of unio per operationem and unio per essentiam, praesentiam et
potentiam. We do not know exactly what it means when we say that something is
united with God, but we do know that of all these the unity of this human nature
with the Son of God is the greatest. Furthermore, the account of all those names of
the Son that either directly or indirectly signify the relation that is the hypostatic
union, employs a conception of relation that is analogical to the relation between
the one knowing and the object of knowledge. We do not know exactly what the
relation common to all these names is, but it does have a similarity with a mixed
relation.
In all these cases the words used to express, indirectly or directly, Christ's unity,
incarnation. What is according to nature, and what reason can disclose in nature, retains its
integrity before the Christian God. And second, they tell us that we must think of God as the one
who can let natural necessity be maintained and let reason be left intact: that is, God is not
himself a competing part of nature or a part of the world. (... ) The reason the pagans could not
conceive of anything like the incarnation is that their gods are part of the world, and the union of
any two natures in the world is bound to be, in some way, unnatural, because of the otherness that
lets one thing be itself only by not being the other. But the Christian God is not a part of the
world and is not a "kind" of being at all. Therefore the incarnation is not meaningless or
impossible or destructive. ( ... ) The Christian distinction between God and the world, the denial
that God in his divinity is part of or dependent on the world, was brought forward with greater
clarity through the discussion of the way the word became flesh. The same distinction was also
emphasized as a background for the Trinitarian doctrines and for the controversies about grace.
(... ) Thus many of the crucial dogmatic issues raised in the early centuries of the church engage
the question of the relationship between God and the world. and the positions judged to be
erroneous would generally have obscured the Christian distinction between the divine and the
mundanelt~
71) The two concerns at stake, i.e. the relation between God 'and the world and the hierarchy
of unions. come together in this analysis of divine names implying 'a temporal relation: Si autem
consideretur relatio creaturae ad Creatorem ut ad terminum, possibile est- quod taUs reLatio
creaturae sit ad aliquid essentiale. vel ad aliquid personale. Contingit autem hoc tripliciter. Aut
secundum operationem. sicut aliquis polest intelligere vel nominare Deum velpaternitatem. Vel
attributorum. et in infusione charitatis est terminatio in similitudinem processionis personalis
Spiritus sancti. Vel est terminatio secundum esse, et iste modus est singularis in incarnatione, per
quam humana natura assumpta est ad esse et Wlitatem divinae personae, non autem ad unitatem
divinae naturae, lSN30.1.2;
138 NAMING THE UNITY OF CHRIST
are used analogously. i.e. their signification or connotation is analogous. As we
have set down extensively in chapter II. however, it is not only cOIUlotation that
determines the actual meaning of words used, but denotation, or supposition, as
well. Supposition is a property of terms consequent on the other property of terms,
signification. We have explained in the beginning of this chapter that this
distinction corresponds with the metaphysical distinction between being and
essence, or supposit and nature. The structure of the language people use to talk
about creation corresponds with the structure of creation itself. God is not part of
the structure of creation, and so the structure of human language is unfit for talking
about God. The doctrine of divine simplicity expresses precisely this in saying that
in God being and essence, supposit and nature, are identical. This must have
consequences for the way people speak about God. Abstract words for example are
words that ordinarily cannot stand for an existing individual, but concrete words
can. And yet we can say Divina natura est incarnata. But language about God
should agree with the laws of human language and logic since we have, nothing
else, and for this reason, even though we can confirm Filius Dei est divina natura,
we cannot say Divina natura est homo, even if Filius Dei est homo is true.
In christology we speak about someone who exceeds the range of created reality.
Moreover, in christology we also -speak about someone who in himself unites two
ranges of reality, one created and one eternal. And even more, they are one and
the same person. If our language about this person is to be successful, and if the
language spoken about this person is to have been successful, one has to find some
element in the structure of creation-language that can, to an acceptable extent,
agree with this unique and yet created union72. Aquinas is looking for something
that is able at the same time to express identity and difference. This he fmds in the
property of words to have a different signification and yet supposit for the same
thing. Whenever I say 'That man is animal' (i.e. endowed with senses), and add to
it 'This animal is rational', then both subject-terms have a different signification,
and yet they supposit for the same subsistent individual. They are identical
according to supposit, yet according to the form or nature different. Aquinas gives
a similar analysis of Deus est homo and Homo est Deus: both propositions concern
the Son of God, but the first says that he is man, and the second that he is God.
The union is a relation, and this relation is expressed in both propositions by est.
The relation that is the model for the mixed relation between this human nature and
the Son of God is the relation that exists between a subject-term that has
supposition and a predicate-term that signifies something predicated of w~at ~e
subject-term stands for. It is the relation of sup-position73 • The word 'sub-Ject' IS
telling: the structure of language suggests that the individual supposited for by the
72) Aquinas calls the union a creature, since the union is a relation that is real (only) from the
side of creation (ST lIT 2.7). This is not only the case for the personal union, but for the general
relation of creation as well (ST I 45.3 ad 1);
73) Cf. the definition of (actual) supposition that William of Sherwood gives: ordinario
alicuius intellectus sub alio, o.c., p. 74;
CHAPTER FOUR 139
subject-term is placed under or takes part in a common hUman nature signified by
the predicate-term, in which many other individuals take part.
Subject and predicate compare as 'small' to 'big', or 'lower' to 'upper'. This is'
spoken figuratively, of course, and one shouldn't think that God is really placed
under something else74 (nor is any other individual for that matter). The
usefulness of this kind of speech is that it shows the difference between
signification and supposition: the one has to do with what is common and abstract,
and the other with what is particular and concrete. What is shown is a
10gicaIlgrammaticai relation" i.e. a relation between concepts or between terms.
This is why Aquinas calls suppositum a name of second imposition (if a term is
indicated) or a second intention (if the concept signified is indicated). In any case
we are dealing with the relation between subject and predicate.
Aquinas deems this relation to be a useful analogy for the relation that the
hypostatic union is. It enables him to explain why the properties that belong to
human nature and the properties that belong to divine nature are truly said of
Christ, without distinguishing whether the subject-term signifies human nature
(homo), or divine nature (Deus). This is the theory of the interchange of properties
(coTfU111JJlicatio idiomatum).
As we will see in the next section, this theory of the interchange of properties is
for christology what the 'theory' of analogy is for the doctrine about God. In
christology a large part of our language about Christ in some way or other must
express a relation, the hypostatic union, whereas in the language about God this
relation most of the time is only presupposed and irrelevant for the determination
of the signification of names. Both have to deal with naming a unique subject, but
the doctrine about God can deal with it on the basis of signification only, whereas
the multiplication of signification in christology (two natures) makes a reflection
upon supposition necessary.
The relation of supposition, being a model or analogy of the hypostatic union, is
not perfect either. If it were perfect, it would not be an analogy. The most
important complaint about it is that it doesn't agree with the fact that in God there
is no distinction between singular and universal (ST I 39.6 ad 2), between concrete
and abstract (ST I 13.1 ad 2). E.g. Homo est Deus suggests there to be a kind of
participation of the singular (Homo) in the universal (Deus i.e. divine nature), but
such a suggestion is false. Another inadequacy can be found in what was said
above concerning the specific fittingness of mixed relations. This model of a
relation of supposition suggests that both related parts belong to the same level, to
the same order. This suggestion must be denied, however, both for God and for the
hypostatic union.
74) Cf. lSN 34.1.1 ad 3, 3SN 5.2.1 ad 3, ad 4; ST I 39.1 ad 3: rebus divinis nomina
imponimus secundum modwn rerum creatarum .. ' Et quia naturae rerwn creatarwn individuantur
per materiam, quae subiicitur naturae speciei. inde est quod individua dicunlUr 'subiecta', vel
'supposita', vel 'hypostases'. Et propter hoc etiam divinae personae 'supposita' vel 'hypostases'
nominantur: non quod ibi sit aliqua suppositio vel subiectio secundum rem;
140 NAMING mE UNITY OF CHRIST
One caD encounter this approach to the union by way of the analogy of the relation
of supposition everywhere in Aquinas' christology. albeit most of the time in an
implicit manner. ST III 17.1 is the best example, and we will discuss it now. The
question fonns the beginning of the examination of the unity of Christ. according
to being, willing and operation, and poses the principal question whether Christ is
one or two, unum vel duo.
The way in which Aquinas orders his answers to the question mentioned, is telling.
First he shows that there is a difference in mode of signification between abstract
and concrete words (1). This difference entails that Christus est humana natura,
Christ is human nature, cannot truly be said (since it would imply that only one
human being exists), However. Christus est homo, using the concrete mode, can.
In the same manner Christus est Deus can truly be said, whereas given divine
simplicity Christus est divina natura is acceptable, as well. Whenever one employs
the concrete mode, not only the nature is signified, but it is also signified as in the
possession of some individual. ,/
Next Aquinas shows that a concrete mode of signification, ,as such, does not
indicate in whose possession the nature is. Aquinas shifts his attention from the
difference between concrete and abstract modes of signification to the difference
between distinct and indistinct supposition (2). Here I have to remind the reader of
the two meanings, distinguished in chapter II (cf. p. 64 and p. 71), of 'supposition'
in Aquinas, i.e. a kind of signification (virtual supposition) and actual denotation.
Here I use the word in the first meaning, for which reason I will talk about 'the
ability to denote'. Aquinas says that a name such as Petrus or Jesus has the ability
to denote a 'distinct person of human nature, and a name like Son of God has the
ability to denote a distinct person of divine nature. But homo and Deus ass u c h
do not have that ability.
Both steps Aquinas takes have an immediate conclusion. The first step (1) leads to
the conclusion that one call1lot say that Christ is 'two', regarding his natures,
because the natures are not both predicated in abstracto of Christ. Both natures are
predicated in a way that they signify the natures in concreto, and so one has to take
the supposit into consideration in order to determine whether Christ can be called
'two'. One has to take into consideration the relation between the predicate-terms
and the subject-tenn, i.e. the relation of supposition. Before this is done however,
another, second step (2) has to be taken. This leads to the conclusion that the mode
of supposition of both homo and Deus as such does not indicate two distinct
supposits, since according to their virtual supposition, i.e. their denotational
capability, they do not indicate someone or something distincte.
So the consideration of modes of signification and modes of supposition yields a
double result: because of the modes of signification of the predicates Deus and
homo (in Christus est Deus/homo) Christ cannot be two (natures), and because of
the modes of supposition of both predicates mentioned, Christ need not be two
(persons).
In order to determine whether Christ is not two, one has to focus on the actual
supposition of both propositions. The second step only considered the virtual
CHAPTER FOUR 141
supposition of the predicate-terms. i.e. the supposition these terms taken as such
are able to have. This contributes to the determination of the actual supposition that
(only) the subject-tenn has, because the predicate-term can for example amplify or
restrict the possible range of denotation of the subject-term. In this case, however,
it does not do so. The predicate-tenns discussed do not force the subject-term to
stand for a supposit that in the case of est Deus is different than in the case of est
homo. So if one considers the logical relation of supposition between subject-term
and predicate-terms, one has to conclude that there is no reason' for saying that
Christ is two. On the contrary, one can truly confess both enunciations without
implying that Christ is two, because both enunciations effect the ability of the
proper name Christus to denote distinctly only one supposit (cf. STIlI 17.1 ad 6).
The question we have just discussed, i.e. ST III 17.1, is especially strong on
predicate~expressions. It says that viewed from the side of the predicate-expressions
there is no necessity to conclude to a double supposition of the subject-expression.
This is exactly what Aquinas needs here, since he is once more engaged in refuting
the neo-Nestorian position of the Assumptus-theory that did teach there to be two
supposits in Christ. Apparently Aquinas was confronted with the claim that to
predicate two concrete words signifying two different individual substantial natures
entails the presence of two different supposits. The same claim can be expressed by
concentrating on the subject-expression, and in that case one says that all the names
of Christ used as subject-expressions in propositiOns about Christ have a double
supposition, or a quasi-double supposition. This version of the ~l~ ~akes even
more clear why the problem at stake is a problem of a proper distInctIOn between
supposition and signification. William of Auxerre, for example, said that iste homo
has a "substantial supposition" for Christ's individual human nature, and an
"accidental supposition" for Christ's individual divine nature. A~u~nas again and
again refutes this position, saying ~at there is ~~y ?n~ S~ppO~ltIOn for all ~e
names of Christ used as subject-expressIOns, whether It IS slgmfymg this or that nature .
75) Cf. W. Principe: "Linked with the problem of unity and duality in Chris~ and reflecting
the importance of speculative grammar are discussions by these latter authors [l.e. Everard of
Ypres, Peter Cantor (c.1130-1197), Stephen Langton (c.1150-1228) - hs] of the supposit~on of
various names, e.g. 'Jesus', 'Filius hominis' or pronouns, e.g. 'iste', 'hic', that occur In the
christological tracts. Each explanation of the mode of union is now shown to under~tand t~e
supposition of these terms differently from the others; each manner of un~erstandlng their
supposition is shown to be consistent with the individual author's own position With respect ~o the
mode of union" 1963, p.70. William of Auxerre interprets the name Jesus to SUppOSlt for
Christ's individu~l humanity, individuum, quis and aliquis supposit for both individual humanity
and divinity, iste, iste homo and Filius Dei have ~ quasi-dou~le supposition: .e.g. iste hom~ ~as
substantial supposition for the individual hwnaruty and acc,lden~al supposItlOn for the diVine
person, Principe: "By these conclusions William of Auxerre, In hiS efforts to ensure the fullness
of Christ's individual 'humanity, seems to come near the teaching of the Assumptus Theory.
William. of course, does not accept this theory, and that is why he constantly uses the word quasi
to qualify his remarks about the twofold supposition of these terms; such a qualification, however,
is insufficient assurance of the consistency and complete integration of his doctrine", ibidem, p.
142 NAMING THE UN[JY OF CHRIST
A wrong theory of supposition leads to a wrong theory of the hypostatic union.
Such is the theological importance of a theory of supposition. Positively
fonnulated: a good theory of supposition enables one to safeguard the unity of
Christ. The same logical relation of supposition caD be approached either from the
side of the predicate-expressions. as is done in ST III 17.1, or from the side of the
subject-expressions, as is done in all those instances where a singular supposition is
affinned (for example in ST III 16.4 and 5, cf. below). In both cases Christ's unity
is approached as a unity not on the level of signification (truly God, truly man) but
on the level of supposition (Christ is truly God and truly man).
I started this section by saying that there is an analogy between Cluist and the
logical relation of supposition. This may cause confusion, since there is a
difference between the analogous usage of names, and the analogous usage of
propositions. The first concerns the signification of words, and the second their
supposition only. The first concerns in some way or other the substance, the' nature
of that which is spoken about. The second does not, but only concerns the way in
which a nature (or accident, or action etc.) signified by the predicate-term is
related to that for which the subject-term stands. It may be helpful to list
expressions according to their level of imposition. Expressions such as 'The word
'one' used of Christ is used analogously' and 'Christ has one supposit' are both
expressions concerning our language about Christ, second level expressions.
Expressions such as 'Christ is one' and 'Ood is man' are expressions about Christ,
first level expressions. 'Christ has one supposit' is a second level expression,
because it accounts for the semantic structure of all propositions about Christ that
are summarized in Deus est homo and Homo est Deus. It is a second level
expression, just as 'Ood is simple' is a second level expression. 'Ood is simple'
regards the lack of correspondence between the structure of human language (e.g.
distinguished in abstract/concrete, singular/universal, subject/predicate-terms) and
the 'structure' of God, and serves as a rule for all interpretation of language about
God. 'Christ has one supposit' regards the analogical correspondence between the
structure of human language, i.e. consisting of signification and supposition, and
127. cf. p. U5. Hugh of Saint-Cher has similar views, since he talks about Jesuitas as indicating
the individual human nature of Christ (1970, p. 83, p. 217), and since he gives a different
interpretation in different contexts; sometimes iste homo signifies (and perhaps supposits for) this
concrete individual man Christ, sometimes it supposits for the divine person but signifies the
created form, sometimes it supposits both for the divine person (accidentally) and for the concrete
individual man (substantially), ibidem. p. 71 and 130. The latter applies to Jesus as well. ibidem,
p. 130. Principe emphasizes that this double supposition of Jesus and Iste homo. which seems to
be so similar to AT that posited a double supposit. is in fact meant as an antidote against AT. that
said that each of the names of Christ had a single supposit, one for words signifying divine nature
and one for words signifying human nature. Alexander of Hales (1967. p. 193ft) and Philip the
Chancellor (1975, p. 132) have views similar to those of William and Hugh.
F. Haberl (1939, p. 79f. note 95) thinks that Aquinas, in 3SN 12.1.1, explicitly refutes this theory
of quasi-double supposition;
CHAPTER FOUR 143
the 'structure' of Christ. It serves as a rule for all interpretation of language about
Christ, as will be elaborated in the doctrine of the communication' of properties.
'Analogy' here does not directly concern the significative content of words used for
Christ, but the corresponding structure between Christ and the propositions used to
talk about him. They correspond to the extent that there is a real distinction in
Christ between the divine person and his human nature, and they do not correspond
to the extent that there is no real distinction in Christ between, the divine person
and his divine nature.
In the preceding sections we examined the examples and analogies that Aquinas
adduces in order to approach the hypostatic union. Some of them are less helpful
and some of them more helpful. Most important is the analogy recognized in the
logical relation of supposition, since it concerns the very structure of our language.
There is no human language that fails to distinguish between signification and
supposition, and if employing this mode of signification in a certain way
corresponds with the mode of being of Christ, it confronts us with the possibilities
of our language as well as with its limitations.
This entails, in retrospect, that all the examples and analogies given in this chapter
concern the signification of names of Christ according to the way in which the
names signifying human nature are connected with the names signifying divine
nature and the Son of God. In other words, they are concerned with the et of
Christus est vere Deus et vere homo, just as the analogy of the relation of
supposition is concerned with the est of this core proposition of faith. Some names,
such as unum and unio, analogously signify the union. Sometimes, however, the
union is expressed in the relation of supposition between subject-term and
predicate-term. Both constitute first level-speech about Christ, whereas where
Christ is called one supposit we are dealing with second level-speech: it constitutes
a rule to adhere to in either interpreting language about Christ or in constructing
language about Christ. This rule could be stated:
avoid any interpretation or construction that so confuses signification and
supposition that the truth-value of propositions about Christ is determined by the
signification of subject-expressions alone.
This rule covers the relation of supposition seen from both sides, sUbject-
expressions 'and predicate-expressions. Subject-expressions are covered in the sense
that one should not distinguish between the supposition of names such as Filius
hominis and Filius Dei; they have the same supposition. Predicate-expressions are
covered in the sense that one should not distinguish between the truth of the
predication of divine attributes and the truth of the predication of human attributes
according to the signification of the subject-expression actually used. The
signification of the subject-expression, signifying aspects of human or divine
nature, does not determine whether or not the predication of either divine or human
attributes will be true. The rule is the rule of the doctrine of the communicatio
idiomatum.
144 NAMING mE UNITY OF CHRIST
Before we consider this doctrine however. and verify the rule just formulated, we
should put our interpretation of Aquinas' reflections about names for the union and
propositions expressing it to the test. We will do so in examining the question
whether or not Christ is composed, as opposed to simple.
2.4 Simple or composed
To say that God is simple is to express God's transcendence. All divine persons,
because of the identity of supposit and nature. are simple. However. Aquinas
accepts the predication of persona composita, composed person, of the Son
Incarnate. Does that mean that God and Christ Incarnate are opposed as the
transcendent and the immanent God? No, and if one is tempted to conclude to such
an opposition, one has a wrong understanding of divine transcendence and of
divine simplicity. To predicate simplicity of God is to say that there is no one else
who qualifies for being God than God himself. For simplicity says that divine
being and divine essence or nature are identical, and thus no one else shares in
divine essence and no one else shares in divine being. This makes 'simple' to be a
predicate different from all other predicates, since it does not describe a certain
feature of God's divine nature, but it says something about all of our language
about God: we caIUlot but employ predicates in talking about God, thus suggesting
that God participates in something essential bigger than God alone, but this
suggestion should be denied; we calUlot but employ predicates in talking about
God, thus suggesting that God has a certain being, but this suggestion should be
denied. The language we use is fit for talking about creatures. This language uses
words that are defined. Each definition contains something that is common and
something that is different. The definition of human being for example employs
'animal', a genus, and 'rationalis' a specific difference, combining together to form
the definition of the species human being. Any proposition about something
concrete, using words with a certain definition, intensifies this difference between
something common, the predicate, and something particular, the subject. The
distinctions used reflect the very structure of human thinking and human speaking,
which expresses that something is unique by its being different from other things.
This will not do for God, since God does not differ from the world in this sense.
God is not transcendent in the sense that he needs a difference to be the unique one
he is. God is not different within a certain genus, on the basis of a common
similarity. This is what simplicity expresses: God is 'outside' of any genus, and
thus God is not different from creatures the way in which creatures mutually differ.
God differs differently. This is where description of God's being or nature stops,
and where we discover that simplicity and transcendence are actually words
qualifying our thinking and speaking about God, instead of qualifying God himself.
All of our language about God should be analyzed in such away, as the analysis of
words and propositions used analogously in fact does, to account for this unique
uniqueness of God.
Such an account undermines the opposition between transcendence and immanence,
CHAPTER FOUR 145
because God is not transcendent in such a way that he is simply 'outside of or
'above' the world, and thus not transcendent in such a way that it would exclude
his 'descent' into the world. The true light that came into the world was already in
the world (In 1). A proper understanding of divine transcendence does not exclude
divine immanence; formulated in terms of 'union', God was already united to the
world before he was united with this human nature. However one interprets divine
simplicity, an understanding that implies God to be unknowable and ineffable
because God is simply 'outside of or 'above' creation is utterly niisleading76 •
So whoever reads in Aquinas' christology (3SN 6.2.3; ST III 2.4) that Christ, who
shares in divine simplicity, can also be called composed, should reflect upon the
'also'. Aquinas does not mean to say that Christ in some respect is x and in
another is non-x, but he means to say that the structure of our language about
Christ sometimes corresponds with Christ's being (Deus es(homo) and sometimes
does not (Homo est Deus). Aquinas does not require that we change attributes, but
that we change modes of signification.
Aquinas' discussion in ST is very short and almost laconicTI • He says that the
person in itself is completely simple, but considered as a person that subsists in two
natures, it is composed. This seems all too easy. First it seems to confirm that even
the divine Son subsisting in divine nature could be called a composite. But even
worse: isn't a person simple for the very reason that it does not subsist in a nature
which is different from it? An important aspect of divine simplicity is that God
does not take part in something. because that would imply imperfection. But
Aquinas says laconically: in this composite the natures are not parts but both are
like numbers and everything in which two occurs is composite: there are two
natures in Christ. Does this really prevent imperfection from being applicable?
Doesn't it imply that [God + xJ is more perfect than God? Or would such a
critique be unfounded 'after' Christ? Apparently Aquinas thinks that he has
explained elsewhere the meaning of divine simplicity to such an extent and in such
a way that obviates a contradiction with what he says here about the persona
76) In this section I implicitly answer Immink's criticism of Aquinas. i.e, that according to
Aquinas God is completely different and that Aquinas is not able to 'specify' God's being
different. Such a criticism betrays a false concept of transcendence and a lack of thea-logical
profundity concerning 'specification'. F.G. Immink, 1987, pp. 123-145;
77) One less important reason for this may be that in his days, Aquinas says, the expression
persona composita is no longer in use: Non tamen est ibi vera ratio compositionis, quia deficit ibi
a/tera conditio (Le. esse cau.satur ex coniunctione naturarum - hs). Unde edam non est in u.su
Modernorum tenentium hanc opinionem (i.e. the Subsistence-theory - hs), quod dicant personam
compositam, 3SN 6.2.3. The confinnation of the name however has been a distinctive mark of
ST, since AT learned a double esse and HT only an accidentaJ union and not a composition at all.
The phrase has a long history, and Aquinas is aware of it. It is used by e.g. Pseudo-Dionysius
(DDN I 4.592B; II 9.648A; cf. above chapter ill, note 51 and 55), in the definitions of the
council of Constantinople II (H. Denzinger. o.c. 216), and by John of Damascus (cf. ST III 2.4
sed contra);
146 NAMING THE UNITY OF CHRIST
composita of Christ. In no way does Aquinas give the impression that theology has
to have recourse to the concept of paradox to reconcile what cannot be reconciled.
In 3SN Aquinas indeed shows that one should understand divine simplicity in such
a way that the assumption to itself of what is not divine cannot be contrary to it:
"The person is not called composite in the sense that his being is constituted by
many - for this contradicts the idea of eternity - but it means that he extends
himself to many things that are assumed to that being"78. Aquinas makes his
remark in response to an argument that denies compositeness by appealing to the
eternity of the person. For eternity is opposed to compositeness. There indeed is,
Aquinas says in the solution of the question, an aspect of compositeness that does
not apply to Christ: the natures of Christ do not, in uniting, cause his person to be,
as e.g. the union of body and soul cause a person to be. However. it is not
opposed to God's simplicity to extend itself to many things that are thus assumed to
God's being79. It is not opposed to divine simplicity, the highest good, to be the
goodness of many created things. Tge creation of good things does not add
anything to God's goodness, and similarly one should not think that the union of
uncreated goodness with something good created, i.e. Christ's human nature, adds
something to the uncreated goodness (3SN 6.2.3 ad 1). Divine simplicity turns out
to be more complicated than it seemed at first sight. For this reaSon is God called
simple, that it denies God the complexity of human speaking and thinking about
him.
If Aquinas refines one term of the contrast, simplicity, this has consequences for
the other term, compositeness, as well. The name composita is only partly
applicable to the person of Christ Incarnate. Compositeness has two aspects, only
one of which is applicable. As has been said, what is not applicable is the fact that
the composing parts constitute the being of the whole. In fact, we cannot even use
the word 'part' in its nonnal sense, because in no way has the divine nature the
notion of a part (3SN 6.2.3 ad 4). Of the true meaning of the word 'composition'
(vera ratio compositionis) only one aspect is applicable, i.e. that the being of the
whole pertains to all of its parts, and yet the word 'part' is inapplicable as well.
We have to, conclude that the word composita is used analogously. When I say
analogously I mean analogous in the sense in which suppositum in 'Christ is one
supposit' is used analogously. We are not dealing with a word signifying divine or
human nature, nor with a word signifying the union. We are dealing with a word'
that concerns the language that we use about Christ: as the language used in talking
about creation, this language possesses modes of signification that reflect modes of
created being; this language suggests created modes of being, the most important of
78) 3SN 6.2.3 ad 2: persona non dicitur composita quasi esse suum sit ex multis constitutum -
hoc enim est contra rationem aeterni - sed quia ad multa se extendit quae assumuntur in iliad
esse;
79) Cf. this remarkable statement: ... natura Verbi ratione suae infinitatis, comprehend;t
oTlU1em naturam finitam. Et ideo, cum persona Verbi assumit naturam humanam, non se extendit
ultra naturam divinam, sed magis accipit quod est infra, QDll ad 14;
CHAPTER FOUR 147
whic.h is being c?mposite. whi~h is suggested by the composition of subject- and
predicate-expressiOn. When saymg that Christ is composite. Aquinas, says that our
language that suggests composition indeed obtains, but only partly so. When we
say Iste est homo, This one is man, and Iste est Deus, This one is God both
propositions are true and express that the Son of God subsists in human natu;e and
subsists in divine nature. The second of both propositions, however, is only true
according to our modes of signification, and does not correspond to the mode of
being of the thing signified. For secundum rem Son and divine natUre are identical
?ut secundum. rati~nem they are noflo. This is the meaning of what Aquinas said
ill those few lmes In ST III 2.4: that the person of Christ can be called composita
concerns our language about Christ more than the person of Christ itself. The word
composita said of Christ is used analogously because the structure of our language
only partly corresponds to Christ's mode of beingsi. This result verifies what has
been said thus far concerning Christus est unum suppositum: it belongs to a second
l~vel-reflection, i.e. it applies not to Jesus Christ, but to the language spoken about
hun.
3. The rule of the 'communicatio idiomatum'
The heart of the theological legislation concerning language about the person of
Christ, is the rule accbrding to which what is said of the person of Christ has to be
analyzed. The theory of the communicatio, Le. conununication or interchange of
idiomata8'2, i.e. words signifying properties of human and divine nature, is
present, implicitly or explicitly, in most of the questions that Aquinas raises
concerning the person of Christ. Moreover, one can say that both cote
80) This is in line with ST I 28.2: Et sic manifestum est quod relatio realiter existens in Deo,
est i~em ~sentiae secundum rem; et non diffen nisi secl!ndum intelligentiae rationem, prout in
relatlOne lmportatur respectus ad suum oppositum, qui non importatur in nomine essentiae: Cf. ST
I 39.1: Persona enim ... signijicat reiationem, prout est subsistens in natura divina. Relatio
aute'!l' ad essentiam ~ompariua, non differt re, sed ratione tantum. Manifest as it may be,
Aqumas does not hesitate to add (ST I 28.2 ad 2): Dictum est enim supra, cum de divinis
n~m~nibus. ageb~ur, qu.o~ plus continetur in perfectione divinae essentiae, quam aliquo nomine
slgnijican pOSSIl. And IbIdem, ad 3: Sed quia divinae essentiae perfectio est maior quam quod
signijicatione alicuius nominis comprehendi possit, non sequitur, sf nomen relativum. vel
quodcumque aUad nomen dictum de Deo, non signijicat aliquid perfectum, quod divina essentia
habeat esse imperfectum: quia divina essentfa comprehendit in se omnium generum
perfection em ... :
81) Thus we come to understand why Aquinas, quite contrary to his custom, feels the need to
address the ineffability and functionality of this union: Et ideo Magister (Le. Peter of Lombard _
hs) didt in sequenti distinctione quod "inexplicabilis est ilIa compositio quae non est partium
rw,iou. DicifUr autem a "!fl~istris ~nio exigi~va: quia tot comprehendunlur iii persona, quot
:I~~ntur ad opus redemptlOnlS, ut sit Deus qUi possU el homo qui debeat satis/acere, 3SN 6.2.3
82) On the history of the expression communicatio idiomatum, that first seems to appear in
Alexander of Hales (communicatio proprietatum), see A.M. Landgraf, 1955, 11/1, p. 145;
148 NAMING THE UNITY OFCHRlST
propositions, Deus est homo and Homo est Deus, are in fact core propositions
because their analysis expressing the unity of Christ is the foundation of the theory
of the interchange of attributes. For it follows from the confinnation of est Deus
and est homo of this one supposit, that of this one supposit anything which is
essential to human nature and anything which is essential to divine nature can be
affinned, and that is precisely what the theory of the interchange of attributes
teaches.
From Aquinas' analysis of both core propositions it appears that the Son of God is
substantially human, and that this man Jesus is substantially God. It follows that it
is true to say that the Son of God has suffered on the cross, and that this man has
created the stars and is omnipotent. Propositions that confirm such unhe~rd-of
truths comply with certain rules. The subject-term is either a concrete common
noun or a proper name or a demonstrative (combined with a concrete conunon
noun or not) or a relative. This list is not exhaustive. What is important is that in
all cases the term supposits for the satD.e person, whatever the signification of the
term (if there is one) may be.
The predicate-term can signify divine nature concretely or even abstractly. In case
of the latter the proposition does not comply with the usual mode of signification,
since of no created individual is its substantial nature predicated abstractly. It
would mean that this individual is one of a kind. Divine simplicity, however,
admits of such a mode of signification. If the predicate-term, signifying either
divine nature or human nature, does so concretely, it complies with the nonnal
mode of signification. Aquinas sometimes calls this significare in supposito (cf.
e.g. ST III 17.1). Predicate-terms that do not signify nature itself, but certain
operations or accidents, are concretely predicated of the subject as well.
The result of this analysis is that the supposit that is supposited for by the subject-
term, is identical to the supposit of which 'the predicate-term signifies a certain
aspect. There is one supposit, and not two, and this means that all propositions
about Christ should be considered to have one and only one subject. If one were to
posit a double supposit, this would mean the end of the interchange of properties.
It would no longer be possible to say that the Word of God was born from the
Virgin, has suffered, was crucified and buriedB3 • A double supposit would admit
of an analysis of the core propositions as propositions that affirm an identity of the
83) .. .quia tantum hypostasis est cui atlribuuntur operationes et proprietates naturae, et ea
etiam quae ad naturae rationem pertinent in concreto: dicimus enim quod 'hic homo' ratiocinatur,
et est risibilis, et est animal rationale. Et hac ratione 'hic homo' dicitur esse suppositum: quia
scilicet supponitur his quae ad hominem pertinent, eorum praedicationem recipiens. Si ergo sit
alia hypostasis in Christo praeter hypostasim Verbi, sequetur quod de aliquo alio quam de Verbo
verificentur ea quae sun! hominis, puta esse natum de Virgine, passum, crucifixum et sepu[tum. Et
hoc etiam damnatum est, approbante concilio Ephesino, sub his verbis: ~Si quis personis duabus
vel subsistentiis eas quae sun! in Evangelicis et Apostolicis Scripturis impartitur voces, aut de
Christo a Sanctis dictas, aut ab ipso de se; et quasdam quidem velut homini praeter illud ex Deo
Verbum specialiter intellecto applicat, quasdam vero, velut Deo dicibiles, soli ex Deo Patre
Verbo: anathema sit, ", ST III 2.3;
CHAPTER FOUR 149
supposits of subject and predicate: 'the one that is x is the one that is y'. But sUch
an analysis is insufficient to keep the interchange of attributes aliYe, for if e.g.
'Word of God' is predicated of this supposit, and 'was born from the Virgin' of
that supposit, how does one account for the unity of the two supposits? Such a
unity of supposits would at most be an accidental unity, and no accidental unity
admits of attributing what is said of the accident to that in which the accident
inheres. To say Deus est homo is something different from saying Spiritus est
colomba, the Spirit is a pigeon (3SN 6,3,2). An accidental union does ·not admit of
Verbum est homo, or the reverse of it (ScG N 37.7). What we discover now is that
according to Aquinas the Assumptus-theory and the Habitus-theory are to be
rejected simply because they cannot keep an interchange of properties alive, or
even reject it.
Above we formulated the rule that summarizes this:
avoid any interpretation or construction that so confuses signification and
supposition that the truth-value of propositions about Christ is determined by the
signification of subject-expressions alone.
This formulation already presupposes that a predicate-term, according to Aquinas'
theory of predication, cannot have actual supposition. Predicate':'te~s ordinarily
are taken fonnally, i.e. significatively only. In this respect Aquinas corrects AT,
which does seem to require supposition of predicate-terms. If we presuppose this
correction, the fonrtWation of the rule can be limited to the analysis of the subject-
expression, as we in fact have done84 •
Aquinas, being the scholastic theologian he is, formulates the same rule rather
concisely: supposito uno, supponitur aitero BS • It means that if the one term (e.g.
Word) may truly be employed as suppositing, the other term (e.g. this man) may
be as well. Sometimes this is formulated as: quod dicitur de uno, dicitur de aitero,
the same predicate can be said of the one subject-term, and of the othet6. The
reverse of this is true as well: predicate-terms signifying both human and divine
nature may truly be said of the same subject-term. Most explicitly Aquinas says:
"In reference to the mystery of the Incarnation there was an interchange of
84) Cf, section 3 of chapter II. Consider this (3SN 6.1.3 ad 3): dicendum quod termini in
praedicalo positi tenentur jormaliter, in subiecto vero materialiter. Unde hoc nomen 'homo'
supponit suppositum aeternum quod subsistit in duabus naturis et tribus substantiis, praedicat vero
tantum naturam humanam. Unde si diceretur quod '[Christus] est tantum homo' excluderetur
natura omnis aUa ab humana; et propter hoc non conceditur quod sit tantum homo. Cf. 3SN 7,1.1
Deus est homo, est praedicatio per injormationem essentialem;
85) Cf. OTT I 211 [144]; ScG IV 38.8; QD! 1 ad 12; 3SN 6 prol; ST TIl 16.1. The reverse of
this, i.e. supposito uno, non supponitur altero is true in Trinitarian theology, cf. lSN 4.2.2 ad 5;
5.1.1 obiectum 2; 26.1.1 ad 5; ST 139.1 ad 2; 39.5 ad 4. The nonnal rule that a word that is
used as a predicate-expression of a certain subject-tenn, can in tum be used to 'supposit for that
which the original subject-term supposited for, is not applicable in trinitarian theology. The Son is
the divine essence, and the Son is generated, but this does not admit of the conclusion that the
divine essence is generated;
86) e.g. 3SN 5. 1.3 sed contra 1;
150 NAMING mE UNITY OF CHRIST
characteristic terms bearing on nature, because whatever is connected with a nature
can be a predicate referring to the person subsisting in that nature, no matter which
nature any given predicate designates"S7. These two rules taken together, one
regarding different subject-terms and the other different predicate-terms, yield this
one statement: de homine dici possunt ea quae sun! divinae naturae. et de Deo
possunt did ea quae sunt humanae naturae, we may predicate of the man what is
attributed to divine nature, and we may predicate of God what is attributed to
human naturess .
Because the properties are said of a person, the subject-term should have the fitting
mode of signification, i.e. the concrete mode of signification89 • Because the
subject-term supposits for one supposit, it does not matter whether the subject-term
signifies human or divine nature90 •
All of this explains the one rule of the interchange of properties91 •
Having explained all this, the extent; to which the rule of the interchange of
properties is connected to the theory of supposition must be obvious by now.
Because the theory of supposition was developed in the logical discipline of coping
with fallacies, the rule of the interchange of properties is cOIUlected to the detection
of theological fallacies as well (e.g. ST III 3.6 ad 3). The primary context of the
rule, however, is not ~o much systematic theology as the interpretation of
auctoritates, the most important of which is Scripture. It cuts both ways. On the
one hand, Aquinas deems the rule to be a scriptural rule because Scripture itself
87) Circa mysterium incarnationis fuil communicatio proprietalum pertinentium ad naturam:
quia quaecumque conventunt naturae, possunt praedicari de persona subsistente in natura illa
cuiuscumque naturae nomine significetur. ST III 3.6 ad 3. Cf. 3SN 1.2.4 ad 3: ... communicatio
idiomatum intelligitur respectu alterius naturae. (... ) De isto enim homine unito tria possunt
praedicari: scilicet ea quae sunt humanae naturae, ut passibilis et mortalis; et ea quae sun!
divinae naturae, ut omnipotens; et ea quae sun! personae, ut genitus, prindpium Spiritus sancti.
Et haec tria etiam de FiUo Dei praedicantur. - Sed ea quae sunt naturae divinae et personae
communicantur homini ex hoc quod de Filio Dei praedicantur, et non e converso. - Sed ea quae
sunt naturae humanae communicat homo assumptus personae assumenti;
88) STm 16.4;
89) Proprietates humanae naturae nunquam dicuntur de divina nec e converso, nisi secundum
quamdam participation em; sed dicuntur utraeque de habente naturam, vel humanam vel divinam,
quae significatur hoc nomine 'Deus' et hoc nomine 'homo '. Idem enim est qui utrasque naturas
habet. 3SN 5.1.2 ad 4;
90) Nee differt utrum fiat praetiicatio de_ supposito secundum nomen quod signi/icat divinam
naturam, ut 'Verbum!, vel humanam, ut 'Jesus', vel utrumque, sicut 'Christus', quia per omnia
supponitur idem suppositum, 3SN 11.4. Cf. e.g. srm 16.4 and 5; 3SN 5.1,2 ad 4; OCG 6 [274];
91) There are exceptions to the rule. The rule covers only those predicates that belong to each
of both natures, and not those predicates that signify the union itsel,f (e.g. Jactus est Deus, 3SN
7.2.2 ad 3, assumptus est, 3SN 11.4 ad 3 and STm 16.4 ad 3, or praedestinatus (uniri) est, 3SN
11.4 ad 4). Another exception was noted in chapter n, when discussing Aquinas' employment of
the logic of reduplication: est creatura is a predicate that applies to Christ's human nature, but
cannot be said of any subject-tenn without the reduplication of the human nature (3SN 11.4). The
next chapter will discuss this predicate est creatura in detail. Cf. also 3SN 7.2.2 ad 3;
CHAPTER FOUR lSI
uses it. "Then, too, both relative verbs and pronouns bring out identity of supposit.
The Apostle says, speaking of the Son of God: "In him were all things created in
heaven and on earth, visible and invisible"; then later he adds: "And lie is the head
of the body, the church, who is the begilUling, the firstborn from the dead" ·(Col
1.16.18). Now clearly the text "In him were all things created," refers to the Word
of God, whereas the text, "first-born from the dead," belongs to the man Christ.
Therefore, God's Word and the man Christ are one supposit and, consequently,
one person, and whatever is said of that man must be said of the Word of God,
M
and conversely 92. It is of the same person that is said that in him all is created
and that he is the firstborn from the dead, and -therefore all words should be
interpreted in a way that what is said of this man should also be said of the Word,
and conversely. Aquinas recognizes the rule of the interchange of properties in the
biblical way of speaking.
On the other hand, the same rule serves as a hermeneutical means to interpret those
biblical enunciations that are unclear or even seem to contradict the rule. The same
chapter from ScG from which the text just mentioned is quoted mentions passages
that speak about the body of Christ as the temple of God, and so seem to suppose a
union that consists of inhabitation instead of a personal union93 , Inhabitation,
however, can never lead to a supposital unity, i.e. can never lead to an
interchange
of attributes. Other texts say that Christ does not will anything other than what God
wills, and thus seem to suppose only a union of will94. This union, however, is an
accidental union as well, and can never lead to an interchange of attributes as well.
With the model of the personal union one is able to account for these texts,
whereas conversely, with the model of the accidental union, one is unable to
account for texts in which a divine property is predicated of a man, or a human
property of God 95 . The rule is a hermeneutical rule.
92) ScG IV 34.29: Relativa tam verba quam pronomina idem suppositum referunt; dicit enim
Apostolus, loquens de Filio Dei: ~In ipso comlita sunt universa in coelo, et in terra, visibilia et
invisibiUa"; et postea subdit: "Et ipse est caput corporis ecclesiae, qui est principium primogenitus
ex mortuis (Col 1.16; 1.18), Manifestum est autem quod hoc quod dicitur: uIn ipso condita sunt
U
universa~, ad Verbum Dei pertinet; quod autem dicitur: wPrimogenitus ex mortuis", homini
·Christo competit. Sic igitur Dei Verbum et homo Christus sunt unum suppositum et per consequens
una persona; et oportet quod quicquid dicitur de homine illo dicatur de Verba Dei, et e converso.
Cf. 3SN 5.1.3 sed contra 1: Ea quae secundum personam differunt et naturarn, quod dicitur de
uno, non dicitur de altero. Sed ea quae sunt Dei, in Scripturis attribuumur homini: ffHomo natus
est in ea et ipse fundavit earn Aitissimus u (Ps 86.5), et quae sunt hominis, Deo attribuuntur:
-Nunquam Dominum gloriae crucifixissent (lCo 2.8). Ergo Deus et homo conveniunt in persona;
U
93) Solvite templum hoc, et in tribus diebus excitabo illud, In 2.19; Ille autem dicebat de
templo corporis sui, ibid. 21; in ipso complacuit omnem plenitudinem inhabitare, Col 1.19;
94) Qui me misit, mecum est; et non reIiquit me solum, quia ego, quae placita sunt ei, facio
semper, In 8.29. There would remain no difference with a union with God of each human being
who loves God: Qui adhaeret Deo, unus spiritus est, 1Co 6.17;
95) E.g. Et Verbum carD factum est, In 1.14; Antequam Abraham jieret, ego sum, In 8.58;
Ego et Pater unum sumus, In 10.30; Ego sum panis vivus qui de caelo descendi, In 6.51; Qui
descemli/, ipse est et qui ascendir, Ep 4.10; Exivi a Patre, et veni in mundum, In 16.28;
152 NAMING THE UNITY OF CHRIST
The rule of the interchange of attributes articulates the second level expression that
Christ is unum suppositum. The theory of analogous use of divine names indicates
the possibilities of speech about God by putting to the service of theology a nonnal
phenomenon of human language, while the theory of the interchange of attributes
indicates the possibilities of speech about Christ by putting to the service of
theology another DOnnal phenomenon of human language: words having a different
signification can have an identical supposition. At the same time, however, both the
theory of analogous usage of divine names and that of the supposition of subject-
terms signifying Christ are indicative of the limits of language about God and
Christ. Words taken from created perfections are used to signify divine perfections,
but precisely what these perfections are escapes the one using the language because
of divine simplicity: such perfections are differently different in God. Likewise the
rule supposito uno, supponitur aitero, applied to language about Christ, is applied
to a unique phenomenon in which an identity of substantial natures has to be
expressed. Application of the rule sefves to safeguard the unity of Christ, but it
does not provide one with a precise understanding of this union. On the contrary.
when divine predicates are attributes of this human being. the lack of human
understanding is intensified and the mystery deepened. We do not know how to
define the divine power signified by the word 'creator', and now one has to
attribute the name to a human being without even knowing how the union can be
accounted for. This confinns the impression that language precedes understanding.
Biblical speech precedes systematic theology, and moreover the Word is spoken
before any created intellect came into play. Mystery is not the end of the line so
much as its beginning.
Conclusion
Aquinas' reflection upon the hypostatic union of divine and human nature in Christ
is primarily focused upon the account to be given of Christ's unity. Christ is truly
God and truly man, but historical and systematic reasons cause Aquinas to consider
especially God's hidden presence in Christ: the et and the est of Christus est vere
homo et vere Deus. The historical reasons concern the fact that Aquinas was
confronted with a discussion of the person of Christ that seemed to be unable to
account for the human individuality of Christ. Aquinas considered many solutions
presented or merely entertained to be neo-Nestorian: the union that resulted was
only an accidental union. The systematic reason concerns the core of Christian
belief iIl. Christ: the confession that this man is God, the greatest mystery of all.
lngrediens mundum dicit: Hostiam et oblationem noiuisti, corpus autem aptasti mihi, Heb 10.5;
Decebat eum, propter quem omnia, et per quem omnia. qui multos filios in gloriam adduxerat
auctorem salutis eorum per passionem consumman·, Heb 2.10; etc.
A good example of Aquinas' employment of the rule as an hermeneutical rule is his exegesis of
the Christ·hymn in the letter to the Philippians (RPL II 2,3). His commentary on Rm 1.4 is
relevant as well (CRO I 2 [200]);
CHAPTER FOUR 153
Aquinas employs new metaphysical insights, especially the real distinction between
existence and essence, translating them into the christological distinction between a
subsistent person and his natures. The individuality of Christ's human nature and
the mutual union of body and soul do not necessarily entail that there is in Christ a
distinct human suppositum, or that his human nature is but a habit to him. What
determines something to be a person or supposit is its subsistent being, accepted as
its actus entis, the act of absolute being that is the ultimate perfection of all that a
subsistent thing is. Christ's human nature possesses this perfection because it
inheres substantially in the being of the Son. This being exceeds all created being,
and therefore Christ's human nature has a perfection greater than all. It is- not
relevant that the human nature lacks a natural perfection that nonnally coheres with
it. Furthennore, being is 'not a natural perfection but a perfection of a nature. For
Christ's human nature this perfection is the highest possible union with God, i.e. a
personal union.
The fact that the union takes place on the level of the subsistent person is relevant
in another respect as well. The union takes place precisely where_ there is no
quiddity or essence, since essence was distinguished from being to start with.
Whatever there is in anything that exists that admits of description, signification,
definition, is to be located in a thing's essence. In identifying Christ's being as the
level on which the union takes place, by way of a negative reasoning that starts
with denying a union on the level of essence, Aquinas chooses to locate the
mystery of the union in the heart of the range of the undescribable, of the
undefinable. Anything that Aquinas adduces in order to approach the union carmot
be accepted as a description of it, but as an unremitting pulling oneself together
and trying to learn from failure. As Mark Jordan paraphrased Aquinas' approach to
the divine names: "the surest approach to the divine is by the scrutiny of linguistic
failure,,96.
For this reason we studied, in the second section, Aquinas' logical and linguistic
approach of the hypostatic union. Aquinas distinguishes between two ba~ic
properties of terms, i.e. signification and supposition. These two propertIes
correspond with the two fundamental aspects of things subsistent: essence and
existence. The depth-structure of language displays a certain isomorphy between
language and reality.
Univocal, equivocal and analogous use of words belongs to their signification.
Words that are used as naines of Christ are sometimes used analogously (Christ is
wisdom), and sometimes univocaUy (Christ is God, Christ is man). In christ~logy it
is most important to emphasize the univocal meaning of the basic affinnatlons of
both natures, in order to avoid any misunderstanding of the truth of Christ's
natures.
However, none of these names, most of which we discussed in chapter III, signify
the union as such. This union is brought under consideration by Aquinas either by
96) 1983. p. 161;
154 NAMING THE UNITY OF CHRIST CHAPTER FOUR 155

discussing the several meanings of the names unum and unio. These names turn out This rule is the christoiogical version of the rule that Kathryn Tanner, studying
to be used analogously, since nothing which is ordinarily called 'one' or 'union' Aquinas, designed for language about God in general:
compares to the hypostatic union. We have shown that Aquinas is very much aware avoid both a simple univocal attribution of predicates to God arut world and
of this, and that he tried to devise a hierarchy of unions of creation with God, the a simple contrast of divine and non-divine predicatel8•
greatest of which is the personal union. More relevant, however. is Aquinas' Both rules display what theological employment of the theory of analogy and
concentration on the supposition of terms. If being corresponds to supposition, and christological employment of the theory of supposition have in common: each
being is the level on which the union occurs, it is worthwhile to devote attention prescrjbes the avoidance of simple contrast and simple identification, the one on the
especially to this property of terJ?lS. Supposition regards a logical relation between level of signification of names, the other on the level of their supposition. Both
a subject- and a predicate-expression. The suppositum of a proposition is that which rules belong to a kind of theology that deems it necessary to reflect upon language
the sUbject-expression stands for, determined by all the elements of the proposition. in divinis. Neither of them contains any direct language about God and Christ, so
Of this suppositum the thing (e.g. a nature) signified by the predicate-expression is both belong to a second order or meta-level of speaking. This level they have in
predicated. Thus the subject-term has both signification and supposition. The common with Aquinas' _enunciations that there is unum suppositum in Christ, and
examination of this linguistic phenomenon yields a useful parallel for the unity of that Christ's person is a persona composita. Simple contrast and simple
two natures in Christ. Just as words that have different significations can be one in identification have no place in speech about Christ.
their supposition for one and the sarn.e supposit, Christ can be called one since his
two natures are united in one person. To call this one person a suppositum is to
establish the link of this interpretation of Christ's person with the property of terms
that supposition is. The result of this parallel is that propositions about Christ
display a certain parallelism or isomorphy with Christ: the mode of signification
fits Christ's mode of being.
However, just as any other analogy, this linguistic isomorphy falls short of a
perfect representation. Normal use of language, used as it is meant to be used, i.e.
for talking about creation, is hardly familiar with an identification in one supposit
of two substantial natures. This does not affect the structure of the proposition,
however, which shows the usefulness of taking supposition into account:
supposition is that part of language that is aimed at the linguistic representation of
the unique. And so, in concentrating upon supposition, Aquinas concentrates upon
the uniqueness of this union97 • The other ways in which the structure of the
proposition fails to be a perfect analogy of the hypostatical union -- its being a
logical relation putting God and creation on a par, as well as its inaptitude to meet
the requirements of divine simplicity -- also serve to highlight the uniqueness of
this union, of this mystery of the incarnation.

Aquinas summarizes the depth-structure of language about Christ in the rule of the
interchange of attributes. This rule is formulated either from the viewpoint of
predicates, or from the viewpoint of subject-expressions. Taking in both
viewpoints, we have proposed one unified rule which highlights besides its critical
its hermeneutical function as well:
- avoid any interpretation or construction that so confuses signification and
supposition that the truth-value of propositions about Christ is determined by the
signification of subject-expressions alone.

97) A similar interpretation of Aquinas' christological exposition is put forward by Bruce 98) 1988, p. 47. On the interpretation of doctrine and conciliar statements as rules for speech
Marshall, 1987; see also: G.A. Lindbeck, 1984; B.I.F. Lonergan, 1967a; R.A. Norris Jr, 1966;

CHAPTER V
BEING AND THE NAMING OF CHRIST
The preceding two chapters were devoted to signification and SUppOSItIon in
speaking of Christ. We ftrst dealt with the names that signify Christ. We
discovered that Aquinas devotes considerable attention to them, distinguishing
between unified and discrete names. Among the discrete names there are many
which indirectly signify the relation that constitutes the union between the Son of
God and his human nature. Next, we dealt with some names signifying the union
itself, and with the supposition of all names of Christ. We discovered that Aquinas
presumes a basic analogy between the logical relation of supposition and the unity
of Christ. This analogy Of isomorphy is expressed in saying that Christ is one
supposit. which turns out to be explained best as a fannal feature of language about
Christ. The theory of the interchange of properties articulates this fonnal feature,
and we proposed a rule that translates its basic concerns. It appears that the unity
, has sent me to you''', Qui est misit me ad vas. If the qui of qui est, Aquinas says,
of Christ escapes human signification, and can only be approached by human
supposition. This semantic feature brings the uniqueness of Christ Incarnate to the
fore.
All of this, however, yields a question of major import. Concerning the being. the
esse of Christ: what is it that we say when we say that there is one being in Christ?
The question is important first of all because, as we said before, the subsistent
being of Christ is the 'level' on which the hypostatic union takes place. It is the
very heart of the union. If the union is a mystery of faith. which it is, then being
should be involved in its articulation. Moreover, there are some names of Christ
that signify being, such as Qui est and Genitus Qui Est. If these names indeed
signify Christ's being, what exactly do they signify? Didn't we show in the last
chapter that Christ's being, the core of his unity, is best approached not by names
signifying it, but by names suppositing for it? In fact, doesn't being correspond
with supposition, as essence corresponds with signification? The history of
controversy, however, carries the question further. Some have said that Aquinas'
positio'n is at odds with the confession of the true humanity of Christ. According to
them this true humanity requires a hUman '1', a human existence in the union, and
not the 'elimination' of a hUman esse, as they say Aquinas has carried out.
So, what does Aquinas say when he says that there is one being in Christ? In this
chapter we will ftrst deal with the names signifying divine being (I). Second we
will consider once more the relation between being and supposition (2). Then we
will be in a good position to show why the controversy about Christ's being in fact
betrays a wrong interpretation of Aquinas' position. I shall then be able to show
that the being of Christ is not so much a problem for Aquinas as an opportunity: an
opportunity to confess the ineffability of the union that undergirds the rule of all
language about Christ. The attention given to modes of signification in our
language about Christ pays off when attempting to approach the mystery of the
CHAPTER FIVE 157
incarnation (3). The latter we will articulate in the fmal section on predicating
creatura of Christ (4).
1. Names signifying Christ's being
The prophet Isaiah records the words spoken by the Lord: "I have let myself be
approached by those who did not consult me, I have let, myself be found by those
who did not seek me. I said, 'Here I am, here I am! to a nation that did not
invoke my name" (65.1). The reader is reminded by a gloss, Aqu~ says, that it
is the Son who is speaking, the Son who said to Moses "I am who I am", Ego. sum
qui sum (Ex 3.14). In Exodus God promises salvation 'to Moses,. ~d in so .doing
the salvation that his Son was to execute was prefigured. A spmtual readmg of
both passages from the Old Testament appropriates the divine name, which is a
unified or essential name, to the Son of God (ST I 39.8 obiectum 5 and corpus).
The Exodus-passage continues: "This is what you are to say to the Israelites, 'I-am
has a definite relation to a,person, as in Filius qui est genitus qui est, then qui est
even turns into a discrete name.
The same spiritual reading occurs concerning Is 52.6: "Because of th'is my people
will know my name, because of this they will know when the day comes, that it is
I saying, Here I am!", Quia ego ipse qui loquebar, ecce adsum. It is Christ who
says 'here I am' (CIS LII [73]).
This justifies us now taking into consideration the divine name Qui est in order to
investigate the being of Christ. The being of the Ego sum qui sum, of the Qui est,
is the being of the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob (Ex 3.15), is the being of
God the Saviour, is the being of the one who carries the name 'Saviour', is the
being of Christ'-
The name Qui est is the niost proper of all divine names, Aquinas says again and
again2. Compared to the unified names such as 'wise', 'good' or 'just', this name
has no special signification, i.e. its meaning does not express the species of a thing
in a deftnite way (QlJP 10.1 ad 9). The name is taken from the being of all
existing things, which all existing things have in common. All things, however,
possess a determinate mode of being. Their being is detennined by the fonn they
have. If we signify those things, we derive our names from what detennines the
thing, from its fonn. We call someone a 'human being', since this person has
humanity. However, th~ name Qui est is not like this. It does not signify one
specific mode of being, it signifies ·that which comprises all modes of being, being
itself. It is the most common name of all names to be given, not only compared to
'wise', 'good' and '~ust', but also compared to the so-called 'transcendentals' one,
1) Cf. also Aquinas' association of Jesus' Antequam Abraham jieret, ego sum (In 8.58) with
this divine name Qui est, in REI vm 8 [4501
2) ISN 8.1.1; STlI3.11; QDP 2.1; 7.2 sed c()lItra 3; 7.5; 7.5 ad 1; 10.1 ad 9;
158 BEING AND NAMING OF CHRIST
good and true. In fact, names usually signify fonus, either something that belongs
to a thing's essence, or that is accidental to it. However, in this case no fonn is
signified, but rather being, esse, This being IS God's essence, which occurs
nowhere else, and so this name signifies something which is unique, it signifies the
utterly simple God. This is another reason why the name Qui est is the name most
proper of all (ST I 13.11; ISN 8.1.1; QDP 7.2 sed contra 3). Qui est is the most
proper name since God is named 'as if' (quasl) he were named after his proper
fonn3 •
Compared to the name 'God' (Deus) and to the Tetragrammaton (JIlWH), one has
to say that Deus is more proper than Qui est in the sense that Deus actually
signifies the divine nature, and that the Tetragrammaton is more proper than Qui
est in the sense that the Tetragrarnmaton signifies the inconununicable, the singular
nature or substance of God (ST I 13.11 ad 1). But Qui est is the most proper name
of God since it does not express any knowledge concerning God's nature or
quiddity, concerning what God is, Oaf/even any knowledge concerning what God is
not (lSN 8.1.1). The being that the name signifies is taken from created being.
which is the first of all participations that creatures have, because it comprises and
unites all other perfections to be found in creation. In God all is one (ibidem).
This is a peculiar kind of signification indeed. One wonders whether it is
signification at all. If nothing natural, nothing essential, nothing quidditative is
signified, does the word have any signification? I think the upshot of all that
Aquinas says, to state it as clearly as possible, is that in the strict sense of the wor~
the name Qui est does not have any signification at all. This is what Aquinas
implies when he says that of all names Qui est most escapes our modes of
signification. All of our signification consists in voicing our modes of
understanding. All of our modes of understanding concern the determination of the
fonns that shape things and give them their particular being. "Any other name
selects some particular aspect of the being of the thing, but 'He who is' fixes on no
aspect of being but stands open to all and refers to him as to an 'infinite ocean of
being' (Jolm of Damascus)", Aquinas says4. It does not even signify God's nature,
since that is what the word Deus does, nor does it focus upon the singularity of his
nature, since that is what the Tetragrammaton does. No, it is the name that fits
God best, because it is the one name that remains after we have denied of God all
that we should. We denied corporeality. Next we denied intellectuality as it is
found in rational creatures, such as goodness and wisdom. What remains in our
intellect is nothing more than the sale fact that he exists. And yet even this he
exceeds, when we even have to deny being as it is found in creatures. What is left
is the darkness of ignorance in which we are united to a God who dwells in some
3) quia sic denominatur quasi a propria suafonna, QDP 2.1:
4) ST I 13.11: Quolibet enim alio nomine determinatur aJiquis modus substantiae rei: sed hoc
nomen 'Qui est' nullum modum essendi determinat, sed se habet indeterminate ad omnes; et ideo
nominat [Dol1UlScenusj ipsum 'pelagus substantiae infinitum'~
CHAPTER FIVE 159
sort of fogS. Unlike any other name, this -name does not signify what the thing
signified is. As a result either it signifies something we know nothing about, or it
has no signification at all, which comes to the same in final analysis. And yet it is
the name of the Son, who is Genitus Qui est, the same Son who brings salvation to
his people, and says Ecce ego, Ecce ego (Is 65.1) and Ecce adsum: "Because of
this my people will know my name, because of this they will know when the day
comes, that it is I saying, Here I am!" (Is 52.6). It may be a name without proper
signification, but can it be a name without any significance?
Let us take a closer look at the name itself: Qui est. What makes it different from
all other names that Aquinas mentions, from Sapiens, from Justus, from Bonus?
The fact that it is not a noun at all, but a (very small yet nevertheless)
PROPOSITION! And Aquinas is very much aware of that. "Since the being of
creation represents divine being imperfectly, the name 'He who is' signifies it
imperfectly as well, because it signifies by way of a certain concretion and
composition." Aquinas recognizes that Qui est is a composition, and not merely a
single nOUD. To this he compares the other names when he continues: "However,
other names signify it even more imperfectly; for when I say that 'God is wise',
because in that phrase being is included, 'a double imperfection is signified: one
concerning his concrete boeing, as in the name 'He who is', and another added to
this concerning the proper meaning of wisdom. For created wisdom falls short of
divine wisdom. Because of this there is greater imperfection in other names than in
this name 'He who is', and therefore it is more dignified and more proper for
God"6. Aquinas compares in fact Qui 'est with Qui est sapiens, or esse with esse
sapiens. Qui est has no predicate nominative at all, and for this reason it is less
imperfect than any proposition containing one. A predicate, as we saw in chapters
II and IV, is normally to be taken formally, i.e. as signifying a fonn rather than as
suppositing. Indeed, the conclusion is justified that Qui est is most proper of all.
since it does not have any signification but only carries out an indefinite
supposition. This we find confIrmed in Aquinas' christology. Concerning Christus
5) lSN 8.1.1 ad 4: Unde quando in Deum procedimus per viam remotionis, primo negamus
ab eo corporalia; et secundo etiam intelleetualia, secundum quod inveniuntur in creaturis. ut
bonitas et sapientia; et tunc remanet tantum in intellectu nostro, quia est, et nihil amplius: unde
est sicut in quadam conjusione. Ad ultimum autem etiam hoc ipsum esse, secundum quod est in
creaturis, ab ipso removemus; et tunc remanet in quadam tenebra ignorantiae, secundum quam
ignorantiam, quantum ad statum viae pertinet, optime Deo coniungimur, ut dicit Dionysius, et
haec est quaedam caligo, in qua Deus habitare dicitur;
6) lSN 8.1.1 ad 3: cum esse creaturae imperfecte repraesentet divinum esse, et hoe nomen
'Qui est' impeifecte significat ipsum, quia significat per modum cuiusdam concretionis et
compositionis; sed adhuc iinpeifectius significatur per alia nomina: cum enim dieo, Deum esse
sapientem, tunc, cum in hoc dicto includatur esse, signijicatur ibi duplex impeifectio: una est ex
parte ipsius esse concreti, sicut in hoc nomine 'Qui est'; et superadditur alia ex propria ratione
sapientiae. Ipsa enim sapientia creata deficit a ratione divinae sapientiae: et propter hoc maior
impeifectio est in aliis nominibus quam in hoc nomine 'Qui est'; et ideo hoc est dignius et magis
Deo proprium;
160 BEING AND NAMING OF CHRIST
est he says: "Therefore when I say 'Christ is'. the being of his supposit is
signified, but not the being of his nature or accident or part"7. What Qui est or
Christus est says. is that there is something of which predicates can be said. As
such, no signification in the strict sense is involved, but supposition only. This is
the significance of Qui est.
Thus we conclude that the name Qui est, which is a name sometimes appropriated
to the Son because of it being used in the context of the promise of salvation,
brings us once more to the consideration of the distinction between signification
and supposition. It 'signifies' being as such, which is God's essence, yet it does so
employing the semantic property of supposition.
2. Being and supposition oj language about Christ
As I said in the preceding chapter, Aquinas' position that in Christ there is one
supposit concerns the est of Christus .est vere Deus et vere homo, and the est of
Deus est homo and Homo est Deus. For this reason, to say unum suppositum bears
directly upon saying unum esse. In fact, all of Aquinas' discussions of the being of
Christ have this same sequence: first he examines the one supposit in Christ, and
next he examines the one being in Christ9 • First Aquinas examines the language
about Christ, and next he examines the being of Christ, First he examines the
differences between what is predicated, and about whom it is predicated, and next
he examines the being of Christ. First he examines modes of signification, i.e.
concrete and abstract modes, modes of signification and supposition, and next he
examines the being of Christ. This is no coincidence of course. Apparently the
examination of the factual structure of language about Christ is the best way to
learn something about Christ's being.
7) 3SN 11.2: Unde cum dico 'Christus est', significatur esse ipsius suppositi, non autem esse
ipsius naturae vel accidentis aut partis;
8) This reading is similar to Aquinas' analysis of the meaning of hoc in eucharistic formula
hoc est corpus meum. Aquinas verifies the enunciation appealing to the indeterminate supposition
of hoc: Et ideo signanter ... dicit Dominus 'Hoc est corpus meum', nullo nomine apposito ex
parte subjecti, sed solo pronomine. quod significat substantiam in communi sine qualitate. idest
forma determinata, ST TIl 78,S. Unde in fine posuit nomen, sed in principio pronomen, q~od
substan/iam indeterminatam significat, REM XXVI 3 [325]. Cf. RiC XI 5 [450], and L ROSIer,
1990, On the similarity between significare substantiam and personal supposition, see note 15 in
chapter II;
9) 3SN 6.2.1 Utrum Christus sit unum, 3SN 6.2.2 Utrum habeat unum esse; QDL 9.2.1
Utrum in Christo sit una hypostasis tantum, QDL 9.2.2 Utrum in Christo sit unum tantum esse;
QDI3 Utrum Christus sit unum neutraliter vel duo, QDi 4 Utrum in Christo sit unum tantum esse;
OTT I 210/211 Quod in ipso non sunt duo suppositalQuod in Christo est unum tantum suppositum
et est una tantum persona, OTT I 212 De his quae dicuntur in Christo unum vel multa; ST III 17.1
Utrum Christus sit unum vel duo. STIlI 17.2 Utrum in Christo sit tantum unum esse.
Cf. QD/4: huius quaestionis est quodammodo eadem ratio et praemissae. quia ex eodem dicitur
aliquid esse unum et ens. Esse enim proprie et vere dicitur de supposito subsistente;
CHAPTER FIVE 161
Since we have discussed extensively all that precedes the question about Christ's
being, a summary will suffice here. To say that there is one supposit in Christ says
in the first place something about the propositions that we may forniulate about
him. All of these propositions find their unity in the identical supposition of their
SUbject-expressions. One should for a moment abstract from the signification of
words, and pay attention to their supposition. As it turns out, 'God is almighty'
and 'Man is almighty' are both true, despite the different signification of the
subject-expressions, and because of their identical supposition. The -logical relation
of supposition between subject-expression and predicate-expression expresses the
unity of what the subject-expression stands for and what the predicate-expression
signifies. This unity is expressed by the est of the proposition. This is where the
being of Christ comes in. Just as in all propositions the same relation of
supposition is employed, paralleling the same one supposit, in all propositions the
same est is employed, paralleling the same one being of Christ. Of course, the
being of Christ does not have the same ontological status as the being of the
copula, since the first is real being, whereas the second is only logical being, Le.
exists only in the human mind. But just as the logical relation may, serve as an
analogy for the supposital unity of Christ, the logical est serves as .an analogy for
the unity of being in Christ. .
Unum suppositum formulates the heart of what is called the interchange of
properties. The Bible and the Councils have a certain mode of signifying Christ,
and the structure of this mode is identified by the theory of the interchange of
properties. Unum suppositum expresses the most important formal feature of
Christ-talk, and because unum suppositum leads to unum esse, unum esse
fonnulates this same fonnal feature, yet focusing this time not on the supposition
of sUbject-tenns, but on. the est of propositions about Christ. It states that whatever
name we use to supposit for Christ, it supposits for one and the same 'He who is'.
Just as we did above, we can fonnulate this in a rule:
avoid any interpretation or construction that so corifuses signification and
supposition that several significations of 'est' are distinguished and (consequently
but falselY) are taken to inform the one relation of supposition that 'est'
expresses iO •
In the proposition Christus est homo, est homo signifies substantial hUman being. In
the proposition Christus est Deus, est Deus signifies substantial divine being.
However, both predicates are one in the same Christus est, which 'signifies' the
same being as Qui est. We know that to distinguish between Qui est and Qui est
10) One could formulate the same rule concerning language about God in general. It would
apply to the question of divine simplicity, and to the question whether all divine names are
synonyms, Qui est sapiens and Qui est iustus concern names that have different significations, but
do not imply any diversity in God's one being, nor a real distinction between Qui est and Qui est
sapiens/iustus. However, christology is a more likely place to develop this rule, since we are
dealing with names signifying two different substantial natures;
162 BEING AND NAMING OF CHRIST
Deus falls short of divine simplicity, because to be God is to be to-bell, Le. being
and being God are identical. But the human modes of signification are fit for things
composed, and the truth of these modes is determined according to their own rules,
even though their structure falls short of the divine 'mode' of being. On the other
hand, Christus est homo matches perfectly the composed mode of being of Christ
Incarnate.
In order to understand what Aquinas says when he says that there is one being in
Christ, we should take the same road he himself travels. This entails first of all
examining unum esse as a fannal feature of language about Christ. That which is
least significative, i.e. est. turns out to be most significant.
3. The false concept of 'human subsistent being'
The controversy about Aquinas' view on the being of Christ concerns the question
whether theology in general and Aquinas in particular rightfully 'eliminates'
(Aquinas himself never employs this word) from Christ a subsistent being proper to
a human being. Is Christ truly human when he does not have human subsistent
being?12 Aquinas is an interesting case moreover, since it seems that he has
contradicted himself, or changed his views. In QDI he acknowledges a human esse
in Christ, be it only a secondary one, whereas in ST III he does not mention such a
being at all and seems to admit only one subsistent divine being.
I am convinced, however, that Aquinas neither contradicts himself nor changes his
views. Moreover, I do not think that any interpretation of Aquinas' texts could be
correct which results in blurring the distinction between signification and
supposition, by dragging the differences between est homo and est Deus into the
one est.
Consider these four propositions:
1. Socrates est
2. Socrates est homo
3. Socrates est habens manus
4. Socrates est a/bus
The first proposition attributes 'personal' (ST III 17.2) or 'substantial' (1) being
(QDL 9.2.2) to Socrates: quod est or esse quod. It says that Socrates is something
subsistent per se, has absolute or independent being. The other propositions all
attribute a kind of being to Socrates: quo est, or esse quo. In Socrates est homo a
substantial (2) being is attributed. This being is that by which Socrates is what he
is; it signifies his most fundamental quiddity. In Socrates est habens manus,
another being which belongs to his quiddity is attributed. All human beings have
hands, but if hands are lacking it is not impossible still to be a human being. These
11) cr. D.B. Burrell, 1979, p. 7fand passim;
12) Cr., pars pro toto, H.-M. Diepen. 1950; A. Patfoort, 1964; M.L.B. Guerard des
Lauriers, 1963·65; Ch.N. Heris, 1966; P.J.A.M. Schoonenberg, 1969, pp. 948~
CHAPTER FIVE 163
are called integral parts. They are not accidental being nor substantial (2) being
itself. The last proposition, Socrates est a/bus attributes accid~ntal being.
Propositions 2, 3 and 4 can all be said to attribute a kind ~r mode of being:
substantial (2) being, integral being, and accidental being.
To Aquinas it is quite clear that in Christ there cannot be ~ human esse that ~~uld
be like accidental being. If Christ's human esse were aCCIdental, the propOsItions
Deus est homo and Homo est Deus could not be true, since no person can be said
to be his accident, and no accident can be said to be of the substantial nature of its
subjectl3 . • .• .
Nevertheless, the being of Cluist's human nature does have a certain sllmlanty
with accidental being, to the extent that no accident cOll.tributes to the subsistent
being of the individual that it inheres in. This similarity Aquinas ~xpresses in QJ?L
9.2.2, and again in QDI4 where he expresses the fact that ChrIst shuman bemg
does not contribute to his subsistent being, by saying that it is secondary.
To Aquinas it is also quite clear that in Christ there cannot be a human esse that
would be like integral being. Aquinas never says so explicitly because he stresses
the similarity, but the same reason as given above concerning accidental being
applies to integral being as well. No man is said to be his hand. The similarity that
provokes Aquinas to mention integral being is the possibility that some being that
originally did not belong to someone's personal being, later comes to take part of
it. For example, the faculty of vision to someone born blind. What is similar is that
this being belongs to personal being yet did not constitute it. The Son of God
subsists in human being, but human being did not constitute the personal being of
the Son. This similarity Aquinas employs in STIlI 17.2 and 3SN6.2.2 ad l.
To Aquinas it is also quite clear that the human esse of Christ cannot be Christ's
personal being or absolute being. For in that case there would be two, and Christ
could not said to be one. It would be impossible to hold on to Deus est homo and
Homo est Deus, since things which have a different personal or absolute being, or
substantial (1) being, can never be predicated of each other. This Aquinas says in
3SN 6.2.2 sed contra, and it is especially aimed at the position of the Assumptus-
Theory. Whatever is absolutely one needs to have one absolute, personal,
subsistent, substantial (1) being.
The only remaining alternative is that Christ's human esse be considered to be
substantial (2) being. The problem attached to it, however, is that everything which
is said to come to be of a substantial nature is always said to come to be
absolutely. This cannot be the case in Christ, because the Son exists from eternity.
It is absolutely singular that two substantial (2) beings exist in one person, have
one substantial (1) being. This unique fact, provokes the study of the manner of
inherence of accidental being and integral being. The latter seems to be favoured
by Aquinas. However, Understanding comes to a halt here, because of the
singularity of the event. For Deus est homo and Homo est Deus to be true, one has
13) Cf. 3SN 6.3.2 ad 2; SeG IV 49.14; STIll 2.6 ad 2;
164 BEING AND NAMING OF CHRIST
to posit that Christ's human esse is a substantial (2) being. but we know not how to
account for it. The least one can say is that it has to be -secondary. since it does not
contribute to the personal being itself.
One thing. however, is clear: we can only fonnulate this negatively. Whatever is
lacking to the person of Christ Incarnate cannot be anything that belongs to the
essence of what it is to be human. Christ's humanity is a full humanity. Moreover,
the personal being that Christ's human nature is attached to, by way of a mixed
relation, is divine being, and since nothing is lacking to divine being. nothing can
be thought to be lacking to the being of Christ's human nature as well. In fact,
whoever objects that a personal human being is lacking in Christ violates the
distinction between supposition and signification, between Christus est and Chrisms
est hOml), Either one talks about substantial (1) being, which by defInition is not
informed by humanity, or one talks about substantial (2) being, which by defInition
is to be distinguished from the act of absolute being itself. One would not only
violate the primary logico-metaphysical distinction, but also affect the
indescribability of divine being itself, because one would pull the definition of
humanity into divine being itself. This is already impossible in dlvinis itself, let
alone concerning any relation between divinity and the created world.
However much this may look like an a priori-approach to the being of Christ, it is
not. Aquinas' point of departure is his systematization of what actually has been
said about Christ in Scripture, Patristic and Conciliar documents. The rule that
animates this language is the rule formulated in the theory of the interchrmge of
properties. The rule is negative in character:
avoid any interpretation or construction that so confuses signification and
supposition that the truth-value of propositions about Christ is determined by the
signification of subject-expressions alone. This rule is translated when being and
'is'. or esse and est is considered:
avoid any interpretation or construction that so confuses signification and
supposition that several significations of 'est' are distinguished and (consequently
but falsely) are taken to infonn the one relation of supposition that 'est' expresses.
The hypostatic union takes place on the level of absolute being. and just as we
call1lot even begin to describe this union, so we cannot even begin to describe the
being in which both divine and human nanne subsist. However, we can state the
priority of actual language about Christ, and formulate how one can avoid any
interpretation that would prevent the simultaneous truth of Deus est horrw and
Homo est Deus. This is what Aquinas does.
4. Predicating 'being a creature' oj Christ
In a remarkable essayl4 Joseph Pieper once mentioned creation as the hidden key
of Aquinas' thought, laying bare his most profound theological attitude. It is a
hidden key since it can only be discovered in detecting certain logical 'jumps' in
14) "The negative element in the philosophy of St Thomas", 1957, pp. 43-71;
CHAPTER FIVE 165
Aquinas' argumentation. Pieper refers to Aquinas' doctrine of truth. This would
already offer a warrant for investigating Aquinas' treatment of Christ's. being .by
looking for such a hidden key, since this treatment follows after the questton which
explicitly deals with the verification of christological enunciations. Among the
fundamental christological enunciations that Aquinas discusses, the following ones
turn out to be very relevant for a proper interpretation of the question of Christ's
being:
Christus est creatura
Christus, secundum quod homo, est creatura
Ille homo (Chrisms) incoepit esse
Chrisms, secundum quod homo, incoepit esse lS
Since Christus supposits for the eternal person, being a creature cannot be predi-
cated in an absolute way of him. The same goes for 'to begin to be'. This seems to
be rather obvious, just as the truth of the two reduplicative statements seems to be
obvious as well. It is not, however, as I will show.
Peter of Lombard gives as his opinion that the phrase Christus secundum quod
homo est creatura is not a proper but only a figurative or symbolic expressionl6 .
The reason for this, Aquinas explains17, lies in his understanding of the logic of
reduplicative statements, whose logic we have discussed in chapter II above. When
the reduplicative term indicates the essence or substantial form of the individual
designated by the subject-term, then the predicate-term can be said immediately of
the subject-term as well. From Socrates secundum quod homo est animal, we may
infer Socrates est animal (simpliciter). This inference verifies the properness of the
reduplicative statement. Of Christ, however, we cannot without any further
addition say that he is a creature, which would seem to make the reduplicative
statement improper. The proper name Christus always stands for the eternal
supposit.
There is yet another reason why such a proposition would not be proper. To say of
something that it is a creature is to predicate absolute being of that thing. It is a
statement which refers to that kind of being which in an absolute way is opposed to
non-being. The kind of being that is meant here is the being which belongs to the
subsisting individual as such, which belongs to. the supposit (3SN 4.1.2.1). And
even though of each existing thing, not only its existence but also its nature is
created, and being-a-creature therefore regards both nature and supposit (3SN
4.1.2.2 ad 1), esse creatura refers in the first place to the existence as such of the
supposit. Since acts belong to the supposit and not to the nature, the act of being is
said of the supposit. But in any reduplicative statement, the reduplicative term is
IS} "Christ is a creature"; "Christ, as human being, is a creature"; "This human being
(Christ) began to be"; "Christ, as human being, began to be"; respectively SF III 16.8; 16.10;
16.9 and 16.10;
16) o.c.Illl1;
17) 3SN 11.3 sol, ad 3; 12.1.1;
166 BEING AND NAMING OF CHRIST
taken formally. not materially. which means that that term is accepted as signifying
a nature or natural property. and not as standing for a supposit. However.
existence never belongs to the definition of a species or essence; existence is not a
genus which together with a specific difference can form a definition. So therefore,
whenever there is a reduplicative statement in which the predicate-tenn concerns
absolute being, the statement will never be proper or per se. That is, unless we 3re
dealing with divine simplicity. but that is not at stake here. In the proposition
Christus secundum quod homo est creatura the reduplicative term homo signifies a
substantial nature, whereas est creatura first of all regards a supposit. Therefore
the statement is improper.
Creation concerns being 1S , and being refers to each supposit, and since the
supposit of Christ is one, his being cannot but be one as well. But of course, not
only is it said that Christ exists, but also that he is human and that he is intelligent
and that he is teaching the new law. This Aquinas expresses in saying: "as being in
a certain way belongs to nature, and / to its parts and accidents" 19. In a certain
way, but only in a certain way, being created can be predicated truly of Christ, just
as being is predicated in all the ways just mentioned. To be created is to come into
existence, is to become absolutely. Therefore, in all of Aquinas' explications of
jactus-enunciations we encounter the same distinction of being-such-and-so, and
becoming absolutely20. Just as we cannot infer from Peter's becoming white that
he came to be, so we cannot infer from God becoming a human being that God
came to be. "However; absolute being is superior to human being"21. 'Superior'
has a logical connotation here: from the latter we cannot infer the former. In fact,
there is not even a proper relation of superiority at all: "Being a creature is not
superior to being a man, because creation regards being more than nature.
However, being is not a genus, nor is it induced in the signification of a genus, as
Avicenna says, since those things that are in one genus, do not come together in
one being, but in a common nature. Or one should say that being a creature is not
superior to being a man, signifying what a man is, because creation does not
regard nature or essence unless mediated by the act of being, which is the first
term of creation"ll.
An interesting feature of this text is not only that it unequivocally distinguishes
being from essence and places creation on the side of being, but also that a
metaphysical account is placed alongside a linguistic account. The nature of
18) Creatio proprie respicit esse rei, 3SN 11.2;
19) 3SN 11.2: sicut esse aliquo modo ad naturam pertinet, et ad partes et accidentia eius, ita
et creatio;
20) E.g. Deusfactus est homo, STIll 16.6; HomoJactus est Deus, ibidem 16.7;
21) ST III 16.9 ad 2: Esse autem simpliciter est superius ad esse homo;
22) 3SN 1l.2 ad 2: Creatura non est superius ad hOminem, quia creatio magis respicit esse
quam naluram. Esse autem non est genus, nec inducitur in signijicatione alicuius generis, ut dicit
Avicenna, cum ea quae sunt in uno genere, non conveniant in uno esse, sed in natura communi.
Vel dicendum quod creatura non est superius ad hominem, signijicans quid est homo, quia creatio
non respicit naturam vel essentiam nisi mediante actu essendi qui est primus tenninus creationis;
CHAPTER FIVE 167
something is that which a word signifies, in the teclmical sense mentioned above,
and since being is not contained in the nature of any creature, being' falls outside
signification as well. Whatever a noun may signify, it never signifies the act of
being. Being never enters the definition of something, it is not to be defmed itself.
It is the most general and universal name, from which its aptness for theological
discourse is derived. Creation is second on this list of most general names, since
anything which is, is either created or uncreated. If esse simpliciter is to have any
signification at all, it would be proper to let the concept of creation do the job: for
it 'describes' the most primary relationship of the world and all that is contained in
it with God, a relationship of dependency and hiddenness. Being is mystery, Joseph
Pieper says23, and once again a 'logical jump' is highly instructive. For 'creature'
in 'is a creature' is a predicate-term. and any predicate-term is normally interpreted
in a formal, merely signifying way. But absolute being cannot be signified. The act
of being is not contained in any created nature. So we learn that creation is,
paradoxically enough, the significative content of absolute being. The predicate-
term sheds full light on the gratuity of being, on the goodness of the Creator.
Speaking about Christ, we may add to Pieper's remark that the mystery of the
incarnation is the mystery of being, and the mystery of being the mystery of
incarnation. Aquinas' christology puts us on this road again. The most important
enunciations in Christology can only be verified ratione suppositi, that is, if we
discard signification and only look upon that which is talked about, upon that which
is. The name creatura comes closest of aU to this primary being, and we can
predicate it truly of Christ's human nature: it does share in what makes each thing
a being in this world, a created being.
The question of Christ's being has emerged as Aquinas' opportunity to elaborate
the mystery of the incarnation. Christ's being is taken into consideration after
baving analyzed the logic of christological predicatio,n. This logic supposes that
there is one Christ who is the subject of Scriptural, Patristic and Scholastic
discourse. In terms of the logic of supposition, this is expressed by saying that
Christ has one supposit. This logic will not do, since divine simplicity states the
identity of supposit and essential nature in God. But just as Aquinas takes seriously
the real incarnation of Christ, he takes seriously the only modes of signification
that human beings have, which are apt only for speaking about the created world
and everything in it. The study of supposition of terms belongs to the more general
study of modes of signification, and always when Aquinas devotes attention to
these modes, he has a twofold strategy of showing its inadequacy, its lack of
congruence when talking about God, together with formulating proposals for
making the best" of it. This same strategy we recognize in the question about
Christ's being. The inadequacy is stressed in stressing divine simplicity, and in
23) O.c. 110. He continues ". an experience, it is true, which urges him [i.e. Aquinas] not so
much to communication as to silence. But it would not be the silence of resignation and still less
of despair. It would be the silence of reverence. ";
168 BEING AND NAMING OF CHRIST
stressing that predication of substantial (2) human being does not imply predication
of human being simpliciter. His proposal is contained in looking at Christ's human
being as an integral part of a substantial nature, and in thinking of the relationship
between divine person and human nature as a mixed relation. The understanding of
this mixed relation was prepared by giving attention to the intentional relation
between subject- and predicate-terms in enunciations like Deus est homo: a relation
true not on the basis of signification, of words standing for essences, but on the
basis of supposition, of words standing for existing individuals. Moreover, it is a
relation which is ODe and the same in Deus est homo and Homo est Deus: Christ
has one being, a unique relation between the Creator and creature: a relation
secundum esstl4 •
Aquinas' treatment of the being of Christ, prepared by his analysis of supposition,
shows that christoiogical discourse reflects at once the inadequacy of human modes
of signification and the mystery of the incarnation. Being is the core of both.
24) vel est lerminalio secundum esse; et iste modus (reiationis creaturae ad creatorum ut ad
terminum hs) est singularis in incarnatione, per quam humana natura assumpta est ad esse et
M
unitalem divinae personae. non autem ad unitatem divinae naturae, ISN 30.1.2;
CHAPTER VI
THE HYPOSTATIC UNION AND
THE UNION OF NAMING GOD
In this sixth and final chapter, we will concentrate once again on the hierarchy of
unions that was outlined in chapter IV. Aquinas designed a hierarchy of unions, in
which the hypostatic union is related analogously to the operative union between
God and man in knowledge and love, and to the union between God the creator
and creature. We discovered that all these unions are like intentional unions
between one who knows and his object of knOWledge. This intentional relation is
called a mixed relation as well, in order to make sure that God is not accounted for
as someone dependent upon that which is related to him.
In chapter N we dealt with this hierarchy because we wanted to show that the
hypostatic union is only approachable by way of recognition of its uniqueness and
by way of an analogous application of the name unio. We continued by
investigating the isomorphy between propositions about Christ and Christ's mode of
being, and expressed this isomorphy in concluding that the logical relation of
supposition offers an analogy for the hypostatic union. However, there is yet
another conclusion to be drawn. It concerns the cOIlllection between fonnulating
enunciations about Christ, and the hierarchy of the unions. This conclusion is the
following: whenever one names the unity of Christ (e.g. Deus est homo) one enters
into an operative union with Christ. Whenever one speaks successfully about the
top of the hierarchy, one is drawn into the hierarchy itself and perfonns part of
what it is to be knowing and loving Christ. All true naming of Christ belongs to
the operative union, and the same applies to all true naming of God.
It takes not a little time to gain full awareness of what this means. Of the many
things it means, it means at least that since all proper naming of God consists of
analogous employment of names, this same analogous employment is analogous to
the hypostatic union. Analogous naming of God follows the paradigm set by Christ,
in whom God and man are personally united. It also means that, since the
hypostatic union is a mystery of faith, all true naming of God as it were intensifies
this mystery of the union. In representing the hypostatic union, one effects a
mysterious union oneself. In a more fonnal vein, it also means that since all true
naming of God is related to the hypostatic union as its paradigm, no discussion of
the divine names is complete without what should be considered to be the heart of
it: the hypostatic union in Christ.
It takes some time to grow fully aware of this. We will devote this last chapter to
it, and try to approach the connection between naming God and Christ and the
hierarchy of the unions by considering the unity of Christ as the unity of the Word
of God with its perf.;ct human knowledge. We will work from both sides, i.e. we
wiIl attempt a mutual elucidation of the one and the other union. In so doing, we
will profi~ from an important aspect of the conclusion reached from the study of the
170 HYPOSTATIC UNiON AND NAMING GOD
being of Christ in chapter V. Le. the fact that creation is the hidden key to
Aquinas' writings. We will profit from Aquinas' knowledge of the third union, i.e.
between Creator and (intelligent) creation.
Complicated as it is, this chapter will be rewarding inasmuch as it will be able to
restore a relation which Aquinas discerned that has been lost in the subsequent
interpretation of his work: the relation between the perfect human lmowledge of
Christ and human naming of God.
In this chapter the first section will discuss the union of the Word of God with the
knowledge of Christ's human soul. Next we will compare our fmdings to the
hierarchy of the unions and investigate what the one brings to the other and
conversely. OUf conclusion will establish the relation between naming God by
knowing and loving God, and naming God by being God.
1. The union of the Word of God with the knowledge of his human soul
In this section, in which the phrases Word of God and KnowZedge of his human
soul are employed as deliberately as can be, we will first examine an exegesis that
Aquinas gives of the first words that Jesus speaks in the gospel of John: "What are
you looking for?" (1.1). Next we will discuss Aquinas' views on the knowledge
that the Word of God is (1.2), followed by an examination of his views on the
knowledge of the human soul of Christ (1.3). We will close the first section of this
chapter by devoting attention to Aquinas' answer to the question how these two are
one in Christ.
1.1 "What are you looking for?"
The first words that Jesus speaks in the gospel of John, are the words that he
speaks to Andrew and John: "What are you looking for?" (In 1.38). Andrew and
Jolm, about to be the first of Jesus' disciples, walk behind him. Jesus turns around
and asks: "What are you looking for?" Aquinas explains (REI I 15 [275]) that there
is a very important spiritual meaning attached to the fact that Jesus is said to tum
around. Christ turns around to give confidence and hope for tenderheartedness to
all who follow him with a pure heart. Wisdom "goes to meet those who desire her"
(Ws 6.14). In turning around Jesus lets his disciples know that in the beatific vision
he will show them his face, which means that they will be saved: "Show us your
face, and we will be saved" (Ps. 80.3). Just like Moses (Ex 33.23), Andrew and
John only see the back of God. Only through considering his 'back', only through
considering the traces he left behind in creating the world, do we gain a little
knowledge of God. Now God turns around, not in the sense that our knowledge is
changed to a knowledge of those who see him face to face, but in the sense that
tenderheartedness, the work of salvation, is about to be bestowed upon God's
CHAPTER SIX 171
people, which opens the way for the beatific visionl . Jesus asks a question: "What
are you looking for'?", and. examines the intentions of Andrew and John. Jesus did
not ask in order to learn something new, Aquinas says. The background of this is
the fact that Christ knows what goes on in the heart of his people (In 2.25).
Aquinas had read the gloss on this verse, in which it is said that Jesus was not
ignorant of that about which he asked a question (QDV 1I.3 obiectum 8). No, he
had another goal in asking the question. He asked so that after, they showed a
proper intention, he might make them more intimate friends and show them that
they were worthy to hear him. The question itself, Aquinas adds, is already
indicative of the answer. He refers to Origen, who had counted: the first six
'words' were said by John the Baptist, and now Jesus says the seventh 'word' in
the Gospel. It indicates the rest of the seventh day, which indicates the rest that
will come to us through Christ. It also indicates the fullness of the seven gifts of
the Holy Spirit: the spirit of the Lord, the spirit of wisdom and insight, the spirit of
counsel and power, the spirit of knowledge and fear of the Lord (Is 11.2).
The disciples know what they are looking for, and show their good intentions:
"Rabbi, where do you live'?". "Rabbi", Magister: they are looking for a teacher,
they are looking for the Teacher, since it is said "You have one Teacher, the
Christ" (Mt 23.10). The name Magister is the fIrst answer the disciples give to
Christ's question, and Aquinas shows it to be quite meaningful2. The second
answer is contained in the question "where do you live?" The answer can be read
literally and spiritually. Literally it expresses their desire to learn more from Jesus
than is possible by questioning him only once and in a superficial way. They
wanted to be able to learn from him frequently and seriously. "If you see a man of
understanding, go to hhn early" (Si 6.36). "Happy is the man who hears me, who
watches daily atmy gates" (pr 8.34). The spiritual sense of the question is both
allegorical and moral. Allegorically they ask for God's home which is in heaven.
"I have lifted up my eyes to you, who live in heaven" (Ps 123.1). They ask where
Christ was living because the purpose of following hhn should be that Christ leads
us to heaven, to heavenly glory. Morally, they ask what they should do so that they
be worthy to have Christ dwell in them. "You are being built into a dwelling place
for God" (Ep 2.22). "Show me, you whom my soul loves, where you graze your
flock, where you rest at midday" (Sg 1.6)'.
I) Cf. E. Jungel's words (1977, p. 42): "Wird der Mensch jedoch der Angst vor dem
Nichtsein definitiv entnommen, dann war Gott am Werk und wird ais der erfahren, der immer
schon am werk gewesen ist, so dass man ilun nur nachschauen (Ex 33.23), nur die 'posteriora dei'
erkennen kann." JUngel (ibidem, note 51) refers to Luther's view that the possibility of correct
('reehte') theology is focused on knowledge of these 'hinder parts of God', i.e. the passion and
the cross;
2) Aquinas elaborates his view on Christ's name Magister especially in QDV 11. On this
text, and Augustine's De Magistro, see F.l.A. de Grijs, 1979;
3) This corresponds with some of the names of Christ: Doctor fidei/justitiae (STIll 7.7; 9.4
ad 1; 42), Caput Ecc1esiae who bestows upon the church the doctrine of the truth (ST III 8.1,
12.3), Auctor et consummator fidei (STill 7.3 obiectum 2; 9.2; 11.6 ad 2), Janua (ST III 49.5),
172 HYPOSTATIC UNION AND NAMING GOD
Jesus' first instruction of the disciples is short, but meaningful: "Come and see".
The first instruction of Jesus in the gospel of John is an invitation: Come and see
where I live. Jesus did not have a house of his own (Mt 8.20) but he invited them
to come to the house of someone else where he remained. The spiritual meaning of
Christ's words is telling: the dwelling of God, whether of glory or grace, cannot be
known except by experience, for it cannot be explained in words. "I will give him
a white stone upon which is written a new name, which no one knows but he who
receives it" (Rv 2.17). Come and see; come, by believing and working, see by
experiencing and understanding. The~e are the four ways. in which ?ne can gain
knowledge of the dwelling of God: domg good works, makmg your mmd free from
daily business, tasting the sweetness of the Lord, and performing acts of devotion,
i.e. prayer. These four ways Aquinas derives from the resemblance of this VenUe
et videte, to Veniam et apparebo (ps 42.2: "When shall I come and appear before
the face of God"), to Vacate et videte (Ps 46.10: "Be still and see"), to Custate et
videte (Ps 34.8: "Taste and see that the Lord is sweet"), and to Palpate et videte
(Lk 24.39: "It is I myself. Touch me and see for yourselves.").
Aquinas' exegesis of this one question and this one answer is telling, a~d pr?vides
one with a good introduction to the question of the lmowledge of ChriSt. Fust of
all it makes clear that the question is raised in reading Scripture. Why is it that
Jesus asks a question? Didn't he lmow? More relevant is that it highlights ~he
proper context for any discussion of Christ's lmowledge: what are people lookmg
for? What is their true happiness? Who will teach them? "What are you looking
for?" elicits the answer that people are looking for wisdom and salvation, far
instruction and liberation. Christ orients this basic human desire ta his own person,
to the Word of God, being the perfect expression of God's knowledge and love. It
provokes consideration of Christ the Wisdom, the Truth, the Light. In this life they
are anly seen 'from the back', i.e. by attributing created perfections, that are God's
effects, ta God in an analogous way. The most perfect of all these created
perfections is human intentionality itself, being the image of God. For this reason
we may use the names Wisdom, Truth, Light and Word. All of these human
perfections are participations in divine wisdom, divine truth, divine light and the
divine word. Yet human knowledge is an independent kind of lmowledge, an
independent natural potency. Aquinas' exegesis shaws Christ to be the one who
proclaims the name of God by being the 'name' of God, so that all will enjoy the
vision of God and receive new names. The most perfect union of God and man is
the union of the divine Word with a human lmowledge as it is meant to be, and this
union prepares the union of knowledge and love between his people and God.
Christ's perfect human knowledge is the fulfilment and promise of this operative
union. All present union, of which naming God and Christ is one very important
part, literally lives from that fulfilment and that promise.
Aquinas' discussions of the Word of God being God's perfect self-manifestation
and of course Via, Veritas et Vita, Sapientia, Lux, etc. Cf. STIlI 12.4 and above chapter III;
CHAPTERSlX 173
and of its union with his perfect human knowledge are to a large extent dependent
upon his discussions of the knowledge of God and of human knowledge .. In fact, all
these discussions are reflections upon this one invitation: "Come and see". The
divine knowledge that the Word _expresses is related to creation from eternity.
Creation fmds its source and goal in it. The knowledge of the human soul of Christ
is the lmowledge of the wayfarer and the knowledge of the one who has arrived, it
is the knowledge of human beings on the, road to their completion, and of human
beings who have fouud rest in God. This knowledge shows that hUman beings are
ordered to the participation in God's verbal self-knowledge. Human knowledge is
not only ordered to this; it already lives from it because all human und~rstanding is
both the exercise of a natural power and illumination by God. In both of these
aspects the human knowledge of Christ is perfect. This perfect human knowledge
fulfils, by being united to the Word in a unique way, the natural desire of all
human understanding. This work is undertaken by the Saviour, and Aquinas'
theology of the knowledge of Christ pictures an image of Christ as the way that
bestows life, the life of the truth of the union with God. The perfect union of God
and humanity in Christ prefigures and prepares the union that is present in the
faithful's naming God and is about to be implemented in life eternal,: "to know
you, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom you have sent" (In 17.3).
1.2 The knowledge oj the Word oj Cod
In Christ the Word of God is united to this human nature. The name 'word',
verbum, is a discrete name; it applies discretely to one of the divine persons only,
i.e. to the Son of God. The Son of God shares in the full divine nature, indeed is
divine nature itself. Of divine nature the unified name 'knowledge', scientia, is
predicated. Both names, scientia and verbum, are taken .from human intentionality,
and are closely linked to each other. We will examine how, as far as human
understanding can carry us.
In God there is knowledge; 'knowledge' is a true name of God, Aquinas says (ST I
14.1). Those having knowledge differ from those lacking it, in that the latter
possess only one form. They only possess the form that is their own, whereas those
having knowledge, in knowing other things, possess the forms of these other things
as well. Aquinas thinks about knowledge as the abstraction and reception of the
principle of being, the form, of each existing thing, which upon reception becomes
the principle of knowledge as well. Those beings capable of lmowledge thus are
less constrained and limited than things which are not. Those beings capable of
knowledge are in a certain sense capable of becoming and making anything else,
where 'becoming' denotes the receiving aspect of understanding, and 'making' the
active, abstractive aspect of understanding. This capability gives intelligent,
intentional beings a wider extent and reach than one which is limited only to itself.
Thus the intelligent soul is in a certain sense all things, quodammodo omnia, quotes
Aquinas from Aristotle. The intelligent human soul is as it were, using an
174 HYPOSTA17C UMON AND NAMING GOD
expression from the neo-platonist Liber de Causi~. the horizon between
corporeality and immateriality or spirituality. That which is material limits each
fonn. while a thing is intelligent inasmuch as it is immaterial. The immateriality of
a thing determines the degree in which it is intelligent, and its mode of knowledge
is always an immaterial mode. Plants are not capable of knowledge because of their
materiality. Animals afe less limited because their sensory experience receives the
species of other things without the matter of those other things. Human
intelligence, although united with a body, is even less limited and more capable of
knowledge, because it is more 'separated' from matter and unmixed with it.
God is most immaterial of all, i.e. infinite instead of being limited by anything.
God's being, his 'form'. is not received by anything. and therefore God is most
infInite and most perfect, most inunaterial and therefore most 'knowing'.
Understanding is a created perfection flowing from the perfect creating God. All
tenns signifying such a created perfection are to be attributed to God. This is done
analogously, i.e. without implying any imperfection, any created mode. The
knowledge that is in God, as any other perfection attributed, is identical to God.
For that reason this knowledge is not a quality or a habit, does not have
potentiality, is not different from wisdom, counsel and prudence, i.e. from the
other aspects of intelligence, and is neither universal nor particular (ST I 14.1 ad
1,2,3).
In fact, no distinction that applies to human intelligence applies to God's
intelligence. One may distinguish between the act of understanding, the intellect,
the species abstracted from the thing to be understood, that which is understood
(the concept, the intention), the object of knowledge, and the being of the one who
understands. This multiplicity does not apply to God, even though one hardly
knows what one says when saying so. This denial of intelligent multiplicity entails
one thing that is quite important to highlight: in God intellect and what is known
must be identical in every way; God's knowledge is knowledge of self through
nothing other than himself (ST I 14.2,4). This is important to remember when we
consider the Word of God.
This explains why Paul wrote to the Romans: "How rich and deep are the wisdom
and the knowledge of God" (Rm 11.33; ST I 14.1 sed contra). The negative aspect
in the attribution of 'knowledge' explains what Paul adds to this: "We cannot reach
to the root of his decisions or ways. 'Who has ever known the mind of the Lord?
Who has ever been his adviser? Who has given anything to him, so that his
presents come only as a debt returned?' Everything there is comes from him and is
caused by him and exists for him" (ibidem, 33b-36a; cf. Is 40.13 and Jb 40.3).
The questions asked are rhetorical questions. Or are they? No one but God himself
knows his own mind. This knowledge of his own mind is called the Word of God,
the one through whom creation came about. The name 'word' is the one exception
4) Cf. CDC 2 [125J;
CHAPTERSlX 175
to the rest of the names signifying divine intelligence. All other names signify
God's essence, since they are taken from the perfection of created intelligence. All
created effects are effects of the action of creation, and creation is attributed "to all
divine persons. These names, such as wisdom, truth and light, may be appropriated
to the Son, but they remain unifIed names. This name 'word', however, is not a
unified name but a discrete name, naming the Son of God onlys. Although it is
taken from a perfection of created intelligence, it is not predicated of the Son of
God because it is a perfection6 • It is predicated of the Son of God because it is a
biblical name, and because this biblical name is interpreted in a way that might
elucidate, in adducing a created similarity, the procession of the Son from the
Father7 •
The name 'word' is employed, Aquinas says (ST I 27.1), in order to explain that
other biblical way of speaking about the Holy Trinity, Le. using names that
indicate the 'procession' of persons in God (cf. In 8.42). The name 'word' enables
one to reject some ways of understanding this procession. Some have understood
procession as the act of a cause resulting in an exterior effect. The act of the cause
is thought to proceed to something outside of the cause. This would make the Son
God's first creature, or it would make the Son a modality of the Father, inasmuch
as the Father is called 'Son' after the Father had caused the flesh to be his. One
recognizes Arian and Sabellian heresies. So one has to look for a certain kind of
action that knows of procession, but not into an exterior effect. The action of the
intellect is properly such: understanding remains in the one who understands.
Understanding results in an interior effect, i.e. the conception of the thing
understood. This conception is the thing signified by a spoken word, and may itself
be called inner word or word of the heart.
The procession of the Son is thought of according to what belongs to the highest
creatures, i.e. being intelligent. It is thought of as an 'intelligible emanation', an
issuing in the mind, remaining in the one understanding.
This procession of the Son is also called the 'generation' of the Son (cf. ST 127.2).
However, generation seems to imply an absolute coming into being, which
Obviously cannot apply to the procession of the Son. Here the analogy of the
5) Aquinas changed his position on this. In JSN27.2.2.1 he still defended verbum being both
a discrete and a unified name. Cf. the development in QDV 4.2, QDP 9.9 ad 7 and REI I 1 [200];
6) Cf. QDP 8.1 ad 12: licet ratio naturalis possit pervenire ad ostendendum quod Deus sit
inteLleetus, modum tamen intelligendi non potest invenire suffieienter. Sieut enim de Deo scire
possumus qll()d est, sed non quid est; ita de Deo scire possumus quod intelligit, sed non quo modo
intelligit. Habere autem conceptionem verbi in intelligetuio, peronet ad modum intelligendi: unde
ratio haec sufficiemer probare non potest; sed ex eo quod est in nobis aliqualiter per simile
coniecturare;
7) Cf. this concise statement in RSV IV: Sciendum est autem quod diversa diversum
generationis modum habent. Generatio aulem Dei aliter est quam generatfo aUarum rerum; et ideo
non possumus ad aliquid pertingere de generatione Dei, nisi per generationem eius quod in
creaturis magis aecedit ad similitudinem Dei. Nichil est autem Deo ita simile sicut anima
hominis ... ;
176 HYPOSTATIC UNION AND NAMING GOD
procession of a iImer word serves to refine the meaning of another biblical word:
generation (cf. Ps 2.7). The proper meaning of the word 'generation' is generation
applied not to all things that are generated and perish, but applied to living things
only. It signifies the origin of some living thing in some other living thing
conjoined to it. Moreover, to its proper meaning also belongs that whatever is
generated is of the same species as the one generating; what comes forth
reproduces the likeness of its originator, as horse proceeds from horse and human
being from human being.
Now a human being that is generated is said to be generated according to both of
its meanings: it comes to be absolutely, and it comes to be according to a natural
similarity with the living thing generating it. The first meaning implies potentiality,
and therefore cannot be attributed to God. Only the proper meaning remains. It is
here that the analogy of the procession of an hmer word comes in. Understanding
is the operation of a living thing, and the word that does proceed proceeds
according to a similarity with the one producing it and with the thing understood.
In God this 'similarity' is even more applicable. Human inner words are not our
children, are not of the same nature as the one understanding. But in God
understanding is identical to his being, and so what comes forth from God's
understanding exists in the same divine being, which is identical to divine nature
(cf. ST 127.2 ad 2). And so the employment of the name verbum serves to select
the proper meaning of 'generation', i.e. to deny passibility or materiality to the
eternal births.
Implied by this employment of the name 'word' is that it is used to signify an inner
word. Aquinas distinguishes between four meanings of 'word', three of which are
proper meanings, and one improper or figurative (ST I 34.1). First of all, in
common employment, it means the sound which is uttered by a voice. Not any
sound that is uttered, but only those that are invested with meaning by an
intelligent agent. Two aspects of this sound bespeak its mental or iImer origin: the
sound itself, the word spoken (verbum vocis), points to its inner origin in human
imagination (verbum imaginationis); the signification of the word spoken points to
the word of the heart or inner word (verbum cordis, verbum interius). i.e. the
conception or idea expressed. The verbum cordis of the speaker causes its spoken
words. The spoken word that the hearer hears signifies the inner word of the
speaker. The spoken word reveals or manifests the inner word.
The improper or figurative meaning of 'word' occurs for example when it is said
that creatures are the words of God: they carry out some effect towards which they
8) Aquinas regularly refers to a sermon of Theodotus, bishop of Ancyra, on the nativity,
read at the council of Ephesus and contained in its acts (Patrologia Graecorum 77, 1376~7).
Aquinas does so in order to emphasize that several names for the Son (i.e. Filius, Verbum,
Splendor, Imago), although suppositing for the same personal property, signify different aspects of
it. Verbum Signifies the impassibility, immateriality and non~posteriority of the procession. Cf. ST
134.2 ad 3; [42.2 ad 1; REIlI [250J; C/O II [275J;
CHAPTER SIX 177
are directed through the Word of divine wisdom. That which the Word sets as a
task is called word itself. The matter signified by the word is called word itself
metaphorically, as when someone executes the word of the king. .
However, the root meaning of the name 'word' is the word of the heart, the
conception of the intellect which is the fruit of the process of understanding. The
word proceeds from something else, and this constitutes its similarity with the
forthcoming of the Son: being from someone other. esse ab alio.
The name 'word', naming one of the divine persons exclusively, names a distinct
eternal subsisting inner relation in God. Nevertheless, the name indirectly signifies
a relation with creation as well, though not a temporal relation but an eternal one9 •
Since the Word is the perfect self-expression of the Father, it contains all that is in
God, all that God understands. Divine knowledge regards divinity itself, and
creation in it. The knowledge of creation is not merely theoretical or speculative,
but practical as well; it is the knowledge of the one who creates the world. And so
the divine Word expresses the theoretical, non-practical knowledge of God as well
as the theoretical and practical divine knowledge of creation. For this reason it is
said that "All things have come into being through the Word" (In 1.3)10.
The name 'word', when used to signify the Son of God, is used in its most proper
meaning, and is used analogously as weIll I • There are many aspects usually
implied in the signification of 'word' that do not apply to the Son of God l2 . To
come to understanding, to produce an inner word can be thought of as the
acquisition of a new perfection, but this supposes potentiality, of which there is
none in God 13. Moreover, in human understanding there is no single inner word
9) The difference is due to the kind of action that the relations are consequent upon. If it is
action that crosses over to an exterior effect, such as creating or governing, the relation is
temporal. If it is action that remains in God itself, such as knowing and willing, the relation is
eternal. Cf. STI 34.3 ad 2; 13.7 ad 3; 38.1 ad 4; QDV 4.5;
10) Cf. REI I 1 [2751 and QDV 4.5 sed contra 1. where Aquinas gives Augustine's
explanation why 'Logos' is translated into Verbum and not into Ratio: the latter only signifies the
irmer concept, whereas the former signifies an outward relation as well. The exegesis of the
quoted verse is to be found in REI I 2 [325], where Aquinas studies a.o. the grammar of per in
Omnia per ipsum facta sun!. The best way to read this is that the Father has created the world
through his wisdom, appropriated to the Son, as an artisan devises his artefact by using his
wisdom;
11) Cf. R. Mcinerny, 1968, pp. 33-39;
12) To these aspects of the failure of naming the divine Word should _be added the general
differences between divine understanding and human understanding;
13) Consider however ScG IV 14.3 (actus ex actu) and QDV 4.2 ad 7 (processio operatz).
Lonergan points to these texts in arguing that, although the act of understanding itself is a
perfection that presupposes potentiality, the production of an inner word need not be such. An
inner word can be thought of as a perfection of a perfection, and thus would apply to the
procession of the Son. Lonergan says: "The act of understanding is to the possible intellect, the
act of loving is to the will, as act to potency, as perfection to its perfectible; the procession is
178 HYPOSTA11C UNION AND NAMING GOD
that completely and perfectly expresses the thing understood. There are different
inner words for different aspects of one and the same thing. This multiplicity does
not apply to God because his understanding is perfect. There is one perfect
expression of divine being, of divine knowledge, and that is the one perfect Word
of GOd I4 • Only God himself comprehends, in the literal sense, God lS , The more
perfect an inner word is, the greater its identity with the thing understood, and in
God there is absolute identity between the inner word and God's substance
understood l6 • This same feature entails another difference between Verbum and
verbum: human inner words do not have a natural similarity, a natural likeness
with the human being conceiving the words, whereas God's Word does, and even
is divine nature17 • All in all, one can understand that Pseudo-Dionysius, as
Aquinas in his commentary records, says that what is called 'Word' can be called
'word beyond speech', Innominabilitas, as welp8.
The name 'Word' signifies God's yerfect expression of selfl9. This perfect
processio operationis and cannot be analogous to any real procession in God. But the inner word
is to our intelligence in act as is act to act, perfection to proportionate perfection; in us the
procession is processio operati; in us dicere is producere verbum. even though it is natural and
not an instance of Aristotelian efficient causality. Inasmuch as dicere does not involve the
imperfection of processio operationis it offers an analogy to the divine procession." B.J.
Lonergan, 1967b, p. 198, cf. pp. 98, 128, 140-41;
14) QDV2.1: Sed si esset aliqua res peifecte repraesentans Deum, non esset nisi una tantum.
quia uno modo repraesemaret, et secundum unam formam; et ideo non est ibi nisi unus Filius, qui
est peifecta imago Patds. Similiter etiam intelJectus noster secundum diversas conceptiones
repraesentat divinam peifectionem, quia unaquaeque impeifecta est; si enim peifecta esset. esset
una tantum, sicut est unum lontum Verbum intellectus divini. Cf. QDL 4.4.1; ST I 14.1 ad 2;
79.4; 85.5; QDV 4.4; REI I 1 [175]. In QDP 9.5 Aquinas considers this to be in fact two
imperfections: multitude and imperfect understanding;
15) e.g. ST I 14.3, QDP 9.5,
16) Cf. STl 27.1 ad 2,
17) STl 27.2 ad 2, QDP 9.5, HEll 1 [175];
18) CDN I 1.30: Unde suMit quod Deus sic dicitur ratio, quod potest did et 'irrationabilitas ';
et sic didtur intellectus, quod potest did 'non-intelligibilitas'; et sic dicitur 'verbum' quod potest
did 'innominabiUtas ';
19) This implies that the Word of God not only expresses God's understanding of self, but an
understanding of self from which love proceeds: Filius aUIem est Verbum, non qualecumque, sed
spirans Amorem: unde, Augustinus dicit. in IX libro De Trin.: ~Verbum quod insinuare
intendimus. cum amore notitia est. Non igitur secundum quamlibet peifectionem intellectus mittitur
Filius: sed secundum lalem instructionem intellectus. qua prorumpat in affectum amoris, ut dicitur
In 4.45: ~Omnis qui audivit a Patre, et didicit, venit ad men; et in Ps 38.4: "In meditatione mea
exardescet ignis. ~ Et ideo signanter dicit Augustinus quod Filius mittitur, "cum a quoquam
cognoscitur atque percipitur~: perceptio enim experimentalem quandam notitiam significat. Et
haec proprie dicitur sapientia, quasi sapida sdentia. secundum illud Si 6.23: HSapientia doctrinae
secundum nomen eius est~, ST 143.5 ad 2. Lonergan (l985b. p. 94) has attempted to voice the
relevance of this for the incarnation: "Again, as the eternal Word is the eternally true expression
of the vaJue that God as 'aBape' is, so the Word as man by obedience unto death again expressed
that value by revealing how much God loved the world (In 3.16),,;
CHAPTER SIX 179
expression of God -himself becomes human. In his commentary to the letter to the
Hebrews, Aquinas says: "because he is the primordial Word, all other words
derive from him, i.e. the concepts expressed in the angelic mind and ours.
Therefore that Word is the expression of all words, as their fountain. "20. All
created perfections are participations in God's- highest perfection, and similarly
human understanding and human judgment are a participation in God's Verbum.
We will now look for the meaning of this, while considering the most perfect of all
human knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of Christ.
1.3 The knowledge oj the human soul oj Christ
In Christ the Word of God is united to a human nature. composed of body and
soul. This human nature possesses all that belongs to what it is to be human, and
so the human soul of Christ must have human intelligence and human knowledge.
The performance of acts of understanding is attributed to a person, but the nature
of someone contains the principles of the actions one perfonns. Since there are two
natures in Christ, there must be two 'kinds' of knowing perfonned by him:
uncreated and created knowledge. The uncreated knowledge of Christ we dealt with
in the preceding section, so now we will focus upon his created knowledge2 1 •
AqUinas' most important principle in reflecting upon the created knowledge of
Christ may be called the principle of perfection". Everything that belongs to the
perfection of human knowledge needs to be attributed to Christ. The reason for this
is two-fold. On the one hand whatever is personally united to the Son of God
should be as perfect as possible, i.e. within the limits set by being a creature. In
the hypostatic union the knowledge which is the Word of God, overflows
abundantly to the human soul united to if'. On the other·hand it is Christ who is
the cause of salvation, salvation being liberation from sin and restoration of hUman
beings to their orientation to their fmal goal: unity with God in knowledge and
20) Verbum enim Dei Db aeterno conceptum, in paterno inteJleclu est Verbum primordiale. De
quo Eccli 1.5 dicitur: ~Fons sapientiae verbum Dei in excelsis~. Et quia est primordiale, ideo ab
ipso derimntur omnia alia verba, quae nihil aliud sunt quam quaedam concepti ones expressae in
mente angeli, vel nostro. Unde illud Verbum est expressio omnium verborum, quasi fons quidam,
RIlE IV 2 [175]. Cf. HEll 1 [300]; QDV 4.5 sed contro 5; STI 56.2; 105.3; CDC 10; C1C II 3
[250];
21) In this paragraph I study the following texts: 3SN 14.1-3, QDV 20, OTT I 216, QDL
3.2.1. and STIll 9·12;
22) Cf. E. Gutwenger, 1954, p. 175 and A. Durand, 1949, p. 497ff. L. Scheffczyk (1957 p.
285) mentions a second principle, i.e. of 'integration', that Aquinas is supposed to apply to the
knowledge of Christ. It means the completion ("Vervol!stiindigung") of the human nature of Christ
according to its proper life of knowledge. However, this is rather superfluous, since the perfection
that is intended in the phrase 'principle of perfection' comprises the perfection of the agent
intellect as well.
An overview of the literature is given in L. Scheffczyk. 1985, note 68 on p. 68;
23) STIU 12.4; Cf. STIU 7.1; 7.7 ad 1; 7.9;
180 HYPOSTATIC UNION AND NAMING GOD
love. The cause call1lot but have that which is confessed to be its effect, and
therefore Christ should have the knowledge that he prepares for the faithful (ST III
9.1_2)24, For these two reasons Christ's created knowledge should be as perfect as
possible. This principle of perfection is the same principle that we saw at work in
the attribution of unified divine names. Knowledge for example is a created
perfection that should be attributed to the most perfect of all, to God. It also is the
same principle as the one that we saw at work, though differently. in attributing the
perfection of an inner word to the procession of the Son2S. We will return to this
in the next section.
However, different capacities are perfected in a different way, resulting in different
perfections. As regards human intelligence, Aquinas distinguishes between three
capacities or powers that may be said to be perfected. First, there is the human
capacity to know and love God, hnman beings being created to the hnage and
likeness of God. Second. there is the human capacity to understand, the capacity to
become, by intellectual identification~. anything that is: quo est omnia fieri.
Third, there is the human capacity to make material things intelligible by way of
abstraction, or in other words, to 'make everything' in the intellect: quo est omnia
jacen?7. The second of these corresponds with what is called the passive intellect,
and the third with the agent intellect. Both belong to the general account of human
psychology, derived from Aristotle's De Anima, In order to understand material
things, the proper object of human intelligence, the human soul must be infonned
by phantasms received in sensible experience, From these phantasms the agent
intellect abstracts the intelligible species or images, Through the consideration of
these intelligible species, received in the passive intellect, the mind comes to a
certain understanding of the thing to be understood. (This is the understanding that
consists of hmer words.) The passive intellect indicates the receptive side of human
understanding; the agent intellect its active side,
All three capacities or powers, Le, the natural desire for knowing and loving God,
the passive intellect, and the agent intellect, are infinite in scope, because they are
aimed at what is infinite, albeit in a different way.
They are to be distinguished in two respects. One distinction is general, and one
applies especially to Christ. First one distinguishes between a natural and a non-
natural perfection. The fulfilment of the human desire to be one with God, cannot
be realised by the human capacity itself. It is God who fulfils this capacity by
bestowing, in eternal life, the beatific vision upon the faithful, and by bestowing
upon them the 'beginning' (inchoatio) of the beatific vision in the grace of faith,
24) ... taUs eognitio sie ani11Ule Christi eonveniat ut deed Auetorem [humanae salutis - hs],
0171216, Cf, STIlI 9,2;
25) The principle works differently here. because verbum is a perfection of a perfection. of
human intelligence. which renders it so fitting to name a discrete relation in God, instead of an
essential property;
26) i.e, the identity of the intellect with the thing known;
27) STIll 9.1, 9.4,12.1;
CHAPTER SIX. 181
hope and love. The other two capacities or powers are perfected by nature itself,
by human beings themselves in the very act of understanding.
The second distinction, the one that applies especially to Christ, is· between a
perfection that is and is not (directly) bestowed by God. In this respect God
bestowed upon the human soul of Christ from the very moment of his conception
not only the knowledge of the beatific vision, but the perfection of understanding in
the sense' of becoming everything that is, a natural perfection in itself.
So a threefold created knowledge in Christ results: beatific knowledge (scientia
beata), infused knowledge (scientia injusa/indita) and experiential knowledge
(scientia acquisita). Beatific knowledge concerns the Word of God. Infused
knowledge concerns both all created things of which human beings can gain
understanding and all they can know by faith through divine revelation.
Experiential knowledge concerns the abstraction of intelligible species from
concrete experience. A scheme may elucidate these aspects of Christ's created
knowledge
beata
scientia
creata
~ irifusa
Verbum Dej28 ___ >
Christi creatura -
acquisita
It is important to stress that aU three capacities or powers are transcendent in
scope. Two transcend human beings' personal matter or corporeality, one is
transcendent in its orientation upon the divine. The principle of perfection employs
this transcendence to postulate a perfect created knowledge in Christ. Since this
knowledge is created, it does not exceed the limits set by being an intelligent
creature:
~ experiential knowledge of immaterial substances is impossible, and experiential
knowledge of things past and future as well. Therefore Christ does not possess this
kind of knowledge.
- infused knowledge is 'known' from the study of angels, and the study of the
seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. The divine infusion of intelligible species, rather
than their abstraction, makes this human intellect less dependent upon sensible
experience, but it does not alter what is an essential feature of human intelligence:
reasoning, Using their knowledge, knowledgeable people deduce an effect from its
cause. In this sense the created (infused) knowledge of Christ is not inunediate; but
puts things together and proceeds from one idea to another (ST III 11.3-4). Human
28) Since the knowledge that is the Word of God contains all that God knows. it contains all
things created as well. This entails that whoever enjoys beatific vision also enjoys the vision of
that of which the Word is 'the principle. The extent to which this knowIedge is had depends on the
intellectual force of the intelligent one in question, For this reason this line between Verbum Dei
and creatura is drawn here, Cf. STill 10.2;
182 HYPOSTATIC UNION AND NAMING GOD
beings become knowledgeable in acquiring understanding. Most of the time this
understanding is habiruaJ., i.e. it is not absent but not in use, not actual as well.
Knowledge is a habit to be employed whenever needed (ST III 11.5). Moreover,
human knowledge of different kinds of things, different classes of things to be
known, results in different habits of knowledge. In this sense the created (infused)
knowledge of Christ is not purely actual nor one, but habitual and differentiated.
- beatific knowledge is always knowledge without any intelligible species, without
any similitude, but urunediated vision of God. To see a similitude of God is
equivalent to not seeing God (ST I 12.3). On the other hand, this does not imply
that in the beatific vision God is 'comprehended', in the literal sense of knowing all
there is to know. Because the mode of each created inte1ligent being is limited, it
cannot receive the infinite God and safeguard his infinity (ST I 12.7). Therefore
Christ's human (beatific) knowledge does not comprehend the Word of God. It
does not comprehend the Word29 , and it does not know all that is contained in the
Word, i.e. that which can be create<!, through ieo. Of these it only knows that
which at some time was, is or will be, and not all that could have been but the
existence of which God did not decide 31 • Therefore not even Christ knows about
possible worlds, and in saying so Aquinas once again observes the limits of being a
creature32 •
29) Sic facta est unio naturarum in persona Christi quod tamen proprietas utriusque naturae
inconjusa permansit: ita scilicet quod ~increatum mansit increatum, et creatum mansit infra limites
creaturae sieut Damaseenus dicit, in 111 libra. Est autem impossibile quod aJiqua ereatura
H
,
comprehendat divinam essentjam ... eo quod infinitum non eomprehenditur a finito. Et ideo
dicendum quod anima Christi nullo modo eomprehendit divinam essentiam, ST TIl 10.1; cf. 10.1
ad 3; 10.3 ad 1 and ad 2; 3SN 14.2.1; QDV20.4; OTT! 216;
30) ... omnia quaeeumque sunt in potentia nunquam reducta ad aetum. Horum autem quaedam
sunt solum in potentia divino. Et huiusmodi non omnia eognoscit in Verba anima Christi. Hoc
enim esset comprehendere omnia quae Deus patest facere: quod esset eamprehendere divinam
virtutem, et per consequens divinom essentiam; virtus enim quaelibet cognoscitur per cagnitionem
eorum in quae potest, ST III 10.2; cf. ST I 12.9; 3SN 14.2.2; QDV 8.4 and 20.5; QDL 3.2.1;
OTT 1 216 [100];
31) Cf. however orr 1216: et secundum hoc anima Christi omnisciens dieitur, quia plenam
tuJtitiam habet omnium que sunt, erunt velfuerum. This remarkable but perhaps infelicitous choice
of words (amnisciens), is not repeated elsewhere in Aquinas' writings;
32) On the history of the theology of the beatific knowledge, see N. Wicki, 1954. Wicld
makes an interesting case that the doctrine that on the one hand the vision is unmediated, and that
on the other hand it does not comprehend God, is an ingenious solution put forward by Albert the
Great. The doctrine solves a problem that was raised under the influence of Eastern theology (i.e.
Pseudo~Dionysius), considering the ultimate vision as a kind of theophany. This opinion was
especially defended by Porretan scholars like Alain of Lille (c.U2D-1202), Simon of Tournai
(c.1l30-l201) and' Magister Martinus, but did not prevent them from defending the traditional
position of an urunediated vision as well. However, Alexander of Hales and Hugh of Saint-Cher
rightly saw that theophany implies mediation. John Scotus Eriugena (c.810-c.877), the first
medieval translator of the work of Pseudo-Dionysius, employs the image of the light of the sun,
that can only be seen by being spread out in the air. In 1225 Pope Honorius III condemns Scotus'
view of beatific vision as theophany CQuod divina essentia in se nee ab homine nec ab angelo
CHAnERSIX. 183
The extent to which Aquinas desires to safeguard the true humanity of Christ
appears in another aspect of his discussion as well. Twice in the ST he explicitly
revokes his former opinion that Christ's experiential knowledge does not admit of
essential growth (ST III 9.4, 12.2)33. The possession of an agent intellect is
essential to any human being, and its use is as well. Such a power cannot remain
unused, since it would mean that God would have created something futile,
something which serves no purpose, which is impossible. A power that does not
perform its proper operations would be futile, but it is impossible, that the Son
assumed anything futile. This does not affect the perfection of this aspect of
Christ's created knowledge, since it does not prevent Christ from having perfect
knowledge in the sense that it always met with the needs of any given time, any
given age that he had (ST III 12.2 ad 2).
And so, Christ's human knowledge is as perfect as Aquinas' knowledge of created
understanding allows for. It may be somewhat too perfect for the liking of modem
interpretation, but Aquinas' examination still is remarkable in two respects. It
employs the transcendent aspects of human understanding to approach the created
knOWledge of Christ. It employs the principle of perfection, the same principle that
is used in attributing knowledge and verbum to the Son of God in the 'first place.
They are the main elements for explaining why the Truth and Life that is Christ,
serve as a Way for the faithful.
1.4 The union of the Word of God and Christ's human knowledge
The union of both natures in Christ is a personal union. This entails that the two
kinds of knowledge are not mixed. Nevertheless, being united to the perfect self-
expression of God does influence Christ's human knowledge. Aquinas cannot state
exactly how this takes place, because it would imply that the mystery of the union
is not a mystery at all. However, some things can be said.
Aquinas employs the metaphor of light to approach the question why the
knowledge that is the Word does not 'consume' the created knowledge of Christ. If
videbitur", quoted by Wicki). Cf. M.~D. Chenu, 1947. Albert the Great distinguishes between the
objective and the subjective side of the beatific vision. He employs the thought of theophany not
for the objective but for the subjective side of it: "Wie Gott sieh seIber urunittelbar durch sich
erkennt, so bietet er sieh auch den Seligen ohne Medium dar. Gleichsam als Zugestandnis an die
dionysische Theologie, unter deren Einfluss der Heilige hier steht und die er genial umdeutet,
setlt er im Objekt der Seligkeit eine Beschriinkung: die Heiligen vennogen das quid est Deus nieht
zu erkennen. Albert schliesst damit die komprehensive Gotteserkenntnis aus, will aber keineswegs
vemeinen, dass die HeiHgen Gottes Wesen schauen", Wield O.c., p. 134f. In his commentary on
Ps.Dionysian De Divinis Nominibus Albert elaborates his solution, a commentary reported by his
student Thomas Aquinas;
33) On the medieval history of the theology of Christ's human knowledge, see J.T. Ernst,
1971. Ernst shows that Aquinas' corrected view on the experiential knowledge is singular, in
regard both of his predecessors and those who came after him;
184 HYPOSTATiC UNiON AND NAMING GOD
there are two lights in each other's vicinity. the greater light will obscure the
lesser. The light of the sun obscures the light of the candle, since both give light in
the same way. "But if you take two lights, one of which is the source of light and
the other a reflector of light, then the lesser is not obscured by the greater but is
rather made brighter; as, for example, the light of the air is by the light of the
sun"". The metaphor is biblical, being employed in the Gospel of Johu which
says about the Word of God: tithe true light that enlightens every man corning into
the world'~ (In 1.9). The Word and the created knowledge of Christ are of a
different order, and one is the source of the other. Moreover, that which lives from
its source is amplified by being united to it in a special way. The latter is
expressed: "For as his particular soul was, beyond the common run of creatures,
united to the Word in person, so it was filled with knowledge and grace
immediatelY by the Word of God himself, beyond the common lot of men,,3S.
This text concerns infused knowledge in particular, but it applie~ to the other
aspects of Christ's created knowledge as well. The union causes Christ to enjoy the
beatific vision. which is unique for iny viator, wayfarer (ST m 11.2). and which
exceeds any other beatific vision: "All the blessed have the vision of the divine
essence by participating in a light that comes to them from its source in the Word
of God. As we read in Si (1.5): 'The word of God on high is the fountain of
wisdom'. The soul of Christ, which is united to the Word in person, is more
closely joined to this Word than any other creature. And therefore it is influenced·
more fully by that light, in which God is seen by the Word hhuself, than is any
other creature, And so it sees the first truth, which is the essence of God, more
perfectly than other creatures"36. The union entails that Christ, although his
knowledge is partly experiential, is never taught by any human being, Christ being
the one bestowing the doctrine of truth upon all. being Dux, Praeceptor, Doctor,
Magister etc. (ST III 12.3; 9.4 ad 1).
34) ST III 9.1 ad 2: si duo lumina accipiantur eiusdem ordinis, minus offuscatur per maius:
sicut lumen solis offuscat lumen candelae, quorum utrumque accipitur in ordine ilIuminanlis. Sed
si accipialur maius in ordine iliuminanlis el minus in ordine illuminati, minus lumen non
offuscatur per maius, sed magis augelur, sicut lumen aeris per lumen solis. Et hoc modo lumen
scientiae non offuscalur, sed c1arescit in anima Chrisli per lumen scientiae divinae, quae est "lux
vera iliuminallS omnem hominem venientem in hunc mundum It, ut dicitur In;
35) ST III 12.4: Sku! enim supra communem modum ereaturae anima illa unita est Verba in
unitate personae, ita supra communem modum hominum immediate ab ipso Dei Verbo repleta est
sci entia et gratia ... ;
36) ST III 10.4: Dicendum quod divinae essentiae visio con venit omnibus beatis secundum
participationem luminis derivati ad eos a/ante Verbi Dei, secundum Wud Si 1.5, "Fons sapientiae
Verbum Dei in excelsis Huie autem Verbo Dei propinquius eoniungirur anima Christi, quae est
lt
•
unita Verbo in persona, quam quaevis alia ereatura. Et ideo plenius recipit influentiam luminis in
quo Deus videtur ab ipso Verbo, quam quaecumque alia ereatura. Et ideo prae ceteris ereaturis
perjectius videt ipsam primam veritatem, quae est Dei essentia. Et ideo dicitur In 1.14, ·~Vidimus
gloriam eius, quasi Unigeniti a Patre, plenum u non solum ~gratiaeu, sed etiam ~veritatis~. Cf. Sf .
III 9.2 ad 1 and orr I 216. Note the comparison between the hypostatic union and the union
between the Word and j)ther intelligent creatures;
CHAPTERS/x 185
The light-metaphor brings to the fore that the Word of God is the light in which
the light of Christ's human knowledge parlicipates. One is the source, the other the
reflection. One is the cause, the other the effect. And yet the reflection and the
effect are called fullness as well: "We saw his glory, the glory as it were of the
only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth" (In 1.14).
This is what Aquinas has to say about the union of knowledge in Christ. On the
one hand he uses the transcendent aspects of human intelligence tQ approach the
perfect created knowledge of Christ. On the other hand he employs the causal
relatiouship between the Word and human understanding (of God and of creatures),
showing how they are related in general despite their different orders, and applIes
it to the union in Christ. On the one hand the Word is that which is desired and
longed for, even in seeking knowledge of creatures. On the other hand the Word is
that which enables human understanding to be understanding. The created
knOWledge of Christ is characterized by both aspects, and its union with the Word
causes more union to be effected.
2, The analogy between unions with God
Aquinas in fact applies the general rule concerning analogous usage of words in
divinis to the union of knowledge in Christ, without violating the limits of creation.
He attributes the perfection of human understanding and judgment to the soul of
Christ, but in so doing 'describes' it as transcending all known human
understanding and judgment. However, in transcending all known human
knowledge, Aquinas does not transcend the limits of creation, which can be
recognized in his denial that Christ's created knowledge comprehend the Word of
God. He shows that Christ's created knowledge is such that it participates in divine
knowledge, in the Word of God. Being a participation of divine knowledge,
Christ's created knowledge is similar to the knowledge of those who are united to
God in knowledge and love. This operative union in itself is a participation in
Christ's created understanding and love, and as such serves as an analogy to be
employed in describing Christ's transcending created understanding. Both Christ's
created knowledge and other created knowledge of God are participations in the
understanding and inner word that God is. As such they are created perfections,
and the names of created perfections may be attributed analogously to the One who
caused these perfections to be.
Stated in a more systematical way:
In general, God and creation are united in that God creates the world and all its
perfections, so all these perfections can be said to participate in God. God and
intelligent human beings are united in a special way, in that human beings
recognize these perfections as participations and attribute their names analogously
to their cause.
In particular, the Word of God and this individual human nature are united in that
the Word causes his created knowledge to be and so his created knowledge can be
186 HYPOSTATIC UNION AND NAMING GOD
said to participate in the Word of God. Both are united in a more special way than
God and human beings in general, because this participating in the Word of God is
based upon a personal union, which means that the participation is the greatest
known participation of any intelligent creature.
In general again, the perfect created knowledge of Christ and the faithful are united
in that Christ's knowledge reveals to them that in which his knowledge participates,
a sign, a 'name', and so this knowledge of the faithful caD be said to participate in
the perfect created knowledge of Christ. Christ and the faithful are united in one
mystical body, the church, of which Christ is the head.
This reasoning contains six elements, most of which have been elucidated in the
first sections of this chapter:
AI) God and the Word of God are the cause of all human understanding and
judgment37
A2) Human understanding and judgment are participating perfections, the names
of which may be attributed analogously to God and the Word of God
Bl) The Word of God is the cause of the ultimate perfection of Christ's created
understanding and judgment
B2) Christ's created understanding and judgment are participating perfections,
the names of which (employed by Christ to signify them) are attributed
analogously to the Word of God38
CI) Christ's created understanding and judgment is the cause of the perfection of
human understanding and judgment about the Word of God (containing all of
God)"
C2) Human understanding and judgment about the Word of God are participating
perfections, the names of which (employed by the faithful to signify them)
may be attributed analogously to the created understanding and jUdgment of
Christ"'.
The numbers I and 2 taken together in A, Band C indicate three unions. A and C
are what was called operative unions, i.e. unions between God and human beings
consisting in the operation of knowledge. B indicates an operative union as well,
but this time founded on a personal union.
Number I indicates causal relations, while number 2 indicates relations of
37) ... licet sint muJtae veritates participatae, est tamen una veritas absoJU/a, quae per suam
essentiam est veritas, scilicet ipsum esse divinum, qua veritate omnia verba sunt verba. Eodem
modo est una sapientia absoJuta supra omnia elevata, scilicet sapientia divina, per cuius
participationem omnes sapientes sum sapientes. Et etlam unum verbum absolutum, cuius
participatione omnes habentes verbum, dicuntur dicentes. Hoc aU/em est verbum divinum, quod
per seipsum est verbum super omnia verba elevatum, REI I 1 [300];
38) Examples of this can be found in REI XII 8 [275] and RCL II 1 [100];
39) Cf. the texts on Christ as a teacher, e.g. QDV 11, and on the grace of Christ as head of
the church, the gratia capitis, e.g. STIlI 8;
40) An example of this can be found in QDV20.4~
CHAPTER SIX 187
signification. This being the case, the three unions themselves relate analogously to
each other:
Al : A2 = BI : B2 = CI : C2.
The relation between Al and A2 is similar to the relation between BI and B2, and
both relations are similar to the one between CI and C2. Each relation as such is
accounted for as the reciprocal relation between an inner and an outer word: the
inner word is the cause of the outer word, and the outer word signifies, manifests
the hmer word 41 • One term of the relation is something which can be heard,
something sensible, while the other term is something in the mind, something
intentional, so the relation itself is a mixed telation. It matches the requirement set
down in the light-metaphor: when two lights are of a different order, the greater
light will not obscure the smaller. God and the world are of a different order, as
the Word of God and the created knowledge of Christ are of a different order. So
also the head of the faithful and the knowledge of the faithful are of a different
order, i.e. in via. Approaching the hypostatic union from an angle quite distinct
from the one employed in chapter IV, from the angle of understandin&, the result
turns out to be the same: an analogy in which what is similar can be called a mixed
relation.
Some may be sceptical about this kind of reasoning, which is essentially circular.
Reasoning which employs analogy is normally thought of as a weak, but
nevertheless valid means of proving something to be the case. However, Aquinas
does not prove anything in the strict sense of the word, but simply employs the
41) QDV 4.1: Ht ideo, quia verbum exterius, cum sit sensibile, est magis notum nobis quam
interius secwuJum nominis impositionem, per prius vocale verbum dicitur verbum quam verbum
interius, quamvis verbum interius naturaliter sit prius, utpote exterioris causa et efficiens etfinalis.
Finalis quidem, quia verbum vocale ad hoc a nobis exprimitur, ut interius verbum manifestetur:
untie oportet quod verbum interius sit illud quod signijicatur per exterius verbum. Verbum aU/em
quod exterius profertur, signijicat id quod intelleetum est, non ipsum intelJigere, neque hoc
intellectum quod est habitus vel potentia, nisi quatenus et haec intellecta sunt: unde verbum
interius est ipsum interius intellectum. Efficiens autem, quia verbum prolatum exterius, cum sit
signijicativum ad placitum, elus principium est voluntas, stcm et ceterorum artificiatorum; et ideo,
sicut aUorum artificiatorum praeexistit in mente artificis imago quaedam exterioris artijicii, ita in
mente proferentis verbum exterius, praeexistit quoddam exemplar exterioris verbi. In the same
article the incarnation is compared to the procession of an inner word. In ad 5 Aquinas says that
the divine self-manifestation in the procession of the Word is similar to but precedes the divine
manifestation to the faithful of the Word Incarnate. In ad 6 Aquinas articulates the similarity and
dissimilarity between the Word Incarnate and an outer word: the 'flesh' reveals the Eternal Word
but carmot be called an inner word, but the Word Incarnate is identical to the Eternal Word. Cf.
RTI UI 3 [125].
The same relation exists between creatures in general and their Creator, cf. ST III 12.3 ad 2; REI
15 [300]; ISN 27.2.2.2 ad 3 (Augustine: Omnia clamant: Deus fecit); QDV 4.2; ST I 34.1 ad 4;
188 HYPOSTATIC UNION AND NAMING GOD
resources of Biblical and Patristic use of words42 • The force of his argument is
not its demonstrative value, which is absent; it is rather the recurrent analogical
'structure' of different types of union between God and (rational) creation. The one
mystery, the Holy Trinity, is shown to be isomorphic to the other mystery, the
hypostatic union. The procession of the iImer Word from the Father is likened to
the procession of the Word into the world of creation. The Word that proceeds
from the Father, from which the mutual love of the Spirit springs. is likened to the
created knowledge of Christ that proceeds from the Word. from which a union of
love springs. In turn, the procession of Christ's created knowledge from the Word
is likened to the procession of faith, hope and charity in the faithful. Mysteries are
employed to elucidate each other, this time revealing the fittingness of the
incarnation43 •
Nevertheless, to others this may seem altogether too austere, too abstract, too
speculative. They might wonder what this analogy has to do with the biblical
narrative, what it has to do with the life that Jesus actually lived, and what it has to
do with his teaching. In order to meet such a criticism, I may refer to Aquinas'
exegesis of 'What are you looking for?' with which I started this chapter. I also
may refer to a sennon that Aquinas delivered. It deals with a part of the Apostolic
Creed: " ... and in Jesus Christ ... ". Having explained the procession of the Son as
the procession of an inner word, having dealt with some wrong views about the
person of Christ, and having outlined the analogical character of verbum, Aquinas
continues by enumerating five points: "Therefore, (1) if the word of God is the
Son of God, and all the words of God resemble this word, we ought to hear the
words of God willingly. (2) If we willingly hear his words, that is a sign we love
God. Let us believe the words of God because in so doing the word of God,
namely Christ, dwells in llS ... (3) It is necessary that we meditate upon the word
of God that continually abides in us, because it is necessary not only to believe the
word but also to ponder it, or it will not profit us. Meditation of this sort works
very well against sin ... (4) So that we might manifest the word of God to others.
42) Consiqer e.g. QDV 4.3;
43) The analogy that I presented above concerns the same hierarchy of unions that I outlined
in chapter IV. The analogy as such is best explained in REI I 8 [250], where Aquinas gives his
interpretation of "Plenum gratiae et veritati.s": Christ IS the Truth, Christ participates in the
Truth, and Christ shares his Truth. However, one can encounter this hierarchy not only in texts in
which Aquinas addresses the fullness of wisdom, truth and knowledge of Christ. The same
hierarchy can be found in two other contexts employing a partly different terminology: the
examination of Christ's fullness of grace, and the examination of the invisible mission of the Son
and the Spirit. The first context emphasizes the analogy between Band C, i.e. between the grace
of Christ and the grace that he bestows upon the faithful. "Fini.s autem gratiae est unio creaturae
rationalis ad Deum", Aquinas says (ST III 7.12; consider ST III 7 and 8). The second context
highlights, from our point of view, the same analogy, i.e. between the incarnation and Christ's
indwelling in the faithful, comparing this to the procession of the Son and the Spirit in God.
"Tunc /invisibiliter Filius] cuiquam miltitur, cum a quoquam cognoscitur atque perdpitur" ,
Aquinas quotes Augustine (De Trinitate IV 15.27), ST 143.5 ad 1; Consider ST 143, especially
43.1,43.3,43.5 ad 3, and 43.6 obiectum 3 and ad 3);
CHAPTER SIX 189
When one's heart is full of the word of God, then it ought to overflow in
preaching, counselling, and enkindling others ... (5) The word of God demands
action indeed: 'Be doers of the word, and not only hearers, deceiving themselves'
(Jm 1.22)"44.
Conclusion
In this chapter we attempted to articulate the connection between naming God and
the union of understanding in Christ. Employing proper names for God, the
naming of God uses those names analogously. Employing proper names for the Son
of God, the naming of the Son uses those names, especially the name 'Word',
analogously. In so doing one's vantage point is the c:ea~ed perfection. of
understanding, and one employs what can ~e called the prmclple of perfectIon.
Aquinas operates with this same principle in his examination of the created
knowledge of Christ, for which reason names as scientia are also said of Christ's
human soul analogously, though in a different way. All of this naming is one
important aspect of the union between God and intelligent creatures. On the one
hand it participates in the perfect self-expression of God, the Word_ of.God ..On the
other hand it participates in the perfect created knowledge of God that ChrIst has.
Thus there is another analogy, one between the different unions mentioned. The
perfect union is the one effected in Christ, and all other types of union can be said
to participate in this one primordial union.
Two conclusions result:
a) the union of Christ's created knowledge with the Word of God is primordial
and exemplary to all naming of God. This union is the heart of all analogous
naming of God;
b) naming Christ is analogous to the primordial union of the Word of God and
created human knowledge in Christ. Naming Christ means to enter into this
mystery and to as it were 'double' this mystery.
Both conclusions display that for Aquinas Christ is the 'name' of God.
Having -reached this conclusion, and having outlined a truly fundamental analogy
that pervades the total theological outlook of Aquinas, we have to return for a
moment to the conclusion reached in chapter I concerning mysterium. There the
44) RSV IV. In this translation (which is from Nicholas Ayo), I omitted capitals in 'word'
because sometimes it is unclear what is denoted, possibly on purpose. Si ergo verbum Dei est
Filius Dei, et omnia verba Dei sunt similitudo quedam istius verbi, debemus libenter audire verba
Dei: hoc enim est .signum quod diligimus Deum, .si libenter verba eius audimus. SecWldo, quod
credamus verba Dei, quia a hoc verbum Dei, scilicet Christus, habitat in nobis ... Tertio oportet
quod verbum Dei in nobis manens continue meditemus, quia non solum verbum oportet credere
sed et meditari, alias non prodesse. Et huiusmodi meditatio multum valet contra peccata ...
Quarto, quod homo maniJestet verbum Dei aliis. Cum enim cor hominis est plenum verbo Dei,
tunc debet effundere in alios predicantio, ammonentio, inflammando. . .. Quinto vero verbum Dei
debet executioni demandari, lac. HEstotefactores verbi etc.;
190 HYPOSTAl1C UNION AND NAMING GOD CHAPTER SIX 191

conclusion was at least unsatisfactory, since we could only sketch an analogy
intimated by Aquinas' use of the word mysterium, without being able to reach some
understanding of it. Now we can do so, since the basic elements of that analogy
correspond with the basic elements of the analogy just stated.
We can put both analogies side by side:
theological outlook, such is the prime function of these analogies. !he~ do not
actually describe, nor define, but invite the faithful to reflect upon the~r faIth. And
that is what we have done.

mysterium (I) unio (II)

A.I.! First Truth

A.2.t Propositions of faith

A.I KnowledgelWord of God

A.2 KnowledgelHuman Word

A.1.2 Christ

A.2.2 Old Law

B.l Word B.1 Word

B.2 Human nature B.2 Knowledge of the soul of Christ

C.l The suffering Christ C.I Knowledge of the soul of Christ

C.2 Bread and wine C.2 Knowledge of the faithful

God's hidden presence in human understanding corresponds to the hidden presence

of the First Truth in propositions of faith and to the hidden presence of Christ in
the Old Testament. The hidden presence of the Word of God in the human
knowledge of Christ corresponds to the hidden presence of the Word of God in
Christ's human uature. The hidden presence of the human knowledge of Christ in
the knowledge of the faithful correspond to the hidden presence of the suffering
Christ in the eucharistic species of bread and wine.
Analogy (I) works with the relation between mode of signifIcation and thing
signified. Analogy (m
works with the relation between an outer word and an inner
word. Let us call both kind of relations relations of signification. Now we know
for sure why it is that signification, taken in a broad sense, is so important for
Aquinas: it serves as Aquinas' prime analogy for all that is important in theology.
Moreover, in putting the two analogies side by side, we learn more about each of
them. The first analogy elucidates types of union between God and human beings.
The second analogy states that all types of mtion are types of mystery; types of
God's hidden presence.
Much remains to be pondered, aud, besides intimating Aquinas' most fundamental

GENERAL CONCLUSION
In this book we studied Thomas Aquinas on naming Christ. We wanted to know
whether Aquinas' discussion of Christ bears distinct marks of a linguistic approach.
If so, we wanted to know whether the naming of Christ is related to the treatises
on naming God; is it the source of the latter, or formulates the latter rules: that the
naming of Christ follows, or both? Thirdly, we wanted to know whether Aquinas'
approach to Christ is such that his can be called a negative christology.
In the first chapter we concentrated on Aquinas' use of the word mysterium. As it
turned Ollt, the word is applied to Christ especially. to the one Christ according to
his incarnation, his hypostatic union, his redemptive suffering, death, resurrection,
ascension and second coming. Three different contexts were adduced in attempting
to understand the meaning of mysterium: the henneneutics of the Old Testament,
the propositions of faith and the sacrament of the eucharist. They all have in
common that what they signify is mysteriously present in their mode of
signification: Christ in the Old Law, the First Truth in the propositions of faith,
and the suffering Christ in the species of bread and wine, The res significata is
present to the mode of signification in a hidden manner. Mysterium turns out to be
the name of an analogous relation. This relation is applied to the union of Christ
the Word with his human nature as well, drawing attention to Christ's human
nature as his 'mode of signification'. Christ's human nature both hides and reveals
the God that he is.
This established one major theological reason for the importance of the examination
of modes of signification, and explained why ineffability is intrinsically linked to
the consideration of modes of signification.
In chapter II we began to study Aquinas on these modes of signification in their
own right. Aquinas employs the grammatical meaning of the tenn, indicating
differences e.g, between concrete and abstract nouns, between sUbject-tenn and
predicate-tenn, and transposes this conception to a more general one, including the
semantic property of actual supposition as well, distinguishing between signification
and supposition. We were able to distil two meanings of the term suppositio
(virtual and actual), and to give an overview of grammatical modes of signification
as well as of varieties of actual supposition, The semantic distinctions are all
employed in theology, in trinitarian theology and christology especially. The
distinction between signification and supposition, and the analysis of (virtual)
supposition as a mode of signification, becomes vital in christology, since it enables
theology to give a proper account of the hypostatic union. To this end Aquinas has
his own views on the theory of predication, i.e. he actually works not with an
identity-theory, but with a theory of inherence of what the predicate-term signifies
in what the subject-term stands for. This theory of inherence, together with the
distinction between signification and supposition, builds a logiC of reduplicative
statements that serves theology to do its proper job in interpreting Scripture and the
Fathers, as well as analyzing propositions about Christ. The general study of
GENERAL CONCLUSION 193
medieval semantics contained in this chapter focused upon supposition especially,
since no previous student of Aquinas' theology has been able to consult the
philosophical and editorial work that has been accomplished ov.er the past d~cade~.
Studies of signification, Le. analogous use of words, were lDcorporated In thIS
study.
The full relevance of both fundamental aspects of medieval semantics, signification
and supposition, to the study of Aquinas on naming Christ is articulated in chapters
III and IV.
Chapter ill set out to prove that there is an implicit treatise of the .name.s o,f C~ist
in Aquinas, and that Aquinas employs ~e same. ~les concerrung sigrufication
examining those names as he does concerrung the dIVIDe names, It was shown that
ST III contains a very large part of the mote than seventy names that are currently
considered to be names of Christ. Aquinas even adds names that are not currently'
mentioned both because he apparently reads Scripture more carefully, and because
he wants ~o include spiritual names, Le. names contained in the Old Testament,
read spiritually, as well. Two names were studied in particul~r, ~e~iator a~
Jesus and in both cases Aquinas' analysis turned out to be quite SImIlar to his
analY~is of divine names used analogously. Both names indicate ~e analogical
relationship between Old and New Testament, and so Aquinas' commentary on
Isaiah was studied as well. Aquinas recognized or mentioned another forty names,
and a new aspect of Aquinas' treatment of names of Christ was discovered: th~ir
being embedded in love, praise and promise. The love for these names that IS~lah
voices, Aquinas explains as the love for the names of the 'name' of the Lord, SlDce
he reveals who the Father is. and Jesus is the name of the Lord, since in Jesus God
shows himself to be the Saviour of humankind, Moreover, this 'name' of the Lord
entails the promise of new names for all those who w~t to be united to him. .
Christ, the 'name' of God, is the source of all namIng of God, The three major
sources of Aquinas in this respect, Peter of Lombard, Pseudo-Dionysius and Albert
the Great all subsume names of Christ under the divine names treated. Peter of
Lombard'~ discussion examines names that in large number were first applied to
Christ. Most explicitly he distinguishes a sixth category of names that do not
signify a temporal relation of creation to God, but are ~aid temp~rally .of ~od.
where names such as incarnatus and humanatus are claSSIfied. Aqumas SImplIfies
Lombard's and other traditional distinctions, distinguishing between metaphorical
and proper names, and subdivides proper names into essential/unified names and
personal/discrete names. Both categories have names signifying a relationship, and
both categories have names that are names of Christ, either because of his divine
nature, or because of the divine person he is, or because of his human nature.
Since names that are said of Christ because of his human nature indirectly signify
the relation that is the hypostatic union, the name homo is counted among the
divine names that are said temporally and discretely. In so doing, Aquinas, by
contrast to Peter of Lombard, puts the relation that is the hypostatic union on a par
with other temporal relations that the names of God either directly or indirectly
signify .
 194 GENERAL CONCLUSION
Aquinas' commentary on Pseudo-Dionysius is even more explicit on Christ being
~e 'n~e' of G?d. Dionysius explicitly defends the practice executed throughout
hIS entire book, I.e. to take the names of God from the names that in Scripture are
applied to Christ. Names relating to the incarnation as such are not mentioned
since their discussion is not the aim of the book, but incarnation and salvation ar;
explained as the chief ground for God's loving-kindness, God's benignitas. The
Son of God shares in the ineffable supremacy of the entire Godhead, and the
personal union in Christ does so as well. Albert says (and Aquinas acknowledges
this) that this union affects all discrete naming of Christ, since the ineffable union
makes Christ's human nature ineffably one with God. Again and again, Aquinas as
well as his partners in discussion emphasize the inadequacy of human naming and
the supremacy of this 'name', for which reason we dared to use the phrase
'negative christology' .
However, the sole consideration of the meaning of names of Christ was not
e~o~gh, ~ince it. is not enough to leafe the union, the relation, implicit ill the
slgruficatlon .of smgular names. Moreover, truth concerning language about Christ
is not only decided by the names that are employed, but also by the way in which
they are said of Christ. In sum, not only their signification, but their supposition is
relevant as well. And so, in chapter IV, we studied the application of medieval
theory of supposition to the theology of Christ Incarnate.
W~ presented the mea~ng of the key-terms of the examination of the hypostatic
umon, and gave an outlIne of the structure of Aquinas' major treatments. It turned
out that Aquinas focuses especially upon the personal unity of both natures, and not
so much upon the truth of either nature. Aquinas' employment of the distinction
be~een supposition and signification turned out to be crucial. The study of the
umon concerns both the et and the est of Christus est vere homo et vere Deus. On
the level of et, signified by unum and unio, an analogical application of these
names is carried through, by comparing the hypostatic union to several kinds of
created identity as well as to several kinds of relation between God and creation.
All created kinds of identity fall short of representing this highest union between
God and creation. The hierarchy of unions between God and creation favours one
created kind o.f identity i.e. the relation between the one knowing and the thing
kno~n, the mixed relation. Its application expresses God's non-dependency upon
creatIOn.
A:nother .different 'yet most. impor~nt analogy of the hypostatic union Aquinas
discerns 10 the baSIC parall~lIsm or Isomorphy between the two basic properties of
langua~~ and the two baSIC properties of being, i.e. between signification and
SUPPosItion on the one hand, and nature and actual being or person on the other. In
any proposition.. the su~ject-term of w~ch has personal supposition, supposition
regards the logIcal relation between subJect- and predicate-term. This relation of
supposition is ~logous ~o ~e ~eal relation between nature and person. The
subJect-te.nn havmg both slgruficauon and supposition expresses a linguistic unity
that Aqumas deems analogous to the unity in Christ. Just like words that have
different significations can be one in their supposition for one and the same
GENERAL CONCLUSION 195
supposit, Christ can be called one since two natures are united in one person. The
mode of signifying Christ is analogous to Christ's mode of being.
Because supposition concerns that linguistic faculty aimed at the linguistic
representation of what is unique, Aquinas' concentration on supposition implies that
he focuses upon the uniqueness of this hypostatic union. The depth-structure of
language about Christ is formulated in the linguistic rule of the interchange of
properties, and we proposed an explicit rule to express the basic thrust of Aquinas'
approach: avoid any interpretation or construction that so confuses s"ignification and
supposition that the truth-value of propositions about Christ is determined by the
signification of subject-expressions alone. This rule assures that the key to Aquinas'
approach to language in divinis, i.e. divine simplicity, is also present in his
approach to language about Christ. Any simple contrast or any simple identification
of God and creation, or of the Word of God and its human nature, is out of the
question. This is the meaning of the phrase that in Christ there is only one
supposit.
The way Aquinas deals with the being of Christ confirms this interpretation. Apart
from the fact that there is no development or even contradiction in Aqqinas on this
point, his statement that there is one being in Christ can best be interpreted as a
sequel to his discussion of the divine name Qui est, and to his statement that there
is one supposit in Christ. To say that there is one being in Christ is equivalent to
saying that, in some respect, each proposition about Christ, each time something is
afflrmed of him through the est of a proposition, fails to represent him perfectly,
yet is also in some respect successful. The same rule formulated consequent upon
the one supposit of Christ can be formulated consequent upon the one being of
Christ: Avoid any interpretation or construction that so confuses signification and
supposition that several significations of 'est' are distinguished and (consequently
but falsely) are taken to inform the one relation of supposition that 'est' expresses.
Once again, in devoting attention to the peculiar predicate est creatura, it is shown
that the basic distinction between God and creation colours Aquinas' approach, and
that the affinnation of est creatura of Christ's human nature represents Aquinas'
answer to those criticizing him for 'eliminating' 'human substantial being' from
Christ.
This same distinction between Creator and creation is taken up in the last chapter
on the hypostatic union and the naming of God. It focuses once again on the
hierarchy of unions explained in chapter IV. Aquinas' discussions of divine
knowledge, the Word of God that Christ is, and the knowledge of God that the
human soul of Christ has, show that his approach to this union of knowledge in
Christ is very similar to his general approach of naming God. Both apply the
principle of perfection. Moreover, whoever is engaged in naming God and naming
Christ enters the same· hierarchy of unions between God and creation, of which the
hyPostatic union is the highest. The relation of the Word to Christ's human
knowledge is shown to be analogous to the relation between Christ and naming
196 GENERAL CONCLUSION
Christ. In final analysis we compared this analogy to the one elaborated at the end
of chapter I concerning Aquinas' use of mysterium, and closed the circle of this
book by demonstrating their mutual similarity. All unions are types of mystery.
types of God's hidden presence. In both cases signification, taken in its broad
sense, serves as the basic analogy at work. Moreover, it is an analogy that properly
fits the one who is confessed to be the 'name' of God.
Returning to the questions that we formulated in the beginning of this general
conclusion we now sum up our answers.
a) Does Aquinas' discussion of Christ bears distinct marks of a linguistic approach?
The answer is affirmative. Taking 'linguistic' in the sense of 'employing tools from
the study of modes of signification', there are a number of distinct marks:
1. attention given to granunatical modes of signification, such as the difference
between concrete and abstract terms, between subject-term and predicate-term etc.
2. attention given to the logic of supposition, one of the two major properties
of terms acknowledged in Aquinas' days.
3. attention given to the signification of words, the other of the two major
properties of terms. Focus on signification is displayed especially where analogous
employment of names is analyzed.
4. attention given to the theory of predication and the logic of reduplication,
which Aquinas deems essential to determine the properties of subject-terms and
predicate-terms actually used in language about Christ.
5. tacit acknowledgment of the basic isomorphy between language and reality,
expressed in the parallelism between signification and supposition on the one hand,
and nature/essence and actual being on the other hand.
These are the more philosophical marks in Aquinas' christology. The more
theological ones are these:
6. an implicit but extensive treatment of the names of Christ, consisting in
preaching-schemes centred around names of Christ (Isaiah); consisting in
exegetically employing names of Christ to identify and explain 'spiritual' names of
Christ, to explain the more general spiritual meaning of the Old Testament and to
explain the subject of the letters of Paul; and consisting in theological usage of
names of Christ in organizing and answering quaestiones.
7. the consideration of Christ's human nature as his 'mode of signifying the
Word of God', for which consideration the modes of signification of Scripture, of
articles of faith, and of the sacrament of the eucharist are highly relevant.
8. the consideration of Christ as the 'name' of God, who is the fountain of all
divine names,
9. the employment of the relation of supposition between subject-term and
predicate-term to approach the hypostatic union in Christ, as a case in point of the
general method of taking propositions into consideration in order to detennine the
truth in reality (e.g, to consider est in order to determine the truth about esse).
10. the employment of a divine name without strict signification (Qui esti
Genitus qui est; Adswn) to approach the 'location' of the unity of both natures in
GENERAL CONCLUSION 197
Christ.
11. the employment of the relation between inner and outer words to articulate
the relation between the Word of God and Christ's human knowledge, and the
relations involved in operative unions between God and rational creatures.
12. the employment of the concept of signification as an analogy to approach the
analogous employment of the words mysterium and unio.
Thus Aquinas' practice is in agreement wi~ his gener~l s~t~ment: "The~logy,
inasmuch as it is the most principal of all SCIences, contams In Itself something of
all sciences; and therefore it discusses not only things but the signification of names
as well"!.
b) Which relationship exists between the discussion of naming Christ and the
discussion of the divine names?
Christ is the Word of God and the 'name' of God, This entails that He is the
fountain of aU divine names. Names that are in Scripture originally applied to
Christ are taken into consideration in the discussion of the divine names, and
names that implicitly signify a relation between God and creation are dea~t wi~ in
a way which is quite similar to Aquinas' dealing. with the hypos:tatI:- uru~n.
Aquinas' linguistic treatment of the names. of .ChriSt and the hyp~s~tlc umon
employs the same basic ideas that are used III hIS treatment of the dIvme names:
analogous signification, divine simplicity. and mixed relation. .
Moreover all human naming of divinity is tied to the Word Incarnate m that both
consist of a union between God and humanity. These unions are ordered
hierarchically. In fact, these unions that are analyzed as mixed relations are capable
of providing us with an elucidating overall structure of Aquinas' Summa
Theologiae. Aquinas adduces the model of a m.i~ed .relati~n in dis~ussi~g ~e n~es
of God, in discussing the trinitarian missions, In dlscussmg creatIOn, m dlscussmg
grace, in discussing the hypostatic union and in dis~ussing the sa~ra~ent of the
eucharist. This structural feature leads one to emphasIZe y, Congar s VIews on the
structure of the Summa: its first part is devoted to the 'general' union between God
and creation, its second part to the operative union between God and rational
creatures, and its third part to the personal union in Christ.'. The naming of God
and Christ is to be located in this threefold divine presence or immanence.
c) Would it be fair to call Aquinas' christology a negative christology?
Again, the answer is affmnative. Aquinas' employment of the term myst~rium is
principally christological and centred around person and work of ChriSt, and
1) Theologia, inquantum est principalis omnium scientiarum, aliquid in se. habet de 0ml!ibus
scientiis' et ideo non solum res, sed nominwn significationes pertractar. AqUinas adds: qwa ad
salurem' consequendam non solum est necessaria fides de veritate rerum, sed etiam vocalis
con/essio per nomina. Ram 10.10: "Carde creditur ad iustitiam, ore autem confessio fit ad
salutem", ISN22 expasitio textus;
2) 1958, p. 282. P.E. Persson has attempted to articulate Congar's views, 1958;
198 GENERAL CONCLUSION GENERAL CONCLUSION 199

indicates the unique hidden presence of God in Christ. The fact that the other Aquinas' reflection is not aimed at the removal or at the mere positing but at the
contexts in which Aquinas speaks about mysterium (Scripture, articles of faith, deepening of the mystery.
sacrament of the eucharist) are all ordered to Christ lends the word its articulate
meaning and displays divine hiddenness as a structural principle of Aquinas'
conception of theology. Moreover, the connection between the analogous
attribution of mysterium and the analogous attribution of unio means that hidden
presence and signification is one of its main structural principles.
Aquinas' regular attention to modes of signification in discussing Christ has the
same characteristics that are familiar to those who have studied his treatise on
divine names: modes of signification are relevant since their examination results in
the articulation of both adequacy and inadequacy in language about the divine.
Aquinas' analysis of the unified and discrete names of Christ stresses both.
Aquinas' analysis of the names of Christ that are attributed according to his human
nature unexpectedly employs the same concept of analogy; because Christ's human
nature is a human nature united to tli'e Word of God, it eventually shares in the
same ineffability of the Word beyond speech. The unity of divinity and humanity in
Christ escapes, in final analysis, any human signification. Aquinas shows this on
the level of meaning, signification, and on the level of reference, supposition. On
the level of supposition his examination of propositions about Christ displays one
principal concern: to safeguard, in all interpretation and construction, the unity of
Christ. In fact, this concern may be translated into a negative rule for language,
which in a non-teclmical vocabulary may be formulated as: beware of spatial
metaphors such as 'above', 'far away', 'close' and 'among'; beware of using
qualifications as 'other' or 'different'. God differs differently from the world. Was
it not 101m who made a mock of those spatial metaphors: " ... among you stands the
one whom you do not know;" (In 1.26)'? Never make the mistake of putting
divine and human predicates either on a par, which would result in monophysitism,
or in simple contrast, which would result in neo-Nestorianism. In both cases
Scripture and Councils would be violated, and salvation rendered into mere
fantasy; creation, faith and incarnation would be turned into mere impossibilities.
The negative rule is, as always, founded on a positive insight, which this time is
provided by the comparing of the structure of hwnan language with the structure of
being: the distinction between being and nature as it is reflected in the distinction
between supposition and signification. It is the closest Aquinas can come to both
reflecting upon the hypostatic union and respecting its character as a mystery.

3) Consider the important role that E. Jiingel, 1977, assigns to these spatial metaphors: pp.
62, 82. 136. 166, 249. 252, 261f, 267f, 295, 381. JUngel employs them to construe an opposition
between traditional theology of the unknowable God and a type of theology that he himself
advocates, focusing on God's nearness In Christ. I think Aquinas would not be opposed to
mngel's proposals, but would question his distinction. Aquinas would agree with the second part
of this citation and not with the first: "Kommen Gott und Mensch im Ereignis des Wortes so
zueinander. dass sie im Word sind, dann karm Gott nieht mehr nur als der aber uns seiende, dann
muss er auch nieht mehr als der Undenkbare gedacht werden. Er ist dann ja im Ereignis des
Wortes unter uns als der ims in dieses Ereignis einbeziehende" (p. 13);
M