G.R. No. L-25094 April 29, 1969
PAN AMERICAN WORLD AIRWAYS INC.,
petitioner,
vs.
PAN AMERICAN EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION,
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
respondents.
Ross, Selph, Salcedo, Del Rosario, Bito and Misa for
petitioner.
Jose C. Espinas and Associates for respondent Pan
American Employees Association.
FERNANDO, J.:
The failure of the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations to indulge petitioner Pan American World
Airways, Inc. in its plea to exclude from a return-to-
work order five union officials of respondent Pan
American Employees Association on the ground of
having led an illegal strike, in itself, according to
petitioner, a sufficient cause for dismissal thus
resulting in their losing their incentive and motivation
for doing their jobs properly with the consequent fear
that they could cause grave injury to it, is challenged
in this special civil action for certiorari as constituting a
grave abuse of discretion. Whatever may be said
against such order complained of respondent Court of
Industrial Relations, the refusal to grant the prayer for
such exclusion cannot be characterized as an abuse
of discretion, much less as one that possesses an
element of gravity.
So it must be unless we are prepared to restrict the
broad scope of authority possessed by respondent
Court of Industrial Relations in discharging its power of
compulsory arbitration in cases certified to it by the
President, and what is worse, unless an undeserved
reflection on the quality of leadership in the labor
movement, indicative of management refusal to
accord to it the presumption of responsibility, is
countenanced. The petition thus carries on its face the
seeds of its own infirmity. It cannot hope to succeed.
It was set forth in the petition, after the usual allegation
as to the personality of the parties, that on August 25,
1965, respondent union filed a notice of strike with the
Department of Labor and on August 28, 1965, the
same respondent union declared and maintained a
strike against the herein petitioner. 1 Then, on
September 17, 1965, the President of the Philippines
certified the strike to the respondent Court of Industrial
Relations as being an industrial dispute affecting the
national interest, the parties being called to a
conference on September 20, 1965. 2
Several conferences were held between petitioner and
respondent Union before the Honorable Amando C.
Bugayong, Associate Judge of respondent Court on
September 20, 21, 23, 24 and 25, 1965. It was the
position of the Union that its members would not
resume the performance of their duties unless its
officers were likewise included in the return-to-work
order. Petitioner was of a different mind. It was
agreeable to having the workers return to work but not
the five officials of respondent Union. It alleged that
the strike was illegal, being offensive to a no-strike
clause of an existing collective bargaining agreement
the result being that the officials could, as the
responsible parties, be liable for dismissal.
Consequently, it was not agreeable to their being
allowed to return to the positions held by them prior to
the strike as they would not be only lacking in
"incentive and motivation for doing their work properly"
but would likewise have the opportunity to cause
"grave and irreparable injury to petitioner." 3
Management did offer, however, to deposit their
salaries even if they would not be working, with the
further promise that they would not even be required
to refund any amount should the right to remain in
their positions be considered as legally terminated by
their calling the alleged illegal strike.
Nonetheless, on September 28, 1965, Judge
Bugayong issued an order requiring petitioner to
accept the five union officers pending resolution on the
merits of the dispute involved in the strike. 4 There
was a motion for reconsideration which was denied by
the court on October 8, 1965. 5 Hence, this petition,
alleging a grave abuse of discretion, consisting in the
failure to grant petitioner's rather unorthodox demand.
As already noted, the inherent weakness of the
petition cannot escape attention.
1. Considering that this is a case certified by the
President, with respondent Court exercising its broad
authority of compulsory arbitration, the discretion it
possesses cannot be so restricted and emasculated
that the mere failure to grant a plea to exclude from
the return-to-work order the union officials could be
considered as tantamount to a grave abuse thereof.
The law is anything but that.
As far back as 1957, this Court, speaking through
Justice Labrador, categorically stated: "We agree with
counsel for the Philippine Marine Radio Officers'
Association that upon certification by the President
under Section 10 of Republic Act 875, the case comes
under the operation of Commonwealth Act 103, which
enforces compulsory arbitration in cases of labor
disputes in industries indispensable to the national
interest when the President certifies the case to the
Court of Industrial Relations. The evident intention of
the law is to empower the Court of Industrial Relations
to act in such cases, not only in the manner prescribed
under Commonwealth Act 103, but with the same
broad powers and jurisdiction granted by that Act. If
the Court of Industrial Relations is granted authority to
find a solution in an industrial dispute and such
solution consists in ordering of employees to return
back to work, it cannot be contended that the Court of
Industrial Relations does not have the power or
jurisdiction to carry that solution into effect. And of
what use is its power of conciliation and arbitration if it
does not have the power and jurisdiction to carry into
effect the solution it has adopted. Lastly, if the said
court has the power to fix the terms and conditions of
employment, it certainly can order the return of the
workers with or without backpay as a term or condition
of the employment." 6
Only recently this Court, speaking through Justice
Sanchez, emphasized: "The overwhelming implication
from the quoted text of Section 10 is that CIR is
granted great breadth of discretion in its quest for a
solution to a labor problem so certified." 7 Hence, as
was announced at to the outset of this opinion, there
can be no legal objection to the mode of exercise of
authority in such fashion by respondent Court of
Industrial Relations. The allegation as to the grave
abuse of discretion is clearly devoid of merit.
2. That should conclude the matter except for the fact
that the question presented possesses an element of
novelty which may require further reflection.
The situation thus presented is the validity of the
return to work order insofar as five union officers are
affected, petitioner airline firm rather insistent on their
being excluded arguing that since the strike called by
them was illegal, and that in any event there was
enough ground for dismissal, there was present a
factor which might make them "lose all their incentive
and motivation for doing their work properly" and
which would furnish them "the opportunity to cause
grave and irreparable injury to petitioner."
To be more specific, the apprehension entertained by
petitioner was in the petition expressed by it thus: "The
five officers of the union consist of three (3) Passenger
Traffic Representatives and a reservation clerk who in
the course of their duties could cause mix-ups in the
reservation and accommodation of passengers which
could result in very many suits for damages against
petitioner such as the case of Nicolas Cuenca vs.
Northwest Airlines, G.R. No. L-22425 promulgated
August 31, 1965 in which this Honorable Court
required the airline to pay P20,000.00 as nominal
damages alone. The other union officer who, is in the
cargo department could underweight or overweigh
cargo to the great detriment of the service or even, of
the safety of petitioner's aircraft." 8
Petitioner would attempt to remove the sting from its
objection to have the union officers return to work by
offering to deposit the salaries of the five officers with
respondent Court to be paid to them, coupled with
what it considered to be a generous concession that if
their right to return to work be not recognized, there
would be no need for refund.
Petitioner, perhaps without so intending it, betrayed an
inexcusable lack of confidence in the responsibility of
union officials and ultimately in the validity of the
collective bargaining process itself. For it is the basic
premise under which a regime of collective bargaining
was instituted by the Industrial Peace Act that through
the process of industrial democracy, with both union
and management equally deserving of public trust,
labor problems could be susceptible of the just
solution and industrial peace attained. Implicit in such
a concept is the confidence that must be displayed by
management in the sense of responsibility of union
officials to assure that the two indispensable elements
in industry and production could-work side by side,
attending to the problems of each without neglecting
the common welfare that binds them
together.lawphi1.nêt
The moment management displays what in this case
appears to be grave but unwarranted distrust in the
union officials discharging their functions just because
a strike was resorted to, then the integrity of the
collective bargaining process itself is called into
question. It would have been different if there were a
rational basis for such fears, purely speculative in
character. The record is bereft of slightest indication
that any danger, much less one clear and present, is
to be expected from their return to work. Necessarily,
the union officials have the right to feel offended by
the fact that, while they will be paid their salaries in the
meanwhile they would not be considered as fit
persons to perform the duties pertaining to the
positions held by them. Far from being generous such
an offer could rightfully, be considered insulting.
The greater offense is to the labor movement itself,
more specifically to the right of self-organization.
There is both a constitutional and statutory recognition
that laborers have the right to form unions to take care
of their interests vis-a-vis their employers. Their
freedom organizations would be rendered nugatory if
they could not choose their own leaders to speak on
their behalf and to bargain for them.
If petitioner were to succeed in their unprecedented
demand, the laborers in this particular union would
thus be confronted with the sad spectacle of the
leaders of their choice condemned as irresponsible,
possibly even constituting a menace to the operations
of the enterprise. That is an indictment of the gravest
character, devoid of any factual basis. What is worse,
the result, even if not intended, would be to call into
question their undeniable right to choose their leaders,
who must be treated as such with all the respect to
which they are legitimately entitled. The fact that they
would be paid but not be allowed to work is, to repeat,
to add to the infamy that would thus attach to them
necessarily, but to respondent union equally.
Apparently, respondent Court was alive to the
implication of such an unwarranted demand, the effect
of which would have been to deprive effectively the
rank and file of their freedom of choice as to who
should represent them. For what use are leaders so
undeserving of the minimum confidence. To that
extent then, their constitutional and statutory right to
freedom of association suffers an impairment hardly to
be characterized as inconsequential.
Fortunately, respondent Court was of a different mind
it acted, according to law. It had a realistic concept of
what was in store for labor if its decision were
otherwise. Nor did it in the process disregard the rights
of management. There is no occasion then for the
supervisory authority of this Court coming into play.
WHEREFORE, this petition for a writ of certiorari is
denied. With costs against petitioner.
CATHAY PACIFIC STEEL CORPORATION,
BENJAMIN CHUA JR., VIRGILIO AGERO, and
LEONARDO VISORRO, JR.,
Petitioner
- versus -
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, CAPASCO UNION OF
SUPERVISORY EMPLOYEES (CUSE) and
ENRIQUE TAMONDONG III,
G.R. No. 164561
Present:
This is a special civil action for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul and set
aside, on the ground of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, (1) the
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
57179 dated 28 October 2003 which annulled the
Decision[2] of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC Case No. 017822-99
dated 25 August 1999, thereby, reinstating the
Decision[3] of Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro C.
Ramos dated 7 August 1998; and (2) the Resolution[4]
of the same court, dated 3 June 2004, which denied
the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.
Herein petitioners are Cathay Pacific Steel
Corporation (CAPASCO), a domestic corporation
engaged in the business of manufacturing steel
products; Benjamin Chua, Jr. (now deceased), the
former CAPASCO President; Virgilio Agerro,
CAPASCOs Vice-President; and Leonardo Visorro,
Jr., CAPASCOs Administrative-Personnel Manager.
Herein private respondents are Enrique Tamondong
III, the Personnel Superintendent of CAPASCO who
was previously assigned at the petitioners Cainta
Plant, and CAPASCO Union of Supervisory
Employees (CUSE), a duly registered union of
CAPASCO.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Four former employees of CAPASCO originally filed
this labor case before the NLRC, namely: Fidel
Lacambra, Armando Dayson, Reynaldo Vacalares,
and Enrique Tamondong III. However, in the course of
the proceedings, Fidel Lacambra[5] and Armando
Dayson[6] executed a Release and Quitclaim, thus,
waiving and abandoning any and all claims that they
may have against petitioner CAPASCO. On 3
November 1999, Reynaldo Vacalares also signed a
Quitclaim/Release/Waiver.[7] Hence, this Petition shall
focus solely on issues affecting private respondent
Tamondong.
Petitioner CAPASCO, hired private respondent
Tamondong as Assistant to the Personnel Manager
for its Cainta Plant on 16 February 1990. Thereafter,
he was promoted to the position of
Personnel/Administrative Officer, and later to that of
Personnel Superintendent. Sometime in June 1996,
the supervisory personnel of CAPASCO launched a
move to organize a union among their ranks, later
known as private respondent CUSE. Private
respondent Tamondong actively involved himself in
the formation of the union and was even elected as
one of its officers after its creation. Consequently,
petitioner CAPASCO sent a memo[8] dated 3
February 1997, to private respondent Tamondong
requiring him to explain and to discontinue from his
union activities, with a warning that a continuance
thereof shall adversely affect his employment in the
company. Private respondent Tamondong ignored
said warning and made a reply letter[9] on 5 February
1997, invoking his right as a supervisory employee to
join and organize a labor union. In view of that, on 6
February 1997, petitioner CAPASCO through a
memo[10] terminated the employment of private
respondent Tamondong on the ground of loss of trust
and confidence, citing his union activities as acts
constituting serious disloyalty to the company.
Private respondent Tamondong challenged his
dismissal for being illegal and as an act involving
unfair labor practice by filing a Complaint for Illegal
Dismissal and Unfair Labor Practice before the NLRC,
Regional Arbitration Branch IV. According to him,
there was no just cause for his dismissal and it was
anchored solely on his involvement and active
participation in the organization of the union of
supervisory personnel in CAPASCO. Though private
respondent Tamondong admitted his active role in the
formation of a union composed of supervisory
personnel in the company, he claimed that such was
not a valid ground to terminate his employment
because it was a legitimate exercise of his
constitutionally guaranteed right to self-organization.
In contrast, petitioner CAPASCO contended that by
virtue of private respondent Tamondongs position as
Personnel Superintendent and the functions actually
performed by him in the company, he was considered
as a managerial employee, thus, under the law he was
prohibited from joining a union as well as from being
elected as one of its officers. Accordingly, petitioners
maintained their argument that the dismissal of private
respondent Tamondong was perfectly valid based on
loss of trust and confidence because of the latters
active participation in the affairs of the union.
On 7 August 1998, Acting Executive Labor Arbiter
Pedro C. Ramos rendered a Decision in favor of
private respondent Tamondong, decreeing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered finding [petitioner CAPASCO] guilty
of unfair labor practice and illegal dismissal.
Concomitantly, [petitioner CAPASCO] is hereby
ordered:
1. To cease and desist from further committing acts
of unfair labor practice, as charged;
2. To reinstate [private respondent Tamondong] to
his former position without loss of seniority rights and
other privileges and his full backwages inclusive of
allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent, computed from the time his compensation
was withheld from him up to the time of his actual
reinstatement, and herein partially computed as
follows:
a) P167,076.00 - backwages from February 7,
1997 to August 7, 1998;
b) P18,564.00 - 13th month pay for 1997 and 1998;
c) P4,284.00 - Holiday pay for 12 days;
d) P3,570.00 - Service Incentive Leave for 1997
and 1998.
P 193,494.00 - Total partial backwages and
benefits.[11]
Aggrieved, petitioners appealed the afore-quoted
Decision to the NLRC. On 25 August 1999, the NLRC
rendered its Decision modifying the Decision of the
Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos, thus:
WHEREFORE, premises all considered, the decision
appealed from is hereby MODIFIED:
a) Dismissing the Complaint for Illegal Dismissal
filed by [private respondent Tamondong] for utter lack
of merit;
b) Dismissing the Complaint for Unfair Labor
Practice for lack of factual basis;
c) Deleting the awards to [private respondent
Tamondong] of backwages, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorneys fees;
d) Affirming the awards to [private respondent
Tamondong], representing 13th month pay for 1997
and 1998, holiday pay for 12 days, and service
incentive leave for 1997 totaling P26,418.00; and
e) Ordering the payment of backwages to [private
respondent Tamondong] reckoned from 16 September
1998 up to the date of this Decision.[12]
Petitioners filed a Motion for Clarification and Partial
Reconsideration, while, private respondent
Tamondong filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the
said NLRC Decision, but the NLRC affirmed its
original Decision in its Resolution[13] dated 25
November 1999.
Dissatisfied with the above-mentioned Decision of the
NLRC, private respondents Tamondong and CUSE
filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court before the Court of Appeals, alleging
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC.
Then, the Court of Appeals in its Decision dated 28
October 2003, granted the said Petition. The
dispositive of which states that:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition for Certiorari is GRANTED and the herein
assailed Decision dated August 25, 1999 of the NLRC,
Third Division is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Accordingly, the Decision dated August 7, 1998 of
NLRC, RAB IV Acting Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro
C. Ramos, insofar as [private respondent Tamondong]
is concerned is hereby REINSTATED.[14]
Consequently, petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision of the Court
of Appeals. Nonetheless, the Court of Appeals denied
the said Motion for Reconsideration for want of
convincing and compelling reason to warrant a
reversal of its judgment.
Hence, this present Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
In the Memorandum[15] filed by petitioners, they aver
that private respondent Tamondong as Personnel
Superintendent of CAPASCO was performing
functions of a managerial employee because he was
the one laying down major management policies on
personnel relations such as: issuing memos on
company rules and regulations, imposing disciplinary
sanctions such as warnings and suspensions, and
executing the same with full power and discretion.
They claim that no further approval or review is
necessary for private respondent Tamondong to
execute these functions, and the notations NOTED BY
of petitioner Agerro, the Vice-President of petitioner
CAPASCO, on the aforesaid memos are nothing but
mere notice that petitioner Agerro was aware of such
company actions performed by private respondent
Tamondong. Additionally, private respondent
Tamondong was not only a managerial employee but
also a confidential employee having knowledge of
confidential information involving company policies on
personnel relations. Hence, the Court of Appeals
acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction when it held that private
respondent Tamondong was not a managerial
employee but a mere supervisory employee,
therefore, making him eligible to participate in the
union activities of private respondent CUSE.
Petitioners further argue that they are not guilty of
illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice because
private respondent Tamondong was validly dismissed
and the reason for preventing him to join a labor union
was the nature of his position and functions as
Personnel Superintendent, which position was
incompatible and in conflict with his union activities.
Consequently, it was grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the Court of Appeals to rule that petitioner
CAPASCO was guilty of illegal dismissal and unfair
labor practice.
Lastly, petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals
gravely abused its discretion when it reinstated the
Decision of Executive Labor Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos
holding CAPASCO liable for backwages, 13th month
pay, service incentive leave, moral damages,
exemplary damages, and attorneys fees.
On the other hand, private respondents, assert that
the assailed Decision being a final disposition of the
Court of Appeals is appealable to this Court by a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court and not under Rule 65 thereof. They
also claim that petitioners new ground that private
respondent Tamondong was a confidential employee
of CAPASCO, thus, prohibited from participating in
union activities, is not a valid ground to be raised in
this Petition for Certiorari seeking the reversal of the
assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
Now, given the foregoing arguments raise by both
parties, the threshold issue that must first be resolved
is whether or not the Petition for Certiorari under Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is the proper
remedy for the petitioners, to warrant the reversal of
the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
dated 28 October 2003 and 3 June 2004, respectively.
The petition must fail.
The special civil action for Certiorari is intended for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction. Its principal office is only to keep the
inferior court within the parameters of its jurisdiction or
to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.[16]
The essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 are: (1) the writ is directed against a
tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial function; (2) such tribunal, board, or
officer has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction, or
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.[17] Excess of jurisdiction as
distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that
an act, though within the general power of a tribunal,
board or officer is not authorized, and invalid with
respect to the particular proceeding, because the
conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the
general power in respect of it are wanting.[18] Without
jurisdiction means lack or want of legal power, right or
authority to hear and determine a cause or causes,
considered either in general or with reference to a
particular matter. It means lack of power to exercise
authority.[19] Grave abuse of discretion implies such
capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words,
where the power is exercised in an arbitrary manner
by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility,
and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an
evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in
contemplation of law.[20]
In the case before this Court, petitioners fail to meet
the third requisite for the proper invocation of Petition
for Certiorari under Rule 65, to wit: that there is no
appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of law. They simply alleged that
the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion
which amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
rendering the assailed Decision and Resolution. They
did not bother to explain why an appeal cannot
possibly cure the errors committed by the appellate
court. It must be noted that the questioned Decision of
the Court of Appeals was already a disposition on the
merits; this Court has no remaining issues to resolve,
hence, the proper remedy available to the petitioners
is to file Petition for Review under Rule 45 not under
Rule 65.
Additionally, the general rule is that a writ of certiorari
will not issue where the remedy of appeal is available
to the aggrieved party. The remedies of appeal in the
ordinary course of law and that of certiorari under Rule
65 of the Revised Rules of Court are mutually
exclusive and not alternative or cumulative.[21] Time
and again this Court reminded members of the bench
and bar that the special civil action of Certiorari cannot
be used as a substitute for a lost appeal[22] where the
latter remedy is available. Such a remedy will not be a
cure for failure to timely file a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45. Nor can it be availed of as a
substitute for the lost remedy of an ordinary appeal,
especially if such loss or lapse was occasioned by
ones own negligence or error in the choice of
remedies.[23]
In the case at bar, petitioners received on 9 June 2004
the Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 3 June
2004 denying their Motion for Reconsideration. Upon
receipt of the said Resolution, they had 15 days or
until 24 June 2004 within which to file an appeal by
way of Petition for Review under Rule 45, but instead
of doing so, they just allowed the 15 day period to
lapse, and then on the 61st day from receipt of the
Resolution denying their Motion for Reconsideration,
they filed this Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
appellate court. Admittedly, this Court, in accordance
with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and
in the interest of justice, has the discretion to treat a
Petition for Certiorari as a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45, especially if filed within the
reglementary period for filing a Petition for Review.[24]
However, in the present case, this Court finds no
compelling reason to justify a liberal application of the
rules, as this Court did in the case of Delsan Transport
Lines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals.[25] In the said case,
this Court treated the Petition for Certiorari filed by the
petitioner therein as having been filed under Rule 45
because said Petition was filed within the 15-day
reglementary period for filing a Petition for Review on
Certiorari. Petitioners counsel therein received the
Court of Appeals Resolution denying their Motion for
Reconsideration on 26 October 1993 and filed the
Petition for Certiorari on 8 November 1993, which was
within the 15-day reglementary period for filing a
Petition for Review on Certiorari. It cannot therefore be
claimed that the Petition was used, as a substitute for
appeal after that remedy has been lost through the
fault of the petitioner.[26] Conversely, such was not
the situation in the present case. Hence, this Court
finds no reason to justify a liberal application of the
rules.
Accordingly, where the issue or question involves or
affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the decision,
and not the jurisdiction of the court to render said
decision, the same is beyond the province of a petition
for certiorari.[27] It is obvious in this case that the
arguments raised by the petitioners delved into the
wisdom or legal soundness of the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, therefore, the proper remedy is a
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
Consequently, it is incumbent upon this Court to
dismiss this Petition.
In any event, granting arguendo, that the present
petition is proper, still it is dismissible. The Court of
Appeals cannot be said to have acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in annulling the Decision of the NLRC
because the findings of the Court of Appeals that
private respondent Tamondong was indeed a
supervisory employee and not a managerial
employee, thus, eligible to join or participate in the
union activities of private respondent CUSE, were
supported by evidence on record. In the Decision of
the Court of Appeals dated 28 October 2003, it made
reference to the Memorandum[28] dated 12
September 1996, which required private respondent
Tamondong to observe fixed daily working hours from
8:00 am to 12:00 noon and from 1:00 pm to 5:00 pm.
This imposition upon private respondent Tamondong,
according to the Court of Appeals, is very
uncharacteristic of a managerial employee. To support
such a conclusion, the Court of Appeals cited the case
of Engineering Equipment, Inc. v. NLRC[29] where
this Court held that one of the essential
characteristics[30] of an employee holding a
managerial rank is that he is not subjected to the rigid
observance of regular office hours or maximum hours
of work.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals also held that upon
careful examination of the documents submitted
before it, it found out that:
[Private respondent] Tamondong may have
possessed enormous powers and was performing
important functions that goes with the position of
Personnel Superintendent, nevertheless, there was no
clear showing that he is at liberty, by using his own
discretion and disposition, to lay down and execute
major business and operational policies for and in
behalf of CAPASCO. [Petitioner] CAPASCO miserably
failed to establish that [private respondent]
Tamondong was authorized to act in the interest of the
company using his independent judgment. x x x.
Withal, [private respondent] Tamondong may have
been exercising certain important powers, such as
control and supervision over erring rank-and-file
employees, however, x x x he does not possess the
power to hire, transfer, terminate, or discipline erring
employees of the company. At the most, the record
merely showed that [private respondent] Tamondong
informed and warned rank-and-file employees with
respect to their violations of CAPASCOs rules and
regulations. x x x. [Also, the functions performed by
private respondent such as] issuance of warning[31] to
employees with irregular attendance and unauthorized
leave of absences and requiring employees to explain
regarding charges of abandonment of work, are
normally performed by a mere supervisor, and not by
a manager.[32]

Accordingly, Article 212(m) of the Labor Code, as
amended, differentiates supervisory employees from
managerial employees, to wit: supervisory employees
are those who, in the interest of the employer,
effectively recommend such managerial actions, if the
exercise of such authority is not merely routinary or
clerical in nature but requires the use of independent
judgment; whereas, managerial employees are those
who are vested with powers or prerogatives to lay
down and execute management policies and/or hire,
transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, discharge, assign or
discipline employees. Thus, from the foregoing
provision of the Labor Code, it can be clearly inferred
that private respondent Tamondong was just a
supervisory employee. Private respondent
Tamondong did not perform any of the functions of a
managerial employee as stated in the definition given
to it by the Code. Hence, the Labor Code[33]
provisions regarding disqualification of a managerial
employee from joining, assisting or forming any labor
organization does not apply to herein private
respondent Tamondong. Being a supervisory
employee of CAPASCO, he cannot be prohibited from
joining or participating in the union activities of private
respondent CUSE, and in making such a conclusion,
the Court of Appeals did not act whimsically,
capriciously or in a despotic manner, rather, it was
guided by the evidence submitted before it. Thus,
given the foregoing findings of the Court of Appeals
that private respondent is a supervisory employee, it is
indeed an unfair labor practice[34] on the part of
petitioner CAPASCO to dismiss him on account of his
union activities, thereby curtailing his constitutionally
guaranteed right to self-organization.[35]
With regard to the allegation that private respondent
Tamondong was not only a managerial employee but
also a confidential employee, the same cannot be
validly raised in this Petition for Certiorari. It is settled
that an issue which was not raised in the trial court
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. This
principle applies to a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65.[36] In addition, petitioners failed to
adduced evidence which will prove that, indeed,
private respondent was also a confidential employee.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant
Petition is DISMISSED. The Decision and Resolution
of the Court of Appeals dated 28 October 2003 and 3
June 2004, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No. 57179,
which annulled the Decision of the NLRC in NLRC
Case No. 017822-99 dated 25 August 1999, thereby,
reinstating the Decision of Acting Executive Labor
Arbiter Pedro C. Ramos dated 7 August 1998, is
hereby AFFIRMED. With costs against petitioners.
150-B Phil. 408
TEEHANKEE, J.:
The present appeal questions the right of supervisors
and confidential employees to organize the
respondent labor association and to bargain
collectively with their employer, petitioner corporation
herein, as upheld by respondent court of industrial
relations in its appealed orders and resolution.
Respondent association is a labor organization duly
registered with the Department of Labor. It is
composed exclusively of the supervisory and
confidential employees of petitioner corporation.
There exists another entirely distinct labor association
composed of the corporation's rank-and-file
employees, the Filoil Employees & Workers
Association (FEWA) with which petitioner executed a
collective bargaining agreement. This collective
bargaining agreement expressly excluded from its
coverage petitioner's supervisory and confidential
employees, who in turn organized their own labor
association, respondent herein.
Respondent association filed on February 18, 1965
with the industrial court its petition for certification as
the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent of
all of petitioner's supervisory and confidential
employees working at its refinery in Rosario, Cavite.
Petitioner corporation filed a motion to dismiss the
petition on the grounds of lack of cause of action and
of respondent court's lack of jurisdiction over the
subject-matter, under its claim that supervisors are not
employees within the meaning of Republic Act 875,
the Industrial Peace Act, and that since they are part
of management, they do not have the right to bargain
collectively although they may organize an
organization of their own.
Respondent court in its order of May 26, 1965 denied
the dismissal motion. It ruled that under the express
provisions of section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act,
"(I)ndividuals employed as supervisors shall not be
eligible for membership in a labor organization of
employees under their supervision but may form
separate organizations of their own."[1]
It rejected petitioner's claim against respondent
association's right to bargain collectively, holding that
such right was expressly granted under section 24 of
the Industrial Peace Act, and asserting that "if
Congress deemed it wise for supervisors not to have
the right to strike, then it should have been so
expressly stated as in the case of government
employees. Section 11 of the Industrial Peace Act
gives to government employees the right to belong to
any labor organization provided no obligation to strike
or join a strike is imposed by such labor organization.
The denial to government employees of the right to
strike is significant in the controversy before this Court
because it manifests to all thatCongress in enacting
Republic Act No. 875 was aware of the implications
that when supervisors were given the right to organize
themselvesinto a labor organization, they have
correlative right to declare a strike. In the case of
supervisors, they were enfranchised by Congress
toorganize themselves into a labor organization and
were not denied the right to strikes. This means the
right to strike was not denied them since no special
reason obtains among the supervisors as it does
obtain among government employees."[2]
The industrial court likewise dismissed petitioner's
objection against the composition of respondent
association in that it included as members technical
men and confidential employees in this wise: "(A)t this
point, it may be stressed that supervisors as a general
rule should form an association of their own and
should exclude all other types of personnel unless a
special consideration exists, like for example, that they
are so few in number and that there are other
technical men or confidential men equally few in
number. In the latter case, the supervisors, technical
men and confidential employees may be constituted
into one unit."[3]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of said order of
May 26, 1965 was denied by respondent court en
banc per its resolution dated September 7, 1965
which affirmed the said order. No appeal having been
taken from the resolution, the petition was accordingly
set for hearing and the parties submitted their
stipulation of facts, stipulating inter alia that
respondent association "has forty-seven (47)
members among the supervisory, technical men and
confidential employees of the company" and that "all
the forty-seven (47) members of the (respondent
association) are being checked off by the company for
union dues pursuant to the individual check off
authorization submitted to the company."
The parties could not agree, however, on the
composition of the appropriate bargaining unit with
petitioner corporation proposing that the 47 members
of respondent association should be broken up into
five (5) separate collective bargaining units, viz, the
supervisors should form a distinct unit separate from
the rest of the personnel who in turn would be divided
into separate and independent units or confidential
employees, professional personnel, "fringe"
employees consisting of five firemen, and twelve (12)
office and clerical employees.
Evidence was received by respondent court and it was
satisfied that executive personnel handling personnel
matters for the employer were duly excluded from
respondent association. Thus, per respondent court's
order of July 23, 1966, it is noted that "not one of the
employees listed under Groups I and II including (their
supervisor) Leonardo R. Santos under Group III, is a
member of (respondent association)", since "(I)t
appears that the personnel listed under Groups I and
Group II * * * are in the category of executives who
have supervision over the supervisors who are
members of (respondent association) and that
Marcelo Bernardo handles personnel matters of the
employer * * *. All of them should, therefore, be
excluded from the appropriate bargaining unit."[4]
Respondent court in its said order of July 23, 1966
consequently cast aside petitioner's sedulous
objections against the inclusion of the confidential
employees in the supervisors' respondent association,
thus: "(F)rom the memorandum and manifestation of
the company, a persistent assault against the
inclusion of the confidential employees with
supervisors under one bargaining unit would seem to
be evident. Although this inclusion has already been
raised in the motion to dismiss filed by the company
and which has already been resolved by the Court en
banc, with no appeal to the Supreme Court having
been taken by the company, we shall try once more to
show why such inclusion. It is admitted by the
company that confidential employees are outside the
coverage of the existing collective bargaining
agreement between the respondent company and the
rank and file union (FEWA) by specific agreement.
Since the confidential employees are very few and
are, bypractice and tradition, identified with
management, the NLRB, because of such 'identity of
interest' (Wilson & Co., 68 NLRB 84), has allowedtheir
inclusion in the bargaining unit of supervisors who are
likewise identified with management. This Court, a
counterpart of the NLRB, for the same reason, should
also allow the inclusion of the confidential employees
in the bargaining unit of supervisors, except of course
Marcelo Bernardo who, pursuant to the Order of May
26, 1965, as affirmed by the Court en banc, should be
excluded because he handles personnel matters for
the employer."[5]
Respondent court pointed out that "in fact, out of the
forty-three (43), excluding the twelve (12) executive
personnel under Groups I and II, the company
proposes five (5) bargaining units or eight (8)
employees per unit. This Court will be creating
fragmentary units which would notserve the interest of
industrial peace, much less in an industry
indispensable to the national interest like the one at
bar, as is now obtaining inthe Philippine National
Railways, also an industry indispensable to the
national interest (Union de Maquinistas, Fogoneros y
Motormen vs. Philippine National Railways, Case No.
67-IPA), with thirteen (13) unions, if it breaks up the
petitioner union into five (5) bargaining units. The
Court is likewise aware of the ineffectiveness of a
small union with a scanty members as bargaining unit.
The breaking up of bargainingagents into tiny units will
greatly impair their organizational value. It has always
been the policy of the United States National Labor
Relations Board that, in deciding upon whether to
include or exclude a group of employees from a
bargaining unit, the Board has always allowed itself to
be guided by the determination as to whether its
action 'will insure to the employees of the Company
the full benefit of their right to self-organization and to
collective bargaining and otherwise effectuate the
policies of the Act' (20 NLRB 705). We see no reason
why this Tribunal whose basic functions are the same
as that of the NLRB, should do less or otherwise
depart from this sound policy."[6]
Since respondent association "clearly represents the
majority of the employees in the appropriate
bargaining unit," respondent court therefore certified it
as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent for all the
employees in the unit.
Respondent court per its resolution en banc dated
September 15, 1966 dismissed petitioner's motion for
reconsideration, holding that "as to the question of the
right of supervisors and confidential employees to
compel their employer to bargain collectively, this has
already been passed upon by the Trial Court in its
Order dated May 26, 1965 which Order was affirmed
by the Court en banc in a resolution dated September
7, 1965. The Company did not appeal this resolution
to the Supreme Court. Hence, this matter, as far as
we are concerned, has already been resolved. We
find it, therefore, unnecessary to pass upon the same
again," and that it found no sufficient justification to
alter or modify the trial court's order upholding the
appropriateness of the bargaining unit. On this latter
point, Judge Salvador, while concurring with the
supervisors' right of self-organization and collective
bargaining, cast a dissenting vote on the ground that
the Industrial Peace Act did not contemplate nor
provide for supervisors and confidential employees to
be under one bargaining unit and as to "executive
personnel" who have supervision over the supervisors
being excluded from any representation, urged that
"another supervisors' unit must be created for these
executive personnel." The second point is not in
contention at bar since the "executive personnel"
concerned have not appealed their exclusion.
In this appeal, petitioner pursues anew its contention
that supervisors form part of management and are not
considered as employees entitled to bargain
collectively, arguing that "as supervisors form part and
parcel of management, it is absurd for management to
bargain collectively with itself." Petitioner further
argues that under the American concept, supervisors
are not considered employees and that since our
Congress copied verbatim the Taft-Harley Act's
definition of supervisor,[7] its act of "incorporating the
definition in the Taft-Hartley Act" must be deemed and
expression of its intention "to follow the intendment of
said Act."
Petitioner's contentions are untenable, prescinding
from the fact of its failure to appeal in due course
respondent court's en banc resolution of September 7,
1965 upholding the right of the supervisors and
confidential employees to organize respondent
association and to compel petitioner to negotiate and
bargain collectively with it. Petitioner's argument that
since supervisors form part of management, to allow
them to bargain collectively would be tantamount to
management bargaining with itself may be a well-
turned phrase but ignores the dual status of a
supervisor as a representative of management and as
an employee.
If indeed the supervisor is absolutely undistinguishable
from management, then he would be beyond removal
or dismissal, for as respondent association counters,
"how can management remove or dismiss itself?"
As stated for the Court by the now Chief Justice in
AG&P Co. of Manila, Inc. vs. CI.R.,[8] section 3 of the
Industrial Peace Act "explicitly provides that
'employees' and this term includes supervisors 'shall
have the right to self-organization, and to form, join or
assist labor organizations of their own choosing for the
purpose of collective bargaining through
representations of their own choosing and to engage
in concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining and other mutual aid or protection' and that
'individuals employed as supervisors * * * may form
separate organizations of their own'. Indeed, it is well
settled that 'in relation to his employer,' a foreman or
supervisor 'is an employee within the meaning of the
Act' * * * For this reason, supervisors are entitled to
engage in union activities and any discrimination
against them by reason thereof constitutes an unfair
labor practice."
Petitioner's arguments go in reality to the wisdom and
policy of the Industrial Peace Act which expressly
grants supervisors the right to organize and bargain
collectively, which are beyond the Court's power to
review. Thus, the argument that "it is axiomatic in the
law of self-interest that an employer must give a 'better
deal' to those who act in his interest and in whom he
has trust and confidence. These are the supervisors
and confidential employees"[9] and that "In the United
States there was a move to have a part of the
supervisory group to be aligned with labor. But the
enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act put an end to this
move."[10]
So with petitioner's thesis that "(T)o then give
supervisors the right to compel employers to bargain
would in effect align labor and management together
against stockholders and bondholders (capital) and
inexorably tilt the balance of power in favor of these
hitherto conflicting forces. This is contrary to the
nature and philosophy of free enterprise."[11] This
further serves to point up the validity and rationale of
the Industrial Peace Act's provision, since the
supervisors and confidential employees, even though
they may exercise the prerogatives of management as
regards the rank and file employees are indeed
employees in relation to their employer, the company
which is owned by the "stockholders and bondholders
(capital)" in petitioner's own words, and should
therefore be entitled under the law to bargain
collectively with the top management with respect to
their terms and conditions of employment.
Petitioner's argument that the express provisions of
section 3 of our Industrial Peace Act must give way to
the intendment of the Taft-Hartley Act which exempts
employers from the legal obligation to recognize and
negotiate with supervisors is tenuous and groundless.
The language of our own statute is plain and
unambiguous and admits of no other interpretation.
The other principal ground of petitioner's appeal
questioning the confidential employees' inclusion in
the supervisors' bargaining unit is equally untenable.
Respondent court correctly held that since the
confidential employees are very few in number and
are by practice and tradition identified with the
supervisors in their role as representatives of
management vis-a-vis the rank and file employees,
such identity of interest has allowed their inclusion in
the bargaining unit of supervisors-managers for
purposes of collective bargaining in turn as employees
in relation to the company as their employer.
No arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion can be
attributed against respondent court's allowing the
inclusion of the confidential employees in the
supervisors' association for as admitted by petitioner
itself, supra, the supervisors and confidential
employees enjoy its trust and confidence. This
identity of interest logically calls for their inclusion in
the same bargaining unit and at the same time fulfills
the law's objective of insuring to them the full benefit of
their right to self-organization and to collective
bargaining, which could hardly be accomplished if the
respondent association's membership were to be
broken up into five separate ineffective tiny units, as
urged by petitioner.
Respondent court's action not being vulnerable to
challenge as being arbitrary or capricious is therefore
sustained, in line with the Court's consistent rulings
that the industrial court "enjoys a wide discretion in
determining the procedure necessary to insure the fair
and free choice of bargaining representations by
employees," and that its action "in deciding upon an
appropriate unit for collective bargaining purposes is
discretionary * * * and (that) its judgment in this
respect is entitled to almost complete finality, unless
its action is arbitrary or capricious"[12] and that absent
any grave abuse of discretion as to justify the Court's
intervention, "this Court has repeatedly upheld the
exercise of the Court of Industrial Relations in matters
concerning the representation of employee
groups."[13]
ACCORDINGLY , the orders and resolution appealed
from are hereby affirmed and the petition at bar is
dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.
FilOil Refinery Corp. vs. FilOil Supervisory &
Confidential Employees Asso. And Court of
Industrial Relations
G.R. No. L-26736 August 18, 1972
Facts: Respondent association is a labor organization
duly registered with the Department of Labor. It is
composed exclusively of the supervisory and
confidential employees of petitioner corporation. There
exists another entirely distinct labor association
composed of the corporation’s rank-and-file
employees, the Filoil Employees & Workers
Association (FEWA) with which petitioner executed a
collective bargaining agreement. This collective
bargaining agreement expressly excluded from its
coverage petitioner’s supervisory and confidential
employees, who in turn organized their own labor
association, respondent herein.
Respondent association filed on February 18, 1965
with the industrial court its petition for certification as
the sole and exclusive collective bargaining agent of
all of petitioner’s supervisory and confidential
employees working at its refinery in Rosario, Cavite.
Petitioner corporation filed a motion to dismiss the
petition claiming that supervisors are not employees
within the meaning of Republic Act 875, the Industrial
Peace Act, and that since they are part of
management, they do not have the right to bargain
collectively although they may organize an
organization of their own and that supervisors form
part of management and are not considered as
employees entitled to bargain collectively, arguing that
“as supervisors form part and parcel of management,
it is absurd for management to bargain collectively
with itself.”
Respondent court denied the dismissal motion. It ruled
that under the express provisions of section 3 of the
Industrial Peace Act, “(I)ndividuals employed as
supervisors shall not be eligible for membership in a
labor organization of employees under their
supervision but may form separate organizations their
own.”
Issue: Whether the respondent Supervisors (and
confidential employees) may form a labor organization
and enjoy right to collective bargaining?
Held: Yes. Supervisors (and confidential employees),
even though they may exercise the prerogatives of
management as regards the rank and file employees
are indeed employees in relation to their employer, the
company which is owned by the stockholders and
bondholders (capital) and should therefore be entitled
under the law to bargain collectively with the top
management with respect to their terms and
conditions of employment.
As stated for the SC in AG & P Co. of Manila, Inc. vs.
C.I.R., section 3 of the Industrial Peace Act “explicitly
provides that “employees” — and this term includes
supervisors — “shall have the right to self-
organization, and to form, join or assist labor
organizations of their own choosing for the purpose of
collective bargaining through representations of their
own choosing and to engage in concerted activities for
the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual
aid or protection” and that “individuals employed as
supervisors … may form separate organizations of
their own”. For this reason, supervisors are entitled to
engage in union activities and any discrimination
against them by reason thereof constitutes an unfair
labor practice.