Managerial Auditing Journal Volume 32 issue 6 2017 [doi 10.1108_MAJ-07-2016-1408] Rossi, Adriana; Tarquinio, Lara -- An Analysis of Sustainability Report Assurance Statements. Evidence from Italian .pdf

Managerial Auditing Journal
An Analysis of Sustainability Report Assurance Statements. Evidence from Italian Listed Companies
Adriana Rossi, Lara Tarquinio,
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Adriana Rossi, Lara Tarquinio, (2017) "An Analysis of Sustainability Report Assurance Statements. Evidence from Italian
Listed Companies", Managerial Auditing Journal, Vol. 32 Issue: 6, doi: 10.1108/MAJ-07-2016-1408
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An Analysis of Sustainability Report Assurance Statements.
Evidence from Italian Listed Companies
1. Introduction
In recent years, studies have begun to explore the assurance of Corporate Social Responsibility
(CSR) reports (e.g. social reports, environmental reports, social and environmental reports;
sustainability reports, triple bottom line reports etc.). Two main lines of research can be identified
in the academic literature. According to “constructivist” literature, assurance of CSR reports
serves as instrument to improve external transparency and internal decision-making and control.
On the other hand, “critical” studies have highlighted the limits and drawbacks of the assurance
process.
The first set of studies argue that assurance may enhance users’ perceptions of the reliability of
voluntary reports, improve trust and increase perceptions of reports’ credibility (Park and Brorson,
2005; Hodge et al., 2009; Fonseca, 2010; Pflugrath et al., 2011). Moreover, assurance may help to
reduce information asymmetries and agency costs (Simnett et al., 2009) and help companies to
control risk management and improve their policies and internal reporting systems (Zadek et al.,
2004; Park and Brorson, 2005; Adams and Frost, 2008; Gillet, 2012, Casey and Greiner, 2015).
Among the constructivist studies, most analyses have mainly focused on the determinants that lead
companies to seek assurance of their CSR reports (Perego and Kolk, 2012; Kolk and Perego, 2010;
Mock et al., 2007, 2013 Cho et al., 2014; Zorio et al., 2013; Sierra et al., 2013). Of these, only a few
studies have explored the content of assurance statements (Ball et al., 2000; O’Dwyer and Owen
2005; Deegan et al., 2006 a;b; Manetti and Becatti, 2009), indicating, in some cases, differences
among these statements that are attributable to different types of assurance providers (Mock et al.,
2007, 2013; Perego, 2009). In contrast to constructivist research, critical research has highlighted
how external assurance of CSR information – far from being an accountability tool – may actually
be considered as an instrument of managerial capture (Ball et al., 2000; Adams and Evans 2004;
Gray 2001; O’Dwyer and Owen 2005). The assurance process seems to be lacking in transparency
and does not provide sufficient evidence to make it truly useful both inside and outside a company
(Gürtürk and Hahn, 2015).
Prior literature has repeatedly pointed to the need for further research on the assurance of CSR
reporting, particularly the importance of a deeper understanding of the factors that can influence the
content and quality of assurance statements (Kolk and Perego, 2010; Cohen and Simnett, 2015).
Trust and credibility – the improvement of which is one of the objectives of the assurance of CSR
reports – are concepts whose meaning and implications may vary substantially among nations and
cultures (Fonseca, 2010, p. 364). Hence, these considerations reinforce the usefulness of studies of
national samples, which has already been widely emphasized by other researchers (Perego and
Kolk, 2012, p. 184-185).
In response to this call for research into the context of CSR report assurance (Cohen and Simnett,
2015, p. 72), this paper has three research goals. First, this study analyses the trend of assurance of
CSR reports among Italian companies, covering the period from 2008 to 2012. Second, using the
lens of legitimacy theory, this analysis measures the content of assurance statements through a
dichotomous disclosure index (hereafter ASDI) constructed based on existing literature and
professional and institutional guidelines. Third, this study explores whether the ASDI is affected by
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some key corporate characteristics and tests how the choice of assuror type is related to the
disclosure of specific items.
The selection of the Italian case is based on different structural (e.g., the predominance of small and
medium-sized enterprises) and historical (e.g., the relevance of the cooperative movement and the
strong role of government) factors that characterize the Italian context and are relevant to promoting
CSR initiatives and their communication (Albareta et al., 2006). This situation may be useful for
explaining the interest of Italian companies in CSR reporting, confirmed by the KPMG survey in
2013 that documented how large companies in Italy lead the world in the quality of their CSR
reports Furthermore, Italy is one of three European countries with the highest percentage of large
companies that conduct assurance of their CSR reports (KPMG, 2011, p.29). These results reflect
the maturity of Italian reporting and assurance practices and make the case for Italy as an interesting
although previously unexplored object of analysis.
Our findings show that the assurance market in Italy is dominated by major accountancy
organizations. Our content analysis of assurance statements and the value of the ASDI indicates
discrepancies in their content and an overall lack of information about the criteria used and the
conclusive comments and recommendations provided. The presence of a CSR Committee and an
expert who serves on it is positively related to a higher rank on the ASDI; in contrast, Big4 firms
seem to be associated with a lower disclosure rank. Finally, Big4 companies are positively
associated with more information about the provider’s characteristics and negatively with the
number of conclusive comments and recommendations.
This study is significant for the following reasons. First, the majority of previous research has
provided an overall description and evaluation of the content and quality of assurance statements;
however, this research has not analysed whether and how different variables may affect such
statements. Specifically, this paper explores the content of the assurance statements (during a five-
year period) and answers the question of whether specific sets of variables (corporate governance
and organization structure variables; Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) Application Level, external
provider and some control variables) are related to the disclosure levels of assurance statements.
Second, this study examines the type and quantity of information in assurance statements to
determine whether there is a relationship between the type of assurance provider and the type and
quantity of information disclosed in their assurance statements.
Assuming that management may implement the assurance process to legitimate its CSR reporting
(O’Dwyer et al., 2011), our analysis is significant in that a) it shows that companies that have
developed, on their Boards, committees with relevant expertise on CSR topics pay great attention to
the level of assurance information disclosed by assurance providers with reference to the CSR
reports analysed; b) it documents that the Big4 assurance providers are associated with a lower
assurance statement content level; and c) it deepens the existing literature on the content of
assurance statements and their possible determinants.
This paper presents some findings in an area where little evidence exists, that is the effects of some
variables on the quantity of information disclosed in the assurance statements. Moreover, our
analysis contributes to enrich the literature on the content level of assurance statements produced by
different assurance providers. This study might provide insights for reporting firms in their choice
of assurance providers. This paper might be of interest to report users to gain information about the
general trend of assurance practices and about the content level of assurance statements. Some
findings of our paper might also be useful for practitioners to understand the effects that some
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variables (in particular corporate governance variables) might produce on the content level of
assurance statements.
The remainder of this study is organised as follows. The next section provides an overview of
studies that have analysed assurance practices and explains our theoretical framework. Section 3
presents the characteristics of the disclosure index produced and the hypotheses developed. Sections
4 and 5 present the methodology used, results and discussion. The final section offers concluding
remarks.
2. Conceptual background and theoretical framework

2.1 CSR report assurance statements
Different studies have analysed specific aspects of the CSR reports assurance process and have
underlined the importance of assurance providers’ independence (Ball et al., 2000) and
stakeholders’ engagement (O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005; Manetti and Toccafondi, 2012) as well as
the heterogeneous content of assurance statements (Deegan et al., 2006a; Manetti and Becatti, 2009;
Perego and Kolk, 2012; Gürtürk and Hahn, 2015).
Ball et al. (2000), through a content analysis of “verification statements” contained in reports short-
listed for the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants Environmental Reporting Awards
(ACCA ERAS) over seven years, investigated the extent to which verification practices “promoted
organizational transparency and the empowerment of the external parties” (Ball et al., 2000, p. 1).
Findings showed a high influence of management on verifiers’ work and a general lack of
transparency across the verification process for environmental reports. O’Dwyer and Owen (2005)
reviewed a sample of UK and European assurance statements appearing in CSR reports and
evaluated the extent to which the contents of the assurance statements addressed key elements of
three different “guidelines” issued by AccountAbility, Fédération des Experts Comptables
Européens (FEE) and GRI. The authors highlighted some improvements with respect to previous
findings obtained by Ball et al. (2000), in particular with reference to a greater focus on the
performance dimension, the extent of work undertaken by verifiers, and verifiers’ independence.
However, they argued that there was an overall failure in the effective inclusion of each stakeholder
group, which was caused by a lack of involvement in the process. Manetti and Toccafondi (2012),
through a content analysis of a sample of 161 assurance statements of international companies,
suggested a tendency toward consultations with stakeholders (mainly internal to the corporation)
during assurance processes.
Deegan et al. (2006a), with reference to a sample of Australian assurance statements, show that, on
average, the contents of assurance statements do not appear to embrace the recommendations of the
GRI or FEE. Subsequently, Deegan et al. (2006b), analysing a sample of European and UK
assurance statements, confirmed high variability within the contents of assurance statements. In
particular, they showed that many assurance statements were akin to “limited assurance” but with
the opinion provided in a positive form (and not in a negative form as is more common). Manetti
and Becatti (2009), investigating 34 assurance statements on sustainability reports, showed a high
frequency of limited assurance statements issued by Big4 assurance providers, with conclusions
mainly expressed in negative form. Perego and Kolk (2012), using a panel of Fortune Global 250
firms over a period of 10 years, analysed the quality of assurance statements by means of a content
analysis based on the framework provided by O’Dwyer and Owen (2005). Their results showed an
improvement in the quality of assurance statements over time, as well as the dependence of the
3
quality of assurance upon the type of assurance provider (accounting firms, certification bodies,
specialists, others). Gürtürk and Hahn (2015) examined the quality, similarities and differences
among 61 assurance statements of sustainability reports from UK and German listed companies.
Their study highlighted differences in the content, processes followed and standards adopted.
Findings also showed how arbitrariness in assuring content and opacity in communicating about the
assurance process may diminish the credibility and the internal value of assurance.
Several studies have focused on the choice of the provider used for the assurance of sustainability
reports. More specifically, some studies have analysed the factors that could affect the use of each
type of assurance provider. Pflugrath et al. (2011) and Hodge et al. (2009) showed that the
credibility of a CSR report is greater when it is assured and when the assurer is a professional
accountant. The choice of a professional accountant might also impact the following: the
recognized link between financial auditing and the assurance of sustainability reports; the specific
skills of financial auditors (Power, 1997; Wallage, 2000; Knechel et al., 2006); the concern that
stakeholders may consider “unconventional” the assurance by a non-accounting provider (Casey

and Greiner, 2014, p. 15); and the existence of codes of ethics, to which the accounting providers
must conform in their activities (Power, 1997) and which are not always present in the case of
consulting firms (Moroney et al., 2012).
Other research has investigated the effects that the choice of different assurance providers might
have on assurance statements. Hasan et al. (2005) revealed that the majority of the assurance
statements produced by Big5 audit firms used a moderate approach, and the main reasons for this
preference were the nature of the subject matter, the lack of appropriate criteria or performance
standards, cost and benefit considerations and lack of appropriate evidence and user needs. Other
factors, including litigation risk, regulatory requirements and adequacy of fees and industry practice
seem to also influence the level of assurance. Perego (2009) found that companies based in
countries with weaker governance systems are more likely to choose Big4 assurors. Moreover,
Perego (2009) investigates whether the quality of assurance statements depends upon the choice of
an assurance provider and highlights that Big4 assurors provide a higher quality of assurance on
issues related to reporting format and procedures used during the verification process. In contrast,
other assurance providers (not Big4) provide a higher quality of assurance with regard to
recommendations and opinions. This research extends the findings of Mock et al. (2007), who
analysed a sample of 130 companies worldwide that issued assured sustainability reports between
2002 and 2004. They analysed the association between the type of assurance provider and the
nature of the assurance service provided. Their results documented that non Big4 assurance
providers (non-accountants) provided more than half of all assurance reports and that the level of
assurance is strongly associated with the type of assurance provider (Big4 and non-Big4). In 2013
the same authors repeated the analysis and documented some differences compared to their
previous study. Qualitative and quantitative variables and symbols were significantly associated
with the Big4 in the 2002-2004 period, but not in 2006-2007. On the other hand, in the 2006-2007
period, the Big4 had a positive relationship with the disclosure of procedures used whereas in 2002-
2004 this relationship was not significant.
These studies provided an overall description and evaluation of the content and quality of assurance
statements; however, they did not analyse whether and how different variables may affect the
content disclosure level of the assurance statements. Under the theoretical lens of legitimacy theory,
our study aims to reduce this gap in the CSR reporting assurance literature.
4
2.2 Theoretical framework
The theoretical framework used in this study is legitimacy theory. Legitimacy theory is based on the
existence of a “social contract” between organizations and the social context in which they operate,
which stipulates that organizations can only continue to operate if they are legitimate. Legitimacy
occurs when organizations’ actions are considered “proper or appropriate within some socially con-
structed system of norms, values, beliefs and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574).
According to legitimacy theory, corporate legitimacy is required for the survival of enterprises,
therefore companies undertake different activities with the goal of increasing their legitimacy.
Based on this theory, several scholars have highlighted that companies may use corporate
governance and CSR disclosures as mechanisms of establishing their legitimacy (Patten, 1992;
Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012; Cong and Freeman, 2011). Moreover, companies may employ
external assurance to enhance societal confidence in the credibility of their CSR reports and to
maintain their legitimacy (Park and Brorson, 2005; Kuruppu and Milne, 2010; Pflugrath et al.,
2011; Perego and Kolk, 2012; Beelde and Tuybens, 2015). Assurance is then a strategic tool that
companies can use to legitimate their activities and to influence the community’s perceptions of the
legitimacy of their corporate behaviour (Smith et al., 2011; O’Dwyer et al., 2011; Cohen and
Simnett, 2015; Bepari and Mollik, 2016).
Based on the distinction of legitimacy proposed by Suchman (1995), O’Dwyer et al. (2011) state
that, from an assuror’s point of view, the type of legitimation sought by companies (their clients)
corresponds to a pragmatic definition of legitimacy. Organizations decide to assure their CSR
reports to legitimize their CSR-related activities and enhancing reports credibility. In this way they
send a positive signal directed to improve their social legitimacy. In contrast, the type of
legitimation sought by companies’ stakeholders is a moral and cognitive legitimacy. Assurance
practices performed by assurance providers are designed to develop a moral and cognitive
legitimacy of assurance among report users. In this case, it could be useful to provide more details
about the procedures used by assurance providers, to pursue greater clarity in opinions, and to
provide a commentary section in which assurors can insert key recommendations to companies on
ways to improve their CSR activities and reporting (O’Dwyer et al., 2011). According to legitimacy
theory the assurance statements accompanying CSR reports have to contain a quantity of
information useful to satisfy the requests of external stakeholders for the improvement of the
accuracy, credibility and quality of CSR reports. Based on these considerations and consistent with
legitimacy theory, the assurance process and the assurance statement play an important role in
establishing legitimacy especially with reference to potential users of assurance.
Previously we have highlighted that different scholars documented that good corporate governance,
CSR reporting and also assurance may be considered mechanisms that companies may use to
legitimize CSR activities. Consequently in our study we want to assess whether some corporate
governance variables and features of CSR reports GRI-based (sustainability reports) may influence
the content level of the assurance statements. Furthermore, we want to verify whether different
assurance providers use different quantities and types of data in their assurance statements. To
measure the extent of assurance statements and to analyse whether some variables may be
correlated with the content of assurance statements, we developed a disclosure index and six
research hypotheses, as discussed in the next section.
5
3. Disclosure index and development of hypotheses
3.1 Disclosure index
An in-depth analysis of sustainability report assurance statements requires and examination of their
content and characteristics. To that end, a disclosure index (ASDI) was developed to measure the
extent of assurance statements. We identify the items of the disclosure index according to the main
elements of AccountAbility (AA1000AS), IAASB’s International Standards on Assurance
Engagement (ISAE3000) and the recommendations of the Global Reporting Initiative.
Data relating to the assurance statements of sustainability reports was collected using content
analysis methodology, which is “a technique for gathering data that consists of codifying qualitative
information in anecdotal and literary form into categories for deriving quantitative scales of varying
levels of complexity” (Abbott and Monsen 1979, p. 504). This approach requires analysing reports
to determine the presence or absence of disclosure across a set of information items (Guidry and
Patten, 2010). We use a particular methodology of thematic content analysis (Jones and Shoemaker,
1994), which consists of elaborating a classification framework, to develop a classification scheme,

to design a series of encoding rules, and to measure and register data. The classification framework
is based on the different key recommendations suggested by academics and practitioners (GRI,
ISAE, AA1000AS, O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005, Manetti and Becatti, 2009). The research was
carried out for each disclosure item using electronic copies of the assurance statements. To
comprehensively evaluate the information contained in the assurance statements, seven specific
items were identified. The framework used to classify the information is presented in table 1. The
seven items identified are: (1) assurance provider characteristics, (2) attribution of responsibility
between reporter and assuror, (3) nature and extent of the planning process, (4) formal
requirements, (5) conclusions, (6) assurance form and criteria (7) comments and advice. A value of
1 was given to each disclosure item if it complied with the requirements included in the assurance
scale and 0 otherwise. Those items, in turn, comprise a total of 29 sub-items. Two coders conducted
the thematic content analysis independently in an attempt to lend credibility to the research (Milne
and Adler, 1999). Content analysis validity and reliability (Potter and Levine Donnerstein, 1999)
relied on the described coding procedures designed for thematic content analysis and the fact that
disclosure items and characteristics are derived from internationally recognized guidelines.
Additionally, one of the authors coded all the reports and a second coder independently analysed
20% of them. After the first round of coding the second author found very few cases of
disagreement. This was followed by a careful consultation in order to reach a final agreed-upon
score.
(Table 1: to be inserted around here)
3.2 Development of Hypotheses

To understand the variables that can affect the content of sustainability report assurance statements,
we examine different companies’ areas of focus. The first concerns corporate governance and
organization structure variables directly involved in sustainability practices: the presence of a CSR
committee (e.g. sustainability committee, environmental committee, governance and sustainability
committee etc.) and the presence of an expert within it, the existence of a Sustainability Officer
(e.g. environmental officer, corporate responsibility officer etc.) and an Internal Audit Function.
6
The second is related to the GRI application level declared in the sustainability report and the type
of external assurance provider chosen. We introduce some control variables based on the findings
of prior research.
3.2.1 Corporate governance and organization structure variables: CSR committee and Expert
within CSR committee, Sustainability Officer and Internal Audit Function.
CSR committee
For sustainability disclosure to be successful, it needs to be integrated with the overall mission and
the resulting strategy of an organization. This anticipates an efficient linkage between corporate
governance and the organization’s sustainability program (Kend, 2015; Dilling, 2010). Current
trends indicate that firms are developing CSR committees within their Boards of Directors as a
fundamental element of their corporate governance practices in order to address sustainability risks
and opportunities. The presence of a CSR committee or the creation of a specific department within
the board indicates a real willingness to implement both business strategy and CSR policies,
translating them into tangible actions (Wagner et al., 2009; GRI, 2013; Peters and Romi, 2015). The
establishment of a CSR committee aligns the structure of the company with the reporting process,
ideally resulting in an improvement in disclosure quality (Adnar et al., 2010). The presence of a
CSR committee may increase organisational legitimacy and enhances firm’s reputation particularly
in the eyes of stakeholders (Neu et al., 1998; Yunus et al., 2016). We may then hypothesize that a
CSR committee may be driven by legitimacy motives. Therefore, the presence of this committee
may induce a firm to request an analytical assurance process and to influence the demand to
assurance providers for high content level assurance statements useful to satisfy the requests of
external stakeholders. According to KPMG (2008), many companies still do not make the link
between corporate governance and sustainability reporting, and only a minimal percentage of firms
show a connection between these two practices in their reports (Dilling, 2009; Kend, 2015).
Previous studies have not produced unequivocal results. For example, Peters and Romi (2014),
Rodrigue et al. (2013) and O’Dwyer (2005) did not find an association between assurance of
sustainability report and the existence of a CSR committee; they showed rather that these
committees were symbolic gestures used to manage stakeholder impressions and symbolise a firm’s
commitment to sustainability. However, a more recent analysis conducted by Peters and Romi
(2015) found that the presence of an environmental committee, when it includes directors with
related expertise, is associated with implementing sustainability assurance. In light of the above, we
want to understand whether the presence of a CSR committee can influence the level of assurance
content:
H1. The presence of a CSR committee is positively associated with the highest level of assurance
statement content
Expert within the CSR committee

Within the CSR committee, the presence of an Expert (E) with specific characteristics and
competences in the field of environmental, social and sustainability issues testifies to a firm’s real
commitment to these issues. Indeed, selecting and hiring a person with specific characteristics is
often a significant cost for companies; some opt to engage an individual with a background in
7
public relations, who has the ability to spin the firm’s activities (Peters and Romi, 2015).
Historically, experts or influential people, identified as independent directors, do not provide
expertise in monitoring companies’ boards, but they do bring to the boards experience and
connections to community groups and organizations. Michelon and Parbonetti (2012) demonstrated
a positive association between a specific category of directors, identified as influential community
members or as promoters of stakeholder engagement and sustainability disclosure. For these
reasons, we hypothesize that:
H2. The presence of an expert component on the CSR Committee is positively associated with the
highest level of assurance statement content
Sustainability officer
The main function of the governance mechanism should be its independence, monitoring and
supervisory management. Although more and more recent studies have highlighted the importance
of a collaborative relationship between the board and management to achieve strategic goals, it is
important to examine more expansive governance components to better understand the firm’s
sustainability disclosure (Cohen et al., 2004; Peters and Romi, 2014). Management can influence
the decision of the board, and the board’s support is an important factor in sustainability activities
(Peters and Romi, 2015; Chin et al., 2013). The presence of a Sustainability officer (SO) helps the
CEO and executive team to visualize the objectives and professionalize the process of aligning
environmental and social needs with business strategy (Luby and Esty, 2010). O’Dwyer et al.
(2011), underlined that CSR managers/directors have an important role in the process of assurance
legitimation within their organisation. To understand whether the firm’s managing SO can affect
the content level of the assurance we hypothesize that:
H3. The presence of a SO is positively associated with the highest level of assurance statement
content
Internal Audit Function

An internal audit function (IAF) can act as an internal monitor to ensure that a company is in
compliance with all CSR related rules and regulations, which can simultaneously improve
stakeholders’ confidence (Cohen and Simnett, 2015). Several studies have provided evidence of the
crucial role of the IAF in improving the quality of corporate governance, performing oversight
functions, controlling and monitoring the environment, and mitigating fraud risk (Beasley et al.,
2009; Coram et al., 2008). Internal auditors have transformed their functions and areas of
involvement to risk management, control and governance processes (Arena and Azzone, 2009),
broadening their involvement from more traditional accounting and financial control to operational
control, risk management and corporate governance (Spira and Page, 2003). Internal auditors’
potential functions range from making line managers conscious of their responsibilities concerning
risk and controls (Arena and Azzone, 2009) to acting as consultants who monitor risks, identify
weaknesses in control systems and facilitate the implementation of enterprise risk management
(Beasley et al., 2009). Despite this evidence, empirical analysis shows that assurance of CSR
reports was one of the least performed activities by internal auditors. Then, we may hypothesize
that the involvement of IAF in providing assurance and his support to the assurance providers might
8
also affect the content level of assurance statements. Consequently we want to test whether – in the
Italian context – the presence of an IAF impacts the content level of the assurance statements:
H4. The presence of an IAF is positively associated with the highest level of SR assurance statement
content
3.2.2 GRI Application Level on CSR Report and External Assurance Provider
GRI Application Level

The GRI Guidelines (G3 and G3.1) state that companies that produce sustainability reports can
inform the readers of such reports about their level of GRI guideline application.
There are three levels in the system: C, B, and A. The “plus” (+) is available for each level when an
external assurance statement accompanies the report. “The reporting criteria at each level reflect a
measure of the extent of application or coverage of the GRI Reporting Framework” (G3; G3.1, AL).
The lowest level is C, and the highest level is A. The choice of a specific application level expresses
the extent of the company’s GRI Reporting Framework adoption. For reports prepared in
accordance with GRI level A (the highest level), it is reasonable to believe that the reporters are
more likely to achieve an equally high level of assurance quality, such that the credibility of the
information provided is improved. The above consideration is the basis for the following
hypothesis:
H5. An application of level A on sustainability reports is positively associated with the highest level
of assurance statement content
External Assurance Provider

The market for assurance services is highly heterogeneous. It is possible to identify three principal
assuror categories: accounting firms (e.g., Big4), certification bodies and specialist consultancies
(Corporateregister, 2008; Perego, 2009). Different assurance providers have different backgrounds
and competencies in providing auditing services. Several researchers have shown how different
assurance providers influence different characteristics of assurance statements (Mock et al., 2007;
2013; O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005; Deegan, 2006). Often, Big4 accounting firms are classified as
high quality assurance providers compared to other types of assurors (Francis, 2004; Deegan,
2006b) because they provide a higher level of disclosure on issues related to reporting format and
procedures used, although they rank lower on factors related to recommendations and conclusive
opinions (O’Dwyer and Owen, 2005; Perego et al., 2009). Some characteristics, such as the form,
the reporting categories assured, the framework and the responsibilities of the reporting
organisations and assurance provider are strongly correlated with the Big4 assurance providers.
Therefore we hypothesize that companies may hire a Big4 assurance provider because their services
are considered of high quality and considered congruent with social expectations. For this reason
we expect that:
H6. The provision of assurance statements by accounting firms (Big4) is positively associated with
the highest level of assurance statement content
9
3.3.3 Control variables: Company size, Industry Sensitivity, Profitability and Leverage
Previous studies have documented that firm size is significantly related to the assurance of CSR
reports (Cho et al., 2014; Sierra et al., 2013; Simnett et al., 2009). Large companies may cause
greater impacts, involve a greater number of stakeholders (Legendre and Coderre, 2012; Meek et
al., 1995) and may suffer more pressure about the reliability and transparency of the content of their
reports. Moreover, several studies have shown that companies with high social and environmental
impact may be more exposed to social and environmental risk and might therefore have their CSR
reports assured (Simnett et al., 2009; Kolk and Perego, 2010; Cho et al., 2014). Empirical studies on
voluntary assurance demand have frequently used profitability indexes, measured by ROA (return-
on-assets) ROE (return-on-equity) (Moroney et al., 2012; Sierra et al., 2013; Branco et al., 2014;
Cho et al., 2014), as well as leverage (Clarkson et al., 2008; Ruhnke and Gabriel, 2013; Simnett et
al., 2009; Sierra et al., 2013; Zorio et al., 2013) as determinants of external assurance. Thus,
according to the above-mentioned literature we have incorporated into the model, size (measured
using the natural logarithm of the total assets), sector, ROA, ROE and leverage as control variables.
4. Research design
4.1 Sample identification and measures of variables
Our sample is focused on all the sustainability report assurance statements published by the Italian
non-financial companies listed on the FTSE Italy All-Share Index from the years 2008 to 2012. The
choice of 2008 is dictated by the emergence of a significant number of sustainability assurance
practices in Italy that before this year was not statistically significant. We excluded companies from
the financial, banking and insurance sectors; the reason for this exclusion relates to the difficulty of
comparing financial information for these companies with firms that belong to other sectors.
During our period of observation, we identified a total of 143 sustainability reports issued, of which
95 possess an assurance statement. We included SR assurance statements produced by the same
companies but referring to different years. Two researchers analysed the corporate website of each
firm to verify the presence of a sustainability report available online and within it the presence of an
assurance statement. We searched for information about the characteristics of corporate governance
and management within the sustainability report the annual financial report and the corporate
governance report.
We searched for CSR committee titles including but not limited to the following: Environmental
Committee, Sustainability Committee, Governance and Sustainability Committee, Audit Risk, and
Sustainability and Corporate Governance Committee. For the Sustainability officer, we searched for
Environmental Officer, Corporate Responsibility Officer and Stakeholder Relations and
Sustainability. For the identification of an Internal Audit Function, we searched for Audit Unit and
Internal Control System. The following titles were used to identify experts within the CSR
Committee: academician, politician, non-profit or social organization members. A content table was
used to calculate an sustainability report assurance disclosure index (ASDI hereafter) for each
company; the index was constructed using a dichotomous procedure by which an item scores 1 if it
is disclosed and 0 otherwise (Cooke, 1989 a;b). To reduce subjective assessment, each item was
given the same weight (Marston and Shrives, 1991). To explain whether the selected variables can
affect the content level of the assurance statements, we use the Ordinary Least Square (OLS)
regression technique with panel data, which is a standard linear regression procedure that considers
the value of the ASDI calculated for each of the 95 companies as a dependent variable. In our
10
analysis we consider the following sensitive industries: Oil and Gas, Basic Materials, Industrials
and Utilities. To identify the dimension we use the natural logarithm of the total assets. We
introduce a set of dummy variables for each year observed. We use clustered standard errors at the
firm level to address autocorrelation and perform the Variance Inflator Factor (VIF) test to assess
whether multicollinearity could affect our results. The model elaborated is the following:
ASDIi= ai + β1i CSR committee + β2i E + β3i SO + β4i IAF + β5i ALA + β6i Big4 + β7i SI +β8i
LnTotAssets + β9i ROA + β10i ROE + β11i Leverage + β12i Year + ui
To test the relationship between the type of assurance provider (Big4) and the disclosure items we
used a contingency table in a matrix format that displays the multivariate frequency distribution of
the variables and provide a frame of the interrelation between two variables. Each disclosure item
(from 1.1. Assurance to 7.2. Advice) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for disclosure
and 0 otherwise. Likewise, Big4 is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for assurance
provided by a large accounting firm and 0 otherwise. In order to calculate the degree of association
between the Big4 variable and each item were used: the Phi coefficient derived from the Pearson’s
chi-squared test that ranges from -1 (complete inverse association) to +1 (complete positive
association) (Singh, K. 2007); and Cramer’s V and contingency coefficient, that ranges from 0 to 1,
where 0 means complete negative independence and 1 complete positive association (Kendall and
Stuart, 1973).
5. Results
5.1 Trend analysis
Table 3 shows how the number of firms that decided to assure their sustainability reports has grown
from 10.5% in 2008 to 26% in 2012. In line with the most recent KPMG surveys, the market for
assurance is dominated by major accountancy organizations that currently perform 71.5% of
assurance work compared to 27.7% by specialist firms. A total of 84% of assurance statements is
produced in accordance with the standard ISAE 3000, and only 16% of external providers use the
AA1000AS. A total of 78% adopted a limited/reasonable assurance level, almost 14% declared a
different level of assurance for different subject matter, and no assuror opted for a high/reasonable
level. The evolution of assurance services is very interesting: the market share of the specialist
firms in the sample decreased from 40% in 2008 to 27% in 2012, and concurrently the use of the
standard AA1000AS has decreased from 20% to 15%, while use of the ISAE 3000 increased from
80% in 2008 to almost 85% in 2012. The level of limited/moderate assurance increased from 82%
in 2008 to 100% in 2012, and the use of a different level for different subject matter decreased
notably, although it had been at 30%. Currently no companies are using this approach.
As shown in Figure 1, overall the level of information disclosed by the companies in the sample is
not high, and despite both the use of assurance services to add credibility to the reporting process
11
and the requirement to include a number of attributes, the contents of the reports remain ambiguous
(Kamp-Roelands, 1999; Deegan et al., 2006). The only items with a satisfactory level of disclosure
are the “Attribution of responsibility between reporter and assuror” and the sub-items included in
the item “Formal requirements”. Almost all of the assurance analysed contained information related
to the title, addressee, date and location of the document, as well as the name and signature of the
provider. Items related to the “Assurance provider characteristics” and the “Nature and extent of the
planning process” have a non-homogeneous distribution. In fact, in reference to provider
characteristics, almost 72% of the companies include information about their independence but only
20% and 17% include information about their Impartiality and Competences, respectively. These
results are in line with previous research highlighting how almost all assurance providers clearly
identified themselves but provided only limited information about their competencies (O’Dwyer
and Owen, 2005). In reference to the “Nature and the extent of the planning process”, the major
gaps are found in the following categories: criteria used; stakeholder engagement and its objectives;
description of the work performed; indication of the evidence-gathering requirements, sampling

methods and associated risks; resources used; and the presence of limitations. Information related to
the conclusions of the accounting system, as well as comments and advice, are presented by only
19% of the companies.
(Figure 1: to be inserted around here)
5.2 Multivariate models

Our correlation analysis (Table 4) confirms that there are not statistically significant relationships
between the independent variables. Table 6 shows the results of the model elaborated to verify the
variables that affect the content level of assurance statements. The R2 is 0.682 and the model
appears highly significant (F = 11.130 and p = 0.000). The descriptive statistics (Table 5) indicate
that 38% of companies have created a CSR committee, 25.2% have an expert on the CSR
committee, 57% have an internal audit function and 47.4% have a sustainability officer. A total of
71.6% of the firms operate in a sensitive sector and 64.2% produce a sustainability report with the
highest GRI application level (“A”). Big4 accounting firms draw up the 79% of the assurance
statements.
The regression model shows that the CSR committee (β=0.116; Sig. 0,042) and the presence of an
expert on it (β=0.075; Sig. 0.045) are positively and significantly associated with the highest
content level of assurance statements. These findings appear to be in line with those of Michelon
and Parbonetti (2012) and Peters and Romi (2015), but they contrast with Rodrigue et al. (2013). In
contrast, the presence of a management SO and the presence of an internal audit function do not
seem to have any significant association. This analysis supports our hypotheses H1 and H2 but not
hypotheses H3 and H4.
In reference to the set of hypotheses related to voluntary disclosure characteristics, the variable
Big4 (β=-0.088; Sig. 0.004) is significantly and negatively correlated to the highest values of the
ASDI, which indicates that the Big4 accounting firms are associated with a lower assurance
statement content level. The variable “application level A” does not seem to have any significant
relation. For this reason we reject hypotheses H5 and H6. The SI (β=0.076; Sig. 0.001) and the
natural logarithm of the total assets (β=0,014; Sig. 0.035) are significantly and positively related to
the highest level of the ASDI in accordance with Sierra et al. (2013) and Simnett et al. (2009). At
last, the highest value of the ASDI has no connection with the year.
12
Some findings reported in table 7 are consistent with previous literature: Big4 providers are more
likely to disclose items related to the independence of the provider, the indication of responsibility
and the inclusion of formal requirements (1, 2, 4) (Manetti and Becatti, 2009; O’Dwyer and Owen,
2005). At the same time, non-Big4 firms are more likely to include in their statements particular
conclusions about the specific accounting system (6) (Deegan et al., 2006a;b; O’Dwyer and Owen,
2005; Perego, 2009). In contrast to previous literature (Mock et al., 2007; 2013; O’Dwyer and
Owen, 2005), the present analysis found that non-Big4 firms are more likely to provide conclusions
and recommendations in their statements (7). Finally, we found mixed evidence regarding
disclosure of the nature and the extent of the planning process (Deegan et al., 2006a;b; Mock et al.,
2013; 2007; Perego, 2009). These results suggest that the assurance of sustainability reports is part
of a process in which methodological developments have emerged in the context of professional
services firms; they also suggest how the translation of their core expertise in financial audit within
the emerging area of assurance services may help to legitimize practices among key audiences
(O’Dwyer et al., 2011; O’Dwyer, 2011).
6. Discussion and conclusions

This study, to the best of the authors’ knowledge, is the first to attempt an assessment of whether
the content level of sustainability report assurance statements is affected by some key company-
specific variables and by the type of assurance provider chosen, which may also influence whether
companies use assurance as a tool to strengthen their legitimacy. The study analyses the assurance
statements in sustainability reports published over five years by FTSE Italy All-Share index
companies. The importance of the CSR report and assurance produced by these Italian companies is
confirmed by the KPMG surveys documenting how these companies lead the world by producing
the highest-quality CSR reports (KPMG, 2013) and underlining how Italy is one of the European
countries with the highest percentage of CSR reports containing formal assurance statements
(KPMG, 2011). From this perspective, the Italian assurance services market is highly competitive
and strongly related to global practice; for these reasons we believe that our study can provide
insight into the broader international market for assurance services.
To date, the literature analysing the determinants of assurance statements has limited its focus to the
firm’s decision whether or not to employ external control of its sustainability report; but it has
completely overlooked the importance of investigating which factors influence sustainability report
content and whether the preference for the Big4 accounting firms, traditionally considered more
qualified to assess these services, corresponds to an exhaustive level of assurance. Our findings
highlight how the phenomenon of SR external control in Italy increased from 10% in 2008 to 26%
in 2012 and that the assurance market is dominated by major accounting firms that currently
13
provide 71.5% of assurance services. Over the years, accounting firms have gained increasing
market shares compared to consulting and specialist firms. Our findings, in line with previous
studies (Deegan et al., 2006; O’Dwyer and Owen 2005), show how this type of assurance provider
prefers the use of the ISAE 3000 standard and is more likely to provide a limited assurance level in
a negative form. These findings suggest a strong correlation between the background and
characteristics of assurance practitioners and some elements of their statements, such as the
standard used, the level declared and the form adopted (Mock et al., 2007; 2013; Perego, 2009).
Overall, the amount of information effectively included in the statements analysed is not compliant
with the requirements of the international framework considered in this study. The major
shortcomings were found, in particular, in the descriptions of the planning process, in the
explanations of stakeholder engagement and its objectives and in the conclusive comments and
advice. To explain these results, we found that corporate governance plays an important role in
orienting the heterogeneity of assurance disclosure. In detail, we found a positive association
between the existence of a CSR committee and the highest level of the ASDI. This result appears to
contrast with previous studies noting that CSR committees do not influence the decision to use SR
assurance but likely act more as symbols of a firm’s commitment to sustainability (O’Dwyer 2005;
Peters and Romi, 2014). Nevertheless, considering that our analysis is focused on the content level
and not just on the decision to use assurance services, this committee could have an active strategic
role in the assurance process. Moreover, our second hypothesis regarding the effect on assurance
content of having an expert on the CSR committee is supported, demonstrating that, in line with
other previous research (Peters and Romi, 2015; Michelon and Parbonetti, 2012), a person with
particular skills, expertise and background can ensure that the board has better knowledge of its
stakeholders’ needs and expectations.
Legitimacy theory may explain these findings by suggesting that companies with CSR committees
(and an expert on them), pay great attention to employing external assurance of their sustainability
reports to enhance confidence in the accuracy and credibility of their sustainability activities.
We have to reject the hypothesis related to the variables Sustainability Officer and Internal Audit
Function. These results could have different explanations. We have not considered the age,
composition and activities of these units. Our speculation is that if these units are relatively recent,
their effectiveness may not be evident yet.
Firms’ inclusion in a sensitive industry seems to have a positive relation with the highest ASDI
rank, in line with Simnett et al. (2009) and Kolk and Perego (2010). Legitimacy theory explains
these findings, suggesting that companies belonging to sensitive industries employ external
assurance and are more likely to obtain an extensive assurance statement to enhance societal
confidence in the credibility of their sustainability reports, with the aim to maintain their legitimacy.
The variable Big4 is significant but negatively related with ASDI. This result may be explained if
we consider that stakeholders may perceive the existence of skills gaps between accounting
assurance providers (in particular Big4) and non-accounting providers. Generally, the
competencies, independence and capabilities of accounting providers are widely recognized
(Perego, 2009; Mock et al., 2007), and their work is generally legitimate. We may hypothesize that
accounting providers (as opposed to non-accounting providers) are therefore less motivated to
deliver more convincing, detailed and clearer assurance statements.
Our second analysis, which related the assuror producing the assurance statement with each item
created, showed how Big4 companies are more focused on disclosing information related to the in-
14
dependence of the provider, their responsibilities and formal requirements like title, place, date and
signature. These results are consistent with other studies showing that Big4 assurance providers are
more likely to disclose information about formal and procedural issues. Conversely, Big4 firms are
less likely to inform about their conclusions, advice and recommendations, in accordance with a
large amount of literature that suggests how rarely Big4 accounting firms include conclusive sug-
gestions and advice in their statements (Perego, 2009; Mock et al., 2007; 2013; O’Dwyer and Ow-
en, 2005). Some authors, under the lens of legitimacy theory, have noted how the Big4 are more
likely to provide information about their competencies, independence and impartiality because this
is part of a process through which methodological developments emerged in the context of profes-
sional services firms and were translated in the new area of assurance services to legitimize practic-
es with key audiences (O’Dwyer et al., 2011; O’Dwyer, 2011).
Finally, our analysis produced mixed findings regarding disclosure of the nature and the extent of
the planning process.
This study is subject to several limitations. In reference to the corporate governance variables, we
considered only the corporate characteristics that the literature indicated were directly related to the
production and content of voluntary disclosure. In future research, more corporate governance
variables could be analysed. The dimensions of the sample could be expanded by including more
companies and testing a cross sectional dataset to encompass greater variety. Our disclosure index
may be subject to criticism, as the dichotomous measurement of disclosure we have adopted only
enables us to make claims about the diversity and heterogeneity of assurance-related issues covered
in statements, rather than enabling us to make any claims about the extent or amount of disclosure.
Finally, the background and culture of the top management team may affect the disclosure policies
emanating from the board. Further research will certainly shed light on this important research area.
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21
Table 1
Sustainability reporting assurance content table
Item Description AA1000AS ISAE3000 Score

1. Assurance practitioner characteristics
1.1. Independence Independence with regard to the assured organization
(0-3)
1.2. Impartiality Impartiality with regard to stakeholders
1.3. Competence Show the competence required to provide assurance
2. Representation by the Responsible Party
(0-1)
2.1. Representation Representation by the responsible party
3. Nature and extent of the planning process
3.1 Scope Range of disclosures covered by the assurance exercise
3.2 Standard Standard to be used
3.3 Assumptions Assumptions regarding reporting criteria and evidence
3.4 Stakeholders Extent of stakeholder participation

3.5 Objectives Objectives of the engagement (1)
3.6 Activities The tasks and activities to be performed
(0-12)
3.7 Work Summary of the work performed
Evidence gathering requirements, sampling methods and
3.8 Evidence
associated risks
3.9 Resources Resources requirements
3.10 Level Level of assurance (2) (3)
3.11 Level/matter Different level for different subject matter (4)
3.12 Limitations Limitations (5)
4. Formal requirements
4.1 Title Title
4.2 Addressee Addressee (0-4)
4.3 Date & place Date and place of the document
4.4 Signature Name of the assuror and signature
5. Particular conclusion on the specific accounting
system
Evaluation of the system, processes, information and data
5.1 System agreed used to support sustainability performance disclosure on O (0-2)
the issues agreed
Evaluation of the quality of the public disclosure and the
5.2 System
underlying system, processes, information and data
6. Assurance form and criteria
6.1 Positive Assurance in positive form
6.2 Negative Assurance in negative form
6.3 Materiality & (0-5)
Assurance considers materiality and inclusivity issues
inclusivity
6.4 Completeness & Assurance considers completeness and responsiveness

responsiveness issues
6.5 Performance Assurance considers performance issues
7. Comments and advices
7.1 Progress Progress in reporting and assurance since last report O (0-2)
Advice is provided for improvements in reporting and
7.2 Advice O
processes
SRASD (0-29)
: Expressly included in the standard
O : Optionally included in the standard
(1) AA1000AS required the “Scope of the engagement”, in this sense the assurance provider before
accepting an engagement shall be satisfied that all the requirements of the standard can be met and
that the reporting organization is acting in good faith. In particular the assurance provider shall be
satisfied that the engagement subject matter is appropriate, and the practitioner will have access to
sufficient evidence to support findings and conclusions.
(2) There are two types of AA1000AS (2008) sustainability assurance engagement Type 1
Accountability principles: the assurance provider shall evaluate the nature and the extent of the
organization’s adherence to all three AA1000 Accountability Principles; Type 2 Accountability
Principles and Performance Information: the assurance provider shall evaluate the nature and the
extent of the organization’s adherence to the AA1000 Accountability Principles, as for the Type 1,
and shall also evaluate the reliability of specific sustainability performance information.
(3) Consistent with extant ISAE 3000, two levels of assurance are possible for engagements:
reasonable assurance and limited assurance. The standard indicate the use of positive form for the
reasonable level and the use of a positive form for the limited level.
(4) The AA1000AS indicate that an assurance engagement may be carried out to provide a high
level of assurance or a moderate level of assurance. Since different subject matter may be addressed
in one assurance engagement, a high level of assurance may be provided for some subject matter
while a moderate level of assurance may be provided for other subject matter in the same assurance
statement.
(5) Any limitation in the scope of the disclosure on sustainability, the assurance engagement or the
evidence gathering shall be addressed in the assurance statement and reflect in the report to
management if one is prepared.
Table 2
Variables includes in the OLS Logistic Model
Explanatory variables Measurement Hypothesis Expected
sign
Assurance statements disclosure Number of Items included/Total items

index (ASDI)
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the Firm's board
Corporate Social Responsibility committee includes a CSR committee and 0 H1 +
committee (CSR committee) otherwise
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the CSR committee H2 +
Expert within CSR committee (E) includes an expert, 0 otherwise
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's H3 +
management includes a sustainability officer, 0
Sustainability Officer (SO) otherwise
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's board H4 +

committee includes an Internal Audit Function, 0
Internal Audit Function (IAF) otherwise
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the companies H5 +
Application level "A" (ALA) declared an AL A, 0 otherwise
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the assurance report H6 +
is issued by an accounting firm (Big4), 0
Type of assurance provider (Big4) otherwise
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the company
operates in the Oil and Gas, Basic Materials,
Sensitivity Industry (SI) Industrial and Utilities sectors, 0 otherwise
Ln Total Assets (LnTotAssets) Natural logarithm of total assets
Return on Assets (ROA) Net profit (loss)/Total assets
Return on Equity (ROE) Net income/Total equity

Leverage
Total debt/Total assets
Set of dummy variables, each of which equal to 1

Year for each year observed
Table 3
Trend analysis of the Italian context
2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 TOT
Sust.Report 41 31 28 21 22 143
Assurance 26 22 20 17 10 95
Provider KPMG 8 4 6 5 3 26
E&Y 5 5 3 2 1 16
DELOITTE 1 2 1 1 1 6
PRICE 6 5 4 4 1 20
SGS 4 3 3 3 2 15
DNV 1 1 1 1 1 5
RGA 2 2 1 1 1 7
Framework ISAE3000 22 19 17 14 8 80
AA1000AS 4 3 3 3 2 15
Level Limited/Moderate 22 18 17 14 7 78
Reasonable/High 0 0 0 0 0
Mixed Levels 0 4 3 3 3 13
Figure 1
Frequency Items
This table presents the percentage of frequency of the items (29 items) rapresented in the table 1.
Table 4
Pearson Correlation matrix
IAF CSRcom. SO E SI ROA ROE Leverage ALA Big4 LnTotAssets
IAF
CSRcom. .309***
SO .086 .216***
E .009 .292*** .431***
SI .295*** .054 .177** .104**
ROA -.295*** -.152** -.043 .058 -.152
ROE -.241*** -.184** .123 .131** -.064 .565***

Leverage -.453*** -.108** -.177** -.214*** -.309** .297*** .267**
ALA .212*** .011 .169 .094 .173** -.05 -.015 -.357***
Big4 -.105** -.342*** -.286*** -.309** -.211*** .286*** .175* .325*** -.219***
LnTotAssets .127 -.171** .106 .101 .125** .163** .116 -.292*** .342*** .029
This table provides the Pearson correlation coefficients between all the independent variables. All the variables are defined
and measured as in Table 2. A correlation coefficient marked *, **, *** indicates that the correlation is statistically
significant at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.
Table 5
Descriptive statistics
Obs. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev.
Continuous Variables
ASDI 95 .31 .76 .485 .133
Ln Tot Assets 95 10.61 20.14 15.834 1.661
ROA 95 - 10.18 8.84 1.717 3.439
ROE 95 - 30.61 37.5 7.592 11.936
Leverage 95 1.19 5.51 2.890 1.091
Frequency Percentage
CSR committee 1 36 37.9
Expert 1 24 25.2
Internal Audit Function 1 57 60.0
Application Level "A" 1 61 64.2
Big4 1 75 78.9
SI 1 66 71.6
This table provides the descriptive statistics (minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation)
of the continuous variables and the frequency of the dichotomous variables of the sample.
Table 6
OLS Regression Model
Collinearity Test
B SD Beta t Sig.
Tollerance VIF
0.156 .116 1.350 .181
CSRcom. 0.043 .022 .160 1.973 .042** .620 1.614
SO -0.013 .032 -.051 -.416 .678 .275 3.635
Expert .075 .037 .282 2.039 .045** .213 4.703
IAF .027 .023 .101 1.178 .242 .560 1.786
ALA .004 .022 .015 .190 .850 .652 1.533

Big4 -.088 .029 -.317 -2.998 .004*** .364 2.744
SI .076 .022 .266 3.456 .001*** .688 1.454
ROA -.002 .003 -.059 -.688 .494 .546 1.831
ROE .000 .001 .010 .122 .903 .608 1.645
Leverage .019 .010 .158 1.843 .069 .557 1.794
LNtotassets .014 .007 .177 2.151 .035** .603 1.658
Year 2012 .015 .021 .054 .730 .460 .622 1.590

Year 2011 .019 .026 .059 .735 .465 .627 1.595
Year 2010 .002 .027 .007 .089 .929 .655 1.527
Year 2009 -.008 .029 -.021 -.271 .787 .653 1.532
Year 2008 -.050 .029 -.137 -1.729 .088 .651 1.537
Pseudo R2 R2 Standard Deviation Durbin - Watson
.682 .620 .0822 1.718

This table presents the results of the OLS regression. All the variables are defined
and measured as in Table 2. All standard errors are clustered by firm. ***, **, *
indicate that the estimated coefficients are statistically significant at 1%, 5% and
10% levels, respectively. ASDIi= ai + β1i CSRcommittee + β2i E + β3i SO + β4i IAF
+ β5i ALA + β6i Big4 + β7i SI + β8i LnTotAssets + β9i ROA + β10i ROE + β11i
Leverage + β12i Year + u
Table 7
Association between disclosure items and Big4
Big4
Phi Correlation Cramer's V Contingency Coefficient
1.1. Independence .477*** .477*** .430***
1.2. Impartiality -.099 .099 .098
1.3. Competence -.081 .081 .081

C
2.1. Representation
3.1 Scope -.300*** .300*** .287**
3.2 Standard .110 .110 .109

3.3 Assumptions -.147 .147 .146
3.4 Stakeholders -.084 .084 .083
3.5 Objectives -.218*** .218*** .213***
3.6 Activities -.054 .054 .054
3.7 Work .594*** .594*** .510***

C
3.8 Evidence
3.9 Resources -.328*** .328*** .312***
3.10 Level -.328*** .328*** .312***
3.11 Level/matter -.022 .022 .022
3.12 Limitations -.125 .125 .124
4.1 Title .277*** .277*** .267***
4.2 Addressee .323*** .323*** .307***

C
4.3 Date & place
C
4.4 Signature
5.1 System agreed -.413*** .413*** .382***
5.2 System -.499*** .499*** .446***
6.1 Positive -.643*** .643*** .541***
6.2 Negative .456*** .456*** .415***
6.3 Materiality -.177 .177 .175
6.4 Completeness -.326** .326** .310**
6.5 Performance .125 .125 .124
7.1 Progress -.443*** .443*** .405***
7.2 Advice -.726*** .726*** .588***
Phi coefficient, Cramer’s V index and contingency coefficient are estimated to measure
the association between each item and Big4 assuror. Each item is a dummy variable that
takes the value of 1 for disclosure and 0 otherwise. Likewise, Big4 is a dummy variable
that takes the value of 1 for assurance provided by a large accounting firm and 0
otherwise. Phi coefficient ranges from -1 to +1 (Singh, K. 2007) and Cramer’s V and
contingency coefficient from 0 to 1, where 0 means complete independence (Kendall and
Stuart, 1973). ***, Significance at 1% level; **, Significance at 5% level; *, Significance
at 10% level. c Statistics not provided because the variable is a constant.

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2. Conceptual background and theoretical framework

stakeholders may consider “unconventional” the assurance by a non-accounting provider (Casey

1994), which consists of elaborating a classification framework, to develop a classification scheme,

(Table 1: to be inserted around here)

3.2 Development of Hypotheses

Expert within the CSR committee

Internal Audit Function

GRI Application Level

External Assurance Provider

(Table 2: to be inserted around here)

(Table 3: to be inserted around here)

description of the work performed; indication of the evidence-gathering requirements, sampling

(Figure 1: to be inserted around here)

5.2 Multivariate models

(Table 5: to be inserted around here)

(Table 6: to be inserted around here)

(Table 7: to be inserted around here)

6. Discussion and conclusions

Accountability (2008), AA1000AS Assurance Standard, Accountability, London.

Department of Accounting and Finance, University of Auckland).

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Texas Tech University.

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Singh, K. (2007), “Quantitative social research methods”, Sage.

Yunus, S., Elijido-Ten, E. and Abhayawansa, S.(2016), “Determinants of carbon management

Item Description AA1000AS ISAE3000 Score

3.4 Stakeholders Extent of stakeholder participation

Assurance statements disclosure Number of Items included/Total items

Dummy variable equal to 1 if the firm's board H4 +

Ln Total Assets (LnTotAssets) Natural logarithm of total assets

Return on Assets (ROA) Net profit (loss)/Total assets

Return on Equity (ROE) Net income/Total equity

Set of dummy variables, each of which equal to 1

2012 2011 2010 2009 2008 TOT

IAF CSRcom. SO E SI ROA ROE Leverage ALA Big4 LnTotAssets

E .009 .292*** .431***

SI .295*** .054 .177** .104**

ROA -.295*** -.152** -.043 .058 -.152

ROE -.241*** -.184** .123 .131** -.064 .565***

Leverage -.453*** -.108** -.177** -.214*** -.309** .297*** .267**

ALA .212*** .011 .169 .094 .173** -.05 -.015 -.357***

Obs. Min. Max. Mean Std. Dev.

ASDI 95 .31 .76 .485 .133

Ln Tot Assets 95 10.61 20.14 15.834 1.661

ROA 95 - 10.18 8.84 1.717 3.439

ROE 95 - 30.61 37.5 7.592 11.936

Leverage 95 1.19 5.51 2.890 1.091

CSR committee 1 36 37.9

Internal Audit Function 1 57 60.0

Application Level "A" 1 61 64.2

0.156 .116 1.350 .181

CSRcom. 0.043 .022 .160 1.973 .042** .620 1.614

SO -0.013 .032 -.051 -.416 .678 .275 3.635

Expert .075 .037 .282 2.039 .045** .213 4.703

IAF .027 .023 .101 1.178 .242 .560 1.786

E .009 .292* .431*

SI .295* .054 .177 .104**

ROA -.295* -.152 -.043 .058 -.152

ROE -.241* -.184 .123 .131 -.064 .565*

Leverage -.453* -.108 -.177 -.214* -.309 .297* .267**

ALA .212* .011 .169 .094 .173 -.05 -.015 -.357***

1.1. Independence .477* .477* .430***

3.1 Scope -.300* .300* .287**

3.5 Objectives -.218* .218* .213***

3.7 Work .594* .594* .510***

3.9 Resources -.328* .328* .312***

3.10 Level -.328* .328* .312***

4.1 Title .277* .277* .267***

4.2 Addressee .323* .323* .307***

5.1 System agreed -.413* .413* .382***

5.2 System -.499* .499* .446***

6.1 Positive -.643* .643* .541***

6.2 Negative .456* .456* .415***

6.4 Completeness -.326 .326 .310**

7.1 Progress -.443* .443* .405***

7.2 Advice -.726* .726* .588***