CASE DIGESTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2
I. BILL OF RIGHTS AND THE
FUNDAMENTAL POWERS
PRELIMINARY CONSIDERATIONS
GMA V. COMELEC
FACTS: Assailed in the petitions are certain regulations
promulgated by the COMELEC in relation to the conduct
of the 2013 national and local elections dealing with
political advertisements—the constitutionality of the
limitations placed on aggregate airtime allowed to
candidates and politics parties as well as the incident
requirements of said airtime (Section 9 [a] or RN. 9615).
The regulations limit the broadcast and radio adverts of
candidates and political parties for national election
positions to an aggregate total of 120 and 180 minutes,
respectively. They also assail Section 7 (d), which delves
on the suspension or revocation of an offender’s franchise
or permit as well as criminal liability.
ISSUE/S:
RULING: YES, IT IS A VIOLATION OF FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION, OF SPEECH, AND OF THE PRESS. The
guaranty of freedom to speak is useless without the ability
to communicate and disseminate what is said. And where
there is a need to reach a large audience, the need to
access the means and media for such dissemination
becomes critical. This is where the press and broadcast
media come along. At the same time, the right to speak
and to reach out would not be meaningful if it is just a
token ability to be heard by a few. It must be coupled with
substantially reasonable means by which the
communicator and the audience could effectively interact.
Section 9 (a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 9615, with its
adoption of the "aggregate-based" airtime limits
unreasonably restricts the guaranteed freedom of speech
and of the press. The court holds that it is not within the
power of the COMELEC to change the computation of the
duration of political advertisements from a per station
basis to an aggregate basis. It appeared from the cited
hearing that the COMELEC did not have any other basis
for coming up with a new manner of determining allowable
time limits except its own idea as to what should be the
maximum number of minutes based on the exercise of
discretion as to how to level the playing field. The
COMELEC is not free to simply change the rules
especially if it has consistently interpreted a legal
provision in a particular manner in the past. If ever it has
to change the rules, the same must be properly explained
with sufficient basis. YES, IT IS A VIOLATION OF THE
PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO SUFFRAGE. Fundamental to the
idea of a democratic and republican state is the right of
the people to determine their own destiny through the
choice of leaders they may have i government. Thus, the
primordial importance of suffrage and the concomitant
right of the people to be adequately informed for the
intelligent exercise of such birthright
POLICE POWER
BELTRAN V. SECRETARY OF HEALTH
FACTS: The National Blood Services Act of 1994 was
enacted into law, and Section 7 of which seeks to phase-
out commercial blood banks in the spirit of promoting
public health and welfare. The study behind such
legislation showed that the prior blood banking system of
the Philippines was unsafe by reason of the high risk of
spreading infectious diseases such as malaria and AIDS.
Thus, voluntary blood donation, safe blood supply, and
proper blood collection form healthy donors are
incorporated in the aforesaid legislation in order to replace
the old system.
ISSUES:
RULING: IT IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE
POWER. The promotion of public health is a fundamental
obligation of the State. The health of the people is a
primordial governmental concern. Basically, the National
Blood Services Act was enacted in the exercise of the
States police power in order to promote and preserve
public health and safety. In serving the interest of the
public, and to give meaning to the purpose of the law, the
Legislature deemed it necessary to phase out commercial
blood banks. This action may seriously affect the owners
and operators, as well as the employees, of commercial
blood banks but their interests must give way to serve a
higher end for the interest of the public. Therefore, the
Legislature, under the circumstances, adopted a course
of action that is both necessary and reasonable for the
common good. Police power is the State authority to
enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or
property in order to promote the general welfare
CARLOS SUPERDRUG v. DSWD
FACTS: The Expanded Senior Citizens Act of 2003
grants 20% discount to senior citizens from all
establishments relative to the utilization of services in
hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants
and recreation centers, and purchase of medicines in all
establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of
senior citizens, including funeral and burial services as tax
deduction based on the net cost of the goods sold or
services rendered.
ISSUE:
RULING: THERE IS NO JUST COMPENSATION IN
THIS CASE, BUT IT IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE
POWER. A tax deduction does not offer full
reimbursement of the senior citizen discount. As such, it
would not meet the definition of just compensation. The
Senior Citizens Act was enacted primarily to maximize the
contribution of senior citizens to nation-building, and to
grant benefits and privileges to them for their
improvement and well-being as the State considers them
an integral part of our society. Because of this rationale,
the law is a legitimate exercise of police power which,
similar to the power of eminent domain, has general
welfare for its object. While the Constitution protects
property rights, petitioners must accept the realities of
business and the State, in the exercise of police power,
can intervene in the operations of a business which may
result in an impairment of property rights in the process.
MIRASOL v. DPWH
FACTS: DPWH issued DO 123, which are revised rules
and regulations governing limited access highways. In
this Order, the word motorcycles was defined in that they
are allowed to operate inside the toll roads and limited
access highways as long as they have an engine
displacement of at least 400 cubic centimeters. However,
Section 3 of A.O. No. 1 makes it unlawful for any person
or group of persons to drive any bicycle, tricycle, pedicab,
motorcycle, or any non-motorized vehicle on limited
access highways.
ISSUE:
RULING: NO. A.O. No. 1 IS NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL
BECAUSE IT IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE
POWER. It merely outlines several precautionary
measures, to which toll way users must adhere. These
rules were designed to ensure public safety and the
uninhibited flow of traffic within limited access facilities.
The DPWH, through the Solicitor General, maintains that
the toll ways were not designed to accommodate
motorcycles and that their presence in the toll ways will
compromise safety and traffic considerations. The DPWH
points out that the same study the petitioners rely on cites
that the inability of other drivers to detect motorcycles is
the predominant cause of accidents. The use of public
highways by motor vehicles is subject to regulation as an
exercise of the police power of the state. As a facility
designed to promote the fastest access to certain
destinations, its use, operation, and maintenance require
close regulation. Public interest and safety require the
imposition of certain restrictions on toll ways that do not
apply to ordinary roads. As a special kind of road, it is but
reasonable that not all forms of transport could use it.
SJS v. LIM
FACTS: The petitioners are assailing the constitutionality
of the continued stay of the Pandacan Oil Terminals by
virtue of Ordinance No. 8187. Although CHEVRON,
Petron, and other oil terminals have already withdrawn
their products form the Pandacan terminals, they have
continued their operations. The respondents and the oil
companies plead that the Pandacan Terminal has never
been one of the targets of terrorist attacks, that the
petitions were based on unfounded fears and mere
conjectures, and that the possibility that it would be picked
by the terrorists is nil given the security measures
installed thereat.
ISSUE:
RULING: IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL. EXERCISE OF
POLICE POWER WAS USED FOR THE GENERAL
WELFARE. In G.R. No. 156052, the validity and
constitutionality of Ordinance No. 8027 was declared as
a guarantee for the protection of the constitutional right to
life of the residents of Manila. There, the Court said that
the enactment of the said ordinance was a valid exercise
of police power with the concurrence of the two requisites:
a lawful subject – "to safeguard the rights to life, security
and safety of all the inhabitants of Manila;" and a lawful
method – the enactment of Ordinance No. 8027
reclassifying the land use from industrial to commercial,
which effectively ends the continued stay of the oil depots
in Pandacan. The ordinance was intended to safeguard
the rights to life, security and safety of all the inhabitants
of Manila and not just of a particular class. The depot is
perceived, rightly or wrongly, as a representation of
western interests which means that it is a terrorist target.
As long as it (sic) there is such a target in their midst, the
residents of Manila are not safe. It therefore became
necessary to remove these terminals to dissipate the
threat.
DRUGSTORES ASSOCIATION v. NATIONAL
COUNCIL ON DISABILITY AFFAIRS
FACTS: Constitutionality of mandatory 20% discount on
the purchase of medicines of disabled persons.
ISSUE:
RULING: VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER.
Similar to Carlos Superdrug case. Article XIII, Section 11
of the Constitution shows the adoption of the state of a
comprehensive approach to health development,
prioritizing disabled children. This is in line with the policy
of the assailed R.A. No 7277, which gives full support to
the improvement of the total well-being of disabled
persons and their integration into the mainstream of
society.
AMCOW v. GCC APPROVED MEDICAL CENTERS
ASSOCATION
FACTS: GAMCA assails the decision of the lower courts
to declare null and void the implementation of the referral
decking system, wherein GCC-accredited medical clinics
or hospitals’ examination results will be honored by the
GCC States’ respective embassies. Then, it requires
OFW applicants to go first to a GAMCA center then they
will refer the applicant to a GAMCA Clinic or hospital. R.A.
10022 however, states that every Filipino migrant worker
shall have the freedom to choose any of the DOH-
accredited or DOH-operated clinics that will conduct
his/her health examinations. GAMCA argues that this is
undue taking of property.
ISSUE:
RULING: NO. IT IS NOT UNDUE TAKING OF
PROPERTY. THE PROTECTION OF THE WELFARE OF
THE OFWS IS A LEGITIMATE PUBLIC CONCERN AND
THUS THE PROHIBITION AGAINST REFERRAL
DECKING IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER.
The prohibition against the referral decking system is
consistent with the State's exercise of the police power to
prescribe regulations to promote the health, safety, and
general welfare of the people. Public interest demands
State interference on health matters, since the welfare of
migrant workers is a legitimate public concern.
FERNANDO v. ST. SCHOLASTICA’S COLLEGE
FACTS: On April 2, 2000, the City Government of
Marikina sent a letter to the respondents ordering them to
demolish and replace the fence of their Marikina property
to make it 80% see-thru, and, at the same time, to move
it back about six (6) meters to provide parking space for
vehicles to park. The respondents, thus, asserted that the
implementation of the ordinance on their property would
be tantamount to an appropriation of property without due
process of law; and that the petitioners could only
appropriate a portion of their property through eminent
domain. The petitioners, on the other hand, countered
that the ordinance was a valid exercise of police power,
by virtue of which, they could restrain property rights for
the protection of public safety, health, morals, or the
promotion of public convenience and general prosperity.
ISSUE:
RULING: IT IS AN INVALID EXERCISE OF POLICE
POWER. The Court joins the CA in finding that the real
intent of the setback requirement was to make the parking
space free for use by the public, considering that it would
no longer be for the exclusive use of the respondents as
it would also be available for use by the general public.
Section 9 of Article III of the 1987 Constitution, a provision
on eminent domain, provides that private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation.
Anent the objectives of prevention of concealment of
unlawful acts and "un- neighborliness," it is obvious that
providing for a parking area has no logical connection to,
and is not reasonably necessary for, the accomplishment
of these goals.
Regarding the beautification purpose of the
setback requirement, it has long been settled that the
State may not, under the guise of police power,
permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
property solely to preserve or enhance the aesthetic
appearance of the community.
Compelling the respondents to construct their
fence in accordance with the assailed ordinance is, thus,
a clear encroachment on their right to property, which
necessarily includes their right to decide how best to
protect their property. It also appears that requiring the
exposure of their property via a see-thru fence is violative
of their right to privacy, considering that the residence of
the Benedictine nuns is also located within the property.
The right to privacy has long been considered a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution that
must be protected from intrusion or constraint.
BASCO v. PAGCOR
FACTS: The petitioners filed the instant petition seeking
to annul the Philippine Amusement and Gaming
Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter — PD 1869, because it
is allegedly contrary to morals, public policy and order.
The petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the
declared national policy of the "new restored democracy"
and the people's will as expressed in the 1987
Constitution.
ISSUE:
RULING: NO NEED TO ANNUL THE PAGCOR
CHARTER BECAUSE IT IS REGULATED BY THE
GOVERNMENT IN THE EXERCISE OF ITS POLICE
POWER. P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of
the government to "regulate and centralize thru an
appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by
existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st whereas
clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently proved,
regulating and centralizing gambling operations in one
corporate entity — the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just
to the Government but to society in general. It is a reliable
source of much needed revenue for the cash strapped
Government. It provided funds for social impact projects
and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation,
supervision and control of the Government" (4th Whereas
Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the
direct intervention of the Government, the evil practices
and corruptions that go with gambling will be minimized if
not totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at the
bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.
EMINENT DOMAIN
CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY v. ERICTA
FACTS: The petition seeks to reverse the decision of the
lower in Court w/c declared Section 9 of Ordinance no.
6118, S-64 as null and void. The said section provides
that at least six (6) percent of the total area of the
memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity
burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have
been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to
their death, to be determined by competent City
Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be
developed and should be open for operation not later than
six months from the date of approval of the application.
Petitioners argue that the taking of the respondent's
property is a valid and reasonable exercise of police
power and that the land is taken for a public use as it is
intended for the burial ground of paupers.
ISSUE:
RULING: NO. POLICE POWER IS NOT APPLICABLE IN
THIS CASE. There is no reasonable relation between the
setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of
an private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of
deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals,
good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people.
The ordinance is actually a taking without compensation
of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit
paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation.
Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for
this purpose, the city passes the burden to private
cemeteries. Even eminent domain cannot be applicable
because if ever it engages expropriation proceedings, it
will not be for public use because it will only benefit
paupers.
DOTC v. SPOUSES ABECINA
FACTS: In February 1993, the DOTC awarded Digitel
Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. (Digitel) a contract
for the management, operation, maintenance, and
development of a Regional Telecommunications
Development Project (RTDP) under the National
Telephone Program, Phase I, Tranche 1 (NTPI-1). Later
on, the municipality of Jose Panganiban, Camarines
Norte, donated a one thousand two hundred (1,200)
square-meter parcel of land to the DOTC for the
implementation of the RDTP in the municipality. However,
the municipality erroneously included portions of the
respondents' property in the donation. Pursuant to the
FLAs, Digitel constructed a telephone exchange on the
property which encroached on the properties of the
respondent spouses. It argues that while the DOTC, in
good faith and in the performance of its mandate, took
private property without formal expropriation proceedings,
the taking was nevertheless an exercise of eminent
domain. The Department prays that instead of allowing
recovery of the property, the case should be remanded to
the RTC for determination of just compensation.
ISSUE:
RULING: NOT A VALID EXERCISE OF EMINENT
DOMAIN BECAUSE NO EXPROPRIATION
PROCEEDINGS WERE HELD. It is unthinkable then that
precisely because there was a failure to abide by what the
law requires, the government would stand to benefit. It is
just as important, if not more so, that there be fidelity to
legal norms on the part of officialdom if the rule of law
were to be maintained. It is not too much to say that when
the government takes any property for public use, which
is conditioned upon the payment of just compensation, to
be judicially ascertained, it makes manifest that it submits
to the jurisdiction of a court. There is no thought then that
the doctrine of immunity from suit could still be
appropriately invoked.
MANILA MEMORIAL PARK v. SEC OF DSWD
FACTS: Petitioners assail the constitutionality of Section
4 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7432, as amended by RA
9257, and the implementing rules and regulations issued
by the DSWD and DOF insofar as these allow business
establishments to claim the 20% discount given to senior
citizens as a tax deduction. Petitioners posit that the tax
deduction scheme contravenes Article III, Section 9 of the
Constitution, which provides that: "private property shall
not be taken for public use without just compensation."
ISSUE:
RULING: EMINENT DOMAIN IS NOT EXERCISED IN
THIS CASE, BUT POLICE POWER. The case provides
the difference between police power and eminent domain.
POLICE POWER EMINENT DOMAIN
Police power is the Eminent domain, on the
inherent power of the other hand, is the inherent
State to regulate or to power of the State to take
restrain the use of liberty or appropriate private
and property for public property for public use.
welfare.
To be a valid exercise of The Constitution requires
police power, it must have that private property shall
a lawful subject or not be taken without due
objective and a lawful process of law and the
method of accomplishing payment of just
the goal. compensation.
In the exercise of police In the exercise of the
power, although the power of eminent domain,
regulation affects the right property interests are
of ownership, none of the appropriated and applied
bundle of rights which to some public purpose
constitute ownership is which necessitates the
appropriated for use by or payment of just
for the benefit of the compensation therefor.
public.
TAXATION
REYES v. ALMANZOR
FACTS: Petitioners J.B.L. Reyes, Edmundo and Milagros
Reyes are owners of parcels of land situated in Tondo and
Sta. Cruz Districts, City of Manila, which are leased and
entirely occupied as dwelling sites by tenants. Said
tenants were paying monthly rentals not exceeding three
hundred pesos (P300.00) in July, 1971. On July 14, 1971,
the National Legislature enacted Republic Act No. 6359
prohibiting for one year from its effectivity, an increase in
monthly rentals of dwelling units or of lands on which
another's dwelling is located, where such rentals do not
exceed three hundred pesos (P300.00) a month but
allowing an increase in rent by not more than 10%
thereafter. Eventually, this was made absolute. Thus, the
Reyeses were precluded from raising the rentals and from
ejecting the tenants.
ISSUE:
RULING: INVALID EXERCISE OF THE POWER OF
TAXATION. Under Art. VIII, Sec. 17 (1) of the 1973
Constitution, then enforced, the rule of taxation must not
only be uniform, but must also be equitable and
progressive. Uniformity has been defined as that principle
by which all taxable articles or kinds of property of the
same class shall be taxed at the same rate. Taxation is
said to be equitable when its burden falls on those better
able to pay. Taxation is progressive when its rate goes up
depending on the resources of the person affected. Verily,
taxes are the lifeblood of the government and so should
be collected without unnecessary hindrance. However,
such collection should be made in accordance with law as
any arbitrariness will negate the very reason for
government itself It is therefore necessary to reconcile the
apparently conflicting interests of the authorities and the
taxpayers so that the real purpose of taxations, which is
the promotion of the common good, may be achieved.
Respondent Assessor of the City of Manila unlawfully and
unjustifiably set increased new assessed values at levels
so high and successive that the resulting annual real
estate taxes would admittedly exceed the sum total of the
yearly rentals paid or payable by the dweller tenants
under P.D. 20. Thus, the tax values were arbitrarily
excessive, unwarranted, inequitable, confiscatory, and
unconstitutional.
PHCP v. CIR
FACTS: On January 27, 2000, respondent Commissioner
of Internal Revenue [CIR] sent petitioner a formal demand
letter and the corresponding assessment notices
demanding the payment of deficiency taxes, including
surcharges and interest, for the taxable years 1996 and
1997 in the total amount of ₱224,702,641.18 for its health
care agreements. The petitioner contends that the
Documentary Stamp Tax under Section 185 of the
National Internal Revenue of 1997 is imposed only on a
company engaged in the business of fidelity bonds and
other insurance policies. Petitioner, as an HMO, is a
service provider, not an insurance company.
ISSUE:
RULING: THE DST IMPOSED UPON PHCP IS VOID
BECAUSE DURING THE TAXABLE YEARS, THE PHCP
WAS NOT ENGAGED IN THE BUSINESS OF
INSURANCE. It was shown that petitioner PHCP was not
engaged in the insurance business. The question, more
broadly, is whether, looking at the plan of operation as a
whole, ‘service’ rather than ‘indemnity’ is its principal
object and purpose. The basic distinction between
medical service corporations and ordinary health and
accident insurers is that the former undertake to provide
prepaid medical services through participating
physicians, thus relieving subscribers of any further
financial burden, while the latter only undertake to
indemnify an insured for medical expenses up to, but not
beyond, the schedule of rates contained in the policy. The
primary purpose of a medical service corporation,
however, is an undertaking to provide physicians who will
render services to subscribers on a prepaid basis. PHCP
was engaged in the dispensation of medical services such
as preventive medical services, diagnostic medical
services, and curative medical services. It negotiates with
health care practitioners through contracts containing
payment schemes, financing, and other procedures for
the delivery of health services. The fact that PHCP was
not engaged in the insurance business was confirmed by
the Insurance Commission.
PARTNERSHIP AMONG THE POWERS
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL v. CITY MAYOR OF MANILA
FACTS: There was the assertion of its being beyond the
powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to
enact Ordinance No. 4760 as it would regulate motels, on
the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila
or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that
Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional
and void for being unreasonable and violative of due
process insofar as it would impose P6,000.00 fee per
annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second
class motels; that the provision in the same section which
would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging
house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest
or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any
person or persons without his filling up the prescribed
form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his
presence, and other such regulation policies. Thus, the
said ordinance is deemed by the petitioners as
unconstitutional.
ISSUE:
RULING: NO, THE ORDINANCE IS NOT
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. THE MUNICIPAL BOARD
MERELY USED ITS POLICE POWER AND POWER TO
TAX TO MINIMIZE CERTAIN PRACTICES. Although
police power is that inherent power of the state used to
regulate and safeguard public morals. There is no
question as to this point, because the explanatory note of
the Councilor Herminio Astorga, speaks of the alarming
increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication
in Manila traceable in great part to the existence of
motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become
the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers."
Furthermore, the power to tax was used in the form of
license fees, intended to discourage "establishments of
the kind from operating for purpose other than legal" and
at the same time, to increase "the income of the city
government." In this sense, the power to tax, too, was
used to regulate or minimize certain practices.
CIR v. CENTRAL LUZON DRUG CORPORATION
FACTS: The
PAULIT-ULIT NALANG ‘YUNG FACTS PUNYETA 20%
DISCOUNT NANAMAN. O BASTA LUMANG CASE TO
KUMPARA SA CARLOS SUPERDRUG. SA CASE NA
TO, YUNG 20%, HINDI DAW TAX DEDUCTION KUNG
HINDI TAX CREDIT. PAG TAX DEDUCTION KASI, SA
PRICE MISMO NAGREREFLECT ‘YUNG BAWAS, SO
MAY PORTION NG DISCOUNT NA ISSHOULDER
MISMO NG KUMPANYA. ETO ‘YUNG NANGYARI SA
CARLOS SUPERDRUG CASE, KAYA NGA VALID
EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER KASI WALANG JUST
COMPENSATION. SA KASO NA ‘TO, ‘YUNG
DISCOUNT DAW AY TAX CREDIT,
NASHINOSHOULDER NG GOVERNMENT KAYA SABI
NUNG PONENCIA, PWEDE DAW MAGING EXERCISE
OF EMINENT DOMAIN KASI WALA NAMANG
MAWAWALA SA KUMPANYA EH. LAHAT NG
MABABAWAS SA KANILA, IBABALIK NAMAN NG
GOVERNMENT SINCE TAX CREDIT NAMAN DAW
SIYA. YUN LANG YON PUNYETA
BILL OF RIGHTS AND PRIVATE PERSONS
PEOPLE v. MARTI
FACTS: On August 14, 1987, between 10:00 and 11:00
a.m., the appellant and his common-law wife, Shirley
Reyes, went to the booth of the "Manila Packing and
Export Forwarders" in the Pistang Pilipino Complex,
Ermita, Manila, carrying with them four (4) gift wrapped
packages. Anita Reyes then asked the appellant if she
could examine and inspect the packages. Appellant,
however, refused, assuring her that the packages simply
contained books, cigars, and gloves and were gifts to his
friend in Zurich. Before delivery of appellant's box to the
Bureau of Customs and/or Bureau of Posts, Mr. Job
Reyes (proprietor) and husband of Anita (Reyes),
following standard operating procedure, opened the
boxes for final inspection. When he opened appellant's
box, a peculiar odor emitted therefrom. His curiousity
aroused, he squeezed one of the bundles allegedly
containing gloves and felt dried leaves inside. Opening
one of the bundles, he pulled out a cellophane wrapper
protruding from the opening of one of the gloves. He
made an opening on one of the cellophane wrappers and
took several grams of the contents thereof. Job Reyes
brought out the box in which appellant's packages were
placed and, in the presence of the NBI agents, opened
the top flaps, removed the styro-foam and took out the
cellophane wrappers from inside the gloves. Dried
marijuana leaves were found to have been contained
inside the cellophane wrappers. Appellant contends that
the evidence subject of the imputed offense had been
obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against
unreasonable search and seizure and privacy of
communication (Sec. 2 and 3, Art. III, Constitution) and
therefore argues that the same should be held
inadmissible in evidence (Sec. 3 (2), Art. III).
ISSUE:
RULING: NO. THERE WAS NO VIOLATION OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS. In a number of cases, the
Court strictly adhered to the exclusionary rule and has
struck down the admissibility of evidence obtained in
violation of the constitutional safeguard against
unreasonable searches and seizures. It must be noted,
however, that in all those cases adverted to, the evidence
so obtained were invariably procured by the State acting
through the medium of its law enforcers or other
authorized government agencies. On the other hand, the
case at bar assumes a peculiar character since the
evidence sought to be excluded was primarily discovered
and obtained by a private person, acting in a private
capacity and without the intervention and participation of
State authorities. Under the circumstances, therefore, the
constitutional right against unreasonable searches and
seizure has not been violated and cannot be invoked
against the state, because in the absence of
governmental interference, the liberties guaranteed by
the Constitution cannot be invoked against the State.
THE SEARCH WAS MADE BY A PRIVATE PERSON.
Records of the case clearly indicate that it was Mr. Job
Reyes, the proprietor of the forwarding agency, who made
search/inspection of the packages. Said inspection was
reasonable and a standard operating procedure on the
part of Mr. Reyes as a precautionary measure before
delivery of packages to the Bureau of Customs or the
Bureau of Posts.
MERE PRESENCE OF THE NBI DOES NOT EQUATE
TO A SEARCH. The mere presence of the NBI agents did
not convert the reasonable search effected by Reyes into
a warrantless search and seizure proscribed by the
Constitution. Merely to observe and look at that which is
in plain sight is not a search. Having observed that which
is open, where no trespass has been committed in aid
thereof, is not a search. Where the contraband articles are
identified without a trespass on the part of the arresting
officer, there is not the search that is prohibited by the
constitution
CAPIN-CADIZ v. BRENT HOSPITAL AND COLLEGES
FACTS: Cadiz was the Human Resource Officer of
respondent Brent Hospital and Colleges, Inc. (Brent) at
the time of her indefinite suspension from employment in
2006. The cause of suspension was Cadiz's
Unprofessionalism and Unethical Behavior Resulting to
Unwed Pregnancy, which is considered by the said
institution as immorality. This immorality is a ground for
her suspension. Cadiz contends, among others, that
getting pregnant outside of wedlock is not grossly
immoral, especially when both partners do not have any
legal impediment to marry. Cadiz surmises that the
reason for her suspension was not because of her
relationship with her then boyfriend but because of the
resulting pregnancy. It is also argued that the condition of
marriage by the institution in order to effect her
reinstatement is oppressive and discriminatory.
ISSUE:
RULING: SHE DID NOT COMMIT IMMORAL ACTS. The
standard of immorality with which an act should be
gauged is not religious, but public and secular—it should
be made in accordance with the prevailing norms of
conduct. This refers to conduct proscribed because they
are detrimental to conditions upon which depend the
existence and progress of human society. They did not
flaunt that they engaged in pre-marital sex, thus, her
relationship with her boyfriend was not carried on under
scandalous or disgraceful circumstances.
MARRIAGE AS A CONDITION OF REINSTATEMENT IS
OPPRESSIVE, COERCIVE, AND DISCRIMINATORY.
The Labor Code provides that it is unlawful for an
employer to require as a condition of employment or
continuation of employment that a woman employee shall
not get married, or to stipulate expressly or tacitly that
upon getting married, a woman employee shall be
deemed resigned or separated… etc. Further, the Magna
Carta of Women protects them against discrimination in
all matters relating to marriage and family relations,
including the right to choose freely a spouse and to enter
into marriage only with their free and full consent.
BILL OF RIGHTS GUARANTEE DURING THE
1986 INTERREGNUM
REPUBLIC v. SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Presidential Commission on Good Government
(PCGG) was created to recover all ill-gotten wealth of
former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate
family, relatives, subordinates and close associates. EO
No. 1 vested the PCGG with the power (a) to conduct
investigation as may be necessary in order to accomplish
and carry out the purposes of this order and the power (h)
to promulgate such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purpose of this order. Based
on its mandate, the AFP Board investigated various
reports of alleged unexplained wealth of respondent
Major General Josephus Q. Ramas. The equipment/items
and communication facilities which were found in the
premises of Elizabeth Dimaano were confiscated. Aside
from the military equipment/items and communications
equipment, the raiding team was also able to confiscate
money in the amount of P2,870,000.00 and $50,000 US
Dollars in the house of Elizabeth Dimaano on 3 March
1986.
ISSUE: WAS THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE LEGAL?
RULING: PARTLY. THE SEARCH WARRANT APPLIED
FOR WAS ONLY THE SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF FIVE
BABY ARMALITE RIFLES AND FIVE BOXES OF
AMMUNITION, NOT THE JEWELRIES, THE MONEY,
THE LAND TITLES AND COMMUNICATIONS
EQUIPMENT. The Bill of Rights under the 1973
Constitution was not operative during the interregnum, but
the protection accorded to individuals under the Covenant
and the Declaration remained in effect during the
interregnum. Thus, a person could not invoke any
exclusionary right under a Bill of Rights because there
was neither a constitution nor a Bill of Rights during the
interregnum. Nevertheless, even in that time, the Filipino
people continued to enjoy, under the Covenant and the
Declaration, almost the same rights found in the Bill of
Rights of the 1973 Constitution. Under Article 17(1) of the
Covenant, the revolutionary government had the duty to
ensure that no one shall be subjected to arbitrary or
unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or
correspondence. The Declaration, to which the
Philippines is also a signatory, provides in its Article 17(2)
that no one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property. the
Court has interpreted the Declaration as part of the
generally accepted principles of international law and
binding on the State. Thus, the revolutionary government
was also obligated under international law to observe the
rights of individuals under the Declaration. The directives
and orders should not have also violated the Covenant or
the Declaration. In this case, the revolutionary
government presumptively sanctioned the warrant since
the revolutionary government did not repudiate it. The
warrant, issued by a judge upon proper application,
specified the items to be searched and seized. The
warrant is thus valid with respect to the items specifically
described in the warrant.