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Slippery Rock Area High School

Analyzing the Anomaly of Spanish Neutrality during the Second World War

Nicholas Shea

Honors World History 12

Ms. Angela Mastrean

23 April 2017
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More often than not when studying the onset of The Second World War the primary area

of study revolves around what lead nations into the conflict. For some nations the topic in

question is not what caused them to engage in the conflict, but instead what caused them to

refrain. Spain was one of the few European nations that would ultimately end up remaining

militarily neutral throughout the entire war. This came as somewhat of a surprise to many due to

the preexisting conditions that predisposed Spain to joining the Axis Powers. Despite the

apparentness of this anomaly, like anything, it can be explained with deeper analysis of the

conditions of the time period. There were several crucial factors that prevented Spain's entry into

the war, but one factor proved to be more essential than any other. The political climate between

Spanish and Axis leadership did contribute to decreasing the likelihood of a Spanish

mobilization​; ​however, it was Spain’s desperate economic dependency on the Allies that

ultimately became the deciding factor in preventing Spanish engagement in the war.

After the First World War, Europe became the breeding ground for new and extreme

theories of government manifested in distinct ideologies. ​The most prominent and significant

two newly popular and influential ideologies were the doctrines of Fascism and of Communism,

new players on the world stage that would both challenge the idea of democratic institutions and

free market capitalism. These ideologies, though they shared common characteristics, harbored

deep seated hatred for one another and tension between extreme right and extreme left parties

manifested itself in governments across Europe. In many nations parties wielding the most

extreme ideologies began to gain popularity. Drastic measures were often taken as unrest lead to

swift and distinct shifts of power that occurred in the governments of many nations. Alliances

began to form as nations with similar ideologies sought to extend the influence of their ideology
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globally. This lead to the creation of an exceedingly polarized Europe that would set the stage for

the conditions that would be seen just prior to and during the war.

One such example of a shift in power of a government can be seen in the events of the

Spanish civil war. Prior to Franco’s rule, Spain was governed by a left wing, communist

sympathising government. ​During this time Francisco Franco Served as a Spanish army officer

causing no major disturbances until 1937 when he joined a right wing (fascist) revolt against the

incumbent government. According to a biographical source on Francisco Franco, "In February

1936 the leftist gov​ernment of the Spanish republic exiled Franco to an obscure command in the

Canary Islands. The following July he joined other right-wing officers in a revolt against the

republic which is when the Spanish Civil War began.” (Francisco Franco 53). At this point the

struggle between fascism and communism had broken out in Spain with Francisco Franco

leading the fascist forces. “In October they made him commander in chief and head of state of

their new Nationalist regime. -- The tide was already turning against the Republicans (or

Loyalists), and Franco was able to move steadily northward toward Madrid, becoming, on

September 29, generalissimo of the rebel forces and head of state." (Francisco Franco 53).

During the civil war, Franco’s right wing revolutionaries received significant military assistance

from the Fascist Government's of Germany and Italy enabling them to gain victory over the

leftist forces and establish a new government. Following the resolution of the conflict, Franco’s

regime owed significant monetary and symbolic debts to Hitler and Mussolini.

As previously stated, the German and Italian governments played an important role in

Franco’s rise to power and consequently the nations were bound in a sort of political

relationship. All mentioned nations were of course Fascist which obviously lead them to see each
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other as allies of sorts in a world of competing ideologies. The sharing of an ideology as well as

the debt of Spain to its fellow fascist nations formed a sort of alliance structure that would play a

role in relations between the nations as the war drew nearer.

The Second World War among many things was a clash between competing ideologies in

an alliance based system of global warfare. There were two main alliances that fought against

each other during the war. The allies (with the major exception of the soviet union) consisted

primarily of democratic and republican based countries. All allies including the soviet union held

extreme unhappiness for the presence of fascism in the world and sought to see it eliminated.

The axis consisted of fascist nations that sought to expand their power through aggressive tactics

of expansion coupled with strategic military alliance with fellow fascist nations. Axis powers

were generally anti democratic and violently opposed to communism. Put simply, “The Second

World War's opposing alliances pitted strong ​democracies​ against totalitarian regimes.” (Allied

Powers). The rapid culmination of the events leading up to the war left many nations in unique

positions and dilemmas regarding their next course of action. Spain sat under a distinct set of

circumstances that made the issue of how to act next a uncertain and challenging endeavor for

Spanish officials and Franco himself.

Ensnared in a variety of external obligations, Franco’s Spain found itself being edged

towards war as the Second World War encroached. For many reasons, the general thought was

that Spain would join the war with the Axis Powers. Interestingly this proved not to be the case

as the war progressed. Several underlying factors would contribute to this abstinence from war;

however, one factor would prove to be the most crucial in preventing Spain from entering the

conflict.
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Throughout the existence of Francisco Franco’s regime in Spain, the topic of government

policy pertaining to Jews and the Holocaust had been the subject of continual debate and

uncertainty. It cannot be denied that there were influential opinions within the regime that

harbored anti semitism and were sympathetic to the Nazi policy regarding the issue of Judaism.

However, that is not to say that there were not significant forces within the Spanish government

that criticised the Nazi policy. Despite Franco governing Spain as a fascist state, the Catholic

Church maintained a highly regarded position in Spanish society and government. While the

church was able to come to a comfortable agreement with the institution of the Franco

dictatorship, the ideology of Hitler’s Nazi Germany proved too unreasonable for church leaders

(Bowen 216). In his book, ​Spain during World War II,​ Dr. Wayne Bowen notes that “​In

1939-40 the Jesuits'​ Razon y Fe​ and other Catholic papers denounced Nazi racism and

anti-Semitism as unchristian, un-Spanish, and un-Catholic, calling on Spain to stay out of the

madness sweeping across Europe.” (217). Church leadership was not alone in feeling

uncomfortable with the extremism found within the borders of Nazi Germany. When prominent

Spanish fascist leader Jose Primo de Rivera returned from his visit to Nazi Germany, he came

away with mixed feelings regarding the Hitler regime. “Although impressed by the discipline

and national spirit of the Nazis, Primo de Rivera came away troubled by Hitler's lack of Christian

faith and the Nazi obsession with race and blood." (Bowen 260). Doubtless, there existed a

degree of tension within the Spanish government as to how Spain should react to Nazi policy and

further how Spain should shape their own policy regarding the issue. These denunciations

doubtlessly had some degree of effect on the Spanish decision to enter the war. To what degree
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this affected the decision can be analyzed by taking into account the Spanish government’s

physical actions towards the Jewish people in certain situations.

Towards the end of the war, when an Allied victory was becoming imminent, Franco's

regime strove to show itself in a positive light to the newly established authorities of the world.

Consequently, the regime attempted to claim that they had gone to significant lengths to assist

Jews during the war whenever they had the opportunity. The level of truth to these claims is

difficult to quantify; however, analysis of particular case studies helps to decipher just how much

the Spanish government offered help to Jews in need of assistance and how influential the topic

was in Spanish wartime government.

After the war in the 1950s, Franco’s Spain found itself faced with an ethical dilemma. A

controversy existed questioning the degree to which it should help Jews facing persecution in

Egypt given its unique position from which to offer assistance. The world's eyes were on Spain

at the time, and the response that Spain would give to the situation would speak volumes as to

what Spain’s true colors were on the issue. It must be noted that how Spain would address this

issue was the topic of significant debate within the Franco government. Dr. Raanan Rein, ​former

President of the Latin American Jewish Studies Association, emphasizes that “​The shaping of

such a policy was not an easy task, due to internal debates in the Francoist leadership as to the

measures to be adopted. Among the considerations discussed, the first and foremost was related

to efforts to strengthen relations with the United States and improve the dictatorship's image in

Western public opinion” (22). Ultimately Spain would opt to extend some help to Jews that were

Spanish citizens but were reluctant to allow them to re-settle in Spain. Additionally, it should be

acknowledged that in most of the cases that Spain did help Jews in distress both during the war
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and later in Egypt, it was not as much the result of overarching policy as it was the efforts of

individual Spanish officials that found themselves in an opportunity to extend individual help.

Dr. Rein emphasizes this idea by pointing out that “efforts made to rescue Jews, both during

World War II and in Arab countries in the post-war period, were often the result of initiatives by

Spanish diplomats in various places and not of a clear policy shaped by the Palace of Santa

Cruz” (Rein 22). Ultimately the controversy of Nazi mistreatment of Jews proved to be an low

ranking issue when stacked against other factors that the Franco government was concerned

with. Dr. Bowen explains this by showing that ​“It was the military defeats on the battlefields of

Europe and Africa, not Hitler's ideology, which proved too abhorrent or unpalatable for Spanish

tastes.” (Bowen 259)​ While there were elements of Franco's government that denounced the Nazi

treatment of Jews and even offered assistance in some cases, the fact that Jewish sympathy did

not materialize into Spanish policy and the presence of anti-semitism in the government

solidifies the idea that the issue was not a deciding factor in preventing Spain from joining

Germany in the war.

Franco generally took a very defensive strategy when it came to the affairs of his nation

and initially it was clear that Franco desired to remain neutral if at all possible. In 1938 as

tensions swelled in Europe, Franco, as quoted in ​The Bulletin of International Press​ emphasized

that “​We have no cause to mix ourselves in other people's affairs. We desire to remain neutral.

We have no desire to create difficulties for anyone….” (5). Despite Franco’s concerns for

domestic stability, the assistance that Nazi Germany and Fascist ​Italy had offered Franco’s

revolutionaries during the civil war could not so easily be forgotten. Spain still owed

considerable war debts to Germany and the connection between the nations was very present.
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This being the case, Franco met with Hitler on more than one occasion to discuss the prospect of

Spain entering the war. The leaders found the other’s desires and offers to be overall unappealing

and even impossible in the case of satisfying Franco’s demands. Doctors Leonard and Rockoff

shed light on the situation by explaining that ​“Franco wanted firm guarantees for Gibraltar and

all of French Morocco, and he did not want to cede the bases that Germany demanded. On the

economic side, Hitler wanted substantial mining concessions, whereas Franco provided a long

list of raw materials he wanted as a precondition for going to war, especially oil and food”

(Rockoff and Caruana 102). As both sides found the other's proposals difficult to accept, the

feasibility of an agreement between Franco and Hitler drawing Spain into the war began to

decrease. In fact, such frustrations began to sway German interest away from Spain entirely.

Bowen points out that despite Franco’s initial consideration of joining the war, “lack of

enthusiasm from Hitler, as well as Franco's indecisiveness, delayed this possibility for so long

that Germany's expansionist thrust and interest shifted from the Mediterranean to Eastern

Europe." (Bowen 259). German skepticism on the issue was quite present as even the German

High Command suggested that Spain remained neutral seeing that, “without foreign help Spain

can wage a war of only very short duration” (Rockoff ​and Caruana​ 170). It was not only the

Germans that harbored doubts about their potential ally. As the war progressed and Germany

began to lose momentum, Spain became increasingly uninterested in the prospect of entering the

war with them. Dr. Bowen emphasizes that toward the end of the war, “It was the military

defeats on the battlefields of Europe and Africa, not Hitler's ideology that proved too abhorrent

or unpalatable for Spanish tastes.” (259). ​Although this mutual disinterest was an important

factor in dissuading Spanish entry into the war, it does not carry the dire and inescapable nature
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that the economic situation carried and therefore cannot be identified as the most significant

factor.

Spain, having just emerged from a depleting civil war, was in a state of economic

weakness during The Second World War. Spain struggled to domestically produce essential

commodities necessary for economic stability and consequently was extremely reliant on

imports. Among the most crucial of goods needed were food for the nation's people and oil

largely used to transport this food. Receiving adequate amounts of these resources was

absolutely necessary for Spanish economic survival. With the need for foreign imports at the

forefront of the Spanish agenda, Spain considered its plausible options that would enable it to

receive its supply of precious oil and food. The Allied blockade ensured that all naval trade

conducted with Spain could be completely controlled and monitored allowing only approved

amounts of cargo into Spanish territory. If Franco crossed the Allies any Spanish mercantile

shipping would be completely vulnerable to the Allied naval forces. Hugh Rockoff describes the

extremely small size of the Spanish shipping fleet and explains that “Evidently, then, the

torpedoing, the breakdown, or even the delay (by accident or design) of a single tanker could

perceptibly effect the Spanish supply” (Rockoff ​and Caruana​ 163). Spain was ultimately left with

a decision to make in where to seek assistance between Nazi Germany, and the Allied Powers.

Franco discussed with Hitler the idea of Spain joining the war in exchange for supplies of oil and

food. The Allies at the time accounted for nearly 100 percent of the Spanish oil supply and also

provided a significant source of food for Spain. If Franco were to join the war with Germany, he

would need to be certain that Germany would be able to adequately provide the resources

necessary for Spanish survival in place of the Allies. The problem with the plausibility of this
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deal was the inability of Germany to afford selling Franco the large amount of resources that he

required. Rockoff explains here that “Even filling half of Franco's request would have had a

measurable impact on the German gasoline budget. By way of contrast, Franco's gasoline request

amounted to less than two days’ worth of production from America's much larger production"

(Rockoff ​and Caruana​ 169). The fact that Germany was hardly able to afford supplying Spain

with what the Allies could easily afford lead Franco further away from the possibility of joining

the war with the Germans.

T​he Allies had instituted an oil embargo against Spain which caused Spain to realize just

how urgent their need for oil was for survival. Essentially if Germany was unable or unwilling to

supply Spain with oil, the only choice left to Franco was to seek the assistance of the Allied

powe​rs, terminating any concept of going to war. The US was entirely aware of Spain’s

precarious position and attempted to manipulate Spain away from the idea of joining the axis

powers. Alexander Weddell, US ambassador to Spain during 1941, described this strategy in a

telegram to the US secretary of state, “The object of our economic aid to Spain would be to

emphasize to the Spanish Government the extent of Spain’s dependence upon Western

Hemisphere and British Empire resources. To do this we must constantly keep before the

Government the benefits to be derived from collaboration with the United States.” (Weddell).

Unlike other reasons cited for deterring Spain’s entry into the war, both the acute economic

vulnerability and depe​ndency that Spain had on the Allies left Spain with no alternative course of

action (other than self-imposed destruction) than to appease the Allies and avoid conflict and

Axis sympathy. This reality leads to the conclusion that Spain’s economic reliance on the Allies’

good favor resulting from the failure of Germany to provide the necessary resources for survival
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was the most fundamental reason for Spain’s maintained neutrality throughout the course of the

war.

Although the issues of Judaism and politics dissuaded Franco from leading his nation to

war, the economic situation that faced Spain completely prevented Spanish entry. Ultimately

Franco would find it impossible to lead the Spanish people to join the war in the aid of the Axis

Powers. This was partly due to the unsuitability of Spain's potential allies, but it was more so the

result of prevention at the hands of their opponents. Unlike most nations of Europe in the time

period, Franco’s Spain proved to be an example that it was not impossible to abstain from

entering into armed conflict. It is important to understand what brings nations to war, but it is

perhaps more important to understand what keeps nations out of them.

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Works Cited

“Allied Powers (World War II).” ​New World Encyclopedia​.

---. “Spanish Pilgrimages to Hitler’s Germany: Emissaries of the New Order.” ​The Historian​,

vol. 71, no. 2, Summer 2009, pp. 258-79. ​JSTOR​, www.jstor.org/stable/24454498.

Accessed 24 Feb. 2017.

“Francisco Franco Bahamonde.” ​Encyclopedia of World Biography​, vol. 6, no. 2, 2004, pp.

52-54. ​Gale Virtual Reference Library​,

go.galegroup.com/ps/i.do?p=GVRL&sw=w&u=pl2839&v=2.1&it=r&id=GALE%7CCX

3404702259&asid=674db2edb1a1c158a38cc8c3e643732f. Accessed 1 Mar. 2017.

“Gibraltar, Spain, and the Straits.” ​Bulletin of International News​, vol. 16, no. 9, 6 May 1939, pp.

3-6. ​JSTOR​, www.jstor.org/stable/25642468. Accessed 2 Mar. 2017.

Raanan, Rein. “Diplomacy, Propaganda, and Humanitarian Gestures: Francoist Spain and

Egyptian Jews, 1956-1968.” ​Iberoamericana​, vol. 6, no. 23, Sept. 2006, pp. 21-33.

JSTOR​, www.jstor.org/stable/41676090. Accessed 22 Feb. 2017. The jewish controversy

in Francoist Spain

Rockoff, Hugh, and Leonard Caruana. “An Elephant in The Garden: The Allies, Spain, and Oil

in World War II.” ​European Review of Economic History​, vol. 11, no. 2, Aug. 2007, pp.

159-87. ​JSTOR​, www.jstor.org/stable/41378462. Accessed 14 Feb. 2017.

Wayne, Bowen H. ​Spain During World War II​. U of Missouri, 2006.

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Weddell, Alexander W. “The Ambassador in Spain (Weddell) to the Secretary of State.”

Received by Cordell Hull, 26 May 1941. ​Office of the Historian​, United States

Department of State, history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1941v02/d885. Accessed

2 Apr. 2017. Telegram.

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Works Consulted

Bowen, Wayne H. “Spain and the Nazi Occupation of Poland, 1939-44.” ​International Social

Science Review​, vol. 82, no. 3/4, 2007, pp. 135-48. ​JSTOR​,

www.jstor.org/stable/41887323. Accessed 12 Apr. 2017.

Caruana, Leonard, and Hugh Rockoff. “A Wolfram in Sheep’s Clothing: Economic Warfare in

Spain, 1940-1944.” ​The Journal of Economic History​, vol. 63, no. 1, Mar. 2003, pp.

100-26. ​JSTOR​, www.jstor.org/stable/3132496. Accessed 23 Mar. 2017.