CIS 2018 Issue2

Advisors
Tang Jiaxuan Li Zhaoxing

Chairman
Qi Zhenhong
Deputy Chairmen
Ruan Zongze Xu Jian
Editor-in-Chief
Ruan Zongze
Executive Editors
Jiang Zhida Wu Shaojie
Senior Copy Editors
William Jones Benjamin Green
Members
Shaun Breslin (UK) Dong Manyuan Guo Xiangang
Liu Jiangyong Alexander Lukin (Russia) Qi Zhenhong
Qin Yaqing Rong Ying Ruan Zongze
Shi Ze Michael Swaine (US) Su Ge
Wang Jisi Xing Guangcheng Xu Jian
Yang Jiemian Yuan Jian Zhou Hong
Patron: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, PRC

Sponsor: China Institute of International Studies
Publisher: Editorial Department of China International Studies
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Number 69 • March/April 2018
Contents
5 Building a Community with a Shared Future: Meliorating the Era of
Strategic Opportunity in China Ruan Zongze
The concept of a community with a shared future for mankind has become
the symbol of the Xi Jinping Diplomatic Thought on Socialism with Chinese
Characteristics for a New Era. As the transformation of the international order
speeds up, the joint construction of the community will bring about an era of
enhanced strategic opportunity for China.
28 China’s Diplomacy in Africa: Ideas and Practices Zhang Ying

Guided by the principle of sincerity, real results, affinity, good faith and the concept
of upholding justice while pursuing shared interests, China’s Africa diplomacy is the
best interpretation of fostering a new type of international relations and building a
community with a shared future for mankind.
47 China-EU Relations: Structural Changes and Future Prospects

Cui Hongjian
The structural changes in the China-EU relations have taken place in the context
of accelerating transformation in relative economic strength and in respective
diplomatic approach. The bilateral relations will enter a period of readjustment
with profound bilateral, regional and global impacts.
66 Trump’s New Trade Policy: Concepts, Agendas and Constraints

Wu Qisheng
Trump’s trade policy, under the “America First” principle, aims to increase investment
in domestic manufacturing, eliminate long-run deficits and achieve significant
economic growth, but the multiple inherent contradictions in the policy’s logic
and practices would greatly impede his agenda.
86 The Indian Ocean Policy of the Modi Government Shi Hongyuan

With greater importance attached to the Indian Ocean, specific and systematic
measures have been adopted by the Modi government for its Indian Ocean policy.
This will not only have implications for the development of India’s maritime
2 China International Studies
CHINA
INTERNATIONAL
STUDIES
strategy, but will also lead to an inevitable transformation of the Indian Ocean’s
geopolitical landscape.
113 Security Dilemma on the Korean Peninsula and the Way Out
Yang Xiyu
The security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula demonstrates that there is no way
out by relying on deterrence to safeguard one’s own security. The region is in urgent
need of a permanent peace mechanism for the purpose of common security on the
basis of denuclearization.
131 The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor: Content, Motivation and Prospects

Lou Chunhao
As a collaborative vision to create a growth corridor and industrial network across
the Indo-Pacific region, the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor is becoming a major
pivot for Japan-India strategic cooperation. Despite obstacles ahead, the initiative
is bound to advance in the long term with implications on China’s Belt and Road
Initiative.
153 The Belt and Road Initiative and China-Japan Economic Cooperation
Jiang Yuechun
The Belt and Road Initiative injects fresh impetus into global economy and
represents new trends in regional economic cooperation. China-Japan cooperation
in the open and inclusive initiative is critical to the healthy development of bilateral
relations, and will contribute to the Asia-Pacific economic integration.
168 Dynamics of the Trump Administration’s Policy on the South China Sea
Su Xiaohui
Trump’s South China Sea policy is now returning to balance and rationality
following the initial tough stance that caused concern. The US will continue to
meddle in the disputes, but it will be more difficult to influence the situation as
regional actors adjust their policy objectives.
March/April 2018 3
中国国际问题研究
目录
英文·双月刊
2018 年第 2 期（总第 69 期）
顾问：唐家璇李肇星特稿
编委会主任委员：戚振宏
构建人类命运共同体　助力中国战略机遇期　
编委会副主任委员：阮宗泽徐坚
编委会委员：（以姓氏拼音字母为序）阮宗泽 5
董漫远郭宪纲刘江永戚振宏
秦亚青荣鹰阮宗泽石泽中国外交　
苏格王缉思邢广程徐坚中国对非洲外交：理念与实践

杨洁勉元简周弘
张颖 28
[英国] 肖恩·布思林
中国—欧盟关系的结构性变化及前景
[俄罗斯] 亚历山大·卢金
[美国] 迈克尔·史文崔洪建 47
主编：阮宗泽国别与地区问题
执行编辑：姜志达吴劭杰特朗普贸易新政：理念、议程与制约因素

文字编辑：William Jones Benjamin Green
吴其胜 66
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莫迪政府的印度洋政策　
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邮政编码：100005 杨希雨 113
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“亚非增长走廊”倡议：内涵、动因与前景　
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特朗普政府南海政策发展态势　　
国家首批A类英文学术期刊苏晓晖 168
Building a Community with a Shared Future:
Meliorating the Era of Strategic Opportunity in China
Ruan Zongze
T
he year 2018 marks the 40th anniversary of China’s reform and
opening-up, and is the year for the beginning of the implementation
of the decisions taken at the 19th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China (CPC). Providing a blueprint for the direction
of China’s development in the next 30 years, the Congress has vowed to
build China into a great modern socialist country that is prosperous, strong,
democratic, culturally advanced, harmonious, and beautiful by the middle of
the century. At present, with an annual GDP of 80 trillion yuan, China has
entered a new stage of development, indicating strong momentum and a bright
future. Under strong leadership of the CPC, the Chinese economy has the
capacity, potential, and confidence to maintain high-speed and high-quality
growth for the foreseeable future. As the world’s second largest economy, China
is expected to maintain its rapid and sound pace of growth at least until 2050,
which will mark a miracle in human history by its 72 consecutive years of
unprecedented growth and development. The key to creating such a miracle
lies in how China ensures and expands the era of strategic opportunity for its
development over the coming decades.
As the country enters a new era in its history, General Secretary Xi
Jinping, taking overall control of the situation, has crafted a top-level design
for China’s diplomacy. He profoundly summarized the brilliant achievements
made by the CPC in diplomacy since the 18th CPC National Congress, and
made comprehensive plans and arrangements for diplomatic objectives in the
Ruan Zongze is Executive Vice President and Senior Research Fellow of China Institute of International
Studies (CIIS).
Building a Community with a Shared Future: Meliorating the Era of Strategic Opportunity in China March/April 2018 5
future. The Chinese commitment he announced to building a “community
with a shared future for mankind” has been incorporated into the CPC
constitution. In the ever-evolving 21st century, this is China’s outstanding
contribution to the theory of international relations. It is a distinct privilege
and honor for China to lead the trend of the times and take up the banner
of progress for human civilization. It is also a guarantee that China’s strength
will grow in a sustained and steady manner, and that this concept will guide
the diplomatic work of China in the new era. It shows that the CPC and the
Chinese people are fully confident and capable of providing new options for
mankind to explore a better social system.
Since the first proposal of building a community with a shared future for
mankind in 2013, General Secretary Xi Jinping has elaborated on this concept
many times, which has contributed to the formation of a rich, scientific,
and profoundly comprehensive ideological system. As a major innovative
achievement of China’s diplomacy in the new era, this concept has been
written into UN documents and gained increasing international recognition. It
has been highly praised and enthusiastically responded to by the international
community. This paper will discuss and analyze the course and trend of China’s
diplomacy in the new era from the aspects of the connotations, background
and necessary conditions of building a community with a shared future for
mankind, as well as the theory and practices of major-country diplomacy with
Chinese characteristics.
Core of Xi Jinping Diplomatic Thought on Socialism with

Chinese Characteristics for a New Era
What is the community with a shared future for mankind? How should it be
built? Why should we build it? The report of the 19th CPC National Congress
has made clear from the outset that “… socialism with Chinese characteristics
has crossed the threshold into a new era. This is a new historic juncture
in China’s development.” In this new era, China is getting ever closer to the
center of the world stage, and is consistently making greater contributions to
6 China International Studies Building a Community with a Shared Future: Meliorating the Era of Strategic Opportunity in China
mankind. This new era calls for a modern take on major-country diplomacy.
As soon as the concept of the community with a shared future for mankind
was proposed, it effectuated strong repercussions at home and abroad, and has
become the symbol of the Xi Jinping Diplomatic Thought on Socialism with
Chinese Characteristics for a New Era.
The report of the 19th CPC National Congress pointed out that
China will follow a path of peaceful development and work to build a
community with a shared future for mankind. China also calls on the people
of all countries to work together to realize this goal. Specifically, this thought
includes “five shoulds:” (1) We should respect each other, discuss issues as
equals, resolutely reject the Cold War mentality and power politics, and take
a new approach to developing state-to-state relations with communication,
not confrontation, and with partnership, not alliance. (2) We should commit
to settling disputes through dialogue and resolving differences through
discussion, coordinate responses to traditional and non-traditional threats, and
oppose terrorism in all its forms. (3) We should stick together through thick
and thin, promote trade and investment liberalization and facilitation, and
make economic globalization more open, inclusive, and balanced so that its
benefits are shared by all. (4) We should respect the diversity of civilizations.
In handling relations among civilizations, let us replace estrangement with
exchange, clashes with mutual learning, and superiority with coexistence. (5)
We should be good friends to the environment, cooperate to tackle climate
change, and protect our planet for the sake of human survival.1
In the keynote speech delivered at the APEC CEO Summit after the
19th CPC National Congress, Xi Jinping for the first time outlined the goals
of major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics for a new era on a
multilateral international stage. While highlighting the beautiful prospects
featured by the interaction between China and the rest of the world in the
new era, the speech also declared that China had ushered in a new journey
1 Xi Jinping, Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects and
Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era: Report of the 19th
National Congress of the Communist Party of China, People’s Publishing House, October 2017, pp. 58-59.
of promoting the building of a new type of international relations and a
community with a shared future for mankind. “Our world is full of challenges
and the road ahead will not be smooth. But we will not give up on our dream.
We will double our efforts and work with all others to build an open, inclusive,
clean, and beautiful world that enjoys durable peace, universal security, and
common prosperity.”2
At the CPC in Dialogue with World Political Parties High-Level Meeting,
General Secretary Xi Jinping further discussed the rich connotations of the
community with a shared future for mankind, as well as how to build it. In
essence, the building of a community with a shared future for mankind is a
process by which the prospects and destinies of every nation and country will
be closely connected to each other, sticking together through thick and thin,
uniting the disparate peoples of the world into one harmonious family, and
turning their aspirations for a better life into a reality. In order to realize such a
common dream, efforts should be made in four aspects: building a safe world
free of fear, with common security as a primary feature; eliminating poverty
and promoting common prosperity; embracing openness and inclusiveness;
and building a clean and beautiful world with picturesque scenery.3
In the face of the international community’s question of “what is going
on with the world,” Xi Jinping’s speeches on two major occasions during his
visit to Switzerland in January 2017 have generated significant reverberations
globally. On January 17, Xi attended the opening session of the World
Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2017, and delivered a keynote speech
entitled “Jointly Shoulder Responsibility of Our Times, Promote Global
Growth.” In response to problems found in the world’s economic growth,
governance, and development model, he proposed that “we should develop
a dynamic, innovation-driven growth model,” “pursue a well-coordinated
2 Xi Jinping, “Seizing the Opportunity of a Global Economy in Transition and Accelerating Development
of the Asia-Pacific: Keynote Address at the APEC CEO Summit,” November 10, 2017, http://www.
chinadaily.com.cn/world/2017-11/11/content_34393531.htm.
3 Xi Jinping, “Working Together toward a Better World: Keynote Speech at the CPC in Dialogue with
World Political Parties High-Level Meeting,” December 1, 2017, http://world.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1202/
c1002-29681600.html.
and inter-connected approach to develop a model of open and win-win
cooperation,” “develop a model of fair and equitable governance in keeping
with the trend of the times,” and “develop a balanced, equitable and inclusive
development model.”4 At the United Nations office at Geneva one day later,
Xi Jinping delivered another keynote speech entitled “Work Together to Build
a Community of Shared Future for Mankind,” which proposed to build an
open, inclusive, green and low-carbon world featuring lasting peace, common
security and common prosperity.5 The two speeches are seamlessly linked,
giving a Chinese reflection in response to the question of “what to do with the
current situation.”
Building a community with a shared future for mankind offers a
powerful answer to the question of “what kind of world China wants.” The
unprecedented expectations of the international community on China also
means unprecedented responsibilities for China. China’s solution is to build
a community with a shared future for mankind to achieve win-win outcomes
and shared benefits. As pointed out in Xi Jinping’s 2018 New Year Speech,
At present, various sides have both expectations and worries about

the prospect of peace and development for mankind, looking forward to
China expressing its stand and attitude. The world is one big family. As
a responsible major country, China has this to say: China will resolutely
uphold the authority and status of the United Nations, conscientiously
perform its due international obligations and responsibilities, keep
its promises on global climate change, actively push forward the
implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative, and always contribute
to the building of world peace and global development, and the
safeguarding of international order. 6
4 “Jointly Shoulder Responsibility of Our Times, Promote Global Growth: Keynote Speech at the Opening
Session of the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2017,” Xinhua, January 17, 2017, http://www.
xinhuanet.com/english/2017-01/18/c_135991184.htm.
5 “Work Together to Build a Community of Shared Future for Mankind: Speech at the United Nations
Office at Geneva,” January 18, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-01/19/c_135994707.htm.
6 “Chinese President Xi Jinping Delivers 2018 New Year Speech,” December 31, 2017, http://chinaplus.
cri.cn/news/china/9/20171231/72084.html.
Today, China has an ever closer relationship with the rest of the world,
in which “all countries have a bit of each other.” In the almost 70 years since
the founding of the PRC, China has become independent and prosperous, and
now it aims to become stronger. The Chinese people pursue not only a better
life, but also aspire to a better world. China does not wish to provide solely for
its own people, it seeks to benefit the world
To build a community with a through shared development opportunities.
shared future for mankind is, The idea of building a community
in essence, an expression of with a shared future for mankind is rooted
the Chinese Dream in a global in the cultural genes of the Chinese nation.
context. The pursuit of a better world serves the
shared benefits of China and the rest of the
world. To build a community with a shared future for mankind is, in essence,
an expression of the Chinese Dream in a global context. The 5,000 years of
Chinese civilization is a profound epic, featuring the pursuit of a beautiful
world. The Chinese nation upholds the ideas that, “all under heaven are one
family,” “all peoples and beings are your kind and shall be loved,” “all nations
live side by side in perfect harmony,” and “all under heaven coexist in great
harmony.” The Chinese culture, which is experiencing a revival in the 21st
century, defines the relationship between China and the world by “win-win
cooperation.” Building a community with a shared future for mankind is not
only the practice of China approaching the center of the world stage, but it is
also the best way for the world to approach China in the new era. This is both
a practical summary of China’s own experience in terms of culture and history,
and China’s solemn commitment to the international community. It reflects
China’s willingness as a major country to make new and greater contributions
to mankind.
An important approach to building a community with a shared future
for mankind is to forge a new type of international relations featuring
mutual respect, fairness and justice, and win-win cooperation, with the aim
of exploring a new path towards friendly coexistence among nations. In this
process, the Belt and Road Initiative functions as a bridge, connecting the
present to the future. The five major factors of the initiative, namely, policy
coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration,
and people-to-people bonds, will help create a new platform for international
cooperation, and add new impetus to common development. As pointed out
by Xi Jinping, the proposal of the Belt and Road Initiative is to practice the
concept of the community with a shared future for mankind. In the past four
years, the Belt and Road construction has become a big cooperative platform
for the common development of all countries concerned.7 It can be seen that
“building a community with a shared future for mankind is not only the noble
goal of China’s diplomacy, but also the common responsibility and historical
mission of all countries in the world. We must thoroughly implement the
idea of building a community with a shared future for mankind, continuously
create new horizons for China’s diplomacy, and work hand in hand with all
other countries to build a better world.”8
Creating a Greater Period of Strategic Opportunity
“In a global context, we are facing a change that is unprecedented within the
past century.”9 While world multi-polarization, economic globalization, the
construction of an information-based society and cultural diversification
have all deepened, the deficits of peace, development and governance are
interwoven. The humankind are faced with various conflicts as regional
hotspot issues continue to flare while terrorism spreads rampantly. The
ideologies of protectionism, anti-globalization and populism have emerged,
greatly hindering the development of global governance and causing a serious
shortage of institutional supply. Faced with the multitude of risks, no country,
however powerful, can fight unilaterally against these global problems, and
7 Xi Jinping, “Working Together toward a Better World: Keynote Speech at the CPC in Dialogue with
World Political Parties High-Level Meeting.”
8 Yang Jiechi, “Promoting the Community with a Shared Future for Mankind,” People’s Daily, November
19, 2017.
9 “Xi Jinping Meets with Chinese Ambassadors Attending the Working Meeting of Ambassadors and
Makes an Important Speech,” Xinhua, December 28, 2017, http://cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1228/c64094-
29734770.html.
all countries must work together as one. The international community must
update its understanding of the concept of global governance, build a more just
and equitable international order, and forge a better future for mankind. As
the transformation of the international order speeds up, the joint construction
of the community with a shared future for mankind will bring about an era of
enhanced strategic opportunity for China.
As underlined by the report of the 19th CPC National Congress,
“Both China and the world are in the midst of profound and complex
changes. China is still in an important period of strategic opportunity for
development; the prospects are bright but the challenges are severe.” With
significant development and readjustments of the world, the global structure
is increasingly balanced, which becomes the irreversible general trend of
the times. On the one hand, Western governance concepts, systems and
models that dominated the world since the end of the World War II have
malfunctioned, plagued by numerous disadvantages and chronic problems
that can hardly be solved by Western countries themselves. The “end of
history” theory once popular following the conclusion of the Cold War has
come to an end, and the world has increasingly approached a “post-Western”
era. On the other hand, emerging market economies and developing
countries have increased in strength. Such new developments have greatly
changed the balance of world power, reshaped the theories and practices
of international relations, and made the international order more just,
reasonable, inclusive and balanced.
Different from past changes, the remarkable feature of this round of
transformation of the international system is the absence of war. In history, the
transformation of international systems has mostly come about by launching
large-scale wars, especially those between major powers. After the wars, power
was redistributed among the victors, and a new order soon came into being.
The Versailles-Washington system that emerged after the World War I and
the Yalta system that emerged after the World War II were both formed in
this way. Since the end of the Cold War, the international system has become
increasingly multi-polar. Despite the sometimes fierce competition among
Chinese President Xi Jinping makes a keynote speech at the United Nations Office in
Geneva titled Work Together to Build a Community with a Shared Future for Mankind on
January 18, 2017. The idea has since been endorsed by various UN agencies, turning
the Chinese concept into international consensus.
major powers, the risk of systemic confrontation or war has reduced, and
peace has generally dominated the international landscape. Therefore, the
transformation of the international order will be a long and tortuous process,
which tests the endurance and patience of great powers.
Building a community with a shared future for mankind calls for a global
governance concept that upholds wide consultation, joint contribution and shared
benefits. China is transforming itself from a participant to a leader of global
governance, as it actively participates in the reform and construction of the global
governance system, and continuously contributes its wisdom and strength. China’s
in-depth interaction with the world and active participation and leadership
in global governance are also effective ways to safeguard and expand its own
interests in the new era. The rise of China is achieved within the existing system.
This unprecedented story of success has been written by more than 1.3 billion
people, and the great achievements made by socialism with Chinese characteristics
have attracted worldwide attention. China has deeply integrated itself into the
international system, and has both the conditions and capabilities to make more
contributions to the world. In order to gain
China’s participation in greater institutional rights, China is actively
global governance will promoting the reform of the current system
extend its governance ideas of global economic governance. In the latest
beyond the borders, enhance round of voting rights redistribution of
the recognition from the the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
international community, and effective from January 2016, China’s voting
allow the Chinese solutions to shares rose from 3.996% to 6.394%, ranking
better serve global governance. third from the sixth place and now behind
only the United States and Japan. This
change has not only boosted China’s weight in the global economic governance
system, but also made the system more fair and reasonable.
The concept of global governance with Chinese characteristics goes hand
in hand with China’s concept of national governance. China’s participation in
global governance will extend its governance ideas beyond the borders, enhance
the recognition from the international community, and allow the Chinese
solutions to better serve global governance. China attaches importance to
the innovation-driven development strategy and the five major development
concepts of innovative, coordinated, green, open and shared development.
China gives priority to strengthened coordination and cooperation with the
international community in major issues such as sustainable development,
climate change, energy security and cyber security. China has put forward the
Belt and Road Initiative, established the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank,
hosted a series of international events, such as the summits of the Conference
on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia, the Asia-Pacific
Economic Cooperation, the Group of 20 and the BRICS, as well as the Belt
and Road Forum for International Cooperation. These events have succeeded
in internationalizing the Chinese solutions put forward on these occasions and
translating them into international consensus, which has gradually broadened
China’s path of development.
Adherence to the path of peaceful development and maintenance of
world peace are what China must do as it seeks to build a community with
a shared future for mankind. China will let history show that its rise from
a country suffering from chronic poverty to the second largest economy
in the world is not built on military expansion and colonial plundering,
but on the people’s diligence and love for peace. China is a force devoted
to the maintenance of world peace, and thus the development of China
indicates the enhancement of global forces for peace. Since the end of the
Cold War, four out of the five permanent members of the UN Security
Council, namely, the US, the UK, France and Russia, have been involved
in wars. China is the only country that has been concentrating on the path
of peaceful development. In fact, this has proven an effective path, urging
China to advance global development with the idea of mutual benefits and
win-win outcomes. At the international level, China’s peaceful development
has enhanced the confidence of a large number of developing countries,
and provided new reference for them to complete their modernization.
To sum up, the more China develops, the better it will be for the world.
World peace and stability will create a better external environment for the
further development of China, and expand China’s strategic opportunities.
Therefore, building a better world featuring a community with a shared
future for mankind is what China will do to shape a new international order
that is more peaceful, stable, prosperous and advanced.
Making New Ground in Pursuing Opening Up on All Fronts
The pursuit of opening up on all fronts and the efforts to build a community
with a shared future for mankind are complementary and mutually
reinforcing. The former can create necessary conditions for the latter, while
the latter can deepen the mutually beneficial cooperation between China and
the international community. China’s development benefits from its opening-
up, and the Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation cannot materialize
without opening-up.
Whether or not China opens up and whether or not the country can
deepen mutually beneficial cooperation with the international community
will impact the effectiveness of building the community with a shared future
for mankind. An important judgment made by the report of the CPC’s 19th
National Congress is that the basic dimension of the Chinese context—that
China is still and will long remain in the primary stage of socialism—has not
changed, and China’s international status as the world’s largest developing
country has not changed. The principal contradiction facing Chinese society
has evolved into one between unbalanced and inadequate development and
the people’s ever-growing needs for a better life. The change of principal
contradiction of the society is historic with a bearing on the overall situation,
and has put forward many new requirements on the work of the CPC and
the state. Despite the total economic output soaring to the second highest
in the world, China clearly recognizes that it is still a developing country at
the primary stage of socialism, and that it still needs to redouble its efforts to
expand reforms and opening-up.
From a historical point of view, China prospered when it was open
and reform-oriented, and declined when it closed its doors and turned
inward. Today, China’s destiny is closely linked with that of the world, and
China’s interests have been deeply embedded in the international system.
Since its opening-up to the outside world 40 years ago, China has had a
stronger voice in the international system, and has contributed significantly
more to the world. China believes that it can only be great when the world
is free from troubles, and that the world can become a better place with
China’s development. This point is well illustrated by the fact that China
has contributed over one third of the world’s economic growth since the
international financial crisis in 2008. As Xi Jinping said when he led the
members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the 19th CPC
Central Committee to meet the domestic and foreign press,
We will celebrate the 40th anniversary of the reform and
opening-up in 2018. Reform and opening-up holds the key to the fate
of contemporary China. Over the 40 years, the Chinese people have
achieved a prosperous life and gradually become affluent. We will sum
up our experience, and take advantage of the momentum to advance
the modernization of China’s governance system and capacity. We
will steadfastly deepen reforms in all fields, and unswervingly expand
opening-up, so as to make reform and opening-up reinforce each other. I
firmly believe that the great renewal of the Chinese nation will surely be
realized in the process of reform and opening-up.10
As the second largest economy and the largest country in terms of trade
in goods, China is a staunch defender of economic globalization and free trade.
Since the 18th CPC National Congress, China has held high the banner of
peace, development, cooperation and win-win, promoted friendly cooperation
with other countries, advanced the reform of the global governance system,
and injected confidence and momentum into global development. “China
has reached a new historical starting point. It is a new starting point for China
to deepen reform across the board and foster new drivers of economic and social
development. It is a new starting point for China to adapt its economy to a new
normal and transform its growth model. It is a new starting point for China to
further integrate itself into the world and open itself wider to the world.” 11
The report of the 19th CPC National Congress stressed “making
new ground in pursuing opening up on all fronts” and that “China will not
close its door to the world; we will only become more and more open.” The
word “open” appears 27 times in the report. The Central Economic Work
10 “Xi Jinping’s Speech as Members of the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau of the
19th CPC Central Committee Meet Press,” Xinhua, October 25, 2017, http://news.xinhuanet.com/
politics/19cpcnc/2017-10/25/c_129726443.htm.
11 Xi Jinping, “A New Starting Point for China’s Development, A New Blueprint for Global Growth:
Keynote Speech at the Opening Ceremony of the B20 Summit,” September 3, 2016, http://www.fmprc.gov.
cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1396112.shtml.
Conference held in December 2017 made it clear that, “we need to further
expand the scope and level of opening-up, and, more importantly, we must
upgrade the ideas, structural arrangements and institutional mechanisms of
opening-up.” 12
In response to some international concern about whether China will
continue to open its doors, Xi Jinping reiterated China’s commitment to opening-
up at the APEC CEO Summit, and reassured the world by highlighting the new
direction of China’s opening-up efforts. He emphasized that:
China will not slow its steps in opening up itself. We will work
together with other countries to create new drivers of common development
through the launching of the Belt and Road Initiative. We will adopt
policies to promote high-standard liberalization and facilitation of trade
and investment. We will implement the system of pre-establishment national
treatment plus a negative list across the board, significantly ease market
access, further open the service sector, and protect the legitimate rights
and interests of foreign investors. All businesses registered in China will
be treated as equals. We will grant more powers to pilot free trade zones to
conduct reform, and explore the opening of free trade ports. We will speed
up negotiations with partner countries on the concluding of free trade
agreements and investment treaties, advance the building of FTAAP, work
for the speedy conclusion of RCEP negotiations, and endeavor to establish a
global network of free trade areas.13
As a symbol of China’s redoubled efforts to open itself up in the new era,

the Belt and Road Initiative has been upgraded from a Chinese solution to an
initiative that has become a point of international consensus. With increasingly
deepened practical cooperation, consecutive “super projects” that connect
12 “Central Economic Work Conference: Six Areas to Expect Next Year,” Xinhua, December 20, 2017,
http://www.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2017-12/20/c_129771242.htm.
13 Xi Jinping, “Seizing the Opportunity of a Global Economy in Transition and Accelerating Development
of the Asia-Pacific: Keynote Address at the APEC CEO Summit.”
China to the rest of the world have been launched.
Building an open world economy is in China’s interests, and consequently
China’s door will only open wider to the outside world as time goes on. As
pointed out by Xi Jinping, “China will keep its door wide open and not
close it. An open door allows both other countries to access the Chinese
market and China itself to integrate with the world. And we hope that other
countries will also keep their door open to Chinese investors and keep the
playing field level for us.”14 In the next 15 years, China will have an even larger
market. It is estimated that China will import US$24 trillion worth of goods,
attract US$2 trillion inbound direct investment and make US$2 trillion of
outbound investment. In November 2018, China will hold the first China
International Import Expo in Shanghai, providing all interested parties with a
new platform to expand in the Chinese market. This move shows China’s good
will in opening up its market to the world. It reflects China’s confidence and
determination in opening up. It will surely foster new opportunities for the
world’s open development.
Enriching Major-Country Diplomacy with Chinese Characteristics
Building the community with a shared future for mankind has

comprehensively enriched and developed the theory of major-country
diplomacy with Chinese characteristics, and has become the overall goal of
China’s diplomacy in the new era. Immediately after the 19th CPC National
Congress, China carried out intensive diplomatic activities, getting a new look
and making new accomplishments, and opening a new chapter for major-
country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics for a new era.
First, China has promoted coordination and cooperation with major
countries, so as to build a framework of major-country relations that feature
general stability and balanced development. China-Russia relations continue
to be characterized by a high level of stability. Xi Jinping’s meeting with Russian
14 “Jointly Shoulder Responsibility of Our Times, Promote Global Growth: Keynote Speech at the
Opening Session of the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2017.”
President Vladimir Putin in Danang, Vietnam on November 10, 2017 was the
fifth for the two leaders within a year. China and Russia firmly support each
other’s right to defend their respective core interests. Having further consolidated
mutual political trust, the two countries have become strategic partners reliable to
each other. The comprehensive strategic partnership of coordination, established
and developed between the two countries, remains a great example of a new type
of international relations, characterized by mutual respect, fairness and justice,
and win-win cooperation. As stressed by Xi Jinping, “at present, socialism with
Chinese characteristics has entered a new era while Russia has also been walking
in steady steps toward a stronger and wealthier country. China-Russia relations
have also ushered in new development opportunities while we are at the critical
stage for our own development. Both sides should continuously enhance mutual
support, strengthen all-round cooperation, advance the scale and quality of
bilateral trade at the same time, well implement major projects in such fields as
energy, investment, high-tech, aviation and aerospace, as well as infrastructure,
push for concrete results from the alignment of the construction of the ‘Belt and
Road’ with the Eurasian Economic Union, and well plan and implement new
activities for national theme year. Both sides need to strengthen communication
on international and regional hotspot issues, and cement coordination and
cooperation within multilateral frameworks including the United Nations, the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization and BRICS.”15 Earlier from October 31 to
November 2, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev paid a visit to China,
becoming the first foreign leader to visit China after the successful conclusion
of the 19th CPC National Congress. During this visit, he joined with Premier
Li Keqiang in holding the 22nd regular meeting between Chinese and Russian
premiers, where 16 cooperation agreements and a number of cooperation
documents were signed, effectively consolidating the comprehensive strategic
partnership of coordination between the two countries.
The Beijing meeting between President Xi Jinping and his US
counterpart Donald Trump has clarified the direction of China-US relations
15 “Xi Jinping Meets with President Vladimir Putin of Russia,” November 11, 2017, http://www.fmprc.
gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1510300.shtml.
in the new era. From November 8 to 10, 2017, Trump was invited to pay
a state visit to China, and was received with “state visit plus” treatment.
This was the third meeting between Xi Jinping and Trump. Since Trump
took office in January 2017, important progress has been made in China-
US relations, and the two heads of state have maintained multiple avenues
of close contact. In April, Xi Jinping and Trump successfully held the first
meeting at Mar-a-Lago, with a second held in Hamburg in July on the
sideline of the G20 summit. The two presidents reached consensus on
a number of important issues regarding the development of China-US
relations in the new era. Both sides believe that the bilateral relations have
a significant bearing on the well-being of the two peoples, and on the peace,
stability, and prosperity of the world. Cooperation is the only correct choice
for China and the US, and only through win-win progress can the two
countries enjoy a better future. Both sides agreed to allow for the strategic
leading role of summit diplomacy in the future bilateral relations; strengthen
contacts at all levels and give precedence to the four high-level dialogue
mechanisms covering diplomacy and security, economy, law enforcement
and cyber security, as well as social and people-to-people exchanges, to
expand exchanges and cooperation in the relevant fields; and enhance
communication and coordination in major international and regional issues,
so as to usher in a new era of greater development in the relationship. When
Xi Jinping, together with Trump, met the press during the US President’s
November state visit to China, he pointed out that:
The development of China and the US is complementary and

moves ahead in parallel, and the success of both countries conforms to
the common interests of both sides. Faced with complicated and ever-
changing international situation, as two major countries, China and the
US share more common interests in and shoulder greater responsibilities
for safeguarding world peace and stability and promoting global
development and prosperity with a broader space for cooperation. The
sound and stable development of China-US relations conforms to not
only the fundamental interests of the two peoples but also the common
expectation of the international community. For China and the US,
cooperation is the only right choice, and only win-win cooperation can
lead to a better future.16
During Trump’s visit, China and the US also discussed ways to achieve
long-term peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast
Asia. The bilateral “super deal” worth $253.5 billion bill” illustrates that the
economic and trade relations between the two countries are mutually beneficial
and win-win. As the only right choice, cooperation between China and the US
exhibits great potential and will bring enormous benefits to both peoples.
Second, neighboring countries are the starting point for China to
build a community with a shared future for mankind. China will deepen its
relations with neighboring countries according to the principles of “amity,
sincerity, mutual benefit and inclusiveness” and “being a good neighbor and
partner.” From November 12 to 14, 2017, after the conclusion of the 19th
CPC National Congress, Xi Jinping, as both the General Secretary of the CPC
Central Committee and the Chinese President, selected the socialist neighbors
of Vietnam and Laos as the first countries to visit. This visit has written a
new chapter of good neighborliness, and brought new opportunities for the
development of China-Vietnam and China-Laos relations, as well as win-win
cooperation between China and its neighbors. Vietnam and Laos share similar
political concepts and development paths with China. The two countries
have shown great interest in the guiding principles of national governance
proposed by the 19th CPC National Congress. China and these two countries
have actively carried out exchanges of experience in governance and national
development, strengthened inter-party communication, enriched the theories
and practices of socialist construction, and striven to build a community
with a shared future with strategic significance. These moves have conveyed a
clear signal to the international community that China will endeavor to build
16 “Xi Jinping and US President Donald Trump Jointly Meet the Press,” November 9, 2017, http://www.
fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1509903.shtml.
a community with a shared future with its neighbors, and support further
development of the socialist cause.
China and Vietnam have strengthened strategic cooperation between
the Belt and Road Initiative and Vietnam’s proposal of Two Corridors and
One Economic Circle. The trade volume between the two countries in 2016
reached nearly $100 billion, ranking among the top in ASEAN countries.
In Laos, President Xi Jinping and Lao
President Boungnang Vorachith witnessed
Neighboring countries are the
the signing of the cooperation document
starting point for China to build
on the joint construction of the China-
a community with a shared
Laos Economic Corridor. The China-Laos
future for mankind.
railway will help promote the economic
development of Laos by enhancing the
country’s strategic position in the connectivity network of the ASEAN region.
For Thailand, the launch of the first phase of the China-Thailand railway
project on December 21, 2017 will effectively enhance the infrastructure
construction and connectivity of Thailand and the region, and promote the
sustainable development of Thailand’s economy. In the future, the China-
Thailand railway and China-Laos railway will connect each other, promote
economic and trade exchanges, personnel exchanges and mutual benefit among
connected countries, and drive regional development and the improvement
of people’s livelihood. In addition, China and Vietnam also agreed to manage
their maritime disputes, and resolve the demarcation issue on land and at the
Beibu Gulf through friendly consultations, creating favorable conditions for
the common development of both countries as well as peace and stability in the
region.
Premier Li Keqiang’s official visit to the Philippines in November
2017 served to effectively promote the development of bilateral relations.
As expressed by Premier Li, exchanges between China and the Philippines
enjoy a long history and friendly cooperation is always the mainstream.
Currently, relations between the two countries have been turned around as
many difficulties had been overcome. Practice has proved that adherence to
good-neighborliness and friendliness is in line with the fundamental interests
of both sides, which meets the common aspirations of the two peoples and is
an irresistible regional trend as well as a cornerstone of mutual development.
China is willing to, together with the Philippines, grasp the right direction,
consolidate bilateral friendship, deepen cooperation and make up the loss of
time in the past so as to promote sound and steady development of China-
Philippines relations.17
From December 13 to 16, 2017, the South Korean President Moon
Jae-in paid a successful state visit to China. China and the ROK are friendly
neighbors and strategic cooperative partners. Since the establishment of
diplomatic ties 25 years ago, remarkable progress has been made between
the two countries through exchanges and cooperation in various fields,
which brings tremendous benefits to both sides. However, since July 2016,
relations between the two countries have suffered a serious blow as a result
of South Korea’s deployment of the THAAD missile defense system, which
threatens China’s strategic security. Moon’s visit shows that the China-ROK
relations have entered a period of restoration after being damaged by the
THAAD issue. As pointed out by Xi during his talks with Moon, China
attaches importance to its relations with the ROK, and is ready to work with
the ROK to keep the original intention of establishing diplomatic relations
in mind, take full account of the well-being of the two peoples, uphold the
basic principle of respecting each other’s core interests and major concerns
as well as the principle of treating each other as neighbors with sincerity,
and seize the cooperation principle of mutual benefit and win-win results
to promote sound and healthy development of China-ROK strategic
cooperative partnership along the right track.18 The improvement of China-
ROK relations is conducive to the maintenance of peace and stability in
Northeast Asia.
17 “Li Keqiang Holds Talks with President Rodrigo Duterte of the Philippines,” November 16, 2017,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1511465.shtml
18 “Xi Jinping Holds Talks with President Moon Jae-in of the ROK,” December 14, 2017, http://www.
fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1520215.shtml.
Finally, following the principle of sincerity, real results, affinity and
good faith, and adopting a balanced approach to upholding justice and
pursuing interests, China has actively developed global partnerships,
expanded common interests, and enhanced unity and cooperation with
other developing countries. The Belt and Road Forum for International
Cooperation held in Beijing in May 2017 attracted the attention of the
world, and successfully transformed the Chinese solution into a point of
international consensus. The BRICS summit in Xiamen in September focused
on fostering the next “Golden Decade” for BRICS cooperation. In his speech
delivered at the APEC CEO Summit in Da Nang, Vietnam on November 10,
2017, Xi Jinping first used the “five new journeys” to explain the historical
position, basic strategy and blueprint of socialism with Chinese characteristics
in a new era,19 which would help the world to objectively understand China’s
development orientation and strategic intention in the new era.
During his attendance at the 12th East Asia Summit in Manila in
November 2017, Premier Li Keqiang stressed that the 19th CPC National
Congress has clearly articulated China’s firm commitment to peaceful
development, and called for efforts to forge a new form of international
relations with a view to building a community with a shared future for
mankind. “China’s development will only bring opportunities for the
development and prosperity of East Asia and the world, and will not pose
a threat to any country. China wishes to work with all other EAS members
to uphold the good momentum of regional peace, development and
cooperation, advance the building of the East Asia Economic Community,
and open new prospects for East Asian cooperation and development.”20
19 The “five new journeys” are: a new journey of deepening reform across the board and unleashing
dynamism for development; a new journey of moving with the times and exploring new model of
development; a new journey toward greater integration with the world and an open economy of higher
standards; a new journey toward a better life for the people; and a new journey toward a new type of
international relations and a community with a shared future for mankind. See Xi Jinping, “Seizing the
Opportunity of a Global Economy in Transition and Accelerating Development of the Asia-Pacific: Keynote
Address at the APEC CEO Summit.”
20 “Speech by H.E. Li Keqiang Premier of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China at the 12th
East Asia Summit,” November 15, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1510667.shtml.
At the 20th China-ASEAN (10+1) Summit held concurrently in Manila,
China and ASEAN announced the start of consultations on the text of the
Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea, which symbolized the
return to dialogue and consultation from the once high level of tension. An
early consensus-based agreement on the COC would effectively safeguard
the peace and stability in the South China Sea. Soon after his visit to the
Philippines for the series of ASEAN meetings, Premier Li attended the
sixth summit of China and Central and Eastern European Countries held
in Budapest from November 26 to December 2, paid an official visit to
Hungary, and then attended the 16th Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation
Organization (SCO) Council of Heads of Governments (Prime Ministers) in
Sochi, Russia.
Under the banner of building a community with a shared future for
mankind, the theory and practices of major-country diplomacy with Chinese
characteristics have continuously been bearing fruits. With one after another
important speeches, policy documents and cooperation projects in various
corners of the world, Chinese leaders have been busy travelling through
multiple diplomatic arenas and making concrete steps. These efforts have
fostered greater strategic opportunities for realizing the Chinese Dream of
national rejuvenation, and made significant contributions to promoting the
development and progress of human society.
Conclusion
The road that leads to China’s rise will never be a smooth one, and the
country may encounter great risks and dangers as it endeavors to realize the
“two centenary goals.”21 The international environment surrounding China
will surely become more complicated. While more and more people will
21 The two centenary goals are to finish building a moderately prosperous society in all respects by
the time the Communist Party of China marks its centenary and to build China into a modern socialist
country that is prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced, and harmonious by the time the People’s
Republic of China celebrates its centenary.
recognize the opportunities that China delivers and expand cooperation
with China, it is hard to exclude the possibility of negative forces looking
to disrupt China’s development process by creating obstacles and provoking
troubles. Given this, China must take sufficient precautions.
Adhering to the path of peaceful development, China’s rise will not
pose a threat to any country. Neither will China simply “import” foreign
models, nor will it “export” the Chinese model or demand other countries
to “copy” China’s practices. China will never develop itself at the expense
of other countries’ interests, nor will it ever give up its legitimate rights and
interests. No country should fantasize about letting China swallow the bitter
fruits that undermine its own interests. Only by working for the same goal,
can countries achieve win-win cooperation. China will unswervingly follow
the path of independent development for peace, safeguarding its sovereign,
security and development interests, while staying resolutely committed
to addressing disputes through dialogue and negotiation. China will stick
to the One China principle, contain the separatist attempt of “Taiwan
independence,” and oppose any external force interfering in China’s internal
affairs. With the unflinching objective of “diplomacy for the people,” it is
the due mission and responsibility of China’s diplomacy in the new era to
actively safeguard the country’s legitimate interests abroad.
The major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics for a new era
will usher in new opportunities and make new accomplishments. In this new
journey, China will make new contributions to the great cause of world peace
and development. With the self-conscious sense to shoulder more global
responsibilities, and the confidence stemming from the successful exploration
of development path, China, at this historic crossroads of the 21st century,
will take the initiative to advocate the building of a community with a shared
future for mankind in an attempt to transcend the history of zero-sum game
and forge a brighter future.
China’s Diplomacy in Africa:
Ideas and Practices
Zhang Ying
W
orking to foster a new type of international relations and
build a community with a shared future for mankind are
the two main objectives of China’s diplomacy in the new era.
Despite an absence of prototype in the history of international relations
which China could follow in realizing these goals, the ideas and practices of
China’s diplomacy in Africa can provide significant lessons in this regard.
Summarizing and reviewing these ideas and practices in the new era could
be of significant reference value for advancing the abovementioned two
missions.
New Ideas of China’s Africa Diplomacy
During his historic visit to Africa in 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping

advocated the principle of sincerity, real results, affinity and good faith for
China’s cooperation with Africa, and creatively put forward the concept of
upholding justice while pursuing shared interests.1 China’s second Africa
policy paper issued in 2015 reaffirmed the principle and the concept as the
fundamental ideas of China’s diplomacy toward Africa and the guiding tenets
of its Africa policy.
As pointed out by President Xi, China remains faithful in treating African
friends, values real results in conducting cooperation with Africa, seeks to
Zhang Ying is Associate Research Fellow at the School of International Relations and Diplomacy, Beijing
Foreign Studies University.
1 “Xi Jinping Talks with Zimbabwean President Mugabe,” People’s Daily, August 26, 2014, p.1.
28 China International Studies China’s Diplomacy in Africa: Ideas and Practices

cultivate kinship-like qualities in the relationship in strengthening friendship
with Africa, and is sincere in addressing problems in cooperation with Africa.2
The highly concise remarks of President Xi that later gave birth to the principle
of sincerity, real results, affinity and good faith can be further elaborated as
follows. “Sincerity” means that China and Africa are genuine friends, treating
each other in a sincere manner. “Real results” means that China is whole-
hearted in its cooperation with Africa, making sure that African countries
achieve tangible benefits from that cooperation. “Affinity” means that China
stresses the Sino-African community of interests, responsibility and shared
future. Similar destinies and historical experiences have brought the two sides
closer together in their values, strategic interests and development priorities,
which makes the China-Africa cooperation particularly cordial. “Good faith”
means keeping one’s promises and adopting a pragmatic attitude in solving
problems that may arise in the process of cooperation.
With regard to the proper understanding of justice and interests,
President Xi pointed out that justice reflects a value cherished by Chinese
Communist Party members and the Chinese socialist state. It is no good
if some people in the world live in decent conditions while others suffer.
True happiness is the common well-being of everyone. It is thus China’s
anticipation that the whole world will progress together and that the
developing countries will accelerate their development. As with pursuing
“interests,” China must adhere to the principle of mutual benefit and
win-win outcomes instead of the philosophy of zero-sum game. With
an obligation to provide whatever assistance it can to the impoverished
countries, China should prioritize justice over interests, even sacrificing the
latter for the former, and should never seek only for profit or be preoccupied
with trifles.3 In a further interpretation by Foreign Minister Wang Yi of
the concept regarding justice and interests, China should always prioritize
2 “Xi Jinping Delivers a Speech at the Julius Nyerere International Convention Center in Tanzania,”
March 25, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/fzs_663828/gjlb_663832/30
99_664224/3101_664228/t1025803.shtml.
3 Wang Yi, “Upholding the Concept of Justice and Interests and Actively Performing the Role of a
Responsible Major Country,” People’s Daily, September 10, 2013 p.7.
China’s Diplomacy in Africa: Ideas and Practices March/April 2018 29

justice, which involves an element of morality, when it concerns Africa,
treating African countries equally with sincerity, honoring the promises
made, and even more, speaking out for the legitimate rights and reasonable
appeals of Africa. On the other hand, the pursuit of interests should also
lead to mutual benefits. In dealing with African countries, China will never
take the old path of colonialist plunder, never copy the capitalist mercenary
practices, and never selfishly consider its own interests. Instead, China
wishes to work together with its African brothers for common development
and prosperity. In this process, China will pay more attention to the sound
demands of African countries, and carry on cooperation so that the African
nations will reap benefits early on. When necessary, China will prioritize
justice over interests and sacrifice benefits for righteousness.4 For Africa,
the core idea of the concept regarding justice and interests is to make more
closely aligned the prospects and destiny of China and African countries, and
through cooperation to assist the African nations in achieving self-reliance
and sustainable development with the ultimate goal of realizing common
prosperity of China and Africa.
The principle of “sincerity, real results, affinity and good faith” inherits
the Chinese traditional way of treating others. To properly handle the
relationship between justice and interests and give priority to righteousness
and responsibility is an important part of China’s cultural heritage. Dealing
with interstate relations with “sincerity, real results, affinity and good faith”
and the concept regarding justice and interests is a reflection of how Chinese
leaders apply traditional culture to contemporary international relations with
a high level of cultural confidence.
The principle of “sincerity, real results, affinity and good faith” and the
concept regarding justice and interests are also rooted in the fine tradition of
China’s foreign policy. Since the founding of New China, Chinese diplomacy
has continually stressed fairness and justice, opposed hegemonism and power
4 “Wang Yi: Upholding Justice While Pursuing Shared Interests Is One Banner of China’s Diplomacy,”
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, January 11, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/zyxw/t1117851.
shtml.

politics, and advocated adherence to international law and the fundamental
principles of international relations, pursuing the democratization of
international relations and respecting global cultural diversity. Insisting on the
principle of sovereign equality, China underscores that all countries are equal,
and should not be treated differently despite their size, strength and wealth.
China adheres to win-win cooperation, opposes gaining benefits at other
countries’ expense or adopting beggar-thy-neighbor policies. With these long-
held diplomatic principles, it should come as no surprise that China now puts
forward the principle of “sincerity, real results, affinity and good faith” and the
concept regarding justice and interests. In one sense, it is a generalization of the
practices that Chinese diplomacy has applied to Africa for quite some time.
The principle of “sincerity, real results, affinity and good faith” and
the concept regarding justice and interests stress that China regards non-
interference into other countries’ internal affairs as the prerequisite of its
relations with Africa. Over the years, one fundamental guideline of China’s
diplomacy has been its respect for the independent choice of other countries
on their own development paths and social systems, and provision of
assistance without any political conditions attached. Although times have
changed, the diplomatic tradition of China remains the same as it was at
the founding of New China. In its relations with Africa, China consistently
upholds the principles of sovereignty, equality and non-interference into
other countries’ internal affairs, which have been written not only into the
Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence but also into the Eight Principles
for Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries.5 They
remain the fundamental principles of China’s diplomacy toward Africa.
In its assistance to Africa, President Xi has repeatedly stated that China
will continue to provide due assistance for African development without
attaching any political conditions.6 Foreign Minister Wang Yi also stresses
5 From December 14, 1963 to February 10, 1964, Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai visited ten African countries
of Egypt, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, Ghana, Mali, Guinea, Sudan, Ethiopia and Somalia, putting forward
the Five Principles Guiding China’s Relations with African and Arab Countries and the Eight Principles for
Economic Aid and Technical Assistance to Other Countries.
6 “Xi Jinping Delivers a Speech at the Julius Nyerere International Convention Center in Tanzania.”

that China’s cooperation with Africa will continue to follow the principle
of non-interference, will not attach any political conditions to its assistance
and will not impose its will on others.7 This is in stark contrast to Western
countries’ assistance to Africa, which is usually attached to some political
conditions. Kenneth Kaunda, the founding father and first president of
Zambia, once highly praised what China did to Africa as friend-to-friend
support, and identified China as Africa’s
The principle of “sincerity, real all-weather friend. Ismaïl Omar Guelleh,
results, affinity and good faith” President of Djibouti, also indicated that
and the concept regarding China’s assistance to Africa sought no
justice and interests are two advantage and was committed to Africa’s
core ideas of China’s Africa development, showing their sincere and
policy and complement each deep friendship.8
other. The principle of “sincerity, real
results, affinity and good faith” and the
concept regarding justice and interests also mean that China will better
perform the role of a responsible major power in its diplomacy with Africa.
The role of a “responsible major power” has two implications. The first is the
responsibility to speak out on behalf of the legitimate rights and reasonable
demands of Africa, to support the African countries in pursuing their own
development paths, to oppose attempts by Western nations to exploit and
oppress Africa, and to strive to build a better development environment for
African countries through the reform of unjust and unreasonable aspects
in the international political and economic order. The second is to provide
financial, technical and personnel support within China’s capability for the
industrialization process of Africa, help African countries build infrastructure
such as railways, roads, ports and power plants, address the bottlenecks
restricting African development, and share China’s successful experience with
7 “Wang Yi: China Practices the Correct Concept Regarding Justice and Interests and Helps Sustainable
Development of Africa,” Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, January 10, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
zflt/chn/zt/1_1_2_1_2_1/t1429265.htm.
8 “Outcomes of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation Receive International Positive Response,”
People’s Daily, July 21, 2012, p.4.

African countries.
As two core ideas of China’s Africa policy, the principle of “sincerity,
real results, affinity and good faith” and the concept regarding justice and
interests complement each other and neither can be disregarded. Their
purpose is to integrate China’s assistance for African countries in realizing
their independent sustainable development with the promotion of China’s
own development. Hence, the two ideas bear distinct characteristics of the
times. On one hand, they reflect China’s fundamental position toward its
diplomacy with developing countries in the new era. On the other hand,
they conform to the new trends in market economy and globalization.
China’s Diplomatic Practices in Africa under New Ideas
Since President Xi Jinping put forward the principle of “sincerity, real

results, affinity and good faith” and upholding justice while pursuing shared
interests, China’s diplomacy in Africa has actively followed these two guiding
ideas. China “is willing to work with African countries to build and develop
a China-Africa comprehensive strategic and cooperative partnership featuring
political equality and mutual trust, win-win economic cooperation, mutually
enriching cultural exchanges, mutual assistance in security, and solidarity and
coordination in international affairs.”9
Politically, China has been enhancing bilateral visits and multilateral
cooperation. Both China and Africa stress the unique role of summit
diplomacy to ensure positive interaction between the two sides from the
top. In 2013 after he became President of China, Xi Jinping chose to pay
his first state visit to Tanzania, South Africa and the Republic of Congo and
attended the fifth BRICS summit held in Durban, South Africa. In 2015,
President Xi joined other Asian and African leaders, including then President
Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe and then Prime Minister Ibrahim Mahlab of
Egypt at the activities commemorating the 60th anniversary of the Bandung
9 “Full Text: China’s Second Africa Policy Paper,” Xinhua, December 4, 2015, http://www.xinhuanet.
com/english/2015-12/04/c_134886545.htm.

Conference held in Bandung, Indonesia. In the same year, Xi attended
the Johannesburg summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation
(FOCAC), working together with African leaders to upgrade Sino-African
relations to the level of comprehensive strategic partnership. Also in 2016
alone, Xi Jinping received visits by the heads of state of Egypt, Nigeria,
Mozambique, Togo, the Republic of Congo, South Africa, Chad, Senegal,
Zimbabwe, Gabon, Sierra Leone and Guinea.
On the multilateral level, besides attaching great importance to the
FOCAC’s role, China also firmly supports the African Union in African
integration, continually utilizing multilateral diplomacy in the development
of Sino-African relations. China established its permanent mission to
the African Union in 2015, which marks the transformation of China’s
Africa diplomacy from exclusive bilateralism to stressing both bilateral
and multilateral channels. In April 2016, China and the African Union
held the first consultation on human rights, discussing each other’s human
rights affairs and agreeing to establish a regular consultation mechanism.
In a speech delivered at the high-level opening event of the United Nations
Africa Week in October 2016, then Chinese Permanent Representative to
the United Nations Liu Jieyi urged that the international community step up
awareness of, and investment in, Africa, safeguard African peace and stability,
increase the independent development capability of Africa, improve Africa’s
development environment, and support African countries in designing their
development strategies according to their own national conditions and on
the basis of the principle of self-determination. He also called on developed
countries to honor their assistance to Africa without attaching any political
conditions. During the United Nations’ Climate Change Conference in
Marrakech in November 2016, China called on developed countries to
implement the climate change roadmap as early as possible and make good
on their financial commitment of providing US$100 billion annually to
developing countries by 2020. This position of China echoed the theme of
the first Africa Action Summit held during the same period, and reflected
the concern and appeal of African countries for developed nations to increase

their technical and financial assistance.10
Economically, China has actively supported the development and
construction of African countries. In recent years, China has set up the
South-South Cooperation Fund, increased its investment in Africa and
relieved the debt of some least developed and landlocked countries in Africa.
China has also been providing additional funding to the China-Africa
Development Fund and the Special Loan for the Development of African
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises.11 During President Xi Jinping’s visit
to Africa in 2013, China and African countries signed and announced over
20 important inter-governmental agreements covering mechanism building,
investment, livelihood and development assistance. These include the charter
establishing the China-South Africa Joint Working Group, the agreement on
investment promotion and mutual protection between China and Tanzania,
and inter-governmental framework agreements and cooperation documents
between China and the Congo Republic as well as between China and
Tanzania.12 Barely a year since Xi Jinping was elected President, China had
provided loans of more than US$10 billion to African countries, which
represented about half of the total loan of $20 billion promised by China
to Africa from 2013 to 2015. In January 2016, the China-Africa Industrial
Capacity Cooperation Fund financed by the China Export-Import Bank
was established, with an initial capital of $10 billion for medium and long-
term development investment. The distinctive feature of these loans is
that China gives priority to investment in infrastructure, agriculture and
manufacturing, which indicates that China is changing its traditional strategy
of investing in the energy sector. In fact, China’s input in Africa’s energy
sector now only accounts for 20 percent of the total Chinese investment in
Africa.13 The increasing financial support to Africa demonstrates China’s
10 China Institute of International Studies, Blue Paper on International Situation and China’s Diplomacy
(2017), World Affairs Press, 2017, p.379.
11 “Xi Unveils Ten Cooperation Projects for Africa, Announces Support Worth $60 Billion,” China News
Service, December 5, 2015, http://it.chinanews.com/gn/2015/12-05/7657047.shtml.
12 “President Xi Jinping’s Fruitful Visit to Africa,” People’s Daily, April 11, 2013, p.3.
13 Yun Sun, “Xi Jinping’s Africa Policy: The First Year,” The Brookings Institution, April 14, 2014,
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/africa-in-focus/2014/04/xi-jinpings-africa-policy-the-first-year.

sincerity in helping Africa achieve common development. In 2014 alone,
Chinese companies signed construction contracts in Africa valued over $70
billion, which would facilitate the building of vital infrastructure, provide
job opportunities and improve local productivity.14 According to statistics,
China-Africa cooperation contributes more than 20 percent to the economic
growth of Africa. By the end of 2014, a total of 3,000 Chinese enterprises
had operated in Africa, providing direct investment of over $3 billion.
The China Development Bank has created a special loan of $5 billion
available for African small and medium-sized enterprises. As 85 percent of
the employees in these enterprises are local, this means more jobs for local
people. In Ethiopia, China has created more than 100,000 jobs.15 The urban
light-rail company project financed by China in this country alone employs
about 4,800 Ethiopians.16
In terms of trade, the import and export volume between the two
sides continues to grow. In 2013 and 2014, the number was respectively
US$210.25 billion and US$221.67 billion, both crossing the $200 billion
threshold. In 2014, the trade volume had registered an around 74.5 percent
increase from the 2010 level. In 2016, with the trade volume standing
at US$149.2 billion, China became Africa’s No.1 trade partner for eight
consecutive years.17
With regard to aid, by the end of 2014, there had been 1,071 China-
assisted projects in Africa, comprising around 47 percent of China’s total
foreign aid. Most projects are related to infrastructure, ranging from railways,
roads, aviation facilities to bridges, ports and power plants. China had also
donated 68 hospitals, dispatched 24,500 medical personnel, trained over
6,000 local medical workers and cured over 270 million persons. China
has established 30 malaria prevention centers and 23 agro-technology
14 Deborah Brautigam, “Five Myths about Chinese Investment in Africa,” Foreign Policy, December 4,
2015, http://foreign policy.com/2015/12/04/5-myths-about-chinese-investment-in-africa.
15 “Chinese Enterprises Create over 100,000 Jobs for Ethiopia in 20 Years,” Xinhua, December 12, 2017,
http://news.xinhuanet.com/2017-12/12/c_1122097649.htm.
16 Deborah Brautigam, “Five Myths about Chinese Investment in Africa.”
17 “China-Africa Trade Statistics in 2016,” Ministry of Commerce of China, February 22, 2017, http://
xyf.mofcom.gov.cn/article/date/201702/20170202520439.shtml.

demonstration centers in Africa, and has trained 81,000 local technicians
in various industries.18 In addition, China has made great contributions in
providing emergency food aid and relieving debt for the least developed
African nations, which helps improve the economic and social environment
of the countries concerned. China’s aid to Africa during the Ebola epidemic
was the longest, broadest, largest and most intensive in its history of dealing
with international public health crisis.19 China has also successfully broken
up the monopoly of Western pharmaceutical companies in Africa. Due to
China’s participation, the price of most medicines has steadily declined.20
In the security field, China has been actively participating in African
peacekeeping and capacity building. With the continuous rise of China’s
comprehensive power, its ability and willingness to provide security public
goods for African countries has also increased. In a meeting with then
Chairperson of the African Union Commission Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma,
President Xi Jinping proposed that China and Africa enhance cooperation in
African peace and security affairs and major international issues, and bring
bilateral relations to a higher level.21 China supports African countries to
address regional problems in their own way and is committed to promoting
peace talks, enhancing international cooperation and safeguarding regional
security and stability. China has been actively mediating in hotspot
issues such as South Sudan, where its special representative on African
affairs exchanged views with both the government leaders and the rebel
representatives, attended the high-level meeting of the Joint Monitoring and
Evaluation Commission (JMEC) Partners’ Group, and played a constructive
18 “Africa: A New Era of China-Africa Relations,” Buziness Africa, November 29, 2015, http://www.
buzinessafrica.com/index.php?option=com_content&view=category&layout=blog&id=8&Itemid=11&
lang=en&limitstart=12.
19 “Promoting the Spirit of the Tanzania-Zambia Railway and Building a China-Africa Community
with a Shared Future,” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China, July 23, 2015, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/web/
wjbz_673089/zyjh_673099/t1283583.shtml.
20 Manyanye Paul Ikome, “China’s Role in Improving Public Health in Cameroon,” Africa-China
Reporting Project, April 7, 2016, http://africachinareporting.co.za/2016/04/chinas-role-in-improving-public-
health-in-cameroon.
21 Zhang Ying, “China’s Summit Diplomacy in Africa,” Contemporary International Relations, No.2,
2016, p.44.

role in realizing the country’s peace, stability and development.22 China has
also lent support to the construction of an African standby force and a rapid
reaction force. At the UN Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping in September
2015, President Xi announced China’s commitment to providing free
military aid worthy of 100 million USD in total to the African Union, so as
to support the establishment of the African Standby Force and the African
Capacity for Immediate Response to Crisis.23 China also works together with
Africa to enhance cooperation in the fields of personnel training, intelligence
sharing and joint exercise and training, helping the African side increase its
capacity in peacekeeping and coutering terrorism, piracy, smuggling and
cross-border crimes. In 2013, China started to dispatch armed forces to
Mali and South Sudan. By 2014, China had sent over 1,960 peacekeeping
personnel, participating in seven of the nine missions in Africa. Among
the permanent members of the UN Security Council, China sends the
most troops to UN peacekeeping missions.24 By the end of 2017, China
had dispatched 14 groups of peacekeeping forces to Africa. Currently, the
Chinese peacekeepers are operating in seven African countries including
Mali, South Sudan and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and conducting
anti-piracy missions in the Gulf of Aden.
In the cultural field, China has been expanding exchanges and
cooperation with Africa. In recent years, the form of China’s cultural
exchanges in Africa has become increasingly diversified. First, China helps
African countries improve their human resources by conducting educational,
cultural and technological cooperation, admitting African students to
Chinese universities, providing training and establishing Confucius
Institutes in Africa. Currently, there are 41,000 African students studying
in China, among whom 7,800 have been awarded Chinese government
22 China Institute of International Studies, Blue Paper on International Situation and China’s Diplomacy
(2017), p.378.
23 “Xi Jinping Attends and Addresses UN Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping,” September 29, 2015,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpdmgjxgsfwbcxlhgcl70znxlfh/t1304147.shtml.
24 Zhang Chun, “China’s Responsible Activities in Africa,” West Asia and Africa, No.5, 2014, p.50.

The passenger train service of Mombasa-Nairobi Railway, the largest infrastructure
project of Kenya since independence, was inaugurated on May 31, 2017. The 480km
Chinese-built railway will link the country’s capital with the southeastern city of
Mombasa, East Africa’s largest port.
scholarships.25 The curriculum of the Confucius Institutes in Africa have

accommodated local features, designing courses in Chinese martial arts,
calligraphy, paper-cutting, painting, film appreciation and traditional
operas, and organizing activities during Chinese traditional holidays such as
the Spring Festival, the Lantern Festival, the Dragon Boat Festival and the
Mid-Autumn Festival. Second, China actively cultivates iconic projects such
as the Chinese Culture Centers, the China-Africa Cultural Cooperation
Partnership Program and the China-Africa People-to-People Friendship
Action, organizes “national year” activities in African countries where
condition permits, and encourages more Chinese to travel to Africa. The
organization of South Africa Year in China in 2014 and the China Year in
South Africa in 2015 is the first time that China and a single African nation
mutually held a “country year.” With the surge of interest in foreign travel in
25 “Africa: A New Era of China-Africa Relations.”

China, the number of Chinese tourists to Africa has increased dramatically.
According to report by the Tanzanian newspaper The Citizen, the number
of Chinese travelling to Tanzania for business, conference and leisure in
2016 was 34,472, accounting for 2.7% of all foreign travelers to Tanzania.
The average spending by Chinese tourists to the country per night is $541,
topping visitors from any other country.26 Third, China organizes forums
on China-Africa exchanges to strengthen understanding and cooperation
between the two sides. During the China-Africa Public Diplomacy Forum
held in Tanzania in August 2016, representatives from China and Africa had
in-depth discussions on charitable exchanges and activities, as well as health
and medical cooperation. In China, a number of interactive forums such as
the China-Africa Think Tank Forum, the China-Africa Media Cooperation
Forum and the China-Africa Youth Festival also contribute to cultural
exchanges between China and the African continent.
Model for New Type of International Relations and Community

with a Shared Future for Mankind
The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China vows to

foster a new type of international relations and build a community with a
shared future for mankind.27 The ideas and practices of China’s diplomacy in
Africa are the best interpretation of promoting these two goals.
The Sino-African relations had a relatively high starting point from its
inception. Since the late 1950s, China has established diplomatic relations
with successive newly independent African countries. In 1996, a 21st
century-oriented long-term stable China-Africa relationship of all-round
cooperation was established between the two sides. At the Beijing summit
26 “Average Spending of Chinese Tourists in Tanzania the Highest,” Forum on China-Africa Cooperation,
December 25, 2017, http://www.focac.org/chn/zfgx/zfgxrwjl/t1521882.htm.
27 Xi Jinping, “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous Society in All Respects
and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with Chinese Characteristics for a New Era: Delivered at the
19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China,” October 18, 2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/
english/download/Xi_Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_Congress.pdf.

of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation in 2006, China and Africa
jointly announced the establishment of a new type of strategic partnership.
In 2015, the Johannesburg summit of the Forum upgraded the Sino-African
relations to the level of comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership.
“Comprehensive” refers to the scope of cooperation between the two sides,
which encompasses not only traditional areas such as politics, economy
and military but also includes culture, environmental protection, society
and other emerging areas. “Strategic” refers to the level of cooperation,
which means that the two sides cooperate at a higher level with consensus
regarding the overall situation, core interests and future development
trends. “Cooperative partnership” refers to the status of cooperation, which
includes mutual coordination and support in terms of policy.28 Standing at
the top within China’s global network of partnerships,29 the China-Africa
Comprehensive Strategic Cooperative Partnership is a model as well as
an experimental field in China’s effort to foster a new type of international
relations and build a community with a shared future for mankind.
The fundamental principles of the new-type international relations
include mutual respect, fairness and justice as well as win-win cooperation,
with win-win cooperation at the core. In China’s Africa diplomacy, the
principle of “sincerity, real results, affinity and good faith” is the concrete
reflection of mutual respect, and the concept regarding justice and interests is
the realization of fairness and justice, while the interactions between China and
Africa under the five pillars announced at the 2015 Johannesburg summit30
28 Sun Jingxin and Lin Jianzhen, “Partnership Boosts Major-Country Diplomacy with Chinese
Characteristics,” Contemporary World, No.10, 2015, pp. 34-37.
29 Currently, there are five types of relationships within China’s global network of partnerships, namely
cooperative partnership, comprehensive cooperative partnership, strategic partnership, comprehensive
strategic partnership, and comprehensive strategic cooperative partnership. The types are defined according
to the closeness of bilateral relations.
30 Chinese President Xi Jinping and then South African President Jacob Zuma, who co-chaired the
Johannesburg summit of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation, suggested that China and Africa further
promote their relations on five pillars: in politics, the two sides should stick to equality and mutual trust; in
the economic realm, they need to pursue win-win cooperation; in terms of civilization, they should learn
from each other; on security, the two sides need to close ranks and help each other; on international affairs,
two sides to cement unity and coordination and jointly defend their common interests.

have brought tangible benefits.31 With highly compatible development
strategies, needs for each other and respective advantages, win-win cooperation
has become an important consensus between China and Africa. The
international community, especially African countries, have spoken highly of
China’s Africa policy. According to a 2016 report entitled “China’s Growing
Presence in Africa Wins Largely Positive Popular Review” conducted by
Afrobarometer after surveying 54,000 persons in 36 African countries, almost
two-thirds (63%) of Africans say China’s influence is somewhat positive or
very positive, while only 15% see it as somewhat or very negative. “I believe
ordinary citizens have a positive sentiment because of the contribution
China has made to Africa,” said Anyway Chingwete, the project manager of
Afrobarometer.32 Peter Kagwanja, CEO of the Nairobi-based Pan African
think-tank, the Africa Policy Institute, noted that unlike Western nations,
China has exerted its influence in Africa through promotion of development
and people-to-people interactions, and that there is a consensus between China
and its African friends that win-win cooperation will be upheld forever.33
“Through significant investments on the continent, China has contributed
to the economic and social development of many countries in Africa,” said
Tebogo Lefifi, Chief Representative of Brand South Africa in China.34
According to research by Professor Calestous Juma from Harvard University’s
John F. Kennedy School of Government, “China’s engagement in Africa is
not limited to trade in raw commodities. Many of the China-funded projects
are designed to foster local manufacturing and regional trade.”35 The French
31 “China’s Growing Presence in Africa Wins Largely Positive Popular Reviews,” Afrobarometer,
No.122, October 24, 2016, http://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/publications/Dispatches/ab_r6_
dispatchno122_perceptions_of_china_in_africa1.pdf.
32 Sophie Morlin-Yron, “This Is What African Think of China,” CNN, November 6, 2016, http://edition.
cnn.com/2016/11/03/africa/what-africans-really-think -of-china.
33 “Spotlight: China-Africa Ties Testify to New Type of International Relations,” Xinhua, December 1,
2015, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2015-12/01/c_134872715.htm.
34 “Shared Vision: Chinese Cooperation Will Help Africa Achieve Agenda 2063,” Beijing Review,
November 26, 2015, http://www.bjreview.com/Special_Reports?2015?Johannesburg_Summit_of_Forum_
on_China_Africa_Cooperation/Opinions/201511/t20151126_800043406.html.
35 Calestous Juma, “How Africa Is Shaping Its Relations with China,” Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, April 11, 2016, http://www.belfercenter.org/publication/
how-africa-shaping-its-relations-china-0.

newspaper L’Humanité also commented that “the African continent allows
China to demonstrate its well-known win-win strategy.” Some African scholars
have pointed out that China is more committed to the improvement of Africa’s
own capacity and synergizes its development closely with that of Africa, which
makes the accusation of China’s alleged neo-colonialism groundless.36
China and Africa have always been a community with a shared future.37
The proposition of a community with a
shared future for mankind has a profound The ideas and practices of
connection with the development of China’s diplomacy in Africa
Sino-African relations. During his visit
38
are the best interpretation
to Africa in early 2013, which is the first of promoting the two goals
overseas visit after taking office as Chinese of fostering a new type of
President and illustrates China’s evolving international relations and
priorities and strategies in the continent, building a community with a
Xi Jinping defined China-Africa relations shared future for mankind.
as a “community with a shared future”
featuring “common historical experience, common development objectives
and common strategic interests.”39 Since then, President Xi has reiterated the
notion of a “community with a shared future,” which then developed into
the “community with a shared future for mankind” and became the core of
China’s commitment to building a new type of international relations.40
The “community with a share future” sums up the traditional Sino-
African friendship. With a common history of being invaded and oppressed
and necessity of seeking a correct path of national development, China
and Africa share consensus on many issues and support each other in the
international community. Chairperson of the African Union Commission
Dlamini Zuma highlighted the long-standing cooperation between Africa
36 Herbert Jauch, “Chinese Investments in Africa: Twenty-First Century Colonialism?” New Labor
Forum, Vol.20, No.2, Spring 2011, pp.48-55.
37 “Full Text: China’s Second Africa Policy Paper.”
38 Yun Sun, “Xi Jinping’s Africa Policy: The First Year.”
39 “Xi Jinping Delivers a Speech at the Julius Nyerere International Convention Center in Tanzania.”
40 Yang Jiemian, “Keeping on the New Chapter of Major-Country Diplomacy with Chinese
Characteristics,” People’s Daily, April 14, 2016, p.7.

and China. “The African Union considers today an important milestone
in the historical relationship between Africa and China. This strategic and
unique relationship is an expression of a long, deep and enduring solidarity
between Africa and China. It was built in the long walk of Africa’s struggles
against colonialism and foreign domination, and Africa’s pursuit for self-
determination, freedom, justice, peace and prosperity,” she underscored.41
In an interview with The Citizen, Ross Anthony, a Research Fellow at the
Center for Chinese Studies at South Africa’s Stellenbosch University,
noted that “As China and Africa have always been a community with a
common destiny with similar historical experiences and values, as well as
shared strategic interests and development tasks, the Chinese dream is also
closely connected with the dream of the African countries.”42 The idea of
“community with a shared future” brings together the historical sentiments
of Sino-African friendship with their concrete interests. It reaffirms their
identification of values and becomes the spiritual bond of Sino-African
relations in the new era.
In recent years, both China and Africa have enjoyed rapid development.
They have formed a community of intertwined interests. China cannot
realize sustainable development without Africa while Africa’s rejuvenation
needs China. Within the framework of the community of interests featuring
win-win cooperation, China is committed to the improvement of Africa’s
own capacity and synergizes its development closely with that of Africa. The
Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation (BRF) held in Beijing
in May 2017 was attended by presidents of several African countries such
as Ethiopia and Kenya. China has been actively promoting the Belt and
Road Initiative as well as major documents regarding Africa’s development
strategy, such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development, the action
plan for Accelerated Industrial Development for Africa, the Program for
41 “Africa and China Strategic Partnership Gets New Impetus with the Visit of China Premier to the AU
Headquarters,” African Union, May 5, 2014, https://au.int/web/en/newsevents/20140505-0.
42 “China Is not a Threat to Africa’s Growth: Scholar,” The Citizen, August 14, 2013, http://www.thecitizen.
co.tz/maganine/politicalreforms/China-is-not-a-threat-to-Africa-s-growth-scholar/-/1843776/1947656/-
/5cjf6k/-/index.html.

Infrastructure Development in Africa and the Africa Agenda 2063, and
helping Africa build the “three networks” from land to sky, namely, the
railway network, the road network and the regional aviation network,
thereby pushing forward the process of African industrialization and
economic integration.
China and Africa also belong to a
The idea of “community with a
community of responsibility promoting shared future” brings together
the construction of a new international the historical sentiments of
order in the interest of the vast number Sino-African friendship with
of developing countries. In recent years, their concrete interests. It
China has taken a greater initiative as a reaffirms their identification
responsible major country, assuming more of values and becomes the
responsibilities and making great efforts to spiritual bond of Sino-African
contribute more to the world in the course relations in the new era.
of its own development. As a permanent
member of the United Nations Security Council and representative
of developing countries, China has a strategic claim and international
obligation to promote the development of the international order in a more
just and rational direction, in which process China needs Africa’s help. As
the continent with the largest number of countries and fastest growth rate,
Africa also desires to have its voice heard and take action on international
affairs. In this regard, the moral support of China is essential. Meanwhile,
in the face of an emerging trend of protectionism and anti-globalization,
China and Africa need to deepen their cooperation and mutual support.
The two sides shoulder a common responsibility in reforming the unjust
and irrational old order and building an open, inclusive, clean and beautiful
world enjoying lasting peace, universal security and common prosperity.
As Charles Onunaiju, Director of the Center for China Studies in Abuja,
noted: “Africa and China share broad sentiments on the key issues of global
peace, stability and global governance driven by the rule of law. The strategic
partnership of Sino-African cooperation can therefore play an important role
in pushing for a global framework that strives toward mainstream peace and

development.”43
As the largest developing country and the largest developing continent
respectively, China and Africa, which in the past supported and helped
each other in political, economic and security arenas, have formed a
close community of interests and responsibility. In the new great cause of
promoting the building of a community with a shared future for mankind,
both China and Africa face a number of new challenges and problems. They
still need mutual assistance and meet each other halfway.
Conclusion
The principle of “sincerity, real results, affinity and good faith” and the
proper understanding of justice and interests reflect the historical legacy
and value of China’s diplomacy toward Africa. They demonstrate the basic
content of the major-country diplomacy with Chinese characteristics,
serving as an important guideline of China’s relations with Africa and
becoming a banner of China’s diplomacy.44 The related ideas have become
key principles directing the relations between China and developing
countries, and are reflected in the report delivered by President Xi Jinping
at the 19th National Congress of the CPC. These new ideas and practices
of China’s Africa diplomacy are of significant reference value to fostering a
new type of international relations and building a community with a shared
future for mankind in the new era. Meanwhile, the two missions will in turn
facilitate the progress and upgrade of the ideas and practices in China’s Africa
diplomacy, providing new and greater development opportunities for Sino-
African relations.
43 Charles Onunaiju, “Development Lessons,” Beijing Review, December 2015, http://www.bjreview.com/
Special_Reports/2015/Johannesburg_Summit_of_Forum_on_China_Africa_Cooperation/Opinions/201511/
t20151127_800043484.html.
44 “Wang Yi: Upholding Justice While Pursuing Shared Interests Is One Banner of China’s Diplomacy.”

China-EU Relations: Structural
Changes and Future Prospects
Cui Hongjian
T
he European Union is the prevailing economic and political
entity in Europe, and is the focal point of China’s Europe policy.
After more than 40 years of cooperation, relations between
China and the EU (and its predecessor the European Community) have
reached a period of structural changes, which is a natural consequence of
evolving international and regional situation. Structural changes refer
to the variation in content and proportion of integral parts as a result of
the interplay between internal and external conditions, which give rise
to changes in relationship between the various parts, and lead to further
transformation in the overall structure. There are various inherent factors
propelling structural changes in China-EU relations, including a major
change in relative economic strength of the two sides, changes in policy
orientation and priorities of China and the EU, and Brexit. External
factors include respective neighboring situations facing China and the
EU, changes in international environment, and uncertainties ensuing
government turnover in the United States. While examining the overall
changes in China-EU relations, this article will analyze the background,
characteristics and prospects of structural changes in China-EU relations
by looking at relevant internal and external factors in terms of domestic
politics, national strategy, economics and trade, perception, policy
initiatives and the broader business environment.
Cui Hongjian is Senior Research Fellow and Director of the Department for European Studies, China
Institute of International Studies (CIIS).
China-EU Relations: Structural Changes and Future Prospects March/April 2018 47

Main Features of Structural Changes in China-EU Relations
Since 2013, due to China’s strengthened initiative and change in EU

policy, the China-EU relations have entered a new period of vigorous
development. The vision of building a partnership for peace, growth,
reform and civilization was incorporated into the China-EU 2020 Strategic
Agenda for Cooperation, symbolizing an unprecedented strategic high
in bilateral relations. Compared with the phased changes in previous
China-EU relations, structural changes have taken place since 2008. The
structural changes in China-EU relations have demonstrated the following
characteristics:
Great changes in mutual perceptions and policies, and more

equal status in policy initiative and agenda setting
Mutual perceptions between China and the EU is an important part of
bilateral relations, and a critical foundation for formulating policies. After
setbacks in China-EU relations in 2008, mutual perceptions and policy
interactions between the two sides experienced remarkable changes.
The EU’s perception of China and its policy changes have exhibited
the following features. First, while attaching increased importance to
the potential for cooperation with China, the EU feels uneasy about the
rise of China. Dragged down by the crisis, the EU is concerned about its
decline in competitiveness amid dim prospects of economic recovery, and
is thus apprehensive about its values, system and model being challenged
by emerging forces. For example, in spite of huge demand for cooperation,
due to concerns about over-dependence on China’s economy and the
consideration to stick to its own political values even in times of crises, there
have been calls within the EU since 2009 for strictly executing the strategy
of “conditional” or even “reciprocal” engagement. To this end, the EU has
elevated China’s position among its strategic partnerships, and identified
a “more liberal and fair access to the Chinese market” as the primary goal
48 China International Studies China-EU Relations: Structural Changes and Future Prospects
in its relationship with China.1 The EU has also stepped up coordination
with other countries in their China policies. For example, the EU is seeking
a common position with the United States and Japan to pressure China
on economic issues like the renminbi exchange rate, resources exports,
and market access. Second, while the governments of EU members are
enthusiastic about strengthening economic and trade cooperation with
China, the EU agencies and public opinion play a counter-balancing role.
In the area of economics and trade, upgrading cooperation with China to
overcome the crisis has gradually become the mainstream viewpoint of
European countries. However, their perception of China is still swinging
between a “challenger” and a “partner.” In particular, special interest groups
and public opinion have a more negative and vigilant perception of China.
However, the EU and some national governments did not address those
concerns in some bilateral issues; sometimes they even appealed to them on
the grounds of “responding to the public opinion” and turned them into a
“weapon” to further pressure China.
Some characteristics can be drawn from China’s perception of the EU
and its policy changes. First, while China continues to attach importance
to Europe, it also recognizes that Europe is entering a difficult period when
various conflicts erupt at the same time and will continue to persist. “The
European debt crisis declares the end of climax of European economic
development, and its impacts will loom large.” Although the difficulties
facing Europe will “turn out to be long-term and complicated with profound
political, economic and social implications, the region, which hosts the most
developed countries in the world, will remain an important and unique
force where the EU is the core and major actor.”2 Second, while continuing
its support for European integration, China has developed a more proactive,
1 Yuan Xue and Li Jing, “Market Access: EU’s Primary Interest in China,” 21st Century Business Herald,
December 20, 2010, http://finance.sina.com.cn/roll/20101221/03059136642.shtml.
2 Liu Haixing, “The European Situation and China-Europe Relations in 2012,” December 19, 2012, http://
dangjian.people.com.cn/n/2012/1219/c117092-19938869.html. Liu Haixing was Director-General of the
Department of European Affairs at China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs when the article was written. His
opinion is representative of the Chinese government’s perception of Europe.

pragmatic and balanced Europe policy. Given the “sub-regionalization” and
“re-nationalization” in terms of economic development and pursuits inside
the EU following the debt crisis, China proposed to “explore new ways and
new channels of cooperation in light of the overarching direction and specific
goals of China-EU relations and different characteristics of EU member
states, European sub-regions and EU institutions.”3 China has enhanced
its relations with major European powers including Germany, France,
the United Kingdom and Italy, and has also launched cooperation with
European sub-regions such as Central and Eastern Europe, Northern Europe
and Southern Europe. Compared with its previous Europe policy that over-
relied on developing ties with the EU to resolve mutual concerns, China’s
current Europe policy is more balanced and pragmatic, reinforcing China’s
initiative in developing relations with Europe.
Expanding politico-strategic relations along with economic ties

First, seeking the synergy of development strategies. (1) Coordinating
the strategic synergy between China’s 12th Five-Year Plan and the Europe
2020 Strategy. At the 15th China-EU Summit held in 2012, the two sides
expressed that “efforts should be made actively to seek synergies between
China’s Twelfth Five Year Plan and the Europe 2020 Strategy with a view
to expanding and deepening pragmatic cooperation in various fields,”4
offering an important chance for furthering cooperation; (2) The China-EU
2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation, released after the 16th China-EU
Summit, has become the guideline document for synergy of development
strategies between China and the EU. The Agenda sets out China and the
EU’s shared aims to enhance cooperation in the areas of peace and security,
prosperity, sustainable development and people-to-people exchanges, which
steers and promotes the comprehensive development of future China-EU
3 Song Tao, “A Changing Europe and Its Relations with China,” Remarks at Seminar on Situation in
Europe and China-Europe Relations, August 16, 2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/
zyjh_665391/t975481.shtml. Song Tao was Vice Foreign Minister in charge of European affairs at the time.
4 “Joint Press Communiqué - 15th EU-China Summit: Towards a stronger EU-China Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership,” September 20, 2012, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-12-693_en.htm.
relations;5 (3) Overall synergy between development strategies of the two
sides. As China and the EU put forward the Belt and Road Initiative and the
Investment Plan for Europe (Juncker Plan) respectively, the 17th China-EU
Summit in 2015 agreed to promote three major dockings, namely, docking
China’s Belt and Road Initiative with Europe’s development strategies,
docking China’s international production capacity cooperation with the
Juncker Plan, and docking the “16+1” cooperation between China and the
Central and Eastern Europe with the overall cooperation between China and
Europe.6
Second, spanning the cooperation agenda. (1) Establishing the
China-EU High Level People-to-People Dialogue, and perfecting the three
pillars of strategic dialogue, economic and trade dialogue and people-to-
people dialogue;7 (2) Strengthening security dialogue and cooperation.
Both China and the EU are confronted with challenges brought by
changes in the security environment of their respective neighborhood.
When Chinese President Xi Jinping visited the EU headquarters in 2014,
the two sides agreed to further elevate their dialogue and cooperation in
defense and security; (3) Expanding the cooperation agenda to areas such
as urbanization and energy. Moreover, the two sides have reached broad
consensus on stepping up exchange and cooperation on cyber issues,
establishing the China-EU Cyber Task Force, launching cooperation
in the carbon emissions trade scheme, and re-starting space technology
cooperation.
Finally, elevating each other’s strategic positioning. (1) Strengthening
regional and global governance cooperation beyond the bilateral level. The
12th China-EU Summit lifted the China-EU relations to a global level by
agreeing to jointly deal with severe global challenges like climate change,
5 “China-EU 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation,” November 23, 2013, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/2649_665393/t1101804.shtml.
6 Wang Yi, “China’s Diplomacy and China-Europe Relations in 2015, ” December 20, 2015, https://
euobserver.com/stakeholders/131704.
7 “Joint Press Communiqué of the 14th China-EU Summit,” February 14, 2012, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t906992.shtml.

financial crises, and energy and resources security.8 Since then, all China-
EU Strategic Dialogues and China-EU Summits have discussed regional
and global issues of concern with concerted efforts to reach a consensus.
(2) Putting forward the vision of building a partnership for peace, growth,
reform and civilization. In his visit to the EU headquarters in March 2014,
President Xi Jinping emphasized that “the two sides should view China-EU
relations from a strategic perspective, and combine the two powers, two
markets and two civilizations of China and the EU to jointly forge four
major China-EU partnerships for peace, growth, reform and civilization, so
as to inject new impetus into China-EU cooperation and to make a greater
contribution to world development and prosperity.”9 The subsequent China’s
policy paper on the EU, entitled Deepen the China-EU Comprehensive
Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit and Win-win Cooperation, says for the
first time “to grow China-EU relations is an integral part of China’s efforts
to build long-term, steady and healthy relations with major powers and a
priority in its foreign policy.”10
Economic relations evolving from trade to a mix of investment,

industrial and financial cooperation
First, equal importance has been given to trade and investment.
Although bilateral trade is undergoing continuous volatility and weak
growth, the trade interdependence is moving towards a better balanced
structure. With the worsening debt crisis and fiscal troubles in some
European economies, it is the common expectation of China and the EU
to benefit from growing bilateral trade. However, as a result of economic
recession, the China-EU trade has been continuously fluctuating,
8 “Joint Statement of the 12th EU-China Summit,” November 30, 2009, http://www.china.org.cn/
world/2009-11/30/content_18979511.htm.
9 “Xi Jinping Holds Talks with President Herman Van Rompuy of European Council,” March 31, 2014,
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/topics_665678/xjpzxcxdsjhaqhfbfwhlfgdgblshlhgjkezzzbomzb_666590/
t1143124.shtml.
10 “China’s Policy Paper on the EU: Deepen the China-EU Comprehensive Strategic Partnership for
Mutual Benefit and Win-win Cooperation,” April 2, 2014, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/
t1143406.shtml.
Structural changes have taken place in the China-EU relations with accelerating change
in relative economic strength and the concurrence of China’s “assertive diplomacy” and
the EU’s inward-looking policy focus.
experiencing different stages of decline, rebound and stability. The overall

growth of bilateral trade remains subdued.11 Despite declining trade volume,
the structure of China-EU trade is being optimized and better balanced
than before in terms of trade in goods. China’s trade surplus with the EU
continues to narrow with declining exports and increasing imports. The
proportion of trade in high-tech products and services between China and
the EU also rose.12 With regard to investment, China’s rapidly expanding
investment in Europe has become a new growth point for bilateral economic
cooperation. In the medium to long term, Europe will be one major
destination for Chinese capital and companies to go global. Therefore,
the bilateral investment will inevitably move in a more balanced direction.
11 The China-EU trade slumped 14.5% in 2009, rebounded by 31.8% in 2010, grew vigorously by 19.2%
in 2011, dropped by 7.1% in 2012, became stable in 2013 (2.1%) and 2014 (10.1%), then fell again in 2015
(7.2%) and 2016 (1.6%).
12 “Eurostat Released China-EU Economic and Trade Data in 2016,” July 23, 2017, http://eu.mofcom.
gov.cn/article/zxhz/hzjj/201711/20171102664006.shtml.

Europe’s relatively mature market environment will help improve the quality
of China’s outbound investment and enhance its ability of risk control. The
advanced technologies in Europe can satisfy Chinese companies’ strategic
needs of technological improvement, brand cultivation and increasing
the value added. At the same time, Europe has vast needs for Chinese
investment. Its long-term management of the sovereign debt crisis will boost
the permanent need of inward capital flows. Therefore, European countries
are open towards Chinese investment, and the valuation of European
corporations is more reasonable compared with other advanced economies.
Second, financial cooperation has become a priority for China-EU
cooperation. Since 2009, China has paid 15.5 billion euro in accordance
with its shares in the IMF, in order to support the IMF’s bailout of European
countries, and has kept increasing its holding of European government debt
during the crisis. Besides, a currency swap deal was reached for the first time
between China and the EU, representing a new model for bilateral financial
cooperation. China’s central bank successfully tested bilateral currency swap
operations with its European counterpart in the first and second half of 2015
respectively. The China Europe International Exchange (CEINEX) , a joint
venture launched by both sides, has also become a highlight.13 Increasing
currency exchange and renminbi clearing services with EU member states
have made the EU an important offshore trading hub for the renminbi.14
Third, innovation emerges as a key cooperation area. Both China and
the EU are engaged in structural reforms and industrial upgrade so as to
confront development challenges and explore cooperation opportunities
in new technologies, new industries and new areas. According to the
consensus between the two sides, “China and the EU face the common task
of achieving innovative, inclusive and sustainable development. Both sides
agree that innovation has an important contribution to make to achieve
13 Chen Xin, “China-EU Economic and Trade Relations in 2015,” Xinhua, December 31, 2015, http://
news.xinhuanet.com/comments/2015-12/31/c_1117642417.htm.
14 “China-EU 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation,” November 23, 2013.
sustainable development.”15 China has for some time been strengthening
innovation cooperation with major European powers including France,
the UK and Germany, which shows huge potential and can have a strong
demonstrative effect.
Background behind the Structural Changes
The structural changes in China-EU relations since 2008 have resulted from
the accelerating change in relative economic strength between China and
the EU, and the concurrence of China’s “assertive diplomacy” and the EU’s
inward-looking policy focus. In addition, changes in global and regional
situation have exerted significant influence over the China-EU relations.
Narrowing of relative economic strength

As the impact of global financial crisis on China and the EU were
quite different, the gap between the economic strength of the two sides
has continued to narrow. The eurozone debt crisis from 2009 and China’s
rise to the world’s second largest economy in 2010 have accelerated and
amplified the change. China’s economic output stood at 24% of that of
the EU in 2008 and 30% in 2009, and has gradually risen to 77% in 2016
(the UK excluded).16 In 2014, China’s share in the world’s total exports and
imports grew to 12.33% and 10.26% respectively, further narrowing the gap
with the EU, whose share in 2014 was 14.98% and 14.7% respectively.17
While the comparison above is merely taken in terms of economic output,
without further comparison in growth quality, energy consumption, and
sustainability, the change in economic strength may possibly lead to growing
competition in economics and trade, but the demand for the two sides to
strengthen coordination in global governance will also grow.
15 “China-EU 2020 Strategic Agenda for Cooperation,” November 23, 2013.
16 The author adopts the World Bank data on Chinese and EU economic outputs.
17 See the WTO data, http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx?Language=E&Country=
E28; http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFView.aspx? Language=E&Country=CN.

China’s “assertive diplomacy” and EU’s inward-looking trend
The academic community of Europe and the United States generally
agree that, around the period 2009-2010, marked by its performance at
the Copenhagen Climate Change Conference and its change of approach
to handling territorial and maritime disputes with neighboring countries,
China’s diplomacy entered a new phase characterized by “assertiveness.”
While the US is concerned about China’s performance in neighboring affairs,
especially in maritime disputes, the EU is much more concerned about
China’s “assertive performance” in global governance like climate change.18
This is not only because the EU’s ambition to play a leading role in global
governance has encountered a major setback, but also because the “China-US
co-governance” at the Copenhagen Conference is not in line with the EU’s
goal of “achieving global governance through multilateralism.”19
In contrast with an assertive China, since the outbreak of the eurozone
debt crisis, the EU has been coping with the problems of internal economic
governance on one hand, and on the other, it has been hit successively by
the Ukraine crisis, terrorist attacks, the influx of refugees and the United
Kingdom’s exit from the bloc. Therefore, its governance emphasis and
policy priority will be put on the rectification of internal affairs and the
maintenance of neighborhood stability, and its participation in regional
and international affairs will be limited by its capability despite a still strong
intention.20 This inward-looking trend is clearly revealed in the agenda of
the EU’s policy-making organs. Until it is able to handle these numerous
problems effectively, the EU will find its influence in continuous decline.
18 Alastair Iain Johnston, “How New and Assertive Is China’s New Assertiveness?” International
Security, Vol.37, No.4, 2013, pp.7-48; Rosemary Foot, ed., China Across the Divide: The Domestic and
Global in Politics and Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013; Björn Jerdén, “The Assertive China
Narrative: Why It Is Wrong and How So Many Still Bought into It,” The Chinese Journal of International
Politics, Vol.7, No.1, 2014, pp.47–88.
19 Jonathan Watts, “Copenhagen Summit: China’s Quiet Satisfaction at Tough Tactics and Goalless
Draw,” The Guardian, December 20, 2009, https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2009/dec/20/
copenhagen-climate-summit-china-reaction.
20 Most Chinese scholars hold this view. See Feng Zhongping, “China Should Actively Shape China-EU
Relations,” April 14, 2014, http://news.nankai.edu.cn/zhxw/system/2014/04/14/000175674.shtml.
Changes in international and regional situation
First of all, the situations in Asia and Europe have experienced
significant changes and the neighborhood has become the top priority in
policies of China and the EU. With more convergence on regional issues,
the two sides have been promoting exchanges on regional stability and
development. Regional cooperation has thus become a new dimension in
the China-EU relations. As the United States shifts its strategic focus from
Europe and the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific, the EU is forced to face
alone the turmoil in Ukraine and the Middle East; on the other hand, it
has also led to an increase in the EU’s attention to the China-US relations
and the China-Russia relations, as well as the evolution of situation in the
Asia-Pacific, Eurasia and Africa. While resisting pressures from the US and
Japan on neighboring disputes, China has been expanding its strategic depth
and maintaining balance through cooperation with Russia strategically and
with Europe economically. Both China and the EU have greater need for
cooperation on regional issues.
Second, outstanding global issues have offered opportunities for
China-EU cooperation to cope with challenges. The China-EU relations
has developed a global dimension besides bilateral and regional ones, with
more strategic elements embedded into the relationship. As influential
international actors, China and the EU share similar positions and common
interests in climate change, global anti-terrorism, strengthening global
economic governance and opposition to protectionism. In particular, in
a context of emerging conservative and populist politics in Europe and the
United States, China and the EU need each other more than ever in dealing
with the complex trends of globalization. Cooperation in global governance
is becoming a new growth point for the China-EU relations.
Finally, changes in relations between Western countries, especially the
impact of Trump’s election as US President on transatlantic relations, have also
facilitated a structural shift in the China-EU relations. Trump’s questioning of
European integration and the traditional relationship between Europe and the

US has undermined the alliance and shaken the established structure of mutual
interests. In addition, the anxiety of a post-Brexit Britain to develop strategic,
economic and trade relations with China and other countries outside the EU
has constituted competition with the EU in reality, which serves as a stimulus
to the China-EU relations. In this context, China and the EU have found
impetus to adhere to a multilateral governance system, and develop stronger
cooperation in free trade and investment and global economic governance.
Prospects and Challenges for Structural Changes
In general, the structural changes in the China-EU relations will lead

to an overall strategic elevation of bilateral relations, the expansion of
cooperation areas and a more balanced economic and trade structure, and
they will exhibit different characteristics in different stages in line with the
evolution of international and regional situation. In the coming years, the
structural changes will bring both opportunities and challenges, which are
demonstrated mainly in the following areas.
Co-existence of cooperation and competition in economics

Economic and trade cooperation stand as the cornerstone of the China-
EU relations, but issues concerning the sustainability of and competition in
bilateral economic ties are becoming prominent and tend to be politicized
against the backdrop of the EU’s long-term economic woes and economic
slowdown in China. Whether China and the EU can properly handle issues
of protectionism and sustainable growth of trade and investment, and reach
consensus on economic and trade rules, will influence the role of cooperation
in this field as the bedrock of bilateral relations.
Sustainable growth of trade and investment. Against the background of falling
global trade and ongoing debt crisis, the China-EU trade has witnessed much
less fluctuations compared with their other trading partners. Considering the
importance of bilateral trade for both sides, however, it remains a huge challenge
for China and the EU to overcome the bottleneck for growth in order to ensure
sound and sustainable development of bilateral trade. Downward pressures on
economic growth and insufficient effective demand contribute to weak growth
in trade. Therefore, China and the EU should adjust their objectives for bilateral
trade and endeavor to improve the trading environment. In terms of bilateral
investment, while problems exist in the diversion of EU investment away from
China, China’s investment in the EU is also unstable and lacks long-term,
reasonable planning.
Dealing with protectionism and properly
In general, the structural
handling issues concerning economic and trade changes in the China-EU
rules. Competition between China and relations will lead to an overall
the EU is rising in the wake of increasing strategic elevation of bilateral
trade and investment flows. First, China relations, the expansion of
has become the main target of the EU’s cooperation areas and a more
trading defense measures and investment balanced economic and trade
barriers. For instance, the EU launched structure.
19 trade remedy investigations from
January to November 2012, among which 4 anti-dumping investigations and
3 countervailing cases were held against Chinese products, accounting for 1/3
and 1/2 of total investigations respectively.21 The photovoltaic products dispute
in the same year even pushed both sides to the brink of a trade war. Second, the
emerging asymmetry and increasing competition in China-EU economic and
trade ties were fully demonstrated in debates on China’s market economy status,
the surrogate country system and iron and steel overcapacity. Against the backdrop
of sluggish global trade and economic downturn on both sides, jointly opposing
protectionism and effectively managing disputes will provide a premise for steady
and sustainable development of bilateral economic and trade relations.
Political mutual trust faced with test

Compared with economic and trade cooperation, political trust between
China and the EU is relatively fragile. The two sides need to deal with the
21 European Commission, “Trade Defence Statistics Covering the First Eleven Months of 2012,” http://
trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2012/december/tradoc_150133.pdf.

long-term rivalry between value diplomacy and pragmatic diplomacy, and try
to resolve political suspicion.
Strained relations between value diplomacy and pragmatic diplomacy.
Politics and human rights have long been a major obstacle to the political
mutual trust between China and the EU, demonstrating their structural
contradictions. In order to obtain China’s economic and political support
when the debt crisis was serious, the EU reduced pressures on political and
human rights issues. However, as the crisis eased, some EU practices have
again given rise to political divergence. Despite the existence of relevant
dialogues, the EU and some member states have not given up interfering in
China’s internal affairs in the name of protecting human rights. In addition
to the traditional topics of Tibet and Xinjiang-related issues, the EU has
stepped up its criticisms and pressures on China with regard to Hong Kong-
related issues, reform of the hukou system, the rights of persons belonging to
ethnic minorities, freedom of religion or belief and freedom of expression.22
The EU’s balance of power diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region. The EU
has important business and investment interests in the Asia-Pacific, and
regards this region as a center of world politics and economics in the future.
It pays close attention on the region’s overall situation, and discussions
about its involvement in Asia-Pacific affairs and implementing the balance
of power diplomacy are becoming increasingly heated. Countries like the
Philippines and Japan who have maritime disputes with China have scaled
up their efforts to introduce external forces like the EU and its member
states, while the EU also shows interest in coordinating regional disputes in
the Asia-Pacific. When China and Japan experienced fierce conflicts on the
sovereignty of the Diaoyu Islands, interactions between the EU and Japan
witnessed a significant increase.23
The EU has maintained continuous attention to the East and South
22 “33rd EU-China Dialogue on Human Rights,” EU External Action, December 9, 2014, https://eeas.
europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/6788/33rd%20EU-China%20Dialogue%20on%20
Human%20Rights.
23 “Japan-U.K. Summit Meeting (Overview),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, June 17, 2013, http://
www.mofa.go.jp/region/page6e_000091.html.
China Seas. While claiming to take no position on territorial disputes, it urges
the resolution of disputes in accordance with international law, in particular
the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea, and to continue ensuring safety
and freedom of navigation.24 The EU and its major member states have also
reinforced mutual political and security interactions with ASEAN and Japan,
reiterating the priority of its Asia policy
that puts the maritime security issue in China and the EU need to deal
Asia above development cooperation. 25
with the long-term rivalry
Despite the failure of some EU members to between value diplomacy and
incorporate their concerns into the Chair’s pragmatic diplomacy, and try
Statement of the Asia-Europe Meeting in to resolve political suspicion.
2014 due to objection from the majority of
countries, this “EU-version Asia-Pacific rebalance” has cast shadow upon the
political mutual trust between China and the EU.
The EU’s concerns over China’s “division diplomacy.” China has firmly
supported the EU’s integration; in the meantime, China has also taken
into consideration the impact of the European debt crisis, the political and
economic trends in Europe, and the EU’s relations with its member states as
the main factors in formulating and implementing the policy towards the EU.
According to the current status and development prospects of its relations
with the EU, China has further streamlined its EU policy and strengthened
initiative, with a view to maintaining balanced development in its relations
with the EU, the European sub-regions and individual EU member states.
However, the EU side feels uneasy and has deep misgivings about China’s
policy. When China and Central and Eastern European countries conducted
sub-regional cooperation for their common interests, the EU reacted strongly,
asserting that sub-regional cooperation is destroying the transfer of foreign
policy authority from the member states to the EU, and weakening the EU’s
24 “Statement by the Spokesperson of the EU High Representative on the Recent Escalation of Tensions
in the South China Sea,” EU External Action, May 8, 2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/china/press_
corner/all_news/news/2014/20140512_en.htm.
25 “EU-ASEAN Foreign Ministers to Discuss Key Challenges in Brussels,” EU External Action, July 18,
2014, http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2014/180714_eu-asean_en.html.

leadership in diplomatic areas, and is thus “a plot to split the EU.”26
Strategic cooperation affected by international structural changes

The China-EU relations have gone beyond the bilateral category,
and now represent increasing regional and global significance. This is a
prominent characteristic of the structural changes in the China-EU relations.
Given the ongoing acute changes in international structure, whether or not
the two sides can enhance strategic mutual trust and cooperation will impose
critical influence on the future of the China-EU relations.
Impact of major-power interplay. Among all its strategic options, the
transatlantic relationship would still be the first choice for the EU to rely
upon in the event of a crisis. Since the United States proposed the Asia-Pacific
rebalance strategy, the EU, out of fear for loss of its position in the US global
strategy, has stepped up policy coordination with the US on trade and security
issues, and launched negotiations on the Transatlantic Trade and Investment
Partnership (TTIP). The strengthening of coordination on economic and trade
issues between the EU and the US, China’s two largest trading partners, will
intensify competition between China and the EU on economic and trade rules.
Therefore, China has paid close attention to the TTIP negotiation process,
and at the same time accelerated coordination with the EU on launching a
China-EU free trade agreement (FTA). However, in order to protect its own
internal market while further exploring the Chinese market, the EU regards
the negotiations on a bilateral investment treaty (BIT) as a priority of its China
policy and takes an evasive attitude towards a bilateral FTA. In terms of security
strategy, the EU, together with the US, has strengthened NATO’s deterrence
against Russia following the Ukraine crisis, and has grave misgivings about
the strategic partnership of coordination between China and Russia. The EU
has also followed the US in partly participating in hotspot issues in China’s
26 At the first High-Level Symposium of Think Tanks of China and Central and Eastern European (CEE)
countries, where the author was a participant, some scholars from CEE countries indicated that there were
EU officials who once considered the cooperation between China and CEE countries as an attempt to
“divide” and “build a new Berlin Wall” in Europe.
neighborhood. The EU’s skepticism about the China-Russia relations will
restrict the building and maintenance of strategic mutual trust with China. Its
“concern” over the Asia-Pacific security and policy coordination with the US on
relevant issues will add complexity to the security situation surrounding China.
Trump’s rise to power adds a new factor to the EU-US, US-Russia and
EU-Russia relations. Given the suspension of negotiations on the TTIP,
the EU is in urgent need of other bilateral FTAs to relieve the coordination
dilemma with the US in the economic and trade sphere. Uncertainties about
Brexit, the US-Russia relations as well as NATO’s prospects push the EU
to strengthen its “strategic autonomy.” This will impose complications on
the future of China-EU strategic relations. On one hand, the EU will have
growing needs of cooperation with China on such issues as BIT negotiations
and the future FTA arrangement. On the other, the EU’s strengthened
“strategic autonomy” may lead to it taking a tough stance towards China.
Consensus and disputes on regional affairs. There is a growing need for
China and the EU to cooperate on regional issues in the wake of the Ukraine
crisis, the changing security situation in the Asia-Pacific, and the refugee
crisis in Europe. To uphold regional stability and cope with the refugee
crisis, China and the EU have reached consensus on cooperation in South
Asia and Middle East countries such as Afghanistan and Syria. Both sides
support the resolution of disputes by political, diplomatic and economic
means and oppose the use of force. However, due to disputes on their Russia
policy, and on some goals of political settlement such as regime change and
democratization, political conditions are still insufficient for the two sides
to conduct practical cooperation. Therefore, the China-EU cooperation on
regional governance for the forseeable future may not go further than the
current dialogues and policy statements. For some time to come, it remains
difficult for the two sides to undertake substantial cooperation in this field.
Impact of Structural Changes in China-EU Relations
China and the EU are important actors in economics and international

relations. The structural shift in the relationship between the two sides will
have profound impacts at bilateral, regional and global levels.
First, the China-EU relations will enter a period of readjustment to
meet the structural changes in their relations. The EU is showing rising
concerns over the narrowing of relative economic and trade competitiveness,
which is aggravated by what it considers as China’s “division diplomacy.”
The increase in the EU’s suspicion over China’s political intention will likely
influence the structural changes in their relations in a negative manner. As a
result, China should give a positive and reasonable response to the concrete
concerns of the EU in the fields of market access and protection of business
interests, by deepening reforms and expanding opening-up. In the meantime,
China, through existing communication mechanisms, should reassure the
EU that it will “continue to approach and advance relations with Europe
from a global perspective and in the context of the world’s major trends,”
and it “firmly supports the European integration process and welcome the
EU’s unity and development,” and is “committed to managing and handling
differences on the basis of mutual respect.”27 Besides, China should take
actions to convert policies and positions into pragmatic cooperation,
dispelling the EU’s concerns by concrete facts, to prevent the EU from taking
passive countermeasures. Currently, both China and the EU have the desire
for reform. The partnership for reform will be an important aspect of the
China-EU relations in the future.
Second, as the most important international actor and economy in
their respective regions, the structural changes in the China-EU relations
will have a significant impact on the relationship between Asia and Europe.
The China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative is providing new opportunities
and broader space for Asia-Europe cooperation. The China-EU cooperation
will certainly provide impetus to cooperation between the two continents
under the Belt and Road framework. China and the EU need to “expand
27 “Speech by Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Opening of Symposium on International Developments
and China’s Diplomacy in 2017,” December 9, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjbxw/t1518130.
shtml.
converging interests and explore new growth areas in regional cooperation
to enrich and expand the strategic substance of China-Europe relations.”28
It is a practical approach to extending the rich substance of the structural
changes in their relations to the broader Asia-Europe cooperation, which will
not only effectively curb the uncertainties and instability in their respective
regions, but also avoid negative impacts from disorderly competition.
Moreover, the structural changes in the China-EU relations will affect
relations between China and the West and the prospects of world multi-
polarization. At a time when the EU is revisiting its strategic positioning
in the global structure and is ready to reshape its strategic relationships,
the structural changes in the China-EU relations, on the basis of equality
and mutual respect, is conducive for the EU to broadening their horizons,
and for China to pursuing its policy goal of building a global network of
partnerships, which objectively contributes to the development of multi-
polar politics in the world.
Finally, the structural changes in the China-EU relations will have an
impact on global governance. China and the EU are major actors in the
global governance system and important forces in promoting the reform of
global governance. As the China-EU relations become more strategic, both
sides will find more cooperation opportunities in global governance. At this
moment, the two sides have a rather high level of cooperation on climate
change, which will become even closer after the US withdrawal from the
Paris Agreement. China and the EU should overcome differences and narrow
divergences, upgrade and promote their cooperation experience on climate
change, and extend the cooperative momentum to other areas of global
governance such as countering terrorism, cyberspace, maritime affairs and
public health.
28 “Speech by Foreign Minister Wang Yi at the Opening of Symposium on International Developments
and China’s Diplomacy in 2017,” December 9, 2017.

Trump’s New Trade Policy:
Concepts, Agendas and Constraints
Wu Qisheng
D
uring the 2016 US presidential election campaign, Donald Trump
identified trade policy reforms along with taxation, regulatory
policy reforms and energy policy reforms as the four major reforms
in his economic plan. He also put forward a roadmap for the reforms in
trade policy. Since taking office, the Trump administration has gradually
fulfilled the campaign promises on trade issues, including withdrawing
from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement, nominating a hawkish
head in charge of trade, promoting renegotiation on the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), strengthening law enforcement on trade,
etc. After a year in power, the foreign trade policy framework of the Trump
administration has taken shape, and a series of new policies have been
introduced. Accurately understanding and evaluating the administration’s
trade concepts, agendas and their internal contradictions is of great
significance in grasping the trend of US foreign trade policy.
Basic Concepts of Trump’s Trade Policy
Trade policy reform is an important part of the Trump administration’s

economic plan, and reflects the economic concepts of President Trump
himself and his policy team. The Trump administration regards the increase
of domestic investment and net exports as a prerequisite for economic
Wu Qisheng is Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations, Shanghai Academy of
Social Sciences.
66 China International Studies Trump’s New Trade Policy: Concepts, Agendas and Constraints
growth, and argues that economic globalization and the failure of previous
administrations in trade, tax, regulatory and energy policies have led to a
decline in US domestic manufacturing investment and long-term negative
net exports. Therefore, in order to address the shrinking manufacturing
industry and the large trade deficits, the US needs to implement a series of
structural reforms, including trade reforms.
Crux of US economic problem lies in declining domestic

investment and large trade deficits
Trump’s trade policy team believes that among the four factors
that drive a country’s GDP growth, namely consumption, government
spending, investment and exports, domestic investment can improve
the total economic output while outbound investment only provides
employment and tax revenues for foreign countries. They also believe
that negative net exports will erode a country’s total economic size, so
that reducing trade deficits is conducive to economic growth.1 Over the
past 15 years, the decline of US economic growth rate has been primarily
due to structural problems in investment (especially in non-residential
fixed investment) and net exports. The relocation of a large number of
factories, a decline in domestic investment and long-term negative net
exports have all directly contributed to the reduction of GDP growth,
brought about a continual decrease of job opportunities in manufacturing,
and led to a sharp rise in government debt and even the outbreak of
financial crisis.2 In the view of the Trump administration, the decline in
domestic investment and the long-term negative net exports are not only a
periodic phenomenon caused by macroeconomic factors such as an ageing
population, reduction of the labor force and a low savings rate, but are also
1 Peter Navarro, “Why the White House Worries About Trade Deficits,” The Wall Street Journal (Eastern
edition), March 6, 2017, A.17; Peter Navarro and Wilbur Ross, “Scoring the Trump Economic Plan: Trade,
Regulatory, and Energy Policy Impacts,” Donald Trump website, September 29, 2016, p.5, https://assets.
donaldjtrump.com/Trump_Economic_Plan.pdf.
2 Robert E. Lighthizer, “Evaluating China’s Role in the World Trade Organization over the Past Decade,”
Testimony before the US-China Economic and Security Review Commission, June 9, 2010, p.15.
Trump’s New Trade Policy: Concepts, Agendas and Constraints March/April 2018 67
a problem caused by economic globalization and the policy mistakes of
previous administration.
Economic globalization is main cause of declining domestic

investment and increasing trade deficits
The mainstream school of economic studies believes that economic
globalization, through the trans-national flow of products, capital and
people, can improve the level of international division of labor and the
efficient allocation of productive factors, and promote overall growth of
the world economy and the productivity of all countries. In the view of
Trump’s economic policy team, however, economic globalization over
the past decades has greatly constrained the growth of US domestic
investment, enlarged the US trade deficits and seriously damaged the
US economy, especially the manufacturing sector. Before the 1980s, US
enterprises substituted capital for labor in domestic factories to improve
productive efficiency, but with the acceleration of globalization, more and
more American businesses have tried to maximize their profits by moving
their factories and production bases to countries with lower costs. This
large-scale relocation has not only reduced domestic investment and GDP
growth, but also further increased America’s trade deficits by importing
more products from these factories. Although globalization has stimulated
US exports, yet the growth rate of imported goods has far exceeded the
growth rate of exports. During his campaign, Trump put forward the
slogan of “American economic independence.” He advocated the slow-
down of globalization, and emphasized economic sovereignty and reduced
dependence on foreign economies. This is largely due to his belief that
current economic globalization is not beneficial to the US.3
Failed trade policy adds to globalization shock on US economy

Trump’s policy team believes that bad trade agreements signed by the
3 Donald J. Trump, “Declaring American Economic Independence,” speech at the Alumisource Factory in
Monessen, Pennsylvania, June 28, 2016.
United States and widespread unfair trade practices abroad have impeded the
rebalance of trade. In their view, Washington has been dominated by a group
of internationalists who supported economic globalization, and their trade
policy is a complete failure, resulting in the US accession to a number of
bad trade agreements and connivance in discriminatory policies by its main
trading partners. As US Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross said, “The
decline in US manufacturing employment and the fall in US productivity,
and associated slower US growth rates and stagnant wages, have ... been
greatly accelerated and amplified by a series of bad trade deals and chronic
currency misalignments that prevent trade from coming back into balance.”4
In addition, the Trump administration also feels that most countries have
failed to adopt market-based economic policies. Mercantilism and “cheating”
in trade are prevalent worldwide, making trade a zero-sum game. In their
view, the previous US administrations were indifferent to the massive unfair
trade practices and were remiss in taking decisive measures to deal with them,
thus resulting in other countries gaining asymmetrical benefits from trade
and achieving faster economic growth than the US.
Tougher trade policy needed to promote economic growth

In response to a declining domestic investment and rocketing trade
deficits in the US economy, the Trump administration advocates not only
reforms in taxation, regulatory and energy policies, but also a comprehensive
readjustment of trade policy. In order to slow down corporate relocation
and eliminate long-standing deficits, the Trump administration has begun
to change the passive trade policies pursued by previous administrations,
and adopted more aggressive and tougher measures, including branding
“free trade” as purely an “ivory tower theory,” and taking more proactive
and frequent protective measures to help the development of American
manufacturing industry; in the fight against unfair trade practices, it puts
more emphasis on bypassing the WTO and resorting to unilateral trade
4 Wilbur Ross, “Trump Campaign Benefits from Criticism of Trade Imbalances,” Financial Times, August
29, 2016, p.11.
sanctions against other countries; and in its endeavor to change the current
trade rules and sign beneficial trade deals, it uses bilateral rather than
multilateral negotiations to maximize the US influence.
Objectives and Priorities of Trump’s Trade Policy
The Trump administration aims to increase investment in domestic

manufacturing, eliminate long-run trade deficits and achieve 3% annual
economic growth through the implementation of trade policy reforms
based on the principle of “America First.” In imports, it will strictly enforce
US trade laws to prevent a distorted domestic market caused by foreign
dumping, subsidies and other unfair practices; in exports, it hopes to
overcome foreign market barriers and expand US exports to the world; in the
area of international trade rules, it is intent on preventing other countries’
interpretation of trade rules that would do harm to American interests, and
will work to update the rules in line with evolving US interests. Over the past
year, the Trump administration has established the following four priorities
to achieve the above objectives:
Getting rid of constraints from multilateral trade rules

Since the establishment of the WTO, successive US administrations
have actively supported the organization’s role in managing global trade
and promoting trade liberalization, including supporting other economies’
accession to the WTO and strictly implementing the rulings made through
the dispute settlement mechanism. However, the Trump administration
thinks that multilateral trade mechanisms, as represented by the WTO,
are promoted and established by a “pro-establishment” camp, and that
these mechanisms allow the asymmetry between rights and duties and have
become increasingly bureaucratic bodies that often adjudicate against US
interests, and thus seriously handicap its unilateral trade actions.5 Because of
5 Shawn Donnan, “Trade Shake-up: Why the US President Has Taken Aim at WTO,” Financial Times,
March 3, 2017, p.6.
its suspicion of the WTO and its desire to eliminate the shackles of WTO
rules, the Trump administration strongly emphasizes the US prerogative in
taking unilateral actions and objects to other countries’ restrictions on the US
trade policy through the WTO dispute settlement mechanism.
In order to bypass the WTO mechanism, the Trump administration,
shortly after taking office, instructed the Office of the US Trade
Representative (USTR) to draft a list of legal mechanisms which the US
could resort to in imposing unilateral sanctions on its trade partners.6
Considering that other countries might sue the US over such actions
through the WTO, Trump even threatened to withdraw from the WTO
if the organization obstructed the US from maintaining the interests of its
domestic industries and workers. Although the US is less likely to quit the
WTO, this stance shows that the Trump administration tends to define
this multilateral mechanism from a much narrower perspective, regarding
the WTO as a reflection of the collective will of its members rather than
an independent institution in global economic governance. In the annual
trade policy agenda released in March 2017, the Trump administration
specifically cited the WTO and domestic legal provisions in pointing out that
the United States had clearly defined the WTO’s role in the management
of international trade during the Uruguay Round negotiations, and
stressed that rulings made by the WTO dispute settlement bodies should
not automatically lead to legal or behavioral changes by WTO members,
including the US. The document indicated that “no provision of any of the
Uruguay Round agreements, or the application of any such provision to any
person or circumstance, that is inconsistent with any law of the United States
shall have effect.”7
In order to get rid of the constraints from multilateral trade
regulations, the Trump administration has changed the “strong binding”
6 Shawn Donnan and Demetri Sevastopulo, “US Looks to Bypass WTO Dispute System,” Financial
Times, February 27, 2017, p.4.
7 Office of the United States Trade Representative, The President’s 2017 Trade Policy Agenda, March
2017, p.3.
position on trade rules upheld for decades, and sought ways to weaken
the multilateral dispute settlement system. The United States Trade
Representative Robert Lighthizer spoke highly of the effectiveness of the
non-binding dispute settlement system under the GATT framework, and
believed that the compulsory dispute settlement mechanism under the
WTO framework went beyond the mandate given by WTO members,
so that reforms of the WTO are now needed.8 In addition, in recent
renegotiations on NAFTA, the US has also sought to establish an advisory
rather than a mandatory dispute settlement mechanism, and is trying to
set up a “sunset provision” in NAFTA, which stipulates that the agreement
would be automatically terminated after five years unless all three signatories
agree to renew the deal.9
Strengthening punishment for “unfair trade practices”

The Trump administration believes that the current global economy
has been distorted by unfair non-market behaviors, and that widespread
subsidization, currency manipulation, and intellectual property theft
have constituted “economic aggression” against the US. The “unfair trade
practices” have seriously damaged the interests of US workers, farmers and
enterprises, and posed threats to American national security. Therefore,
strict implementation of trade laws is required to “counter unfair trade
practices” which violate international rules.10 In this respect, the countries
which have large trade deficits with the US become the main targets.
Since taking office, the Trump administration has frequently resorted
to trade enforcement measures such as anti-dumping and countervailing
investigations to combat so-called unfair trade practices. From the time
Trump took office to mid-April 2017, the US Department of Commerce
8 Robert Lighthizer, “U.S. Trade Policy Priorities,” keynote remarks at the Center for Strategic and
International Studies, September 18, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/us-trade-policy-priorities-robert-
lighthizer-united-states-trade-representative.
9 Jenny Leonard, “U.S. NAFTA Sunset Proposal Ties Termination to Trade Deficit, Sources Say,” Inside
US Trade, Vol. 35, Issue 39, September 29, 2017, p.5.
10 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, pp.19-20.
launched 24 such investigations on imported steel, chemicals, timber, and
rubber products with a value of over US$2.3 billion, and made preliminary
or final rulings on 34 investigations impacting more than $3.6 billion of
imports.11 In order to raise the anti-dumping tariff, the US Commerce
Department, for the first time, invoked Section 504 of the 2015 Trade
Preferences Extension Act, and has adopted a more rigorous approach
when assessing dumping margins.12 In terms of investigation procedure, the
Trump administration has also initiated more active trade relief procedures
by changing the past practice under which investigation applications were
submitted by domestic corporations or labor organizations.13 At the end of
November 2017, the Commerce Department announced anti-dumping
and countervailing investigations into imports of China’s aluminum alloy
products, the first ever self-initiated investigation in more than a quarter
century. Because traditional trade relief measures are time-consuming and
must meet certain standards, the Trump administration favors some unusual
approaches, including levying direct tariffs through executive orders or tax
reform, opening national security investigations into imported steel and
aluminum products by invoking Section 232 of the 1962 Trade Expansion
Act, and launching intellectual property rights and technology transfer
investigations into China’s trade practices by invoking Section 301 of the
1974 Trade Act.
In order to enhance law enforcement in trade, in his budget plan
to the Congress for the 2018 fiscal year, Trump significantly increased
funding to those trade enforcement divisions such as the International
Trade Administration under the Commerce Department and the Bureau
11 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Statement of U.S. Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross on Today’s
Trade Enforcement Actions,” April 18, 2017, https://www.commerce.gov/news/press-releases/2017/04/
statement-us-secretary-commerce-wilbur-ross-todays-trade-enforcement.
12 U.S. Department of Commerce, “Department of Commerce Finds Dumping of Oil Country Tubular
Goods from the Republic of Korea in Groundbreaking Ruling,” April 11, 2017, https://www.commerce.gov/
news/press-releases/2017/04/department-commerce-finds-dumping-oil-country-tubular-goods-republi.
13 Wilbur Ross, “Free and Fair Trade for American Workers and Business,” April 13, 2017, https://www.
whitehouse.gov/blog/2017/04/13/free-and-fair-trade-american-workers-and-businesses.
of International Labor Affairs under the Labor Department.14 On March
31, 2017, Trump signed two executive orders to crack down on violations
of trade and customs law and to ensure a thorough collection of anti-
dumping and countervailing tariffs. He also instructed the Commerce
Department to coordinate with other agencies in making an overall
assessment of the US trade deficits and other countries’ violation of trade
rules, so as to provide evidence for stepped-up trade law enforcement in
the future.
Expanding overseas markets with tough measures

Since taking office, the Trump administration has taken various
measures to promote exports. For example, an undersecretary for trade and
foreign agricultural affairs was created under the Department of Agriculture
to help expand the export of agricultural products; and despite opposition
within the Republican Party, the administration submitted its nomination
for the leader and board members of the US Export-Import Bank in order to
support the bank’s greater role in promoting American exports. Believing that
there are long-term tariff and non-tariff barriers which restrict US exports
to the overseas market, the Trump administration has made it clear that it
would overcome trade barriers through tougher measures and strive for more
market access for American business, including threatening withdrawal from
the US-ROK free trade agreement to pressure South Korea to cancel non-
tariff barriers on imported cars. Trump has also publicly attacked Canada on
the country’s dairy supply management mechanism, and launched a “Section
301” investigation against China regarding intellectual property rights
protection and technology transfer. Section 301 of the 1974 Trade Act will
become a powerful tool for the Trump administration to force open overseas
markets to American exports. According to the legal authorization of Section
301, the US can investigate trade barriers and violations of trade rules by
14 Executive Office of the President of the United States, Office of Management and Budget, Budget
of the U.S. Government: A New Foundation for American Greatness, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
BUDGET-2018-BUD/pdf/BUDGET-2018-BUD.pdf.
other countries, and retaliate against those countries which discriminate or
damage the interests of American exports, including suspension of or even
withdrawal from trade agreements, and imposing tariffs or quotas on foreign
imports. While the section was an important means of opening up markets
in Japan, the European Union, Brazil and India in the 1980s, Washington
has been more reliant on the WTO’s dispute settlement mechanism in
dealing with its accession to overseas markets since 1995. Now, due to lack of
trust in the WTO, the Tump administration is again more inclined to invoke
Section 301, and force its trading partners to make concessions on market
access by means of unilateral pressures.
Since the end of World War II, for the sake of its global strategic
interests, the US has often made asymmetric concessions to its allies and
strategic partners on market access, and supported the most-favored-
nation treatment under the GATT/WTO framework. However, the Trump
administration believes that such unilateral trade liberalization has dragged
down the US economy and prevented other countries from opening their
markets to the US. To this end, the Trump administration focuses on
mutual benefits and reciprocity in promoting access to foreign markets.
As Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross put it, “if we have a country that
has big trade barriers against us, we should logically have similar trade
barriers against them. And if there’s a country that has relatively few
barriers against us, we should have relatively few against them.”15 Trump
himself has also repeatedly claimed that he would achieve fair trade by
forcing other countries to reduce tariffs through “the protective policy.”16
In order to retain its right to exert pressures on other countries through
trade protectionist actions, the Trump administration has refused to have
“opposition to protectionism” written into the communiqués of the G20
15 The White House, “Press Briefing by Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross on Executive Order on Trade
Agreement Violations and Abuses,” April 4, 2017, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2017/04/28/
press-briefing-secretary-commerce-wilbur-ross-executive-order-trade; “Trump Administration and World
Financial Officials Clash Over Trade,” Reuters, April 21, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-imf-g20/
worries-over-trump-policies-cloud-start-of-imf-world-bank-meetings-idUSKBN17M0EP.
16 The White House, “Remarks by President Trump in Joint Address to Congress,” February 28, 2017,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefings-statements/remarks-president-trump-joint-address-congress.
and G7 meetings of finance ministers and central bank governors held in
the first half of 2017.
Reviewing negotiated trade agreements

The Trump administration believes that the real effects of most trade
agreements signed by the US since the late 1980s have been contrary to
their intended results, and have led to a huge increase in trade deficits and
a great loss of manufacturing jobs. Therefore, it is necessary to review those
trade agreements, including withdrawing from or renegotiating the “bad”
agreements, and achieve more favorable trade agreements through tough and
smart negotiations.
To this end, Trump signed an executive order in late April 2017,
instructing the Department of Commerce and the USTR to conduct a
comprehensive reassessment of trade agreements and relations between
the US and those WTO members with whom the US have huge deficits.
The first round of negotiations on the revision of NAFTA, which covers
strengthening of intellectual property rights protection, supervision and
regulation, government procurement, labor, environment, digital trade and
state-owned enterprises, started in mid-August 2017, which, if successful,
would become a template for revising other agreements like the US-ROK
free trade agreement. In the National Security Strategy released in December
the same year, the Trump administration made it clear that it wanted to
reshape and reform the WTO to ensure that the organization would improve
its efficiency and ability in its rulings on “unfair” trade practices.17
Concerning the approach of negotiation, out of a belief that multilateral
negotiations will weaken its bargaining power, the Trump administration
has insisted on seeking better terms for American businesses and workers
through bilateral rather than multilateral means. Soon after taking office,
Trump announced a permanent withdrawal from the TPP, and instructed
the USTR to start bilateral talks to “promote American industry, protect
17 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2017, pp. 40-41.
American workers, and raise American wages.”18 After the US withdrew from
the TPP, the administration started bilateral talks with Japan, Vietnam and
other Asia-Pacific countries in order to replace the regional trade agreement.19
Because of its deep suspicion of the multilateral approach, Trump and his
policy advisers once even expressed intention to start bilateral talks with
individual EU member states to replace the negotiations on the Transatlantic
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP). They also adopted a positive
attitude towards bilateral trade negotiations with the UK after its exit from
the EU.
Internal Contradictions of Trump’s Trade Policy
The readjustment of Trump’s trade policy, to a large extent, reflects the

return of American traditional economic nationalism, that is, putting more
emphasis on manufacturing, economic sovereignty and trade protectionist
policies. Drawing on the experience of the Reagan administration, Trump
also wants to maintain the competitiveness of the US economy by taking
more offensive and tougher measures on trade issues. Trump’s trade policy
caters to the domestic populist demands, and is supported by the traditional
manufacturing industry and trade unions from the northeastern region as
well as some Democrats in the Congress. However, the logic and practices
of Trump’s trade policy contain multiple inherent contradictions, which will
greatly impede the implementation of his agenda.
Misunderstanding relationship between trade deficits and

manufacturing development
In the view of the Trump administration, trade deficit and decline in
investment, especially the relocation of manufacturing abroad, reflects
18 The White House, “Presidential Memorandum Regarding Withdrawal of the United States from the
Trans-Pacific Partnership Negotiations and Agreement,” January 23, 2017, https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/
FR-2017-01-25/pdf/2017-01845.pdf.
19 Jenny Leonard and Jack Caporal, “Navarro Outlines Trade Priorities to Finance, Ways and Means
Lawmakers,” Inside US Trade, Vol. 35, No. 7, February 17, 2017, p.2.
the weakening of the US economy, which needs to be rectified through
economic reforms, including readjustment of the trade policy. However,
economic analyses have shown that trade deficit under the current account
goes hand in hand with capital surplus under the capital account, and the
countries that enjoy trade surplus with the US tend to invest their export
revenues in real estate, factories, equipment and financial assets of the US,
among which most investment does not require repayment as seen in debt.
In addition, trade deficit, in many cases, is a sign of economic prosperity,
which means strong purchasing power of a country’s currency and consumer
demand. In fact, most economic prosperity in the US history appeared at a
time when the country’s trade deficits rapidly increased. The US had a trade
surplus during most of the 1930s, but the economy in that period was very
much depressed.20
Manufacturing employment in the US is currently at a low level
compared to the total number of workers employed, but the manufacturing
output is at a record high. In fact, the manufacturing industries transferred
from the US to other countries are mainly low value-added ones, which
is a result of international division of labor based on factor endowments
in different countries in the context of global economic integration.
Considering that the overall unemployment rate of the US is not high,
if some low value-added manufacturing industries were forced back to the
US, it would immediately lead to rising labor costs, and compel enterprises
to increase inputs into automated production in order to offset the costs,
causing greater structural labor problems in the long run.21 Therefore, while
Trump’s victory in the presidential election was largely due to support from
low-income voters along the “rust belt” because of his commitment to
bringing back manufacturing jobs to the US, the implementation of his trade
policy may ultimately hurt the interests of these voters.
20 “How to Think About the Trade Deficit,” The Wall Street Journal (Eastern edition), March 10, 2017,
A.14.
21 Erik Kobayashi-Solomon, “Donald Trump’s ‘Investment’ Strategy Doomed to Failure,” Forbes,
December 7, 2016, https://www.forbes.com/sites/erikkobayashisolomon/2016/12/07/donald-trumps-
investment-strategy-doomed-to-failure/#58729c901538.
Protectionist measures not helpful in removing trade deficits
and reviving US manufacturing
The Trump administration hopes to eliminate trade deficits and
promote manufacturing investment by strengthening enforcement of
trade laws, increasing tariffs, restricting imports and carrying out bilateral
trade negotiations. These propositions are politically attractive, but they
will not help achieve the desired goals; instead they may even harm the
American economy. Since trade deficits emerge mainly through a variety
of macroeconomic factors such as domestic private savings, investment
and government spending, narrowing deficits with individual countries
will not achieve the goal of slashing overall deficits unless the root cause
of trade imbalance is resolved.22 Besides, due to the trade diversion effect,
bilateral trade arrangements can only affect the sectoral and geographical
distribution of deficits, but will not fundamentally eliminate the deficits.
To prevent the relocation of US enterprises, Trump, soon after taking
office, warned those enterprises which have transferred their businesses
overseas that he would punish the transferred factories by increasing tariffs
and restricting access to government procurement. In order to get more
government subsidies and support on issues such as reducing corporate tax
and relaxing regulation, some companies in automobile, household appliance
and toy industries have revealed plans to increase domestic investment or
suspend relocating factories abroad. Judging from the market feedback,
however, the decision of enterprises on investment destination is still based
on consideration about production cost and sales demand. It is difficult for
the Trump administration to block the transnational production strategy of
US enterprises with the trade policy tool.23
22 Stephen Roach, “Trump Is Suffering from Trade Deficit Disorder,” Financial Times, March 8, 2017,
p.13; Martin Wolf, “The Folly of Donald Trump’s Bilateralism in Global Trade,” Financial Times, March 14,
2017, p.9; Joseph E. Gagnon, “We Know What Causes Trade Deficits,” Trade & Investment Policy Watch,
Peterson Institute for International Economics, April 7, 2017, https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-
policy-watch/we-know-what-causes-trade-deficits.
23 Danielle Paquette, “Trump Said He Would Save Jobs at Carrier, The Layoffs Start July 20,” The
Washington Post, May 24, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2017/05/24/here-is-the-
number-of-jobs-carrier-is-moving-to-mexico-after-trump-said-hed-save-them.
Conflicts with other economic reforms
Proceeding from the conservative concept of small government and
big market, the Trump administration opposes excessive expansion of
government power, restricts government intervention in the market, and has
put forward a plan to reform the US regulatory system. However, Trump’s
trade measures, aimed at promoting a return of manufacturing to the US and
reduction of trade deficits, represents a continuous intervention on players
in the market, which runs counter to the government regulatory reform
he proposed. In order to reduce the burden on enterprises and consumers,
Trump has also cut the corporate and personal income taxes. However,
the measures that strength trade relief and increase tariffs on imported
goods will inevitably lead to higher prices for imported intermediate and
consumer goods, thereby placing a heavier burden on US companies and
consumers. Although the practice to encourage enterprises to move their
overseas factories back to the US through financial support and tax subsidies
is attractive, the cost of moving back is too high to be sustainable, and
local and federal governments will have to shoulder greater fiscal burdens,
which runs contrary to the cost-cutting goal the administration pursues.
In addition, some protective trade measures of Trump will also disrupt
the regional and global supply chains in various sectors, and weaken the
international competitiveness of US enterprises, which is unfavorable for the
revitalization of American manufacturing.
Trump’s restriction of imports and threaten to bypass the WTO
and impose unilateral sanctions on trade partners will also invite other
countries to follow suit and take countermeasures, including restricting
the import of American agricultural products, high technology and high
value-added industrial products and services, and making themselves less
dependent on American goods. Under such circumstances, trade frictions
in the world will surely intensify, and may even be likely to evolve into a
trade war, thus inevitably dragging down the world economy. If the Trump
administration could focus on tax cuts, infrastructure and regulatory
reforms in the next few years, the US economic growth rate would reach
3-4%. However, if a trade war similar to that in the 1930s was launched,
all the achievements would be ruined.24 Therefore, even though some
industries in the US could profit from trade protection, the entire US
economy would have to pay a heavy price.
Constraints from Domestic Politics
Since the US Constitution gives the president great power in foreign

affairs, and the Congress over the past century has, through legislation,
granted the president considerable authority in making trade policies,
Trump has relatively great power and a wide range of policy tools at hand
to promote his trade agenda, including withdrawal from trade agreements
and imposing higher tariffs on imported goods. Although enterprises and
local governments, when their interests are affected, can challenge Trump’s
trade policy in the court or pressure the Congress to curtail the president’s
authority through new legislation, these procedures are either time-
consuming or subject to presidential veto. Therefore, if the president was
intent on maximizing his authority, he could push forward and implement
his trade agenda without substantial constraints from the Congress or the
Supreme Court in the short term.25 However, in the long run, the Trump
administration’s trade reform will still be constrained by domestic public
opinion, interest groups from the agricultural sector and other priorities on
the policy agenda.
Lack of public support

Despite growing populism, the general public of the US still strongly
supports foreign trade. Since the conclusion of trade debate during the
2016 presidential election campaign, the attitude of the American people
24 Robert J. Barro, “How to Engineer a Trump Boom,” The Wall Street Journal (Eastern edition), March
28, 2017, A.17.
25 Gary C. Hufbauer, “Could a President Trump Shackle Imports?,” in Assessing Trade Agendas in the
U.S. Presidential Campaign, PIIE Briefing 16-6, Peterson Institute for International Economics, September
2016, pp.5-16.
towards trade has changed greatly. At present, most Americans hold a
positive attitude towards trade. The Gallup poll in early February 2017
showed that 72% of respondents believed that foreign trade provided
opportunities for economic growth. The figure, which exceeded by a
significant margin the 58% who believe this in 2016, is the highest since
the end of the Cold War.26 According to a Wall Street Journal and NBC
News poll, 43%, the highest percentage since the poll was conducted
in 1999, of Americans believe that free trade with foreign countries is
beneficial to the US, while only 34% of respondents think that free trade
is detrimental to US interests. In 2016, the two figures were 27% and
43% respectively.27 In order to consolidate its political basis, the Trump
administration has to take into account the attitude of the mainstream
public on international trade when promoting its policy agenda. In
particular, when negative effects of his trade policy starts to emerge and
the public opinion rebounds in favor of trade, the administration will face
greater pressure from the general public.
Discontent from agricultural interest groups

Trump’s new trade policy, which largely prioritizes strengthening the US
manufacturing industry, has led to considerable discontent on the part of the
states with a substantial agricultural base. On one hand, Trump’s protection
of the domestic manufacturing industry would bring about retaliation by
other countries against American agricultural products, and result in direct
damage to the interests of American farmers and relevant enterprises. On the
other hand, in future trade negotiations, if the Trump administration took a
tough stance on manufacturing, it would be difficult to achieve compromise
on agricultural trade from other countries.28 At present, agricultural interest
26 Art Swift, “In US, Record-High 72% See Foreign Trade as Opportunity,” Gallup, February 16, 2017.
27 Jacob M. Schlesinger, “Public Support for Free Trade Climbs,” The Wall Street Journal (Eastern
edition), February 27, 2017, A.4.
28 Catherine Boudreau, “The Trade War Comes to the Prairie: What’s Good for Manufacturers Could Be
a Big Problem for Farmers,” Politico, February 13, 2017, https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/02/
trade-war-rural-voters-000312; Shawn Donnan, “Farm Belt Fears a Trump Trade War,” Financial Times,
April 17, 2017, p.11.
groups in the US and congressmen from agricultural states have begun
to pressure the government on the issues of NAFTA talks and relations
with major trading partners, asking the latter to ensure that the interests
of agricultural export would not suffer losses as a result of the trade policy.
Considering that most core Trump supporters in the 2016 election are from
the central and western agricultural states, the administration would have to
evaluate the impacts on agricultural exports before resorting to extreme trade
measures.29
Divided views in the Congress

The two chambers of the US Congress are currently dominated by
the Republicans who support foreign trade. Even those Democrats who
oppose trade liberalization do not agree with Trump’s extreme measures
such as withdrawing from NAFTA, boycotting the WTO or imposing high
tariffs on imported goods. Leaders of both parties in the Congress have
expressed their clear opposition to the White House position on restricting
imports and weakening the multilateral trade mechanism. Although the
Congress, in the short term, is unable to revoke the trade authority granted
to the president by legislation, there are three ways available to constrain
the administration’s extreme trade measures. First, the Congress has the
constitutional power to levy tariffs and manage foreign trade. Congressional
approval is required for any trade legislation and trade agreements proposed
by the president before they take effect. If Trump wants to carry out reforms
or renegotiate international trade agreements, he must win support from the
Congress. Second, the principal trade officials nominated by the president
need the Senate’s confirmation, and the Congress can also influence the
trade policy through its control of the federal budget. Finally, the Congress
can constrain the government’s trade power by taking advantage of other
policy issues. Besides trade, the Trump administration’s priorities also
29 Ashley Parker et al., “‘I Was All Set to Terminate’: Inside Trump’s Sudden Shift on NAFTA,” The
Washington Post, April 27, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/i-was-all-set-to-terminate-
inside-trumps-sudden-shift-on-nafta/2017/04/27/0452a3fa-2b65-11e7-b605-33413c691853_story.html.
include health care, immigration and tax reform, and all these reforms
require congressional support. To win votes for his plan on these issues,
Trump has to consider the concerns of the Congress with regard to his trade
policy. For example, in order to win Republicans’ support for his tax reform,
Trump once decided to postpone the release of the Section 232 investigation
report on imported steel and aluminum products indefinitely. In addition,
in the case of previous administrations, a strong public support helped the
president win votes from the Congress.30 However, given his low popularity
rating early in office, Trump would be at a disadvantage in a tussle with the
Congress.31
Conclusion
Because of the inherent contradictions between policy objectives and

practices, as well as constraints from domestic public opinion, interest
groups from the agricultural sector, mainstream political elites and
the Congress, Trump’s new trade policy faces many challenges in its
implementation. Therefore, adjustments to both the objectives and means
of the policy will be necessary. In fact, compared with his remarks during
the election campaign and the early days of his presidency, Trump has
already moderated his tone on foreign trade policy. For example, Trump
appointed some elite supporters of foreign trade as core members of his
policy team. With regard to NAFTA, in contrast to his earlier claim that
the agreement had been a “disaster” for the US that needs to be overhauled,
and threaten of the US withdrawal, Trump has recently indicated that
only some revisions to the agreement are needed. In addition, while he
threatened during the election campaign to impose high tariffs on goods
from China, and list China as a “currency manipulator,” Trump began to
30 “Ross Fears ‘Irritating’ Congress on Trade, Says 232 Actions ‘A Question of Timing’,” Inside US Trade
Daily Report, September 25, 2017.
31 Michael C. Bender, “The Wall Street Journal/NBC News Poll: Trump’s Approval at Historical Low,”
The Wall Street Journal, Eastern edition, February 27, 2017, A.4.
highlight dialogue and cooperation with China soon after taking office.
The leaders of the two countries, at their Mar-a-Lago meeting in April
2017, decided to establish the China-US Comprehensive Economic
Dialogue as one of the four pillars of bilateral comprehensive dialogue,
and early harvests in economics and trade have since been achieved under
the framework of a 100-day action plan. As with the US-Europe economic
and trade relations, while Trump had initially wanted to bypass the EU
and started bilateral trade talks with individual EU member states, he has
reiterated the willingness to develop economic and trade ties with Brussels
under the EU framework after encountering strong opposition from the
EU.
However, taking into account the demands of his main political
supporters and the economic nationalist ideology still held by Trump
and his core advisers, the Trump administration will continue to invest
considerable political resources to fulfill at least some of his campaign
promises. Therefore, the administration is more likely to strike a balance
between the interests of the agricultural and traditional manufacturing
sector, between economic sovereignty and international obligations, and
between trade liberalization and trade protection. On one hand, under
the existing international legal and regulatory framework, the Trump
administration would step up trade law enforcement concerning key
countries and key industries, through a more active and frequent use of
trade remedy instruments, to protect sensitive domestic industries. The
US would also be likely to strengthen its bargaining power in negotiations
through unilateral trade measures. On the other hand, the US would still
attach importance to dialogue and cooperation with its major trading
partners, in order to avoid a trade war that might ultimately damage its
own economic interests. The US would also make efforts to win more
favorable trade and investment rules and greater market access for American
businesses.
The Indian Ocean Policy of the
Modi Government
Shi Hongyuan
S
ince coming to power in May 2014, the Narendra Modi
government of India has endeavored to adjust the country’s foreign
policy, with the most drastic changes taking place in its Indian
Ocean policy. Modi’s strong personality, together with his Bharatiya Janata
Party’s majority status in Lok Sabha, the lower house of India’s bicameral
parliament, helped lay a solid foundation for his brand of Indian Ocean
policy. This will not only have implications for the development of India’s
maritime strategy, but will also influence India’s interactions with other
countries in this region, leading to an inevitable transformation of the
Indian Ocean’s geopolitical landscape. Therefore, an in-depth analysis of
this topic is of great significance.
Visions of Modi’s Indian Ocean Policy
Since winning independence from Britain in 1947, India’s policy on

the Indian Ocean has been in a state of constant evolution, reflecting
both regional and global power struggles. At the beginning of India’s
independence when the Indian Ocean was still dominated by the British,
India mainly relied upon Britain for protection of its Indian Ocean
interests. Only towards the end of 1960s, when Britain withdrew its
troops from the east of the Suez Canal, did India begin to pay serious
attention to the formation of its Indian Ocean policy. In the wake of
Shi Hongyuan is Professor at the Institute for Regional and Country Studies, Henan University.
86 China International Studies The Indian Ocean Policy of the Modi Government
the British withdrawal, India, with an aim to fill the power vacuum left
by the British, began to actively develop its naval power, supported the
Indian Ocean Zone of Peace proposal, and tried to prevent the Indian
Ocean from descending into a rivalry arena for the US and the Soviet
Union, the two superpowers at that time. Since the end of the Cold War, a
prevailing objective for Indian policy strategists has been to restore India’s
historical influence in the Indian Ocean region.1 Notwithstanding, this
goal never cohered into a vibrant national strategy, as few Indian leaders
managed to systematically elaborate on, let alone implement, their Indian
Ocean policies.2 However, since the election of Modi as Prime Minister
of India, this trend has been reversed. Besides sharing the common goal
of shaping India into the dominant power in the Indian Ocean, the Modi
government has demonstrated its own characteristic in its visions and
measures regarding the future of the Indian Ocean. The Modi government
is currently endeavoring to create a favorable maritime environment for
the rise of India, shape a benign yet strong image of India to its neighbors,
expand India’s influence, and maximize its interests in the region. Towards
this end, the Modi government has proposed the following visions for its
Indian Ocean policy.
Indian Ocean as an important region for India’s diplomacy

Owing to its geographic location, previous Indian governments
had prioritized South Asia diplomacy, but lacked a clear position on the
Indian Ocean. The Modi government is different in that it regards the
Indian Ocean as an immediate and extended neighborhood, as well as an
important region for India’s diplomacy.3 Modi’s invitation of the President
of Mauritius, an island country in the Indian Ocean, to his inauguration
ceremony as the only head of state ouside South Asia signaled a change
1 C Raja Mohan, “Modi and the Indian Ocean: Restoring India’s Sphere of Influence,” Insights of Institute
of South Asian Studies of National University of Singapore, No.277, March 20, 2015, p.3.
2 Ibid.
3 The International Institute for Strategic Studies (UK), “India’s New Maritime Strategies,” Strategic
Comments, Vol.21, No.37, December 2015, p.9.
The Indian Ocean Policy of the Modi Government March/April 2018 87

in India’s Indian Ocean policy.4 The Modi government also announced
its decision to set up the National Maritime Authority to strengthen the
country’s management of Indian Ocean affairs. In addition, Modi’s first
trip upon taking office was a visit to Goa to attend the commissioning
ceremony of India’s biggest aircraft carrier INS Vikramaditya, and
Mauritius and the Seychelles were designated as India’s neighboring
countries by the new Indian Ocean Region Division, which was
established under the Ministry of External Affairs in January 2016 with
the specific responsibility of dealing with Indian Ocean affairs.5 Each of
the above actions reflects the greater importance attached to this region
by Modi than his predecessor Manmohan Singh, and illustrates that the
Indian Ocean region is now regarded with greater strategic importance
within India’s foreign policy.6 Modi’s actions also sent a signal to other
Indian Ocean countries that engagement with states in the Indian
Ocean would be an important direction for India’s foreign policy in the
foreseeable future.7
This policy stance is closely related to India’s heavy reliance on the
Indian Ocean where most of its maritime interests converge. India boasts a
coast line of 7,517 kilometers, with 193,800 square kilometers of territorial
waters that contain 1,200 islands, and an exclusive economic zone of 2.02
million square kilometers. 90% of India’s foreign trade by volume and 70%
by value are transported via the Indian Ocean, accounting for more than a
third of India’s GDP.8 Aside from economic reliance, India is also concerned
about unconventional maritime security threats, especially terrorism, in the
Indian Ocean. In the white paper released by the Ministry of Defence in
October 2015, titled Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy,
4 Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy, “The Indian Ocean Policy of the Modi Government,” in Sinderpal Singh,
Modi and the World: (Re)Constructing Indian Foreign Policy, Singapore: World Scientific Publishing
Company, 2017, p.171.
5 Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 2015-16, p.18.
6 Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy, “The Indian Ocean Policy of the Modi Government,” p. 172.
7 C Raja Mohan, “Modi and the Indian Ocean: Restoring India’s Sphere of Influence,” p.3.
8 Gopal Suri, “India’s Maritime Security Concerns and the Indian Ocean Region,” Indian Foreign Affairs
Journal, Vol.11, No.3, July-September 2016, p.247.
the Modi government defined India’s maritime core interests as follows:
“Protect India’s sovereignty and territorial integrity against threats in the
maritime environment”; “promote safety and security of Indian citizens,
shipping, fishing, trade, energy supply, assets and resources in the maritime
domain”; “pursue peace, stability and security in India’s maritime zones,
maritime neighborhood and other areas of maritime interest”; and “preserve
and protect other national interests in the maritime dimension.”9 This
document summarized three reasons for the importance of the Indian Ocean
affairs: first, “the sweeping change that the global and regional geo-strategic
environment has seen during the period. The shift in worldview from a Euro-
Atlantic to an Indo-Pacific focus and the repositioning of global economic
and military power towards Asia has resulted in significant political,
economic and social changes in the Indian Ocean region and impacted
India’s maritime environment in tangible ways”; second, “a considerable
change that India’s security-cum-threat calculus has seen during the period.
In addition to persisting threats and challenges of the ‘traditional’ nature,
India’s maritime security environment has become even more complex and
unpredictable today with the expansion in scale and presence of a variety of
‘non-traditional’ threats,” which demanded “a re-evaluation of our maritime
security ... including coastal and offshore security”; third, “a national outlook
towards the seas and the maritime domain, and a clearer recognition of
maritime security being a vital element of national progress and international
engagement,” thus India needs to employ “maritime security engagement as a
cornerstone for her regional foreign policy initiatives.”10
Corresponding to these changes, this document also expanded
India’s scope of maritime interests, which is the most radical departure
from the last maritime strategy in 2007. A comparison of the two
maritime strategies illustrates several differences. First, the new maritime
9 Indian Navy, Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, Naval Strategic Publication,
October 2015, p.9, https://www.indiannavy.nic.in/sites/default/files/Indian_Maritime_Security_Strategy_
Document_25Jan16.pdf.
10 Ibid., p.ii.

strategy expanded India’s scope of interests in Southeast and West
Indian Ocean. India’s sea routes to the Pacific, the East China Sea, the
Mediterranean Sea and the west coast of Africa were listed as “secondary
areas of interest” in the 2015 maritime strategy, while the 2007 strategy
listed only littoral regions of Australia and the east coast of Africa under
this category. Second, the new maritime strategy elevated the status
of some “secondary areas of interest” to “primary areas of interest,”
including Southwestern Indian Ocean and the Red Sea. In addition,
the new strategy highlighted the status of the Six-Degree Channel and
Eight/Nine-Degree Channel in the Indian Ocean, and included the
Mandeb Strait and the Mozambique Channel as “choke points.”11 The
strategy also placed special emphasis on the severity of non-traditional
security threats and the necessity of unimpeded utilization of the sea. To
summarize, this new strategy reflects the maritime ambition of the Modi
government, and serves as a guide for future management of maritime
affairs and development of naval forces.
Responsibility to advance SAGAR in the Indian Ocean

With five central components, the initiative of Security and Growth
for All in the Region (SAGAR) was first proposed by Modi in March
2015. First, India will try its best to protect the security of its mainland
and islands, safeguard its national interests, and ensure the security and
stability of the Indian Ocean for the benefit of the entire region. Second,
India will deepen economic and security cooperation with maritime
neighboring countries and island nations in the Indian Ocean, and help
them build and improve their maritime security capabilities. Third,
India will build collective action mechanisms for the Indian Ocean
region, which can deepen mutual understanding of and enhance joint
response capacity towards maritime challenges. These mechanisms are
also conducive to combating piracy, terrorism and other transnational
11 Gurpreet S Khurana, “Indian Navy Updates Indian Maritime Doctrine 2009,” in Vijay Sakhuja and
Gurpreet S Khurana, Maritime Perspectives 2016, New Delhi: National Maritime Foundation, 2017, pp.33-34.
crimes.12 India will also help to respond to issues of safety and actions
to be undertaken during natural disasters.13 Fourth, India will promote
sustainable development of the Indian Ocean region, with a primary
focus on maritime economy, or “blue economy.” Given its potentially
devastating effects on the survival of citizens in littoral countries, climate
change is also included under the category. Fifth, littoral countries of the
Indian Ocean shoulder the major responsibility for maintaining regional
peace, stability and prosperity. India acknowledges the interests of other
countries in the Indian Ocean, and is ready to engage these countries
through dialogues, visits, military exercises, capacity building and
economic partnerships.14
As to the SAGAR initiative, Modi once said that, “The Indian
Ocean is critical to the future of the world … we will all prosper when
the seas are safe, secure and free for all.”15 This statement demonstrates
that Modi’s maritime ambition, with a focus on the Indian Ocean, is
aimed at establishing India’s dominance in the region.16 According to
analysts, the Modi government has embarked on a more ambitious foreign
policy to establish India’s advantageous status in the Indian Ocean, and
puts emphasis on its special role in ensuring safety, promoting collective
security and advancing economic integration in the Indian Ocean.17 By so
doing, the Modi government elevates itself onto a higher moral ground,
in an effort to win the hearts of Indian Ocean countries and increase its
influence in the Indian Ocean region.
“Net security provider” in the Indian Ocean region

While SAGAR stresses collective power and economic development,
12 Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy, “The Indian Ocean Policy of the Modi Government,” pp.174-175.
13 G. Padmaja, “Modi’s Maritime Diplomacy: A Strategic Opportunity,” Maritime Affairs: Journal of the
National Maritime Foundation of India, Vol.11, No.2, Winter 2015, p.27.
14 Rajeev Ranjan Chaturvedy, “The Indian Ocean Policy of the Modi Government,” p.176.
15 Ibid., p.167.
16 Isabelle Saint-Mézard, “India’s Act East Policy: Strategic Implications for the Indian Ocean,” Journal
of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2016, p. 182.

the “net security provider” concept highlights India’s unique role in regional
security issues. The concept of “net security provider,” first put forward by
the US government in 2009, was used to describe the importance of India’s
role in the Indian Ocean region.18 Now, this term is widely used by India’s
decision-makers and analysts, which illustrates its acceptance of the concept.
India first elaborated on this concept in the 2015 maritime security strategy,
indicating that the Modi government would like to play an active role in
regional security and stability.19
According to this document, “net security describes the state of actual
security available in an area, upon balancing prevailing threats, inherent
risks and rising challenges in the maritime environment, against the ability
to monitor, contain and counter all of these. The shaping or creation
of conditions that enhance net maritime security would support our
national maritime interests and maritime security objectives.” “A favorable
maritime environment entails conditions of security and stability at sea,
with various threats remaining at a very low level. A positive maritime
environment implies conditions wherein any rise in threats can be prevented
or contained.” “Together, this would provide net security.” There are three
principles in net maritime security: “preservation of peace,” “promotion
of stability” and “maintenance of security.” Transcribing these principles
into sustained activity needs such actions as presence and rapid response,
maritime engagement, capacity building and capability enhancement,
developing regional maritime domain awareness, maritime security
operations, and strategic communication. And it is one of India’s maritime
security objectives “to shape a favorable and positive maritime environment,
for enhancing net security in India’s areas of maritime interest.”20 India
also aims to serve as the net security provider for its maritime neighbors,
taking on such tasks as anti-piracy operations, non-combatant evacuation
18 Gurpreet S. Khurana, “India’s Maritime Strategy: Context and Subtext”, Maritime Affairs: Journal of
the National Maritime Foundation of India, No.1, 2017, p.3.
19 Ibid.
20 Indian Navy, Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, pp.78-82.
operations, as well as humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.21
For India, becoming a net security provider is not only the responsibility of
a major regional power, but is also of significance to India’s economic growth
and prosperity.22
India wants to play the role of a stabilizer in the Indian Ocean
region, concomitantly establishing a global image as a major power. India
would not want to be seen as a hegemon or regional police, but rather as a
country that can cooperate on, promote, and safeguard common interests.
Meanwhile, India would also like to use the concept of net security
provider to show the United States that it is able to share responsibilities
in the Indian Ocean region and serve as a reliable partner of the US in
maritime cooperation.
Main Measures of Modi’s Indian Ocean Policy
In order to realize the above visions, the Modi government has taken the
following measures:
Strengthening relations with Indian Ocean island nations

Despite their small sizes, most island nations in the Indian Ocean are
located at strategic transportation hubs. Although India has historically
valued relations with these island nations, in the past, few Indian leaders had
actually visited these countries. However, this is no longer the case as Modi
visited Mauritius, Seychelles and Sri Lanka in March 2015. While Modi
was in Mauritius, the two governments signed five documents, including
a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on the development of blue
economy.23 India also agreed to help Mauritius improve its air and maritime
21 Indian Navy, Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, p.8.
22 Gurpfujreet S Khurana, “‘Net Security Provider’ Defined: An Analysis of India’s New Maritime
Strategy 2015,” in Vijay Sakhuja and Gurpreet S Khurana, Maritime Perspectives 2015, New Delhi:
National Maritime Foundation, 2016, p.64.
23 Lindsay Hughes, “Modi and India’s Security in the Indian Ocean,” Strategic Analysis Paper, August
30, 2016, p.4.

connectivity between South and North Agaléga islands, and provide $500
million in credit towards this cause.24 Besides, India handed over a maritime
patrol boat that it built for the Mauritian Coast Guard.25 During Modi’s
visit to Seychelles, the two countries signed five agreements, including an
agreement which tasks India with helping upgrade the infrastructure on
Seychelles’ Assumption Island, and decided to set up a joint working group
on cooperation in blue economy. A decision was also taken by India to gift
a second Dornier aircraft to Seychelles.26 In addition, Modi inaugurated
the first of the eight Coastal Surveillance Radar Systems being built by
India.27 When in Sri Lanka, Modi announced a $300 million credit to Sri
Lanka.28 This Indian Ocean tour has strengthened India’s maritime strategic
cooperation with these three island nations, and consolidated India’s overall
presence in the Indian Ocean. It has become India’s core policy to “bring
the island countries that run through the central Indian Ocean into a tight
security and political embrace.”29
Modi has visited all South Asian countries except the Maldives, but
the Maldives President Abdulla Yameen has paid three visits to India since
he took office in 2014. Yameen has identified India as his country’s “most
important friend,” and stated that the Maldives would pursue a foreign
policy that places its relations with India as a top priority.30 In August 2015,
India helped the Maldives complete the first phase of installment on three
coastal radar systems. In December 2015, India donated $240,000 to the
Maldives for the operational expenses of its two helicopters.31 In April 2016,
24 G. Padmaja, “Modi’s Maritime Diplomacy: A Strategic Opportunity,” p.28.

25 Ibid.
27 Lindsay Hughes, “Modi and India’s Security in the Indian Ocean,” p.3.
28 Ramtanu Maitra, “Modi Strengthens India’s Ties with Its Indian Ocean Neighbors,” Executive
Intelligence Review, Vol. 42, No. 12, 2015, p.16.
29 Pal Chaudhuri and Pramit, “Making Waves in Indian Ocean: PM Modi Building Bridges to Island
States,” Hindustan Times, March 15, 2015, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india/making-waves-in-indian-
ocean-modi-building-bridges-to-island-states/story-kPGjODlHJO2vlwgaaGhEdL.html.
30 Prakash Gopal, “India and Maldives: A Triumph for Maritime Diplomacy,” in Vijay Sakhuja and
Gurpreet S Khurana, Maritime Perspectives 2016, p.109.
31 G. Padmaja, “Maldives President Visits India: Bilateral Partnership for Regional Security,” in Vijay
Sakhuja and Gurpreet S Khurana, Maritime Perspectives 2016, p.120.
India and the Maldives signed six agreements, including an action plan on
defense cooperation.32 Through these measures, India has increased its
influence over the Maldives, and sent a clear message to the country that it
had to put India’s interests and concerns at a high priority.
Advancing Project Mausam

Project Mausam33 is a cultural project that was first discussed at the
end of the previous Indian National Congress government. However, due
to government transition, it wasn’t until Modi became Prime Minister
that it was clearly proposed. Despite eventual failure to be inscribed on
the World Heritage List, India presented the concept to an international
audience at the 38th session of the World Heritage Committee at Doha,
Qatar in June 2014. This project has two objectives: “At the macro level,
it aims to re-connect and re-establish communications between the
Indian Ocean countries, which would lead to an enhanced understanding
of cultural values and concerns”; “at the micro level, the focus is on
understanding national cultures in their regional maritime milieu.”34
Project Mausam covers a large geographic area, stretching from East
Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, the South Asian subcontinent and Sri
Lanka, all the way to Southeast Asia.35 Five themes for this plan have
already been developed: (1) knowledge and understanding of contextual
history, particularly the period from 3000 BCE to the colonial times;
(2) oral literature and literary writings that present a conceptualized
Indian Ocean; (3) movable cultural relics and manmade objects, such as
32 G. Padmaja, “Maldives President Visits India: Bilateral Partnership for Regional Security,” p.115.
33 This term derives from Arabic, referring to the season when ships can navigate safely. The Indian
Ocean has southwesterly seasonal wind from May to September every year, and northeasterly seasonal wind
from November to March the next year. In ancient times, businessmen, fishermen and sailors would utilize
the seasonal wind to travel across the Indian Ocean, which helped form close cultural and economic ties
among different parts in the Indian Ocean.
34 Ministry of Culture, Government of India, “Project Mausam,” http://www.indiaculture.nic.in/project-
mausam.
35 Thomas Daniel, “Project Mausam-A Preliminary Assessment of India’s Grand Maritime Strategy from
a Southeast Asian Perspective,” in Vijay Sakhuja and Gurpreet S Khurana, Maritime Perspectives 2015,
p.166.

inscriptions, monuments and archaeological objects; (4) pilgrimage and
religious tourism across the Indian Ocean; and (5) spice and relevant
cultural products such as rituals, ceremonies and cuisine. This project is
implemented by Indira Gandhi National Centre for the Arts, New Delhi
as the nodal coordinating agency with support of Archeological Survey of
India and National Museum as associate bodies.36
Project Mausam, according to India’s Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar,
“promotes archeological and historical research on cultural, commercial,
and religious interactions. It has become a vehicle for knowledge
exchanges, networking and publications.”37 While the cultural veneer
has made it easier to promote to other countries, Project Mausam has
obviously gone beyond the scope of a cultural project, becoming an
important component of the Modi government’s ambitious foreign policy,
and in this regard has taken on a strategic meaning. The underlying
intention of the Modi government is to increase India’s influence, and
gain recognition of India’s important status in the Indian Ocean region.
Project Mausam furthers this goal by enhancing both understanding
of and identification with Indian culture among Indian Ocean
countries. Analysts pointed out that Project Mausam looked more like
a foreign policy initiative of the Modi government, with an aim towards
rejuvenating the ancient maritime route by way of culture and trade
connections between India and other Indian Ocean littoral countries.
This project is likely to resemble the Look East policy during the Singh
administration, which received scant attention at first but achieved
important results in the end.38 Even though Project Mausam might not
appear to contain any overt strategic intention, when coupled with other
maritime initiatives advanced by the Indian government, it would become
a power amplifier, winning the support of other countries while enriching
36 Ministry of Culture, Government of India, “Project Mausam.”

38 Thomas Daniel, “Project Mausam-A Preliminary Assessment of India’s Grand Maritime Strategy from
a Southeast Asian Perspective,” pp.165-166.
their maritime cultural heritage, which is conducive to increasing India’s
influence in the Indian Ocean.39
Enhancing the role of Indian Ocean governance mechanisms

The main governance mechanisms in the Indian Ocean region
include the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium,40 the Indian Ocean Rim
Association (IORA)41 and the Milan multilateral naval exercise, with India
playing a dominant role in all three. The Singh government initiated
the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium and organized its first conference.
As the biggest sponsor and supporter, India desires to play a major role
in the symposium and serve as a balancer in the Indian Ocean region.42
For Modi, the Symposium would deepen mutual understanding of
and enhance joint response capacity towards maritime challenges, and
therefore India would support the efforts to strengthen regional maritime
cooperation mechanisms that deal with a wide range of issues from
countering terrorism and piracy to responding to natural disasters.43 In
August 2015, a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief working conference
was hosted by India, in which participants discussed the guiding principles
of assistance and relief. A sandbox simulation was also conducted where an
Indian Ocean island nation is in need of help following a hurricane. In
the Fifth Indian Ocean Naval Symposium held in Bangladesh in January
2016, then India’s Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Robin K. Dhowan
elaborated on the guiding principles of rapid and effective humanitarian

40 The Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, taking the form of the Western Pacific Naval Symposium, is a
new type of military cooperation framework, focusing on maritime security and relief and countering such
activities as terrorist attacks and piracy. Established in 2008, the Symposium divides the Indian Ocean into
four sub-regions, namely South Asia, West Asia, east coast of Africa, and Southeast Asia and Australia. The
Symposium now has 35 members and holds a naval leadership meeting every two years.
41 The Indian Ocean Rim Association (IORA), whose predecessor was the Indian Ocean Rim Association
for Regional Cooperation, was founded in 1997 and changed to the current name in 2013. The IORA, with
21 member countries, is the first big organization on economic cooperation in the Indian Ocean region, and
is also the only economic cooperation organization that covers the entire Indian Ocean.
42 P. K. Ghosh, “Indian Ocean Naval Symposium: Uniting the Maritime Indian Ocean Region,” Strategic
Analysis, Vol.36, No.3, May-June 2012, p.357.

assistance and disaster relief.44
The IORA, currently having six priority areas to promote sustainable
growth and balanced development in the Indian Ocean region, ranks
maritime security as the first priority.45 As one of the founding members,
India regards the IORA as an important instrument to pursue sustainable
development and prosperity in the Indian Ocean region. As Modi said
during his 2015 visit to Mauritius, “We often define regional groupings
around landmass. The time has come for a strong grouping around the
Indian Ocean. We will pursue this with new vigour in the years ahead.”46
Since then, the Modi government has actively participated in IORA
activities and proposed several initiatives to strengthen cooperation
in non-traditional security and promote economic development. In
September 2015, India initiated and organized the first Indian Ocean
Dialogue, where participants discussed the geo-strategic significance
and security challenges of the Indian Ocean.47 During the 10th
IORA ministerial conference in November 2015, India proposed a
10-point suggestion on the development of the association, including
institutionalizing the Blue Economy Dialogue.48 Under the IORA
framework, India held the first and second Blue Economy Dialogues in
August and November 2016 respectively. India also held the first Experts
Meeting on Maritime Safety and Security in August 2016, and an
international symposium “The Future of Maritime Order in the Indian
Ocean” in November 2016.49 In 2017, India further held a ministerial
meeting on renewable energy, an international conference on water
security and sustainable development, and hosted the second Experts
44 “Navy Cief in Bangladesh for Indian Ocean Naval Symposium”, http://www.business-standard.com/
article/news-ians/navy-chief-in-bangladesh-for-indian-ocean-naval-symposium-116011000718_1.html,
accessed on November 20, 2017.
45 Gopal Suri, “India’s Maritime Security Concerns and the Indian Ocean Region,” Indian Foreign Affairs
Journal Vol. 11, No. 3, July-September 2016, p. 247.
47 G. Padmaja, “Modi’s Maritime Diplomacy: A Strategic Opportunity,” p. 33.
48 Indian Ministry of External Affairs, “Indian Ocean Rim Association and India’s Role,” http://www.
mea.gov.in/Portal/ForeignRelation/IORA_new.pdf.
49 Ibid.
Meeting on Maritime Safety and Security.50 In March 2017, India’s Vice
President Mohammad Hamid Ansari attended the first IORA summit in
Jakarta, Indonesia, and announced India’s willingness to set up an IORA
Centre of Excellence for strengthening maritime domain awareness in one
of the coastal cities of India.51
Started in 1995 and initiated by India, the Milan naval exercises
are held every two years, except for temporary suspensions in 2005 and
2011. In order to expand its influence, India has been mobilizing other
Indian Ocean countries to participate in these exercises, and it has played
the role of organizer and coordinator in every exercise. Promoted by India,
the number of participants in the exercise has been growing, increasing
from 5 in 1995 to 17 in 2014.52 The geographic scope of the participants
has also widened, expanding from Southeast Asia to Western Indian
Ocean countries like Kenya and Tanzania, as well as Indian Ocean island
nations like Mauritius and Seychelles. As to India’s role in these exercises,
the Indian commentator K. R. Singh pointed out that under India’s
leadership, the Milan military exercises “tore down the barriers among
different regions in the Indian Ocean, and showed that even without a
super power, countries in the Indian Ocean could conduct maritime
activities all by themselves, and even without an alliance mechanism like
NATO, if there is political will, maritime cooperation in the Indian Ocean
region could also become a real possibility.”53 The Australian scholar
David Brewster said that “The Indian Navy has successfully promoted
itself as a relatively benign provider of public goods and maritime
policing,” and “has also sought to institutionalize itself as the leading
Indian Ocean navy through such initiatives as sponsoring the Indian
50 Indian Ministry of External Affairs, Annual Report 2016-17, p.20, http://mea.gov.in/annual-
report-2016-17.htm.
51 “Vice President Attends IORA Leaders’ Summit at Jakarta,” March 8, 2017, https://www.mea.gov.in/
Portal/CountryNews/7499_Vice_President_attends_IORA_Leaders__Summit_at_Jakarta.pdf.
52 Smruti S. Pattanaik, “Indian Ocean in the Emerging Geo-strategic Context: Examining India’s Relations
with Its Maritime South Asian Neighbors,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2016, p.135.
53 K.R.Singh, Maritime Security for India: New Challenges and Responses, New Delhi: New Century
Publications, 2008, p.166.

Ocean Naval Symposium.”54
Deepening relations with Gulf countries

The Gulf region is where India’s multiple interests converge. First,
it is India’s biggest energy supplier. Over half of India’s crude oil and
85% of its liquefied natural gas imports come from the Gulf region.55
Second, the region is also India’s largest trading partner. The trade
between India and the Gulf countries reached $96.9 billion in 2016-
2017.56 Third, the region is India’s largest source of overseas remittance.
There are 8.5 million Indian migrant workers in the region, who send
$35 billion back to India every year, accounting for around 52% of all
remittance from overseas Indians.57 Furthermore, the Gulf region is an
important destination of India’s outbound direct investment. Successive
Indian governments have attached great importance to the Gulf region,
where Pakistan traditionally has great influence that India wants to
balance. Since taking office, Modi has shown his intention to inject
new momentum into this relationship. Modi’s visit to the United Arab
Emirates in August 2015, the first time an Indian Prime Minister visited
the country since 1981, greatly improved the bilateral relations between
India and the Gulf country. The UAE decided to set up a $75 billion fund
for India’s infrastructure,58 and sent Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan,
Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi and Deputy Supreme Commander of the
UAE Armed Forces, to attend the military parade on India’s Republic Day
in January 2017. Modi visited Saudi Arabia in February 2016, becoming
the fourth Indian Prime Minister to visit the country. In order to strike a
balance between Iran and Saudi Arabia, Modi visited Iran in May 2016,
making him the first foreign prime minister to visit Iran since the lifting
54 David Brewster, “Indian Strategic Thinking about the Indian Ocean: Striving Towards Strategic
Leadership,” India Ocean Economic & Political Review, Vol.14, No.2, 2016, p.230.
56 Ibid., p. 65.
57 Harsh V. Pant, “Bridging the Gulf,” The Hindu, January 25, 2017, http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/
op-ed/Bridging-the-Gulf/article17089302.ece.
of sanctions in January 2016. During the visit, the two sides signed 12
cooperation agreements, the most important of which was the agreement
tasking India with helping construct Iran’s Chabahar port. This agreement
set out a plan for India to invest $90 million in this construction project,
with the aim of blazing a trade route via Afghanistan to Central Asia
and Europe.59 Modi also visited Qatar in June 2016, making him the
first Indian Prime Minister to the country in eight years. The two sides
signed seven cooperation agreements. These frequent high-level exchanges
are conducive to strengthening the relationship between the Modi
government and foreign governments, enhancing India’s energy security,
and protecting interests of Indian migrant workers overseas.
As concerns the maritime arena, India’s naval ships visit the Gulf
countries almost every year. From May to November 2015, India’s naval
vessels visited Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar and the UAE. In May
2016, then Indian Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar visited the UAE
and discussed bilateral defense cooperation, including maritime counter-
terrorism. Later, Parrikar visited Oman and signed four cooperative
documents with his counterpart there, including the MOU on Maritime
Issues and the MOU between the Royal Oman Police (Coast Guard)
and the Indian Coast Guard in the field of Marine Crime Prevention
at Sea. Oman becomes the only Gulf country that has deployed all
three military services to joint military exercises with India.60 Through
maritime cooperation with the Gulf countries, India intends to expand
its influence in the region, ensure the safety of sea lane, especially energy
transportation.
Maritime cooperation with the US, Japan and Australia

Since the beginning of the 21st century, the US-India relations
have become closer. Due to its concern over the possible negative political
consequences as a result of a closer strategic alignment with the US, the

60 Ibid., p.64.
Singh government had reservations about cooperating with the US on
maritime issues,61 to the point that it reduced its participation in the naval
exercises with the US and Japan.62 However, since coming to power, Modi
has actively pushed for the strengthening of US-India relations and US-India
maritime cooperation. During Modi’s September 2014 visit to the US, the
two sides issued a joint communiqué announcing that “the leaders expressed
concern about rising tensions over maritime territorial disputes, and affirmed
the importance of safeguarding maritime security and ensuring freedom
of navigation and over-flight through the region, especially in the South
China Sea.”63 During then US President Barack Obama’s visit to India in
January 2015, the two countries stressed strengthening cooperation in such
areas as maritime security and building counter-terrorism mechanisms.64
In June 2015, then US Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter and Indian
Defense Minister Manohar Parrikar signed a 10-year defense framework
agreement, which was first signed in 2005. According to the new agreement,
the two sides would have higher-level consultations and communications
that cover a wider range of issues. As Carter’s predecessor Chuck Hagel
stated earlier, “This renewed framework will support stronger military-to-
military engagement, including deeper maritime cooperation and increased
opportunities in technology and trade.”65 During Carter’s another trip to
India in April 2016, the two countries agreed to set up a new high-level
dialogue mechanism for maritime security.66 In May the same year, the first
US-India Maritime Security Dialogue, between Indian officials of Defense
and External Affairs Ministries and their US counterparts, was held in India.
Furthermore, the two countries also agreed to include Japan as a regular
62 Pramit Pal Chaudhuri, “New Delhi at Sea: The China Factor in the Indian Ocean Policy of the Modi
and Singh Governments,” Asia Policy, No. 22, July 2016, p.29.
63 The White House (President Barack Obama), “U.S.-India Joint Statement,” September 30, 2014,
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/09/30/us-india-joint-statement.
64 Rakesh Sood, “A Visit and Outcomes in Superlatives,” The Hindu, January 27, 2015, http://www.
thehindu.com/opinion/lead/a-visit-and-outcomes-in-superlatives/article6824148.ece.
65 “A New Chapter in Defence Ties, Says Hagel,” The Hindu, January 26, 2015, http://www.thehindu.
com/news/national/a-new-chapter-in-defence-ties-says-hagel/article6822129.ece.
participant in the Malabar naval exercise.67 Since Japan is a close ally of the
United States, by inviting Japan to the annually-held naval exercise, India
intends to further enhance its relations with the US, strengthen its maritime
cooperation with Japan, and increase its presence in the Indian Ocean and
the West Pacific.
In January 2015, India and the US released the Joint Strategic Vision
for the Asia-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region, emphasizing further
cooperation in the vast area.68 In May 2016, the two countries concluded
a “white shipping agreement” to improve data sharing on cargo ships, and
agreed to set up a dialogue mechanism on maritime security.69 During
Modi’s trip to Washington in June the same year, the US for the first time
designated India as a “major defense partner,” making India enjoy a status
commensurate with that of the closest allies and partners of the US.70
Then in August 2016, the two countries finalized the Logistics Exchange
Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA), which had been a decade in
the making.71 According to the LEMOA, the US and Indian militaries
will utilize each other’s sea, land and air bases to carry out such logistic
activities as replenishment of supplies, and repair and maintenance. The
signing of this document is not only of military significance, but also
marks India’s shift from hesitation to determination in its efforts to build
an effective strategic partnership with the US.72 In June 2017, Modi paid
his fifth visit to the US in three years. In his meeting with Modi, the new
67 Harsh V. Pant and Yogesh Joshi, “Indo-US Relations under Modi: The Strategic Logic Underlying the
Embrace,” International Affairs, Vol.93, No.1, 2017, p.140.
68 “US-India Joint Strategic Vision for the Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean Region,” January 25, 2015,
http://www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl%2F24728%2FUSIndia_Joint_Strategic_Vision_for_
the_AsiaPacific_and_Indian_Ocean_Region.
70 Ankit Panda, “US Implementation of ‘Major Defense Partner’ Perks for India Underway,” The
Diplomat, April 14, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/04/us-implementation-of-major-defense-partner-
perks-for-india-underway.
71 The Logistics Exchange Memorandum of Agreement was proposed as early as 2004, but the Singh
government was reluctant to sign it for fear a military alignment with the US might constrain its strategic
autonomy. The Modi government’s decision to early finalize the agreement indicated that Modi was more
willing to forge closer ties with the US and its allies in terms of Indian Ocean affairs.
72 Harsh V. Pant and Yogesh Joshi, “Indo-US Relations under Modi: The Strategic Logic Underlying the
Embrace,” p.143.
US President Donald Trump said that “the relationship between India
and the United States has never been stronger, never been better.”73 As
pointed out by analysts, the India-US relations have undergone qualitative
changes under the Modi government. Although previous administrations
also maintained good relations with the US, the bilateral relations reached
a new high under Modi, and broke the constraints of India’s traditional
“non-alliance” policy tenets.
The maritime cooperation between India and Japan has deepened
in the 21st century, and is further bolstered under Modi. During Modi’s
visit to Japan in September 2014, the two countries agreed to upgrade
their bilateral relationship to a “special strategic and global partnership.”74
Modi even called Japan the center of India’s Act East policy. During this
trip, India and Japan decided to hold regular joint maritime exercises.
Japan agreed to invest $35 billion over the next five years to help India
build its infrastructure.75 The two countries also reached consensus
on maritime security, freedom of navigation, and peaceful resolution
of maritime disputes through friendly negotiations.76 In August 2015,
Japan participated for the first time in the Malabar naval exercises
held in the Bay of Bengal, which was the first time Japan conducted
military exercises on the high seas off India.77 The sixth Chief of Naval
Staff meeting between the two countries was held in March 2016. In
November the same year, Modi visited Japan again. During the trip,
the two sides signed 11 agreements on peaceful utilization of nuclear
energy, and maritime cooperation, among other issues.78 In May 2017,
the two countries discussed advancing the initiative of Asia-Africa
73 “Donald Trump Says US–India Ties Have ‘Never Been Stronger’, Praises PM Modi,” Hindustan
Times, June 27, 2017, https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/narendra-modi-has-been-a-great-prime-
minister-india-doing-very-well-trump/story-beB5q9XSDiX09uodqpqolM.html.
75 Ibid.
76 Annpurna Nautiyal, “US Security Strategy of Asian Rebalance: India’s Role and Concerns,” Strategic
Analysis, Vol.41, No.1, 2017, p.22.
The USS Theodore Roosevelt (right) aircraft carrier, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense
Force destroyer JS Fuyuzuki (left) alongside the Indian Deepak-class fleet tanker INS
Shakti (center) during the Malabar Exercise 2015. (AFP/ US Navy)
Growth Corridor, which is an important component of the India-Japan

Vision 2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together
for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region, and extends
geographically from the Asia-Pacific region to Africa, with infrastructure
projects in Africa, Iran, Sri Lanka and Southeast Asian countries.79
During the Malabar naval exercise held in waters off India’s Chennai
and the Bay of Bengal in July 2017, the largest in scale compared
with previous exercises, India, the US, and Japan all sent out aircraft
carriers or similar vessels for the first time. Compared with the Singh
government, the Modi government has attached greater importance
79 Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India, Japan Come up with AAGC to Counter China’s OBOR,” The
Economic Times, May 26, 2017, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/economy/policy/india-japan-
come-up-with-aagc-to-counter-chinas-obor/articleshow/58846673.cms.
to the role of Japan in the Indo-Pacific region, and has enlarged and
deepened its maritime cooperation with Japan.
Maritime cooperation between India and Australia had been rather
limited, but under Modi, the scenario has also changed. Modi visited
Australia in November 2014, making him the first Indian Prime Minister
to visit Australia in 28 years. The trip greatly improved the relationship of
the two countries, culminating in the signing of a Framework for Security
Cooperation. The two sides also held their first joint naval exercise in the
Bay of Bengal in September 2015.
Furthermore, the Modi government has also strengthened its maritime
cooperation with Southeast Asian countries as well as Bangladesh in South
Asia. In October 2014, direct bi-weekly container shipping service was
launched between India and Myanmar, which, in India’s vision, aims at
creating a transport connection between India’s eastern littoral and the
landlocked northeastern region through Myanmar.80 India has intended
to use Bangladesh’s Chittagong port and carve out a sea gate for its deep
inland northeastern region.81 India and Myanmar signed an agreement
on joint maritime patrols in February 2016, making Myanmar the third
Southeast Asian country after Thailand and Indonesia to formally sign
such an agreement with India.82 In July 2014, the Modi government
accepted the ruling of the Arbitration Tribunal set up under the Permanent
Court of Arbitration in The Hague on its maritime demarcation with
Bangladesh, which resolved a long-standing maritime dispute between
the two countries.83 During Modi’s visit to Bangladesh in May 2016, the
two sides agreed to develop blue economy, and discussed possibilities in
such areas as joint maritime patrols, naval exercises, joint monitoring of
exclusive economic zones, information exchanges on civilian vessel shipping,
expansion of maritime security cooperation in the Bay of Bengal, and
80 Isabelle Saint-Mézard, “India’s Act East Policy: Strategic Implications for the Indian Ocean,” Journal
of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol.12, No.2, 2016, p.183.
81 Ibid., p.184.
82 Ibid., p.186.
promoting ship-building cooperation.84 The Indian Coast Guard visited
Bangladesh for the first time in September 2016. There had been a lack
of cooperation between coast guards of the two countries due to the long-
simmering maritime dispute. Following settlement of the dispute, however,
their maritime cooperation would increase accordingly, with this visit as an
important start.
Gap between Objectives and Realities
Despite confidence and ambitions, the realization of Modi’s objectives

towards the Indian Ocean remains far from easy.
Naval capabilities in need of improvement

In the hope of playing a dominant role in the Indian Ocean, the
Modi government has been relying upon a strong comprehensive maritime
combat force, utilizing overseas military bases and strategic pillars,
uniting with neighboring countries in the Indian Ocean, and managing
Indian Ocean affairs in terms of security, trade, energy and humanitarian
assistance in a relative exclusive manner. However, this objective is still far
from attainable.85 India’s naval power is leading the littoral countries in
the Indian Ocean, but it still pales in comparison with other great powers.
In terms of input, India’s military expenditure stood at $55.92
billion in 2016, while the United States reached $611.19 billion, Russia
$69.25 billion, China $215.18 billion, and Japan $46.13 billion, making
India’s defense spending only above that of the militarily restrained
Japan.86 Furthermore, in terms of specific expenditure of the three
military services, the navy has long been the least funded, with its average
84 Smruti S. Pattanaik, “Indian Ocean in the Emerging Geo-strategic Context: Examining India’s Relations
with Its Maritime South Asian Neighbors,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol.12, No.2, 2016, p.137.
85 Li Jiasheng, “Evaluation of Effects of India’s Maritime Strategy,” Pacific Journal, Vol.24, No.4, 2016,
p.67.
86 SIPRI Military Expenditure Database, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, https://www.
sipri.org/databases/milex.
proportion accounting for less than 16% of the total expenditure in
2014-2016, and further decreasing to 14% in 2017, quite off the mark
for the 25% target set by the government.87 Moreover, 60% of warships
in the Indian Navy are reaching retirement age, while the ones under
construction cannot be delivered on schedule due to lack of funding and
inefficiency. To a large extent, this further constrains the effectiveness of
the Indian Navy, making it doubtful whether India is able to adequately
deploy its naval forces to a theatre of operations where rapid response is
necessitated.88 India also lacks the strategic capability to shape the wider
environment beyond its immediate neighborhood.89 Therefore, just as an
Indian analyst pointed out, “if Delhi succeeds in bridging the gap between
good ideas and the implementation thereof, India could restore its sphere
of influence in the Indian Ocean.”90
Inadequate naval capabilities also prevent India from denying other
powers’ access the Indian Ocean. The United States is currently the real
dominant player in the Indian Ocean, with its Central Command, Africa
Command, and the Fifth Fleet all participating in Indian Ocean affairs. It
has been estimated that the US spends between US$47 billion and US$98
billion per year to secure the Persian Gulf.91 The US would not tolerate
India to challenge its established status. If India’s actions conflicted with
the US core interests in the Indian Ocean, the close maritime cooperation
between the two countries would break down and the cost would be
unbearable for India. Currently, the huge capability gap between India and
the US can hardly be bridged or even reversed in the near future, which
makes Modi’s objective, transforming India into the dominant power within
the Indian Ocean region, unlikely to materialize. Present circumstances
only allow the Modi government, under the US leadership, to play a role in
87 Iskander Rehman, “India’s Fitful Quest for Sea Power,” India Review, Vol.16, No.2, 2017, p.227.
88 Ibid., p.244.
89 Harjeet Singh, India’s Strategic Culture: The Impact of Geography, New Delhi: W Publishers Pvt Ltd,
2009, p.25.
91 Jan Hornat, “The Power Triangle in the Indian Ocean: China, India and the United States,” Cambridge
Review of International Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 2, 2016, p.434.
Indian Ocean affairs, in the meantime gradually consolidating its power and
expanding its influence. Similarly, it is very difficult for India to challenge
the presence of other major powers in the Indian Ocean, such as the UK,
France, Germany, Japan, Russia and China. For the sake of practicality, it
would be best for India to cooperate with these countries.
Maritime disputes with neighboring countries

India is involved in maritime disputes with Pakistan. Their maritime
disputes have arisen from their differing interpretations of internal waters,
territorial seas, exclusive economic zones, and limits of the continental
shelf. Their disputes of internal waters and territorial seas revolve around
the mouth of the 60-mile Sir Creek in the Rann of Kutch marshland
where it opens up into the Arabian Sea. This area is adjacent to the
Gujarat State of India and the Sindh Province of Pakistan. Pakistan relies
on a 1914 map to demarcate the boundary at the east bank of Sir Creek’s
estuary, while India insists on dividing the river by the mid-channel.92
With regard to maritime demarcation beyond territorial waters, Pakistan
sticks to the equity principle, while India insists on the equal-distance
principle in dividing the exclusive economic zones and continental
shelves.93 Since these disputed areas are rich in oil and gas reserves, neither
side will give in to the other. At stake is the 250 square miles of sea surface
and sea bed, which amounts to a winner take all scenario.94 The two
countries are thus often involved in quarrels and even military conflicts
due to this dispute.
Pakistan’s maritime strategy takes India as its imaginary enemy and a
target to develop its navy. Due to its weaker naval capability and a military
expenditure only one seventh the amount of India’s,95 Pakistan cannot
92 Sugandha, Evolution of Maritime Strategy and National Security of India, New Delhi: D. K. Print
World (P) Limited, 2008, p.7.
93 K.R.Singh, Maritime Security for India: New Challenges and Responses, p.170.
94 Sugandha, Evolution of Maritime Strategy and National Security of India, p.131.
95 Waqar-un-Nisa, “Pakistan-India Equation: Determinants, Dynamics and the Outlook,” Policy
Perspectives, Vol.14, No.1, 2017, p.31.
pose a serious threat to India’s maritime capability, but it can distract India
from focusing all its resources on seeking its maritime ambitions. Sartaj
Aziz, former Advisor to the Pakistani Prime Minister on Foreign Affairs,
once said, “We are planning to highlight the dangerous implications of
India’s plans to nuclearise the Indian Ocean at all relevant international
fora. Pakistan is fully prepared to defend its people and its borders …
Despite limitations of resources, Pakistan has developed a robust nuclear
deterrence which is constantly updated.”96 He also alleged on another
occasion that, “India’s evolving expansionist maritime security strategy
and undemarcated border of Sir Creek, pose a threat to the security of
the Indian Ocean…We are aware of our national interests and every effort
will be made to strengthen our capacity to ensure that we remain ready
to meet the emerging maritime security challenges.”97 Generally, Pakistan
poses two concerns for India, one being its cooperation with other major
powers, which might change the balance of power between India and
Pakistan in confrontations; the other being that it might use asymmetrical
measures to attack India, on land as well as at sea.98 Former Chief of
Naval Staff Admiral Dhowan once indicated that “Islamic terrorists could
hijack Pakistani naval vessels to attack Indian ships and installations,”
like the terrorist attack on Karachi naval base in September 2014 in an
attempt to hijack Pakistani warships with the ostensible purpose to use
them against Indian and US ships, which would be “a very, very serious
situation.”99 The maritime dispute with Pakistan deprives India of a
peaceful environment for development in South Asia and the North
Indian Ocean. As the renowned American South Asia scholar Stephen
Cohn indicated, even if India is rising to become a major Asian power
with global ambitions, its foreign policy would still be constrained by its
96 “Pakistan to Push UN to Declare Indian Ocean Nuclear-free Zone,” The Indian Express May 20,
2016, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-news-india/pakistan-to-push-un-to-declare-indian-ocean-
nuclear-free-zone-2810100.
97 “Pakistan Concerned over Peace in Indian Ocean: Sartaj Aziz,” The Indian Express February 11, 2017,
http://indianexpress.com/article/world/pakistan-concerned-over-peace-in-indian-ocean-sartaj-aziz.
98 K.R.Singh, Maritime Security for India: New Challenges and Responses, p.49.
99 Camelia Nathaniel, “India, China Heading for Standoff Over Ocean Security,” p.11.
relations with Pakistan.100
Although India’s other neighbors are not involved in maritime
disputes with India, their foreign policies are not necessarily pro-India.
For these countries, the most important objective is protecting their own
security by utilizing the balance of power among major countries.101 For
example, Sri Lanka learned that neglecting the interests of any major
power would bring itself trouble, and therefore it decided to pursue a
balanced diplomacy by maintaining friendly relations with key major
powers, refraining from harming anyone’s interests, and avoiding unfair
competition with them, in order to protect its own interests.102 Based on
this thinking, Sri Lanka would handle its relations with India for the sake
of its own national interests, instead of following India’s will. Similarly, the
current Maldives President Abdulla Yameen takes India as a priority in his
foreign policy, but his government still seeks to develop friendly relations
with other major powers. Since India once supported the Maldives’ former
President Mohamed Nasheed, who was defeated by Yameen, it makes
matters even more complicated.103 The balanced diplomacy adopted by its
maritime neighbors makes India’s policy unlikely to win genuine support
from these countries, which makes it even more difficult for India to
accomplish its vision of Security and Growth for All in the Region.
Conclusion
Compared with the previous Singh government, the Modi government

attaches greater importance to the Indian Ocean, adopts more specific
100 Stephen P. Cohen and Rohan S. Sandhu, “Rising India’s Pakistan Problem,” International Studies,
Vol.47, No.2-4, 2010, p.413.
101 Smruti S. Pattanaik, “Indian Ocean in the Emerging Geo-Strategic Context: Examining India’s
Relations with Its Maritime South Asian Neighbors,” Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, Vol.12, No.2,
2016, p.138.
102 Gulbin Sultana, “Sri Lanka after Rajapaksa: Can It Ignore China?” Strategic Analysis, Vol.40, No.4,
2016, pp.250-251.
103 Smruti S. Pattanaik, “Indian Ocean in the Emerging Geo-strategic Context: Examining India’s
Relations with Its Maritime South Asian Neighbors,” p.138.
and systematic measures for its Indian Ocean policy, and promotes
these measures with greater efforts. This is a reflection of the Modi
government’s ultimate goal to rejuvenate India. However, it must be
pointed out that, despite efforts to differentiate his Indian Ocean policy
from his predecessors to highlight his governance ability, Modi has still
inherited some measures adopted by previous governments. For example,
the Indian Ocean Naval Symposium, Project Mausam, and even the Act
East policy were adopted or deliberated on in the previous administration,
while the Modi government simply updated or upgraded them to
bring them to life. Likewise, without the foundation laid by previous
governments, the Modi government would find it hard to consolidate,
deepen and upgrade its maritime cooperation with other countries. From
this perspective, the Indian Ocean policy under Modi reflects continuity
from previous governments.
The current developments show that the Modi government, which
is highly interested in and has great ambitions for the Indian Ocean,
will continue to actively advance its Indian Ocean policy. Due to its
suspicions towards China’s entry into the Indian Ocean, Modi’s policy
might have a negative impact on the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road
initiative. On one hand, the refusal of India, a key stop along the route
of the Maritime Silk Road, to join this initiative would make the projects
involving India more difficult to advance. On the other hand, if India
uses its special status in the Indian Ocean to put pressure on or provide
assistance to other countries, it would hinder their all-round cooperation
with China even if these countries have already joined this initiative.
Therefore, China needs to strengthen communication and exchange with
Indian Ocean countries including India, in an effort to ensure a smooth
advancement of the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road in the Indian
Ocean region.
Security Dilemma on the Korean
Peninsula and the Way Out
Yang Xiyu
T
he Korean Peninsula is where military forces and strategic
weapons are most densely deployed. With the Democratic
People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) accelerating the development
of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles in recent years, the mutual
deterrence between the DPRK and the alliance between the Republic
of Korea (ROK) and the United States has been escalating. Both sides
have established strategic strike capabilities able to destroy each other.
This has caused both sides to become increasingly locked in a security
dilemma whereby greater investments in arms may only lead to greater
security threats. As a result, tensions have escalated and the risk of war has
increased. The only realistic path for escaping from this security dilemma
is realizing a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula while establishing a permanent
peace mechanism for the purpose of common security. The new concept
of security in Asia, as advocated by President Xi Jinping, is therefore of
great significance for breaking the security dilemma on the Korean
Peninsula.
Ever-Increasing Strategic Arms Race
For over half a century since the armistice of the Korean War, both the
DPRK and the ROK have maintained huge military expenditures for years
on end and have preserved a relatively high global military strength in
Yang Xiyu is Senior Research Fellow at China Institute of International Studies (CIIS).
Security Dilemma on the Korean Peninsula and the Way Out March/April 2018 113
proportion to their respective populations.1 Also, about 28,000 US ground,
marine and air personnel are stationed in the ROK, which has a size of only
100,000 square kilometers. At present, one basic characteristic of the security
situation on the Korean Peninsula is that both the DPRK and the US-ROK
alliance are racing to enhance their strategic strike capabilities to destroy
the other, resulting in rising threats to both sides. This is manifested in the
continuous intensification and expansion of the strategic arms race between
the two sides.
First, the DPRK nuclear issue has undergone a qualitative change
from inter-Korean mutual deterrence to DPRK-US mutual assurance
of nuclear destruction. After years of massive investment and multiple
ballistic missile tests, the DPRK has obtained ballistic missile forces that
cover a number of models with different ranges, including intercontinental
ballistic missiles capable of striking the US homeland. After successfully
testing a Hwasong-14 ballistic missile, the DPRK’s top leader Kim Jong-un
was reported to have claimed that all the US mainland is within the striking
range of the DPRK’s intercontinental missiles.2 The DPRK’s nuclear weapons
development has advanced even further. Substantial progress has been made
in the production of weapons-grade plutonium and enriched uranium as well
as the test of nuclear fission warheads and thermonuclear fusion warheads.
The US Defense Intelligence Agency believes that after a series of nuclear
tests conducted since 2006, the DPRK has been able to miniaturize a nuclear
warhead to carry it on its long-range ballistic missiles.3 It is conservatively
estimated that the DPRK has between 13 to 30 nuclear warheads.4 The various
1 According to statistics from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, the number of DPRK
and ROK troops rank fifth and sixth respectively in the world, while the proportion of troops within their
populations rank first and third respectively.
2 Park Chan-kyong, “N. Korea Leader Says ‘All of US within Range after Missile Test,” AFP News, July
29, 2017, https://sg.news.yahoo.com/n-korea-launches-another-ballistic-missile-us-160151580.html.
3 Joby Warrick, Ellen Nakashima and Anna Fifield, “DPRK Now Making Missile-Ready Nuclear
Weapons, US Analysts Say,” The Washington Post, August 8, 2017, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/
national-security/north-korea-now-making-missile-ready-nuclear-weapons-us-analysts-say/2017/08/08/
e14b882a-7b6b-11e7-9d08-b79f191668ed_story.html.
4 David Albright, “DPRK’s Nuclear Capabilities: A Fresh Look,” Institute for Science and International
Security report, April 26, 2017, http://isis-online.org/isis-reports/detail/north-koreas-nuclear-capabilities-a-
fresh-look/10.
114 China International Studies Security Dilemma on the Korean Peninsula and the Way Out
tests already conducted by the DPRK showcase the country’s commitment to
becoming a world-class nuclear player with various land and sea-based mobile
launchers and the capability to strike anywhere in the United States.
From a geostrategic point of view, the rise of the newborn nuclear
power means that the small peninsula will give birth to a nuclear state
guided by the principle of preemptive strike, which in turn will accelerate the
structural shift from the “peace with terror” based on inter-Korean mutual
deterrence toward the mutual assurance of nuclear destruction between the
DPRK and the US.
Although the DPRK will never develop the same size of nuclear
arsenal as that of the US, the strategic location of the peninsular country
between China and the ROK has created a de facto asymmetrical balance
of nuclear terror. The only nuclear test site of the DPRK is located in
Punggye-ri, less than 80 kilometers away from Changbai county in China’s
Jilin Province. If the US plans to conduct a nuclear strike against the
state with an area slightly exceeding 120,000 square kilometers, it will
doubtlessly be opposed by both the ROK and China. This is a concern the
US must consider before deciding a nuclear attack. Unlike the US, should
the DPRK desire to use hydrogen bombs to preemptively strike the vastly
populated United States, it need not consider any third-party factor. It may
not even have to consider the so-called “precision bombing.” This is the
basic geopolitical condition for the DPRK to achieve “nuclear deterrence
balance” with the US. The status quo could be understood as a geopolitical
lever that will not only escalate the mutual deterrence between the DPRK
and the ROK to the dangerous mutual assurance of destruction by weapons
of mass destruction, but will also make the US accelerate the deployment
of its missile defense and offence forces on the Korean Peninsula and even
in the broader Northeast Asia. Such a situation will likely result in greater
strategic investment from the US to the Peninsula.
Second, the US-ROK military alliance has been continuing its
strategic transformation with the goal of destroying the DPRK regime.
With the deteriorating situation on the Korean Peninsula, the scope of
cooperation and operational coordination by the US-ROK military alliance
has been constantly adjusted in depth. Hence, the goal of the alliance has
changed from a defensive posture focused on defeating a DPRK invasion to
preemptive destruction of the DPRK regime. The nature of the US-ROK
alliance has shifted from defensive to offensive. This transformation has
been highlighted by the continuous renewal and adjustment of the US-ROK
alliance’s combat plans against the DPRK.
The Operations Plan 5027 (OPLAN 5027) is the most important
plan of the United States and the ROK targeting the DPRK. During the
Cold War, this US-dominated plan was changed from a model of “retreat-
defense-counterattack” to a model of “forward deployment-defense-
counterattack.” With the end of the Cold War and the escalation of the
DPRK nuclear crisis, the OPLAN 5027 has been increasingly focused
on completely destroying the DPRK regime in a total war. Following the
outbreak of the first DPRK nuclear crisis in 1994, the United States made
drastic adjustments to its combat scenarios and demanded the use of the
US military bases in Japan to provide logistical support to the Korean
Peninsula should a war break out. After the Bush administration proposed
the strategy of preemptive strike against the DPRK in 2002, the US
military immediately amended the plan accordingly and proposed the US
military to attack the DPRK alone if necessary, even without consulting
the ROK. With the continuous progress of the DPRK’s nuclear weapons
program, the United States has continuously revised and updated the
OPLAN 5027 and successively formulated the OPLANs 5027-04 and
5027-06, which witnessed major structural adjustments to the US-ROK
allied forces, making a massive reduction in the number of artillery and
ground troops and replacing them with naval and air force units and
precision-guided missiles as the main force and means of fighting against
the DPRK. In order to accelerate the abovementioned transformation of
operational modes of the US-ROK allied forces, the United States and the
ROK rolled out the OPLAN 5027-08 and established an integrated plan
for the formation and coordinated actions of the allied force units in the
coming period.
With the acceleration of the DPRK’s nuclear missile development
and testing in recent years, the United States and ROK have especially
formulated the OPLAN 5015 for “the 21st-century approach of precision
strike and limited war” and expanded the scale of joint military exercises
since 2015. The subjects of military exercises include 4D (detect, disrupt,
destroy and defend) operations, special force operations, decapitation strike,
targeted bombing of deep tunnels, beach landing and seizure of key points,
among others, with an aim to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of a
preemptive strike against the DPRK.5
The above adjustment process has gradually transformed the US-ROK
military alliance into an offensive alliance able to eliminate the DPRK
regime. This increasingly clear strategic and tactical readjustment against the
DPRK regime and its supreme leader has prompted the DPRK to further
enhance its nuclear deterrence and thus escalated the tensions on the
Peninsula, resulting in both sides being dragged deeper and deeper into the
security dilemma.
Third, the introduction of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) system in the ROK has further complicated the situation
and might lock the security of the Korean Peninsula into major-power
strategic competition. While the ROK has vigorously developed its ability
to attack the DPRK, it has completed the deployment of the THAAD
missile defense system. On the surface, the move is a response to the DPRK’s
ballistic missile threats. In fact, what is at stake is the US global deployment
of its missile defense network.
Using the DPRK missile threat as an excuse to introduce THAAD into
the ROK followed a similar pattern as introducing missile defense systems
into Europe under the pretext of the Iranian missile threat. It is in fact a
strategic move of the United States aimed at building a global missile defense
5 Michael Peck, “OPLAN 5015: The Secret Plan for Destroying DPRK (and Start World War III?),” The
National Interest, March 11, 2017, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/oplan-5015-the-secret-plan-
destroying-north-korea-start-19747.
network. The expansion of THAAD into the ROK lays a solid foundation
for the US to gradually establish a missile defense network in East Asia
similar to the one it has in Europe.
THAAD is one of the missile defense systems with the highest success
rate in tests. The maximum interception range is 200 kilometers and the
vertical range is as high as 150 kilometers. Although THAAD is a tactical
anti-missile weapon, the X-band radar equipped to the system has a
maximum surveillance range of 1,500-2,000 kilometers. This can monitor
not only the military targets in a large area of eastern China, but also the
whole process of China’s intercontinental ballistic missiles, if the X-band
radar approaching China is networked with the S-band radar in Alaska.
Theodore Postol, professor of science, technology, and security policy
at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and former US Chief of
Naval Operations science and policy advisor, has indicated that deploying
THAAD in the ROK threatens China’s strategic deterrence capability.6
Similarly, the deployment poses threat to Russia’s strategic deterrence in its
far eastern region, and therefore has been strongly opposed by both China
and Russia. As pointed out in a joint statement by the two countries, the
crux of anti-missile systems such as THAAD is that they break the global
and regional strategic balance and undermine strategic stability. “China
and Russia oppose the strengthening of military presence by external forces
in Northeast Asia, and oppose building a new anti-missile outpost in the
region as part of the US missile defense network in the Pacific under the
pretext of the DPRK nuclear and missile threats.”7 Although the ROK has,
through a series of dialogues with China on the THAAD issue, formally
promised not to target third parties or undermine China’s strategic and
security interests, there remain uncertainties regarding the implementation
of such commitment.
6 “US THAAD System in ROK Would Threaten China’s Deterrent,” Sputnik International, April 3, 2016,
https://sputniknews.com/world/201603041035754227-us-thaad-system-would-threaten-chinas-deterrent.
7 “China-Russia Joint Statement Criticizes US Destabilizing Global Strategic Balance,” People.com.cn,
June 27, 2016, http://sc.people.com.cn/n2/2016/0627/c345527-28569003.html.
Nuclear Issue: Key Variable in Peninsula’s Security Dilemma
Among the various complex contradictions in the Korean Peninsula

security dilemma, the major one is the wrestling over the nuclear issue by
the DPRK and the United States. This is not only causing turmoil in the
security situation around the Korean Peninsula, but also profoundly affecting
the security order on the Peninsula. The DPRK nuclear issue continues to
deteriorate due to two abnormalities on the Peninsula. First, the Korean
Peninsula remains in a state of war de jure. Although the 1953 Korean
Armistice Agreement resulted in an effective ceasefire, formal negotiations
have not been held and a peace agreement to ensure the Korean Peninsula’s
lasting peace and security has yet to be signed. Second, the Korean Peninsula
is still in a cold war status. Although the Cold War has long ended, the
relations between the DPRK, on one side, and the United States and the
ROK, on the other, are far from normal. In fact, relations have continued to
deteriorate, which has prompted both sides to strive to develop the strategic
strike capability to destroy the other.
This is the geo-political environment on the Korean Peninsula in which
the state of war and the status of cold war are superimposed on each other.
Since the early 1990s, the DPRK nuclear issue has been a determining factor
for the ups and downs between the DPRK and the United States. It also
leads the direction of the situation on the Korean Peninsula.
The situation of the Korean Peninsula stabilizes whenever the DPRK
and the United States reach compromise and fulfill agreement on the
nuclear issue. The DPRK’s plan to secretly develop nuclear weapons started
in the 1950s, but only after the Cold War did its nuclear capabilities start
to become a real concern. From 1993 to 1994, the DPRK and the United
States became sharply antagonistic to each other over the inspection of
nuclear facilities in Yongbyon, triggering the US to prepare for a “surgical”
military attack. Later on, however, the two countries signed a framework
agreement after tense negotiations, which not only defused the immediate
crisis of war, but also opened the door to bilateral relations. Based on the
framework agreement, the two sides went through intensive negotiations,
focusing on 21 issues including denuclearization, the DPRK’s ballistic
missile development, terrorism, economic and trade relations, establishment
of liaison offices and energy development projects on the Korean Peninsula,
among others. Bilateral agreements on 18 issues were signed.8 During this
period, the security relations between the US and the DPRK apparently
stabilized, and the US, by means of the United Nations, started to provide
the DPRK with sizable grants. In particular, in response to the food shortage
in the DPRK, the US government provided about 1.09 million tons of free
food aid during the fiscal years of 1995-2000.9 A joint communiqué was
issued by the two countries in 2000, proclaiming that they would work
together to “build a new relationship free from past enmity.”10 Negotiation
and cooperation between the DPRK and the US on the critical and sensitive
nuclear issue not only made a significant breakthrough and improvement
in the bilateral relations, but also led the tensions on the Korean Peninsula
to ease and created the necessary political climate for the first inter-Korean
summit in 2002. During this period, the mutual hostility between the
DPRK and the US-ROK alliance was at a relatively low level.
The situation on the Korean Peninsula deteriorates and runs the
risk of war when the DPRK-US antagonism over the nuclear issue
escalates. When the United States discovered the DPRK’s secret development
of enriched uranium, which is in violation of the Framework Agreement,
in 2002, it immediately rescinded the agreement, prompting the DPRK to
publicly accelerate its pace of nuclear weapons development. The security
landscape on the Korean Peninsula and the relatively stable US-DPRK
and inter-Korean relations were thus completely broken, and the tense
8 Robert Carlin and John W. Lewis, Negotiations with DPRK: 1992-2007, Center for International
Security and Cooperation, Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies, Stanford University, January
2008, http://cisac.fsi.stanford.edu/publications/negotiating_with_north_korea_19922007.
9 “US Assistance to DPRK,” CRS Report, RS21834, updated July 31, 2008, https://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/
RS21834.pdf.
10 “US-DPRK Joint Communique,” October 12, 2000, https://1997-2001.state.gov/www/regions/
eap/001012_usdprk_jointcom.html.
confrontation focusing on the DPRK nuclear issue entered a period of
escalating turmoil and deterioration. From the first nuclear test in September
2006, which signified the DPRK crossing the nuclear threshold, to the
sixth test in September 2017 and the Hwasong-15 intercontinental ballistic
missile test in November the same year, the DPRK has obtained the strategic
deterrence capability to destroy the ROK and strike the US homeland. In
response, the US-ROK alliance has continuously strengthened its ability
to deter the DPRK. The United States has established and deployed on the
Peninsula the capacity to destroy the DPRK with extended nuclear deterrence.
In this stage of the security dilemma, in which both sides compete to
strengthen their respective deterrence, the nuclear weapons available for the
DPRK became the core issue of the US-DPRK strategic competition.
For the DPRK, who faces huge external military threats as well as
isolation and blockade, the power of nuclear weapons and the capability to
deliver ballistic missiles are both a strategic means necessary to safeguard its
national security and regime survival, and a critical leverage to facilitate the
improvement of US-DPRK relations. It is precisely because the possession of
nuclear weapons can bring tremendous security and strategic interests that
the DPRK, under heavy pressure from the international community, wants
to become a nuclear power and rely on its nuclear weapons to establish
“equilibrium” of military force with the US.11 However, for the United
States, the DPRK’s nuclear weapons are not only related to the survival of
global nuclear non-proliferation system, but are also directly related to
the US homeland security and its “strategic credibility” as the provider of
nuclear umbrella for allies. Therefore, the United States has continuously
strengthened the deployment of its armed forces capable of destroying the
DPRK regime, and persuaded the ROK to deploy THAAD, looking to
topple the DPRK regime that rejects denuclearization.
The diametrically opposed strategic resolves and interests between the
DPRK and the United States have made the nuclear issue an encased knot
11 “North Korea Will Reach Its Nuclear Force Goal - Kim Jong-un,” BBC, September 16, 2017, http://
www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41289532.
for the security plight of the Korean Peninsula. The more the DPRK speeds
up the pace of developing its nuclear weapons and missiles, the more the
US-ROK alliance accelerates its preparation for a military strike against
the DPRK, putting the latter under greater threats, which, in turn, further
encourages its development of nuclear arms. Kim Jong-un has publicly
announced that the DPRK’s goal of establishing a balance of power with
the United States has come to the final stage,12 which means that the DPRK
now poses an unprecedented threat not only to the ROK, but also to the
US homeland. In response, the US President Donald Trump has repeatedly
stated that the “strategic patience” of the US government is over, and that all
options for resolving the nuclear issue are on the table.13 The sharply opposed
stances of the DPRK and the US show that the nuclear issue, evolving since
the end of the Cold War, is now at a historic crossroads. By deterring each
other with nuclear weapons, the security situation on the Korean Peninsula
has reached the edge of war. Either the two sides jointly walk out of the
security dilemma or continue to be trapped in the status that is more likely
to run out of control, this “balance of terror” cannot sustain. The answer
depends on the ability of parties concerned to terminate the mutual threat
and open up a path of common security on the Peninsula.
Way Out: Common Security Based on Denuclearization
In more than two decades since the first nuclear crisis broke out in the
1990s, the DPRK’s nuclear deterrence has grown from scratch and developed
from weak to strong, but the external environment facing the country
has become even more unsafe. The ROK and the United States have
continuously strengthened their military alliance during the same period,
and the US has deployed strategic weapons of unprecedented density in and
12 “Kim Jung-un: DPRK Nuclear Development Nears Ultimate Goal of Balance with US,” Lianhe
Zaobao, September 16, 2017, http://www.zaobao.com/realtime/world/story20170916-795789.
13 Peter Jacobs and David Choi, “Trump Warns DPRK after Missile Passes over Japan: ‘All options Are
on the Table’,” Business Insider, August 29, 2017, http://www.businessinsider.com/trump-north-korea-all-
options-are-on-the-table-2017-8.
around the Korean Peninsula. However, the ROK and even the US have
similarly become more insecure. This profoundly shows that there is no way
out by relying on deterrence to safeguard one’s own security.
Conflicting security interests of opposing blocs

Looking at the long-term and sharp confrontation between the ROK
and the DPRK since the armistice of the Korean War, it can be seen that
the state of war and the status of cold war on the Korean Peninsula has
divided the security interests between the two sides. This is the root cause of
the security dilemma on the Peninsula. The geopolitical background of such
relations is that the US-led alliance system in Northeast Asia is opposed to
countries outside the bloc in terms of security interests.
From the partial logic of the US-ROK alliance, the more military
cooperation between the two sides and between the three sides of the US,
Japan and the ROK, the more guaranteed is their “collective security.”
However, the reality is that peace and security on the Korean Peninsula and
in Northeast Asia is not only the fundamental interest of the three “collective
security” members of the US, the ROK and Japan, but also the fundamental
interest of the DPRK, China, Russia and other countries. In the small area
of the Korean Peninsula, dividing the DPRK and the ROK into the target
of attack and the protected object, under the Cold War mentality of bloc
politics, will inevitably lead to a security dilemma for both sides. In Northeast
Asia, where security interests are intertwined, separating relevant countries in
and out of the region into “collective security” members and non-“collective
security” members fundamentally puts the countries in these two groups into
a zero-sum game. When the former group strive to enhance their own security
by strengthening military cooperation and building armaments, the latter bloc
would immediately feel the increase in security threats and thus inevitably
respond by cementing their own security. This, in turn, adds to the sense of
insecurity among the members of the former group. The gradual escalation
of such negative security interactions will necessarily lead to the situation
where the security gains of one group is always at the expense of the other’s
compromised security. One party’s pursuit of its own security has become the
root cause of the other’s insecurity.14
Urgency to develop sustainable security in the region

The deteriorating security predicament on the Korean Peninsula is
mainly due to the unsustainability of regional security order, which is based
on the antagonism of security interests. In recent years, the frequent crisis
basically reflects the fact that the security order on the Peninsula and even
in Northeast Asia is becoming increasingly unsustainable and is entering a
period of profound readjustment and transformation.
At the regional level, the post-war security order in Northeast Asia,
which was based on the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation
but was then seriously distorted by the Treaty of San Francisco, is facing
increasingly acute challenges in its stability, adaptability and sustainability.
However, a new security order is far from taking shape. In this transitional
period, whether a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula can be achieved directly
concerns the security of the Korean Peninsula and the kind of security order
that would replace the old one based on the temporary armistice agreement
of 1953. A security order based on mutual assurance of destruction will
inevitably push both the DPRK and the ROK into the dangerous abyss of
security dilemma. Establishing a permanent peace mechanism based on a
denuclearized Korean Peninsula will not only ensure that both the DPRK
and the ROK enjoy common security and long-term stability, but is also an
essential prerequisite for peaceful unification of the Peninsula.
The concept of common security, as proposed by Chinese President Xi
Jinping at the 2014 Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building
Measures in Asia (CICA), pointed out the direction for transcending the
security dilemma on the Korean Peninsula. “We cannot just have the security
of one or some countries while leaving the rest insecure, still less should one
seek the so-called absolute security of itself at the expense of the security of
14 John Baylis, Steve Smith, and Patria Owens, The Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to
International Relations, Oxford University Press, 2011, p. 95.
others.”15 This universal, equal and inclusive common security is the way out
of security dilemma, and is highly applicable to the Korean Peninsula and
Northeast Asia, which is deeply trapped in the dilemma. In the long-term
standoff between the DPRK and the ROK, if one wants to ensure its own
security, it must also take into account the security of the other. In Northeast
Asia, where security relations between the countries are complicated,
historical issues and current disputes are entangled, and forces in and
outside the region are intertwined, the expansion of the so-called “right of
collective self-defense” and the enhancement of the “collective security”
system will inevitably push other countries to step up their corresponding
security measures. One country seeking to strengthen its own security will
always cause other countries to take countermeasures, which will only lead
to a deeper security dilemma for the country concerned. The DPRK, the
ROK and the United States cannot break out of their security plights by
continuing to increase “nuclear deterrence” or “extended nuclear deterrence.”
Only by reducing the threats to each other and establishing a nuclear-free
Korean Peninsula can the security dilemma that has ensnared all parties be
broken and peace, stability and prosperity be realized.
“Double Suspension” toward “Dual-Track Negotiation”

There are many different proposals on how to break the security
plight caused by the “mutual deterrence” and realize denuclearization and
permanent peace on the Korean Peninsula. China’s proposal is to move from
“double suspension” to “dual-track negotiation,”16 achieving denuclearization
and long-lasting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula through
dialogue, negotiation and cooperation. First of all, based on the principle
of “commitment for commitment, action for action” established by the
September 19 Joint Statement of the Six-Party Talks, it calls for the DPRK
15 “New Asian Security Concept For New Progress in Security Cooperation: Remarks at the Fourth
Summit of the Conference on Interaction and Confidence Building Measures in Asia,” May 21, 2014, http://
www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/t1159951.shtml.
16 “Chinese FM Calls for Non-Proliferation Efforts, Peace Talks on Korean Peninsula,” Xinhua, April 29,
2017, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-04/29/c_136244611.htm.
to suspend its nuclear and missile development activities while the US
and ROK suspend their large-scale military exercises, so as to ease tensions
on the Peninsula and identify a place of breakthrough to resume the peace
talks. Second, based on the stability of situation on the Peninsula, parallel
progress would be made on two tracks: one is resuming the Six-Party Talks,
and, according to the objectives established by the parties of the September
19 Joint Statement, achieving “two completely,” that is, the DPRK
completely abandons its nuclear weapons and related missile programs while
its reasonable concerns, such as those concerning its sovereignty, territorial
security and international status, are completely addressed. The other
track is to initiate negotiations on the establishment of a peace mechanism
on the Korean Peninsula. in accordance with the recommendations and
consensus of the September 19 Joint Statement. All parties, including the
DPRK and the ROK, the two countries triggering the Korean War and
the direct stakeholders of the current situation, as well as China and the
United States, the two most prominent antagonists in the war and the most
important external forces today, would jointly negotiate the establishment
of a permanent peace mechanism on the Korean Peninsula to replace the
provisional Korean Armistice Agreement and thus bring about lasting peace
to the Peninsula.
The denuclearization and permanent peace and stability of the Korean
Peninsula that the dual-track negotiation aims to realize are in essence
a legal and order arrangement, which should and must address four basic
issues: First, common security should be guaranteed by international
treaties, especially the sovereignty and territorial integrity, dignity and
international status of the DPRK and the ROK. This requires legally
ending the state of war that still exists between the DPRK on one side and
the ROK and the US on the other, terminating the United States’ hostile
policy against the DPRK and the antagonism between the two countries,
ensuring the normalization of relations and peaceful coexistence among
the DPRK, the ROK and other countries. Second, comprehensive security
on the Korean Peninsula, involving both traditional and non-traditional
South Korean National Security Adviser Chung Eui-yong (center) briefs reporters
outside the West Wing of the White House on March 8, 2018, in Washington, D.C.,
announcing US President Donald Trump has agreed to meet with North Korean leader
Kim Jong-un by May.
security, should be addressed in a coordinated way. In particular, the security

interests of both the DPRK and ROK in terms of military, environment and
economy should be carefully managed. Third, cooperative security involving
equal participation by all parties under a stable multilateral framework
should be established, making dialogue and cooperation via multiple
channels the basis for common security of all parties. Fourth, the rights of
peaceful development of both sides of the Peninsula should be respected, so
as to realize and maintain the sustainable security of the Korean Peninsula.
This requires integrating all the positive achievements of inter-Korean
dialogues since the signing of the 1991 Basic Agreement, especially the
outcomes of joint declarations of the two inter-Korean summits, so that a
legal framework for peace, reconciliation and cooperation can be established
and the process of peaceful unification can restart. In addition, as the two
external forces most influential on the situation of the Korean Peninsula,
China and the United States have the obligation to establish and abide by
the basic principle of actively engaging in the economic development and
prosperity of the Korean Peninsula.
Since the DPRK and the US-ROK alliance have been trapped in
the security dilemma for decades, it is no easy task to achieve common,
comprehensive, cooperative and sustainable security on the Korean Peninsula
on a nuclear-free basis. As the nuclear issue is at stake to all parties, it seems
that it is difficult for any one of them to compromise. However, peacefully
resolving the nuclear issue is in the interest of all parties, including the
DPRK and the United States. This determines the feasibility of resolving
the nuclear issue through negotiation. On the surface, the DPRK-US
contradiction on the issue has become increasingly irreconcilable and may
even lead to the outbreak of war. However, it is precisely because peaceful
settlement of the nuclear issue is mutually beneficial that the DPRK and
the US have released positive signals for resolution of the nuclear issue
through negotiation at the same time they have maintained tough and
confrontational stands. Shortly after the Independence Day of the United
States in 2016, the DPRK reiterated its position of realizing a nuclear-free
Korean Peninsula and listed five preconditions for a denuclearization.17 In
2017, the US Secretary of State Rex Tillerson repeatedly stated his “Four
Nos” policy which includes “not seeking regime change.”18 Although
there is still a large gap between their positions, they have displayed some
common ground and similarities. These commonalities and similarities not
only constitute the political basis for negotiation and dialogue to resolve
the nuclear issue, but also provide important positive factors for all parties
concerned to build their common security and get out of the security
dilemma. The “dual-track negotiation” China calls for and emphasizes is a
17 “DPRK Government Denounces U.S., S. Korea’s Sophism about ‘Denuclearization of North’,” KCNA,
July 6, 2016, http://www.kcna.kp/kcna.user.article.retrieveNewsViewInfoList.kcmsf#this.
18 “China Supports US Dialogue with North Korea at Some Point,” The Hill, August 3, 2017, http://
thehill.com/policy/international/345109-china-supports-us-dialogue-with-north-korea-at-some-point.
pragmatic and feasible solution, making full use of the common interests
and common needs of all parties involved in the peaceful settlement of the
nuclear issue, to realize a nuclear-free Korean Peninsula through the Six-Party
Talks and purse common security through negotiation on a permanent peace
mechanism on the Peninsula.
To achieve common security on the Korean Peninsula, which involves
multiple parties and long-term antagonism, not only requires dialogue
and negotiation, but also needs to establish an appropriate multilateral
cooperation framework. In view of the particularity of the Korean
Peninsula, there is no ready-made experience and mode of reference.
However, through the Six-Party Talks, the countries concerned have not
only explored the possibility of denuclearization and peace and stability on
the Korean Peninsula, but also made a helpful attempt on common security
cooperation based on peaceful coexistence of the six countries in Northeast
Asia. This is highlighted in the September 19 Joint Statement. After arduous
negotiations and bargaining by the parties, the document established the
common goal of denuclearization on the Korean Peninsula and the path of
“commitment for commitment, action for action,” and pledged to “negotiate
the permanent peace regime on the Korean Peninsula at an appropriate
separate forum.” An objective of the six countries establishing a Northeast
Asian security cooperation mechanism based on sovereign equality and
peaceful co-existence was also set in the Joint Statement.19 If the Six-Party
Talks can successfully resolve the complicated nuclear issue on the Korean
Peninsula, this dialogue mechanism can naturally evolve into a mature
security cooperation mechanism in Northeast Asia and become a guide for
all countries concerned to get out of the security dilemma and realize long-
term peace and stability. Therefore, the practice of the Six-Party Talks and
its consensus concepts are valuable assets and a realistic basis for building
common security in Northeast Asia.
Although the Six-Party Talks have stalled for many years and suffered
19 “Full Text of 6-Party Talks Joint Statement,” China Daily, September 19, 2005, http://www.chinadaily.
com.cn/english/doc/2005-09/19/content_479150.htm.
serious setbacks, the deteriorating crisis on the Korean Peninsula and
the increasingly worsening security dilemma after the suspension of the
Talks have exactly revealed the value of common interests enshrined in
the mechanism. Objectively speaking, regarding the nuclear issue or even
the Korean Peninsula’s peace and security, no country will be able to seize
all benefits and become the sole winner. Restarting the Six-Party Talks
to resolve the nuclear issue peacefully and negotiate a permanent peace
mechanism for the Korean Peninsula is a win-win choice. In an era of
increasing interdependence, it is an inevitable historical trend to establish
a mechanism for common security on the Korean Peninsula and even in
Northeast Asia that transcends social systems and ideological differences.
Relevant countries in the region should follow the trend of the times and
actively explore the possibility of common, comprehensive, cooperative and
sustainable security that benefits all parties through wide consultation and
joint contribution.
Conclusion
The security interests of the DPRK and the ROK are closely intertwined
and interact with each other. Any unilateral efforts made by one side to
reinforce its own security will inevitably lead to reaction by the other side.
Therefore, the competition between the DPRK and the US-ROK alliance
to guarantee their respective security at the expense of the other only leads
to deepening security dilemma. To ensure its own security, each side must
take into account the security of other relevant parties. Deterring others
with nuclear weapons would be counterproductive. This is an objective law
independent of the will of any country. All parties in Northeast Asia must
work together to surpass all the disputes brought about by the “collective
security” distorted by the Cold War and seek for a feasible path of common
security.
The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor:
Content, Motivation and Prospects
Lou Chunhao
T
he Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC) is a collaborative vision
shared by India and Japan to create a growth corridor and industrial
network connecting Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia
and Africa across the Indo-Pacific region. Once it was raised, the AAGC was
tagged as aiming at “countering the Belt and Road (the Silk Road Economic
Belt and the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road Initiative),”1 as there is a high
level of overlapping in geographic coverage and cooperation fields between the
AAGC and the Belt and Road Initiative. What’s more, the AAGC came out
less than ten days after Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi refused to send
delegates to the Belt and Road Forum for International Cooperation in Beijing.
Therefore, in order to promote the Belt and Road Initiative across this region,
it is necessary to evaluate of the motivation behind the AAGC, as well as its
prospects, so as to properly deal with possible competition originating from it.
Content of the Proposed Asia-Africa Growth Corridor
On May 23, 2017, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi declared that “India,
Lou Chunhao is Associate Research Fellow and Deputy Director of the Institute for Maritime Strategic
Studies, China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR).
1 Manas Dasgupta, “OBOR Counter? Modi for Asia-Africa Corridor,” May 23, 2017, http://www.
tribuneindia.com/news/nation/obor-counter-modi-for-asia-africa-corridor/411899.html; Sudip Bhattacharyya,
“The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor Is the Answer to the OBOR,” June 22, 2017, http://www.dnaindia.com/
analysis/column-the-asia-africa-growth-corridor-is-the-answer-to-obor-2479792; Titli Basu, “Thinking Africa:
India, Japan, and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor,” June 03, 2017, http://thediplomat.com/2017/06/thinking-
africa-india-japan-and-the-asia-africa-growth-corridor; Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “Pushing Back against
China’s One Belt One Road, India, Japan Build Strategic ‘Great Wall’,” Economic Times, May 16, 2017.
The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor: Content, Motivation and Prospects March/April 2018 131
the United States and Japan are cooperating to support the development of
Africa” and he had “fully discussed with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe
on this issue.” He then stated India and Japan would jointly develop an Asia-
Africa Growth Corridor and a vision document of the Asia-Africa Growth
Corridor Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative Development was drawn
up.2 In the document, which was jointly produced by three think tanks,
namely the Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS),
the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), and the
Institute of Developing Economies-Japan External Trade Organization (IDE-
JETRO), it is pointed out that the AAGC will be instrumental in creating new
production channels, expanding and deepening existing value chains, ensuring
economic and technical cooperation for enhancing capacities, facilitating a
greater flow of people between the two continents, and achieving sustainable
growth over the longer term. The AAGC will be developed through quality
infrastructure and complemented by digital and regulatory connectivity.3
Although no detailed implementation procedures have been made public, based
on official documents released by governments of India and Japan, as well as the
research findings of the think tanks concerned, the main content and features of
this initiative can be concluded as below:
Geographically, the AAGC covers the Indo-Pacific region, with special
emphasis on “Maritime Asia” and Africa. The AAGC claims to promote
integration between Asia and Africa across the Pacific and Indian Oceans.
However, such a broad geographic coverage would increase the difficulty
of strategic coordination between Japan and India, and might obscure the
distribution of strategic resources and make it hard to achieve the two countries’
interests. Judging from the present situation, Maritime Asia and Africa are the
priority areas for Japan and India in their efforts to build the AAGC.
2 “PM’s Address at the Inauguration of the Annual Meeting of the African Development Bank,”
Government of India, May 23, 2017, http://www.pmindia.gov.in/en/news_updates/pms-address-at-the-
inauguration-of-the-annual-meeting-of-the-african-development-bank/?comment=disable.
3 Research and Information System for Developing Countries (RIS), Economic Research Institute for
ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA), Institute of Developing Economies-Japan External Trade Organization
(IDE-JETRO), Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative Development, A
Vision Document, pp. 3-4.
132 China International Studies The Asia-Africa Growth Corridor: Content, Motivation and Prospects
Maritime Asia refers to the maritime region extending from Northeast
Asia, across Southeast Asia and South Asia to West Asia. During the past years,
with the growing importance of sea lane security in these regions, which seems
to have become more vulnerable, the maritime security concerns of Japan
and India have been increasing with the intensifying disputes over maritime
rights and interests in the Asia-Pacific region, and these intensifying concerns
have driven them to enhance maritime security cooperation. Although
there is not much about Maritime Asia in the Vision Document, Maritime
Asia is indeed the key field for these two countries’ strategic coordination
based on the designs and practices of the two countries. In fact, before the
AAGC was proposed, Japan and India had already started or were going to
start cooperation on multiple projects including Trincomalee in Sri Lanka,
the Chabahar port in Iran and the Dawei port in Myanmar, as well as in
developing the Lakshadweep and Andaman and Nicobar islands in India. Since
the Vision Document was released, cooperation between the two countries has
further deepened: for one thing, the progress China has made in port and pier
building in Maritime Asia has intensified India’s worries about so-called China’s
String of Pearls strategy, while Japan also fears that China will jeopardize the
maritime order. The two countries believe it is a must for them to jointly act
to counter China’s “dominance”; for another the “maritime awareness” has
become more significant in India’s construction of its national strategy, plus
Japan is also pushing ahead with what it calls its “Free and Open Indo-Pacific
Strategy.” These factors have encouraged their cooperation under the banner of
two “maritime democracies.”
Africa is another key area for the AAGC. In the Vision Document, many
development and cooperation programs focus on Africa, specifically arguing for
the complementarity of India and Japan in Africa. Although the United States
considers the Indo-Pacific region as stretching from the west coast of India to
the western shores of the United States,4 according to Japan and India, Africa
(especially East Africa) should also be included as part of the Indo-Pacific
4 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017, p.46.
region. The important status of Africa can be seen from the occasions on which
the strategies were announced. Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe unveiled
Japan’s Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy at the Sixth Tokyo International
Conference on African Development (TICAD), and Indian Prime Minister
Narendra Modi announced the AAGC at the annual meetings of the African
Development Bank. There are great prospects for Africa as a key region of the
AAGC, since the continent is rich in natural resources and has great market
potential. In addition, the many African countries which account for more
than a quarter of United Nations membership are a potential “voting bloc” in
the UN General Assembly. As Africa’s status appears more and more evident in
the economic, diplomatic and even security strategies of Japan and India, it is
in these two country’s interests to increase their strategic inputs with regard to
Africa.
The AAGC stresses a development-oriented vision and regional
connectivity. The Vision Document outlines four pillars for the AAGC. These
four pillars are development and cooperation projects, quality infrastructure
and institutional connectivity, enhancing capacity and skills, and people-to-
people partnerships.5 For the AAGC, development and cooperation projects are
the main leverage, building quality infrastructure and institutional connectivity
are the practical focus, while enhancing capacity and skills is the fundamental
basis and people-to-people partnerships build a foundation of mutual
understanding.
The reasons why Japan and India have made people-to-people partnerships
a key field in the AAGC are as follows: First, emphasizing people-to-people
interactions makes it easy to claim the moral high ground and ease other
countries’ worries. Second, people-to-people partnerships are consistent
with the respective economic development strategies of Japan and India, who
would benefit from the AAGC. Third, as it echoes the United Nations’ 2030
Agenda for Sustainable Development and Agenda 2063 of the African Union,
strengthening people-to-people interactions could help to gain more support for
5 Asia Africa Growth Corridor: Partnership for Sustainable and Innovative Development, A Vision
Document, p.8.
the AAGC. This logic can be observed from the government agencies that took
part in outlining the AAGC plan: on the Indian side, it is the Development
Partnership Administration Agency, the Policy Planning and Research
Division, and the East Asia Division under the Ministry of External Affairs,
as well as the Department of Commerce under the Ministry of Commerce
and Industry, while Japan’s Trade Policy Bureau at the Ministry of Economy,
Trade and Industry participated in the process. Apart from this, the three
think tanks6 mentioned above also work specifically on regional economic and
trade cooperation and connectivity, and all of them are closely related to the
governments of Japan and India.
Among the four pillars in the Vision Document, quality infrastructure,
institutional connectivity, and people-to-people partnerships can all be put
into the category of connectivity. The three of them separately correspond
to physical, institutional and people-to-people connectivity. Physical
connectivity covers transportation and other basic infrastructure construction.
Here transportation refers to highways, railways, airports, ports and urban
transportation. Japan regards urban development as one of the key priorities
in its efforts to promote the development of Africa.7 Other basic infrastructure
includes electricity (smart grids), telecommunications, postal services and
other service facilities. Institutional connectivity focuses on the coordination
between development strategies and working procedures, such as partnership
in the International Solar Alliance and trade and investment facilitation
6 The RIS is a policy research institute under the Indian Ministry of External Affairs. Members of its
governing council are high-ranking officials from the Ministry of External Affairs, Ministry of Finance,
Ministry of Commerce and Industry and Ministry of Science and Technology, etc. The RIS acts as the main
consulting institute when the Indian government is promoting policies on ASEAN-India connectivity, South
Asia regional integration, and South-south cooperation. Also, the Indian government tends to consult with
the RIS before signing economic cooperation agreements with other countries. The ERIA was established
in 2008 and is the most important policy advisory institute for regional integration in ASEAN. Although its
headquarters is located at the ASEAN Secretariat, Japan nevertheless has great influence. IDE-JETRO was
established in 1960. Its conducts research on economic, social and political issues in developing countries/
areas, and provides policy advice to the Japanese government in its economic and trade cooperation with
foreign countries.
7 Japan’s African strategy concentrates on three important areas including the Mombasa/Northern
corridor, Nacala corridor, and the growth area in West Africa; resources and energy development (such as
geothermal energy and efficient power generation); and urban development like city transportation. See Titli
Basu, “Thinking Africa: India, Japan, and the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor.”
mechanisms. Japan and India share the desire to further promote cooperation
and collaboration in Africa in line with the priority measures identified
through the India-Japan Dialogue on Africa, the India-Africa Forum Summit
(IAFS) and TICAD.8 People-to-people exchanges include tourism, education,
knowledge promotion and people-to-people communication. This multi-
dimensional connectivity is designed to achieve multiple goals in five aspects,
including effective mobilization of financial resources; building alignment with
socio-economic development and development strategies of partner countries
and regions; the application of high-quality standards in terms of compliance
with international standards established to mitigate environmental and social
impacts; the provision of quality of infrastructure taking into account aspects of
economic efficiency and durability, inclusiveness, safety and disaster-resilience,
sustainability as well as convenience and amenities; and contributions to the
local society and economy.9
The AAGC is driven by perceptions and may fail to carry through
despite a good start. Major powers tend to use perceptions as the first step
of their diplomacy; sometimes these perceptions only appear in the leaders’
speeches and even if reflected in their diplomatic practices there may be no
systematic and normative strategic documents about these ideas. India’s Act
East policy is one example of this phenomenon. The AAGC in large part is
also driven by perceptions and ideas, which shows Japan and India’s strategic
aspirations and capability to strengthen cooperation. There was once some
news report saying that the final version of implementation plan for the AAGC
would be published during Abe’s visit to India in September 2017.10 However,
considering the broad coverage of this initiative and the many different fields
8 “India-Japan Joint Statement during visit of Prime Minister of Japan to India: Toward a Free, Open and
Prosperous Indo-Pacific,” September 14, 2017, http://www.mea.gov.in/incoming-visit-detail.htm?28946/
IndiaJapan+Joint+Statement+during+visit+of+Prime+Minister+of+Japan+to+India+September+14+2017.
Document, p.4.
10 Neha Sinha, “Asia- Africa Growth Corridor: Can It Be a Game Changer?” June 5, 2017, http://www.
vifindia.org/article/2017/june/05/asia-africa-growth-corridor-can-it-be-a-game-changer;
Maulik Pathak, “India-Japan Partnership to Play Key Role in Asia-Africa Corridor,” May 25, 2017, http://
www.livemint.com/Politics/gfSbaVJjfHuoUKPTMxrU8L/IndiaJapan-partnership-to-play-key-role-in-
AsiaAfrica-corr.html.
it involves, Abe only emphasized that “they (Japan and India) welcome the
deepening of their connectivity dialogue aimed at achieving concrete progress
and decided to further accelerate such an initiative” and “the two prime
ministers welcome the efforts to explore the development of industrial corridors
and industrial network for the growth of Asia and Africa, which will benefit
various stakeholders in the Indo-Pacific region including Africa.”11 However, the
two parties did not issue any policy paper.
According to the schedule set out in the Vision Document, a joint study
team commissioned by the two governments is to conduct the preparation of
Asia Africa Growth Corridor study between 20017-2018 and seek the advice
of Japanese, Indian and African think tanks, and the final study report is due
to be published in 2018.12 Nevertheless, this final study report could probably
be an implementation plan in the foreseeable future while there would be no
stipulated time period for the AAGC itself. For one thing, this initiative covers
such a broad geographic area and so many different cooperation fields that it
is difficult to set a definite timetable for it; for another, the initiative itself is
driven by perceptions and acts as a policy guideline for Japan and India, rather
than some specific implementation schedule. In addition, the proposal and
promotion of the AAGC itself is the outcome of geopolitical changes, hence
Japan and India will not set a specific timetable to “trap themselves.”
Policy Motivation for the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor
The AAGC is neither an expedient plan, nor a baseless initiative that came out
of nowhere. On the contrary, it is the outcome of the transition in domestic
policies of Japan and India. Also, it has come out of the coordination of these
two countries’ strategies from the perspectives of the Indo-Pacific region and
suits both countries’ interests in tapping their complementarity and jointly
11 “India-Japan Joint Statement during the visit of Prime Minister of Japan to India: Toward a Free, Open
and Prosperous Indo-Pacific,” September 14, 2017, https://newsroompost.com/347700/full-text-of-the-
india-japan-joint-statement/.
Document, p.16.
exploring the opportunities presented by Africa’s development. This AACG
initiative embodies their worries about China’s Belt and Road Initiative and its
striving to be a maritime power.
The strategic understanding between Japan and India has upgraded
to strategic coordination, which can be clearly observed from the AAGC.
In recent years, it has become a strategic consensus that the Indian Ocean
and the Pacific Ocean have turned into one integrated zone with geopolitical
significance.13 As two important powers in the Indo-Pacific region, Japan
and India have been steadily enlarging their bilateral cooperation under the
Indo-Pacific framework, and they have even actively planned for multilateral
cooperation with the United States and Australia.
In August 2007, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe delivered a speech
entitled “The Confluence of the Two Seas” to the Indian Parliament, claiming
that “The Pacific and the Indian Oceans are now bringing about a dynamic
coupling as seas of freedom and of prosperity. A ‘broader Asia’ that broke away
geographical boundaries is now beginning to take on a distinct form,” “Japanese
diplomacy is now promoting various concepts in a host of different areas so
that a region called ‘the Arc of Freedom and Prosperity’ will be formed along
the outer rim of the Eurasian continent,” “the strategic global partnership of
Japan and India is pivotal for such pursuits to be successful ... incorporating the
United States of America and Australia.”14 After he took office for the second
time in late December 2012, Abe proposed the concept of a “Democratic
Security Diamond,” saying that “Japan is a mature maritime democracy, and its
choice of close partners should reflect that fact. I envisage a strategy whereby
Australia, India, Japan, and the US state of Hawaii form a diamond to safeguard
the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western
Pacific….India deserves greater emphasis.”15 Since then, Japan’s policies toward
India, Southeast Asia and even Africa have all centered on the vision of building
13 Zhao Qinghai, “The Concept of Indo-Pacific and Its Implications for China,” Contemporary
International Relations, No.7, 2013.
14 “Confluence of the Two Seas,” Speech by Shinzo Abe, Prime Minister of Japan at the Parliament of the
Republic of India, http://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html.
15 Shinzo Abe, “Asia’s Democratic Security Diamond,” Project Syndicate, December 27, 2012.
a Indo-Pacific order more beneficial for Japan. At the sixth TICAD in 2016,
Abe unveiled the “Free and Open Indo-Pacific Strategy,” claiming that “Japan
bears the responsibility of fostering the confluence of the Pacific and Indian
Oceans and of Asia and Africa into a place that values freedom, the rule of
law, and the market economy, free from force or coercion, and making it
prosperous,” “Let us make this stretch that is from Asia to Africa a main artery
for growth and prosperity.”16
India published its first-ever maritime strategy, the Indian Maritime
Doctrine, in 2004, pointing out that “the focus of global maritime affairs
has transferred from the Atlantic-Pacific area to the Indo-Pacific Ocean.”17
Thereafter, Indian leaders have used the term “Indo-Pacific” on several
occasions, yet there was no officially stated Indo-Pacific strategy. Since Modi
became prime minister, he has broadened the strategic and diplomatic view of
the Indo-Pacific region and has been trying to construct an Indo-Pacific strategy
based on the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific. Therefore, he first upgraded
India’s East Asia strategy from the Look East policy to Act East policy, then
proposed a Think West strategy for the western Indian Ocean and the concept
of SAGAR (a Hindi word meaning Security and Growth for All in the Region).
India’s areas of interest in its 2015 Maritime Security Strategy have clearly
expanded compared with the 2007 version, with its primary interests focusing
on the northwestern Indian Ocean (Persian Gulf, Gulf of Oman, Gulf of Aden,
Red Sea) and newly covering the southwestern Indian Ocean (island nations in
the Ocean and countries along Africa’s eastern coast), as well as the Straits of
Malacca, Singapore, Sunda and Lombok. The secondary maritime interests are
topped by the Southeastern Indian Ocean (including the sea lane to the Pacific
Ocean) and covers for the first time the East China Sea, the Mediterranean Sea,
Africa’s western coast and the Antarctica.18 It is most obvious in the new Indian
16 “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International
Conference on African Development,” August 27, 2016, http://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/page4e_000496.
html.
17 Indian Maritime Doctrine, New Delhi: Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of Defence 2004, pp. 65-67.
18 Ensuring Secure Seas: Indian Maritime Security Strategy, Integrated Headquarters, Ministry of
Defence (Navy), 2015, p. 32.
Maritime Security Strategy that the geographic scope has expanded across the
entire Indo-Pacific region.19
When promoting their own Indo-Pacific policies, Japan and India
both regard each other as important partners and their strategic cooperation
has been continuously deepened. In 2014 when Modi took power, he made
Japan his first destination outside India’s immediate neighborhood in South
Asia, and during his visit the two countries decided to upgrade their bilateral
relations to a “special strategic and global partnership.” In 2015, Abe paid a
another visit to India and both sides announced the “Japan and India Vision
2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working Together for the
Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World.”20 Two years
later, Japan and India issued another joint statement named “Toward a Free,
Open and Prosperous Indo-Pacific.” In all these documents, Japan and India
have reiterated their strategic cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, especially
coordination between Japan’s Free and Open India and Pacific Strategy and
India’s Act East policy. It was based on this consensus that the AAGC was
formed. In the Japan and India Vision 2025, the two countries “reiterated their
unwavering commitment to realize a peaceful, open, equitable, stable and rule-
based order in the Indo-Pacific region and beyond” and “pledged to advance
industrial networks and regional value chains with open, fair and transparent
business environment in the region.”21 In 2016 when Modi visited Japan, both
countries stressed their aspirations to “improve connectivity between Asia and
Africa, through realizing a free and open Indo-Pacific region” and “to promote
cooperation and collaboration in Africa, with the objective to synergize their
efforts and explore specific joint projects including in the areas of training
19 Satu Limaye, Weighted West, Focused on the Indian Ocean and Cooperating across the Indo-Pacific:
The Indian Navy’s New Maritime Strategy, Capabilities, and Diplomacy, Center for Naval Analysis, April
2017, p. 16.
20 This statement is recognized as the guide for the new era in Japan-India relations. http://www.mofa.
go.jp/region/asia-paci/india/data.html.
21 “Joint Statement on India and Japan Vision 2025: Special Strategic and Global Partnership Working
Together for Peace and Prosperity of the Indo-Pacific Region and the World,” December 12, 2015, http://
www.mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/26176/Joint_Statement_on_India_and_Japan_Vision_2025_
Special_Strategic_and_Global_Partnership_Working_Together_for_Peace_and_Prosperity_of_the_
IndoPacific_R.
and capacity building, health, infrastructure and connectivity. In this regard,
they also expressed their intention to work jointly and cooperatively with the
international community to promote the development of industrial corridors
and industrial network in Asia and Africa.”22 Therefore, the AAGC is the
natural outcome of the two countries’ efforts to synergize their individual Indo-
Pacific strategies.
Japan and India have been continuously upgrading Africa’s status in
their diplomatic network with the realistic goal to advance complementarity
of their policy resources. Ties between these two countries and Africa stretch
back a long time. After its independence, India endeavored to support African
countries’ fight for their own independence and regarded Africa as an important
partner in the Non-Alliance Movement. Similarly, Japan initiated the TICAD in
1993. However, the two countries did not dedicate a lot of resources to Africa
at first. Since Shinzo Abe and Narendra Modi took office, they have put a lot
of emphasis on their governments’ diplomacy towards Africa. For instance, the
Abe administration has made Africa the “new frontier” of Japanese diplomacy,
and Abe “travelled no fewer than three times to the African Continent, an
unprecedented number for a Japanese Prime Minister.”23 In 2014, Japan
decided to hold the TICAD every three years instead of five. And it would be
held alternately in both Japan and Africa, instead of only in Japan. The Modi
government held the third India-Africa Forum Summit with a far higher format,
bigger scale and richer outcomes.24 Modi announced his SAGAR proposal
during his visit to Seychelles and Mauritius in 2015. In 2016, Modi visited the
African continent, and this was first visit an Indian Prime Minister has paid to
Southeast Africa since 1982.
22 “India-Japan Joint Statement during the Visit of the Indian Prime Minister to Japan,” November 11,
2016, http://mea.gov.in/bilateral-documents.htm?dtl/27599/IndiaJapan+Joint+Statement+during+the+visit+
of+Prime+Minister+to+Japan.
23 Céline Pajon, Japan’s Security Policy in Africa: The Dawn of a Strategic Approach?, Institute français
des relations internationals (Ifri), May 2017, pp. 5-6.
24 The first India-Africa Forum Summit was held in New Delhi in 2008 with only 14 countries’
representatives present. The second India-Africa Forum Summit was held in Addis Ababa, the capital of
Ethiopia and only 15 countries sent officials to attend. The third summit invited 54 countries, among which
leaders of 41 countries participated this event.
Several considerations underlie Japan and India’s upgrade of diplomacy
toward the African continent. First, political interests. Both countries have been
anxious to become permanent members of the United Nations Security Council
by taking advantage of the reform of the United Nations. In this process, African
countries, due to the number of their votes, have a significant effect. The G4,
a four-nation bloc composed of Japan, India, Germany and Brazil, indicated
at a joint press statement after a foreign ministers’ meeting on United Nations
reform in September 2014 that, “Since support from two-thirds of the member
states (129 countries) are necessary for promotion of the reform, the G4 nations
will approach and encourage reform-oriented member states, including African
countries (54 countries).”25 This proposal has been continuously reiterated in
recent G4 foreign ministers’ meetings. Second, economic benefits. Although the
economic performance of African countries is worse than expected due to the
declining price of international bulk commodities and the political turmoil in
West Asia and North Africa, their growth rates are still higher than the global
average. The McKinsey Global Institute, in its 2016 report Lions on the Move
II: Realizing the Potential of Africa’s Economies, pointed out that: “The region
is expected to enjoy the fastest urbanization of any region in the world, and to
have a larger workforce than either India or China by 2034. It also has a huge
opportunity to leverage internet and mobile technology, and still has abundant
resources.”26 Third, it involves security interests. Some African countries have
been faced with the risks of terrorism, corruption and even turmoil. To protect
their overseas interests on the continent, Japan and India, as major active players
in African peacekeeping, have been participating in UN peacekeeping operations
by means of financial and personnel input.
The AAGC serves to realize the policy goals of the two countries toward
Africa. On the one hand, it accords with both the development demands of
Africa and the economic diplomacy of Japan and India toward the continent.
In its Infrastructure System Export Strategy of 2013, Japan announced its
25 “Ministerial-Level Meeting of G4 (Brazil, Germany, India and Japan),” Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/fp/unp/page18e_000104.html.
26 Mckinsey Global Institute, Lions on the Move II: Realizing the Potential of Africa’s Economies,
September 2016, pp. 5-7.
goal to achieve 30 trillion yen in infrastructure-related orders to Japanese
companies by 2020. In his speech at the banquet of the 21st International
Conference on the Future of Asia held in Tokyo in May 2015, Abe expressed
Japan’s intention to “spread high-quality and innovative infrastructure
throughout Asia.”27 Abe further proposed the Expanded Partnership for
Quality Infrastructure at the 2016 G7 Ise-Shima summit, where he pledged
to provide financing of approximately US$200 billion as the target for the
next five years to infrastructure projects across the world, with the targeted
area expanding from Asia to the whole world (e.g. Russia and Africa) and
the scope expanding to a wide range of infrastructure that includes natural
resources and energy (e.g. oil, gas, hospitals).28 In this policy context, the focus
of Japan’s Africa diplomacy has gradually shifted to infrastructure construction
from merely resource exploitation. At the TICAD in 2016, Abe promised
that Japan, for a period of three years from 2016 to 2018, would invest
approximately US$30 billion in Africa under public-private partnerships, with
US$10 billion of the amount to be invested in quality infrastructure.29 India
has also sought to enhance its assistance for Africa’s development projects by
tapping its unique advantages of geographical and interpersonal ties. At the
third India-Africa Forum Summit in 2015, Modi announced that India would
offer concessional credit of US$10 billion over the next five years and a grant
assistance of US$600 million (to include an India-Africa Development Fund
of $100 million).30 The framework for India-Africa strategic cooperation
“Partners in Progress: Towards a Dynamic and Transformative Development
Agenda,” which was adopted at the summit, also emphasized the synergies
27 “The Future of Asia: Be Innovative,” Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Banquet of the
21st International Conference on the Future of Asia, May 21, 2015, https://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/
statement/201505/0521foaspeech.html.
28 The G7 Ise-Shima Summit, “Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure,” http://www.meti.go.jp/
english/press/2016/pdf/0523_01a.pdf.
29 “Address by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Opening Session of the Sixth Tokyo International
Conference on African Development (TICAD VI) ,” August 2, 2016, http://www.mofa.go.jp/afr/af2/
page4e_000496.html.
30 “India-Africa Summit: Read Full Text of PM Narendra Modi’s Speech,” The Times of India, October
29, 2015, https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/India-Africa-summit-Read-full-text-of-PM-Narendra-
Modis-speech/articleshow/49577890.cms.
of shared core objectives as defined in Africa’s Agenda 2063 and the Indian
government’s development priorities.31
On the other hand, the AAGC is conducive to reinforcing the
complementary advantages of Japan and India’s policy resources. With a large
number of expatriates in Africa, India has particularly prominent influence in
the politics and economy of island countries in the western Indian Ocean, 68
percent of the Mauritian people are of Indian origin, and the approximately
2.8 million Indian people now living on the African continent have greatly
facilitated Indian enterprises’ interpersonal network building and integration
into the local society.32 Among the entrepreneurs of Indian descent in Africa,
the percentages of those with Indian and African nationalities are respectively
45 percent and 48 percent, while the proportions of those with Chinese and
African nationalities, among the businessmen of Chinese origin in Africa, are
respectively 93 percent and 4 percent, which shows the former’s high level of
integration into local society. Japan, despite its financial and technological
advantages, lacks an understanding of Africa’s cultural environment and
market operations. Although as early as 2010, Japan and India established
a dialogue mechanism on Africa-related issues, which has since become an
important platform for the two countries to coordinate their Africa policies.
In the Vision Document for the AAGC, the complementary role of India and
Japan is specifically discussed. For example, India, through the Pan Africa
e-Network and the India-Africa Forum Summit, has a comparative edge
in capacity building and developing a structured engagement with Africa,
but its development partnerships in Africa are confronting the challenges of
resource constraints. Japan, meanwhile, has expertise in capital, technology,
management, and R&D.33
China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific region has triggered
31 “Partners in Progress: Towards a Dynamic and Transformative Development Agenda, India-
Africa Framework for Strategic Cooperation,” October 29, 2015, http://www.mea.gov.in/Uploads/
PublicationDocs/25981_framework.pdf.
32 Harry G. Broadman, Africa’s Silk Road: China and India’s New Economic Frontier, Washington, DC:
World Bank, 2007, p.23, https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/handle/10986/7186.
Document, pp. 5-6.
Japan and India’s strategic anxiety and catalyzed their joint promotion
of the AAGC. Since China proposed the Belt and Road Initiative in 2013,
China’s strategic interests and clout in the Indo-Pacific region have witnessed
steady progress, which is manifested in the growing number of countries
which are participating in and benefiting from Belt and Road projects, and
their understanding of and support for a series of concepts and mechanisms
promoted by China. In this context, Japan and India’s strategic anxiety toward
China has intensified, fearing that the latter will destabilize the existing
regional order. Over the past few years, both Japan and India have put
forward some initiatives separately to offset China’s Belt and Road, claiming
to provide regional countries with alternative choices besides the Chinese
one. For example, the Partnership for Quality Infrastructure is the Japanese
government’s response to what it considers China’s one-sided emphasis on
quantity at the expense of quality in infrastructure investment, an approach
that in Japan’s opinion has mired the recipient countries in debt. Under the
initiative, Japan has been competing with China for infrastructure projects. In
addition, Japan has also touted the so-called “rule of law at sea” and proposed
a “rules-based maritime order,” criticizing China’s “assertive” maritime
security policies. India has similarly put forward the Monsoon Project and
the Sagarmala Project, and raised concerns about, even objections to, China’s
port construction in Sri Lanka, its free trade negotiations with the Maldives
and especially the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor, among other Belt and
Road projects. At the same time, India has been investing more efforts into
the revival of the identity and community of the Indian Ocean,34 in order
to consolidate its dominance in the region. In the eyes of the US scholar J.
Berkshire Miller, “One reason the two countries are coming together is a
common strategic anxiety about China’s rise, particularly its foreign policy
ambitions in Asia. For them, Beijing’s maritime assertiveness in the East and
South China Seas, as well as the Indian Ocean region, and its push to expand
34 Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, “Foreign Secretary’s Address to the Indian
Ocean Conference,” September 1, 2017, http://mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/28909/
Foreign+Secretarys+Address+to+the+Indian+Ocean+Conference+Colombo.
its geopolitical influence beyond East Asia through its Belt and Road Initiative
and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank are particularly alarming. India and
Japan, in response, have come to share a sense of purpose in promoting the
current order in the region, which is based on transparent institutions, good
governance, and international law and benefits them by ensuring secure supply
chains and fair access to resources.”35
Even though the governments of Japan and India do not and will not
explicitly claim that the AAGC is targeted at China, a look at the interactions
between the two countries in recent years shows that China is an important
factor in Japan and India’s considerations when promoting the AAGC. First,
their shared concerns about the rise of China have accelerated their cooperation.
Out of fear that China will challenge the existing order and anxiety that the
United States’ capability and commitment to safeguarding the regional order
is at stake, Japan and India, as two major powers in the Indo-Pacific, have
reinforced their cooperation against China. “The rise of China is considered by
Japanese policymakers as presenting the greatest systemic challenge the country
faces in the coming years … China is thus a structural factor in Japanese foreign
policy, even when considering its diplomacy vis-à-vis Africa.”36 Take the 2016
TICAD, for example. Unsatisfied with some African countries that had lent
support to China’s position on the South China Sea issue, Japan promoted the
incorporation of “maintaining a rules-based maritime order in accordance with
the principles of international law” into the TICAD VI Nairobi Declaration. 37
Second, Japan and India intend to shape the AAGC to rival the Belt and Road
Initiative. Although similar considerations to offset the influence of the Chinese
initiative also underlie the multiple proposals the two countries launched in
previous years, the Belt and Road has greatly advanced, independent of Japan
and India’s will, and gained increasingly broader international attraction. Given
35 J. Berkshire Miller, “How Abe and Modi Can Save the Indo-Pacific: Asia’s Most Strategic Friendship,”
Foreign Affairs, November 15, 2017, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/japan/2017-11-15/how-abe-
and-modi-can-save-indo-pacific.
36 Céline Pajon, Japan’s Security Policy in Africa: The Dawn of a Strategic Approach? p.10.
37 “Advancing Africa’s Sustainable Development Agenda: TICAD Partnership for Prosperity,” TICAD
VI Nairobi Declaration, August 28, 2016, http://www.mofa.go.jp/af/af1/page3e_000543.html.
this, the two countries hope to integrate their comparative advantages and offer
regional countries an alternative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative.
Prospects and Implications of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor
The specific design of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor and detailed

measures for its implementation are yet to be released, but despite various
obstacles that lie ahead, the AAGC is bound to advance in the long term and
impact on China’s Belt and Road Initiative to a certain extent.
The possibility of the AAGC’s final materialization, characterized
by a model of “led by Japan and India and joined by the rest,” cannot
be underestimated. As mentioned earlier, there are profound geo-political
and geo-economic drivers for the two countries to promote the AAGC. Both
Japan and India, in a period of strongman leadership, have great enthusiasm
for advancing their external strategies. Particularly since China is successfully
advancing and further developing its Belt and Road Initiative, they have felt
increasingly great pressure and thus set high expectations for the AAGC,
which they hope will rival and undercut China’s Belt and Road. In the first
half of 2017, the Research and Information System for Developing Countries
(RIS), the Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA)
and the Institute of Developing Economies of the Japan External Trade
Organization (IDE-JETRO), conducted a feasibility study for the AAGC
under the sponsorship of India’s External Affairs Ministry and Japan’s Ministry
of Economy, Trade and Industry. The thinks tanks held two Track 1.5
roundtables on the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor and Asia-Africa connectivity
in January and April 2017, respectively in New Delhi and Jakarta, and
scholars from South Africa, Mozambique, Singapore and Australia attended
the second conference. The vision document was unveiled at the annual
meetings of African Development Bank in late May 2017. During Japanese
Prime Minister Shinzo Abe’s visit to India in September, the India-Japan
Economic Forum was held, during which there was a session to discuss the
AAGC Vision Document and India-Japan cooperation. It is obvious that
relevant research on the AAGC is in progress and the AAGC has become a key
issue for the two governments.
In addition, more countries are likely to participate in the initiative. Apart
from India and Japan, South Africa, Mozambique, Indonesia, Singapore and
Australia sent representatives for the consultation process on the Document.38
Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi also chose such multilateral occasions as
the African Development Bank Annual Meetings to announce the AAGC and test
the water. Moreover, given US President Donald Trump reiterated Japan’s proposal
of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” in November 2017, and the harsh criticism of
China in the new US National Security Strategy is consistent with Japan and
India’s concerns, the US will encourage the two countries to advance the initiative
even in the absence of active participation. In fact, the US has been seeking to
spare its commitment to regional affairs and realize its objective of “America
First” by pushing in-depth strategic cooperation among Indo-Pacific countries
(especially Japan and India). For the countries along the routes, the AAGC gives
them more development opportunities and more flexible policy options, and thus
there is no need to oppose such an initiative. Furthermore, the several influential
regional platforms (such as the Asian Development Bank and the Indian Ocean
Rim Association) will facilitate the implementation of the AAGC.
While the AAGC is intended to compete with the Belt and Road, the
possibility of cooperation cannot be ruled out. As concerns about China are
an important driver of the AAGC, the advance of the initiative will inevitably
have competitive effects on China. Despite China’s reiterations it is committed
to a path of peaceful development, as well as its commitment to fostering a new
type of international relations and building a community with a shared future
for mankind, which was delivered at the 19th CPC National Congress, the
Japanese and Indian governments have not given any positive response. The
perception of China challenging the existing international order has become a
strategic consensus for the two countries. In Japan’s opinion, “China’s economic
38 Neha Sinha, “Asia- Africa Growth Corridor: Can It Be a Game Changer?” Vivekananda International
Foundation, June 5, 2017, http://www.vifindia.org/article/2017/june/05/asia-africa-growth-corridor-can-it-
be-a-game-changer.
expansion in Africa is advancing at the expense of human rights and good
governance, and is used to gather support for Beijing’s core interests (from
cross-Straits relations to expansion in the South China Sea) and revisionist
international agenda.”39 Therefore, the AAGC, which provides an alternative
to hedge against the Belt and Road, will not be easily abandoned by the two
countries. The United States, while actively encouraging closer Japan-India
relations, has also criticized China in its new National Security Strategy: “China
is using economic inducements and penalties, influence operations, and implied
military threats to persuade other states to heed its political and security agenda.
China’s infrastructure investments and trade strategies reinforce its geopolitical
aspirations.”40
The AAGC is likely to collide with some Belt and Road projects in its
implementation. Since Japan launched its Partnership for Quality Infrastructure,
it has been competing with China on infrastructure projects in Southeast Asia.
In practical terms, this has had negative effects on some Chinese projects.
Similarly, India has also been interfering with and obstructing China’s Belt
and Road projects in South Asia by wielding its influence on its South Asian
neighbors (such as Sri Lanka and Nepal), causing some of the projects to be
delayed or even suspended. Provided Japan and India are able to integrate their
respective policy resources and comparative advantages, they will be a potent
competitor for China for regional development projects.
That being said, the possibility of cooperation between the AAGC and
the Belt and Road Initiative cannot be simply ruled out. First, the geographical
coverage and the scope of the two initiatives largely overlap. The possibility
exists for China, Japan and India to jointly advance some development projects,
especially in low-sensitivity areas that concern people’s livelihoods, such as
agriculture, medicine and disaster relief. Second, without appropriate guidance,
the competition or even antagonism between the two initiatives is not in the
interests of both sides. A recent Kyodo News report, citing officials from the
39 Céline Pajon, Japan’s Security Policy in Africa: The Dawn of a Strategic Approach? p.10.
40 The White House, Céline Pajon, Japan’s Security Policy in Africa: The Dawn of a Strategic Approach?
p.10. National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p.46.
Japanese government, revealed that Prime Minister Abe considers it an urgency
to improve relations with China. Abe, according to the report, has basically
decided to connect and advance its free and open Indo-Pacific strategy with
China’s Belt and Road concept.41 The same goes for China. If it could cooperate
with Japan and India, the two significant powers in the region, the Belt and
Road could be more effectively realized.
With multiple obstacles ahead, the AAGC will not advance smoothly.
First, there is difficulty with policy integration between Japan and India.
Despite intensified bilateral strategic coordination, the two countries are still
at odds in many areas. For example, during the first Australia-India-Japan-US
Consultations on the Indo-Pacific on November 12, 2017, there was a slight
difference in the statements released by the four countries. The Indian statement
did not mention freedom of navigation as did those of the United States, Japan
and Australia, and modified the concept of free and open Indo-Pacific into “a
free, open, prosperous and inclusive Indo-Pacific region.”42
Second, the capital needed for the AAGC construction is strained. In
Japan, the budget for the Official Development Assistance (ODA) in 2015
witnessed a decline for the 16th consecutive year. Although the spending
picked up again in 2016 and 2017, the amount was still less than half the
level in 1997. Considering the investment for infrastructure, with an annual
quota of approximately US$13 billion prior to 2015, is only one of the core
operations for the Asian Development Bank, the capital available falls far
short of the global demands for infrastructure.43 Therefore, financial input
from the private sector will be needed besides governmental investment and
41 “Abe Changes China Strategy, Considers Connection with the Belt and Road,” Kyodo News, December
18, 2017, http://china.kyodonews.net/news/2017/12/7d748322b8b0--.html.
42 “India-Australia-Japan-U.S. Consultations on Indo-Pacific,” Ministry of External Affairs, Government
of India, http://mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm?dtl/29110/IndiaAustraliaJapanUS_Consultations_on_
IndoPacific_November_12_2017; “Australia-India-Japan-U.S. Consultations on the Indo-Pacific,” Ministry
of Foreign Affairs of Japan, http://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_001789.html; “Australia-India-
Japan-U.S. Consultations on the Indo-Pacific,” U.S. Department of State, https://www.state.gov/r/pa/
prs/ps/2017/11/275464.htm; “Australia-India-Japan-United States consultations on the Indo-Pacific,”
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Government, http://dfat.gov.au/news/media/Pages/aus-
india-japan-us-consultations-on-the-indo-pacific.aspx.
43 Meng Xiaoxu, “Partnership for Quality Infrastructure: The Japanese Initiative and Its Prospects,”
International Studies, No.3, 2017, p.83.
aid. However, given the long cycle and low rate of return of infrastructure
investment, as well as the strong risk-averse preference of Japanese enterprises,
it remains uncertain how much private capital will be attracted to the AAGC in
the future.
Last but not least, the coordination with other countries could also be a
bottleneck for the AAGC. The first requirement is to win support from the
United States. Looking back on the evolution of Japan-India relations, the
two countries’ closer engagement is inseparable from the encouragement of
the United States.44 While promoting Japan-India cooperation, the Trump
administration has criticized in the new National Security Strategy that “Some
Chinese practices undermine Africa’s long-term development by corrupting
elites, dominating extractive industries, and locking countries into unsustainable
and opaque debts and commitments.”45 However, the document did not
mention in the part concerning its Africa strategy how and to what extent the
United States will participate in the AAGC. The second is to defuse China’s
misgivings. With extensive interests on the African continent, China plays an
important role in the broader Indo-Pacific region. Take direct investment for
example. While the direct investment of Japan and India to Africa from 2009
to 2014 increased by 74.6 percent and 25 percent to reach US$10 billion and
US$15 billion respectively, China’s input during the same period skyrocketed by
255.6 percent, hitting US$32 billion.46 Given this, it is unlikely Japan and India
will be able to advance the AAGC without any consideration of China, and it
is also in the two countries’ interests to avoid vicious competition with China.
The third is to overcome investment risks in the host countries. The majority
of Asian and African nations are developing countries, among which quite a
few are blighted by corruption, terrorism and political turmoil. All these have
added to the difficulty incentivizing Japanese and Indian private enterprises to
44 Thomas F. Lynch III and James J. Przystup, “India-Japan Strategic Cooperation and Implications
for U.S. Strategy in the Indo-Asia-Pacific Region,” Strategic Perspectives, No. 24, Center for Strategic
Research, Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, 2014, pp.5-6.
45 The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, p.52.
46 John Aglionby and Leo Lewis, “Japan Looks to Boost Trade with Africa,” Financial Times, August 26,
2016, https://www.ft.com/content/89e0c824-6ac4-11e6-a0b1-d87a9fea034f.
participate in the AAGC.
Conclusion
The AAGC is becoming a major pivot for Japan-India strategic cooperation in

Asia and Africa. Looking at the diplomatic adjustments of the two countries in
recent years, the AAGC is far from simply an economic initiative, but a specific
reflection of strengthened bilateral strategic coordination in the region. Even
in the absence of an explicit and detailed implementation blueprint, Japan and
India have invested enough political commitment and institutional preparations
for the launching and advancing of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor, which
is manifested in the Japan-India Dialogue on Africa and the bilateral Special
Strategic and Global Partnership, the India-Africa Forum Summit and India’s
Act East strategy, the Tokyo International Conference on African Development,
the Expanded Partnership for Quality Infrastructure and Japan’s strategy for a
“free and open Indo-Pacific.” Particularly, as the United States has adopted
Japan’s proposal of a “free and open Indo-Pacific” and encouraged India to be
a stronger strategic and defense partner, the cooperation between Japan and
India on the strategic level will be given new impetus. Even though the specific
planning for the AAGC has not yet been unveiled, and despite the multiple
risks and challenges its implementation might encounter, the two countries’
determination to advance the initiative will hardly be reversed.
While the competitive effects of the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor on
the Belt and Road should not be underestimated, China should avoid a zero-
sum mentality. On the contrary, it is necessary for China to closely follow
the progress of the AAGC and the relevant consultations among the United
States, Japan, India and Australia, so it can more actively enhance its policy
communication with Japan and India, publicly voice its own concerns, and
explore the possibility of cooperation between the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor
and the Belt and Road Initiative.
The Belt and Road Initiative and
China-Japan Economic Cooperation
Jiang Yuechun
T
he China-proposed Belt and Road Initiative, viewed as a “grand
chorus” of international economic and trade cooperation, is
increasingly recognized and participated in by the international
community. Japan is China’s close neighbor and an important economic
partner. Trying to find converging areas in the Belt and Road construction
in order to expand the space of bilateral economic and trade cooperation is
critical to the healthy development of bilateral relations, and will contribute
to the economic integration of the Asia-Pacific region.
Belt and Road Injecting Vigor into World Economic Growth
Finding new growth areas for global economy

The year 2018 marks 10 years since the outbreak of the international
financial crisis. The US-led Western economies have shown signs of recovery
to various degrees, but the overall performance has not yet reached the pre-
crisis level. For the emerging economies, as they are undertaking structural
adjustments, it is rather hard for them in the foreseeable future to maintain
the high growth rates they have achieved until now. The global economy
is experiencing a slow recovery. Given this context, the China-proposed
Belt and Road Initiative, as an open “grand chorus,” is very likely to inject
fresh impetus to the recovery and development of the world economy. The
Jiang Yuechun is Senior Research Fellow and Director of the Department for World Economy and
Development, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS).
The Belt and Road Initiative and China-Japan Economic Cooperation March/April 2018 153
Initiative, which originated in China, spans across Central Asia, Southeast
Asia, South Asia, West Asia and even parts of Europe. The countries
along the Belt and Road are mostly emerging economies and developing
countries with a population of around 4.4 billion and a total economic
output of US$21 trillion, accounting for 63% of the world population
and 29% of global economic output respectively.1 The countries along
the Belt and Road are different in economic conditions and development
levels, but their economies are complementary to each other. The initiative,
which is motivated by the five major goals of policy coordination, facilities
connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration and people-to-people
bonds, has received recognition and positive response from the majority
of the countries concerned. The Belt and Road will not only help China
and other participants bring their comparative advantages into full play
and carry out fruitful economic cooperation, it will also promote within
the region the orderly movement of all factors of production and efficient
allocation of resources. After four years’ operation and development, the
Initiative has made remarkable progress and acquired recognition from even
more countries. In particular, the US and Japan, who were skeptical at the
beginning, have since 2016 begun to change their minds. The two countries,
in addition to sending representatives to the Belt and Road Forum for
International Cooperation in May 2017, have expressed a positive intention
to participate in the Belt and Road Initiative. Therefore it can be asserted
that the Belt and Road Initiative will inject new vigor into the prosperity and
development of the Eurasian continent. Not only will it present a unique
historic possibility to the Eurasian countries, it will also likely usher more
than 60% of world population into unprecedented cohesion and prosperity.
Facilitating worldwide infrastructure construction

Connectivity is the top priority in the Belt and Road Initiative, and
an important growth area for driving the recovery of the world economy
1 “China’s Belt and Road Initiative Helps World Economy Overcome Difficulties,” March 2, 2015, http://
www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-03/02/content_2823962.htm.
154 China International Studies The Belt and Road Initiative and China-Japan Economic Cooperation
prior to the onset of a new technological revolution. Take Asia, one area
with the fastest economic growth, for example. All countries in the region
are now vigorously moving forward with industrialization and urbanization.
Infrastructure is an integral part in this process and will play an indispensable
role. However, the infrastructure in Asia is rather underdeveloped and is
the major bottleneck for economic growth in some countries. Despite the
downturn of the world economy in recent years, infrastructure construction
is still undergoing a period of accelerated development. According to a
report entitled Meeting Asia’s Infrastructure Needs published by the Asian
Development Bank in early 2017, Asia will need at least US$1.7 trillion
of investment in infrastructure per year until 2030 to maintain its growth
momentum.2 In addition, there is a demand for around US$300 billion
for regional infrastructure construction every year. The IMF also indicated
that the whole world is advancing investment in infrastructure, which will
increase total demand in the short term and improve labor productivity
in the long term. McKinsey & Company pointed out that from 2013 to
2030 the demand for infrastructure investment will be US$5.7 billion,
which is 60% more than the total demand in the past 18 years. Along
with the launch and progress of the Belt and Road construction, hard
infrastructure in Eurasia and the world at large, such as railways, highways,
airports, ports, will be seamlessly connected, forming a three-dimensional
and comprehensive transport network which will offer convenient and fast
circulation for regional trade. In addition, by developing in the direction
of the abovementioned five major goals, various countries will have similar
procedures in the realm of economic policies, port operation, customs,
inspection and quarantine, and trade and investment will become more
convenient. Meanwhile, the increasing people-to-people exchanges among
various countries in education, science and technology, culture, tourism,
business, etc., will help promote the formation and steady development of a
slew of economic zones and corridors in this area.
2 Asian Development Bank, Meeting Asia’s Infrastructure Needs, https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/

publication/227496/special-report-infrastructure.pdf.
Representing new trends in regional economic cooperation
Since the beginning of the 21st century, economic globalization and
regional economic integration have undergone robust development. Various
conceptions about economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region have
sprung up one after another, among which, the Asia-Pacific Economic
Cooperation (APEC) is the one that has the largest scope and the longest
duration of cooperation. At the moment, the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)
and the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) are the two
regional economic cooperation conceptions which have attracted the most
attention. The two economic and trade arrangements, known for “high
threshold” and “high standards,” are creating exclusive economic and trade
cooperation blocs, setting new rules for international trade and investment,
and gaining a favorable position in the transformation of world trade and
investment, which will undoubtedly pose fresh challenges and threats to the
economic development of emerging countries. The Belt and Road Initiative
adopts an economic cooperation mode which is totally different from the TPP
and TTIP arrangements. First, based on the principles of wide consultation,
joint contribution and shared benefits, the Initiative will neither set exclusive
standards and rules, nor limit countries and zones, let alone form a closed
bloc. All countries and economies can participate in it if they so wish. As a
China-initiated win-win international cooperation mechanism with great
inclusiveness, it advocates feasible economic cooperation between different
nations, different cultures, and countries with different levels of development,
expands effective links with Eurasian markets, and boosts the development
of diversified economies. Second, it emphasizes the win-win concept based
on equality and cooperation. Adhering to the win-win partnership idea of
peace, openness, mutual learning and mutual benefits, and based on policy
coordination, facilities connectivity, unimpeded trade, financial integration
and people-to-people bonds, the Belt and Road Initiative comprehensively
promotes pragmatic cooperation to forge an open and win-win regional
community featuring mutual political trust, economic integration and
cultural inclusiveness. It respects other countries’ independent choices of
path and development mode as well as strengthens the dialogue between
different civilizations for the sake of realizing mutual compatibility and joint
development. Therefore, as a new regional cooperation mode, the Belt and
Road Initiative has some similarities, but more differences, with other kinds of
cooperation modes in today’s world.
Strengthened China-Japan Economic Cooperation in Bilateral

and Multilateral Interests
Healthy and steady economic and trade cooperation is conducive to the

interests of China and Japan who have long been important economic and
trade partners. Since the establishment of diplomatic ties, the economic and
trade cooperation between the two countries has become ever closer and
deeper, with the volume of trade expanding 340 times in 40 years, from US$1
billion in 1972 to US$3.428 trillion in 2011. However, Japan’s unilateral
declaration of the nationalization of the Diaoyu Islands in 2012 has strained
bilateral relations, and the economic and trade relations have been seriously
affected as a result. China-Japan trade and investment underwent a constant
decline until the end of 2016. Benefiting from the slow recovery of the world
economy, the bilateral trade and investment started to rebound in 2017,
in particular, China’s direct investment in Japan witnessing a robust growth.
Therefore, enhancing economic and trade cooperation is in the interests of the
two countries and is also a reasonable result of their economic interdependence.
Strong economic complementarity between China and Japan

China and Japan are in different development stages and have different
economic structures, which creates broad cooperation prospects for the
two countries. Owing to the high-speed growth of the Chinese economy,
some industries have become competitors of Japanese industries. However,
Japan possesses unique advantages in many industries. As there is a certain
complementarity between the two economies, there is a bright prospect
for Chinese investment in Japan. The two sides have great potential for
cooperation in services, new energy, low-carbon technology, etc. At a time
when China and Japan are undergoing a new industrial transformation and
economic structural adjustment, mutually beneficial economic and trade
cooperation will certainly facilitate these efforts.
Currently, China is vigorously implementing energy conservation
and emissions reduction, and promoting the upgrade of its industries.
The emphasis is placed on developing the industries in areas such as energy
conservation, environmental protection, new energy utilization, medicine,
medical equipment, and intelligent transportation. Japan holds a leading
position in most of these areas. To be specific, Japan has an edge in ecological
industries like haze control, climate change, biodiversity protection, sand
storms mitigation, mercury contamination and marine litter, as well as in
technical fields like energy conservation and emissions reduction in automobile
engines. Japan is also experienced in municipal administration fields, such
as urban public transportation and subway operation. Enhancing mutually
beneficial cooperation between China and Japan in new areas is conducive
to the economic development of the two countries, and the progress of
bilateral relations. It’s worthwhile to note that there is a huge potential for
agricultural cooperation. Japan is the world’s largest importer of food, with its
imports accounting for one-tenth of world agricultural trade volume. Many
unfavorable factors, such as the limited land resources, difficulties in adopting
agricultural machinery in large-scale agricultural production and expanding the
size of farms, have contributed to Japan’s low self-sufficiency rate in food of
40%, far below the world’s average. China has a vast territory, rich resources
and widespread production areas, and is able to produce all kinds of high-
quality agricultural products. Moreover, the low prices and abundant supply
make China one of the largest exporters of agricultural products in the world.
China’s rise an opportunity for Japan’s economic development

The Japanese economy has not yet recovered from the aftermath of the
international financial crisis, and even “Abenomics” has not achieved the
hoped-for results in stimulating economic growth. In effect, all countries
and regions have their own cycles of economic development. If the 1960s
was regarded as Japan’s youth with bursting vitality, then it came to energetic
maturity in the 1980s, and started to show signs of old age when it entered
into the 21th century. China is now in its prime of life with great potential
for economic growth. As an export-dependent country, Japan is heavily
reliant on the European and US markets, but the increasing facts in recent
years suggest that China can no longer be ignored. China is pushing for
rapid marketization, and is implementing a Western development strategy
and increasing its urbanization. All this will provide Japanese corporations
with more business opportunities, and inject new vitality into the Japanese
economy. A Japanese research institute estimates that by 2026, Japan’s trade
with China will increase to 35% of its total trade, and by that time China may
have overtaken the United States to be the world’s largest economy. According
to a report released by Nomura Equity Research, a one percentage decline in
China’s GDP growth will effect a 0.5 percentage fall of Japanese economic
growth, and further effect a possible decrease by 4% in the recurring profit
of Japan’s large non-financial corporations. It is worth mentioning that,
although Prime Minister Abe has adopted, since he began his second term, a
strategic adjustment in his China policy featuring suppression, containment,
and confrontation, he has not denied the importance of bilateral economic
relations. At a symposium held in April 2015, he highlighted that China’s
economic growth means an opportunity for Japan and for the world. In May
2015, before the Vice President of the Liberal Democratic Party Masahiko
Koumura visited China, Abe asked him to convey his expectation of resuming
the China-Japan strategic relationship of mutual benefit which is aimed at
expanding the two countries’ common interests. When meeting with Chinese
President Xi Jinping, on the sidelines of the G20 Hamburg summit in July
2017, Abe expressed the wish to strengthen high-level exchanges and set up
mechanisms to deepen cooperation in the fields of trade, finance, tourism etc.,
and to explore collaboration under the Belt and Road Initiative.3
3 “Xi, Abe Meet on Ties, Reaffirm Readiness to Strengthen China-Japan Partnership,” July 8, 2017, http://
chinaplus.cri.cn/news/politics/11/20170708/8187.html.
China needs time to catch up with Japan
Despite the fact that China has left Japan far behind in total output,
there still exists quite a big gap in their overall economic strength. In 2016,
China’s GDP approached US$11 trillion, and Japan’s GDP was US$4.38
trillion. However, Japan’s per capita GDP was US$38,917.29, ranking
22nd in the world, while China ranked 74th with its per capita GDP of
US$8,113.26. In fact, the total output should not be viewed as the sole
indicator of a country’s overall strength. More indicators such as technical
strength, high-end industrial manufacturing capability, enterprise innovation
capability, energy consumption of per capita GDP and soft power, should
also be considered. China is taking the lead in some areas like spaceflight,
but it is undeniable that there is a gap to be bridged in management and
in some other industries. For example, the powerful industrial strength and
manufacturing capability has become Japan’s trump card, and the highly
automated manufacturing industry makes Japan the world’s largest country
in producing machinery and industrial robots. Through innovative structural
adjustments in recent years, the Japanese corporations still firmly hold the
commanding heights of world industrial technology and maintain control
over the global industry chain in many areas. Take the electronic industry for
example. Japanese corporations are expanding and transforming from B2C
to B2B. In 2016, Japan had 45,220 patents, just next to the United States
which had 56,440 patents, but in terms of quality, Japan possessed an 80%
proportion of core technology patents, which was number one in the world.
What’s more, Japan’s patent authorization rate reached 80%, indicating the
high quality of its patent applications.
Furthermore, it is crucial to strengthen China-Japan economic and
trade ties in the perspective of promoting Asia-Pacific economic cooperation.
Currently, the world economy is undergoing profound structural changes,
and the regionalization undertaken by the US and Europe is accelerating.
Economic integration is also vigorously unfolding in the Asia-Pacific region
where China and Japan are located. China and Japan, as the world’s second
and third largest economies, will certainly play critical roles in Asia’s economic
integration. The bilateral cooperation will not only raise Asia’s ability to fight
against external economic risks, but will also determine whether economic
integration can make decisive progress in East Asia and the broader Asia-
Pacific region. China, Japan and Korea rank 2nd, 3rd and 14th in the list of
economies in terms of GDP, and the aggregate GDP of the three countries
is around US$15 trillion, comprising 20%
of the world’s GDP and 90% of East Asia’s The crux of East Asian
GDP. Nevertheless, the internal trade economic integration lies in
of the three East Asian countries only the success of Northeast Asian
accounts for 19.2% of their total foreign regional cooperation which
trade. It is clear that the complementarities includes both China and Japan.
of these three countries have not been
given full play. Therefore, East Asian economic development and integration
rest on the cooperation among China, Japan and Korea. It can be assumed
that the crux of East Asian economic integration lies in the success of
Northeast Asian regional cooperation which includes both China and Japan.
Belt and Road: New Platform for China-Japan Cooperation
The Belt and Road Initiative is not a closed entity but an open and inclusive
initiative for economic cooperation irrespective of country or region. All
countries and economies who wish to take part could join. The purpose of
the Belt and Road is to seek common ground while shelving differences, and
pursue peaceful co-existence and common prosperity. As a major country in
Northeast Asia, Japan is an important economic partner of China and the
two sides enjoy close economic and trade ties. China and Japan can identify
priority areas for economic cooperation in third markets, based on each
other’s practical needs in internal and external development.
No limitation on geographical scope under Belt and Road

The Belt and Road emphasizes synergy with development strategies of
countries along the Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st Century Maritime
Silk Road. At the same time, the Belt and Road advocates the concepts
of open and non-exclusive cooperation, which indicates no limitation
on geographical scope. Synergies between the Belt and Road and other
countries’ development strategies are composed on two levels. First, synergy
at the bilateral level, represented by that between the Belt and Road Initiative
and the Eurasian Economic Union. During President Xi’s state visit to Russia
in May 2015, China and Russia signed a Joint Statement on Cooperation on
the Construction of Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Projects.4
According to the statement, both sides will endeavor to maximize the synergy
between the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Eurasian Economic Union,
ensure steady and sustainable economic development in the region, enhance
regional economic integration and uphold regional peace and development.
Both sides will support launching a dialogue mechanism on the synergy of
the Silk Road Economic Belt and Eurasian economic integration. With the
participation of experts from the two countries, both sides will also hold
discussions to strengthen coordination in exploring common economic
space. Besides, China has pursued the synergy of the Belt and Road Initiative
with other countries’ development strategies, such as Mongolia’s Prairie
Road, Kazakhstan’s new economic policy of “Nurly Zhol” or Bright Path, the
United Kingdom’s Northern Powerhouse, and Poland’s Amber Road, etc.
Second, synergy at the multilateral level. This entails extending
bilateral agreements to multilateral areas so that policy coordination and
regional cooperation can be conducted at multilateral levels and a new
path toward multilateral cooperation might take shape. For example,
under the framework of the Belt and Road, relevant countries can enhance
cooperation in a third market or make joint bidding on some projects in a
third country. By taking advantage of new international financial institutions
such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB), the Belt and Road
4 “Joint Statement on Cooperation on the Construction of Joint Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk
Road Projects,” May 8, 2015, http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/The-Belt-and-
Road-Initiative/Joint-Statement-on-Cooperation-on-the-Construction-of-Joint-Eurasian-Economic-Union-
and-the-Silk-Road-Projects/obor/en/1/1X000000/1X0A3ABV.htm.
may strengthen financial cooperation with other countries or international
organizations such as the US and the EU. Through the cooperation among
China, Russia and Central Asian countries on raw material supply, relevant
countries can jointly build a cross-regional value chain, a financing chain and
an industrial cooperation chain. A win-win result can thus be achieved.
AIIB: a new platform for China-Japan cooperation

On January 16, 2016, the AIIB was officially launched in Beijing
with 57 founding members, among which 37 are Asian countries and 20
are from Oceania, Europe, Latin America and Africa. By the end of 2017,
the number of AIIB members reached 84 and exceeded that of the Asian
Development Bank led by Japan and the US, which stands at 67. As an
important financial platform to support the Belt and Road Initiative, the AIIB
attempts to diversify financing channels for projects along the Belt and Road
and strengthen public-private partnership construction. Through the open
multilateral financial institutions represented by the AIIB, China, with the
Belt and Road countries, will establish a tripartite operating mechanism led
by infrastructure connectivity, highlighted by flagship projects, and supported
by financial platforms. A better and faster development in Asia can thus be
realized. An all-round connectivity through infrastructure improvement
will be the core of future investment. The first priority is to build three-
dimensional transport corridors covering railroads, highways, aviation and
waterborne transport. The second is to establish an energy network covering
oil and gas transmission, hydropower, coal power, solar energy and wind
power, etc. The third is to establish an information integration network
composed of telecommunications, broadband and internet. For countries with
high savings rates, joining the AIIB will help improve capital utilization and
realize efficient capital allocation by guiding deposit funding to infrastructure.
By providing new investment opportunities, the AIIB will also help boost
economic growth and cope with problems such as unemployment. Besides,
the AIIB will realize connectivity more effectively so that members can
reinforce their diplomatic relations.
On June 6, 2015, China and Japan held their fifth finance dialogue in
Beijing after delay of more than three years. A joint statement was released after
the meeting, saying that the dialogue “helps further deepen bilateral pragmatic
cooperation in finance.” There have been long-standing disputes within Japan
regarding the AIIB. On Asian infrastructure construction, disparities still
exist between Japan, an advocate of high-quality infrastructure, and China,
which is trying to promote fast construction of infrastructure at a low cost.
Japan’s former Finance Minister Hirohisa Fujii affirmed the positive effect of
infrastructure and some experts called on the Japanese government to join the
AIIB as soon as possible so as to make concerted efforts with other countries
and regions in promoting development of Asian economies. But Japanese
officials continued to express a cautious attitude towards the AIIB. On May
21, 2015, Prime Minister Shinzo Abe announced a new plan to provide about
US$110 billion in aid for spreading high-quality infrastructure throughout
Asia over five years. The Japanese funds are regarded as a counter to the AIIB.
China has repeatedly expressed that the AIIB is open to Japan and invited
Japan to join as a founding member with offers of positions of vice president
and one director exclusively for Japan. But for now China’s willingness to
cooperate has received no response. With the operation of AIIB and the
normalization of bilateral relations, it is believed that China and Japan will
identify areas where cooperation can be enhanced under the AIIB.
Belt and Road providing business opportunities for Japan

Economic relations are a critical part of China-Japan bilateral
relations. Since Abe took office, Japan’s trade with China has grown
moderately, and was exceeded by China-Korea trade in the first half of
2015. In the Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt
and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road,5 China emphasizes that the Belt and
Road should be jointly built through consultation to meet the interests of
5 “Vision and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk
Road”, Xinhua, March 28, 2015, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/bilingual/2015-03/28/c_134105922.
htm.
all, and efforts should be made to integrate the development strategies of
countries along the Belt and Road. China also stresses the openness of the
initiative and welcomes the participation of countries from other regions.
One typical example is the United Kingdom’s participation in the Belt and
Road projects.
China and Japan are major
economies in the age of globalization.
The industrial restructuring
Severely weakening bilateral economic
processes in both China
and trade ties serves the interests of
and Japan will be boosted
neither side. First, as export-oriented
if the two countries can go
economies, China and Japan are global together to explore
suffering from a lag in exports due to third markets, based on
sluggish world economy. Infrastructure the combination of Japan’s
connectivity under the Belt and Road advanced technologies and
will explore more space and increase the China’s cost-effective industrial
efficiency of bilateral trade between the capacity.
two countries. For example, about 30%
of the cargoes in a logistics base jointly built by China and Kazakhstan
under the Belt and Road are auto parts and electronic components from
Japan. The logistics base will benefit Japanese companies by reducing
transportation time from 3 weeks or so to just a few days. Second, China
and Japan can explore the possibilities of cooperation in a third country.
For instance, Japan has accumulated certain experience in improving
operation and management of current railway lines in the Indochina
Peninsula. The two countries can coordinate in railway projects in
Indochina in order to avoid destructive competition. As the world’s
major oil and gas consumers, China and Japan can cooperate with South
Korea and India to establish an organization of Asian energy consumer
countries, so that Asian energy importing countries can help each other
in eliminating the Asia premium and achieve a win-win result. Besides,
if China and Japan can go global together to explore third markets, based
on the combination of Japan’s advanced technologies and China’s cost-
effective industrial capacity, the industrial restructuring processes in both
countries will be boosted, and international demand will significantly
increase, which will accelerate industrialization in other countries.
Major areas of bilateral cooperation under the Belt and Road

The Belt and Road will set up a broader platform for China-Japan
economic and trade cooperation and cultural exchanges. By giving full
play to each other’s advantages, China and Japan can conduct mutually
beneficial cooperation, which will bring rare opportunities for economic
development in both countries and provide a tailwind for enhancing
mutual political trust.
Looking ahead, China and Japan can pursue cooperation in several
areas. The first is in the area of exploring third-party markets. After decades
of development, China-Japan bilateral trade has become the world’s
second largest next to China-US trade. The transformation of the Chinese
economy to a domestic demand-driven model and the convergence of
the two countries’ trade structures are leading to more severe competition
between China and Japan. Therefore, the two sides should transcend the
bilateral framework and find more cooperation space in third markets
so as to boost trade growth. By taking advantage of Japan’s overseas
operational experience and resources, and China’s capital and industrial
capacity, the two countries can jointly explore cooperation opportunities
in third markets and realize win-win results, especially in areas such as
infrastructure, high-speed railways, energy conservation, environmental
protection, artificial intelligence and energy resources development. The
second area of possible cooperation is the logistics channel. Against the
backdrop of the Belt and Road, China is connecting to the world through
more diversified channels. Cross-border railways connecting China with
Central Asia, Europe, Russia and Mongolia form the main structure of
land transportation network. The China-Europe rail route, an important
corridor for cross-border transport of China and Japan, should be a priority
of cooperation between logistics companies of both countries. The third
area of cooperation is financing. Based on multilateral platforms such
as the AIIB and the ADB, China and Japan can cooperate in financially
supporting some flagship projects of the Belt and Road. According to an
ADB report released in February 2017, developing Asia will need to invest
US$26 trillion in infrastructure from 2016 to 2030, or US$1.7 trillion
per year. As the world’s second and third largest economies and two major
powers in Asia, China and Japan can take advantage of the AIIB and the
ADB, and financially support some influential and signature infrastructure
projects on the basis of effectively managing risks and ensuring profits. The
fourth area is in international industrial capacity cooperation at bilateral
and multilateral levels. China used to be Japan’s production base, but with
China’s huge market and Japanese companies’ advanced technologies and
management experience, China and Japan can enhance cooperation in
production efficiency and quality by joint R&D and production. In this
way, both sides can realize innovation-oriented development, explore a
larger market and lead bilateral economic cooperation to a higher level.
Against the background of the Belt and Road, companies from China and
Japan are sharing a huge potential of cooperation both in time and space.
International industrial capacity cooperation might be a highlight of this
cooperation. Japan has a wealth of experience in international industrial
transfer, while China’s excess industrial capacity is urgently needed in other
countries. In the future, companies from the two countries can jointly
expand markets along the Belt and Road to enhance industrial capacity
cooperation.
China-Japan cooperation should certainly go far beyond the above-
mentioned areas. With the implementation of the Belt and Road Initiative
and the normalization of bilateral relations, China and Japan will surely
share more areas of cooperation and achieve win-win results.
Dynamics of the Trump Administration’s
Policy on the South China Sea
Su Xiaohui
T
he domestic and foreign policies of the United States have witnessed
significant changes over the year since Donald Trump was inaugurated
as the US President. On the South China Sea issue, the tough stance
that Trump and his policy team once signaled has caused concern by relevant
parties about the overall situation and the China-US relations.
Generally speaking, despite their close watch on China’s actions in the
South China Sea, Trump and his policy team lack comprehensive and in-depth
understanding of the issue, which means a risk of misjudgment. On the other
hand, it seems that the South China Sea is not a priority for the president
who was elected under an “America First” platform. Therefore, an analysis of
the direction and influence of the US South China Sea policy under the new
administration is of great significance for China to safeguard its sovereignty and
maritime rights and help maintain regional stability.
The US Judgment and Actions in the South China Sea
The US government maintains that China intends to firmly control the South
China Sea in the long term, and that the US has failed to effectively respond to
China’s relevant actions.
China’s increasing control of the South China Sea

As far as the United States is concerned, China has become increasingly
Su Xiaohui is Associate Research Fellow and Deputy Director of the Department for International Strategic
Studies, China Institute of International Studies (CIIS).
168 China International Studies Dynamics of the Trump Administration’s Policy on the South China Sea
assertive on the South China Sea disputes. China has adopted an
uncompromising stance on the issue of sovereignty, vigorously strengthened
its actual control over the disputed areas, and promoted its maritime claims
without direct military conflict with the United States. China’s construction
of infrastructure and deployment of military facilities on the South China Sea
islands and reefs helps strengthen its control over the South China Sea. The
Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a US-based think tank,
has repeatedly released satellite images of the South China Sea islands and
reefs and surmised China’s intention to militarize the areas. In August 2016,
a report published by the think tank claimed that China had built military-
standard hangars on three artificial islands in the South China Sea that can
accommodate any type of military aircraft.1 In December 2016, another CSIS
report claimed that China had deployed air-defense facilities on the islands
and reefs, which could be used to shoot down aircraft and cruise missiles.2
In February 2017, the think tank released imagery alleging that China had
nearly completed structures intended to house missile systems on its three
largest outposts in the Spratly Islands.3 The US has been accusing China of
providing repair and supply sites for various military forces under the pretext
of island construction. On the other hand, the Chinese military has been
strengthening its air force, navy and coast guard. In July 2016, the Chinese
Air Force organized its first battle group operation in the South China Sea.
Another operation was conducted after a short interval. In the two operations,
the PLA Air Force dispatched multiple types of fighters, such as H-6K and
Su-30, on combat patrols in the airspace over the Nansha (Spratly) Islands
and the Huangyan Island (Scarborough Shoal). China has made it clear that
these patrols promote the in-depth development of combat-oriented maritime
training and improve the PLA’s actual combat capacity against various security
threats. China’s air force patrols over the South China Sea have now been
1 “Build It and They Will Come,” CSIS, August 1, 2016, https://amti.csis.org/build-it-and-they-will-come.

2 “China’s New Spratly Island Defense,” CSIS, December 13, 2016, https://amti.csis.org/chinas-new-
spratly-island-defenses.
3 “A Look at China’s SAM Shelters in the Spratlys,” CSIS, February 23, 2017, https://amti.csis.org/
chinas-sam-shelters-spratlys.
Dynamics of the Trump Administration’s Policy on the South China Sea March/April 2018 169
conducted on a regular basis.
China is using military means to respond to the US actions in the
South China Sea, warning US aircraft to stay away from the Nansha islands
and reefs it controls. In May 2015, CNN reported that a US Navy P-8A
surveillance aircraft received warnings eight times from the Chinese Navy
during a reconnaissance mission over the Nansha Islands.4 In December the
same year, two US B-52 strategic bombers approached the South China Sea
islands and reefs. While the US defended that the mission was unplanned
and that it had no intention to fly within 12 nautical miles of the South
China Sea islands and reefs, the Chinese military had been monitoring the
two strategic bombers and remaining on high alert in the whole process. In
response to US warships in the South China Sea carrying out the so-called
Freedom of Navigation Operations, especially entering the adjacent waters of
the islands and reefs, China has employed warships and aircraft to identify
and verify the vessels and issued warnings. In December 2016, the Chinese
Navy seized a US unmanned underwater vehicle (UUV) in waters of the
South China Sea, provoking tremors in the West. While the US Defense
Department attempted to defend the use of the UUV and demanded China
give it back, China expressed its regret over the US dramatizing the incident.
The Chinese Defense Ministry reiterated firm opposition to the frequent
appearance of US military aircraft and vessels in waters facing China for
close-in reconnaissance and military surveys, and required the US side to stop
such activities.5
US strategic position in Asia-Pacific under challenge

The United States believes that currently it still maintains a military
advantage over China, and it has conducted several Freedom of Navigation
Operations in the South China Sea. In October 2015, the US Navy destroyer
USS Lassen entered within 12 nautical miles of Subi Reef of the Nansha Islands
4 “Exclusive: China Warns US Surveillance Plane,” CNN, May 20, 2015, https://edition.cnn.
com/2015/05/20/politics/south-china-sea-navy-flight/index.html.
5 “China to Hand Over Underwater Drone to U.S. in Appropriate Manner,” Chinese Ministry of National
Defense, December 18, 2016, http://eng.mod.gov.cn/news/2016-12/18/content_4771612.htm.
without authorization. In 2016, there were more US military activities in the
South China Sea, along with the process of so-called international arbitration
unilaterally initiated by the Philippines under the Aquino administration. In
January 2016, the US guided missile destroyer USS Curtis Wilbur intruded
into Chinese territorial waters of Xisha (Paracel) Islands. In May the same
year, the Arleigh Burke-class guided missile destroyer USS William P. Lawrence
came within 12 nautical miles of Yongshu Reef (Fiery Cross Reef ) of Nansha.
In the coming June, the US Navy dispatched three Aegis destroyers to carry
out patrol and surveillance activities in the South China Sea. In October, the
guided missile destroyer USS Decatur entered Chinese territorial waters off the
Xisha Islands. In February 2017, a US battle group led by aircraft carrier USS
Carl Vinson entered the South China Sea, a move the US Defense Department
alleged to maintain what it considers the “freedom of navigation” in the South
China Sea.
Despite these actions, the United States still feels powerless to
counter the Chinese activities in the South China Sea, falling short of the
expectation to change China’s posture in the region. Therefore, in addition
to unilateral moves, the US has made financial investment to support its
regional partners in capacity building with the aim of withstanding what
it calls China’s “assertiveness”. In May to June 2015, then US Secretary
of Defense Ashton Carter visited Vietnam and signed the Joint Vision
Statement on Defense Relations, which promised Vietnam $18 million
to help it purchase US-made patrol boats to boost defense capabilities.
In April 2016, the US announced that it would give $42 million worth
of sensors, radar, and communications equipment to the Philippines to
enhance the Philippine military’s capacity to collect information in the
South China Sea. However, according to US judgment, such moves are not
enough to help its regional partners catch up with China’s capacity building
in the South China Sea.
Besides, the United States has been trying to persuade its allies and
partners into its Freedom of Navigation Operations. During an interview
with Reuters in January 2015, Vice Admiral Robert L. Thomas, Commander
of the US 7th Fleet, said that the US “would welcome a Japanese extension
of air patrols into the South China Sea as a counterweight to a growing fleet
of Chinese vessels pushing China’s territorial claims in the region.”6 At the
Langkawi International Maritime and Aerospace Exhibition in March the
same year, Thomas further proposed the creation of joint maritime patrols in
the South China Sea by ASEAN member nations.7 During his visit to India
in March 2016, Admiral Harry B. Harris, Commander of the US Pacific
Command, also proposed joint naval patrols by India, Japan, Australia and the
US in the South China Sea.8
Up to now, however, no substantial progress has been made in the
United States’ plan for joint patrols in the South China Sea. As US allies,
Japan touched upon the possibility of its Self-Defense Forces patrolling the
South China Sea, and Australia also discussed its position on the South
China Sea, but both countries have highlighted the necessity of avoiding
regional tensions. Japan has maintained a cautious attitude toward the
joint patrol issue. Although it was once reported that then Japanese
Defense Minister Tomomi Inada had agreed to join the US-led patrols
in the South China Sea, and the US Defense Department also released
information confirming the two countries to conduct maritime actions in
accordance with international law to support the “freedom of navigation,”
Inada soon clarified that her remarks had been deliberately distorted and
that Japan had no plan to send its forces to conduct joint actions with the
US in the South China Sea. Australian officials also publicly stated that
they had not received any invitation from the US, nor were they ready
to take part in any joint military actions in South China Sea. At the US-
Australia “2+2” meeting in October 2015, the two sides agreed to further
6 “U.S. Would Welcome Japan Air Patrols in South China Sea,” Reuters, January 29, 2015, https://www.
reuters.com/article/us-japan-southchinasea/u-s-would-welcome-japan-air-patrols-in-south-china-sea-
idUSKBN0L20HV20150129.
7 “Joint Patrols and US Coast Guard Capacity,” CSIS, April 1, 2015, https://amti.csis.org/joint-patrols-
and-u-s-coast-guard-capacity.
8 “U.S. Proposes Reviving Naval Coalition to Balance China Expansion,” The New York Times, March
3, 2016, https://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/03/world/asia/us-proposes-india-naval-coalition-balance-china-
expansion.html.
their naval cooperation, but also clarified that such cooperation would not
include Australia’s participation in the US-led South China Sea patrols. In
response to the abovementioned proposal by Admiral Harris, the Indian
Defense Minister indicated immediately that India was not considering
joint patrols with the US and other countries in the Asia-Pacific. The
response was interpreted by Indian media as the country’s avoidance of any
involvement in the US-China competition. ASEAN has also turned the
cold shoulder on the proposal of joint patrols. For the Philippines, while
it at first responded positively, when then US Defense Secretary Carter and
his Philippine counterpart Voltaire Gazmin jointly met the press in April
2016 and confirmed the two countries’ joint patrols in the South China Sea
a month before, in September the same year, the Philippines’ new president
Rodrigo Duterte indicated that the country would no longer conduct such
patrols. In October, the new Philippine Defense Secretary Delfin Lorenzana
also announced the Philippines’ suspension of joint patrols, and requested
the US Special Forces stationed in the Philippines to withdraw in the near
future. It is clear that the US has failed to form a regional alliance to exert
pressure on China.
The US military actions have failed to achieve desired results. At the same
time, the US has admitted its lack of non-military means to counter China in
the South China Sea. It is worried that some countries in the Asia-Pacific will
judge its capabilities and commitment in light of its counter-China efforts in
the South China Sea. If the US cannot effectively challenge China in the South
China Sea, its dominant alliance system and its credibility as a security partner
will be severely undermined.9
These basic judgments reflect the important consensus among policymakers
and the academic community of the United States, and have become an
important basis for the Trump administration to formulate its South China Sea
policy.
9 Amy Searight and Geoffrey Hartman, “The South China Sea-Some Fundamental Strategic Principles,”
CSIS, January 26, 2017, https://www.csis.org/analysis/south-china-sea-some-fundamental-strategic-
principles.
Orientation of Trump’s South China Sea Policy
The Trump administration’s policy on the South China Sea, which once aroused
concerns, is now returning to balance and rationality.
Tough position grossly exaggerated

During the transfer period, Trump and his team released tough signals
about China’s construction of artificial islands in the South China Sea.
Trump accused China of building “a massive military complex in the middle
of the South China Sea” before asking the US.10 Rex Tillerson, Trump’s pick
for Secretary of State, said at his confirmation hearing that “building islands
and then putting military assets on those islands is akin to Russia’s taking of
Crimea,” and that the United States might use its armed forces to deny the
Chinese access to the islands.11 In his first press briefing, Sean Spicer, then
White House spokesman, said when asked whether the President agreed with
Tillerson’s comments: “If those islands are, in fact, in international waters and
not part of China proper … we’ll make sure we defend international interests
from being taken over by one country.”12 Steve Bannon, once White House
Chief Strategist and Senior Counselor to the President thought to have had an
important influence on Trump’s policy, even predicted in an interview in March
2016 that China and the United States were “going to war in the South China
Sea in five to ten years.”13
Based on these remarks, some media have alleged that once the United
States tried to deny China’s access to the South China Sea islands and reefs, it
10 “Trump Takes Fresh Swipe at China after Controversial Taiwan Call,” CNN, December 5, 2016, https://
edition.cnn.com/2016/12/04/politics/trump-china-tweets/index.html.
11 “Rex Tillerson’s South China Sea Remarks Foreshadow Possible Foreign Policy Crisis,” The New York
Times, January 12, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/12/world/asia/rex-tillerson-south-china-sea-us.
html.
12 “What We Learned at Sean Spicer’s First Briefing,” CNN, January 24, 2017, https://www.cnn.
com/2017/01/23/politics/sean-spicer-press-briefing-day-one/index.html.
13 “Steve Bannon: ‘We’re going to war in the South China Sea ... no doubt’,” The Guardian, February 1,
2017, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/feb/02/steve-bannon-donald-trump-war-south-china-sea-
no-doubt.
might face a powerful counterattack beyond the imagination of many. Although
there is gap in term of military strength between China and the US, the Chinese
navy has submarines, anti-ship missiles and other weapons specifically designed
to destroy important naval equipment of the US, which are powerful enough
to prevent or impede the approaching of the enemy’s navy. For some time, the
argument that the risk of China-US military confrontation increases quickly
gained popularity.
However, it is believed by many US officials that Trump’s “noises” on the
South China Sea issue early in his office are understandable. Trump did not
come from the establishment and lacks administrative experience. Therefore, it
was difficult for him to fully understand the ins and outs of all the complex
regional and international issues in a short period of time. As with Secretary of
State Tillerson, despite his outstanding management competency, he was not
familiar with foreign affairs. With too many things to take care of at the same
time, it is inevitable that he might not be able to attend to everything. For the
White House spokesperson, it needs so time to get used to challenges from the
press besides understanding the diplomatic lines.
A gradual return to rationality

Trump has been eager to fulfill his campaign promises after taking office,
which has exerted a significant influence on domestic and foreign policies of the
United States. However, the US bureaucracy is mature enough to play a role
in guiding the president and preventing him from making major mistakes. It is
the president and the bureaucracy that collectively influence the formulation of
foreign policies.
Trump sticks to the principle of “America First” and cares about the
interests and gains of the United States. Therefore, the US would not be a
cat’s paw for any disputed party at the expense of its own national interests.
The United States has come to realize that its interests in the South China Sea
need not be won by defeating China. On the country, the stability of the South
China Sea is in line with its needs to develop economic and trade cooperation
and guarantee the safety of goods transportation. As he did not make any clear
commitment with regard to the South China Sea issue during the election
campaign, it is not necessary for Trump to demonstrate strength on this front
after taking office. With the high level of difficulty and uncertain effects if
disputes were addressed, the South China Sea issue is not a priority on Trump’s
agenda. As far as the US-China relationship is concerned, Trump has revealed a
possibility to take the South China Sea issue as a bargaining chip in the United
States’ trade negotiations with China. Therefore, the US would try to avoid the
conflicts from spiraling out of control, which would cause its loss of credible
deterrence.
Inheriting the basic stance and behavior in the Obama period

First, highlighting the principle of peaceful settlement of disputes. During
his stop in Japan in his first overseas visit as the US Defense Secretary, James
Mattis expressed concern over China’s intensified activities in the South China
Sea. However, he also clarified that the main direction of the United States’
South China Sea policy is to employ all means, especially diplomatic means,
to properly settle the disputes and keep the sea lane open. The US military
stance should be one that “reinforces our diplomats in this regard. But there is
no need right now at this time for military maneuvers or something like that,
that would solve something that’s best solved by the diplomats.” Mattis also
concluded that he did “not see any need for dramatic military moves at all.”14
Given that the US military has been accustomed to taking a tough position on
the South China Sea issue, the new Defense Secretary’s emphasis of peaceful
means in handling disputes aroused immediate concerns. The move was widely
interpreted as the US withdrawing from the previous hardline stance taken by
Trump, and may speak for the new administration’s South China Sea policy to
a great extent.
Second, continuing the Freedom of Navigation Operations. The Freedom
of Navigation Program was proposed in 1979, under the Carter administration,
14 “Mattis Says No Need for Dramatic U.S. Military Moves in South China Sea,” Reuters, February
4, 2017, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-southchinasea-mattis/mattis-says-no-need-for-
dramatic-u-s-military-moves-in-south-china-sea-idUSKBN15J061.
with a publicly stated purpose to challenge “excessive maritime claims” of all
countries, including the US allies. When the United States considers that the
maritime claims of one country violate the “freedom of navigation,” it will send
warships or aircraft to conduct a test navigation or overflight to confirm that
the “freedom of navigation” it advocates is not affected. This includes: forcibly
entering the 12-nautical-mile territorial waters of another country in the
name of exercising the so-called “right of innocent passage”; sending warships
into the exclusive economic zone of another country to exercise the “freedom
of navigation and overflight”; and intruding into the archipelagic waters that
other countries regard as internal waters in the name of the “freedom of high
seas, transit passage and innocent passage.” The US Freedom of Navigation
Operations in the South China Sea are in fact challenging the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea and the international maritime order,
provoking and damaging the sovereignty and security of China and other coastal
states, and undermining regional peace and stability by virtue of its own military
strength.
The United States has repeatedly indicated the continuing of Freedom
of Navigation Operations to demonstrate the inherent US position since
Trump took office. The US Pacific Command has requested several times such
operations in the South China Sea. In May 2017, the guided missile destroyer
USS Dewey conducted the first Freedom of Navigation Operation in the South
China Sea under the Trump administration. In July the same year, the Arleigh
Burke-class destroyer USS Stethem intruded into Chinese territorial waters
of Xisha Islands without authorization. In August, another Arleigh Burke-
class destroyer USS John S. McCain entered the adjacent waters of the Meiji
(Mischief ) Reef.
While the US insists on such operations, it has attached importance to
professionalism, avoiding accidental collisions that may provoke conflicts with
China. A report published by the US think tank National Bureau of Asian
Research in February 2017 suggested that China and the US maintain military
communication over the South China Sea issue to avoid miscalculation,
reduce confrontation and manage crises. The two countries should work
together to prevent the escalation of confrontation caused by the United States’
frequent Freedom of Navigation Operations. The two sides should continue
to build a crisis management mechanism based on the two Memorandums of
Understanding signed by the two defense ministries in 2014, which are the
MOUs on Notification of Major Military Activities and on the Rules of Behavior
for the Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters.15
In the future, the United States is likely to maintain the consistency of its
South China Sea policy, and is highly unlikely to sacrifice its South China Sea
interests in order to gain China’s support on other issues. For example, the US
would not reduce its military presence in the South China Sea or downgrade
its involvement to win China’s cooperation on the North Korean nuclear issue.
As its Asia-Pacific policy is gradually taking shape, the Trump administration is
reinforcing the US military deployment in the region. The US might expand
its means of involvement in the South China Sea issue, such as by imposing
sanctions on enterprises engaged in China’s construction activities in the South
China Sea. The US would also encourage its allies and partners to shoulder
more responsibilities, assigning tasks with regard to the South China Sea. While
its allies and partners respond to China’s common actions, the US itself would
focus on more difficult incidents.16
Underlying key principles still uncertain

Under the Obama administration, President Obama and his top-level
officials, such as the Secretary of State, repeatedly claimed that the US takes
no position on the sovereignty disputes of the South China Sea. In April
2012, when the China-Philippines tensions surrounding the Huangyan Island
had yet to be settled, then US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and then
Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta held the “2+2” meeting with their Philippine
counterparts. Clinton reiterated the US position of “not taking sides on the
competing sovereignty claims to land features in the South China Sea” at the
15 Nong Hong, “Beyond the UUV Incident: Challenges in the South China Sea for the Trump
Administration,” http://maritimeawarenessproject.org/2017/02/17/beyond-the-uuv-incident-challenges-in-
the-south-china-sea-for-the-trump-administration.
16 Amy Searight and Geoffrey Hartman, “The South China Sea-Some Fundamental Strategic Principles.”
press conference after the talks.17 During his visit to the Philippines in April
2014, President Obama again pointed out that “we don’t even take a specific
position on the disputes between nations,” while stressing that “our primary
interest is the peaceful resolution of conflict, the freedom of navigation that
allows for continued progress and prosperity.”18
It is one basic principle of the US South China Sea policy to take no
position on the sovereignty issue. Such a stance can effectively avoid the political
costs of taking sides and help the US to maintain its policy flexibility and
maneuvering space. However, Trump and his team have yet to understand the
importance of this position and have not issued any clear statement. Tillerson’s
claim to deny China’s access to its artificial islands and Spicer’s indication that
the US would “defend international interests from being taken over by one
country” have fueled speculation and concern about the new administration’s
South China Sea policy. Trump’s non-establishment approach increases the risk
of miscalculation by the United States.
Trump has also yet to skillfully wield the principle of “freedom of
navigation.” When talking about the South China Sea issue, Trump does
not highlight the importance of “freedom of navigation,” nor take it as an
underlying justification for US positions and relevant actions. US officials and
the academic community are advising Trump to better apply this principle
to meddle in the South China Sea issue, and have even suggested a “revival”
of the South China Sea arbitration case initiated by the Philippines’ Aquino
government.
Trump’s South China Sea Policy under Restraints
Although the Trump administration will remain involved in the South
17 “Remarks with Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta, Philippines Foreign Secretary Albert del Rosario,
and Philippines Defense Secretary Voltaire Gazmin after Their Meeting,” US Department of State (2009-
2017), April 30, 2012, https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/04/188982.htm.
18 “Remarks by President Obama and President Benigno Aquino III of the Philippines in Joint Press
Conference,” The White House (President Obama), April 28, 2014, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/
the-press-office/2014/04/28/remarks-president-obama-and-president-benigno-aquino-iii-philippines-joi.
China Sea issue, it has become more difficult for the US to influence the
situation as regional actors such as China and ASEAN are adjusting their
policy objectives.
China-ASEAN objection to US meddling on COC

Until recently, the arbitration case unilaterally filed by the Philippines’
Aquino government was the focus of attention. Since the arbitration drama
subsided, regional parties have come to recognize that arbitration would not
help address the South China Sea tensions, which should be handled in a
constructive manner. Currently, China and ASEAN are making concerted
efforts to promote negotiations on a code of conduct (COC) in the South
China Sea, aiming to develop commonly recognized regional rules and maintain
peace and stability in the South China Sea.
Formulating the COC once took a detour, as the Aquino government tried
to use the COC to materialize the Philippines’ territorial claims and maritime
rights in the South China Sea, in the name of ASEAN’s collective will. The US
has also been instrumental in urging the formulation of the COC as soon as
possible.
In this regard, China has repeatedly stressed its willingness to
negotiate the COC with ASEAN, but advocated that any agreed COC
would not be a panacea of sovereignty disputes. Instead, China is calling
for the ASEAN countries to foster a positive environment for the COC
negotiations. Under the Aquino administration, the Philippines repeatedly
triggered disturbances during multiple senior officials’ meetings, foreign
ministers’ meetings and summits between China and ASEAN, accusing
China of slowing progress on the COC. In August 2013, China’s Foreign
Minister Wang Yi, during his visit to Vietnam, presented China’s four-
point proposition on the formulation of the COC, namely, reasonable
anticipation, consensus-oriented consultation, elimination of interference,
and gradual progress.
On the COC issue, China and ASEAN countries have been maintaining
positive communication and promoting the formation of consensus. During
General Secretary of Vietnam’s Communist Party Nguyen Phu Trong’s visit to
China in April 2015, important consensus was reached and incorporated into
a joint communiqué issued by the two countries. China and Vietnam agreed
to jointly manage their maritime disputes, fully and effectively implement the
Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea (DOC) and
reach an agreement on the COC through consultation as early as possible. In
September 2016, a joint statement was issued at the China-ASEAN summit
on the 25th anniversary of China-ASEAN dialogue relations. According
to the statement, the parties concerned “remain committed to … working
substantively towards the early adoption of a Code of Conduct in the South
China Sea (COC) based on consensus.”19
At present, negotiations on the COC have made important progress.
A COC framework was agreed upon on May 18, 2017 at the 14th Senior
Officials’ Meeting on the Implementation of the DOC in Guiyang. At the 50th
ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting held in Manila in August the same year,
the COC framework was officially confirmed. On November 13, at the China-
ASEAN (10+1) Summit, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang and ASEAN leaders
jointly announced the commencement of the next-step consultation on the text
of the COC.
Thanks to unremitting efforts of China and ASEAN, the COC
consultation remains on the right track. Any external country attempting to stir
up the regional situation and interfere with the COC formulation will inevitably
meet resistance across the region. Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi gave an
explicit warning that “if someone should try to make waves and stir trouble,
then he will have no support but meet the common opposition of the entire
region,” and that “China will never allow the hard-won stability to be disrupted
again,” when taking questions during China’s National People’s Congress session
in March 2017.20
19 “Joint Statement of the 19th ASEAN-China Summit to Commemorate the 25th Anniversary of
ASEAN-China Dialogue Relations,” ASEAN, September 7, 2016, http://asean.org/storage/2016/09/Joint-
Statement-of-ASEAN-China-Commemorative-Summit-Final.pdf.
20 “Foreign Minister Wang Yi Meets the Press,” March 8, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/
zxxx_662805/t1444204.shtml.
Loss of key support for US interference
Since the inauguration of Rodrigo Duterte as President, the Philippines’
policies toward China and the United States have witnessed major adjustments.
Duterte has changed the provocative stance of his predecessor on the South
China Sea issue. Despite support from the US, Japan and Australia for the so-
called award on the South China Sea arbitration case, which revealed obvious
injustice and political intentions, Duterte has repeatedly expressed goodwill
to set the verdict aside and cooperate with China. In August 2016, former
Philippine President Fidel Ramos, as Duterte’s special envoy, paid a visit to
Hong Kong, in order to break ice in China-Philippines relations.
Duterte made China the destination for his first state visit outside ASEAN.
During the visit, the two sides reached important consensus on the South China
Sea issue, and decided not to let the disputes kidnap their bilateral relations.
China and the Philippines reiterated that “contentious issues are not the sum
total of the bilateral relationship,” and reaffirmed the importance of “addressing
their territorial and jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, without resorting
to the threat or use of force, through friendly consultations and negotiations by
sovereign states directly concerned.” The two sides also explored the possibility
of establishing a bilateral consultation mechanism, and made commitment to
“exercising self-restraint in the conduct of activities in the South China Sea that
would complicate or escalate disputes and affect peace and stability.”21 In May
2017, the first meeting of China-Philippines Bilateral Consultation Mechanism
on the South China Sea was held in Guiyang, which materialized the important
consensus reached the year before and established an institutional platform for
related issues between the two countries. During Premier Li Keqiang’s official
visit to the Philippines in November 2017, the two governments issued a
joint statement affirming that “contentious maritime issues are not the sum
total of the China-Philippines bilateral relationship,” and agreed to “continue
discussions on confidence-building measures to increase mutual trust and
21 “Joint Statement of China and the Philippines,” October 21, 2016, http://english.gov.cn/news/
international_exchanges/2016/10/21/content_281475471607490.htm.
confidence.”22
In terms of policy toward the US, the Duterte government has changed
the Philippines’ over-reliance on the alliance with the US as practiced by the
previous administration, and reassessed the status quo of US-Philippines
security cooperation. The Obama administration’s criticism of Duterte for his
anti-drug operations and subsequent suspension of aid further caused a strong
reaction by the Philippine government.
In view of the Philippines’ reluctance to act as a pawn of the United States
in the South China Sea disputes, the think tank CSIS has suggested that the
US government encourage Japan and Australia, another two US regional allies,
to intensify their coordination with the US in this regard, so as to increase the
costs of China’s actions in the South China Sea.23 However, as neither Japan nor
Australia are parties of the South China Sea disputes, and neither country is an
ASEAN member, it is inappropriate for them to directly voice their opinions
on the South China Sea issue, and therefore it becomes difficult for them to
influence ASEAN’s position on the disputes.
China’s strategic initiative and restriction of US involvement

China has drawn a red line regarding the South China Sea issue and
conveyed the message clearly to the Trump administration to avoid strategic
miscalculation by the United States. As declared by China, the South China Sea
islands are the inherent territory of China and it is absolutely normal to deploy
necessary national defense facilities there. Such deployment will not change in the
face of US objections. The Trump administration is unable to utilize the South
China Sea disputes to curb China’s rise.
In the meantime, China attaches great importance to the overall situation
of China-US relations. The South China Sea issue is by no means a problem
between China and the US. China has maintained communication with the
Trump administration through various channels to make the US side realize that
22 “Joint Statement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines,” November 16, 2017, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/zxxx_662805/
t1511299.shtml.
23 Amy Searight and Geoffrey Hartman, “The South China Sea-Some Fundamental Strategic Principles.”
“no conflict, no confrontation, mutual respect and win-win cooperation” is the
basis for China-US relations and serves the interests of both countries. China
will continue to promote cooperation with the US, particularly in creating more
opportunities for bilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific.
Furthermore, China has been strengthening efforts to guide public opinion
and expose the essence of the “freedom of navigation” presented by the US.
Chinese academics have been pointing out the difference between the concept
of “freedom of navigation” in international law and in the US context on
multiple international platforms, revealing that the US is in fact using it as a
pretext to strengthen military presence in the South China Sea and challenge the
UN Convention on the Law of the Sea and the international maritime order.
Conclusion
The South China Sea issue has become an intractable factor in China-US
relations. With the development of China’s power and influence, China and
the US will continue to compete in the South China Sea. Under the Trump
administration, it is almost a foregone conclusion that the US will continue to
meddle in the South China Sea disputes. Although risks of policy miscalculation
do exist, Trump’s South China Sea policy is expected to maintain its overall
stability and rationality as the US does not want to provoke a conflict that may
eventually lead to war.
China will adhere to its bottom-line thinking in the face of the US policy.
On one hand, it will continue to properly handle the disputes with the parties
directly involved, actively communicate with the ASEAN and other regional
powers, promote maritime cooperation, build mutual trust and strive to achieve
a favorable South China Sea situation. China is also willing to take this as the
basis to manage differences with the US and jointly play an active role in the
peace and stability of the South China Sea. On the other hand, China will
always prepare for the worst and are ready to face up to evolving changes in the
South China Sea.

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New Ideas of China’s Africa Diplomacy

During his historic visit to Africa in 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping

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China’s Diplomatic Practices in Africa under New Ideas

Since President Xi Jinping put forward the principle of “sincerity, real

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scholarships.25 The curriculum of the Confucius Institutes in Africa have

25 “Africa: A New Era of China-Africa Relations.”

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Model for New Type of International Relations and Community

The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China vows to

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China-EU Relations: Structural Changes and Future Prospects March/April 2018 47

Since 2013, due to China’s strengthened initiative and change in EU

Great changes in mutual perceptions and policies, and more

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Expanding politico-strategic relations along with economic ties

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Economic relations evolving from trade to a mix of investment,

experiencing different stages of decline, rebound and stability. The overall

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Background behind the Structural Changes

Narrowing of relative economic strength

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Prospects and Challenges for Structural Changes

In general, the structural changes in the China-EU relations will lead

Co-existence of cooperation and competition in economics

Political mutual trust faced with test

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苏格王缉思邢广程徐坚中国对非洲外交：理念与实践

执行编辑：姜志达吴劭杰特朗普贸易新政：理念、议程与制约因素