HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

HEIRS OF MARIO MALABANAN vs. REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
GR No. 179987

FACTS:

On 20 February 1998, Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration before the RTC of Cavite-
Tagaytay, covering a parcel of land situated in Silang Cavite, consisting of 71,324 square meters. Malabanan
claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest
had been in open, notorious, and continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty
(30) years. Velazco testified that the property was originally belonged to a twenty-two hectare property owned by
his great-grandfather, Lino Velazco. Lino had four sons– Benedicto, Gregorio, Eduardo and Esteban–the fourth
being Aristedes’s grandfather. Upon Lino’s death, his four sons inherited the property and divided it among
themselves. But by 1966, Esteban’s wife, Magdalena, had become the administrator of all the properties inherited
by the Velazco sons from their father, Lino. After the death of Esteban and Magdalena, their son Virgilio succeeded
them in administering the properties, including Lot 9864-A, which originally belonged to his uncle, Eduardo
Velazco. It was this property that was sold by Eduardo Velazco to Malabanan.

Among the evidence presented by Malabanan during trial was a Certification dated 11 June 2001, issued by the
Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was “verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land
per Land Classification Map No. 3013 established under Project No. 20-A and approved as such under FAO 4-
1656 on March 15, 1982.” On 3 December 2002, the RTC approved the application for registration.

The Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan had failed to prove that the
property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding
that he had been in possession of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for
confirmation of imperfect title. On 23 February 2007, the Court of Appeals reversed the RTC ruling and dismissed
the appliocation of Malabanan.

ISSUES:

1. In order that an alienable and disposable land of the public domain may be registered under Section 14(1) of
Presidential Decree No. 1529, otherwise known as the Property Registration Decree, should the land be classified
as alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or is it sufficient that such classification occur at any time prior
to the filing of the applicant for registration provided that it is established that the applicant has been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12,
1945 or earlier?

2. For purposes of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree may a parcel of land classified as alienable
and disposable be deemed private land and therefore susceptible to acquisition by prescription in accordance with
the Civil Code?

3. May a parcel of land established as agricultural in character either because of its use or because its slope is
below that of forest lands be registrable under Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree in relation to the
provisions of the Civil Code on acquisitive prescription?

4. Are petitioners entitled to the registration of the subject land in their names under Section 14(1) or Section 14(2)
of the Property Registration Decree or both?

HELD:

The Pertition is denied.

(1) In connection with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act
recognizes and confirms that “those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945” have acquired ownership
of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their possession.

(a) Since Section 48(b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does not require that the lands should
have been alienable and disposable during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe
imposed by Section 47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is further confirmed by Section 14(1)
of the Property Registration Decree.
(2) In complying with Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that under the Civil Code,
prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of patrimonial property. However, public domain
lands become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There
must also be an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer retained
for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the
property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion
begin to run.

(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person acquires ownership of patrimonial
property by prescription under the Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14(2) of the
Property Registration Decree.

(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be acquired, one ordinary and other
extraordinary. Under ordinary acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial property
through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive
prescription, a person’s uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least thirty (30) years,
regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into ownership.

It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has acquired ownership over
the subject property under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that
Malabanan or petitioners as his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June
1945 or earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own evidence—the
Tax Declarations they presented in particular—is to the year 1948. Thus, they cannot avail themselves of
registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.

Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14(2) as basis for registration. While the subject property was
declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent evidence that is no longer intended for public
use service or for the development of the national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The
classification of the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not change its
status as property of the public dominion under Article 420(2) of the Civil Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to
acquisition by prescription.

Republic v. Corazon Sese and Fe Sese

G.R. 185092 | June 4, 2014 | Mendoza, J.

FACTS
Records show that on September 17, 2002, Corazon C. Sese and Fe C. Sese (respondents) filed with the MTC
an application for original registration of land over a parcel of land with an area of 10, 792 square meters, situated
in Barangay Sto. Cristo, Municipality of Pulilan, Province of Bulacan, and more particularly described as Lot 11247.

Respondents alleged that on July 22, 1972, they acquired, through a donation inter vivos from their mother,
Resurreccion L. Castro (Resurreccion), the subject agricultural land; that they, through their predecessors-in-
interest, had been in possession of the subject property; and that the property was not within a reservation.

In support of their application, respondents submitted tax declarations under their name, a Certificate of Technical
Description, a Certification in lieu of lost Surveyor’s Certificate, Official Receipts of payment of real property tax,
a certification from the municipal treasurer, and the survey plan stating that the land subject of the survey was
alienable and disposable land, and as certified to by the Bureau of Forestry on March 1, 1927, was outside of any
civil or military reservation. On the lower portion of the plan, there was a note stating that a deed of absolute sale
over the subject property was executed by a certain Luis Santos and Fermina Santos (the Santoses) in favor of
Resurreccion on October 4, 1950.

Finding the application sufficient in form and substance, the MTC issued the Order, dated October 10, 2002,
setting the case for hearing with the corresponding publication. During the trial on June 4, 2003, respondent
Corazon C. Sese (Corazon) testified on their claim over the subject lot. Thereafter, respondents submitted their
formal offer of evidence, after which the evidence offered were admitted by the MTC in the Order, dated July 10,
2003, without objection from the public prosecutor. The OSG did not present any evidence to oppose the
application. MTC granted and orderred the registraiton of the subject property in the name of the respondents.

On December 19, 2003, the OSG interposed an appeal with the CA, docketed as CA-GR. CV No. 81439. In its
brief, the OSG argued that there was no proof that the subject property was already segregated from inalienable
lands of the public domain. Verily, it was only from the date of declaration of such lands as alienable and
disposable that the period for counting the statutory requirement of possession would start.

CA affirmed MTC. It reasoned out, among others, that the approved survey plan of the subject property with an
annotation, stating that the subject property was alienable and disposable land, was a public document, having
been issued by the DENR, a competent authority. Its contents were prima facie evidence of the facts stated
therein. Thus, the evidence was sufficient to establish that the subject property was indeed alienable and
disposable.

With respect to the second issue, the CA was of the view that the doctrine of constructive possession was
applicable. Respondents acquired the subject property through a donation inter vivos executed on July 22, 1972
from their mother. The latter acquired the said property from the Santoses on October 4, 1950 by virtue of a deed
of absolute sale. Further, respondent Corazon testified that a small hut was built on the said land, which was
occupied by the worker of her mother. Moreover, neither the public prosecutor nor any private individual appeared
to oppose the application for registration of the subject property.

With respect to the tax declarations, the CA added that although tax declaration or realty tax payments of property
were not conclusive evidence of ownership, nevertheless, they were good indicia of possession in the concept of
owner.

ISSUE
WON the CA erred in ruling that the approved survey plan is proof that the subject plan is alienable and disposable.
YES.

HELD
Applicants for registration of land title must establish and prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the
disposable and alienable lands of the public domain; (2) that the applicant and his predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the same; and (3) that it is under
a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier. Compliance with the foregoing requirements is
indispensable for an application for registration of land title, under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, to validly
prosper. The absence of any one requisite renders the application for registration substantially defective.

Anent the first requisite, respondents presented evidence to establish the disposable and alienable character of
the subject land through a survey plan, where on its lower portion, a note stated, among others, as follows: "This
survey is inside the alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 20 LC Map No. 637 certified by the Bureau
of Forestry on March 1, 1927. It is outside any civil or military reservation." The said plan was approved by the
DENR, Land Management Services, Regional Office III, San Fernando, Pampanga on December 3, 1998. The
annotation in the survey plan, however, fell short of the requirement of the law in proving its disposable
and alienable character.

In Republic v. Espinosa, the court held that a notation made by a surveyor-geodetic engineer that the property
surveyed was alienable and disposable was not the positive government act that would remove the
property from the inalienable domain and neither was it the evidence accepted as sufficient to controvert
the presumption that the property was inalienable.

This proof is not sufficient. Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides: "All lands of the public domain,
waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State..."

For the original registration of title, the applicant (petitioners in this case) must overcome the presumption that the
land sought to be registered forms part of the public domain. Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified
or alienated to a private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public domain. Indeed, "occupation
thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title." To
overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown by the applicant. Absent such evidence,
the land sought to be registered remains inalienable.

In the present case, petitioners cite a surveyor geodetic engineer’s notation in Exhibit "E" indicating that the survey
was inside alienable and disposable land. Such notation does not constitute a positive government act validly
changing the classification of the land in question. Verily, a mere surveyor has no authority to reclassify lands
of the public domain. By relying solely on the said surveyor’s assertion, petitioners have not sufficiently
proven that the land in question has been declared alienable."

The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the lands of the public domain is on the
person applying for registration (or claiming ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is
alienable or disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be established that the
land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable. The applicant must establish the existence of
a positive act of the government such as a presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; or a legislative act or a statute. The applicant may
also secure a certification from the government that the land claimed to have been possessed for the required
number of years is alienable and disposable. The applicant must also show sufficient proof that the DENR
Secretary approved the land classification and released the land in question as alienable and disposable.

Thus, the present rule is that an application for original registration must be accompanied by (1) a CENRO or
PENRO Certification; and (2) a copy of the original classification approved by the DENR Secretary and certified
as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.

Here, the only evidence presented by respondents to prove the disposable and alienable character of the subject
land was an annotation by a geodetic engineer in a survey plan. Although this was certified by the DENR, it clearly
falls short of the requirements for original registration.

With regard to the third requisite, it must be shown that the possession and occupation of a parcel of land by the
applicant, by himself or through his predecessors-in-interest, started on June 12, 1945 or earlier. A mere showing
of possession and occupation for 30 years or more, by itself, is not sufficient.

In this regard, respondents likewise failed. As the records and pleadings of this case will reveal, the earliest that
respondents and their predecessor-in-interest can trace back possession and occupation of the subject land was
only in the year 1950,when their mother, Resurreccion, acquired the subject land from the Santoses on October
4, 1950 by virtue of an absolute sale. Evidently, their possession of the subject property commenced roughly five
(5) years beyond June 12, 1945, the reckoning date expressly provided under Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529.
Thus, their application for registration of land title was legally infirm.

Accordingly, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer
intended for public service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, pursuant to Article 420(2), and, thus, incapable of acquisition by prescription. It is
only when such alienable and disposable lands are expressly declared by the State to be no longer intended for
public service or for the development of the national wealth that the period of acquisitive prescription can begin to
run. Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a Presidential Proclamation in
cases where the President is duly authorized by law.

Thus, under Section 14(2) of P.D. No. 1529, for acquisitive prescription to commence and operate against the
State, the classification of land as alienable and disposable alone is not sufficient. The applicant must be able to
show that the State, in addition to the said classification, expressly declared through either a law enacted by
Congress or a proclamation issued by the President that the subject land is no longer retained for public service
or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into patrimonial.

February 10, 2016.G.R. No. 199537.REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs. ANDREA TAN, Respondent

FACTS: Tan applied for the original registration of title of Lot No. 4080, Cad. 545-D situated in Casili, Consolacion,
Cebu. She alleged that she is the absolute owner in fee simple of the said 7,807 square-meter parcel of residential
land she purchased from a certain Julian Gonzaga on September 17, 1992. Land registration court granted Tan’s
application. The court confirmed her title over the subject lot and ordered its registration. The Republic appealed
the case to the CA, arguing that Tan failed to prove that she is a Filipino citizen who has been in open, continuous,
exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject lot, in the concept of an owner, since June 12,
1945, or earlier, immediately preceding the filing of her application.

The CA noted that before land of the public domain can be acquired by prescription, it must have been
declared alienable and disposable agricultural land. The CA pointed to the certification issued by the Community
Environment and Natural Resources Office (CENRO) as evidence that the subject was classified as alienable and
disposable on September 1, 1965, pursuant to Land Classification Project No. 28. The CA concluded that Tan
had already acquired the subject lot by prescription.

ISSUE: Whether or not the CENRO certification and tax declarations presented were insufficient to prove that
the subject lot was no longer intended for public use.

HELD: In Malabanan case, we already held en banc that a declaration that property of the public dominion is
alienable and disposable does not ipso facto convert it into patrimonial property. While a prior declaration that the
property has become alienable and disposable is sufficient in an application for judicial confirmation of title under
Section 14(1) of the PRD, it does not suffice for the purpose of prescription under the Civil Code. Before
prescription can even begin to run against the State, the following conditions must concur to convert the subject
into patrimonial property:

1. The subject lot must have been classified as agricultural land in compliance with Sections 2 and 3 of
Article XII of the Constitution;

2. The land must have been classified as alienable and disposable

3. There must be a declaration from a competent authority that the subject lot is no longer intended for
public use, thereby converting it to patrimonial property.

Only when these conditions are met can applicants begin their public and peaceful possession of the
subject lot in the concept of an owner.

In the present case, the third condition is absent. Even though it has been declared alienable and
disposable, the property has not been withdrawn from public use or public service. Without this, prescription
cannot begin to run because the property has not yet been converted into patrimonial property of the State. It
remains outside the commerce of man and the respondent’s physical possession and occupation thereof do not
produce any legal effect. In the eyes of the law, the respondent has never acquired legal possession of the
property and her physical possession thereof, no matter how long, can never ripen into ownership.

Director of Lands vs. Intermediate Appelate Court (IAC)

146 SCRA 509 December 29, 1986

Facts:

1. Defendant through his lawyer filed an answer therein admitting the averment in the complaint
that the land was acquired by the plaintiff through inheritance from his parents, the former owners
thereof.

2.Subsequently, the defendant changed his counsel, and with leave of court, amended the
answer. In the amended answer, the admission no longer appears. The alleged ownership of the
land by the plaintiff was denied coupled with an allegation that the defendant is the owner of the
land as he bought it from the plaintiff’s parents while they were still alive.

3. A f t e r t r i a l , t h e l o w e r c o u r t u p h e l d t h e d e f e n d a n t ’ s ownership of the land. On appeal, the

plaintiff contended that the defendant is bound by the admission contained in his original answer.

Issue: Whether or not the contention of plaintiff is correct

RULING: NO. The original pleading had been amended such that it already disappeared from the
record, lost its status as a pleading and cease to be a judicial admission. While the said pleading may be utilized
against the pleader as extrajudicial admission, they must, in order t o h a v e s u c h e f f e c t , b e formally offered
in evidence.

Republic vs. Zurbaran

Facts:

Zurbaran Realty and Development Corporation filed with RTC an application for original registration of land.
Director of Lands opposed it arguing that applicant and its predecessor in interest had not been in open,
continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of land since June 12, 1945.

RTC and CA ruled in favor of Zurbaran.

On appeal to SC, the Republic appealed arguing that Zurbaran failed to establish the time when the land became
alienable and disposable, which is crucial in determining whether Zuburan acquired the land by prescription.
ISSUE: What are the substantive elements in filing an application for original registration of land?
RULING:

The requirements depend on what basis the application was filed..

The following are the bases for application:

1. On the basis of possession, wherein you need to show the following:

a. The land is alienable and disposable property of the public domain (Example of non-alienable lands are forests,
lakeshores, etc)

b. the applicant and its predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious
possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership; and

c. the applicant and its predecessors-in-interest have possessed and occupied the land since June 12, 1945, or
earlier

Note: Land need not be declared alienable and disposable as of June 12, 1945 or earlier. It is sufficient that
property is alienable and disposable at the time of application (Malaban vs. Republic)
2. On the basis of prescription, wherein you need to prove the following:

a. Land is alienable and disposable, and patrimonial property

b. continuous possession of land for at least 10 years in good faith and with just title OR 30 years regardless of
good faith or bad faith.

c. Land is converted or declared as patrimonial property of the State at the beginning of 10-year or 30-year period
of possession.

Only patrimonial property of the State may be acquired by prescription (Article 1113 of Civil Code). Property of
public dominion, if not longer intended for public use or service, shall form part of patrimonial property of
State. (Article 422 of Civil Code)

Here, there must be an express declaration by the State that the public dominion property is no longer intended
for public use, service or the development of the national wealth or that the property has been converted into
patrimonial. Without such express declaration, the property, even if classified as alienable or disposable, remains
property of the public dominion, Such declaration shall be in the form of a law duly enacted by Congress or a
Presidential Proclamation in cases where the President is duly authorized by law.

In the case at bar, the application did not state when their possession and occupation commenced (no allegation
that they have been in possession since June 12, 1945) and the duration. So the application is based on
prescription. Here, there is no evidence showing that the land in question was within an area expressly declared
by law either to be the patrimonial property of the State, or to be no longer intended for public service or the
development of the national wealth.