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G.R. No. 182371, September 4, 2013

FACTS: Spouses Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga filed a complaint against John Sycip (who died during the
pendency of the case and was substituted by his heirs) for the declaration of nullity of documents and recovery of
possession of real property with a prayer for a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction (WPMI) and damages. The
trial court initially dismissed the case on the ground of prescription, but the CA set aside the order of dismissal and
remanded the case for further proceedings. The RTC declared Melencio Yu as the registered and absolute owner of
the land. The case was elevated to the Supreme Court, which, sustained the CA affirming the trial court’s judgment.
The Court’s ruling is now final and executory.

During the pendency of the case, squatters entered the subject lot. Consequently, when a writ of execution and an
order of demolition were issued by the trial court, a group of squatters known (YUHAI) filed a complaint for
injunction with damages and prayer for writ of preliminary injunction (WPI) or temporary restraining order (TRO).
The RTC ruled in favor of petitioners. The RTC granted petitioners’ motion to implement the writ of demolition. A
notice to vacate was issued. Private respondents filed a Special Appearance with Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation,
praying that the "Provincial Sheriff or any of his deputies be properly informed of the pending protest between
petitioners and private respondents before the DENR and enjoined from implementing the Special Order of
Demolition. As their demands went unheeded, private respondents filed a complaint for quieting of title, specific
performance, reconveyance and damages with prayer for the issuance of TRO, WPI and WPMI. The trial court
denied the issuance of a TRO and the case is still pending trial at this time. YUHAI once more filed a complaint
against the spouses Melencio Yu and Talinanap Matualaga for quieting of title, damages and attorney’s fees with
application for TRO and WPI. The trial court declined to issue a TRO; denied YUHAI’s urgent motion for
clarification; and rejected for the second time YUHAI’s prayer for issuance of TRO or WPI.

The CA revoked the TRO, denied due course the petition of YUHAI. The CA essentially ruled that the issue of
ownership over the subject lot was already passed upon and binds YUHAI under the principle of res judicata.

Arguing in main that there was no complete demolition and no proper turn-over of the contested lot on private
respondents filed a motion for reconsideration with WPI and WPMI. The CA resolved to grant the prayer for
preliminary mandatory injunction. On the same day, the writ was issued by respondent Rosemarie D. Anacan-

Petitioners argued that the Order and the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction was hastily issued and released
for service simultaneously on the same day without first waiting for private respondents to post the required bond.

ISSUE: Can the Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction in this case be hastily issued and released for service
simultaneously on the same day?

RULING: NO. Under Sec. 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order
may be granted only when: (b) Unless exempted by the court, the applicant files with the court where the action or
proceeding is pending, a bond executed to the party or person enjoined, in an amount to be fixed by the court, to the
effect that the applicant will pay to such party or person all damages which he may sustain by reason of the
injunction or temporary restraining order if the court should finally decide that the applicant was not entitled thereto.
Upon approval of the requisite bond, a writ of preliminary injunction shall be issued. To be sure, an Order granting a
preliminary injunction, whether mandatory or prohibitory, does not automatically entitle the applicant-movant to an
immediate enforcement. Posting of a bond is a condition sinequa non for the issuance of a corresponding writ.

A preliminary injunction is an order granted at any stage of an action or proceeding prior to the judgment or final
order, requiring a party or a court, agency or a person to refrain from a particular act or acts. It may also require the
performance of a particular act or acts, in which case it shall be known as a preliminary mandatory injunction. 38 To
justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, it must be shown that: (1) the complainant has a
clear legal right; (2) such right has been violated and the invasion by the other party is material and substantial; and
(3) there is an urgent and permanent necessity for the writ to prevent serious damage.
Thus, a preliminary mandatory injunction should only be granted "incases of extreme urgency; where the right is
very clear; where considerations of relative inconvenience bear strongly in complainant's favor; where there is a
willful and unlawful invasion of plaintiff's right against his protest and remonstrance, the injury being a continuing
one; and where the effect of the mandatory injunction is rather to re-establish and maintain a pre-existing continuing
relation between the parties, recently and arbitrarily interrupted by the defendant, than to establish a new relation."

In this case, there is doubt on private respondents’ entitlement to a preliminary mandatory injunction since the
evidence presented before the respondent CA in support thereof appears to be weak and inconclusive, and the
alleged right sought to be protected is vehemently disputed.


G.R. No. 157494, December 10, 2004

FACTS: Respondent City opposed the Schedule of Automatic Water Rates Adjustments for the years 1999, 2000
and 2001 published by the petitioner. It alleged that the proposed water rates would violate due process as they were
to be imposed without the public hearing. Hence, it prayed that before the hearing of the main case, a temporary
restraining order or a preliminary injunction be issued.
On February 24, 2000. On the same date requested, respondent court heard respondents application for temporary
restraining order and issued an Order commanding petitioner to stop, desist and refrain from implementing the
proposed water rates.
On December 21, 2000, respondent court issued the assailed Decision granting the final injunction which allegedly
confirmed the previous preliminary injunction.
Petitioner filed its Motion for Reconsideration of the assailed Decision on January 11, 2001 asserting, among others,
that the case was not yet ripe for decision when the court granted the final injunction, the petitioner having had no
opportunity to file its answer, avail of the mandatory pre-trial conference and have the case tried on the merits.
ISSUE: Whether or not preliminary injunction had been issued.
RULING: NO. The sequence of events and the proceedings that transpired in the trial court make a clear conclusion
that the Order issued was a temporary restraining order and not a preliminary injunction.
Given the previous undeviating references to it as a temporary restraining order, respondents cannot now consider it
as a preliminary injunction to justify the validity of the assailed Decision. The attendant facts and circumstances
clearly show that the respondent trial court issued a temporary restraining order.
Injunction is a judicial writ, process or proceeding whereby a party is ordered to do or refrain from doing a certain
act. It may be the main action or merely a provisional remedy for and as an incident in the main action. ]
The main action for injunction is distinct from the provisional or ancillary remedy of preliminary injunction which
cannot exist except only as part or an incident of an independent action or proceeding. As a matter of course, in an
action for injunction, the auxiliary remedy of preliminary injunction, whether prohibitory or mandatory, may issue.
Under the law, the main action for injunction seeks a judgment embodying a final injunction which is distinct from,
and should not be confused with, the provisional remedy of preliminary injunction, the sole object of which is to
preserve the status quo until the merits can be heard. A preliminary injunction is granted at any stage of an action or
proceeding prior to the judgment or final order. It persists until it is dissolved or until the termination of the action
without the court issuing a final injunction.
A restraining order, on the other hand, is issued to preserve the status quo until the hearing of the application for
preliminary injunction which cannot be issued ex parte. Under Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, a judge may issue a
temporary restraining order with a limited life of twenty (20) days from date of issue. If before the expiration of the
twenty (20)-day period the application for preliminary injunction is denied, the temporary restraining order would be
deemed automatically vacated. If no action is taken by the judge on the application for preliminary injunction within
the said twenty (20) days, the temporary restraining order would automatically expire on the 20th day by the sheer
force of law, no judicial declaration to that effect being necessary.[47]
Hence, in the case at bar, since no preliminary injunction was issued, the temporary restraining order granted
automatically expired after twenty (20) days under the Rules. The fact that respondent court merely ordered the
respondent[,] its agents, representatives or any person acting in his behalf to stop, desist and refrain from
implementing in their billings the new water rate increase which will start on March 1, 2000[48] without stating the
period for the restraint does not convert the temporary restraining order to a preliminary injunction.
The rule against the non-extendibility of the twenty (20)-day limited period of effectivity of a temporary restraining
order is absolute if issued by a regional trial court. The failure of respondent court to fix a period for the ordered
restraint did not lend the temporary restraining order a breath of semi-permanence which can only be characteristic
of a preliminary injunction. The twenty (20)-day period provided by the Rules of Court should be deemed
incorporated in the Order where there is an omission to do so. It is because of this rule on non-extendibility that
respondent City was prompted to move that hearings be set for its application of a preliminary injunction.
Respondent City cannot take advantage of this omission by respondent trial court.


G. R. No. L-13555, May 30, 1962

FACTS: The Faculty Club of the University of Santo Tomas, Inc. and San Beda College Lay Faculty Club, Inc.
filed a petition for declaratory relief with preliminary injunction before the Court of First Instance of Manila
alleging in substance that they have existing agreements with their respective employers the University of Santo
Tomas and San Beda College for the establishment of gratuity and retirement funds which have been in operation
prior to September 1, 1957; that the Social Security Commission tried to compel them to integrate their private
systems into the Social Security System on said date; that inasmuch as their private systems grant more benefits to
the members than the Social Security System the integration of their private systems would deprive their members
of property without due process of law, as well as would impair the obligation of their contract to the detriment of
the members. Hence, they prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction ex parte commanding the Social
Security Commission to desist from compelling them to integrate during the pendency of the case on the ground
that, unless said Commission is enjoined, it might enforce the penal provisions of the Social Security Act.

Judge Froilan Bayona, presiding, issued ex parte a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the SSC from
compelling the integration sought for. The SSC moved to dissolve the preliminary injunction on the following
grounds: (1) a statute is presumed constitutional; (2) there is no irreparable injury shown to justify the issuance of
injunction; (3) injunction does not lie against laws for public welfare; (4) injunction does not lie against enforcement
of penal laws; (5) injunction does not lie to stop the collection of contributions under the Social Security Law; and
(6) the preliminary injunction was barred by laches.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is irreparable injury in this case.

RULING: NO. The writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent judge is hereby lifted. Damages are
irreparable within the meaning of the rule relative to the issuance of injunction when there is no standard by which
their amount can be measured with reasonable accuracy. An irreparable injury which a court of equity will enjoin
includes that degree of wrong of a repeated and continuing kind which produce hurt, inconvenience, or damage that
can be estimated only by conjecture and not by any accurate standard of measurement. An irreparable injury to
authorize an injunction consists of “a serious charge of, or is destructive to, the property it affects, either physically
or in the character in which it has been held and enjoined, or when the property has some peculiar quality or use, so
that its pecuniary value will not fairly recompense the owner of the loss thereof.”

For an injury to be irreparable, it does not have to refer to the amount of damages that may be caused but rather to
the difficulty of measuring the damages inflicted. If full compensation can be obtained by way of damages, equity
will not apply the remedy of injunction.