POLITICAL LAW REVIEW

Constitutional Commissions

Arevalo 1. National Service Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, Nov. 29, 1988

(National Service Corp. v. National Labor Relations Commission, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, [November
29, 1988], 250 PHIL 129-148)

Doctrine:

SUBSIDIARIES OF GOVERNMENT OWNED OR CONTROLLED CORPORATION NOT INCLUDED IN

THE AMBIT OF CIVIL SERVICE.

FACTS:

Eugenia C. Credo was an employee of the National Service Corporation (NASECO), a domestic
corporation which provides security guards as well as messengerial, janitorial and other similar manpower
services to the Philippine National Bank (PNB) and its agencies. She was first employed with NASECO
as a lady guard on 18 July 1975. Through the years, she was promoted to Clerk Typist, then Personnel
Clerk until she became Chief of Property and Records, on 10 March 1980.

Sometime before 7 November 1983, Credo was administratively charged by Sisinio S. Lloren, Manager of
Finance and Special Project and Evaluation Department of NASECO, stemming from her non-compliance
with Lloren’s memorandum.

On 7 November 1983, Credo was called to meet Arturo L. Perez, then Acting General Manager of
NASECO, to explain her side. After said meeting, on the same date, Credo was placed on "Forced
Leave" status.

On 1 December 1983, Credo was called again to the office of Perez to be informed that she was being
charged with certain offenses. And was made to explain her side in connection with the charges filed
against her; however, due to her failure to do so, she was handed a Notice of Termination.

Hence, Credo filed a supplemental complaint for illegal dismissal.

The labor Arbiter dismissed Credo’s complaint and directed NASECO to ay her separation pay.

Both appealed to the NLRC to which rendered a decision ordering NASECO to reinstate Credo and pay
her back wages but not granting Credo’s claim for attorney’s fee, moral and exemplary damages.

Hence, this appeal.

In NASECO's comment, it is belatedly argued that the NLRC has no jurisdiction to order Credo's
reinstatement. NASECO claims that, as a government corporation (by virtue of its being a subsidiary of
the National Investment and Development Corporation (NIDC), a subsidiary wholly owned by the
Philippine National Bank (PNB), which in turn is a government owned corporation), the terms and
conditions of employment of its employees are governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations.
In support of this argument, NASECO cites National Housing Corporation vs. Juco, where this Court held
that "There should no longer be any question at this time that employees of government-owned or
controlled corporations are governed by the civil service law and civil service rules and regulations."
It would appear that, in the interest of justice, the holding in said case should not be given retroactive
effect, that is, to cases that arose before its promulgation on 17 January 1985. To do otherwise would be
oppressive to Credo and other employees similarly situated, because under the same 1973 Constitution
but prior to the ruling in National Housing Corporation vs. Juco, this Court had recognized the applicability
of the Labor Code to, and the authority of the NLRC to exercise jurisdiction over, disputes involving terms
and conditions of employment in government-owned or controlled corporations, among them, the National
Service Corporation (NASECO).

ISSUE:

Whether NASECO is covered by the Civil Service or by NLRC

HELD:

NLRC has jurisdiction.

The situations sought to be avoided by the 1973 Constitution and expressed by the Court in the National
Housing Corporation case in the following manner appear relegated to relative insignificance by the 1987
Constitutional provision that the Civil Service embraces government-owned or controlled corporations
with original charter; and, therefore, by clear implication, the Civil Service does not include government-
owned or controlled corporations which are organized as subsidiaries of government-owned or controlled
corporations under the general corporation law.

On the premise that it is the 1987 Constitution that governs the instant case because it is the Constitution
in place at the time of decision thereof, the NLRC has jurisdiction to accord relief to the parties. As an
admitted subsidiary of the NIDC, in turn a subsidiary of the PNB, the NASECO is a government-owned or
controlled corporation without original charter.
2. Alliance of Gov’t. Workers v. Minister of Labor & Employment, 124 SCRA 1 (1983)

12. Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor, 124 SCRA 1 (1983)

G.R. No. L-60403 August 3, 1983

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Doctrine: Under the present [1973] Constitution, govemment-owned or controlled corporations are
specifically mentioned as embraced by the civil service. Thus, the branches, agencies, subdivisions, and
instrumentalities of the Government, including government owned or controlled corporations are not
included among the 4 "employers" under Presidential Decree No. 851 which are required to pay an their
employees receiving a basic salary of not more than P1,000.00 a month, a 13th month pay not later than
December 24 of every year. The Republic of the Philippines, as sovereign, cannot be covered by a
general term like "employer" unless the language used in the law is clear and specific to that effect.

Facts: Petitioner Alliance of Government Workers (AGW) is a registered labor federation while the other
petitioners are its affiliate unions with members from among the employees of PNB, MWSS, PUP, etc. On
February 28, 1983, the Philippine Government Employees Association (PGEA) filed a motion to come in
as an additional petitioner. According to the petitioners, P.D. No. 851 requires all employers to pay the
13th-month pay to their employees with one sole exception found in Section 2 which states that
"(E)mployers already paying their employees a 13th month pay or its equivalent are not covered by this
Decree. " The petitioners contend that Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential
Decree No. 851 included other types of employers not exempted by the decree. They state that nowhere
in the decree is the secretary, now Minister of Labor and Employment, authorized to exempt other types
of employers from the requirement.

The petitioners assail Section 3 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree
No. 851 as ultra vires and void. They state that a legislative act cannot be amended by a rule and an
administrative officer cannot change the law. Section 3 is challenged as a substantial modification by rule
of a Presidential Decree and an unlawful exercise of legislative power.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General in his comment for the Minister of Labor and Employment,
the Social Security System the Philippine Normal College, and Polytechnic University, the contention that
govermment owned and controlled corporations and state colleges and universities are covered by the
term "all employers" is belied by the nature of the 13- month pay and the intent behind the decree. What
the P.D. No. 851 intended to cover, as explained in the prefatory statement of the Decree, are only those
in the private sector whose real wages require protection from world-wide inflation. This could only refer to
the private sector, and not to those in the government service because at the time of the enactment of
Presidential Decree No. 851 in 1975, only the employees in the private sector had not been given any
increase in their minimum wage. The employees in the government service had already been granted in
1974 a ten percent across-the-board increase on their salaries as stated in P.D. No. 525, Section 4.
Moreover, where employees in the government service were to benefit from labor standard laws, their
coverage is explicitly stated in the statute or presidential enactment. That no such express provision was
provided and no accompanying appropriation measure to was passed clearly show the intent to exclude
government employees from the coverage of P. D. No. 851.

Issue: Whether or not the branches, agencies, subdivisions, and instrumentalities of the Government,
including government owned or controlled corporations are included among the 4 "employers" under
Presidential Decree No. 851 which are required to pay an their employees receiving a basic salary of not
more than P1,000.00 a month, a thirteenth (13th) month pay not later than December 24 of every year.
Ruling: No. It is an old rule of statutory construction that restrictive statutes and acts which impose
burdens on the public treasury or which diminish rights and interests, no matter how broad their terms do
not embrace the Sovereign, unless the Sovereign is specifically mentioned. The Republic of the
Philippines, as sovereign, cannot be covered by a general term like "employer" unless the language used
in the law is clear and specific to that effect.

The general rule in the past and up to the present is that "the terms and conditions of
employment in the Government, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof are governed
by law." Since the terms and conditions of government employment are fixed by law, government workers
cannot use the same weapons employed by workers in the private sector to secure concessions from
their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peace cannot be
secured through compulsion by law. Relations between private employers and their employees rest on an
essentially voluntary basis. Subject to the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and
welfare legislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized private sector are settled
through the process of collective bargaining. In government employment, however, it is the legislature
and, where properly given delegated power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms
and conditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or administrative circulars, rules, and
regulations, not through collective bargaining agreements.

At the same time, the old Industrial Peace Act excepted employees and workers in proprietary
functions of government from the above compulsion of law. The exception, however belongs to the past.

The petitioners state in their counter comment filed July 23, 1982 that the 1973 Constitution is
categorical about the grant of the rights to self- organization and collective bargaining to all workers and
that no amount of stretched interpretation of lesser laws like the Labor Code and the Civil Service Act can
overturn the clear message of the Constitution with respect to these rights to self-organization and
collective bargaining.

Under the present Constitution, govemment-owned or controlled corporations are specifically

mentioned as embraced by the civil service. (Section 1, Article XII-B, Constitution). The inclusion of the
clause "including every government owned or controlled corporation" in the 1973 amendments to the
Constitution was a deliberate amendment for an express purpose. There may be those who disagree with
the intent of the framers of the amendment but because it is fundamental law, we are all bound by it. The
amendment was intended to correct the situation where more favored employees of the government
could enjoy the benefits of two worlds. They were protected by the laws governing government
employment. They could also engage in collective bargaining and join in strikes to secure higher wages
and fringe benefits which equally hardworking employees engaged in government functions could only
envy but not enjoy.

Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines has implemented the
1973 Constitutional amendment. It is categorical about the inclusion of personnel of government-owned
or controlled corporations in the civil service and their being subject to civil service requirements.
Personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations are now part of the civil service. It would not
be fair to allow them to engage in concerted activities to wring higher salaries or fringe benefits from
Government even as other civil service personnel such as the hundreds of thousands of public school
teachers, soldiers, policemen, health personnel, and other government workers are denied the right to
engage in similar activities.

To say that the words "all employers" in P.D. No. 851 includes the Government and all its
agencies, instrumentalities, and government-owned or controlled corporations would also result in
nightmarish budgetary problems. For instance, the Supreme Court is trying its best to alleviate the
financial difficulties of courts, judges, and court personnel in the entire country but it can do so only within
the limits of budgetary appropriations. Public school teachers have been resorting to what was formerly
unthinkable, to mass leaves and demonstrations, to get not a 13th-month pay but promised increases in
basic salaries and small allowances for school uniforms. The budget of the Ministry of Education, Culture
and Sports has to be supplemented every now and then for this purpose. The point is, salaries and fringe
benefits of those embraced by the civil service are fixed by law. Any increases must come from law, from
appropriations or savings under the law, and not from concerted activity.

Records of the 1971 Constitutional Convention show that in the deliberations held relative to what
is now Section 1(1) Article XII-B, supra the issue of the inclusion of government-owned or controlled
corporations figured prominently. “It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the
nature of the public employer and the peculiar character of the public service, it must necessarily regard
the right to strike given to unions in private industry as not applying to public employees and civil service
employees. It has been stated that the Government, in contrast to the private employer, protects the
interests of all people in the public service, and that accordingly, such conflicting interests as are present
in private labor relations could not exist in the relations between government and those whom they
employ.’

“Moreover, determination of employment conditions as well as supervision of the management of

the public service is in the hands of legislative bodies. It is further emphasized that government agencies
in the performance of their duties have a right to demand undivided allegiance from their workers and
must always maintain a pronounced esprit de corps or firm discipline among their staff members. It would
be highly incompatible with these requirements of the public service, if personnel took orders from union
leaders or put solidarity with members of the working class above solidarity with the Government. This
would be inimical to the public interest.’

“Moreover, it is asserted that public employees by joining labor unions may be compelled to
support objectives which are political in nature and thus jeopardize the fundamental principle that the
governmental machinery must be impartial and non-political in the sense of party politics.”

Section 6, Article XII-B of the Constitution gives added reasons why the government employees
represented by the petitioners cannot expect treatment in matters of salaries different from that extended
to all others government personnel. The provision states: “The National Assembly shall provide for the
standardization of compensation of government officials and employees, including those in government-
owned or controlled corporations, taking into account the nature of the responsibilities pertaining to, and
the qualifications required for the positions concerned.”

It is the legislature or, in proper cases, the administrative heads of government and not the
collective bargaining process nor the concessions wrung by labor unions from management that
determine how much the workers in government-owned or controlled corporations may receive in terms of
salaries, 13th month pay, and other conditions or terms of employment. There are government institutions
which can afford to pay two weeks, three weeks, or even 13th-month salaries to their personnel from their
budgetary appropriations. However, these payments must be pursuant to law or regulation.
Lazaro 3. Overruled: NHA v. Juco, 134 SCRA 172 (1985)

G.R. No. L-64313 January 17, 1985

NATIONAL HOUSING CORPORATION vs. BENJAMIN JUCO AND THE NATIONAL

LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

Doctrine:

The fact that "private" corporations owned or controlled by the government may be created by
special charter does not mean that such corporations not created by special law are not covered by the
civil service. Nor does the decree repealing all charters and special laws granting exemption from the civil
service law imply that government corporations not created by special law are exempt from civil service
coverage. These charters and statutes are the only laws granting such exemption and, therefore, they are
the only ones which could be repealed. There was no similar exempting provision in the general law
which called for repeal. And finally, the fact that the Constitutional Convention discussed only
corporations created by special law or charter cannot be an argument to exclude petitioner NHC from civil
service coverage

FACTS:

Private respondent Juco is a project engineer of the National Housing Corporation (NHC) from 1970 to
1975 for having been implicated in a crime of theft and/or malversation of public funds involving 214
pieces of scrap G.I. pipes owned by the corporation which was allegedly committed in 1975. Juco's
services were terminated by NHC.

In 1977, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner (NHC) with Regional Office No. 4,
Department of Labor (Ministry of Labor). He alleged that he was innocent and that he was only dismissed
based on purely fabricated charges purposely to harass him because he stood as a witness in the theft
case filed against certain high officials of the NHC and prayed for 'his immediate reinstatement to his
former position without loss of seniority rights and the consequent payment of his back wages plus all the
benefits appertaining thereto.

NHC also filed its position paper alleging that the Regional Office Branch IV, Manila, NLRC, "is without
authority to entertain the case for lack of jurisdiction, considering that the NHC is a government owned
and controlled corporation; that even assuming that this case falls within the jurisdiction of this Office,
NHC maintains that Juco was separated from the service for valid and justified reasons.

ISSUE:

Are employees of the National Housing Corporation (NHC) covered by the Labor Code or by laws and
regulations governing the civil service?

HELD:

Employees of NHC are covered by the civil service laws.

Basis:

- 1973 Constitution and the Labor Code.

- The NHC is a one hundred percent (100%) government-owned corporation organized in accordance
with Executive Order No. 399, the Uniform Charter of Government Corporations, dated January 5, 1951.
The NHC has never had any private stockholders. The government has been the only stockholder from
its creation to the present.

Section 1, Article XII-B of the 1973 Constitution specifically provides:

The Civil Service embraces every branch, agency, subdivision, and instrumentality of the
Government, including every government-owned or controlled corporation. ...

The 1935 Constitution had a similar provision in its Section 1, Article XI I which stated:

A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the Government shall be provided by law.

The inclusion of "government-owned or controlled corporations" within the embrace of the civil
service shows a deliberate effort of the framers to plug an earlier loophole which allowed
government-owned or controlled corporations to avoid the full consequences of the an
encompassing coverage of the civil service system. The same explicit intent is shown by the
addition of "agency" and "instrumentality" to branches and subdivisions of the Government. All
offices and firms of the government are covered.The amendments introduced in 1973 are not Idle
exercises or a meaningless gestures. They carry the strong message that civil service coverage is broad
and an- embracing insofar as employment in the government in any of its governmental or corporate
arms is concerned.

The constitutional provision has been implemented by statute. Presidential Decree No. 807 is
unequivocal that personnel of government-owned or controlled corporations belong to the civil service
and are subject to civil service requirements.

The very Labor Code, P. D. No. 442 as amended, which the respondent NLRC wants to apply in its
entirety to the private respondent provides:

ART. 277. Government employees. — The terms and conditions of employment of all government
employees, including employees of government-owned and controlled corporations shall be
governed by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations. Their salaries shall be standardized by
the National Assembly as provided for in the New Constitution. However, there shall be reduction
of existing wages, benefits and other terms and conditions of employment being enjoyed by them
at the time of the adoption of the Code.

This becomes more apparent if we consider the fact that the NHC performs governmental
functions and not proprietary ones.
The petitioner points out that it was established as an instrumentality of the government to accomplish
governmental policies and objectives and extend essential services to the people. It would be
incongruous if employees discharging essentially governmental functions are not covered by the same
law and rules which govern those performing other governmental functions. If government corporations
discharging proprietary functions now belong to the civil service with more reason should those
performing governmental functions be governed by civil service law.

The fact that "private" corporations owned or controlled by the government may be created by special
charter does not mean that such corporations not created by special law are not covered by the civil
service. Nor does the decree repealing all charters and special laws granting exemption from the civil
service law imply that government corporations not created by special law are exempt from civil service
coverage. These charters and statutes are the only laws granting such exemption and, therefore, they are
the only ones which could be repealed. There was no similar exempting provision in the general law
which called for repeal. And finally, the fact that the Constitutional Convention discussed only
corporations created by special law or charter cannot be an argument to exclude petitioner NHC from civil
service coverage.

Section I of Article XII-B, Constitution uses the word "every" to modify the phrase "government-owned or
controlled corporation."

"Every" means each one of a group, without exception It means all possible and all taken one by one. Of
course, our decision in this case refers to a corporation created as a government-owned or controlled
entity. It does not cover cases involving private firms taken over by the government in foreclosure or
similar proceedings. We reserve judgment on these latter cases when the appropriate controversy is
brought to this Court.

Uy 4. Overruled: Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, 146 SCRA 137 (1986)

22. Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, 146 SCRA 137 (1986)

FELICITO R. QUIMPO vs. TANODBAYAN (OMBUDSMAN), GREG DIMAANO and DANNY F. REMO

G.R. No. 72553 December 2, 1986

NOTE: The case was decided in 1986. The term ‘government-owned or controlled corporations’ in the
1973 Constitution was qualified by the 1987 Constitution to refer only to those with original charters (Khan
vs. Office of Ombudsman, G.R. No. 125296, July 20, 2006).

FACTS

In 1984, petitioner Quimpo (President of Admiral Adjusters and Surveyors, Inc.) filed with
Tanodbayan a complaint against private respondents (Dimaano and Remo as Manager and Analyst
Distribution Dept. of Petrophil Corp.) for violation of RA 3091 (Anti- Graft and Corrupt Practices Act).

Petitioner alleged that AASI was engaged by Petrophil to render survey services, and that Respondents
Dimaano and Remo caused the withholding of the fees due AASI amounting to P147,300. Despite AASI's
demand and explanation for losses caused by leaking valves, respondents still refused to release the
payments and even threatened to forfeit AASI's performance bond and claim damages and losses from
AASI. Petitioner further alleged that private respondents favored Greater Marine Cargo Surveyors to
enable it to win the bidding in January 1984.
Respondents moved for dismissal, alleging lack of jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan.

NOTE: Petrophil was not created by special law but as a private corporation under the Corporation Law
with the name Standard Vacuum Oil Company (STANVAC). STANVAC was taken over by Esso
Philippines, which was, in turn bought by Esso Eastern Standard. Eventually, Esso Eastern Standard was
purchased by the Philippine National Oil Corporation (PNOC), and its corporate name was changed to
Petrophil Corporation.

Tanodbayan Decision: It has no jurisdiction over GOCCs created under the Corporation Law, but only
GOCCs created by special law. It’s decision relied on the Opinion of Sec. of Justice that when Section 6,
Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution mentions "GOCC," the intent is only to those created by special law.

Petition for certiorari was filed.

ISSUE: Whether or not PETROPHIL Corporation, a subsidiary of PNOC, is a government-owned

or controlled corporation, whose employees fall under Tanodbayan jurisdiction

HELD:

Yes. While it may be that PETROPHIL was not originally "created" as a GOCC, after it was
acquired by PNOC, which is a GOCC, PETROPHIL became a subsidiary of PNOC and thus shed-off its
private status. It is now funded and owned by the government as, in fact, it was acquired to perform
functions related to government programs and policies on oil a vital commodity in the economic life of the
nation. It was acquired not temporarily but as a permanent adjunct to perform essential government or
government-related functions, as the marketing arm of PNOC to assist the latter in selling and distributing
oil and petroleum products to assure and maintain an adequate and stable domestic supply. It should
make no substantial difference that it was not originally "created" as a government-owned or controlled
corporation. What is decisive is that it has since been acquired by the Government to perform
functions related to government programs and policies on oil.

Sections 5 and 6, Article XIII of the 1975 Constitution, on the Sandiganbayan and Tanodbayan,
adopted in the so-called Freedom Constitution, provide:

SEC. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan,
which shall have jurisdiction over criminal and civil case involving graft and corrupt practices and such
other offenses committed by public officers and employees, including those in GOCCs, in relation to their
office as may be determined by law.

SEC. 6. The Batasang Pambansa shall create an office of the Ombudsman, to be known as
Tanodbayan, which shall receive and investigate complaints relative to public office, including those in
GOCCs, make appropriate recommendations, and in case of failure of justice as defined by law, file and
prosecute the corresponding criminal civil or administrative case before the proper court or body.

Moreover, "Government" as defined in Section 2(a) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
include government corporations:

Sec. 2. Definition of terms. — (a) 'Government' includes the national government, the local
governments, GOCCs, and other instrumentalities or agencies of the Republic of the Philippines and their
branches.

Evident is the intent to include employees of GOCCs within the jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan
and the Sandiganbayan.
 Private respondents allege, however, that PETROPHII, is possessed of unique characteristics
that endow it with all the vestiges of a private corporation, such as (1) its employees are not members of
the GSIS but of the SSS; (2) they are covered by the Labor Code and other labor laws and not by Civil
Service rules; (3) PETROPHIL was never created pursuant to the express provisions of the PNOC
charter; and (4) it is engaged in the highly competitive business of petroleum distribution/retail and its
operation is profit-oriented.

Assuming these to be so, they are internal matters not determinative of its real corporate
classification. Besides, its exclusion from GSIS coverage is not by virtue of its private character but by
operation of law pursuant to Section 15 of P.D. No. 405, amending the PNOC charter, specifically
providing that, "PNOC subsidiaries organized to undertake purely business ventures shall not, as a matter
of right, be subject to the provisions of the GSIS, as provided for under R.A. No. 186, as amended, as
well as to any law, EO and decrees relating to leave of absences, retirement privileges, regular working
hours, and other government employee benefits." And even granting that it is profit-oriented, the fact
remains that it was acquired with capital belonging to the Government and Government money is
utilized in its operations.

In other words, there can be no gainsaying that as of the date of its acquisition by the
Government utilizing public funds, PETROPHIL, while retaining its own corporate existence, became a
government-owned or controlled corporation within the Constitutional precept. Its employees, therefore,
are public servants falling within the investigatory and prosecutory jurisdiction of the Tanodbayan for
purposes of the Anti-Graft & Corrupt Practices Act.

Otherwise, a major policy of Government, which is to eradicate, or at the very least minimize, the
graft and corruption that has permeated the fabric of the public service, like a malignant social cancer,
would be seriously undermined. In fact, Sec. 1 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act seeks to
repress not only certain acts of public officers but also of "private persons alike, which constitute graft or
corrupt practices or which may lead thereto.
Fernando 5. Cailles v. Bonifacio, 65 Phil. 328 (1938)

JUAN CAILLES v. ARSENIO BONIFACIO

[G.R. No. L-45937. February 25, 1938]

Laurel, J.:

DOCTRINE: Being a qualified elector and the possession by him of the other qualifications prescribed for
an elective provincial office not being challenged, he is not ineligible to the office of provincial governor to
which he has been elected.

FACTS:

This is an original action in the nature of quo warranto instituted by the petitioner under the provisions of
section 408 of the Election Law for the purpose of ousting the respondent from the office of provincial
governor of Laguna. It is contended that at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy and was elected to
office, the respondent was a captain in the reverse force of the Philippine Army and, for this reason, is
ineligible to office. Two grounds are advanced in support of this contention: (a) the alleged disqualification
of the respondent under section 431 of the Election Law and (b) prohibition against him as member of the
armed forces under section 2 of Article XI of the Constitution and section 449 of the Election Law.

ISSUE:

Whether or not respondent Bonifacio is legible to office.

HELD:

Yes. Section 2, Article XI of the 1935 Constitution (similar to the 1987 provision) prohibits members of the
Armed Forces from engaging in any partisan political activity or otherwise taking part in any election
except to vote, but it does not ex vi termini grant or confer upon them the right of suffrage. As Section 431
of the Election Law, as amended disqualifies from voting only members in the active service of the
Philippine Army and no claim is made that this discrimination violates Constitution, it follows that the
respondent, being in the reserve force, is not disqualified from voting. The respondent being a qualified
elector and the possession by him of the other qualifications prescribed for an elective provincial office
not being challenged, he is not ineligible to the office of provincial governor to which he has been elected.
The constitutional provision mentioned contemplates only those in the active service otherwise it would
lead to widespread disqualification of the majority of the able bodied men who are part of the reserve
corps of the armed forces from voting and from being voted upon.

The most important reason for the disqualification is that members of the armed forces are servants of
the State and not the agents of any political group.
Hernandez 6. Santos v. Yatco, 59 O.G. 548 (1959)

(De los Santos v. Yatco, G.R. No. L-13932, [December 24, 1959], 106 PHIL 745-750)

Ponente: J. Bengzon

Doctrine: A judge has jurisdiction to quash a writ of execution issued by him, especially where it was
improvidently issued. In the case at bar, although the court has already issued the order of execution,
there being opposition on the part of the defendant, who alleged and proved a subsequent verbal
agreement amending the compromise agreement, execution could not validly be decreed without a
hearing.

FROM NET: Article IX (B), Section 2. (1) The civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,
instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charters. (2) Appointments in the civil service shall be made only according to
merit and fitness to be determined, as far as practicable, and, except to positions which are policy-
determining, primarily confidential, or highly technical, by competitive examination. (3) No officer or
employee of the civil service shall be removed or suspended except for cause provided by law. (4) No
officer or employee in the civil service shall engage, directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan
political campaign. (5) The right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees. (6)
Temporary employees of the Government shall be given such protection as may be provided by law.

FACTS: Petitioner files a petition for certiorari to revoke the order of the respondent judge cancelling his
previous order of execution on the parcel of land owned by the petitioner. The said parcel of land is being
occupied by Fernandez Mendonez with an agreement to pay in installment the said land to the petitioners
and that he shall voluntarily vacate the land and the payments he previously made shall be forfeited in
favor of the plaintiff. A civil case was filed by the petitioner against Mendonez for failure to pay as per
agreement of both parties. Petitioner later filed a motion for execution to take the land back. Defendant
Mendonez moved for postponement to give the both parties sufficient time to come to an agreement
which was allowed by the respondent judge. It was settled by both parties that Mendonez will secure a
GSIS loan however when he was ready to make the payment the petitioner refused to abide with their
agreement and now asking for a higher amount of money for payment. Finding no justification on the
issuance of the writ of execution, Judge Yatco quash said order hence this petition for certiorari based on
lack of jurisdiction or abuse of discretion.

ISSUE: Whether or not there is abuse of discretion.

HELD: No. In the first place, there being opposition on the part of the defendant, who alleged and proved
a subsequent verbal agreement amending the compromise, execution could not validly be decreed
without a hearing. As we said in Co. vs. Lucero, 100 Phil., 160, 52 Off. Gaz., (17), 7255, when under
similar circumstances a breach of the compromise agreement is alleged, "there arises a cause of action
which must be passed upon by the court requiring a hearing to determine whether such breach had really
taken place." In the second place, the allegations proved by Mendoñez about their verbal agreement, his
having secured a loan from the GSIS and his consequent ability to discharge his obligation seemingly
justified the court's refusal to eject defendant from the premises (on execution) with the consequent
forfeiture in favor of the plaintiffs of more than P12,000.00 already paid by defendant as previous
instalments of the purchase price, not to mention the loss of defendant's use of the house and theatre
erected on that parcel of land. Upon the other hand, the respondent judge's action caused no irreparable
or undue harm to plaintiffs, because the latter still have the judgment that may be enforced upon any
further default of defendant Mendoñez. Note particularly that their unpaid credit continuous to earn 10%
interest.

Wherefore, as the court had jurisdiction and has committed no grave abuse of discretion, the writ of
certiorari may not be issued. Petition denied, with costs against petitioners.
Lingahan 7. De los Santos v. Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 (1950)

Ponente: Tuason

Nature of action: quo warranto proceeding

DOCTRINE: Positions which are NOT primarily confidential, highly technical and policy-determining
cannot be removed except for cause. They also cannot be removed at the president’s pleasure.

FACTS:

On July 16, 1946, Eduardo de los Santos was appointed as City Engineer of Baguio by the President and
was confirmed by the Commission on Appointments Thereafter, De Los Santos duly exercised his duties
and functions as City Engineer.

On June 1, 1950 - Gil R. Mallare was extended an ad interim appointment by the President to the same
position.

On June 3, the Undersecretary of the Department of Public Works and Communications directed de los
Santos to report to the Bureau of Public Works for another assignment. De los Santos refused to vacate
the office, and when the City Mayor and the other officials named as Mallare's co-defendants ignored him
and paid Mallare the salary corresponding to the position, he commenced these proceedings.

He argues: that he cannot be removed against his will and without cause as provided in Article XII of the
Constitution, Sec. 4: "No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or suspended except
for cause as provided by law."

On the other hand, Mallare answered that the City Engineer of Baguio "belongs to the unclassified
service." According to him, Section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code, which falls under Chapter
61 entitled "City of Baguio," authorizes the Governor General (now the President) to remove at pleasure
any of the officers enumerated therein, one of whom is the city engineer.

ISSUE: WON De Los Santos may be removed from his position at the president’s pleasure. NO

RULING:

1. The Revised Administrative Code Sec 2545 provides that the president may remove at pleasure
any of the said appointive officers.

2. The constitution provided “for cause as provided by law”. It left to the Congress the causes for
removal. It may mean that the president’s choice to remove is a cause itself.

3. For cause means for reasons which the law and sound public policy recognized as sufficient
warrant for removal, that is, legal cause, and not merely causes which the appointing power in the
exercise of discretion may deem sufficient. It is implied that officers may not be removed at the mere will
of those vested with the power of removal, or without any cause. Moreover, the cause must relate to and
affect the administration of the office, and must be restricted to something of a substantial nature directly
affecting the rights and interests of the public.

4. BUT if the appointees in the Civil Service may be removed at the president’s pleasure, then the
merit system in the Civil Service will be rendered useless.

5. The position city engineer merely executes policies, ministerial in character, and technical but not
highly technical.

a. It is not primarily confidential, policy-determining, nor highly technical

i. These positions (primarily confidential etc) require the

highest degree of confidence and are excluded from the merit system. Thus, may be removed by the
president at will.

6. We are not declaring any part of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code unconstitutional.
What we declare is that the particular provision thereof which gave the Chief Executive power to
remove officers at pleasure has been repealed by the Constitution and ceased to be operative
from the time that instrument went into effect.

a. the questioned part of section 2545 of the Revised Administrative Code does not need a positive
declaration of nullity by the court to put it out of the way. To all intents and purposes, it is non-existent,
outlawed and eliminated from the statute book by the Constitution itself by express mandate before this
petitioner was appointed.

DISPOSITIVE: De Los Santos cannot be removed except for cause. Thus, Mallare’s appointment to the
same position is invalid.
8. Corpus v. Cuaderno, 13 SCRA 591 (1965)

G.R. No. L-23721 March 31, 1965

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Doctrine: The constitutional provisions merely constitute the policy-determining, primarily

confidential, and highly technical positions as exceptions to the rule requiring appointments in
the Civil Service to be made on the basis of merit and fitness as determined from competitive
examinations, but the Constitution does not exempt such positions from the operation of the
principle emphatically and categorically enunciated in section 4 of Article XII.

Facts: On 7 March 1958, the petitioner-appellant, R. Marino Corpus, then holding the position of
"Special Assistant to the Governor, In Charge of the Export Department" of the Central Bank, a position
declared by the President of the Philippines on 24 January 1957 as highly technical in nature, and
admitted as such by both the present litigants, was administratively charged by several employees in the
export department with dishonesty, incompetence, neglect of duty, and/or abuse of authority, oppression,
conduct unbecoming of a public official, and of violation of the internal regulations of the Central Bank.

On 18 March 1958, the Monetary Board suspended the petitioner from office effective on said
date and created a three-man investigating committee composed of Atty. Guillermo de Jesus, chairman;
and Atty. Apolinar Tolentino, Assistant Fiscal of the City of Manila, and Professor Gerardo Florendo,
senior attorney of the Central Bank, members. In its final report dated 5 May 1959, the investigating
committee, "after most extensive hearings in which both complainants and respondent were afforded all
the opportunity to submit their evidence, and after a most exhaustive and conscientious study of the
records and evidence submitted in the case," made the following conclusion and recommendation:
disciplinary action against respondent, and, therefore, immediate reinstatement.

Nevertheless, on 20 July 1959, the Monetary Board approved the following resolution: “in
accordance with the provisions of Section 14 of the Bank Charter, considers the respondent R. Marino
Corpus, resigned as of the date of his suspension.” Corpus moved for the reconsideration of the above
resolution, but the Board denied it, after which he filed an action for certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto,
and damages, with preliminary injunction, with the Court of First Instance of Manila. The said court, after
trial, rendered judgment declaring the Board resolution null and void, and ordering, among others, the
reinstatement of the herein petitioner and awarding him P5,000.00 as attorney's fees. As aforesaid, both
the petitioner and the respondents appealed the judgment.

The appeal of the Central Bank and its Monetary Board is planted on the proposition that officers
holding highly technical positions may be removed at any time for lack of confidence by the appointing
power, and that such power of removal is implicit in section 1, Art. XII, of the Constitution:

Section 1. A Civil Service embracing all branches and subdivisions of the

Government shall be provided by law. Appointments in the Civil Service,
except as to those which are policy-determining, primarily confidential or
highly technical in nature, shall be made only according to merit and fitness,
to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination.

It is argued that for the three classes of position referred to in the constitutional disposition
(policy-determining, primarily confidential and highly technical), lack of confidence of the one making the
appointment constitutes sufficient and legitimate cause of removal.

Issue: Whether or not lack of confidence of the one making the appointment is a sufficient ground
for removal of employee.
Ruling: No. In the first place, the loss of confidence ground, on which the dismissal is sought to be
predicated, is a clear and evident afterthought resorted to when the charges, subject matter of the
investigation, were not proved or substantiated. The Monetary Board nowhere stated anything in the
record which the committee failed to consider in recommending exoneration from the charges; it nowhere
pointed to any substantiation of the charges; it, therefore, relied only on the statement of the loss of
confidence made by Governor Cuaderno. We find in the particular set of facts herein that the alleged loss
of confidence is clearly a pretext to cure the inability of substantiating the charges upon which the
investigation had proceeded.

The court, therefore, cannot rely on the so-called "loss of confidence" as a reason for dismissal.
And inasmuch as the charges against petitioner were unsubstantiated, that leaves no other alternative but
to follow the mandate that — No public officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law (Sec. 4, Art. XII, Constitution of the Phil.)

Since in the interest of the service reasonable protection should be afforded civil servants in
positions that are by their nature important, such as those that are "highly technical," the Constitutional
safeguard requiring removal or suspension to be "for cause as provided by law" at least demands that
their dismissal for alleged "loss of confidence" if at all allowed, be attended with prudence and
deliberation adequate to show that said ground exists.

In the second place, the argument for the Monetary Board ignores the self-evident fact that the
constitutional provisions merely constitute the policy-determining, primarily confidential, and highly
technical positions as exceptions to the rule requiring appointments in the Civil Service to be made on the
basis of merit and fitness as determined from competitive examinations, but that the Constitution does not
exempt such positions from the operation of the principle emphatically and categorically enunciated in
section 4 of Article XII. It is well to recall here that the Civil Service Law in force (Rep. Act No. 2260)
divides positions into three categories: competitive or classified; non-competitive or unclassified service;
and exempt service, the last being expressly excluded from the scope of the Civil Service Act (sec. 3,
R.A. 2260). It is indisputable that the plaintiff Corpus is protected by the Civil Service law and regulations
as a member of the non-competitive or unclassified service, and that his removal or suspension must be
for cause recognized by law

The tenure of officials holding primarily confidential positions (such as private secretaries of public
functionaries) ends upon loss of confidence, because their term of office lasts only as long as confidence
in them endures; and thus their cessation involves no removal. But the situation is different for those
holding highly technical posts, requiring special skills and qualifications. The Constitution clearly
distinguished the primarily confidential from the highly technical, and to apply the loss of confidence rule
to the latter incumbents is to ignore and erase the differentiation expressly made by our fundamental
charter. Moreover, it is illogical that while an ordinary technician, say a clerk, stenographer, mechanic, or
engineer, enjoys security of tenure and may not be removed at pleasure, a highly technical officer, such
as an economist or a scientist of avowed attainments and reputation, should be denied security and be
removable at any time, without right to a hearing or chance to defend himself. No technical men worthy of
the name would be willing to accept work under such conditions. Ultimately, the rule advocated by the
Bank would demand that highly technical positions be filled by persons who must labor always with an
eye cocked at the humor to their superiors. It would signify that the so-called highly technical positions will
have to be filled by incompetents and yes-men, who must rely not on their own qualifications and skill but
on their ability to curry favor with the powerful. The entire objective of the Constitution in establishing and
dignifying the Civil Service on the basis of merit would be thus negated. Of course, a position may be
declared both highly technical and confidential, as the supreme interests of the state may require. But the
position of plaintiff-appellant Corpus is not of this category.
Manalac 9. Ingles v. Mutuc, 26 SCRA 171 (1968)

INGLES VS MUTUC

41 SCRA 471

FACTS:

Direct appeal by the plaintiffs from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila dismissing their
complaint herein, with costs against them.

plaintiffs herein are civil service eligibles, holding positions, in the budget for the fiscal year 1961-1962,
under the Office of the President.

-Plaintiff Raul R. Ingles has a first-grade civil service eligibility, holding a WAPCO-classified position of
Senior Executive Assistant II, with a compensation of P6,888.00 a year, and eight (8) years of service in
the Government.

Plaintiff Roaldo G. Adviento is, in turn, a second-grade civil service eligible, holding a WAPCO-classified
position of Clerk I, with a compensation of P1,800.00 a year, and four (4) years of service in the
Government,

-plaintiff Isabel C. Corpus is a third-grade civil service eligible, holding a WAPCO-classified position of
Supervising Clerk I, with a compensation of P2,544.00 a year, and eight (8) years of service in the
Government.

- Plaintiff Consuelo M. Villanueva is another third-grade civil service eligible, holding a WAPCO-classified
position of Clerk I, with a compensation of P1,800.00 a year, and ten (10) years of service in the
Government. P

-laintiff Esperanza M. Gutierrez is a third-grade civil service eligible, holding a WAPCO-classified position
of Stenographer, with a compensation of P1,980.00 a year, and eight (8) years of service in the
Government.

second week of January, 1962, plaintiffs received a communication of the then Executive Secretary,
Amelito R. Mutuc, advising them that their services in the Government were terminated as of January 1,
1962. Plaintiffs appealed from this action to the President, on or about January 26, 1962. A month later,
or on February 27, 1962, they received a letter of Mr. Mutuc, acting "by authority of the President,"
denying the reconsideration prayed for.

Soon thereafter, Salvador L. Marino was substituted in lieu of Amelito R. Mutuc as one of the defendants
herein, the former having meanwhile assumed the office of Executive Secretary, which the latter vacated
upon his appointment as Ambassador of the Philippines to the United States.

Defendants maintained that the principal issue in this case "is whether or not the plaintiffs are occupying
positions which are primarily confidential and, therefore, are subject to removal at the pleasure of the
appointing power," and that this issue should be resolved in the affirmative. The trial court did so, with the
result already adverted to.

Issue: whether or not officer holding a position which is primarily confidential in nature is "subject to
removal at the pleasure of the appointing power."

HELD:

The assumption that an officer holding a position which is primarily confidential in nature is "subject to
removal at the pleasure of the appointing power," is inaccurate. This assumption is evidently based upon
a statement in De los Santos v. Mallare (87 Phil. 289) to the effect that "three specified cases of positions
— policy — determining, primarily confidential and highly technical — are excluded from the merit system
and dismissal at pleasure of officers and employees appointed therein is allowed by the Constitution."
This was, however, a mere obiter, because, the office involved in said case — that of City Engineer of
Baguio — did not belong to any of the excepted classes, and, hence, it was not necessary to determine
whether its incumbents were removable or not at the pleasure of the appointing power. What is more,
said obiter, if detached from the context of the decision of which it forms part, would be inconsistent with
the constitutional command to the effect that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed
or suspended except for cause as provided by law" (Sec. 4, Art. XII, Phil. Constitution), and it is conceded
that one holding in the Government a primarily confidential position is "in the Civil Service." In fact, in the
De los Santos case, this Court cited with approval the view, expressed in Lacson v. Romero, 84 Phil. 740,
to the effect "that officers or employees in the unclassified, as well as those in the classified service are
protected by the abo

ve cited provision of the organic law.||| (Ingles v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20390, [November 29, 1968], 135
PHIL 177-185)

Again, the law alluded to in the Constitution, namely Section 32 of Republic Act No. 2260, provides:

"Sec. 32.Disciplinary Action. — No officer or employee in the civil service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law and after due process; Provided, That a
transfer from one position to another without reduction in rank or salary shall not be considered
disciplinary when made in the interest of public service; Provided, further, That no complaint
against a civil service official or employee shall be given due course unless the same is in
writing and subscribed and sworn to by the complainant; And provided, finally, that the
respondent shall be entitled to a formal investigation, if he so elects, in which case he shall
have the right to appear and defend himself at said investigation in person or by counsel, to
confront and cross-examine the witnesses against him, and to have the attendance of
witnesses and production of documents in his favor by compulsory process of subpoena or
subpoena duces tecum."

This should not be misunderstood as denying that the incumbent of a primarily confidential position holds
office at the pleasure only of the appointing power. It should be noted, however, that when such pleasure
turns into displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed" or "dismissed" from office — his "term" merely
"expires", in much the same way as an officer, whose right thereto ceases upon expiration of the fixed
term for which he had been appointed or elected, is not and can not be deemed "removed" or "dismissed"
therefrom, upon the expiration of said term. The main difference between the former — the primarily
confidential officer — and the latter is that the latter's term is fixed or definite, whereas that of the former
is not pre- fixed, but indefinite, at the time of his appointment or election, and becomes fixed and
determined when the appointing power expresses its decision to put an end to the services of the
incumbent. When this event takes place, the latter is not removed or dismissed from office — his term has
merely expired.

||| (Ingles v. Mutuc, G.R. No. L-20390, [November 29, 1968], 135 PHIL 177-185)

Considering that plaintiffs herein are admittedly civil service eligibles, with several years of service in the
Government, and that positions which are policy determining, primarily confidential and highly technical in
nature are exceptions to the general rule governing Civil Service officers and employees, it was up to
defendants-appellees to establish that plaintiffs belong to one of these excepted classes. This,
defendants-appellees have failed to accomplish.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from should be, as it is hereby reversed, and another one shall be
entered declaring that plaintiffs' removal from office was illegal and contrary to law, and that they are,
accordingly, entitled to reinstatement to their respective offices and to the payment of their corresponding
emoluments, from January 1, 1962, up to their actual reinstatement.
Monzon 10. Cristobal v. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175 (1977)

G.R. No. L-43203 July 29, 1977

JOSE C. CRISTOBAL, plaintiff-appellant,

vs.

ALEJANDRO MELCHOR and FEDERICO ARCALA, defendants-appellees.

MUÑOZ PALMA, J:

Doctrine : That one holding in the government a primarily confidential position is "in the Civil
Service" and that "officers or employees in the unclassified" as well as "those in the classified
service" are protected by the provision in the organic law that "no officer or employee in the Civil
Service shall be removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law" (Section 4, Article
XII, 1935 Constitution)

Facts :

Cristobal was formerly employed as a private secretary in the President's Private Office,
Malacañang, Manila, having been appointed to that position on July 1, 1961 with a salary of P4,188.00
per annum. On or about the second week of January, 1962, the then Executive Secretary Amelito R.
Mutuc, by means of a letter dated January 1, 1962, informed the plaintiff that his services as private
secretary in the President's Private Office were "terminated effective today." A similar letter was
addressed by Secretary Mutuc to some other employees in the Office of the President. The dismissed
employees appealed to the President by means of letters dated January 3, 1962 and January 26, 1962
for a reconsideration of their separation from the service. In a letter dated February 27, 1962, their
request for reconsideration was denied by Secretary Mutuc, acting by authority of the President.

While the Civil case of Ingles (Cristobal was not a party in this case) was still pending, the
dismissed employees who filed said action were recalled to their positions in the Office of the President,
without prejudice to the continuation of their civil action, With respect to the other employees who were
not reinstated, efforts were exerted by Secretary Mutuc to look for placements outside of Malacañang so
that they may be re-employed. Cristobal was one of those who had not been fortunate enough to be
reappointed to any positions as befits his qualifications.

He waited for Secretary Mutuc to make good his assurance that he would be recalled to the
service, until Secretary Mutuc was replaced by other executive secretaries who likewise assured the
plaintiff of assistance to be reemployed at "the opportune time."

After the decision of the Ingles Case, which was for reinstatement and backwages, Cristobal
wrote a letter to the Office of the President requesting for his reinstatement and backwages. The requests
letters were denied.
 Thus Cristobal filed a case before the CFI of Manila naming then Executive Secretary, Alejandro
Melchor and Federico Arcala, cash disbursing officer, Office of the President of the Philippines, as
defendants.

Defendants, alleged that plaintiff Jose Cristobal had no cause of action as he is deemed to have
abandoned his office for failure to institute the proper proceedings to assert his right within one year from
the date of separation pursuant to Sec. 16, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court, he having come to court only
after the lapse of more than nine years, thereby in effect acquiescing to his separation, and therefore he
is not entitled to any salary from termination of his employment.

CFI ruled against Cristobal.

Issue : W/N Cristobal can still be reinstated despite the lapse of one year.

Held :

YES. Jose Cristobal consistently pressed for a reconsideration of his separation from the service;
another was that he was given assurance that would be recalled at the opportune time; and that the
sudden termination of his employment without cause after eight years of service in the government is
contrary to law following the ruling Ingles vs, Mutuc which inures to the benefit of Cristobal who is similarly
situated as the plaintiffs in said case and who merely desisted from joining the suit because of the
assurance given him that he would be recalled to the service.

The dismissal of appellant Cristobal was contrary to law on the strength of this Court's Decision in
Ingles vs. Mutuc. The court ruled that Cristobal is holding a confidential position as decided in the case of
Ingles. That one holding in the government a primarily confidential position is "in the Civil Service" and
that "officers or employees in the unclassified" as well as "those in the classified service" are protected by
the provision in the organic law that "no officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
suspended except for cause as provided by law" ; that while the incumbent of a primarily confidential
position holds office at the pleasure only of the appointing power and such pleasure turns into
displeasure, the incumbent is not "removed" or "dismissed" but that his term merely "expires"; that there
was no evidence to indicate that the respective positions of the dismissed plaintiffs were "primarily
confidential" in nature and on the contrary the compensation attached and the designation given thereto
suggest the purely or at least mainly clerical nature of their work; and consequently,, considering that the
plaintiffs were admittedly civil service eligibles with several years of service in the Government, their
removal from office was "illegal and contrary to law".
Abon 11. Acolola v. Tantuico, 85 SCRA 789 (1978)

G.R. No. L-47191 June 27, 1978

ARTURO ACOLOLA, petitioner,

vs.
FRANCISCO S. TANTUICO JR. Acting Chairman, Commission on Audit, General Auditing Office and
HORACIO A. MARTINEZ, respondents.

SANTOS, J.:

DOCTRINE: Summary dismissal of government employees resorted to when the offense charged against
him is serious, the circumstances surrounding its commission and the evidence of guilt being
overwhelmingly and indubitably strong.

FACTS:

Petitioner Arturo Alcolola was assigned as Provincial Auditor of Capiz on April 16, 1972. In 1972, an
administrative complaint was filed against him charging him with various irregularities in connection with
the discharge of his duties. The complaint was subsequently dismissed.Meanwhile,in 1

974 he was again administratively charged with offenses ranging from "misconduct, neglect of duty to
incompetence in the performance of official duties," which charges were likewise dismissed.

On December 3, 1976, while petitioner was assigned as Acting Highway Engineering District Auditor
of Romblon private respondent Horacio A. Martinez, a contractor of Public Works Project in the province
of Romblon, filed another complaint against petitioner charging him, this time, with —(1) Delaying action
on payment of vouchers;(2) Delaying action on request for inspection of accomplished work;(3)
Refusal to assign an auditor's representative to check deliveries of materials at job sites at the
time of deliveries;(4) Piece meal suspension of vouchers;(5) Demanding free transportation and
meals when on inspection of materials delivered or work accomplished; and(6) Demanding P24,000
cost of plane fare for his twin daughter's trip to the United States.

On December 15, 1976,upon recommendation of the Civil Security Office of the Commission on Audit, an
entrapment scheme was devised and executed.Petitioner was apprehended by the Provincial Command
in the act of receiving from complainant Horacio A. Martinez, the amount of P2,000.00 in marked P20 bills
as bribe money, while he was about to enter his room at the Seaside Hotel.

On January 12, 1977, a formal administrative charge was filed against him. At the same time the
preventive suspension of petitioner was ordered by the respondent Hon. Francisco S. Tantuico, Jr.
pursuant to Section 41, Presidential Decree No. 807.

On May 12,1977, was summarily dismissed from the service, pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 807,
dated October 6, 1975.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit Hon. Francisco S.
Tantuico, Jr. could, under the foregoing circumstances, summarily dismiss petitioner pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 807. (YES)

HELD:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the court resolved to dismiss, as it hereby DISMISSES, this petition for
lack of merit. The temporary restraining order dated November 4, 1977 is hereby LIFTED and SET
ASIDE.

The Court agree with the Solicitor General, that the issue should be answered in the affirmative.

Section 40 of Presidential Decree No. 807 specifically provides:

Sec. 40.Summary Proceedings. — No formal investigation is necessary and the respondent may be
immediately removed or dismissed if any of the following circumstances is present:

(a) When the charge is serious and the evidence of guilt is strong.

(b) When the, respondent is a recidivist or has been repeatedly charged and there is reasonable
ground to believe that he is guilty of the present charge.

(c) When the respondent is notoriously undesirable.

Resort to summary proceedings by disciplining authority shall be done with utmost objectivity and
impartiality to the end that no injustice is committed: Provided, That removal or dismissal except those by
the President, himself or upon his order, may be appealed to the commission.

As the Solicitor General forcefully argued —

It is indisputable that the summary dismissal of petitioner by respondent Chairman of the Commission on
Audit, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of Presidential Decree No. 807 was premised on the fact that
petitioner was caught redhanded by agents of the Philippine Constabulary in the act of receiving and
having in his possession P2,000.00 in marked P20 bills, and for which he was criminally charged in court.
The evidence against him was overwhelming. Such fact, by itself, sufficiently warranted his summary
dismissal from the service under the above-mentioned decree. The seriousness of the offense charged,
the circumstances surrounding its commission and the evidence of guilt, being overwhelming and
indubitably strong, the interest of the public service demanded the drastic remedy of summary dismissal,
which respondent Chairman of the Commission on Audit judiciously took against petitioner. Respondent
Chairman was indeed left with no option. With the evidence at hand, Chairman could not have done
otherwise.

Of course, the charges filed earlier against petitioner could not just be allowed to pass unnoticed.

.
12. Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor, 124 SCRA 1 (1983)

SEE DIGEST IN (2).

Arevalo 13. National Service Corp. v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, Nov. 1988

SEE DIGEST IN (1).

GUTIERREZ 14. Nacionalista Party v. Angelo Bautista, 85 Phil. 101 (1949)

G.R. No. L-3474, December 7, 1949

MORAN, C.J.:

Doctrine: Petitioner Nacionalista Party may be organized and registered as a political party in or with the
Commission on Elections for the purposes of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180), but for
the purpose of bringing an action in the courts of justice such organization and registration are not
sufficient. It has to be incorporated under Act 1459 for only natural or juridical persons may be parties in a
civil action, but this technical defect may be cured by allowing the substitution of the real parties in
interest for the petitioner.

Facts: Petitioner Nacionalista Party alleges that it is organized and registered under the laws of the
Philippines, brought this action praying that a writ of prohibition issue commanding the respondent
Solicitor General to desist forever from acting as acting member of the Commission on Elections under
the designation rendered to him by President Quirino, unless he is legally appointed as regular member
of the said Commission on Elections.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner, a political party is entitled to bring an action in the courts of justice.

Held: It may be organized and registered as a political party in or with the Commission on Elections for
the purposes of the Revised Election Code (Republic Act No. 180), but for the purpose of bringing an
action in the courts of justice such organization and registration are not sufficient. It has to be
incorporated under Act 1459 for only natural or juridical persons may be parties in a civil action, but this
technical defect may be cured by allowing the substitution of the real parties in interest for the petitioner.

The petitioner is granted five days within which to amend its petition so as to substitute the real parties in
interest for it (the petitioner) or to show that it is a juridical person entitled to institute these proceedings.
Otherwise, or if the petitioner does not amend its petition or does not show that it is a juridical entity, the
petition will be dismissed. After the amendment or showing referred to shall have been made, the writ
prayed for will issue.
Sanchez 15. Sanchez v. COMELEC, 114 SCRA 454 (1982)

G.R. No. L-55513, L-55642, [June 19, 1982]

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J:

Case Doctrines:

It may be true that there is no specific provision vesting the COMELEC with authority to
annul an election. However, there is no doubt either relative to COMELEC's extensive powers.
Under the Constitution, the COMELEC is tasked with the function to "enforce and administer all
laws relative to the conduct of elections”... It would be unreasonable to state that the COMELEC
has a legal duty to perform and at the time deny it the wherewithal/ ability to fulfill that task.

Clearly, under Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, when the election "results in a failure
to elect, the COMELEC may call for the' holding or continuation of the election as soon as
practicable." We construe this to include the calling of a special election in the event of a failure to
elect in order to make the COMELEC truly effective in the discharge of its functions.

Facts:

In the local elections held on January 30, 1980, Armando Biliwang, a Kilusang Bagong Lipunan
(KBL) candidate, was proclaimed winner for the office of Municipal Mayor of San Fernando, Pampanga
as against Virgilio Sanchez, a Nacionalista Party (NP) candidate.

Sanchez filed with the Commission on Elections (Comelec) a Petition to declare null and void the
local elections in San Fernando due to alleged large scale terrorism.

The COMELEC, which first denied but reconsidered the Petition, ordered the

· annulment of the local elections held on January 30, 1980 in San Fernando, consequently,

· the annulment and setting aside of the proclamation of Biliwang and other municipal officials;

· and certified to the President/Prime Minister and the Batasang Pambansa the failure of election
threat, based on a finding that threats and coercion or terrorism and irregularities were committed after
the elections or specifically the counting of votes and in the preparation of the election return against
teachers-members of the Citizens Election Committees.

The COMELEC concluded that there were threats and coercion or terrorism and irregularities
committed AFTER the elections based on:

There is strong and sufficient evidence to support the charge that in the
preparation of election returns, the teacher-members of the Citizens Election Committees
(CEC's) were threatened and coerced into making spurious election returns without
regard to the genuine ballots in the ballot boxes. Policemen, armed goons and other
persons — all in obvious conspiracy — 'herded' the teacher-members of the CEC's to the
Town Hall of San Fernando, where the ballot boxes were forced open and the contents
 thereof substituted with pre-prepared ballots favoring respondent Biliwang. In fact, some
of the genuine ballots replaced with those fake ballots were produced at the hearing by
the teachers who managed to 'save' or 'salvage' them secretly, together with some stubs
detached from the fake ballots which upon comparison appeared wider than the genuine
ones (Exhs. F & G; N, N-1 to N-31: O, O-1 to O-16).

"The operation involving the use of force and coercion was so open and
pervasive that after voting a preponderant number of the voting centers were placed
under the control of the terrorists. And the Town Hall of San Fernando was virtually
converted into a 'concentration camp', wherein the teacher-members of the CEC's for
several hours were at the mercy of the armed goons who were bent to ensure the victory
of the incumbent mayor at the time i.e. respondent Biliwang, at all costs. No watchers
were allowed inside; the relatives and friends of the teachers were kept outside until the
early morning of January 31, 1980."

Sanchez sought reconsideration of that portion of the COMELEC Resolution which certified the
failure of election to the President/Prime Minister and the Batasang Pambansa, and prayed that a special
election be called.

Biliwang, also moving for reconsideration, alleged that COMELEC has no authority to annul the
entire municipal election (the power to try election contests relative to elective municipal officials is vested
in Courts of First Instance), prayed that he be proclaimed on the basis of the undisputed returns. Both
were denied by the COMELEC.

Hence, the two separate petitions filed by Sanchez and Biliwang, respectively, with the Supreme
Court.

Issues:

Does the COMELEC have the authority to call for a special election?

Does the COMELEC have the power to annul an entire municipal election on the ground of post-
election terrorism?

Ruling:

WHEREFORE, in G. R. No. 55513 (Sanchez), the challenged Resolution of May 15, 1980 is hereby
modified, and the Commission on Elections hereby held empowered to call a special election
where there has been a failure to elect. That portion which certifies the failure of election in San
Fernando, Pampanga, to the President and the Batasang Pambansa for the enactment of remedial
measures, is hereby set aside.

In G. R. No. 55642 (Biliwang), the Petition is hereby denied for lack of merit, and the authority of
the Commission on Elections to annul an election hereby upheld.
 It may be true that there is no specific provision vesting the COMELEC with authority to annul an
election. However, there is no doubt either relative to COMELEC's extensive powers. Under the
Constitution, the COMELEC is tasked with the function to "enforce and administer all laws relative to the
conduct of elections" (Article XII (c), Section 2(1), 1973 Constitution). The 1978 Election Code (PD No.
1296) accords it exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct
of elections for the purpose of insuring file, orderly and honest elections (Sec. 185). In other words, in line
with the plenitude of its powers and its function to protect the integrity of elections under the 1973
Constitution and the 1978 Election Code, the COMELEC must be deemed possessed of authority to
annul elections where the will of the voters has been defeated and the purity of elections sullied. It would
be unreasonable to state that the COMELEC has a legal duty to perform and at the time deny it the
wherewithal to fulfill that task.

The COMELEC found that the local election in San Fernando, Pampanga, was vitiated by post-
election widespread and pervasive terrorism and resulted in the submission of "gunpoint or coerced"
returns. In other words, there were no election returns worthy of faith and credit and from which could be
gauged a fair and true expression of the popular will. Its action, therefore, of rejecting all election returns
and annulling the local elections thereat was but in keeping with its constitutionally ordained power of
administration and enforcement of elections laws and its main objective to insure free, orderly and honest
elections.

Under the regime of the 1935 Constitution and the former Revised Election Code(Republic Act
No. 180, as amended), there was no constitutional nor statutory precept that empowered the COMELEC
to annul an election and/or to direct a new election after one had already been held. Clearly, under
Section 5 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 52, when the election "results in a failure to elect,'' the COMELEC may
call for the "holding or continuation of the election as soon as practicable." We construe this to include the
calling of a special election in the event of a failure to elect in order to make the COMELEC truly effective
in the discharge of its functions. In fact, Section 8 of the 1978 Election Code specifically allows the
COMELEC to call a special election for the purpose of filing a vacancy or a newly created position, as the
case may be. There should be no reason, therefore, for not allowing it to call a special election when
there is a failure to elect.

It would be to circumscribe the power of the COMELEC to ensure free, orderly and honest
elections if We were to hold that the COMELEC authority to call for the holding of the election is
applicable only when the causes therefore occurred before the elections; in other words, that the grounds
for calling special elections do not include post-election terrorism. That interpretation would not only
hamper the effectiveness of the COMELEC in the discharge of its functions but it would also, in case of
failure to elect due to post-election terrorism, delay the opportunity to the voters to cast their votes at the
earliest possible time. The electorate should not be disenfranchised for long and the COMELEC should
not be presented from taking the necessary steps to complete the elections. After all, the casting of
ballots is not the only act constitutive of elections. An election is not complete until proclamation has been
made.
Betguen 16. De Jesus v. People, 120 SCRA 760 (1983)

ROGELIO DE JESUS, petitioner,

vs.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, et al., respondents.

Doctrine: Section 184 of the Election Code deals specifically with election offenses, Section 4[c]
of P.D. No, 1606 speaks generally of "other crimes or offenses committed by public officers ... in
relation to their office." Needless to state, as between specific and general statute, the former
must prevail since it evinces the legislative intent more clearly than a general statute does. And
where a reconciliation between the statute is possible, as in the case at bar, the former should be
deemed an exception to the latter. The same principle of statutory construction should be applied
with respect to the powers vested upon the COMELEC and the Tanodbayan in so far as election
offenses are concerned.

Facts: After the local elections of January 18, 1980, Ananias Hibo, defeated candidate of the Nacionalista
Party for the office of mayor of the Municipality of Casiguran, Sorsogon filed with the COMELEC a
complaint charging petitioner Rogelio de Jesus, then COMELEC registrar of Casiguran, with violation of
the 1978 Election Code. Asst. Fiscals Manuel Genova and Delfin Tarog, in their capacity as deputized
Tanodbayan prosecutors, conducted an investigation. A prima facie case against petitioner for violation of
section 89 and sub-sections [x] and [mm] of Section 178 of the Election Code of 1978 was found to exist.

That on or about January 30, 1980 and sometime thereafter to February 6, 1980, in the Municipality of
Casiguran Province of Sorsogon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused while discharging the Office of the Election Registrar in the Municipality of
Casiguran, Province of Sorsogon, taking advantage and abusing his official position, did there and there
wilfully unlawfully and feloniously by reason of his being a registrar knowingly registered persons in order
to vote on January 30, 1980 being an election day and at the same time issuing Identification cards
during election day, thereby violating the provision of the Election Code of 1978 and at the same time
tampering with the election reports by mag it appear that 10,727 persons were the total number of
registered voters for the election of January 30, 1980, when in truth and in fact the actual total number of
voters as - sported on January 27, 1980 by the accused was only 10,532 but then changed to 10,727,
thereby violating the provisions of Section '89' and Section.'178' under Article XVI specifically sub- section
'X' and sub-section 'MM' which is a violation of the Election Code of 1978 to the erosion of public faith and
confidence. The following information was filed before the Sandiganbayan.

[x] Any election registrar or any person acting in his behalf who issues or causes the issuance of a voter's
certificate of registration or cancels or causes the cancellation thereof the violation of the provisions of
this Code.

[mm] Any person who, without authority, acts as, or assumes r performs any -function of a member of the
election committee, or the board of canvassers, or deputy of representative of the Commission
Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information, contending that neither the Tanodbayan nor the
Sandiganbayan has the authority to investigate, prosecute and try the offense. In its opposition, the
prosecution maintained the Tanodbayan’s exclusive authority to investigate and prosecute offenses
committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, and consequently, the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to try and decide the charges against petitioner.

Issue: Whether or not the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan have the power to investigate, prosecute,
and try election offenses committed by a public officer in relation to his office.

Held: The evident constitutional intendment in bestowing the power to enforce and administer all laws
relative to the conduct of election and the concomitant authority to investigate and prosecute election
offenses to the COMELEC is to insure the free, orderly and honest conduct of elections, failure of which
would result in the frustration of the true will of the people and make a mere idle ceremony of the sacred
right and duty of every qualified citizen to vote. To divest the COMELEC of the authority to investigate
and prosecute offenses committed by public officials in relation to their office would thus seriously impair
its effectiveness in achieving this clear constitutional mandate. From a careful scrutiny of the
constitutional provisions relied upon by the Sandiganbayan. We perceive neither explicit nor implicit grant
to it and its prosecuting arm, the Tanodbayan, of the authority to investigate, prosecute and hear election
offenses committed by public officers in relation to their office, as distinguished from the clear and
categorical bestowal of said authority and jurisdiction upon the COMELEC and the courts of first instance
under Sections 182 and 184, respectively, of the Election Code of 1978. The COMELEC is hereby
directed to forthwith conduct an investigation, and if the evidence so warrants, to prosecute the complaint
against petitioner before the proper court of first instance.
Fernando 17. Corpuz v. Tanodbayan, 149 SCRA 281 (1987)

NATIVIDAD CORPUS, AURORA FONBUENA, JOSIE PERALTA, CRESENCIA PADUA, DOMINADOR

BAUTISTA, LEOLA NEOG, EPIFANIO CASTILLEJOS AND EDGAR CASTILLEJOS vs.
TANODBAYAN OF THE PHILIPPINES, FISCAL JUAN L. VILLANUEVA, JR., AND ESTEBAN
MANGASER

[G.R. No. L-62075. April 15, 1987]

CORTES, J.:

DOCTRINE: COMELEC has the exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses
committed by any person. It is the nature of the offense, not the personality of the offender that matters.

FACTS:

Petitioners were members of the Citizens Election Committee of Caba, La Union in the 1980 elections;
petitioner Castillejos was Director of the Bureau of Domestic Trade and petitioner Edgar Castillejos was
then a candidate and later elected mayor in the same election. Mangaser, an independent candidate for
vice mayor of the same municipality sent a letter to President Marcos charging the petitioners with
violation of the 1978 Election Code, specifically for electioneering and/or campaigning inside the voting
centers during the election. On instruction from the COMELEC the Regional Election Director of San
Fernando, La Union, conducted a formal investigation and submitted its report recommending to the
COMELEC the dismissal of the complaint. Later on, Mangaser formally withdrew his charges filed with the
COMELEC stating his intention to refile it with the Tanodbayan. The COMELEC dismissed the complaint
for insufficiency of evidence.

Subsequently the assistant provincial fiscal started a preliminary investigation of a complaint filed by
Mangaser with the Tanodbayan against the same parties and on the same charges previously dismissed
by the COMELEC. The COMELEC Legal Assistance Office entered its appearance for the respondents
and moved for dismissal of the complaint. The motion was denied. The TANODBAYAN asserting
exclusive authority to prosecute the case, stated in a letter to the COMELEC Chairman that a lawyer of
the COMELEC if not properly deputized as a Tanodbayan prosecutor has no authority to conduct
preliminary investigations and prosecute offenses committed by COMELEC officials in relation to their
office. A motion for reconsideration was denied.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Tanodbayan has exclusive authority to prosecute the case.

HELD:

No. This Court rejected the assertion that no tribunal other than the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over
offenses committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office.
An examination of the provisions of the Constitution and the Election Code of 1978 reveals the clear
intention to place in the COMELEC exclusive jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute election offenses
committed by any person, whether private individual or public officer or employee, and in the latter
instance, irrespective of whether the offense is committed in relation to his official duties or not. In other
words, it is the nature of the offense and not the personality of the offender that matters. As long as the
offense is an election offense jurisdiction over the same rests exclusively with the COMELEC, in view of
its all-embracing power over the conduct of elections.
Ibis 18. UNIDO v. COMELEC, 104 SCRA 17 (1981)

UNITED DEMOCRATIC OPPOSITION (UNIDO)

vs.

COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (COMELEC)

G.R. No. 56515

April 3, 1981

FACTS:

· COMELEC issued three (3) Resolutions all dated March 5, 1981, to wit:

(1) Resolution No. 1467 providing for Rules and Regulations for 'equal opportunity' on
public discussions and debates on the plebiscite questions to be submitted to the
people on April 7, 1981;

(2) Resolution No.1468 providing "equal time on the use of the broadcast media (radio
and television) in the plebiscite campaign"; and

(3) Resolution No.1469 providing for "equal space on the use of the print media in the
1981 plebiscite of April 7, 1981".

· Petitioner UNIDO addressed a letter dated 10 March 1981 to respondent COMELEC, which reads:

xxx The newspapers this morning have announced that President Marcos will lead the campaign for
"Yes" votes on the proposed constitutional amendments in the April 7 plebiscite in his nationwide
"Pulong-Pulong sa Pangulo" radio-television program on Thursday, March 12, from 9:30 to 11:30
P.M., which will be carried live by 26 television and 248 radio stations throughout the country.

The undersigned, in behalf of the United Democratic Opposition (UNIDO), hereby demand exactly
the same number of TV and radio stations all over the country at the earliest possible date, to
campaign for 'No' votes in the forthcoming plebiscite.

· Petitioner addressed its second letter to respondent COMELEC, which reads:

Pursuant to the letter of UNIDO dated 10 March 1981 requesting for equal opportunity, the same
prime time and number of TV and radio stations all over the country which were utilized by
President Marcos last March 12 from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M., we wish to state that on Saturday, March 21,
the UNIDO will hold a public meeting at the Plaza Miranda, Quiapo, Manila, and we hereby request
that the same be covered by radio and television from 9:30 to 11:30 P.M.

· Respondent COMELEC issued a Resolution and held that they "cannot be granted and the same is
hereby denied."

· COMELEC: It is the considered view of this Commission that when President Marcos conducted
his 'pulong-pulong' or consultation with the people on March 12, 1981, he did so in his capacity
as President Prime Minister of the Philippines and not as the head of any political party. Under
the Constitution, the 'Prime Minister and the Cabinet shall be responsible . . . . for the program
of government and shall determine the guidelines of national policy' (Art. IX, Sec. 2 ) xxx
 · Petitioner UNIDO addressed its letter dated March 20, 1981 as its "motion for reconsideration" of the
COMELEC Resolution

· Respondent COMELEC RESOLVED TO DENY for lack of

ISSUES:

1.) The COMELEC Resolutions are contrary to the Constitution and the law, and moreover, are unjust,
unfair and inequitable, for said Resolutions violate the basic principles of equality, good faith and fair play,
and they are not conducive to insure free, orderly and honest elections;

2.) The request and/or demand of petitioner for equal broadcast media of its public meeting or rally at the
Plaza Miranda was arbitrarily denied

(The political campaign of the Kilusan ng Bagong Lipunan (KBL) for "YES" votes used all the radios and
televisions in the Pulong Pulong of its political leader, President Ferdinand E. Marcos, the political
campaign for "NO" votes of petitioner UNIDO should and must be granted the same right and equal use
of the same facilities for the remaining days of the political campaign for "NO" votes up to the plebiscite)

HELD:

1.) NO.

· Petitioner has not shown that they have requested any TV or radio station to give them
the same time and style of "pulong-pulong" as that which they afforded the President on
March 21, 1981 and that their request has been denied.

· No doubt the Constitution and the Election Code provisions as well as the general Comelec
resolution cited by petitioner's counsel may be availed of, but since, We have not been informed
of the circumstances under which the President was accorded the privilege which
petitioner wants to be equally granted to them, We are not even in a position to determine
under what definite terms the order prayed for should be issued by Us, considering there
are other groups and aggrupations not to speak of individuals who are similarly situated as
petitioner who would also want to be heard. We are afraid We would be expecting from the TV
and radio networks more than what conceivably the Charter, the law and the Comelec resolutions
contemplate, if We granted what UNIDO wants and did less for those other oppositors to the
amendments who may come to Us.

2.) NO.

· We opine and so hold that the provisions of all election laws regulating propaganda through the
mass media, for example, Section 41 of the Election Code of 1978, must be deemed applicable to
plebiscites. Therefore, it is the duty of the Comelec to see to it that the sale of air time by TV and radio
stations insures that time equal as to duration and quality is available to all candidates for the same office
or political parties, groups or aggrupations at the same rates or given free of charge.

· While it may not be exactly proper to say, as the Comelec resolution in question puts it, that
"(u)nder our Constitution, the President-Prime Minister has no counterpart, not even the
Opposition still waiting in the uncertain wings of power", it is undeniable and but natural that the
head of state of every country in the world must from the very nature of his position, be accorded
certain privileges not equally available to those who are opposed to him in the sense that, since
the head of state has the grave and tremendous responsibility of planning and implementing the
plan of government itself, either by virtue of the popular mandate given to him under the corresponding
provisions of the Constitution and the laws or any other duly recognized grant of power and authority, the
opposition cannot be placed at par with him, since logically the opposition can only fiscalize the
administration and punctualize its errors and shortcomings to the end that when the duly
scheduled time for the people to exercise their inalienable power to make a better choice, the
opposition may have the chance to make them accept the alternative they can offer.

· When the head of state is afforded the opportunity or when he feels it incumbent upon him
to communicate and dialogue with the people on any matter affecting the plan of government or
any other matter of public interest, no office or entity of the government is obliged to give the
opposition the same facilities by which its contrary views may be ventilated. lf the opposition
leaders feel any sense of responsibility in the premises to counter the administration, it is up to
them – and they are free – to avail of their own resources to accomplish their purpose.

· It is not for the administration to hand them on a silver platter the weapon they need.

· In instances where the head of state is at the same time the president of the political party that is in
power, it does not necessarily follow that he speaks with two voices when he dialogues with the
governed.

· Unquestionably, there are matters of vital public interest wherein partisan considerations could in
some degree be involved, but then such partisan interest would be purely secondary. The
President/Prime Minister of the Philippines is the political head of all the people. His is the sacred
responsibility to protect and defend the security of all the people, the stability of the government and the
integrity of the national territory, not only for the tenure to which he has been elected but for all times.
When, as in the instant situation, he deems it warranted by the circumstances to present to them a
plan of government which includes the modification of the existing structure of government
together with its concomitant allocation of governmental powers, it is not only his right but his
duty to take the people directly into his confidence and impart to them to the fullest measure of
his capacity and by all available adequate means the reasons therefor and the corrollarily
advantages thereof to their welfare. The opposition, if it opines otherwise, has naturally the
indisputable right to make every effort to thwart his objective. But, surely, this is far from saying
that it is the duty of the administration to generously grant to them the means to wage their
campaign against it.

· The long and short of the foregoing is that it is not true that in speaking as he did in the "Pulong-
Pulong sa Pangulo" on March 21, 1981, he spoke not only as President-Prime Minister but also as head
of the KBL, the political party now in power. It was in the former capacity that he did so. If in any way,
what he said would induce the people to accept the proposed amendments, his exposition of the
advantages thereof was not to promote the interest of that party but to improve the quality of the
government thereby to enable him or anyone who may be chosen by the people to take his place
to better serve the welfare not only of the KBL but of all of us, including those who are minded, for
reasons of their own, to oppose the amendments.

· Thus, for being beyond what the charter, the laws and pertinent Comelec regulations contemplate,
for being more than what the opposition is duly entitled vis-a-vis the duty, obligation and/or privilege
inherent in the head of state to directly dialogue with the sovereign people when the occasion demands,
for being impractical under prevailing circumstances, and for its failure to join in the instant petition
indispensable parties, thereby depriving the Court of jurisdiction to act, and for these alone among other
reasons which there is hardly time to state herein, the prayer in the instant petition cannot be granted.
Mentioned provisions:

Section 5 of Article XII-C of the Constitution circumscribes the relevant powers of the Comelec this wise:

The enjoyment or utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public
utilities, media of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by
the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned
or controlled corporation, may be supervised or regulated by the Commission during the election period
for the purpose of ensuring free, orderly, and honest elections.

Section 41 of the Election Code of 1978 pertinently reads as follows:

Regulation of election propaganda through mass media. – (a) The Commission shall promulgate rules
and regulations regarding the sale of air time for political purposes during the campaign period to insure
that time equal as to duration and quality is available to all candidates for the same office or political
parties, groups or aggrupations at the same rates or given free of charge; that such rates are reasonable
and not higher than those charged other buyers or users of air time for non-political purposes; that the
provisions of this Code regarding the limitation of expenditures by candidates and contributions by private
persons and certain classes of corporations, entities and institutions are effectively enforced; that said
radio broadcasting and television stations shall not be allowed to schedule any program or permit any
sponsor to manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or political party, group or aggrupation by unduly or
repeatedly referring to or including said candidate and/or political party, group or aggrupation respecting,
however in all instances the right of said stations to broadcast accounts of significant or newsworthy
events and views on matters of public interest.

Sections 7 and 8 of Comelec Resolution No. 1468 read thus:

SEC. 7. Free air time. – Any radio broadcasting or television station that grants free of charge the use of
air time to any supporter, oppositors political party, group or aggritpution shall also give similar air time
free of charge to other supporters, oppositors, political party group or aggrupations except when such use
of air -time is part of a news program or coverage involving a newsworthy event.

A radio, television station giving air time free of charge to any supporter, oppositor, political party/group
for campaign purposes shall inform the Commission of such fact within two days from the use of such free
time.

SEC. 8. Failure to agree on equal time. – In case the supporter, oppositor, political party group and the
radio-television station, despite mediation by the Ministry of Public Information, cannot agree on the equal
time to be sold or given free, the controversy shall be referred to the Commission whose decision on the
matter shall be final and immediately executory.
19. Javier v. COMELEC, 144 SCRA 194

G.R. Nos. L-68379-81 September 22, 1986

J. Cruz

Doctrine: "Sole judge" excluded not only all other tribunals but also and even the division of the
Commission. A decision made on the contest by less than the Commission en banc would not meet the
exacting standard of care and deliberation ordained by the Constitution.

Facts: Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the
Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of “massive terrorism, intimidation,
duress, vote-buying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and
intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador.” COMELEC just
referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on
Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to
suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd
Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the
outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the
board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period
of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election
must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should
inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the
2nd Division but the Constitution requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986,
during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it
being moot and academic by virtue of Javier’s death, the abolition of the Batasang Pambansa, and the
disappearance of the office in dispute between the petitioner and the private respondent-both of whom
have gone their separate ways.

The petitioner complains that the Proclamation made by the Second Division is invalid because
all contests involving the members of the Batasang Pambansa come under the jurisdiction of the
Commission on Elections en banc. This is as it should be, he says, to insure a more careful decision,
considering the importance of the offices involved. The respondents, for their part, argue that only
contests need to be heard and decided en banc and all other cases can be-in fact, should be-filed with
and decided only by any of the three divisions.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Second Division of the Commission on Elections is authorized to proclaim the
private respondent as the winner in the election.

HELD: No. The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen’s tenor.

The applicable provisions are found in Article XII-C, Sections 2 and 3, of the 1973 Constitution.

Section 2 confers on the Commission on Elections the power to:

(2) Be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns
and qualifications of all member of the Batasang Pambansa and elective
provincial and city officials.

Section 3 provides:

The Commission on Elections may sit en banc or in three divisions. All

election cases may be heard and decided by divisions except contests
involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which shall be heard and
decided en banc. Unless otherwise provided by law, all election cases shall
 be decided within ninety days from the date of their submission for
decision.

We believe that in making the Commission on Elections the sole judge of all contests involving
the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the Batasang Pambansa and elective provincial
and city officials, the Constitution intended to give it full authority to hear and decide these cases from
beginning to end and on all matters related thereto, including those arising before the proclamation of the
winners.

The word "contests" should not be given a restrictive meaning; on the contrary, it should receive
the widest possible scope conformably to the rule that the words used in the Constitution should be
interpreted liberally. As employed in the 1973 Constitution, the term should be understood as referring to
any matter involving the title or claim of title to an elective office, made before or after proclamation of the
winner, whether or not the contestant is claiming the office in dispute. Needless to stress, the term should
be given a consistent meaning and understood in the same sense under both Section 2(2) and Section 3
of Article XII-C of the Constitution.

The phrase "election, returns and qualifications" should be interpreted in its totality as referring to
all matters affecting the validity of the contestee's title. But if it is necessary to specify, we can say that
"election" referred to the conduct of the polls, including the listing of voters, the holding of the electoral
campaign, and the casting and counting of the votes; "returns" to the canvass of the returns and the
proclamation of the winners, including questions concerning the composition of the board of canvassers
and the authenticity of the election returns and "qualifications" to matters that could be raised in a quo
warranto proceeding against the proclaimed winner, such as his disloyalty or ineligibility or the
inadequacy of his certificate of candidacy.

All these came under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections insofar as they
applied to the members of the defunct Batasang Pambansa and, under Article XII-C, Section 3, of the
1973 Constitution, could be heard and decided by it only en banc.

We interpret "cases" as the generic term denoting the actions that might be heard and decided by
the Commission on Elections, only by division as a general rule except where the case was a "contest"
involving members of the Batasang Pambansa, which had to be heard and decided en banc.

As correctly observed by the petitioner, the purpose of Section 3 in requiring that cases involving
members of the Batasang Pambansa be heard and decided by the Commission en banc was to insure
the most careful consideration of such cases. Obviously, that objective could not be achieved if the
Commission could act en banc only after the proclamation had been made, for it might then be too late
already. We are all-too-familiar with the grab-the-proclamation-and-delay-the-protest strategy of many
unscrupulous candidates which has resulted in the frustration of the popular will and the virtual defeat of
the real winners in the election. The respondent's theory would make this gambit possible for the pre-
proclamation proceedings, being summary in nature, could be hastily decided by only three members in
division, without the care and deliberation that would have otherwise been observed by the Commission
en banc.

After that, the delay. The Commission en banc might then no longer be able to rectify in time the
proclamation summarily and not very judiciously made by the division. While in the end the protestant
might be sustained, he might find himself with only a Phyrric victory because the term of his office would
have already expired.

It may be argued that in conferring the initial power to decide the pre- proclamation question upon
the division, the Constitution did not intend to prevent the Commission en banc from exercising the power
directly, on the theory that the greater power embraces the lesser. It could if it wanted to but then it could
also allow the division to act for it. That argument would militate against the purpose of the provision,
which precisely limited all questions affecting the election contest, as distinguished from election cases in
general, to the jurisdiction of the Commission en banc as sole judge thereof. "Sole judge" excluded not
only all other tribunals but also and even the division of the Commission. A decision made on the contest
by less than the Commission en banc would not meet the exacting standard of care and deliberation
ordained by the Constitution.

Incidentally, in making the Commission the "sole judge" of pre- proclamation controversies in
Section 175, supra, the law was obviously referring to the body sitting en banc. In fact, the pre-
proclamation controversies involved in Aratuc vs. Commission on Elections, where the said provision was
applied, were heard and decided en banc.
Gardiano 20. Pimentel v. COMELEC, 101 SCRA 769 (1980)

Facts:

The herein petitioners are the contestants while herein private respondents are the contestees in
Election Cases Nos. 8, 9 and 10 which are pending before the Court of First Instance of Quirino.
Petitioners-contestants allege in their election protests that they were duly certified candidates for mayor,
vice-mayor and members of the Sangguniang Bayan of the Municipality of Diffun, Quirino Province, in the
general elections held last January 30, 1980, as shown in the resolution of the Comelec but that they
were not con-sidered as such by the Municipal Board of Canvassers who, con-sequently, did not count
the votes cast in their favor (having considered the same as stray votes) and proceeded to proclaim the
contestees as the duly elected officials of Diffun. Petitioners-contestants contend that had it not been for
the said error in the appreciation of the votes cast in their favor, they would have certainly emerged as the
winners in said election. In their answers to the election protests, the contestees deny that contestants
are duly certified candidates and allege that during the voting and the counting of votes, the contestants
were not bona fide candidates and it was for this reason that the votes cast in their favor were not
counted.

During the hearing of said protests, the contestees filed with the CFI of Quirino a Joint Motion to
Limit Reception of Evidence Pursuant to Material Allegations in the Protests. The contestees pray that
only the election returns should be considered in the counting of the votes in favor of the contestants and
that the ballots should not be re-examined for that purpose. The CFI of Quirino issued an order denying
the motion of the contestees. Thereafter, the contestees filed with the Commission on Elections a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction seeking to restrain the CFI of Quirino from
enforcing its orders. The COMELEC then issued Resolution No. 9592 restraining CFI Quirino Judge from
enforcing his order.

Thus, the contestants filed with the Supreme Court the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition with preliminary mandatory injunction seeking to annul Resolution No. 9592 of the
Commission on Elections; to prohibit the enforcement of said resolution; and to compel the Court of First
Instance of Quirino to proceed with the hearing of the election cases. Petitioners allege, among others,
that the Commission on Elections has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the petition for certiorari and
prohibition filed by the herein private respondents questioning an interlocutory order issued by the CFI of
Quirino, much less to restrain said court from enforcing said order.

Issue:

Whether or not COMELEC has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitions for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus involving said cases in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.

Held:

No. COMELEC has no jurisdiction.

In support of the contention that the Commission on Elections has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus involving election cases filed with the Court of First Instance by can-didates for
municipal offices, the respondents argue as follow: That Section 192 of the 1978 Election Code (P.D. No.
1296) grants the Commission on Elections the power to "prescribe the rules to govern the procedure and
other matters relating to election contests"; that, accordingly, the COMELEC issued Resolution No. 1451
prescribing the procedural rules for election contests in the Court of First Instance involving elective
municipal and municipal district offices; that Section 19 of said Rules provides that the Rules of Court of
the Philippines "shall serve as supplementary rules in election contests filed with the Court of First
Instance"; that under Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines, petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus "may also be filed with the Court of Appeals if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction"; that since the COMELEC exercises appellate jurisdiction over election cases filed with the
Court of First Instance involving municipal offices, pursuant to Section 196 of the 1978 Election Code,
said Commission is, thus, vested with jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
involving said election cases, applying by analogy the quoted provision of Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court of the Philippines.

The fallacy of the foregoing arguments of the respondents lies in the erroneous interpretation of the
aforequoted portion of Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court of the Philippines, as a grant of jurisdiction to
the Court of Appeals and, by analogy, to the Commission on Elections, to take cognizance of petitions for
certiorari, prohibition or mandamus involving cases over which said court or commission exercises
appellate jurisdiction.

Settled is the rule that jurisdiction is conferred only by the Constitution or the law. (Bacalso vs.
Ramolete, October 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 519, 523.) Thus, it cannot be conferred by the Rules of Court
which are neither constitutional provisions nor legislative enactments but mere procedural rules
promulgated by this Court in the exercise of its power to prescribe "rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts" (Sec. 5 (5), Art. X, 1973 Constitution; Sec. 13, Art. VIII, 1935 Constitution).

Accordingly, the aforequoted provision of Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, cannot be
construed as a grant of jurisdiction to the Court of Appeals over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus involving cases appealable to it. Much less can such provision be interpreted, by analogy, as
a grant to the Commission on Elections of jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus involving election cases cognizable by the Court of First Instance and appealable to said
commission under Sec. 196 of the Revised Election Code.

While it is true that the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus involving cases appealable to it, the grant of jurisdiction is not by virtue of the aforequoted
provision of Sec. 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, but by express legislative fiat, namely, Sec. 30 of the
Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296), to wit:

"SEC. 30. ORIGINAL JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS. - The Court of Appeals shall have
original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus, and all
other auxiliary writs and process in aid of its appellate jurisdiction."

No such legislative grant of jurisdiction exists in the case of the Commission on Elections. Consequently,
respondents' contention that the Commission on Elections has jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari,
prohibition or mandamus involving election cases cognizable by the Courts of First Instance and
appealable to said Commission cannot be sustained. It results, therefore, that Resolution No. 9592 was
issued by the COMELEC without authority to do so.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari and prohibition is hereby granted. Resolution No. 9592,
issued by the Commission on Elections in EAC No. 1-80 is hereby declared null and void and said
Commission is permanently enjoined from taking any further action on said case except to dismiss the
same for lack of jurisdiction. Costs against private respondents.
Magdaraog 21. Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan, 111 SCRA 433 (1982)

“Equal Protection -- Creation of Sandiganbayan

FACTS: Nunez assails the validity of PD 1486 creating the Sandiganbayan as amended by PD1606. He
was accused before the Sandiganbayan of estafa thru falsification of public and commercial documents
committed in connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials in several cases. It is the claim of
Nunez that PD 1486 as amended, is violative of the due process, equal protection, and ex post facto
clauses of the Constitution. He claims that the Sandiganbayan proceedings violates his right to equal
protection because appeal as a matter of right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; -
appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only to questions of law, excluding a review of facts and trial
evidence. He lamented that there is only one chance to appeal conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme
Court, instead of the traditional two chances; while all other estafa indictees are entitled to appeal as a
matter of right covering both law and facts and to two appellate courts, i.e., first to the CA and thereafter
to the SC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the creation of Sandiganbayan violates equal protection insofar as appeal would
be concerned.

HELD: No. The SC ruled against Nunez. The 1973 Constitution had provided for the creation of a special
court that shall have original jurisdiction over cases involving public officials charged with graft and
corruption. It follows that those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as
far back as January 17, 1973, when the present Constitution came into force that a different procedure for
the accused therein, whether a private citizen, as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily
offensive to the equal protection standard requiring that “it must be based on substantial distinctions
which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to
existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each member of the class.” Further still, decisions in
the Sandiganbayan are reached by a unanimous decision from 3 justices - a showing that decisions
therein are more conceivably carefully reached than other trial courts.
Uy 22. Quimpo v. Tanodbayan, 146 SCRA 137 (1986)

(Please refer to Case #4)

Padilla 23. Zaldivar v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 79690-707, April 7, 1988 and Resolution, May 19, 1988

Doctrines:

a.) The Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987 Constitution and who is supposed to
retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly without authority to conduct
preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan, except upon
orders of the Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost effective February 2, 1987. From that time, he has
been divested of such authority.

b.) The freedom of speech and of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that
freedom of expression needs on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of
equally important public interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the
integrity and orderly functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free
expression and the integrity of the system of administering justice.

Facts: Enrique A. Zaldivar, governor of the province of Antique, sought to restrain the Sandiganbayan
and Tanodbayan Raul Gonzalez from proceeding with the prosecution and hearing of Criminal Cases
Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163-12177 on the ground that said cases were filed by said Tanodbayan
without legal and constitutional authority, since under the 1987 Constitution which took effect on February
2, 1987, it is only the Ombudsman (not the present or incumbent Tanodbayan) who has the authority to
file cases with the Sandiganbayan.the resolution of the Supreme Court stopping the respondent from
investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar. The Court ruled that since the adoption
of the 1987 Constitution, respondent’s powers as Tanodbayan have been superseded by the creation of
the Office of the Ombudsman, he however becomes the Special Prosecutor of the State, and can only
conduct an investigation and file cases only when so authorized by the Ombudsman. A motion for
reconsideration was filed by the respondent wherein he included statements which were unrelated in the
Issue raised in the Court. This include: (a)That he had been approached twice by a leading member of
the court and he was asked to 'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him; (b) That he "was
approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal disbursements in the
Supreme Court because 'it will embarrass the Court;" and (c) that in several instances, the undersigned
respondent was called over the phone by a leading member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the
cases against two Members of the Court." Statements of the respondent saying that the SC’s order
'"heightens the people's apprehension over the justice system in this country, especially because the
people have been thinking that only the small fly can get it while big fishes go scot-free” was publicized in
leading newspapers.

Now, the Court Resolved to require respondent to explain in writing why he should not be punished for
contempt of court for making such public statements reported in the media. Respondent then sought to
get some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of the Zaldivar case for alleged
bias and prejudice against him. A little later, the Court has become incapable of judging him impartially
and fairly. The Court found respondent guilty of contempt of court and indefinitely suspended from the
practice of law. Now, he assails said conviction, invoking his freedom of speech. Counsel for respondent
urges that it is error "for this Court to apply the "visible tendency" rule rather than the "clear and present
danger" rule in disciplinary and contempt charges."

Issues:
a.) Whether or not the present or incumbent tanodbayan has authority to file cases with the
Sandiganbayan?

b:) Whether or Not there was a violation of the freedom of speech/expression.

Held:

a.) No. The Authority lies with the Ombudsman. Under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman (as
distinguished from the incumbent Tanodbayan) is charged with the duty to:"Investigate on its own, or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when
such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or ineficient." (Sec. 13, par. 1). The
Constitution likewise provides that:"The existing Tanodbayan shall hereafter be known as the Office of the
Special Prosecutor. It shall continue to function and exercise its powers as now or hereafter may be
provided by law, except those conferred on the Office of the Ombudsman created under this
Constitution." (Art. XI, Section 7). The Tanodbayan (called Special Prosecutor under the 1987
Constitution and who is supposed to retain powers and duties NOT GIVEN to the Ombudsman) is clearly
without authority to conduct preliminary investigations and to direct the filing of criminal cases with the
Sandiganbayan, except upon orders of the Ombudsman. This right to do so was lost effective February 2,
1987. From that time, he has been divested of such authority. The Office of the Ombudsman is a new
creation under Article XI of the Constitution different from the Office of the Tanodbayan created under PD
1607 although concededly some of the powers of the two offices are identical or similar. The Special
Prosecutor cannot plead that he has a right to hold over the position of Ombudsman as he has never held
it in the first place.

b.) There was no violation. The Court did not purport to announce a new doctrine of "visible tendency," it
was simply paraphrasing Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court which penalizes a variety
of contumacious conduct including: "any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede,
obstruct or degrade the administration of justice."

Under either the "clear and present danger" test or the "balancing-of-interest test," the Court held that the
statements made by respondent Gonzalez are of such a nature and were made in such a manner and
under such circumstances, as to transcend the permissible limits of free speech. What is here at stake is
the authority of the Supreme Court to confront and prevent a "substantive evil" consisting not only of the
obstruction of a free and fair hearing of a particular case but also the avoidance of the broader evil of the
degradation of the judicial system of a country and the destruction of the standards of professional
conduct required from members of the bar and officers of the courts, which has some implications to the
society.
Plus Recit Questions last time:

24. La Bugal B'laan v. Ramos

G.R. No 127882

Facts :

On July 25, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 2796 authorizing
the DENR Secretary to accept, consider and evaluate proposals from foreign-owned corporations or
foreign investors for contracts or agreements involving either technical or financial assistance for large-
scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, which, upon appropriate recommendation of
the Secretary, the President may execute with the foreign proponent.

On March 3, 1995, then President Fidel V. Ramos approved R.A. No. 7942 to "govern the exploration,
development, utilization and processing of all mineral resources." R.A. No. 7942 defines the modes of
mineral agreements for mining operations, outlines the procedure for their filing and approval,
assignment/transfer and withdrawal, and fixes their terms. Similar provisions govern financial or technical
assistance agreements.

On April 9, 1995, 30 days following its publication on March 10, 1995 in Malaya and Manila Times, two
newspapers of general circulation, R.A. No. 7942 took effect. Shortly before the effectivity of R.A. No.
7942, however, or on March 30, 1995, the President entered into an FTAA with WMCP covering 99,387
hectares of land in South Cotabato, Sultan Kudarat, Davao del Sur and North Cotabato.

On August 15, 1995, then DENR Secretary Victor O. Ramos issued DENR Administrative Order (DAO)
No. 95-23, s. 1995, otherwise known as the Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 7942. This
was later repealed by DAO No. 96-40, s. 1996 which was adopted on December 20, 1996.

On January 10, 1997, counsels for petitioners sent a letter to the DENR Secretary demanding that the
DENR stop the implementation of R.A. No. 7942 and DAO No. 96-40, giving the DENR fifteen days from
receipt to act thereon. The DENR, however, has yet to respond or act on petitioners' letter.

Petitioners claim that the DENR Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction.

They pray that the Court issue an order:

(a) Permanently enjoining respondents from acting on any application for Financial or Technical
Assistance Agreements;
(b) Declaring the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 or Republic Act No. 7942 as unconstitutional and null and
void;

(c) Declaring the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the Philippine Mining Act contained in DENR
Administrative Order No. 96-40 and all other similar administrative issuances as unconstitutional and null
and void; and

(d) Cancelling the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement issued to Western Mining Philippines,
Inc. as unconstitutional, illegal and null and void.

Issues :
1. Whether or not Republic Act No. 7942 is unconstitutional.
2. Whether or not the FTAA between the government and WMCP is a ―service contract that
permits fully foreign owned companies to exploit the Philippine mineral resources.
3. What is the proper interpretation of the phrase “Agreements involving Either Technical or
Financial Assistance” contained in paragraph 4, Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution?

Ruling :
1. The Court finds the following provisions of R.A. No. 7942 to be violative of Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution and hereby declares unconstitutional and void:

(1) The proviso in Section 3 (aq), which defines "qualified person," to wit:

Provided, That a legally organized foreign-owned corporation shall be deemed a qualified person for
purposes of granting an exploration permit, financial or technical assistance agreement or mineral
processing permit.

(2) Section 23, which specifies the rights and obligations of an exploration permittee, insofar as said
section applies to a financial or technical assistance agreement,

(3) Section 33, which prescribes the eligibility of a contractor in a financial or technical assistance
agreement;

(4) Section 35, which enumerates the terms and conditions for every financial or technical assistance
agreement;

(5) Section 39, which allows the contractor in a financial and technical assistance agreement to convert
the same into a mineral production-sharing agreement;

(6) Section 56, which authorizes the issuance of a mineral processing permit to a contractor in a financial
and technical assistance agreement;

The following provisions of the same Act are likewise void as they are dependent on the foregoing
provisions and cannot stand on their own:

(1) Section 3 (g), which defines the term "contractor," insofar as it applies to a financial or technical
assistance agreement.

Section 34, which prescribes the maximum contract area in a financial or technical assistance
agreements;

Section 36, which allows negotiations for financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 37, which prescribes the procedure for filing and evaluation of financial or technical assistance
agreement proposals;
Section 38, which limits the term of financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 40, which allows the assignment or transfer of financial or technical assistance agreements;

Section 41, which allows the withdrawal of the contractor in an FTAA;

The second and third paragraphs of Section 81, which provide for the Government's share in a financial
and technical assistance agreement; and

Section 90, which provides for incentives to contractors in FTAAs insofar as it applies to said contractors;

RA 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 is unconstitutional for permitting fully foreign owned
corporations to exploit the Philippine natural resources.

Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution retained the Regalian Doctrine which states that ―All lands
of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other
natural resources are owned by the State. The same section also states that, ―the exploration and
development and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the
State.

Conspicuously absent in Section 2 is the provision in the 1935 and 1973 Constitution authorizing the
State to grant licenses, concessions, or leases for the exploration, exploitation, development, or utilization
of natural resources. By such omission, the utilization of inalienable lands of the public domain through
license, concession or lease is no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution.

Under the concession system, the concessionaire makes a direct equity investment for the purpose of
exploiting a particular natural resource within a given area. The concession amounts to complete control
by the concessionaire over the country‘s natural resource, for it is given exclusive and plenary rights to
exploit a particular resource at the point of extraction.

The 1987 Constitution, moreover, has deleted the phrase ―management or other forms of assistance in
the 1973 Charter. The present Constitution now allows only ―technical and financial assistance. The
management and the operation of the mining activities by foreign contractors, the primary feature of the
service contracts was precisely the evil the drafters of the 1987 Constitution sought to avoid.

The constitutional provision allowing the President to enter into FTAAs is an exception to the rule that
participation in the nation‘s natural resources is reserved exclusively to Filipinos. Accordingly, such
provision must be construed strictly against their enjoyment by non-Filipinos. Therefore, RA 7942 is
invalid insofar as the said act authorizes service contracts. Although the statute employs the phrase
―financial and technical agreements in accordance with the 1987 Constitution, its pertinent provisions
actually treat these agreements as service contracts that grant beneficial ownership to foreign contractors
contrary to the fundamental law.

The underlying assumption in the provisions of the law is that the foreign contractor manages the mineral
resources just like the foreign contractor in a service contract. By allowing foreign contractors to manage
or operate all the aspects of the mining operation, RA 7942 has, in effect, conveyed beneficial ownership
over the nation‘s mineral resources to these contractors, leaving the State with nothing but bare title
thereto.

The same provisions, whether by design or inadvertence, permit a circumvention of the constitutionally
ordained 60-40% capitalization requirement for corporations or associations engaged in the exploitation,
development and utilization of Philippine natural resources.

When parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected as conditions, considerations,
inducements or compensations for each other as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as
a whole, then if some parts are unconstitutional, all provisions that are thus dependent, conditional or
connected, must fail with them.

Under Article XII Section 2 of the 1987 Charter, foreign owned corporations are limited only to merely
technical or financial assistance to the State for large scale exploration, development and utilization of
minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils.

2. The FTAA between the WMCP and the Philippine government is likewise unconstitutional since the
agreement itself is a service contract.

Section 1.3 of the FTAA grants WMCP a fully foreign owned corporation, the exclusive right to explore,
exploit, utilize and dispose of all minerals and by-products that may be produced from the contract area.
Section 1.2 of the same agreement provides that EMCP shall provide all financing, technology,
management, and personnel necessary for the Mining Operations.

These contractual stipulations and related provisions in the FTAA taken together, grant WMCP beneficial
ownership over natural resources that properly belong to the State and are intended for the benefit of its
citizens. These stipulations are abhorrent to the 1987 Constitution. They are precisely the vices that the
fundamental law seeks to avoid, the evils that it aims to suppress. Consequently, the contract from which
they spring must be struck down.

3. “The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or
financial assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and
other mineral oils according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real
contributions to the economic growth and general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State
shall promote the development and use of local scientific and technical resources.”

Full control is not anathematic to day-to-day management by the contractor, provided that the State
retains the power to direct overall strategy; and to set aside, reverse or modify plans and actions of the
contractor. The idea of full control is similar to that which is exercised by the board of directors of a private
corporation, the performance of managerial, operational, financial, marketing and other functions may be
delegated to subordinate officers or given to contractual entities, but the board retains full residual control
of the business. Thus, the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its
implementing rules and regulations – insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements as well
as the subject Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement.

25. Impeachment Procedure

READ NACHURA Chapter 13