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AMIGABLE

v. CUENCA (Commissioner of contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use


Public Highways) of the land. What is required is the surrender of
Facts: Petitioner’s lot has been appropriated by the title to and the physical possession of the
the government and petitioner requests for the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to
payment of said lot. Respondents contend that the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary.
they cannot be sued as it is against the GOV’t. This is definitely an exercise not of the police
ISSUE: can appellant properly sue the power but of the power of eminent domain.
government Wherefore, the Court holds the constitutionality
RULING: She can. Appellant is entitled to of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and
compensation by the government. This is their E.O. Nos. 228 and 229. However, the title to all
only relief. expropriated properties shall be transferred to
- Where the government takes away the State only upon full payment of
property from a private landowner for compensation to their respective owners.
public use without going through the
legal process of expropriation or CITY OF MANILA v. CHINESE COMMUNITY
negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may Facts: The plaintiff prayed that certain lands be
properly maintain a suit WITHOUT ITS expropriated for the purpose of constructing a
CONSENT. public improvement into an extension of Rizal
- No deed of conveyance of any portion Avenue, Manila which is necessary for the
of her lot was executed, the appellant plaintiff to exercise in fee simple of certain
remains the owner of the whole lot. parcels of land. The defendant on the other
hand, contends that the expropriation was not
necessary as a public improvement and that the
ASSOC OF SMALL LANDOWNERS v. plaintiff has no right to expropriate the said
SECRETARY DEP. OF AGRARIAN REFORM cemetery or any part or portion thereof for
Facts: In these consolidated cases, petitioners street purposes. The lower court declared that
primarily assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. there was no necessity for the said
6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. expropriation. Hence, this appeal.
228 and 229 arguing that no private property
shall be taken for public use without just ISSUE: Can the Courts inquire into the necessity
compensation. The respondent invokes the of expropriation of the delegate, City of Manila?
police power of the State.
ISSUE: Is the taking of property a valid exercise RULING: Yes. The right of expropriation is not
of police power or of the power of eminent an inherent power in a municipal corporation,
domain and before it can exercise the right some law
RULING: It is an exercise of the power of must exist conferring the power upon it.
eminent domain. The cases present no knotty The general power to exercise the right of
complication insofar as the question of eminent domain must not be confused with the
compensable taking is concerned. To the extent right to exercise it in a particular case. The
that the measures under challenge merely power of the legislature to confer, upon
prescribe retention limits for landowners, there municipal corporations and other entities
is an exercise of the police power for the within the State, general authority to exercise
regulation of private property in accordance the right of eminent domain cannot be
with the Constitution. But where, to carry out questioned by courts, but the general authority
such regulation, it becomes necessary to of municipalities or entities must not be
deprive such owners of whatever lands they confused with the right to exercise it in
may own in excess of the maximum area particular instances. The moment the municipal
allowed, there is definitely a taking under the corporation or entity attempts to exercise the
power of eminent domain for which payment of authority conferred, it must comply with the
just compensation is imperative. The taking conditions accompanying the authority. The
necessity for conferring the authority upon a in the construction of SCTEX. The supervisory
municipal corporation to exercise the right of group of HLI, the corporation composed of
eminent domain is admittedly within the power board of directors and farmers, filed a petition
of the legislature. But whether or not the against the constitutionality of SDP. They allege
municipal corporation or entity is exercising that the 3% of the gross earnings were not at all
the right in a particular case under the given to the farmers and the HLI failed to
conditions imposed by the general authority, is comply with the conditions of the SDP. The
a question which the courts have the right to group of farmers in a Petisyon called the
inquire into. AMBALA or FARM also allege that 16 years
have passed and still there are no
When the courts come to determine the improvements on their livelihoods. They too
question, they must only find seek the nullification of the SDP as they have
(a) that a law or authority exists for the received no lands. Consequently, PARC, a
exercise of the right of eminent domain, but special group created out of RA 6657 (Special
(b) also that the right or authority is being Agrarian Reform Law), revoked the SDP. The
exercised in accordance with the law petitioners then contend the power of PARC to
make such revocation and the constitutionality
In the present case there are two conditions of SDP was put to test Hence this petition for
imposed upon the authority conceded to the certiorari.
City of Manila: First, the land must be private;
and, second, the purpose must be public. The ISSUE: whether or not PARC gravely abused its
authority of the city of Manila to expropriate discretion in revoking or recalling the subject
private lands for public purposes, is not denied SDP and placing the hacienda under CARP's
as provided in its Charter. However, if the court, compulsory acquisition and distribution
upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions scheme.
exists or that either one of them fails, certainly
it cannot be contended that the right is being Did SDP constitute a taking?
exercised in accordance with law. In the instant
case, the record does not show conclusively RULING: No it did not. It is PARC who has
that the plaintiff has definitely decided that power to exercise such revocation since what is
there exists a necessity for expropriation. The expressly conferred necessarily implies a grant
decision of the lower court is affirmed. of power incidental to its function.

HACIENDA LUISITA v. PRESIDENTIAL Yes, it did in view of the fact that this is the
AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL time that the FWBs were considered to own
Facts: Hacienda Luisita including its sugar mill and possess agricultural lands in Hacienda
was sold to Tadeco. A petition was then filed by Luisita. These lands became subject of the
the Manila RTC against Tadeco to surrender the agrarian reform coverage through the stock
Hacienda Luisita to DAR to be distributed to distribution scheme only upon the approval
farmers at cost. A settlement has been devised of the SDP. Such approval is akin to a notice
and Tadeco opted for the Stock Distribution of coverage ordinarily issued under
Option Plan (SDOP). This involves giving 3% of compulsory acquisition.
the total cost of earnings to the Farm Worker
Beneficiaries (FWB) and giving them lands for HLI shall be paid just compensation for the
their residents not exceeding 240 sqm. remaining agricultural land that will be
Basically, through the SDP, there is voluntary transferred to DAR for land distribution to the
offer by the landowner for the agricultural land FWBs. We find that the date of the "taking" is
to be under the scope of CARP. However, a November 21, 1989, when PARC approved
portion of the Hacienda was sold to Centennary, HLI's SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2.
a private entity. Another aliquot was also used DAR shall coordinate with LBP for the
determination of just compensation. We cannot makes mention of a commitment on the part of
use May 11, 1989 when the SDOA was the State to pursue, by law, an agrarian reform
executed, since it was the SDP, not the SDOA, program founded on the policy of land for the
that was approved by PARC. landless, but subject to such priorities as
Congress may prescribe, taking into account
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. such abstract variable as "equity
PARC Resolution No. 2005-32-01 dated considerations." The textual reference to a law
December 22, 2005 and Resolution No. 2006- and Congress necessarily implies that the above
34-01 dated May 3, 2006, placing the lands constitutional provision is not self-executory
subject of HLI's SDP under compulsory and that legislation is needed to implement the
coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme urgently needed program of agrarian reform.
of the CARP, are hereby AFFIRMED with the And RA 6657 has been enacted precisely
MODIFICATION that the original 6,296 pursuant to and as a mechanism to carry out
qualified FWBs shall have the option to remain the constitutional directives. This piece of
as stockholders of HLI. DAR shall immediately legislation, in fact, restates the agrarian reform
schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs policy established in the aforementioned
and explain to them the effects, consequences provision of the Constitution of promoting the
and legal or practical implications of their welfare of landless farmers and farmworkers.
choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to RA 6657 thus defines "agrarian reform" as "the
manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the redistribution of lands . . . to farmers and
ballot, signing their signatures or placing their regular farmworkers who are landless . . . to lift
thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their the economic status of the beneficiaries and all
printed names. other arrangements alternative to the
physical redistribution of lands, such as
In fine, there are two (2) requirements before production or profit sharing, labor
one may be considered a purchaser in good administration and the distribution of shares
faith, namely: (1) that the purchaser buys the of stock which will allow beneficiaries to
property of another without notice that some receive a just share of the fruits of the lands
other person has a right to or interest in such they work.”
property; and (2) that the purchaser pays a full
and fair price for the property at the time of The wisdom of Congress in allowing an SDP
such purchase or before he or she has notice of through a corporation as an alternative
the claim of another. mode of implementing agrarian reform is
not for judicial determination. Established
The prohibition [against impairment of the jurisprudence tells us that it is not within
obligation of contracts] is aligned with the the province of the Court to inquire into the
general principle that laws newly enacted have wisdom of the law, for, indeed, We are
only a prospective operation, and cannot affect bound by words of the statute.
acts or contracts already perfected; however, as
to laws already in existence, their provisions MANOSCA v. CA
are read into contracts and deemed a part Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land
thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause which was later declared as national landmark
under Section 10, Article II [of the due to being ascertained by National Historic
Constitution] is limited in application to Institute (NHI) as the birthplace of Felix Y.
laws about to be enacted that would in any Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. On the
way derogate from existing acts or contracts opinion of Secretary of Justice, he said that the
by enlarging, abridging or in any manner place must be subjected to the power of
changing the intention of the parties eminent domain since places invested with
thereto. unusual historical interest is a public use which
Likewise, Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution such power may be authorized. Thus, Republic,
through the office of Solicitor General instituted means a use concerning the whole community
a complaint for expropriation and filed an as distinguished from particular individuals.
urgent motion for the issuance for an order to But each and every member of society need not
permit it to take immediate possession of the be equally interested in such use, or be
property. The trial court issued an order personally and directly affected by it; if the
authorizing Republic to take over the property object is to satisfy a great public want or
once the required sum would have been exigency, that is sufficient.
deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of The term may be said to mean public
Taguig, Metro Manila. The petitioners moved to usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is
dismiss the complaint since such expropriation productive of general benefit. It may be limited
would constituted an application of funds to the inhabitants of a small or restricted
directly or indirectly for the use, benefit, or locality, but must be in common, and not for a
support of Iglesia ni Cristo, which is contrary to particular individual. The use must be a needful
the provision of Section 29 (2) Article VI of the one for the public, which cannot be
1987 Constitution. surrendered without obvious general loss and
inconvenience. A "public use" for which land
Issue: Whether or not the ―public use‖ may be taken defies absolute definition for it
requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the changes with varying conditions of society, new
attempted expropriation by the Republic of a appliances in the sciences, changing
492- square-meter parcel of land as declared by conceptions of scope and functions of
the NHI as a national landmark? government, and other differing circumstances
brought about by an increase in population and
Held: Yes. According to Justice Black, term new modes of communication and
―public use‖ means one which confers benefit transportation.
or advantage to the public and it is not confined
to actual use by public. It may also be said to The validity of the exercise of the power of
mean public usefulness, utility or advantage, or eminent domain for traditional purposes is
what is productive of general benefit. beyond question; it is not at all to be said,
The term "public use," not having been however, that public use should thereby be
otherwise defined by the constitution, must be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that
considered in its general concept of meeting a "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of
public need or a public exigency. 16 Black "use by the public" has long been discarded.
summarizes the characterization given by The taking to be valid must be for public use.
various courts to the term; thus:
There was a time when it was felt that a literal
Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional meaning should be attached to such a
and statutory basis for taking property by requirement. Whatever project is undertaken
eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of
"public use" is one which confers same benefit streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is
or advantage to the public; it is not confined to not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as
actual use by public. It is measured in terms of the purpose of the taking is public, then the
right of public to use proposed facilities for power of eminent domain comes into play. As
which condemnation is sought and, as long as just noted, the constitution in at least two cases,
public has right of use, whether exercised by to remove any doubt, determines what is public
one or many members of public, a "public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be
advantage" or "public benefit" accrues subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to
sufficient to constitute a public use individuals. The other is the transfer, through
Public use, in constitutional provisions the exercise of this power, of utilities and other
restricting the exercise of the right to take private enterprise to the government. It is
private property in virtue of eminent domain, accurate to state then that at present whatever
may be beneficially employed for the general In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition
welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary
Petitioners ask: restraining order, PPI asks us to declare
Comelec resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional
But "(w)hat is the so- called unusual interest and void on the ground that it violates the
that the expropriation of (Felix Manalo's) prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon
birthplace become so vital as to be a public use the government, and any of its agencies, against
appropriate for the exercise of the power of the taking of private property for public use
eminent domain" when only members of the without just compensation.
Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to
give some religious perspective to the case Issue: May COMELEC compel the members of
deserves little consideration, for what should print media to donate ―Comelec Space?
be significant is the principal objective of, not
the casual consequences that might follow Held: NO. To compel print media companies to
from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in donate "Comelec space" amounts to "taking" of
setting up the marker is essentially to recognize private personal property for public use or
the distinctive contribution of the late Felix purposes. The taking of print space here sought
Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather to be effected may first be appraised under the
than to commemorate his founding and public of expropriation of private personal
leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. property for public use. The threshold
requisites for a lawful taking of private
The practical reality that greater benefit may be property for public use need to be examined
derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than here: one is the necessity for the taking;
by most others could well be true but such a another is the legal authority to effect the
peculiar advantage still remains to be merely taking. The element of necessity for the taking
incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It
only a few would actually benefit from the has not been suggested that the members of PPI
expropriation of property does not necessarily are unwilling to sell print space at their normal
diminish the essence and character of public rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed,
use. the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to
buy print space lies at the heart of the problem.
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE v. COMELEC Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone
Facts: The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted
("PPI") is before this Court assailing the the power of imminent domain either by the
constitutional validity of resolution No. 2772 Constitution or by the legislative authority. A
issued by respondent Commission on Elections reasonable relationship between that power
("Comelec") and its corresponding Comelec and the enforcement and administration of
directive dated 22 March 1995, through a election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. not casually to be assumed.
Petitioner PPI is a non-stock, non-profit
organization of news paper and magazine The taking of private property for public use it,
publishers. of course, authorized by the Constitution, but
not without payment of "just compensation"
On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the
Resolution No. 2772, providing for a Comelec necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec
Space, which is a free print space of not less space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided
than one half (1/2) page in at least one by respondent Commission. There is nothing at
newspaper of general circulation in every all to prevent newspaper and magazine
province or city. publishers from voluntarily giving free print
space to Comelec for the purposes
contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and
of resolution No. 2772 does not, however, therefore be destroyed at the expense of the
provide a constitutional basis for compelling owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant
publishers, against their will, in the kind of filed a written request with the incumbent
factual context here present, to provide free municipal mayor for a permit to construct a
print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 building adjacent to their gasoline station on a
does not constitute a valid exercise of the parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name,
power of eminent domain. located along the national highway and
separated from the public plaza by a creek. The
As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also request was denied, for the reason among
contended that Section 2 of Resolution No. others that the proposed building would
2772, even if read as compelling publishers to destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza.
"donate" "Comelec space," may be sustained as Defendants reiterated their request for a
a valid exercise of the police power of the state. building permit, but again the mayor turned
This argument was, however, made too casually down the request. Whereupon, appellants
to require prolonged consideration on their proceeded with the construction of the building
part. Firstly, there was no effort (and without a permit, because they needed a place
apparently no inclination on the part of of residence very badly, their former house
Comelec) to show that the police power - having been destroyed by a typhoon and
essentially a power of legislation - has been hitherto they had been living on leased
constitutionally delegated to respondent property. Thereafter, defendants were charged
Commission. Secondly, while private property in violation of the ordinance and subsequently
may indeed be validly taken in the legitimate convicted. Hence this appeal.
exercise of the police power of the state, there ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is a valid
was no attempt to show compliance in the exercise of police power.
instant case with the requisites of a lawful RULING: o. It is not a valid exercise of police
taking under the police power. power. The ordinance is unreasonable and
oppressive, in that it operates to permanently
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and deprive appellants of the right to use their own
heavy instrument that purports, without a property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of
showing of existence of a national emergency police power, and amounts to a taking of
or other imperious public necessity, appellant’s property without just
indiscriminately and without regard the the compensation. We do not overlook that the
individual business condition of particular modern tendency is to regard the beautification
newspapers or magazines located in different of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort
parts of the country, to take private property of and happiness of residents.
newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt As the case now stands, every structure that
was made to demonstrate that a real and may be erected on appellants' land, regardless
palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of of its own beauty, stands condemned under the
print space confronted the Comelec and that ordinance in question, because it would
Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the interfere with the view of the public plaza from
only reasonable and calibrated response to the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be
such necessity available to Comelec. Section 2 constrained to let their land remain idle and
does not constitute a valid exercise of the police unused for the obvious purpose for which it is
power of the State. best suited, being urban in character. To legally
achieve that result, the municipality must give
PEOPLE v. FAJARDO appellants just compensation and an
Facts: The municipal council of Baao, opportunity to be heard.
Camarines Sur stating among others that
construction of a building, which will destroy REPUBLIC v. Vda De CASTELLVI
Facts: The Republic of the Philippines occupied substantially to oust the owner and deprive him
the land of Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi from 1 of all beneficial enjoyment thereof."
July 1947, by virtue of a contract of lease, on a Pursuant to the aforecited authority, a number
year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to of circumstances must be present in the
June 30 of the succeeding year). The Republic "taking" of property for purposes of eminent
sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. domain.
The AFP refused to vacate the leased premises First, the expropriator must enter a private
after the termination of the contract because it property. This circumstance is present in the
would difficult for the army to vacate the instant case, when by virtue of the lease
premises in view of the permanent installations agreement the Republic, through the AFP, took
and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 possession of the property of Castellvi.
that were erected and already established on
the property. Castellvi then brought suit to eject Second, the entrance into private property
the Philippine Air Force from the land. While must be for more than a momentary period.
this ejectment case was pending, the Republic "Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of
filed on 26 June 1959 complaints for eminent but a moment's duration" (The Oxford English
domain against the respondents over the 3 Dictionary, Volume VI, page 596); "lasting a
parcels of land. In its complaint, the Republic very short time; transitory; having a very brief
alleged, among other things, that the fair life; operative or recurring at every moment"
market value of the above-mentioned lands, (Webster's Third International Dictionary,
according to the Committee on Appraisal for 1963 edition.) The word "momentary" when
the Province of Pampanga, was not more than applied to possession or occupancy of (real)
P2,000 per hectare.The court authorizes the property should be construed to mean "a
Republic to take immediate possession of the limited period" not indefinite or permanent.
lands upon deposit of that amount with the The aforecited lease ontract was for a period of
Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga.In 1961, the one year, renewable from year to year. The
trial court, rendered its decision in the entry on the property, under the lease, is
ejectment case, finding that the unanimous temporary, and considered transitory. The fact
recommendation of the commissioners of that the Republic, through the AFP, constructed
P10.00 per square meter for the 3 lots subject some installations of a permanent nature does
of the action is fair and just; and required the not alter the fact that the entry into the land
Republic to pay interests. was transitory, or intended to last a year,
although renewable from year to year by
ISSUE: Whether the taking of Castellvi‘s consent of the owner of the land. By express
property occurred in 1947 or in 1959. provision of the lease agreement the Republic,
as lessee, undertook to return the premises in
RULING: The Republic urges that the "taking " substantially the same condition as at the time
of Castellvi's property should be deemed as of the property was first occupied by the AFP.
the year 1947 by virtue of afore-quoted lease
agreement. In American Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, It is claimed that the ―INTENTION‖ of the
2nd edition, Section 157, on the subject of lessee was to occupy the land permanently,
"Eminent Domain, we read the definition of as may be inferred from the construction of
"taking" (in eminent domain) as follows: permanent improvements. But this
"Taking‖under the power of eminent domain "INTENTION" cannot prevail over the clear
may be defined generally as entering upon and express terms of the lease contract.
private property for more than a momentary Intent is to be deduced from the language
period, and, under the warrant or color of legal employed by the parties, and the terms of
authority, devoting it to a public use, or the contract, when unambiguous, as in the
otherwise informally appropriating or instant case, are conclusive in the absence of
injuriously affecting it in such a way as averment and proof of mistake or fraud the
question being not what the intention wag, renewal of the lease contract from year to year,
but what is expressed in the language used. and by the provision in the lease contract
Moreover, in order to judge the intention of the whereby the Republic undertook to return the
contracting parties, their contemporaneous and property to Castellvi when the lease was
subsequent acts shall be principally considered terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived of
(Art. 1371, Civil Code). If the intention of the all the beneficial enjoyment of the property,
lessee (Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy because the Republic was bound to pay, and
permanently Castellvi's property, why was the had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly
contract of lease entered into on year to year rentals until the time when it filed the
basis? Why was the lease agreement renewed complaint for eminent domain on June 26,
from year to year? Why did not the Republic 1959.
expropriate this land of Castellvi in 1949 when,
according to the Republic itself, it expropriated Untenable also is the Republic's contention that
the other parcels of land that it occupied at the although the contract between the parties was
same time as the Castellvi land, for the purpose one of lease on a year to year basis, it was "in
of converting them into a jet air base?" It might reality a more or less permanent right to
really have been the intention of the Republic to occupy the premises under the guise of lease
expropriate the lands in question at some with the 'right and privilege' to buy the
future time, but certainly mere notice much less property should the lessor wish to terminate
an implied notice of such intention on the part the lease," and "the right to buy the property is
of the Republic to expropriate the lands in the merged as an integral part of the lease
future did not, and could not, bind the relationship . . . so much so that the fair market
landowner, nor bind the land itself. The value has been agreed upon, not as of the time
expropriation must be actually commenced in of purchase, but as of the time of occupancy".
court. 15 We cannot accept the Republic's contention
that a lease on a year to year basis can give rise
Third, the entry into the property should be to a permanent right to occupy, since by
under warrant or color of legal authority. This express legal provision a lease made for a
circumstance in the "taking" may be considered determinate time, as was the lease of Castellvi's
as present in the instant case, because the land in the instant case, ceases upon the day
Republic entered the Castellvi property as fixed, without need of a demand (Article 1669,
lessee. Civil Code). Neither can it be said that the right
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a of eminent domain may be exercised by simply
public use or otherwise informally leasing the premises to be expropriated (Rule
appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be 67, Section 1, Rules of Court). Nor can it be
conceded that the circumstance of the property accepted that the Republic would enter into a
being devoted to public use is present because contract of lease where its real intention was to
the property was used by the air force of the buy, or why the Republic should enter into a
AFP. simulated contract of lease ("under the guise of
lease", as expressed by counsel for the
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public Republic) when all the time the Republic had
use must be in such a way as to oust the owner the right of eminent domain, and could
and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of expropriate Castellvi's land if it wanted to
the property. In the instant case, the entry of without resorting to any guise whatsoever.
the Republic into the property and its Neither can we see how a right to buy could be
utilization of the same for public use did not merged in a contract of lease in the absence of
oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial any agreement between the parties to that
enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained effect. To sustain the contention of the Republic
as owner, and was continuously recognized as is to sanction a practice whereby in order to
owner by the Republic, as shown by the secure a low price for a land which the
government intends to expropriate (or would
eventually expropriate) it would first negotiate (A number of circumstances must be present
with the owner of the land to lease the land (for in the ―taking‖ of property for purposes of
say ten or twenty years) then expropriate the eminent domain. First, the expropriator must
same when the lease is about to terminate, then enter a private property. Second, the
claim that the "taking" of the property for the entrance into private property must be for
purposes of the expropriation be reckoned as of more than a momentary period. Third, the
the date when the Government started to entry into the property should be under
occupy the property under the lease, and then warrant or color of legal authority. Fourth,
assert that the value of the property being the property must be devoted to a public use
expropriated be reckoned as of the start of the or otherwise informally appropriated or
lease, in spite of the fact that the value of the injuriously affected. Fifth, the utilization of
property, for many good reasons, had in the the property for public use must be in such a
meantime increased during the period of the way as to oust the owner and deprive him of
lease. This would be sanctioning what all beneficial enjoyment of the property. )
obviously is a deceptive scheme, which would
have the effect of depriving the owner of the It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of
property of its true and fair market value at the Castellvi's property for purposes of eminent
time when the expropriation proceedings were domain cannot be considered to have taken
actually instituted in court. The Republic's place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to
claim that it had the "right and privilege" to buy occupy the property as lessee thereof. We find
the property at the value that it had at the time merit in the contention of Castellvi that two
when it first occupied the property as lessee essential elements in the "taking" of property
nowhere appears in the lease contract. What under the power of eminent domain,
was agreed expressly in paragraph No. 5 of the namely: (1) that the entrance and
lease agreement was that, should the lessor occupation by the condemnor must be for a
require the lessee to eturn the premises in the permanent, or indefinite period, and (2)
same condition as at the time the same was first that in devoting the property to public use
occupied by the AFP, the lessee would have the the owner was ousted from the property.
"right and privilege" (or option) of paying the and deprived of its beneficial use, were not
lessor what it would fairly cost to put the present when the Republic entered and
premises in the same condition as it was at the occupied the Castellvi property in 1947. Under
commencement of the lease, in lieu of the Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the
lessee's performance of the undertaking to put ―just compensation‖ is to be determined as of
the land in said condition. The "fair value" at the date of the filing of the complaint.
the time of occupancy, mentioned in the lease This Court has ruled that when the taking of the
agreement, does not refer to the value of the property sought to be expropriated coincides
property if bought by the lessee, but refers to with the commencement of the expropriation
the cost of restoring the property in the same proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the
condition as of the time when the lessee took filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the
possession of the property. Such fair value just compensation should be determined as of
cannot refer to the purchase price, for purchase the date of the filing of the complaint. Herein, it
was never intended by the parties to the lease is undisputed that the Republic was placed in
contract. It is a rule in the interpretation of possession of the Castellvi property, by
contracts that "However general the terms of authority of the court, on 10 August 1959. The
a contract may be, they shall not be ―taking‖ of the Castellvi property for the
understood to comprehend things that are purposes of determining the just compensation
distinct and cases that are different from to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of 26
those upon which the parties intended to June 1959 when the complaint for eminent
agree" (Art. 1372, Civil Code). domain was filed.)
PUNSALAN v. MUNICIPAL BOARDF legislation", the burden of plaintiffs' complaint
Facts: An ordinance was approved by the is not that the professions to which they
Municipal Board of the City of Manila which respectively belong have been singled out for
imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons the imposition of this municipal occupation tax;
exercising various professions in the city and and in any event, the Legislature may, in its
penalizes non-payment of the tax by a fine of discretion, select what occupations shall be
not more than two hundred pesos or by taxed, and in the exercise of that discretion it
imprisonment of not more than six months or may tax all, or it may select for taxation certain
by both such fine and imprisonment in the classes and leave the others untaxed. (Cooley
discretion of the court. The ordinance was in on Taxation, Vol. 4, 4th ed., pp. 3393- 3395.)
pursuance to paragraph (1) Section 18 of the Plaintiffs' complaint is that while the law has
Revised Charter of the City of Manila which authorized the City of Manila to impose the said
empowers the Municipal Board of said city to tax, it has withheld that authority from other
impose a municipal occupation tax, not to chartered cities, not to mention municipalities.
exceed P50 per annum, on persons engaged in We do not think it is for the courts to judge
the various professions above referred to the what particular cities or municipalities should
plaintiffs, after having paid their occupation tax, be empowered to impose occupation taxes in
now being required to pay the additional tax addition to those imposed by the National
prescribed in the ordinance. The plaintiffs paid Government. That matter is peculiarly within
the said tax under protest. The lower court the domain of the political departments and the
declared the validity of the law authorizing the courts would do well not to encroach upon it.
enactment of the ordinance, but declared the Moreover, as the seat of the National
latter illegal and void since its penalty provided Government and with a population and volume
for the non- payment of tax was not legally of trade many times that of any other Philippine
authorized. city or municipality, Manila, no doubt, offers a
more lucrative field for the practice of the
Issue: Is this ordinance and the law authorizing professions, so that it is but fair that the
it constitute class legislation, are unjust and professionals in Manila be made to pay a higher
oppressive, and authorize what amounts to occupation tax than their brethren in the
double taxation? provinces.

Held: NO. To begin with defendants' appeal, we Thirdly, Plaintiffs brand the ordinance unjust
find that the lower court was in error in saying and oppressive because they say that it creates
that the imposition of the penalty provided for discrimination within a class in that while
in the ordinance was without the authority of professionals with offices in Manila have to pay
law. The last paragraph (kk) of the very section the tax, outsiders who have no offices in the city
that authorizes the enactment of this tax but practice their profession therein are not
ordinance (section 18 of the Manila Charter) in subject to the tax. Plaintiffs make a distinction
express terms also empowers the Municipal that is not found in the ordinance. The
Board "to fix penalties for the violation of ordinance imposes the tax upon every person
ordinances which shall not exceed to(sic) two "exercising" or "pursuing" — in the City of
hundred pesos fine or six months" Manila naturally — any one of the occupations
imprisonment, or both such fine and named, but does not say that such person must
imprisonment, for a single offense." Hence, the have his office in Manila. What constitutes
pronouncement below that the ordinance in exercise or pursuit of a profession in the city is
question is illegal and void because it imposes a a matter of judicial determination. The
penalty not authorized by law is clearly without argument against double taxation may not be
basis. invoked where one tax is imposed by the state
and the other is imposed by the city (1 Cooley
Secondly, In raising the hue and cry of "class on Taxation, 4th ed., p. 492), it being widely
recognized that there is nothing inherently donee‘s gift tax is not a property tax but an
obnoxious in the requirement that license fees excise tax imposed on the transfer of property
or taxes be exacted with respect to the same by way of gift inter vivos. Its assessment was
occupation, calling or activity by both the state not on the property themeselves. It does not
and the political subdivisions thereof. rest upon general ownership, but an excise
upon the use made of the properties, upon the
LLADOC v. CIR exercise of the privilege of receiving the
Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc., of Bacolod properties. The imposition of such excise tax on
City, donated P10,000.00 in cash to Fr. Crispin property used for religious purposes does not
Ruiz then parish priest of Victorias, Negros constitute an impairment of the Constitution.
Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Casimiro
Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic
Church in the locality. The total samount was
actually spent for the purpose intended. On 3
March 1958, MB Estate filed the donor‘s gift tax
return. Under date of 29 April 1960, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued as
assessment for donee‘s gift tax against the
Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental,
of which petitioner was the priest. The tax
amounted to P1,370.00 including surcharges,
interest of 1% monthly from 15 May 1958 to 15
June 1960, and the compromise for the late
filing of the return. Petitioner lodged a protest
to the assessment and requested the
withdrawal thereof. The protest and the motion
for reconsideration presented to the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue were
denied. The petitioner appealed to the CTA on 2
November 1960. After hearing, the CTA
affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue except the imposition of
compromise penalty of P20. Fr. Lladoc appealed
to the Supreme Court.

Issue: Whether a donee‘s gift tax may be
assessed against the Catholic Church.

Held: Yes. The phrase ―exempt from taxation,‖
as employed in the Constitution should not be
interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds
of taxes. Section 22(3), Art. VI of the
Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from
taxation cemeteries, churches and personages
or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands,
buildings, and improvements used exclusively
for religious purposes. The exemption is only
from the payment of taxes assessed on such
properties enumerated, as property taxes, as
contra-distinguished from excise taxes. A

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