v. CUENCA (Commissioner of contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use
Public Highways) of the land. What is required is the surrender of Facts: Petitioner’s lot has been appropriated by the title to and the physical possession of the the government and petitioner requests for the said excess and all beneficial rights accruing to payment of said lot. Respondents contend that the owner in favor of the farmer-beneficiary. they cannot be sued as it is against the GOV’t. This is definitely an exercise not of the police ISSUE: can appellant properly sue the power but of the power of eminent domain. government Wherefore, the Court holds the constitutionality RULING: She can. Appellant is entitled to of R.A. No. 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and compensation by the government. This is their E.O. Nos. 228 and 229. However, the title to all only relief. expropriated properties shall be transferred to - Where the government takes away the State only upon full payment of property from a private landowner for compensation to their respective owners. public use without going through the legal process of expropriation or CITY OF MANILA v. CHINESE COMMUNITY negotiated sale, the aggrieved party may Facts: The plaintiff prayed that certain lands be properly maintain a suit WITHOUT ITS expropriated for the purpose of constructing a CONSENT. public improvement into an extension of Rizal - No deed of conveyance of any portion Avenue, Manila which is necessary for the of her lot was executed, the appellant plaintiff to exercise in fee simple of certain remains the owner of the whole lot. parcels of land. The defendant on the other hand, contends that the expropriation was not necessary as a public improvement and that the ASSOC OF SMALL LANDOWNERS v. plaintiff has no right to expropriate the said SECRETARY DEP. OF AGRARIAN REFORM cemetery or any part or portion thereof for Facts: In these consolidated cases, petitioners street purposes. The lower court declared that primarily assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. there was no necessity for the said 6657, P.D. No. 27, Proc. No. 131, and E.O. Nos. expropriation. Hence, this appeal. 228 and 229 arguing that no private property shall be taken for public use without just ISSUE: Can the Courts inquire into the necessity compensation. The respondent invokes the of expropriation of the delegate, City of Manila? police power of the State. ISSUE: Is the taking of property a valid exercise RULING: Yes. The right of expropriation is not of police power or of the power of eminent an inherent power in a municipal corporation, domain and before it can exercise the right some law RULING: It is an exercise of the power of must exist conferring the power upon it. eminent domain. The cases present no knotty The general power to exercise the right of complication insofar as the question of eminent domain must not be confused with the compensable taking is concerned. To the extent right to exercise it in a particular case. The that the measures under challenge merely power of the legislature to confer, upon prescribe retention limits for landowners, there municipal corporations and other entities is an exercise of the police power for the within the State, general authority to exercise regulation of private property in accordance the right of eminent domain cannot be with the Constitution. But where, to carry out questioned by courts, but the general authority such regulation, it becomes necessary to of municipalities or entities must not be deprive such owners of whatever lands they confused with the right to exercise it in may own in excess of the maximum area particular instances. The moment the municipal allowed, there is definitely a taking under the corporation or entity attempts to exercise the power of eminent domain for which payment of authority conferred, it must comply with the just compensation is imperative. The taking conditions accompanying the authority. The necessity for conferring the authority upon a in the construction of SCTEX. The supervisory municipal corporation to exercise the right of group of HLI, the corporation composed of eminent domain is admittedly within the power board of directors and farmers, filed a petition of the legislature. But whether or not the against the constitutionality of SDP. They allege municipal corporation or entity is exercising that the 3% of the gross earnings were not at all the right in a particular case under the given to the farmers and the HLI failed to conditions imposed by the general authority, is comply with the conditions of the SDP. The a question which the courts have the right to group of farmers in a Petisyon called the inquire into. AMBALA or FARM also allege that 16 years have passed and still there are no When the courts come to determine the improvements on their livelihoods. They too question, they must only find seek the nullification of the SDP as they have (a) that a law or authority exists for the received no lands. Consequently, PARC, a exercise of the right of eminent domain, but special group created out of RA 6657 (Special (b) also that the right or authority is being Agrarian Reform Law), revoked the SDP. The exercised in accordance with the law petitioners then contend the power of PARC to make such revocation and the constitutionality In the present case there are two conditions of SDP was put to test Hence this petition for imposed upon the authority conceded to the certiorari. City of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. The ISSUE: whether or not PARC gravely abused its authority of the city of Manila to expropriate discretion in revoking or recalling the subject private lands for public purposes, is not denied SDP and placing the hacienda under CARP's as provided in its Charter. However, if the court, compulsory acquisition and distribution upon trial, finds that neither of these conditions scheme. exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be contended that the right is being Did SDP constitute a taking? exercised in accordance with law. In the instant case, the record does not show conclusively RULING: No it did not. It is PARC who has that the plaintiff has definitely decided that power to exercise such revocation since what is there exists a necessity for expropriation. The expressly conferred necessarily implies a grant decision of the lower court is affirmed. of power incidental to its function.
HACIENDA LUISITA v. PRESIDENTIAL Yes, it did in view of the fact that this is the AGRARIAN REFORM COUNCIL time that the FWBs were considered to own Facts: Hacienda Luisita including its sugar mill and possess agricultural lands in Hacienda was sold to Tadeco. A petition was then filed by Luisita. These lands became subject of the the Manila RTC against Tadeco to surrender the agrarian reform coverage through the stock Hacienda Luisita to DAR to be distributed to distribution scheme only upon the approval farmers at cost. A settlement has been devised of the SDP. Such approval is akin to a notice and Tadeco opted for the Stock Distribution of coverage ordinarily issued under Option Plan (SDOP). This involves giving 3% of compulsory acquisition. the total cost of earnings to the Farm Worker Beneficiaries (FWB) and giving them lands for HLI shall be paid just compensation for the their residents not exceeding 240 sqm. remaining agricultural land that will be Basically, through the SDP, there is voluntary transferred to DAR for land distribution to the offer by the landowner for the agricultural land FWBs. We find that the date of the "taking" is to be under the scope of CARP. However, a November 21, 1989, when PARC approved portion of the Hacienda was sold to Centennary, HLI's SDP per PARC Resolution No. 89-12-2. a private entity. Another aliquot was also used DAR shall coordinate with LBP for the determination of just compensation. We cannot makes mention of a commitment on the part of use May 11, 1989 when the SDOA was the State to pursue, by law, an agrarian reform executed, since it was the SDP, not the SDOA, program founded on the policy of land for the that was approved by PARC. landless, but subject to such priorities as Congress may prescribe, taking into account WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. such abstract variable as "equity PARC Resolution No. 2005-32-01 dated considerations." The textual reference to a law December 22, 2005 and Resolution No. 2006- and Congress necessarily implies that the above 34-01 dated May 3, 2006, placing the lands constitutional provision is not self-executory subject of HLI's SDP under compulsory and that legislation is needed to implement the coverage on mandated land acquisition scheme urgently needed program of agrarian reform. of the CARP, are hereby AFFIRMED with the And RA 6657 has been enacted precisely MODIFICATION that the original 6,296 pursuant to and as a mechanism to carry out qualified FWBs shall have the option to remain the constitutional directives. This piece of as stockholders of HLI. DAR shall immediately legislation, in fact, restates the agrarian reform schedule meetings with the said 6,296 FWBs policy established in the aforementioned and explain to them the effects, consequences provision of the Constitution of promoting the and legal or practical implications of their welfare of landless farmers and farmworkers. choice, after which the FWBs will be asked to RA 6657 thus defines "agrarian reform" as "the manifest, in secret voting, their choices in the redistribution of lands . . . to farmers and ballot, signing their signatures or placing their regular farmworkers who are landless . . . to lift thumbmarks, as the case may be, over their the economic status of the beneficiaries and all printed names. other arrangements alternative to the physical redistribution of lands, such as In fine, there are two (2) requirements before production or profit sharing, labor one may be considered a purchaser in good administration and the distribution of shares faith, namely: (1) that the purchaser buys the of stock which will allow beneficiaries to property of another without notice that some receive a just share of the fruits of the lands other person has a right to or interest in such they work.” property; and (2) that the purchaser pays a full and fair price for the property at the time of The wisdom of Congress in allowing an SDP such purchase or before he or she has notice of through a corporation as an alternative the claim of another. mode of implementing agrarian reform is not for judicial determination. Established The prohibition [against impairment of the jurisprudence tells us that it is not within obligation of contracts] is aligned with the the province of the Court to inquire into the general principle that laws newly enacted have wisdom of the law, for, indeed, We are only a prospective operation, and cannot affect bound by words of the statute. acts or contracts already perfected; however, as to laws already in existence, their provisions MANOSCA v. CA are read into contracts and deemed a part Facts: Petitioners inherited a piece of land thereof. Thus, the non-impairment clause which was later declared as national landmark under Section 10, Article II [of the due to being ascertained by National Historic Constitution] is limited in application to Institute (NHI) as the birthplace of Felix Y. laws about to be enacted that would in any Manalo, the founder of Iglesia ni Cristo. On the way derogate from existing acts or contracts opinion of Secretary of Justice, he said that the by enlarging, abridging or in any manner place must be subjected to the power of changing the intention of the parties eminent domain since places invested with thereto. unusual historical interest is a public use which Likewise, Sec. 4, Art. XIII of the Constitution such power may be authorized. Thus, Republic, through the office of Solicitor General instituted means a use concerning the whole community a complaint for expropriation and filed an as distinguished from particular individuals. urgent motion for the issuance for an order to But each and every member of society need not permit it to take immediate possession of the be equally interested in such use, or be property. The trial court issued an order personally and directly affected by it; if the authorizing Republic to take over the property object is to satisfy a great public want or once the required sum would have been exigency, that is sufficient. deposited with the Municipal Treasurer of The term may be said to mean public Taguig, Metro Manila. The petitioners moved to usefulness, utility, or advantage, or what is dismiss the complaint since such expropriation productive of general benefit. It may be limited would constituted an application of funds to the inhabitants of a small or restricted directly or indirectly for the use, benefit, or locality, but must be in common, and not for a support of Iglesia ni Cristo, which is contrary to particular individual. The use must be a needful the provision of Section 29 (2) Article VI of the one for the public, which cannot be 1987 Constitution. surrendered without obvious general loss and inconvenience. A "public use" for which land Issue: Whether or not the ―public use‖ may be taken defies absolute definition for it requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the changes with varying conditions of society, new attempted expropriation by the Republic of a appliances in the sciences, changing 492- square-meter parcel of land as declared by conceptions of scope and functions of the NHI as a national landmark? government, and other differing circumstances brought about by an increase in population and Held: Yes. According to Justice Black, term new modes of communication and ―public use‖ means one which confers benefit transportation. or advantage to the public and it is not confined to actual use by public. It may also be said to The validity of the exercise of the power of mean public usefulness, utility or advantage, or eminent domain for traditional purposes is what is productive of general benefit. beyond question; it is not at all to be said, The term "public use," not having been however, that public use should thereby be otherwise defined by the constitution, must be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that considered in its general concept of meeting a "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of public need or a public exigency. 16 Black "use by the public" has long been discarded. summarizes the characterization given by The taking to be valid must be for public use. various courts to the term; thus: There was a time when it was felt that a literal Public Use. Eminent domain. The constitutional meaning should be attached to such a and statutory basis for taking property by requirement. Whatever project is undertaken eminent domain. For condemnation purposes, must be for the public to enjoy, as in the case of "public use" is one which confers same benefit streets or parks. Otherwise, expropriation is or advantage to the public; it is not confined to not allowable. It is not so any more. As long as actual use by public. It is measured in terms of the purpose of the taking is public, then the right of public to use proposed facilities for power of eminent domain comes into play. As which condemnation is sought and, as long as just noted, the constitution in at least two cases, public has right of use, whether exercised by to remove any doubt, determines what is public one or many members of public, a "public use. One is the expropriation of lands to be advantage" or "public benefit" accrues subdivided into small lots for resale at cost to sufficient to constitute a public use individuals. The other is the transfer, through Public use, in constitutional provisions the exercise of this power, of utilities and other restricting the exercise of the right to take private enterprise to the government. It is private property in virtue of eminent domain, accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition welfare satisfies the requirement of public use. with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Petitioners ask: restraining order, PPI asks us to declare Comelec resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional But "(w)hat is the so- called unusual interest and void on the ground that it violates the that the expropriation of (Felix Manalo's) prohibition imposed by the Constitution upon birthplace become so vital as to be a public use the government, and any of its agencies, against appropriate for the exercise of the power of the taking of private property for public use eminent domain" when only members of the without just compensation. Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit? This attempt to give some religious perspective to the case Issue: May COMELEC compel the members of deserves little consideration, for what should print media to donate ―Comelec Space? be significant is the principal objective of, not the casual consequences that might follow Held: NO. To compel print media companies to from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in donate "Comelec space" amounts to "taking" of setting up the marker is essentially to recognize private personal property for public use or the distinctive contribution of the late Felix purposes. The taking of print space here sought Manalo to the culture of the Philippines, rather to be effected may first be appraised under the than to commemorate his founding and public of expropriation of private personal leadership of the Iglesia ni Cristo. property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private The practical reality that greater benefit may be property for public use need to be examined derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than here: one is the necessity for the taking; by most others could well be true but such a another is the legal authority to effect the peculiar advantage still remains to be merely taking. The element of necessity for the taking incidental and secondary in nature. Indeed, that has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It only a few would actually benefit from the has not been suggested that the members of PPI expropriation of property does not necessarily are unwilling to sell print space at their normal diminish the essence and character of public rates to Comelec for election purposes. Indeed, use. the unwillingness or reluctance of Comelec to buy print space lies at the heart of the problem. PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE v. COMELEC Similarly, it has not been suggested, let alone Facts: The Philippine Press Institute, Inc. demonstrated, that Comelec has been granted ("PPI") is before this Court assailing the the power of imminent domain either by the constitutional validity of resolution No. 2772 Constitution or by the legislative authority. A issued by respondent Commission on Elections reasonable relationship between that power ("Comelec") and its corresponding Comelec and the enforcement and administration of directive dated 22 March 1995, through a election laws by Comelec must be shown; it is Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition. not casually to be assumed. Petitioner PPI is a non-stock, non-profit organization of news paper and magazine The taking of private property for public use it, publishers. of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of "just compensation" On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated (Article III, Section 9). And apparently the Resolution No. 2772, providing for a Comelec necessity of paying compensation for "Comelec Space, which is a free print space of not less space" is precisely what is sought to be avoided than one half (1/2) page in at least one by respondent Commission. There is nothing at newspaper of general circulation in every all to prevent newspaper and magazine province or city. publishers from voluntarily giving free print space to Comelec for the purposes contemplated in Resolution No. 2772. Section 2 the view of the plaza, shall not be allowed and of resolution No. 2772 does not, however, therefore be destroyed at the expense of the provide a constitutional basis for compelling owner, enacted an ordinance. Herein appellant publishers, against their will, in the kind of filed a written request with the incumbent factual context here present, to provide free municipal mayor for a permit to construct a print space for Comelec purposes. Section 2 building adjacent to their gasoline station on a does not constitute a valid exercise of the parcel of land registered in Fajardo's name, power of eminent domain. located along the national highway and separated from the public plaza by a creek. The As earlier noted, the Solicitor General also request was denied, for the reason among contended that Section 2 of Resolution No. others that the proposed building would 2772, even if read as compelling publishers to destroy the view or beauty of the public plaza. "donate" "Comelec space," may be sustained as Defendants reiterated their request for a a valid exercise of the police power of the state. building permit, but again the mayor turned This argument was, however, made too casually down the request. Whereupon, appellants to require prolonged consideration on their proceeded with the construction of the building part. Firstly, there was no effort (and without a permit, because they needed a place apparently no inclination on the part of of residence very badly, their former house Comelec) to show that the police power - having been destroyed by a typhoon and essentially a power of legislation - has been hitherto they had been living on leased constitutionally delegated to respondent property. Thereafter, defendants were charged Commission. Secondly, while private property in violation of the ordinance and subsequently may indeed be validly taken in the legitimate convicted. Hence this appeal. exercise of the police power of the state, there ISSUE: Whether or not the ordinance is a valid was no attempt to show compliance in the exercise of police power. instant case with the requisites of a lawful RULING: o. It is not a valid exercise of police taking under the police power. power. The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 is a blunt and deprive appellants of the right to use their own heavy instrument that purports, without a property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of showing of existence of a national emergency police power, and amounts to a taking of or other imperious public necessity, appellant’s property without just indiscriminately and without regard the the compensation. We do not overlook that the individual business condition of particular modern tendency is to regard the beautification newspapers or magazines located in different of neighborhoods as conducive to the comfort parts of the country, to take private property of and happiness of residents. newspaper or magazine publishers. No attempt As the case now stands, every structure that was made to demonstrate that a real and may be erected on appellants' land, regardless palpable or urgent necessity for the taking of of its own beauty, stands condemned under the print space confronted the Comelec and that ordinance in question, because it would Section 2 of Resolution No. 2772 was itself the interfere with the view of the public plaza from only reasonable and calibrated response to the highway. The appellants would, in effect, be such necessity available to Comelec. Section 2 constrained to let their land remain idle and does not constitute a valid exercise of the police unused for the obvious purpose for which it is power of the State. best suited, being urban in character. To legally achieve that result, the municipality must give PEOPLE v. FAJARDO appellants just compensation and an Facts: The municipal council of Baao, opportunity to be heard. Camarines Sur stating among others that construction of a building, which will destroy REPUBLIC v. Vda De CASTELLVI Facts: The Republic of the Philippines occupied substantially to oust the owner and deprive him the land of Carmen M. vda. de Castellvi from 1 of all beneficial enjoyment thereof." July 1947, by virtue of a contract of lease, on a Pursuant to the aforecited authority, a number year to year basis (from July 1 of each year to of circumstances must be present in the June 30 of the succeeding year). The Republic "taking" of property for purposes of eminent sought to renew the same but Castellvi refused. domain. The AFP refused to vacate the leased premises First, the expropriator must enter a private after the termination of the contract because it property. This circumstance is present in the would difficult for the army to vacate the instant case, when by virtue of the lease premises in view of the permanent installations agreement the Republic, through the AFP, took and other facilities worth almost P500,000.00 possession of the property of Castellvi. that were erected and already established on the property. Castellvi then brought suit to eject Second, the entrance into private property the Philippine Air Force from the land. While must be for more than a momentary period. this ejectment case was pending, the Republic "Momentary" means, "lasting but a moment; of filed on 26 June 1959 complaints for eminent but a moment's duration" (The Oxford English domain against the respondents over the 3 Dictionary, Volume VI, page 596); "lasting a parcels of land. In its complaint, the Republic very short time; transitory; having a very brief alleged, among other things, that the fair life; operative or recurring at every moment" market value of the above-mentioned lands, (Webster's Third International Dictionary, according to the Committee on Appraisal for 1963 edition.) The word "momentary" when the Province of Pampanga, was not more than applied to possession or occupancy of (real) P2,000 per hectare.The court authorizes the property should be construed to mean "a Republic to take immediate possession of the limited period" not indefinite or permanent. lands upon deposit of that amount with the The aforecited lease ontract was for a period of Provincial Treasurer of Pampanga.In 1961, the one year, renewable from year to year. The trial court, rendered its decision in the entry on the property, under the lease, is ejectment case, finding that the unanimous temporary, and considered transitory. The fact recommendation of the commissioners of that the Republic, through the AFP, constructed P10.00 per square meter for the 3 lots subject some installations of a permanent nature does of the action is fair and just; and required the not alter the fact that the entry into the land Republic to pay interests. was transitory, or intended to last a year, although renewable from year to year by ISSUE: Whether the taking of Castellvi‘s consent of the owner of the land. By express property occurred in 1947 or in 1959. provision of the lease agreement the Republic, as lessee, undertook to return the premises in RULING: The Republic urges that the "taking " substantially the same condition as at the time of Castellvi's property should be deemed as of the property was first occupied by the AFP. the year 1947 by virtue of afore-quoted lease agreement. In American Jurisprudence, Vol. 26, It is claimed that the ―INTENTION‖ of the 2nd edition, Section 157, on the subject of lessee was to occupy the land permanently, "Eminent Domain, we read the definition of as may be inferred from the construction of "taking" (in eminent domain) as follows: permanent improvements. But this "Taking‖under the power of eminent domain "INTENTION" cannot prevail over the clear may be defined generally as entering upon and express terms of the lease contract. private property for more than a momentary Intent is to be deduced from the language period, and, under the warrant or color of legal employed by the parties, and the terms of authority, devoting it to a public use, or the contract, when unambiguous, as in the otherwise informally appropriating or instant case, are conclusive in the absence of injuriously affecting it in such a way as averment and proof of mistake or fraud the question being not what the intention wag, renewal of the lease contract from year to year, but what is expressed in the language used. and by the provision in the lease contract Moreover, in order to judge the intention of the whereby the Republic undertook to return the contracting parties, their contemporaneous and property to Castellvi when the lease was subsequent acts shall be principally considered terminated. Neither was Castellvi deprived of (Art. 1371, Civil Code). If the intention of the all the beneficial enjoyment of the property, lessee (Republic) in 1947 was really to occupy because the Republic was bound to pay, and permanently Castellvi's property, why was the had been paying, Castellvi the agreed monthly contract of lease entered into on year to year rentals until the time when it filed the basis? Why was the lease agreement renewed complaint for eminent domain on June 26, from year to year? Why did not the Republic 1959. expropriate this land of Castellvi in 1949 when, according to the Republic itself, it expropriated Untenable also is the Republic's contention that the other parcels of land that it occupied at the although the contract between the parties was same time as the Castellvi land, for the purpose one of lease on a year to year basis, it was "in of converting them into a jet air base?" It might reality a more or less permanent right to really have been the intention of the Republic to occupy the premises under the guise of lease expropriate the lands in question at some with the 'right and privilege' to buy the future time, but certainly mere notice much less property should the lessor wish to terminate an implied notice of such intention on the part the lease," and "the right to buy the property is of the Republic to expropriate the lands in the merged as an integral part of the lease future did not, and could not, bind the relationship . . . so much so that the fair market landowner, nor bind the land itself. The value has been agreed upon, not as of the time expropriation must be actually commenced in of purchase, but as of the time of occupancy". court. 15 We cannot accept the Republic's contention that a lease on a year to year basis can give rise Third, the entry into the property should be to a permanent right to occupy, since by under warrant or color of legal authority. This express legal provision a lease made for a circumstance in the "taking" may be considered determinate time, as was the lease of Castellvi's as present in the instant case, because the land in the instant case, ceases upon the day Republic entered the Castellvi property as fixed, without need of a demand (Article 1669, lessee. Civil Code). Neither can it be said that the right Fourth, the property must be devoted to a of eminent domain may be exercised by simply public use or otherwise informally leasing the premises to be expropriated (Rule appropriated or injuriously affected. It may be 67, Section 1, Rules of Court). Nor can it be conceded that the circumstance of the property accepted that the Republic would enter into a being devoted to public use is present because contract of lease where its real intention was to the property was used by the air force of the buy, or why the Republic should enter into a AFP. simulated contract of lease ("under the guise of lease", as expressed by counsel for the Fifth, the utilization of the property for public Republic) when all the time the Republic had use must be in such a way as to oust the owner the right of eminent domain, and could and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of expropriate Castellvi's land if it wanted to the property. In the instant case, the entry of without resorting to any guise whatsoever. the Republic into the property and its Neither can we see how a right to buy could be utilization of the same for public use did not merged in a contract of lease in the absence of oust Castellvi and deprive her of all beneficial any agreement between the parties to that enjoyment of the property. Castellvi remained effect. To sustain the contention of the Republic as owner, and was continuously recognized as is to sanction a practice whereby in order to owner by the Republic, as shown by the secure a low price for a land which the government intends to expropriate (or would eventually expropriate) it would first negotiate (A number of circumstances must be present with the owner of the land to lease the land (for in the ―taking‖ of property for purposes of say ten or twenty years) then expropriate the eminent domain. First, the expropriator must same when the lease is about to terminate, then enter a private property. Second, the claim that the "taking" of the property for the entrance into private property must be for purposes of the expropriation be reckoned as of more than a momentary period. Third, the the date when the Government started to entry into the property should be under occupy the property under the lease, and then warrant or color of legal authority. Fourth, assert that the value of the property being the property must be devoted to a public use expropriated be reckoned as of the start of the or otherwise informally appropriated or lease, in spite of the fact that the value of the injuriously affected. Fifth, the utilization of property, for many good reasons, had in the the property for public use must be in such a meantime increased during the period of the way as to oust the owner and deprive him of lease. This would be sanctioning what all beneficial enjoyment of the property. ) obviously is a deceptive scheme, which would have the effect of depriving the owner of the It is clear, therefore, that the "taking" of property of its true and fair market value at the Castellvi's property for purposes of eminent time when the expropriation proceedings were domain cannot be considered to have taken actually instituted in court. The Republic's place in 1947 when the Republic commenced to claim that it had the "right and privilege" to buy occupy the property as lessee thereof. We find the property at the value that it had at the time merit in the contention of Castellvi that two when it first occupied the property as lessee essential elements in the "taking" of property nowhere appears in the lease contract. What under the power of eminent domain, was agreed expressly in paragraph No. 5 of the namely: (1) that the entrance and lease agreement was that, should the lessor occupation by the condemnor must be for a require the lessee to eturn the premises in the permanent, or indefinite period, and (2) same condition as at the time the same was first that in devoting the property to public use occupied by the AFP, the lessee would have the the owner was ousted from the property. "right and privilege" (or option) of paying the and deprived of its beneficial use, were not lessor what it would fairly cost to put the present when the Republic entered and premises in the same condition as it was at the occupied the Castellvi property in 1947. Under commencement of the lease, in lieu of the Section 4 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, the lessee's performance of the undertaking to put ―just compensation‖ is to be determined as of the land in said condition. The "fair value" at the date of the filing of the complaint. the time of occupancy, mentioned in the lease This Court has ruled that when the taking of the agreement, does not refer to the value of the property sought to be expropriated coincides property if bought by the lessee, but refers to with the commencement of the expropriation the cost of restoring the property in the same proceedings, or takes place subsequent to the condition as of the time when the lessee took filing of the complaint for eminent domain, the possession of the property. Such fair value just compensation should be determined as of cannot refer to the purchase price, for purchase the date of the filing of the complaint. Herein, it was never intended by the parties to the lease is undisputed that the Republic was placed in contract. It is a rule in the interpretation of possession of the Castellvi property, by contracts that "However general the terms of authority of the court, on 10 August 1959. The a contract may be, they shall not be ―taking‖ of the Castellvi property for the understood to comprehend things that are purposes of determining the just compensation distinct and cases that are different from to be paid must, therefore, be reckoned as of 26 those upon which the parties intended to June 1959 when the complaint for eminent agree" (Art. 1372, Civil Code). domain was filed.) PUNSALAN v. MUNICIPAL BOARDF legislation", the burden of plaintiffs' complaint Facts: An ordinance was approved by the is not that the professions to which they Municipal Board of the City of Manila which respectively belong have been singled out for imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons the imposition of this municipal occupation tax; exercising various professions in the city and and in any event, the Legislature may, in its penalizes non-payment of the tax by a fine of discretion, select what occupations shall be not more than two hundred pesos or by taxed, and in the exercise of that discretion it imprisonment of not more than six months or may tax all, or it may select for taxation certain by both such fine and imprisonment in the classes and leave the others untaxed. (Cooley discretion of the court. The ordinance was in on Taxation, Vol. 4, 4th ed., pp. 3393- 3395.) pursuance to paragraph (1) Section 18 of the Plaintiffs' complaint is that while the law has Revised Charter of the City of Manila which authorized the City of Manila to impose the said empowers the Municipal Board of said city to tax, it has withheld that authority from other impose a municipal occupation tax, not to chartered cities, not to mention municipalities. exceed P50 per annum, on persons engaged in We do not think it is for the courts to judge the various professions above referred to the what particular cities or municipalities should plaintiffs, after having paid their occupation tax, be empowered to impose occupation taxes in now being required to pay the additional tax addition to those imposed by the National prescribed in the ordinance. The plaintiffs paid Government. That matter is peculiarly within the said tax under protest. The lower court the domain of the political departments and the declared the validity of the law authorizing the courts would do well not to encroach upon it. enactment of the ordinance, but declared the Moreover, as the seat of the National latter illegal and void since its penalty provided Government and with a population and volume for the non- payment of tax was not legally of trade many times that of any other Philippine authorized. city or municipality, Manila, no doubt, offers a more lucrative field for the practice of the Issue: Is this ordinance and the law authorizing professions, so that it is but fair that the it constitute class legislation, are unjust and professionals in Manila be made to pay a higher oppressive, and authorize what amounts to occupation tax than their brethren in the double taxation? provinces.
Held: NO. To begin with defendants' appeal, we Thirdly, Plaintiffs brand the ordinance unjust find that the lower court was in error in saying and oppressive because they say that it creates that the imposition of the penalty provided for discrimination within a class in that while in the ordinance was without the authority of professionals with offices in Manila have to pay law. The last paragraph (kk) of the very section the tax, outsiders who have no offices in the city that authorizes the enactment of this tax but practice their profession therein are not ordinance (section 18 of the Manila Charter) in subject to the tax. Plaintiffs make a distinction express terms also empowers the Municipal that is not found in the ordinance. The Board "to fix penalties for the violation of ordinance imposes the tax upon every person ordinances which shall not exceed to(sic) two "exercising" or "pursuing" — in the City of hundred pesos fine or six months" Manila naturally — any one of the occupations imprisonment, or both such fine and named, but does not say that such person must imprisonment, for a single offense." Hence, the have his office in Manila. What constitutes pronouncement below that the ordinance in exercise or pursuit of a profession in the city is question is illegal and void because it imposes a a matter of judicial determination. The penalty not authorized by law is clearly without argument against double taxation may not be basis. invoked where one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city (1 Cooley Secondly, In raising the hue and cry of "class on Taxation, 4th ed., p. 492), it being widely recognized that there is nothing inherently donee‘s gift tax is not a property tax but an obnoxious in the requirement that license fees excise tax imposed on the transfer of property or taxes be exacted with respect to the same by way of gift inter vivos. Its assessment was occupation, calling or activity by both the state not on the property themeselves. It does not and the political subdivisions thereof. rest upon general ownership, but an excise upon the use made of the properties, upon the LLADOC v. CIR exercise of the privilege of receiving the Facts: In 1957, the MB Estate Inc., of Bacolod properties. The imposition of such excise tax on City, donated P10,000.00 in cash to Fr. Crispin property used for religious purposes does not Ruiz then parish priest of Victorias, Negros constitute an impairment of the Constitution. Occidental, and predecessor of Fr. Casimiro Lladoc, for the construction of a new Catholic Church in the locality. The total samount was actually spent for the purpose intended. On 3 March 1958, MB Estate filed the donor‘s gift tax return. Under date of 29 April 1960, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue issued as assessment for donee‘s gift tax against the Catholic Parish of Victorias, Negros Occidental, of which petitioner was the priest. The tax amounted to P1,370.00 including surcharges, interest of 1% monthly from 15 May 1958 to 15 June 1960, and the compromise for the late filing of the return. Petitioner lodged a protest to the assessment and requested the withdrawal thereof. The protest and the motion for reconsideration presented to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue were denied. The petitioner appealed to the CTA on 2 November 1960. After hearing, the CTA affirmed the decision of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue except the imposition of compromise penalty of P20. Fr. Lladoc appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether a donee‘s gift tax may be assessed against the Catholic Church.
Held: Yes. The phrase ―exempt from taxation,‖ as employed in the Constitution should not be interpreted to mean exemption from all kinds of taxes. Section 22(3), Art. VI of the Constitution of the Philippines, exempts from taxation cemeteries, churches and personages or convents, appurtenant thereto, and all lands, buildings, and improvements used exclusively for religious purposes. The exemption is only from the payment of taxes assessed on such properties enumerated, as property taxes, as contra-distinguished from excise taxes. A