Caunca v Salazar (Constitutional Law)
mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the
Caunca v Salazar
GR. No. L-2690
January I, 1949
Liberty of abode and travel
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the
same within the limits prescribed by law shall not
be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except
in the interest of national security, public safety or
public health, as may be provided by law.
Facts:
This is an action for habeas corpus brought by
Bartolome Caunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita
Flores, an orphan and an illiterate, who was
employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau,
owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein.
An advanced payment has already been given to
Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work
as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to
another residence, which was disallowed by the
employment agency. Further she was detained and
her liberty was restrained. The employment
agency wanted that the advance payment, which
was applied to her transportation expense from the
province should be paid by Estelita before she
could be allowed to leave.
Issue:
Whether or Not an employment agency has the
right to restrain and detain a maid without
returning the advance payment it gave?
Held:
An employment agency, regardless of the amount
it+-- may advance to a prospective employee or
maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her
freedom of movement. The fact that no physical
force has been exerted to keep her in the house of
the respondent does not make less real the
deprivation of her personal freedom of movement,
freedom to transfer from one place to another,
freedom to choose one’s residence. Freedom may
be lost due to external moral compulsion, to
founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in
the existence of an imaginary power of an
impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to
any other psychological element that may curtail
the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered
exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such
1
psychological spell is to place a person at the
protection of courts of justice as much as the
individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by
duress or physical coercion.
Ratio:
On the hypothesis that petitioner is really
indebted, such is not a valid reason for
respondents to obstruct, impede or interfere with
her desire to leave. Such indebtedness may be
multiplied by thousands or millions but would not
in any way subtract an iota from the fundamental
right to have a free choice of abode. The fact that
power to control said freedom may be an effective
means of avoiding monetary losses to the agency
is no reason for jeopardizing a fundamental
human right. The fortunes of business cannot be
controlled by controlling a fundamental human
freedom. Human dignity is not merchandise
appropriate for commercial barters or business
bargains. Fundamental freedoms are beyond the
province of commerce or any other business
enterprise.
Also, under the Revised Penal Code, penalties are
imposed "upon any person who, in order to
require or enforce the payment of a debt, shall
compel the debtor to work for him, against his
will, as household servant or farm laborer."
Moral restraint is a ground for the issuance of this
writ, as where a housemaid is prevented from
leaving her employ because of the influence of the
person detaining her.
Manotoc v. CA, 142 SCRA 149
Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment
and the state of the burden of keeping him, pending
the trial, and at the same time, to put the accused as
much under the power of the court as if he were in
custody of the proper officer, and to secure the
appearance of the accused so as to answer the call
of the court and do what the law may require of him.
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make
himself available at all times whenever the court
requires his presence operates as a valid
restriction on his right to travel. As we have held
in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).
... the result of the obligation
assumed by appellee (surety) to
hold the accused amenable at
all times to the orders and
processes of the lower court,
was to prohibit said accused
from leaving the jurisdiction of
the Philippines, because,
otherwise, said orders and
processes will be nugatory, and
inasmuch as the jurisdiction of
the courts from which they
issued does not extend beyond
that of the Philippines they
would have no binding force
outside of said jurisdiction.
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the
Philippines without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts.
The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when
fully executed or filed of record, and the prisoner
released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of
the accused from the public officials who have
him in their charge to keepers of his own
selection. Such custody has been regarded
merely as a continuation of the original
imprisonment. The sureties become invested
with full authority over the person of the principal
and have the right to prevent the principal from
leaving the state.14
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by
petitioner is not an absolute right. Section 5, Article
IV of the 1973 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or
when necessary in the interest of national security,
public safety or public health.
urgency of his travel, the duration thereof, as
well as the consent of his surety to the proposed
travel,
A court has the power to prohibit a person
admitted to bail from leaving the
Philippines. This is a necessary
2
consequence of the nature and function of
a bail bond. The condition imposed upon
petitioner to make himself available at all
times whenever the courtrequires his
presence operates as a valid restriction on
his right to travel. Indeed, if the accused
were allowed to leave the Philippines
without sufficient reason, he may be
placed beyond the reach of the courts.
Petitioner has not shown the necessity for
his travel abroad. There is no indication
that the business transactions cannot be
undertaken by any other person in his
behalf.
Petitioner cites the Court of Appeals case of
People vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R,
Feb. 13, 1980) as authority for his claim that he
could travel. The S.C. held however that said
case is not squarely on all fours with the case
at bar. Unlike the Shepherd case, petitioner
has failed to satisfy the courts of the urgency
of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as
the consent of his surety to the proposed
travel.
e. It may thus be inferred that the fact that a
criminal case is pending against an accused
does not automatically bar him from travelling
abroad. He must however convince the courts
of the urgency of his travel, the duration
thereof, and that his sureties are willing to
undertake the responsibility of allowing him
to travel.
Marcos v. Manglapus, 177 SCRA 668
Assuming that the President has the power to
bar former President Marcos and his family from
returning to the Philippines, in the interest of
"national security, public safety or public health
Article II is the most loosely drawn chapter of the
Constitution. To those who think that a
constitution ought to settle everything
beforehand it should be a nightmare; by the
same token, to those who think that constitution
makers ought to leave considerable leeway for
the future play of political forces, it should be a
vision realized.
This case involves a petition of mandamus and
prohibition asking the court to order the
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To
issue travel documents to former Pres. Marcos
and the immediate members of his family and to
enjoin the implementation of the President's
decision to bar their return to the Philippines.
Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses
to return in the Philippines is guaranteed by the
Bill of Rights, specifically Sections 1 and 6. They
contended that Pres. Aquino is without power to
impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses
because only a court may do so within the limits
prescribed by law. Nor the President impair their
right to travel because no law has authorized her
to do so.
They further assert that under international law,
their right to return to the Philippines is
guaranteed particularly by the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights, which has been ratified by the Philippines.
ISSUE: Whether or not, in the exercise of the
powers granted by the constitution, the President
(Aquino) may prohibit the Marcoses from
returning to the Philippines.
HELD: "It must be emphasized that the individual
right involved is not the right to travelfrom the
Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines. These are what the rightto
travel would normally connote. Essentially, the
right involved in this case at bar is the right to
return to one's country, a distinct right under
international law, independent from although
related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and
abode within the territory of a state, the right to
leave the country, and the right to enter one's
country as separate and distinct rights. What the
Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of
each state". On the other hand, the Covenant
guarantees the right to liberty of movement and
freedom to choose his residence and the right to
3
be free to leave any country, including his own.
Such rights may only be restricted by laws
protecting the national security, public order,
public health or morals or the separate rights of
others. However, right to enter one's country
cannot be arbitrarily deprived. It would be
therefore inappropriate to construe the limitations
to the right to return to ones country in the same
context as those pertaining tothe liberty of abode
and the right to travel.
The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode
and the right to travel, but it is a well considered
view that the right to return may be considered,
as a generally accepted principle of International
Law and under our Constitution as part of the law
of the land.
The court held that President did not act arbitrarily
or with grave abuse of discretion in determining
that the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and
his family poses a serious threat to national
interest and welfare. President Aquino has
determined that the destabilization caused by the
return of the Marcoses would wipe away the
gains achieved during the past few years after the
Marcos regime.
The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat
and therefore prohibiting their return
tothe Philippines, the instant petition is hereby
DISMISSED
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
provides:
Article 13. (1) Everyone has the
right to freedom of movement
and residence within the
borders of each state.
(2) Everyone has the right to
leave any country, including his
own, and to return to his
country.
Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which had been ratified by
the Philippines, provides:
Article 12
 1) Everyone lawfully within the
territory of a State shall, within
that territory, have the right to
liberty of movement and
freedom to choose his
residence.
2) Everyone shall be free to
leave any country, including his
own.
3) The above-mentioned rights
shall not be subject to any
restrictions except those which
are provided by law, are
necessary to protect national
security, public order (order
public), public health or morals
or the rights and freedoms of
others, and are consistent with
the other rights recognized in
the present Covenant.
4) No one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of the right to enter his
own country.
On the other hand, the respondents' principal
argument is that the issue in this case involves a
political question which is non-justiciable.
According to the Solicitor General:
As petitioners couch it, the
question involved is simply
whether or not petitioners
Ferdinand E. Marcos and his
family have the right to travel
and liberty of abode. Petitioners
invoke these constitutional
rights in vacuo without reference
to attendant circumstances.
Respondents submit that in its
proper formulation, the issue is
whether or not petitioners
Ferdinand E. Marcos and family
have the right to return to the
Philippines and reside here at
this time in the face of the
determination by the President
that such return and residence
will endanger national security
and public safety.
4
It may be conceded that as
formulated by petitioners, the
question is not a political
question as it involves merely a
determination of what the law
provides on the matter and
application thereof to petitioners
Ferdinand E. Marcos and family.
But when the question is
whether the two rights claimed
by petitioners Ferdinand E.
Marcos and family impinge on
or collide with the more
primordial and transcendental
right of the State to security and
safety of its nationals, the
question becomes political and
this Honorable Court can not
consider it.
There are thus gradations to the question, to wit:
Do petitioners Ferdinand E.
Marcos and family have the
right to return to the Philippines
and reestablish their residence
here? This is clearly a justiciable
question which this Honorable
Court can decide.
Do petitioners Ferdinand E.
Marcos and family have their
right to return to the Philippines
and reestablish their residence
here even if their return and
residence here will endanger
national security and public
safety? this is still a justiciable
question which this Honorable
Court can decide.
Is there danger to national
security and public safety if
petitioners Ferdinand E. Marcos
and family shall return to the
Philippines and establish their
residence here? This is now a
political question which this
Honorable Court can not decide
for it falls within the exclusive
authority and competence of the
President of the Philippines.
[Memorandum for Respondents,
pp. 9-11; Rollo, pp. 297-299.]
Respondents argue for the primacy of the right
of the State to national security over individual
rights. In support thereof, they cite Article II of
the Constitution, to wit:
Section 4. The prime duty of the
Government is to serve and
protect the people. The
Government may call upon the
people to defend the State and,
in the fulfillment thereof, all
citizens may be required, under
conditions provided by law, to
render personal, military, or civil
service.
Section 5. The maintenance of
peace and order, the protection
of life, liberty, and property, and
the promotion of the general
welfare are essential for the
enjoyment by all the people of
the blessings of democracy.
It must be emphasized that the individual right
involved in this case is not the right to travel
from the Philippines to other countries or
within the Philippines. These are what the right
to travel connote. Essentially, the right to
return to one’s country, a totally distinct right
under international law, independent from,
though related to the right to travel. Thus,
even the Universal declaration of Human Rights
and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of
the state, the right to leave a country and the
right to enter one’s country as separate and
distinct rights.
THE RIGHT TO RETURN TO ONE’S COUNTRY IS
NOT AMONG THE RIGHTS SPECIFICALLY
GUARANTEED BY THE BILL OF RIGHTS, WHICH
TREATS ONLY OF THE LIBERTY OF ABODE AND
THE RIGHT TO TRAVEL, BUT IT IS OUR WELL-
CONSIDERED VIEW THAT THE RIGHT TO RETURN
MAY BE CONSIDERED AS A GENERALLY
5
ACCEPTED PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW,
UNDER OUR CONSTITUTION, IS PART OF THE
LAW OF THE LAND.
To the President, the problem is one of
balancing the general welfare and the
common good against the exercise of rights of
certain individuals. The power involved is
the President’s RESIDUAL POWER to protect
the general welfare of the people.
The court cannot close its eyes to present
realities and pretend that the country is not
besieged by the insurgency, separatist
movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to
grab power, etc. With these before her, the
President cannot be said to have acted
arbitrarily, capriciously and whimsically.
Lastly, the issue involved in the case at bar is
not political in nature since under Section 1,
Art. VIII of the Constitution, judicial power now
includes the duty to “determine whether or
not there has been a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the
government.”
NOTE:
The main opinion was concurred in by 7 justices
(CJ Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera,
Gancayco, Grino-Aquino, Medialdea and
Regalado) or a total of 8 justices in voting in
favor of DISMISSING the petition. Seven justices
filed separate dissenting opinions (Gutierrez,
Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin and
Sarmiento).
PASEI v. Drilon
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988, Sarmiento,
J.
(Labor Standards, Police Power defined)
FACTS:
Phil association of Service Exporters, Inc., is
engaged principally in the recruitment of Filipino
workers, male and female of overseas
employment. It challenges the constitutional
validity of Dept. Order No. 1 (1998) of DOLE
entitled “Guidelines Governing the Temporary
Suspension of Deployment of Filipino Domestic
and Household Workers.” It claims that such
order is a discrimination against males and
females. The Order does not apply to all Filipino
workers but only to domestic helpers and females
with similar skills, and that it is in violation of the
right to travel, it also being an invalid exercise of
the lawmaking power. Further, PASEI invokes
Sec 3 of Art 13 of the Constitution, providing for
worker participation in policy and decision-
making processes affecting their rights and
benefits as may be provided by law. Thereafter
the Solicitor General on behalf of DOLE
submitting to the validity of the challenged
guidelines involving the police power of the State
and informed the court that the respondent have
lifted the deployment ban in some states where
there exists bilateral agreement with the
Philippines and existing mechanism providing for
sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and
protection of the Filipino workers.
ISSUE:
Whether or not D.O. No. 1 of DOLE is
constitutional as it is an exercise of police power.
RULING:
“[Police power] has been defined as the "state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere
with personal liberty or property in order to
promote the general welfare." As defined, it
consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon
liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the
common good. It is not capable of an exact
definition but has been, purposely, veiled in
general terms to underscore its all-
comprehensive embrace.
“The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason
why the contested measure should be nullified.
There is no question that Department Order No.
6
1 applies only to "female contract workers," but it
does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality
before the law" under the Constitution does not
import a perfect Identity of rights among all men
and women. It admits of classifications, provided
that (1) such classifications rest on substantial
distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes
of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing
conditions; and (4) they apply equally to all
members of the same class.
The Court is satisfied that the classification made-
the preference for female workers — rests on
substantial distinctions.
Silverio v. CA
"Bail is the security given for the release of a
person in custody of the law, furnished by him or
a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance
before any court when so required by the Court
or the Rules
Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has
posted bail but has violated the conditions
thereof by failing to appear before the Court
when required. Warrants for his arrest have
been issued. Those orders and processes would
be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be
allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure,
outside the territorial confines of the country.
Holding an accused in a criminal case within the
reach of the Courts by preventing his departure
from the Philippines must be considered as a
valid restriction on his right to travel so that he
may be dealt with in accordance with law. The
offended party in any criminal proceeding is the
People of the Philippines. It is to their best
interest that criminal prosecutions should run
their course and proceed to finality without
undue delay, with an accused holding himself
amenable at all times to Court Orders and
processes.
Justice Douglas, in Aptheker v. Secretary of State,
said: “Free movement by the citizen is, of course, as
dangerous to a tyrant as free expression of ideas or
the right of assembly, and it is therefore controlled in
most countries in the interest of security . . . . That is
why the ticketing of people and the use of
identification papers are routine matters under
totalitarian regimes.”
Freedom of movement in Philippine law has evolved
through the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions. The
“watch list order” issued by the justice secretary must
be measured against the present status of the current
constitutional provision.
The 1935 provision simply said: “The liberty of
abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired.” The
teaching then was that no one could be compelled to
change his or her home except in accordance with
law. Thus, when the mayor of Manila sought to
cleanse the city of prostitutes by sending them to
Davao, the Supreme Court stopped him. The Court
then said: “If [the City Mayor and Chief of Police]
can take to themselves such power, then any official
can do the same . . . And if a prostitute could be sent
against her wishes and under no law from one
locality to another within the country, then
officialdom can hold the same club over the head of
any citizen.”
ADVERTISEMENT
The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text to read:
“The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court, or
when necessary in the interest of national security,
public safety, or public health.” The liberty could
thus be impaired either “upon lawful order of the
court” or even without such order provided that the
restriction was “necessary in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health.” The phrase
“within the limits prescribed by law” in the 1935
provision disappeared. Thus, the net effect was that
an executive officer could impair liberty of abode and
of travel even without a prior court order provided
only that in the executive officer’s judgment
impairment was “necessary in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health.”
Drastic attempts by the government to control the
travel of citizens during the period of martial law did
reach the Court. The curtailment took the form of
denial of exit permits. The Court had occasion to
warn the Travel Processing Center not to treat the
constitutional guarantee of the right to travel as an
empty phrase in a pauper’s will.
The 1987 Constitution has strengthened the guarantee
by splitting freedom of movement into two distinct
sentences and treating them differently. The liberty of
abode is treated in a separate sentence. It may be
impaired only “upon lawful order of the court,” and
the court is to be guided by “the limits prescribed by
law” on the liberty itself. The clear intent was to
proscribe practices like “hamletting.”
7
As to liberty of travel, under the 1987 law, it may be
impaired even without a court order, but the
appropriate executive officer is not armed with
arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. He can
impose limits only on the basis of “national security,
public safety, or public health” and “as may be
provided by law,” a limitive phrase which had
disappeared from the less libertarian 1973 text.
My questions, therefore, are two. First, in what way
will the travel of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo be a
threat to “national security, public safety, or public
health”? Second, by what statutory authority is the
justice secretary preventing the exit of GMA?
In issuing “watch list orders” the Department of
Justice has relied on its prosecutorial powers as found
in Section 3[1], [2] & [6], Chapter I, Title III, Book
IV of the Administrative Code. Of these, the only
part specifically related to travel is Section 3(6)
which deals with the admission and stay of aliens! In
effect, the policy being followed now claims even a
broader executive discretion than that given under the
1973 Constitution which at least was limited by the
needs of “national security, public safety, or public
health.”
The limitation on the right to travel must be based on
law and not on a mere executive circular. The
limitation may also be by legitimate court order
under the Rules of Court. As the Court has said in
reference to persons out on bail, (and who are
therefore under the jurisdiction of a court), the right
to travel should not be “construed as delimiting the
inherent power of the courts to use all means
necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal
cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction
is conferred on a court or judicial officer, all auxiliary
writs, processes and other means necessary to carry it
into effect may be employed by such court or
officer.” The executive department is claiming
similar discretionary power and without relation to
national security, public safety, and public health.
Incidentally, the celebrated case on the right to travel
was the ban of President Cory Aquino on former
President Ferdinand Marcos’ return to the
Philippines. Since the authority to impair the right to
travel must be based on law, there was need to point
to a law giving her such authority. The Court found it
in the “faithful execution clause” of Article VII,
Section 17. The Court accepted the argument that the
return of Marcos then could be a threat to public
safety and the stability of the government at that
time. Is the justice secretary making such claim even
if President Aquino himself has been quoted as
saying that he has no objection to the foreign travel
of GMA?
Comendador v De Villa 200 SCRA 80
(1991) Held: The SC ruled that the bail invoked
"military members exempted from the right by petitioners is not available in the military as an
to bail” exception to the general rule embodied in the Bill
of Rights. Thus the right to a speedy trial is given
more emphasis in the military where the right to
bail does not exist. Justification to this rule
Facts: This is a consolidated case of members of
involves the unique structure of the military and
the AFP who were charged with violation
national security considerations which may result
ofArticles of War (AW) 67 (Mutiny), AW 96
to damaging precedents that mutinous soldiers
(Conduct Unbecoming an Officer and a
will be released on provisional liberty giving them
Gentleman) and AW 94 (Various Crimes) in
the chance to continue their plot in overthrowing
relation to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code
the government. Therefore the decision of the
(Murder). The petitioners were questioning the
lower court granting bail to the petitioners was
conduct of the pre-trial investigation conducted
reversed.
where a motion to bail was filed but was denied.
Petitioner applied for provisional liberty and
preliminary injunction before the court which was
granted. However De Villa refused to release
petitioner for provisional liberty pending the
ANICETO SABBUN MAGUDDATU and LAUREANA
resolution of the appeal they have taken before
the court invoking that military officers are an SABBUN MAGUDDATU,
exemption from the right to bail guaranteed by the petitioners, vs
Constitution. Decision was rendered reiterating
the release for provisional liberty of petitioners . Honorable COURT OF APPEALS (FOURTH DIVISION)
with the court stating that there is a mistake in the and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
presumption of respondents that bail does not
apply among military men facing court martial respondents.
proceeding. Respondents now appeal before the
higher court.
DECISION

KAPUNAN,
The 1987 Constitution of the Philippines J
The Constitution of the Republic of the
.:
Philippines explained
For a human being who has been inside a prison
cell, a bail bond represents his only ticket to liberty,
Issue: Whether or not military men are exempted albeit provisional. But the right to bail is not always a
from the Constitutional guarantee on the right to demandable right. In certain instances, it is a matter
bail. of discretion. This discretion, however, is not full and
unfettered because the law and the rules set the
parameters for its proper exercise. Discretion is, of
Cases on constitutional law course, a delicate thing and its abuse of such grave
(Philippine casebook series) nature would warrant intervention of this Court by
way of the special civil action for
A historical and juridical study of the Philippine
Bill of rights certiorari

8
Sections 4, 5 and 7 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court The appellate court may review the resolution of the
provide: Regional Trial Court, on motion and with notice to
the adverse party.
SEC. 4. Bail, a matter of right.- All persons in custody
shall: (a) before or after conviction by the xxx
Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court,
SEC. 7. Capital offense or an offense punishable by
Municipal Trial Court in Cities and Municipal Circuit
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
Trial Court, and (b) before conviction by the Regional
bailable.- No person charged with a capital offense,
Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
or an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be
life imprisonment, when evidence of guilt is strong,
admitted to bail as a matter of right, with sufficient
shall be admitted to bail regardless of the stage of
sureties, or be released on recognizance as
the criminal prosecution.
prescribed by law or this Rule.

SEC. 5. Bail, when discretionary.- Upon conviction by

the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable WHAT IS BAIL?
by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment,
the court, on application, may admit the accused to 1. It is the security given
bail.
2. For the release of a person in custody of the law
The court, in its discretion, may allow the accused to
3. Furnished by him or a bondsman
continue on provisional liberty under the same bail
bond during the period to appeal subject to the 4. To guarantee his appearance before any court as
consent of the bondsman. required

If the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment .

exceeding six (6) years but not more than twenty
(20) years, the accused shall be denied bail, or his
bail previously granted shall be cancelled, upon a
showing by the prosecution, with notice to the
accused, of the following or other similar
circumstances:

(a) That the accused is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or

habitual delinquent, or has committed the crime
aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;

(b) That the accused is found to have previously

escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence,
or has violated the conditions of his bail without
valid justification;

(c) That the accused committed the offense while on

probation, parole, or under conditional pardon;

(d) That the circumstances of the accused or his case

indicate the probability of flight if released on bail;
or

(e) That there is undue risk that during the pendency

of the appeal, the accused may commit another
crime.