Section 22. Dealings with land pending original registration.
After shown the lots to be affected, as they were before, and as they will
the filing of the application and before the issuance of the decree
of registration, the land therein described may still be the subject
of dealings in whole or in part, in which case the interested party
shall present to the court the pertinent instruments together with a
subdivision plan approved by the Director of Lands in case of
transfer of portions thereof and the court, after notice to the
parties, shall order such land registered subject to the conveyance
or encumbrance created by said instruments, or order that the
decree of registration be issued in the name of the person to whom
the property has been conveyed by said instruments.
Section 50. Subdivision and consolidation plans. Any owner
subdividing a tract of registered land into lots which do not
constitute a subdivision project has defined and provided for under
P.D. No. 957, shall file with the Commissioner of Land Registration
or with the Bureau of Lands a subdivision plan of such land on
which all boundaries, streets, passageways and waterways, if any,
shall be distinctly and accurately delineated.
If a subdivision plan, be it simple or complex, duly approved by the
Commissioner of Land Registration or the Bureau of Lands together
with the approved technical descriptions and the corresponding
owner's duplicate certificate of title is presented for registration,
the Register of Deeds shall, without requiring further court
approval of said plan, register the same in accordance with the
provisions of the Land Registration Act, as amended: Provided,
however, that the Register of Deeds shall annotate on the new
certificate of title covering the street, passageway or open space, a
memorandum to the effect that except by way of donation in favor
of the national government, province, city or municipality, no
portion of any street, passageway, waterway or open space so
delineated on the plan shall be closed or otherwise disposed of by
the registered owner without the approval of the Court of First
Instance of the province or city in which the land is situated.
A registered owner desiring to consolidate several lots into one or
more, requiring new technical descriptions, shall file with the Land
Registration Commission, a consolidation plan on which shall be
appear after the consolidation. Upon the surrender of the owner's
duplicate certificates and the receipt of consolidation plan duty
approved by the Commission, the Register of Deeds concerned
shall cancel the corresponding certificates of title and issue a new
one for the consolidated lots.
The Commission may not order or cause any change, modification,
or amendment in the contents of any certificate of title, or of any
decree or plan, including the technical description therein,
covering any real property registered under the Torrens system,
nor order the cancellation of the said certificate of title and the
issuance of a new one which would result in the enlargement of the
area covered by the certificate of title.
CHAPTER V
SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION
I
VOLUNTARY DEALINGS WITH REGISTERED LANDS
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 51. Conveyance and other dealings by registered owner.
An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge
or otherwise deal with the same in accordance with existing laws.
He may use such forms of deeds, mortgages, leases or other
voluntary instruments as are sufficient in law. But no deed,
mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument, except a will
purporting to convey or affect registered land shall take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract
between the parties and as evidence of authority to the Register of
Deeds to make registration.
The act of registration shall be the operative act to convey or
affect the land insofar as third persons are concerned, and in all
cases under this Decree, the registration shall be made in the
office of the Register of Deeds for the province or city where the
land lies.
Section 52. Constructive notice upon registration. Every
conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order, judgment,
instrument or entry affecting registered land shall, if registered,
filed or entered in the office of the Register of Deeds for the
province or city where the land to which it relates lies, be
constructive notice to all persons from the time of such registering,
filing or entering.
Section 53. Presentation of owner's duplicate upon entry of new
certificate. No voluntary instrument shall be registered by the
Register of Deeds, unless the owner's duplicate certificate is
presented with such instrument, except in cases expressly
provided for in this Decree or upon order of the court, for cause
shown.
The production of the owner's duplicate certificate, whenever any
voluntary instrument is presented for registration, shall be
conclusive authority from the registered owner to the Register of
Deeds to enter a new certificate or to make a memorandum of
registration in accordance with such instrument, and the new
certificate or memorandum shall be binding upon the registered
owner and upon all persons claiming under him, in favor of every
purchaser for value and in good faith.
In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may
pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to
such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of any
innocent holder for value of a certificate of title. After the entry of
the decree of registration on the original petition or application,
any subsequent registration procured by the presentation of a
forged duplicate certificate of title, or a forged deed or other
instrument, shall be null and void.
Section 54. Dealings less than ownership, how registered. No new
certificate shall be entered or issued pursuant to any instrument
which does not divest the ownership or title from the owner or
from the transferee of the registered owners. All interests in
registered land less than ownership shall be registered by filing
with the Register of Deeds the instrument which creates or
transfers or claims such interests and by a brief memorandum
thereof made by the Register of Deeds upon the certificate of title,
and signed by him. A similar memorandum shall also be made on
the owner's duplicate. The cancellation or extinguishment of such
interests shall be registered in the same manner.
Section 55. Grantee's name, nationality, etc., to be stated. Every
deed or other voluntary instrument presented for registration shall
contain or have endorsed upon it the full name, nationality,
residence and postal address of the grantee or other person
acquiring or claiming an interest under such instrument, and every
deed shall also state whether the grantee is married or unmarried,
and if married, the name in full of the husband or wife. If the
grantee is a corporation or association, the instrument must
contain a recital to show that such corporation or association is
legally qualified to acquire private lands. Any change in the
residence or postal address of such person shall be endorsed by
the Register of Deeds on the original copy of the corresponding
certificate of title, upon receiving a sworn statement of such
change. All names and addresses shall also be entered on all
certificates.
Notices and processed issued in relation to registered land in
pursuance of this Decree may be served upon any person in
interest by mailing the same to the addresses given, and shall be
binding, whether such person resides within or without the
Philippines, but the court may, in its discretion, require further or
other notice to be given in any case, if in its opinion the interest of
justice so requires.
Section 56. Primary Entry Book; fees; certified copies. Each
Register of Deeds shall keep a primary entry book in which, upon
payment of the entry fee, he shall enter, in the order of their
reception, all instruments including copies of writs and processes
filed with him relating to registered land. He shall, as a preliminary
process in registration, note in such book the date, hour and
minute of reception of all instruments, in the order in which they
were received. They shall be regarded as registered from the time
so noted, and the memorandum of each instrument, when made
on the certificate of title to which it refers, shall bear the same
date: Provided, that the national government as well as the
provincial and city governments shall be exempt from the payment
of such fees in advance in order to be entitled to entry and
registration.
Every deed or other instrument, whether voluntary or involuntary,
so filed with the Register of Deeds shall be numbered and indexed
and endorsed with a reference to the proper certificate of title. All
records and papers relative to registered land in the office of the
Register of Deeds shall be open to the public in the same manner
as court records, subject to such reasonable regulations as the
Register of Deeds, under the direction of the Commissioner of Land
Registration, may prescribe.
All deeds and voluntary instruments shall be presented with their
respective copies and shall be attested and sealed by the Register
of Deeds, endorsed with the file number, and copies may be
delivered to the person presenting them.
Certified copies of all instruments filed and registered may also be
obtained from the Register of Deeds upon payment of the
prescribed fees.
(A) CONVEYANCES AND TRANSFERS
Section 57. Procedure in registration of conveyances. An owner
desiring to convey his registered land in fee simple shall execute
and register a deed of conveyance in a form sufficient in law. The
Register of Deeds shall thereafter make out in the registration
book a new certificate of title to the grantee and shall prepare and
deliver to him an owner's duplicate certificate. The Register of
Deeds shall note upon the original and duplicate certificate the
date of transfer, the volume and page of the registration book in
which the new certificate is registered and a reference by number
to the last preceding certificate. The original and the owner's
duplicate of the grantor's certificate shall be stamped "canceled".
The deed of conveyance shall be filled and indorsed with the
number and the place of registration of the certificate of title of the
land conveyed.
Section 58. Procedure where conveyance involves portion of land.
If a deed or conveyance is for a part only of the land described in a
certificate of title, the Register of Deeds shall not enter any
transfer certificate to the grantee until a plan of such land showing
all the portions or lots into which it has been subdivided and the
corresponding technical descriptions shall have been verified and
approved pursuant to Section 50 of this Decree. Meanwhile, such
deed may only be annotated by way of memorandum upon the
grantor's certificate of title, original and duplicate, said
memorandum to serve as a notice to third persons of the fact that
certain unsegregated portion of the land described therein has
been conveyed, and every certificate with such memorandum shall
be effectual for the purpose of showing the grantee's title to the
portion conveyed to him, pending the actual issuance of the
corresponding certificate in his name.
Upon the approval of the plan and technical descriptions, the
original of the plan, together with a certified copy of the technical
descriptions shall be filed with the Register of Deeds for annotation
in the corresponding certificate of title and thereupon said officer
shall issue a new certificate of title to the grantee for the portion
conveyed, and at the same time cancel the grantor's certificate
partially with respect only to said portion conveyed, or, if the
grantor so desires, his certificate may be canceled totally and a
new one issued to him describing therein the remaining portion:
Provided, however, that pending approval of said plan, no further
registration or annotation of any subsequent deed or other
voluntary instrument involving the unsegregated portion conveyed
shall be effected by the Register of Deeds, except where such
unsegregated portion was purchased from the Government or any
of its instrumentalities. If the land has been subdivided into several
lots, designated by numbers or letters, the Register of Deeds may,
if desired by the grantor, instead of canceling the latter's
certificate and issuing a new one to the same for the remaining
unconveyed lots, enter on said certificate and on its owner's
duplicate a memorandum of such deed of conveyance and of the
issuance of the transfer certificate to the grantee for the lot or lots
thus conveyed, and that the grantor's certificate is canceled as to
such lot or lots.
Section 59. Carry over of encumbrances. If, at the time of any
transfer, subsisting encumbrances or annotations appear in the
registration book, they shall be carried over and stated in the new
certificate or certificates; except so far as they may be
simultaneously released or discharged.
(B) MORTGAGES AND LEASES
Section 60. Mortgage or lease of registered land. Mortgage and
leases shall be registered in the manner provided in Section 54 of
this Decree. The owner of registered land may mortgage or lease it
by executing the deed in a form sufficient in law. Such deed of
mortgage or lease and all instruments which assign, extend,
discharge or otherwise deal with the mortgage or lease shall be
registered, and shall take effect upon the title only from time of
registration.
No mortgagee's or lessee's duplicate certificate of title shall
hereafter be issued by the Registers of Deeds, and those issued
prior to the effectivity of this Decree are hereby deemed canceled
and the holders thereof shall immediately surrender the same to
the Register of Deeds concerned.
Section 61. Registration. Upon presentation for registration of the
deed of mortgage or lease together with the owner's duplicate, the
Register of Deeds shall enter upon the original of the certificate of
title and also upon the owner's duplicate certificate a
memorandum thereof, the date and time of filing and the file
number assigned to the deed, and shall sign the said
memorandum. He shall also note on the deed the date and time of
filing and a reference to the volume and page of the registration
book in which it is registered.
Section 62. Discharge or cancellation. A mortgage or lease on
registered land may be discharge or canceled by means of an
instrument executed by the mortgage or lessee in a form sufficient
in law, which shall be filed with the Register of Deeds who shall
make the appropriate memorandum upon the certificate of title.
Section 63. Foreclosure of Mortgage. (a) If the mortgage was
foreclosed judicially, a certified copy of the final order of the court
confirming the sale shall be registered with the Register of Deeds.
If no right of redemption exists, the certificate of title of the
mortgagor shall be canceled, and a new certificate issued in the
name of the purchaser.
Where the right of redemption exists, the certificate of title
of the mortgagor shall not be canceled, but the certificate
of sale and the order confirming the sale shall be
registered by a brief memorandum thereof made by the
Register of Deeds upon the certificate of title. In the event
the property is redeemed, the certificate or deed of
redemption shall be filed with the Register of Deeds, and a
brief memorandum thereof shall be made by the Register
of Deeds on the certificate of title of the mortgagor.
If the property is not redeemed, the final deed of sale
executed by the sheriff in favor of the purchaser at a
foreclosure sale shall be registered with the Register of
Deeds; whereupon the title of the mortgagor shall be
canceled, and a new certificate issued in the name of the
purchaser.
(b) If the mortgage was foreclosed extrajudicially, a
certificate of sale executed by the officer who conducted
the sale shall be filed with the Register of Deeds who shall
make a brief memorandum thereof on the certificate of
title.
In the event of redemption by the mortgagor, the same
rule provided for in the second paragraph of this section
shall apply.
In case of non-redemption, the purchaser at foreclosure
sale shall file with the Register of Deeds, either a final deed
of sale executed by the person authorized by virtue of the
power of attorney embodied in the deed of mortgage, or
his sworn statement attesting to the fact of non-
redemption; whereupon, the Register of Deeds shall issue
a new certificate in favor of the purchaser after the owner's
duplicate of the certificate has been previously delivered
and canceled.
(C) POWERS OF ATTORNEY; TRUSTS
Section 64. Power of attorney. Any person may, by power of
attorney, convey or otherwise deal with registered land and the
same shall be registered with the Register of Deeds of the province
or city where the land lies. Any instrument revoking such power of
attorney shall be registered in like manner.
Section 65. Trusts in registered land. If a deed or other
instrument is filed in order to transfer registered land in trust, or
upon any equitable condition or limitation expressed therein, or to
create or declare a trust or other equitable interests in such land
without transfer, the particulars of the trust, condition, limitation or
other equitable interest shall not be entered on the certificate; but
only a memorandum thereof shall be entered by the words "in
trust", or "upon condition", or other apt words, and by a reference
by number to the instrument authorizing or creating the same. A
similar memorandum shall be made upon the original instrument
creating or declaring the trust or other equitable interest with a
reference by number to the certificate of title to which it relates
and to the volume and page in the registration book in which it is
registered.
Section 66. Trust with power of sale, etc., how expressed. If the
instrument creating or declaring a trust or other equitable interest
contains an express power to sell, mortgage or deal with the land
in any manner, such power shall be stated in the certificate of title
by the words "with power to sell", or "power to mortgage", or by
apt words of description in case of other powers. No instrument
which transfers, mortgages or in any way deals with registered
land in trust shall be registered, unless the enabling power thereto
is expressly conferred in the trust instrument, or unless a final
judgment or order of a court of competent jurisdiction has
construed the instrument in favor of the power, in which case a
certified copy of such judgment or order may be registered.
Section 67. Judicial appointment of new trustee. If a new trustee
of registered land is appointed by a court of competent jurisdiction,
a new certificate may be issued to him upon presentation to the
Register of Deeds of a certified copy of the order or judicial
appointment and the surrender for cancellation of the duplicate
certificate.
Section 68. Implied, trusts, how established. Whoever claims an
interest in registered land by reason of any implied or constructive
trust shall file for registration with the Register of Deeds a sworn
statement thereof containing a description of the land, the name of
the registered owner and a reference to the number of the
certificate of title. Such claim shall not affect the title of a
purchaser for value and in good faith before its registration.
CHAPTER VIII
REGISTRATION OF PATENTS
Section 103. Certificates of title pursuant to patents. Whenever
public land is by the Government alienated, granted or conveyed
to any person, the same shall be brought forthwith under the
operation of this Decree. It shall be the duty of the official issuing
the instrument of alienation, grant, patent or conveyance in behalf
of the Government to cause such instrument to be filed with the
Register of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies, and to
be there registered like other deeds and conveyance, whereupon a
certificate of title shall be entered as in other cases of registered
land, and an owner's duplicate issued to the grantee. The deed,
grant, patent or instrument of conveyance from the Government to
the grantee shall not take effect as a conveyance or bind the land
but shall operate only as a contract between the Government and
the grantee and as evidence of authority to the Register of Deeds
to make registration. It is the act of registration that shall be the
operative act to affect and convey the land, and in all cases under
this Decree, registration shall be made in the office of the Register
of Deeds of the province or city where the land lies. The fees for
registration shall be paid by the grantee. After due registration and
issuance of the certificate of title, such land shall be deemed to be
registered land to all intents and purposes under this Decree.
CHAPTER XIII
DEALINGS WITH UNREGISTERED LANDS
Section 113. Recording of instruments relating to unregistered
lands. No deed, conveyance, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary
instrument affecting land not registered under the Torrens system
shall be valid, except as between the parties thereto, unless such
instrument shall have been recorded in the manner herein
prescribed in the office of the Register of Deeds for the province or
city where the land lies.
(a) The Register of Deeds for each province or city shall
keep a Primary Entry Book and a Registration Book. The
Primary Entry Book shall contain, among other particulars,
the entry number, the names of the parties, the nature of
the document, the date, hour and minute it was presented
and received. The recording of the deed and other
instruments relating to unregistered lands shall be effected
by any of annotation on the space provided therefor in the
Registration Book, after the same shall have been entered
in the Primary Entry Book.
(b) If, on the face of the instrument, it appears that it is
sufficient in law, the Register of Deeds shall forthwith
record the instrument in the manner provided herein. In
case the Register of Deeds refuses its administration to
record, said official shall advise the party in interest in
writing of the ground or grounds for his refusal, and the
latter may appeal the matter to the Commissioner of Land
Registration in accordance with the provisions of Section
117 of this Decree. It shall be understood that any
recording made under this section shall be without
prejudice to a third party with a better right.

(c) After recording on the Record Book, the Register of

Deeds shall endorse among other things, upon the original
of the recorded instruments, the file number and the date
as well as the hour and minute when the document was
received for recording as shown in the Primary Entry Book,
returning to the registrant or person in interest the
duplicate of the instrument, with appropriate annotation,
certifying that he has recorded the instrument after
reserving one copy thereof to be furnished the provincial or
city assessor as required by existing law.

(d) Tax sale, attachment and levy, notice of lis pendens,

adverse claim and other instruments in the nature of
involuntary dealings with respect to unregistered lands, if
made in the form sufficient in law, shall likewise be
admissible to record under this section.

(e) For the services to be rendered by the Register of

Deeds under this section, he shall collect the same amount
of fees prescribed for similar services for the registration of
deeds or instruments concerning registered lands.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 81163 September 26, 1988
EDUARDO S. BARANDA and ALFONSO HITALIA, petitioners,
vs.
HONORABLE JUDGE TITO GUSTILO, ACTING REGISTER OF
DEEDS AVITO SACLAUSO, HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
and ATTY. HECTOR P. TEODOSIO, respondents.
Eduardo S. Baranda for petitioners.
Rico & Associates for private respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia were the petitioners in G.R.
No. 64432 and the private respondents in G.R. No. 62042. The
subject matter of these two (2) cases and the instant case is the
same — a parcel of land designated as Lot No. 4517 of the
Cadastral Survey of Sta. Barbara, Iloilo covered by Original
Certificate of Title No. 6406.
The present petition arose from the same facts and events which
triggered the filing of the earlier petitions. These facts and events
are cited in our resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No.
64432, as follows:
. . . This case has its origins in a petition for
reconstitution of title filed with the Court of First
Instance of Iloilo involving a parcel of land known
as Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 6406 in
the name of Romana Hitalia. Eventually, Original
Certificate of Title No. 6406 was cancelled and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 106098 was issued
in the names of Alfonso Hitalia and Eduardo S.
Baranda The Court issued a writ of possession
which Gregorio Perez, Maria P. Gotera and Susana
Silao refused to honor on the ground that they also
have TCT No. 25772 over the same Lot No. 4517.
The Court, after considering the private
respondents' opposition and finding TCT No. 25772
fraudulently acquired, ordered that the writ of
possession be carried out. A motion for
reconsideration having been denied, a writ of
demolition was issued on March 29, 1982. Perez
and Gotera filed a petition for certiorari and
prohibition with the Court of Appeals. On August 6,
1982, the Court of Appeals denied the petition.
Perez and Gotera filed the petition for review on
certiorari denominated as G.R. No. 62042 before
the Supreme Court. As earlier stated the petition
was denied in a resolution dated January 7,1983.
The motion for reconsideration was denied in
another resolution dated March 25, 1983, which
also stated that the denial is final. This decision in
G.R. No. 62042, in accordance with the entry of
judgment, became final on March 25, 1983. The
petitioners in the instant case G.R. No. 64432--
contend that the writs of possession and
demolition issued in the respondent court should
now be implemented; that Civil Case No. 00827
before the Intermediate Appellate Court was filed
only to delay the implementation of the writ; that
counsel for the respondent should be held in
contempt of court for engaging in a concerted but
futile effort to delay the execution of the writs of
possession and demolition and that petitioners are
entitled to damages because of prejudice caused
by the filing of this petition before the Intermediate
Appellate Court. On September 26, 1983, this
Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order ' to
maintain the status quo, both in the Intermediate
Appellate Court and in the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo. Considering that (l)there is merit in the
 instant petition for indeed the issues discussed in
G.R. No. 64432 as raised in Civil Case No. 00827
before the respondent court have already been
passed upon in G.R. No. 62042; and (2) the
Temporary Restraining Order issued by the
Intermediate Appellate Court was only intended
not to render the petition moot and academic
pending the Court's consideration of the issues, the
Court RESOLVED to DIRECT the respondent
Intermediate Appellate Court not to take
cognizance of issues already resolved by this Court
and accordingly DISMISS the petition in Civil Case
No. 00827. Immediate implementation of the writs
of possession and demolition is likewise ordered.
(pp. 107-108, Rollo — G.R. No. 64432)
On May 9, 1984, the Court issued a resolution denying with finality
a motion for reconsideration of the December 29, 1983 resolution
in G.R. No. 64432. On this same date, another resolution was
issued, this time in G.R. No. 62042, referring to the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo the ex-parte motion of the private respondents
(Baranda and Hitalia) for execution of the judgment in the
resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and March 9, 1983. In the
meantime, the then Intermediate Appellate Court issued a
resolution dated February 10, 1984, dismissing Civil Case No.
00827 which covered the same subject matter as the Resolutions
above cited pursuant to our Resolution dated December 29, 1983.
The resolution dated December 29, 1983 in G.R. No. 64432
became final on May 20, 1984.
Upon motions of the petitioners, the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch 23 presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued the following
order:
Submitted are the following motions filed by
movants Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia
through counsel dated August 28, 1984:
(a) Reiterating Motion for Execution of Judgment of
Resolutions dated January 7, 1983 and March 9,
1983 Promulgated by Honorable Supreme Court
(First Division) in G.R. No. 62042;
(b) Motion for Execution of Judgment of Resolution
dated December 29, 1983 Promulgated by
Honorable Supreme Court (First Division) in G.R.
No. 64432;
(c) The Duties of the Register of Deeds are purely
ministerial under Act 496, therefore she must
register all orders, judgment, resolutions of this
Court and that of Honorable Supreme Court.
Finding the said motions meritorious and there
being no opposition thereto, the same is hereby
GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
25772 is hereby declared null and void and
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-106098 is hereby
declared valid and subsisting title concerning the
ownership of Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso
Hitalia, all of Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
The Acting Register of Deeds of Iloilo is further
ordered to register the Subdivision Agreement of
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia as prayed
for." (p. 466, Rollo--G.R. No. 64432)
The above order was set aside on October 8, 1984 upon a motion
for reconsideration and manifestation filed by the Acting Registrar
of Deeds of Iloilo, Atty. Helen P. Sornito, on the ground that there
was a pending case before this Court, an Action for Mandamus,
Prohibition, Injunction under G.R. No. 67661 filed by Atty. Eduardo
Baranda, against the former which remained unresolved.
In view of this development, the petitioners filed in G.R. No. 62042
and G.R. No. 64432 ex-parte motions for issuance of an order
directing the Regional Trial Court and Acting Register of Deeds to
execute and implement the judgments of this Court. They prayed
that an order be issued:
1. Ordering both the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
Branch XXIII, under Hon. Judge Tito G. Gustilo and
the acting Register of Deeds Helen P. Sornito to
 register the Order dated September 5, 1984 of the
lower court;
2. To cancel No.T-25772. Likewise to cancel No.T-
106098 and once cancelled to issue new
certificates of title to each of Eduardo S. Baranda
and Alfonso Hitalia;
Plus other relief and remedies equitable under the
premises. (p. 473, 64432 Rollo)
Acting on these motions, we issued on September 17,1986 a
Resolution in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 granting the
motions as prayed for. Acting on another motion of the same
nature filed by the petitioners, we issued another Resolution dated
October 8, 1986 referring the same to the Court Administrator for
implementation by the judge below.
In compliance with our resolutions, the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, Branch 23 presided by Judge Tito G. Gustilo issued two (2)
orders dated November 6,1986 and January 6,1987 respectively, to
wit:
ORDER
This is an Ex-parte Motion and Manifestation
submitted by the movants through counsel on
October 20, 1986; the Manifestation of Atty. Helen
Sornito, Register of Deeds of the City of Iloilo, and
formerly acting register of deeds for the Province
of Iloilo dated October 23, 1986 and the
Manifestation of Atty. Avito S. Saclauso, Acting
Register of Deeds, Province of Iloilo dated
November 5, 1986.
Considering that the motion of movants Atty.
Eduardo S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia dated
August 12, 1986 seeking the full implementation of
the writ of possession was granted by the
Honorable Supreme Court, Second Division per its
Resolution dated September 17,1986, the present
motion is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, the Acting Register of Deeds,
Province of Iloilo, is hereby ordered to register the
Order of this Court dated September 5, 1984 as
prayed for.
xxx xxx xxx
ORDER
This is a Manifestation and Urgent Petition for the
Surrender of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-
25772 submitted by the petitioners Atty. Eduardo
S. Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia on December 2,
1986, in compliance with the order of this Court
dated November 25, 1 986, a Motion for Extension
of Time to File Opposition filed by Maria Provido
Gotera through counsel on December 4, 1986
which was granted by the Court pursuant to its
order dated December 15, 1986. Considering that
no Opposition was filed within the thirty (30) days
period granted by the Court finding the petition
tenable, the same is hereby GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Maria Provido Gotera is hereby
ordered to surrender Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-25772 to this Court within ten (10) days from
the date of this order, after which period, Transfer
Certificate of Title No. T-25772 is hereby declared
annulled and the Register of Deeds of Iloilo is
ordered to issue a new Certificate of Title in lieu
thereof in the name of petitioners Atty. Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, which certificate shall
contain a memorandum of the annulment of the
outstanding duplicate. (pp. 286-287, Rollo 64432)
On February 9, 1987, Atty. Hector Teodosio, the counsel of
Gregorio Perez, private respondent in G.R. No. 64432 and
petitioner in G.R. No. 62042, filed a motion for explanation in
relation to the resolution dated September 17, 1986 and
manifestation asking for clarification on the following points:
 a. As to the prayer of Atty. Eduardo Baranda for the
cancellation of TCT T-25772, should the same be
referred to the Court of Appeals (as mentioned in
the Resolution of November 27, 1985) or is it
already deemed granted by implication (by virtue
of the Resolution dated September 17, 1986)?
b. Does the Resolution dated September 17, 1986
include not only the implementation of the writ of
possession but also the cancellation of TCT T-
25772 and the subdivision of Lot 4517? (p. 536,
Rollo — 4432)
Acting on this motion and the other motions filed by the parties,
we issued a resolution dated May 25, 1987 noting all these motions
and stating therein:
xxx xxx xxx
Since entry of judgment in G.R. No. 62042 was
made on January 7, 1983 and in G.R. No. 64432 on
May 30, 1984, and all that remains is the
implementation of our resolutions, this COURT
RESOLVED to refer the matters concerning the
execution of the decisions to the Regional Trial
Court of Iloilo City for appropriate action and to
apply disciplinary sanctions upon whoever
attempts to trifle with the implementation of the
resolutions of this Court. No further motions in
these cases will be entertained by this Court. (p.
615, Rollo-64432)
In the meantime, in compliance with the Regional Trial Court's
orders dated November 6, 1986 and January 6, 1987, Acting
Register of Deeds AvitoSaclauso annotated the order declaring
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 as null and void, cancelled
the same and issued new certificates of titles numbers T-111560,
T-111561 and T-111562 in the name of petitioners Eduardo S.
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia in lieu of Transfer Certificate of TItle
No. T-106098.
However, a notice of lis pendens "on account of or by reason of a
separate case (Civil Case No. 15871) still pending in the Court of
Appeals" was carried out and annotated in the new certificates of
titles issued to the petitioners. This was upheld by the trial court
after setting aside its earlier order dated February 12, 1987
ordering the cancellation of lis pendens.
This prompted the petitioners to file another motion in G.R, No.
62042 and G.R. No. 64432 to order the trial court to reinstate its
order dated February 12, 1987 directing the Acting Register of
Deeds to cancel the notice of lis pendens in the new certificates of
titles.
In a resolution dated August 17, 1987, we resolved to refer the said
motion to the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Branch 23 for
appropriate action.
Since respondent Judge Tito Gustilo of the Regional Trial Court of
Iloilo, Branch 23 denied the petitioners' motion to reinstate the
February 12, 1987 order in another order dated September 17,
1987, the petitioners filed this petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus with preliminary injunction to compel the
respondent judge to reinstate his order dated February l2, 1987
directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the notice of lis
pendens annotated in the new certificates of titles issued in the
name of the petitioners.
The records show that after the Acting Register of Deeds
annotated a notice of is pendens on the new certificates of titles
issued in the name of the petitioners, the petitioners filed in the
reconstitution case an urgent ex-parte motion to immediately
cancel notice of lis pendens annotated thereon.
In his order dated February 12, 1987, respondent Judge Gustilo
granted the motion and directed the Acting Register of Deeds of
Iloilo to cancel the lis pendens found on Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos. T-106098; T-111560; T-111561 and T-111562.
Respondent Acting Register of Deeds Avito Saclauso filed a motion
for reconsideration of the February 12, 1987 order stating therein:
That the undersigned hereby asks for a
reconsideration of the said order based on the
second paragraph of Section 77 of P.D. 1529, to
wit:
"At any time after final judgment in
favor of the defendant or other
disposition of the action such as to
terminate finally all rights of the
plaintiff in and to the land and/or
buildings involved, in any case in
which a memorandum or notice of
Lis Pendens has been registered as
provided in the preceding section,
the notice of Lis Pendens shall be
deemed cancelled upon the
registration of a certificate of the
clerk of court in which the action or
proceeding was pending stating
the manner of disposal thereof."
That the lis pendens under Entry No. 427183 was
annotated on T-106098, T-111560, T-111561 and
T-111562 by virtue of a case docketed as Civil
Case No. 15871, now pending with the
Intermediate Court of Appeals, entitled, "Calixta
Provido, Ricardo Provido, Sr., Maria Provido and
Perfecto Provido, Plaintiffs, versus Eduardo
Baranda and Alfonso Hitalia, Respondents."
That under the above-quoted provisions of P.D.
152, the cancellation of subject Notice of Lis
Pendens can only be made or deemed cancelled
upon the registration of the certificate of the Clerk
of Court in which the action or proceeding was
pending, stating the manner of disposal thereof.
Considering that Civil Case No. 1587, upon which
the Notice of Lis Pendens was based is still pending
with the Intermediate Court of Appeals, only the
Intermediate Court of Appeals and not this
Honorable Court in a mere cadastral proceedings
can order the cancellation of the Notice of Lis
Pendens. (pp. 68-69, Rollo)
Adopting these arguments and on the ground that some if not all
of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not privies to the case
affected by the Supreme Court resolutions, respondent Judge Tito
Gustilo set aside his February 12, 1987 order and granted the
Acting Register of Deeds' motion for reconsideration.
The issue hinges on whether or not the pendency of the appeal in
Civil Case No. 15871 with the Court of Appeals prevents the court
from cancelling the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles
of the petitioners which were earlier declared valid and subsisting
by this Court in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432. A corollary
issue is on the nature of the duty of a Register of Deeds to
annotate or annul a notice of lis pendens in a torrens certificate of
title.
Civil Case No. 15871 was a complaint to seek recovery of Lot No.
4517 of Sta. Barbara Cadastre Iloilo, (the same subject matter of
G.R. No 62042 and G.R. No. 64432) from petitioners Baranda and
Hitalia filed by Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido
and Perfecta Provido before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo,
Branch 23. At the instance of Atty. Hector P. Teodosio, the
Provides' counsel, a notice of is pendens was annotated on
petitioners' Certificate of Title No. T-106098 covering Lot No. 4517,
Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
Acting on a motion to dismiss filed by the petitioners, the court
issued an order dated October 24, 1984 dismissing Civil Case No.
15871.
The order was then appealed to the Court of Appeals. This appeal
is the reason why respondent Judge Gustilo recalled the February
12, 1987 order directing the Acting Register of Deeds to cancel the
notice of lis pendens annotated on the certificates of titles of the
petitioners.
This petition is impressed with merit.
Maria Provido Gotera was one of the petitioners in G.R. No. 62042.
Although Calixta Provido, Ricardo Provido, Maxima Provido and
Perfecta Provido, the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were not
impleaded as parties, it is very clear in the petition that Maria
Provido was acting on behalf of the Providos who allegedly are her
co-owners in Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre as shown by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-25772 issued in her name and the
names of the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871, among others.
(Annex "E" G.R. No. 62042, p. 51, Rollo) In fact, one of the issues
raised by petitioners Maria Provido Gotera and Gregoria Perez in
G.R. No. 62042 was as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Whether or not, in the same reconstitution
proceedings, respondent Judge Midpantao L. Adil
had the authority to declare as null and void the
transfer certificate of title in the name of petitioner
Maria Provido Gotera and her other co-owners. (p.
3, Rollo; Emphasis supplied)
It thus appears that the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 15871 were
privies to G.R. No. 62042 contrary to the trial court's findings that
they were not.
G.R. No. 62042 affirmed the order of the then Court of First
Instance of Iloilo in the reconstitution proceedings declaring TCT
No. 25772 in the name of Providos over Lot No. 4517, Sta. Barbara
Cadastre null and void for being fraudulently obtained and
declaring TCT No. 106098 over the same parcel Lot No. 4517, Sta.
Barbara Cadastre in the name of petitioners Eduardo Baranda and
Alfonso Hitalia valid and subsisting.
The decision in G.R. No. 62042 became final and executory on
March 25,1983 long before Civil Case No. 15871 was filed.
Under these circumstances, it is crystal clear that the Providos,
private respondents herein, in filing Civil Case No. 15871 were
trying to delay the full implementation of the final decisions in G.R.
No. 62042 as well as G.R. No. 64432 wherein this Court ordered
immediate implementation of the writs of possession and
demolition in the reconstitution proceedings involving Lot No.
4517, Sta. Barbara Cadastre.
The purpose of a notice of lis pendens is defined in the following
manner:
Lis pendens has been conceived to protect the real
rights of the party causing the registration thereof
With the lis pendens duly recorded, he could rest
secure that he would not lose the property or any
part of it. For, notice of lis pendens serves as a
warning to a prospective purchaser or
incumbrancer that the particular property is in
litigation; and that he should keep his hands off the
same, unless of course he intends to gamble on
the results of the litigation. (Section 24, Rule 14,
RuIes of Court; Jamora v. Duran, et al., 69 Phil. 3,
11; I Martin, Rules of Court, p. 415, footnote 3,
citing cases.) (Natanov. Esteban, 18 SCRA 481,
485-486)
The private respondents are not entitled to this protection. The
facts obtaining in this case necessitate the application of the rule
enunciated in the cases of Victoriano v. Rovila (55 Phil. 1000),
Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First Instance of Rizal
(70 Phil., 363) and Sarmiento v. Ortiz (10 SCRA 158), to the effect
that:
We have once held that while ordinarily a notice of
pendency which has been filed in a proper case,
cannot be cancelled while the action is pending
and undetermined, the proper court has the
discretionary power to cancel it under peculiar
circumstances, as for instance, where the evidence
so far presented by the plaintiff does not bear out
the main allegations of his complaint, and where
the continuances of the trial, for which the plaintiff
is responsible, are unnecessarily delaying the
determination of the case to the prejudice of the
defendant. (Victoriano v. Rovira, supra; The
Municipal Council of Paranaque v. Court of First
Instance of Rizal, supra)
The facts of this case in relation to the earlier cases brought all the
way to the Supreme Court illustrate how the private respondents
tried to block but unsuccessfuly the already final decisions in G.R.
No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
Parenthetically, respondent Judge Tito Gustilo abused his discretion
in sustaining the respondent Acting Register of Deeds' stand that,
the notice of lis pendens in the certificates of titles of the
petitioners over Lot No. 4571, Barbara Cadastre cannot be
cancelled on the ground of pendency of Civil Case No. 15871 with
the Court of Appeals. In upholding the position of the Acting
Register of Deeds based on Section 77 of Presidential Decree No.
1529, he conveniently forgot the first paragraph thereof which
provides:
Cancellation of lis pendens. — Before final
judgment, a notice of lis pendens may be cancelled
upon Order of the Court after proper showing that
the notice is for the purpose of molesting the
adverse party, or that it is not necessary to protect
the rights of the party who caused it to be
registered. It may also be cancelled by the Register
of Deeds upon verified petition of the party who
caused the registration thereof.
This Court cannot understand how respondent Judge Gustilo could
have been misled by the respondent Acting Register of Deeds on
this matter when in fact he was the same Judge who issued the
order dismissing Civil Case No. 15871 prompting the private
respondents to appeal said order dated October 10, 1984 to the
Court of Appeals. The records of the main case are still with the
court below but based on the order, it can be safely assumed that
the various pleadings filed by the parties subsequent to the motion
to dismiss filed by the petitioners (the defendants therein) touched
on the issue of the validity of TCT No. 25772 in the name of the
Providos over Lot Number 4571, Sta. Barbara Cadastre in the light
of the final decisions in G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432.
The next question to be determined is on the nature of the duty of
the Register of Deeds to annotate and/or cancel the notice of lis
pendens in a torrens certificate of title.
Section 10, Presidential Decree No. 1529 states that "It shall be the
duty of the Register of Deeds to immediately register an
instrument presented for registration dealing with real or personal
property which complies with all the requisites for registration. ... .
If the instrument is not registrable, he shall forthwith deny
registration thereof and inform the presentor of such denial in
writing, stating the ground or reasons therefore, and advising him
of his right to appeal by consulta in accordance with Section 117 of
this Decree."
Section 117 provides that "When the Register of Deeds is in doubt
with regard to the proper step to be taken or memoranda to be
made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage or other instrument
presented to him for registration or where any party in interest
does not agree with the action taken by the Register of Deeds with
reference to any such instrument, the question shall be submitted
to the Commission of Land Registration by the Register of Deeds,
or by the party in interest thru the Register of Deeds. ... ."
The elementary rule in statutory construction is that when the
words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their
meaning must be determined from the language employed and the
statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. (Aparri v.
Court of Appeals, 127 SCRA 231; Insular Bank of Asia and America
Employees' Union [IBAAEU] v. Inciong, 132 SCRA 663) The statute
concerning the function of the Register of Deeds to register
instruments in a torrens certificate of title is clear and leaves no
room for construction. According to Webster's Third International
Dictionary of the English Language — the word shall means "ought
to, must, ...obligation used to express a command or exhortation,
used in laws, regulations or directives to express what is
mandatory." Hence, the function of a Register of Deeds with
reference to the registration of deeds encumbrances, instruments
and the like is ministerial in nature. The respondent Acting Register
of Deeds did not have any legal standing to file a motion for
reconsideration of the respondent Judge's Order directing him to
cancel the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of
titles of the petitioners over the subject parcel of land. In case of
doubt as to the proper step to be taken in pursuance of any
deed ... or other instrument presented to him, he should have
asked the opinion of the Commissioner of Land Registration now,
the Administrator of the National Land Title and Deeds Registration
Administration in accordance with Section 117 of Presidential
Decree No. 1529.
In the ultimate analysis, however, the responsibility for the delays
in the full implementation of this Court's already final resolutions in
G.R. No. 62042 and G.R. No. 64432 which includes the cancellation
of the notice of lis pendens annotated in the certificates of titles of
the petitioners over Lot No. 4517 of the Sta. Barbara Cadastre falls
on the respondent Judge. He should never have allowed himself to
become part of dilatory tactics, giving as excuse the wrong
impression that Civil Case No. 15871 filed by the private
respondents involves another set of parties claiming Lot No. 4517
under their own Torrens Certificate of Title.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The February 12,

1987 order of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch 23 is
REINSTATED. All subsequent orders issued by the trial court which
annulled the February 12, 1987 order are SET ASIDE. Costs against
the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C.J., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.


Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-64159 September 10, 1985
CIRCE S. DURAN and ANTERO S. GASPAR, petitioners,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ERLINDA B. MARCELO
TIANGCO and RESTITUTO TIANGCO, respondents.
RELOVA, J.:
The respondent then Court of Appeals rendered judgment,
modifying the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
which reads as follows:
(1) the complaint of the plaintiffs (herein
petitioners) is hereby DISMISSED;
(2) the defendants-appellants spouses Erlinda B.
Marcelo Tiangco and Restituto Tiangco (herein
private respondents) are hereby declared the
lawful owners of the two (2) parcels of land and all
the improvements thereon including the 12-door
apartment thereon described in the complaint, in
the counterclaim, in the cross-claim, and in the
Sheriff's Certificate of Sale;
(3) the plaintiffs-appellants and the defendant-
appellee Fe S. Duran are hereby ordered to deliver
to (the Tiangcos) the two parcels of land and all the
improvements thereon including the 12-door
apartment thereon, subject matter of the
complaint, counterclaim, and cross-claim, and in
the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale;
(4) the plaintiffs-appellants and the defendant-
appellee Fe S. Duran are hereby ordered to pay
solidarily to the Tiangcos the sum of Two Thousand
Four Hundred Pesos (P2,400) a month from May
16, 1972 until delivery of possession of the
properties in question to said Tiangco spouses,
representing rentals collected by plaintiffs-
appellants and defendant- appellee Fe S. Duran;
(5) the plaintiffs-appellants and defendant-appellee
Fe S. Duran are hereby ordered to pay solidarily to
the spouses Tiangco the sum of Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000) as damages for attorney's fees,
and the sum of Twenty-Five Thousand Pesos
(P25,000) for moral damages, and the costs. (pp.
149-150, Rollo)
The antecedent facts showed that petitioner Circe S. Duran owned
two (2) parcels of land (Lots 5 and 6, Block A, Psd 32780) covered
by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 1647 of the Register of Deeds of
Caloocan City which she had purchased from the Moja Estate. She
left the Philippines in June 1954 and returned in May 1966.
On May 13, 1963, a Deed of Sale of the two lots mentioned above
was made in favor of Circe's mother, Fe S. Duran who, on
December 3, 1965, mortgaged the same property to private
respondent Erlinda B. Marcelo-Tiangco. When petitioner Circe S.
Duran came to know about the mortgage made by her mother, she
wrote the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City informing the latter
that she had not given her mother any authority to sell or
mortgage any of her properties in the Philippines. Failing to get an
answer from the registrar, she returned to the Philippines.
Meanwhile, when her mother, Fe S. Duran, failed to redeem the
mortgage properties, foreclosure proceedings were initiated by
private respondent Erlinda B. Marcelo Tiangco and, ultimately, the
sale by the sheriff and the issuance of Certificate of Sale in favor of
the latter.
Petitioner Circe S. Duran claims that the Deed of Sale in favor of
her mother Fe S. Duran is a forgery, saying that at the time of its
execution in 1963 she was in the United States. On the other hand,
the adverse party alleges that the signatures of Circe S. Duran in
the said Deed are genuine and, consequently, the mortgage made
by Fe S. Duran in favor of private respondent is valid.
With respect to the issue as to whether the signature of petitioner
Circe S. Duran in the Deed of Sale is a forgery or not, respondent
appellate court held the same to be genuine because there is the
presumption of regularity in the case of a public document and
"the fact that Circe has not been able to satisfactorily prove that
she was in the United States at the time the deed was executed in
1963. Her return in 1966 does not prove she was not here also in
1963, and that she did not leave shortly after 1963. She should
have presented her old passport, not her new one. But even if the
signatures were a forgery, and the sale would be regarded as void,
still it is Our opinion that the Deed of Mortgage is VALID, with
respect to the mortgagees, the defendants-appellants. While it is
true that under Art. 2085 of the Civil Code, it is essential that the
mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property mortgaged, and
while as between the daughter and the mother, it was the
daughter who still owned the lots, STILL insofar as innocent third
persons are concerned the owner was already the mother (Fe S.
Duran) inasmuch as she had already become the registered owner
(Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 2418 and 2419). The mortgagee
had the right to rely upon what appeared in the certificate of title,
and did not have to inquire further. If the rule were otherwise, the
efficacy and conclusiveness of Torrens Certificate of Titles would
be futile and nugatory. Thus the rule is simple: the fraudulent and
forged document of sale may become the root of a valid title if the
certificate has already been transferred from the name of the true
owner to the name indicated by the forger (See De la Cruz v. Fable,
35 Phil. 144; Blondeau et al. v. Nano et al., 61 Phil. 625; Fule et al.
v. Legare et al., 7 SCRA 351; see also Sec. 55 of Act No. 496, the
Land Registration Act). The fact that at the time of the foreclosure
sale proceedings (1970-72) the mortgagees may have already
known of the plaintiffs' claim is immaterial. What is important is
that at the time the mortgage was executed, the mortgagees in
good faith actually believed Fe S. Duran to be the owner, as
evidenced by the registration of the property in the name of said
Fe S. Duran (pp. 146-147, Rollo)."
In elevating the judgment of the respondent appellate court to Us
for review, petitioners discussed questions of law which, in effect
and substance, raised only one issue and that is whether private
respondent Erlinda B. Marcelo-Tiangco was a buyer in good faith
and for value.
Guided by previous decisions of this Court, good faith consists in
the possessor's belief that the person from whom he received the
thing was the owner of the same and could convey his title (Arriola
vs. Gomez dela Serna, 14 Phil. 627). Good faith, while it is always
to be presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary, requires a
well-founded belief that the person from whom title was received
was himself the owner of the land, with the right to convey it
(Santiago vs. Cruz, 19 Phil. 148). There is good faith where there is
an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious
advantage from another (Fule vs. Legare, 7 SCRA 351). Otherwise
stated, good faith is the opposite of fraud and it refers to the state
of mind which is manifested by the acts of the individual
concerned. In the case at bar, private respondents, in good faith
relied on the certificate of title in the name of Fe S. Duran and as
aptly stated by respondent appellate court "[e]ven on the
supposition that the sale was void, the general rule that the direct
result of a previous illegal contract cannot be valid (on the theory
that the spring cannot rise higher than its source) cannot apply
here for We are confronted with the functionings of the Torrens
System of Registration. The doctrine to follow is simple enough: a
fraudulent or forged document of sale may become the ROOT of a
valid title if the certificate of title has already been transferred
from the name of the true owner to the name of the forger or the
name indicated by the forger." (p. 147, Rollo)
Thus, where innocent third persons relying on the correctness of
the certificate of title issued, acquire rights over the property, the
court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation
of the certificate for that would impair public confidence in the
certificate of title; otherwise everyone dealing with property
registered under the torrens system would have to inquire in every
instance as to whether the title had been regularly or irregularly
issued by the court. Indeed, this is contrary to the evident purpose
of the law. Every person dealing with registered land may safely
rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor and
the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to
determine the condition of the property. Stated differently, an
innocent purchaser for value relying on a torrens title issued is
protected. A mortgagee has the right to rely on what appears in
the certificate of title and, in the absence of anything to excite
suspicion, he is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate
and investigate the title of the mortgagor appearing on the face of
said certificate.

Likewise, We take note of the finding and observation of

respondent appellate court in that petitioners were guilty of
estoppel by laches "in not bringing the case to court within a
reasonable period. Antero Gaspar, husband of Circe, was in the
Philippines in 1964 to construct the apartment on the disputed lots.
This was testified to by Circe herself (tsn., p. 41, Nov. 27, 1973). In
the process of construction, specifically in the matter of obtaining a
building permit, he could have discovered that the deed of sale
sought to be set aside had been executed on May 13, 1963 (the
building permit needed an application by the apparent owner of
the land, namely, Circe's mother, Fe S. Duran). And then again
both plaintiffs could have intervened in the foreclosure suit but
they did not. They kept silent until almost the last moment when
they finally decided, shortly before the sheriff's sale, to file a third-
party claim. Clearly, the plaintiffs can be faulted for their estoppel
by laches." (p. 148, Rollo)

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We find the petition without merit

and hereby AFFIRMED in toto the decision of respondent appellate
court promulgated on August 12, 1981.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Gutierrez, Jr., De

la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-59825 September 11, 1982
ERNESTO MEDINA and JOSE G. ONG, petitioners,
vs.
HON. FLORELIANA CASTRO-BARTOLOME in her capacity as
Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance Cf Rizal,
Branch XV, Makati, Metro Manila, COSME DE ABOITIZ and
PEPSI-COLA BOTTLING COMPANY OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.,
respondents.
ABAD SANTOS, J.:
Civil Case No. 33150 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch
XV, was filed in May, 1979, by Ernesto Medina and Jose G. Ong
against Cosme de Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. of the
Philippines, Inc. Medina was the former Plant General Manager and
Ong was the former Plant Comptroller of the company. Among the
averments in the complaint are the following:
3. That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon of
December 20, 1977, defendant Cosme de Aboitiz,
acting in his capacity as President and Chief
Executive Officer of the defendant Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Company of the Philippines, Inc., went to
the Pepsi-Cola Plant in Muntinlupa, Metro Manila,
and without any provocation, shouted and
maliciously humiliated the plaintiffs with the use of
the following slanderous language and other words
of similar import uttered in the presence of the
plaintiffs' subordinate employees, thus-
GOD DAMN IT. YOU FUCKED ME UP ... YOU SHUT
UP! FUCK YOU! YOU ARE BOTH SHIT TO ME! YOU
ARE FIRED (referring to Ernesto Medina). YOU TOO
ARE FIRED! '(referring to Jose Ong )
4. That on January 9, 1978, the herein plaintiffs
filed a joint criminal complaint for oral defamation
against the defendant Cosme de Aboitiz duly
supported with respective affidavits and
corroborated by the affidavits of two (2) witnesses:
Isagani Hernandez and Jose Ganseco II, but after
conducting a preliminary investigation, Hon. Jose B.
Castillo, dismissed the complaint allegedly because
the expression "Fuck you and "You are both shit to
me" were uttered not to slander but to express
anger and displeasure;
5. That on February 8, 1978, plaintiffs filed a
Petition for Review with the office of the Secretary
of Justice (now Ministry of Justice) and on June 13,
1978, the Deputy Minister of Justice, Catalino
Macaraig, Jr., issued a resolution sustaining the
plaintiff's complaint, reversing the resolution of the
Provincial Fiscal and directing him to file against
defendant Cosme de Aboitiz an information for
Grave Slander. ... ;
6. That the employment records of plaintiffs show
their track performance and impeccable
qualifications, not to mention their long years of
service to the Company which undoubtedly caused
their promotion to the two highest positions in
Muntinlupa Plant having about 700 employees
under them with Ernesto Medina as the Plant
General Manager receiving a monthly salary of
P6,600.00 excluding other perquisites accorded
only to top executives and having under his direct
supervision other professionals like himself,
including the plaintiff Jose G. Ong, who was the
Plant Comptroller with a basic monthly salary of
P4,855.00;
7. That far from taking these matters into
consideration, the defendant corporation, acting
through its President, Cosme de Aboitiz, dismissed
and slandered the plaintiffs in the presence of their
subordinate employees although this could have
been done in private;
8. That the defendants have evidently enjoyed the
act of dismissing the plaintiffs and such dismissal
was planned to make it as humiliating as possible
because instead of allowing a lesser official like the
Regional Vice President to take whatever action
was necessary under the circumstances, Cosme de
Aboitiz himself went to the Muntinlupa Plant in
order to publicly upbraid and dismiss the plaintiffs;
9. That the defendants dismissed the plaintiffs
because of an alleged delay in the use of
promotional crowns when such delay was true with
respect to the other Plants, which is therefore
demonstrative of the fact that Cosme de Aboitiz did
not really have a strong reason for publicly
humiliating the plaintiffs by dismissing them on the
spot;
10. That the defendants were moved by evil
motives and an anti-social attitude in dismissing
the plaintiffs because the dismissal was effected on
the very day that plaintiffs were awarded rings of
loyalty to the Company, five days before Christmas
and on the day when the employees' Christmas
party was held in the Muntinlupa Plant, so that
when plaintiffs went home that day and found their
wives and children already dressed up for the
party, they didn't know what to do and so they
cried unashamedly;
xxx xxx xxx
20. That because of the anti-social manner by
which the plaintiffs were dismissed from their
employment and the embarrassment and
degradation they experience in the hands of the
defendants, the plaintiffs have suffered and will
continue to suffer wounded feelings, sleepless
nights, mental torture, besmirched reputation and
other similar injuries, for which the sum of
P150,000.00 for each plaintiff, or the total amount.
of P300,000.00 should be awarded as moral
damages;
21. That the defendants have demonstrated their
lack of concern for the rights and dignity of the
Filipino worker and their callous disregard of
Philippine labor and social legislation, and to
prevent other persons from following the footsteps
of defendants, the amount of P50,000.00 for each
plaintiff, or the total sum of P100,000.00, should be
awarded as exemplary damages;
22. That plaintiffs likewise expect to spend no less
than P5,000.00 as litigation expenses and were
constrained to secure the services of counsel for
the protection and enforcement of their rights for
which they agreed to pay the sum of P10,000.00
and P200.00 per appearance as and for attorney's
fees.
The complaint contains the following:
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing. it is most
respectfully that after proper notice and hearing,
judgment be rendered for the plaintiffs and against
the defendants ordering them, jointly and
solidarily, to pay the plaintiffs the sums of:
1. Unrealized income in such sum as will be
established during the trial;
2. P300,000.00 as moral damages;
3. P100,000.00 by way of exemplary damages:
4. P5,000.00 as litigation expenses;
5. P10,000.00 and P200.00 per appearance as and
for attorney's fees; and
6. Costs of this suit.
Plaintiffs also pray for such further reliefs and
remedies as may be in keeping with justice and
equity.
On June 4, 1979, a motion to dismiss the complaint
on the ground of lack of jurisdiction was filed by
the defendants. The trial court denied the motion
on September 6, 1979, in an order which reads as
follows:
Up for resolution by the Court is the defendants'
Motion to Dismiss dated June 4, 1979, which is
basically anchored on whether or not this Court has
jurisdiction over the instant petition.
The complaint alleges that the plaintiffs' dismissal
was without any provocation and that defendant
Aboitiz shouted and maliciously humiliated
plaintiffs and used the words quoted in paragraph
3 thereof. The plaintiffs further allege that they
were receiving salaries of P6,600.00 and P4,855.00
a month. So the complaint for civil damages is
clearly not based on an employer-employee
relationship but on the manner of plaintiffs'
dismissal and the effects flowing therefrom. (Jovito
N. Quisaba vs, Sta. Ines-Melale Veneer & Plywood
Co., Inc., et al., No. L-38088, Aug. 30,1974.)
This case was filed on May 10, 1979. The
amendatory decree, P.D. 1367, which took effect
on May 1, 1978 and which provides that Regional
Directors shall not indorse and Labor Arbiters shall
not entertain claims for moral or other forms of
damages, now expressly confers jurisdiction on the
courts in these cases, specifically under the
plaintiff's causes of action.
Because of the letter dated January 4, 1978 and
the statement of plaintiff Medina that his receipt of
the amount from defendant company was done
"under strong protest," it cannot be said that the
demands set forth in the complaint have been
paid, waived or other extinguished. In fact, in
defendants' Motion to Dismiss, it is stated that 'in
the absence of a showing that there was fraud,
duress or violence attending said transactions,
such Release and Quitclaim Deeds are valid and
binding contracts between them, which in effect
admits that plaintiffs can prove fraud, violence,
duress or violence. Hence a cause of action for
plaintiffs exist.
It is noticed that the defamatory remarks standing
alone per se had been made the sole cause under
the first cause of action, but it is alleged in
connection with the manner in which the plaintiffs
had been dismissed, and whether the statute of
limitations would apply or not would be a matter of
evidence.
IT has been alreadly settled by jurisprudence that
mere asking for reinstatement does not remove
from the CFI jurisdiction over the damages. The
case must involve unfair labor practices to bring it
within the jurisdiction of the CIR (now NLRC).
WHEREFORE, the defendants' Motion to Dismiss
dated June 4, 1979 is hereby denied.
The defendants are hereby directed to interpose
their answer within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof.
While the trial was underway, the defendants filed a second motion
to dismiss the complaint dated January 23, 1981, because of
amendments to the Labor Code immediately prior thereto. Acting
on the motion, the trial court issued on May 23, 1981, the following
order:
Up for resolution by the Court is the defendants'
Motion to Dismiss dated January 23, 1981, on
grounds not existing when the first Motion to
Dismiss dated June 4, 1979 was interposed. The
ground relied upon is the promulgation of P.D. No.
1691 amending Art. 217 of the Labor Code of the
Philippines and Batasan Pambansa Bldg. 70 which
took effect on May 1, 1980, amending Art. 248 of
the Labor Code.
The Court agrees with defendants that the
complaint alleges unfair labor practices which
under Art. 217 of the Labor Code, as amended by
P.D. 1691, has vested original and exclusive
jurisdiction to Labor Arbiters, and Art. 248,
thereof ... "which may include claims for damages
and other affirmative reliefs." Under the
amendment, therefore, jurisdiction over employee-
employer relations and claims of workers have
been removed from the Courts of First Instance. If
it is argued that this case did not arise from
employer-employee relation, but it cannot be
denied that this case would not have arisen if the
plaintiffs had not been employees of defendant
Pepsi-Cola. Even the alleged defamatory remarks
made by defendant Cosme de Aboitiz were said to
plaintiffs in the course of their employment, and
the latter were dismissed from such employment.
Hence, the case arose from such employer-
employee relationship which under the new
Presidential Decree 1691 are under the exclusive,
original jurisdiction of the labor arbiters. The ruling
of this Court with respect to the defendants' first
motion to dismiss, therefore, no longer holds as the
positive law has been subsequently issued and
being a curative law, can be applied retroactively
(Garcia v. Martinez, et al., L-47629, May 28, 1979;
90 SCRA 331-333).
It will also logically follow that plaintiffs can
reinterpose the same complaint with the Ministry of
Labor.
WHEREFORE, let this case be, as it is hereby
ordered, dismissed, without pronouncement as to
costs.
A motion to reconsider the above order was filed on July 7, 1981,
but it was only on February 8, 1982, or after a lapse of around
seven (7) months when the motion was denied.
Plaintiffs have filed the instant petition pursuant to R. A. No. 5440
alleging that the respondent court committed the following errors:
IN DIVESTING ITSELF OF ITS JURISDICTION TO HEAR
AND DECIDE CIVIL CASE NO. 33150 DESPITE THE
FACT THAT JURISDICTION HAD ALREADY ATTACHED
WHICH WAS NOT OUSTED BY THE SUBSEQUENT
ENACTMENT OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1691;
IN HOLDING THAT PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1691
SHOULD BE GIVEN A RETROSPECTIVE EFFECT
WHEN PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1367 WHICH WAS IN
FORCE WHEN CIVIL CASE NO. 33150 WAS FILED
AND TRIAL THEREOF HAD COMMENCED, WAS
NEVER EXPRESSLY REPEALED BY PRESIDENTIAL
DECREE 1691, AND IF EVER THERE WAS AN
IMPLIED REPEAL, THE SAME IS NOT FAVORED
UNDER PREVAILED JURISPRUDENCE;
IN HOLDING THAT WITH THE REMOVAL BY
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1691 OF THE PROVISO
INSERTED IN ARTICLE 217 OF THE LABOR CODE BY
PRESIDENTIAL DECREE 1367, THE LABOR
ARBITERS HAVE ACQUIRED JURISDICTION OVER
CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES ARISING FROM EMPLOYER-
EMPLOYEE RELATIONS TO THE EXCLUSION OF THE
REGULAR COURTS, WHEN A READING OF ARTICLE
 217 WITHOUT THE PROVISO IN QUESTION READILY
REVEALS THAT JURISDICTION OVER DAMAGE
CLAIMS IS STILL VESTED WITH THE REGULAR
COURTS;
IN DISMISSING FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION CIVIL
CASE NO. 33150 THEREBY VIOLATING THE
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONERS
NOTABLY THEIR RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
The pivotal question to Our mind is whether or not the Labor Code
has any relevance to the reliefs sought by the plaintiffs. For if the
Labor Code has no relevance, any discussion concerning the
statutes amending it and whether or not they have retroactive
effect is unnecessary.
It is obvious from the complaint that the plaintiffs have not alleged
any unfair labor practice. Theirs is a simple action for damages for
tortious acts allegedly committed by the defendants. Such being
the case, the governing statute is the Civil Code and not the Labor
Code. It results that the orders under review are based on a wrong
premise.
WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the respondent judge is
hereby ordered to reinstate Civil Case No. 33150 and render a
decision on the merits. Costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Barredo (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr. Guerrero, De Castro and
Escolin, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J.,dissenting:
I dissent with due deference to the opinion penned by Mr. Justice
Abad Santos.
This case is about the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to
entertain an action for damages arising from the alleged
disgraceful termination of petitioners' employment.
Ernesto Medina, the manager of the Muntinlupa plant of Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Company of the Philippines with a monthly salary of
P6,600, and Jose G. Ong, Pepsi's controller in the same plant with a
monthly salary of P4,855, were summarily dismissed by Cosme de
Aboitiz, Pepsi's president and chief executive officer, on December
20, 1977 for having allegedly delayed the use of promotional
crowns (pp. 29-31, Rollo),
The two signed on January 5, 1978 letters of resignation and
quitclaims and were paid P93,063 and P84,386 as separation pay,
respectively. However, before receiving those amounts, Medina
and Ong sent by registered mail to Aboitiz letters wherein they
indicated that they objected to their illegal dismissal and that they
would sign the quitclaim and resignation papers "under protest"
(pp. 32, 270-275, Rollo).
More than a month after their dismissal, or on January 27, 1978,
Medina and Ong filed with the Ministry of Labor, a complaint for
illegal dismissal. They prayed for reinstatement with full
backwages and, in the alternative, they prayed for additional
separation pay of P72,904 for Medina and P35,927 for Ong (NLRC
Case No. R4-STF-1-492-78, pp. 40, 288-299, Rollo).
The director of Region IV of the Ministry of Labor dismissed that
complaint because of their resignation and quitclaim. Medina and
Ong appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. Deputy
Minister Amado C. Inciong affirmed the dismissal in his order of
April 23, 1979 (p. 246, Rollo), He denied the motion for
reconsideration of Medina and Ong in his Order of October 25,
1979 (p. 327, Rollo).
Seventeen days after that order of dismissal, or on May 10, 1979,
Medina and Ong filed, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati
Branch XV an action for damages against Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola by
reason of the humiliating manner in which they were dismissed.
They prayed for the payment of unrealized income and P415,000
as moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation
expenses (pp. 34-5, 246, Rollo).
Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of
lack of jurisdiction, pendency of a labor case, lack of cause of
action, payment and prescription (p. 37, Rollo). Ong and Medina
opposed the motion.
Judge Floreliana Castro-Bartolome in her order of September 6,
1979 denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that under
Presidential Decree No. 1367, which took effect on May 1, 1979,
the NLRC and Labor Arbiters cannot entertain claims for moral or
other damages, thus implying that such claims should be
ventilated in court (p. 247, Rollo).
After Medina had commenced his testimony, Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola
filed another motion to dismiss based on Presidential Decree No.
1691, which took effect on May 1, 1980 and which repealed
Presidential Decree No. 1367 and restored to the NLRC and Labor
Arbiters the jurisdiction to adjudicate money claims of workers,
including moral damages, and other claims arising from employer-
employee relationship.
Judge Bartolome in her order of May 23, 1981 dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction. That order of dismissal is assailed in this
appeal by Medina and Ong under Republic Act No. 5440.
In my opinion the dismissal of the civil action for damages is
correct because the claims of Medina and Ong were within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, as
originally provided in article 217 of the Labor Code and as
reaffirmed in Presidential Decree No. 1691. Medina and Ong could
not split their cause of action against Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola. (See
Aguda vs. Judge Vallejos, G. R. No. 58133, March 26,1982; Ebon vs.
Judge De Guzman, G. R. No. 58265, March 25, 1982; Cardinal
Industries, Inc. vs. Vallejos, G. R. No. 57032, June 19, 1982; Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Co. vs. Martinez, G. R. No. 58877, March 15,1982.)
The decisions of the Regional Director and Deputy Minister Inciong
are res judicata as to the claims of Medina and Ong.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J.,dissenting:
I dissent with due deference to the opinion penned by Mr. Justice
Abad Santos.
This case is about the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance to
entertain an action for damages arising from the alleged
disgraceful termination of petitioners' employment.
Ernesto Medina, the manager of the Muntinlupa plant of Pepsi-Cola
Bottling Company of the Philippines with a monthly salary of
P6,600, and Jose G. Ong, Pepsi's controller in the same plant with a
monthly salary of P4,855, were summarily dismissed by Cosme de
Aboitiz, Pepsi's president and chief executive officer, on December
20, 1977 for having allegedly delayed the use of promotional
crowns (pp. 29-31, Rollo),
The two signed on January 5, 1978 letters of resignation and
quitclaims and were paid P93,063 and P84,386 as separation pay,
respectively. However, before receiving those amounts, Medina
and Ong sent by registered mail to Aboitiz letters wherein they
indicated that they objected to their illegal dismissal and that they
would sign the quitclaim and resignation papers "under protest"
(pp. 32, 270-275, Rollo).
More than a month after their dismissal, or on January 27, 1978,
Medina and Ong filed with the Ministry of Labor, a complaint for
illegal dismissal. They prayed for reinstatement with full
backwages and, in the alternative, they prayed for additional
separation pay of P72,904 for Medina and P35,927 for Ong (NLRC
Case No. R4-STF-1-492-78, pp. 40, 288-299, Rollo).
The director of Region IV of the Ministry of Labor dismissed that
complaint because of their resignation and quitclaim. Medina and
Ong appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission. Deputy
Minister Amado C. Inciong affirmed the dismissal in his order of
April 23, 1979 (p. 246, Rollo), He denied the motion for
reconsideration of Medina and Ong in his Order of October 25,
1979 (p. 327, Rollo).
Seventeen days after that order of dismissal, or on May 10, 1979,
Medina and Ong filed, in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Makati
Branch XV an action for damages against Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola by
reason of the humiliating manner in which they were dismissed.
They prayed for the payment of unrealized income and P415,000
as moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation
expenses (pp. 34-5, 246, Rollo).
reaffirmed in Presidential Decree No. 1691. Medina and Ong could
not split their cause of action against Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola. (See
Aguda vs. Judge Vallejos, G. R. No. 58133, March 26,1982; Ebon vs.
Judge De Guzman, G. R. No. 58265, March 25, 1982; Cardinal
Industries, Inc. vs. Vallejos, G. R. No. 57032, June 19, 1982; Pepsi-
Cola Bottling Co. vs. Martinez, G. R. No. 58877, March 15,1982.)
The decisions of the Regional Director and Deputy Minister Inciong
are res judicata as to the claims of Medina and Ong.

Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of

lack of jurisdiction, pendency of a labor case, lack of cause of
action, payment and prescription (p. 37, Rollo). Ong and Medina
opposed the motion.

Judge Floreliana Castro-Bartolome in her order of September 6,

1979 denied the motion to dismiss on the ground that under
Presidential Decree No. 1367, which took effect on May 1, 1979,
the NLRC and Labor Arbiters cannot entertain claims for moral or
other damages, thus implying that such claims should be
ventilated in court (p. 247, Rollo).

After Medina had commenced his testimony, Aboitiz and Pepsi-Cola

filed another motion to dismiss based on Presidential Decree No.
1691, which took effect on May 1, 1980 and which repealed
Presidential Decree No. 1367 and restored to the NLRC and Labor
Arbiters the jurisdiction to adjudicate money claims of workers,
including moral damages, and other claims arising from employer-
employee relationship.

Judge Bartolome in her order of May 23, 1981 dismissed the case
for lack of jurisdiction. That order of dismissal is assailed in this
appeal by Medina and Ong under Republic Act No. 5440.

In my opinion the dismissal of the civil action for damages is

correct because the claims of Medina and Ong were within the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC, as
originally provided in article 217 of the Labor Code and as

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
UDK No. 7671 June 23, 1988
DEVELOPMENT BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, registrant-
appellant,
vs.
THE ACTING REGISTER DEEDS OF NUEVA ECIJA, respondent-
appellee.
NARVASA, J.:
This case, rather cut-and-dried as far as factual background is
concerned, turns upon a determination of the true meaning and
intendment of Section 56 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, 1 which
in part reads:
Sec. 56. Primary Entry Book; fees, certified copies.
— Each Register of Deeds shall keep a primary
entry book in which, upon payment of the entry
fee, he shall enter, in the order of their reception,
all instruments including copies of writs and
processes filed with him relating to registered land.
He shall, as a preliminary process in registration,
note in such book the date, hour and minute of
reception of all instruments, in the order in which
they were received. They shall be regarded as
registered from the time so noted, and the
memorandum of each instrument, when made on
the certificate of title to which it refers, shall bear
the same date: Provided, that the national
government as well as the provincial and city
governments shall be exempt from the payment of
such fees in advance in order to be entitled to
entry and registration.
xxx xxx xxx
The facts are few and undisputed. On June 13, 1980, the
Development Bank of the Philippines (hereafter, DBP) presented
for registration to the Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija,
Cabanatuan City, a sheriff's certificate of sale in its favor of two
parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. NT-
149033 and NT-149034, both in the names of the spouses Andres
Bautista and Marcelina Calison, which said institution had acquired
as the highest bidder at an extrajudicial foreclosure sale. The
transaction was entered as Entry No. 8191 in the Registry's
Primary Entry Book and DBP paid the requisite registration fees on
the same day. Annotation of the sale on the covering certificates of
title could not, however be effected because the originals of those
certificates were found to be missing from the files of the Registry,
where they were supposed to be kept, and could not be located. 2
On the advice of the Register of Deeds, DBP instituted proceedings
in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija to reconstitute said
certificates, and reconstitution was ordered by that court in a
decision rendered on June 15, 1982. 3 For reasons not apparent on
the record, the certificates of title were reconstituted only on June
19,1984. 4
On June 25, 1984, DBP sought annotation on the reconstituted
titles of the certificate of sale subject of Entry No. 8191 on the
basis of that same four-year-old entry. The Acting Register of
Deeds, being in doubt of the proper action to take on the
solicitation, took the matter to the Commissioner of Land
Registration by consulta raising two questions: (a) whether the
certificate of sale could be registered using the old Entry No. 8191
made in 1980 notwithstanding the fact that the original copies of
the reconstituted certificates of title were issued only on June 19,
1984; and (b) if the first query was answered affirmatively,
whether he could sign the proposed annotation, having assumed
his duties only in July 1982. 5
The resolution on the consulta held that Entry No. 8191 had been
rendered "... ineffective due to the impossibility of accomplishing
registration at the time the document was entered because of the
non-availability of the certificate (sic) of title involved. For said
certificate of sale to be admitted for registration, there is a need
for it to be re-entered now that the titles have been reconstituted
upon payment of new entry fees," and by-passed the second query
as having been rendered moot and academic by the answer to the
first. 6
Unwilling to accept that result, the DBP appealed the resolution to
the Court of Appeals (then the Intermediate Appellate Court) 7
which, after reviewing the record, certified the appeal to this Court
as involving a question purely of law. 8
The appealed resolution appears to be based upon a reading of the
cited Section 56 of PD No. 1529, and particularly of the provision
therein referring to the Register's act of making a primary entry as
" ... a preliminary process in registration ...," as depriving of any
effect a primary entry without a corresponding annotation thereof
on the certificate of title to which the instrument subject of said
entry refers.
That view fails to find support from a consideration of entire
context of said Section 56 which in another part also provides that
the instrument subject of a primary entry "... shall be regarded as
registered from the time so noted ...," and, at the very least, gives
such entry from the moment of its making the effect of putting the
whole world on notice of the existence the instrument on entered.
Such effect (of registration) clearly attaches to the mere making of
the entry without regard to the subsequent step of annotating a
memorandum of the instrument subject of the entry on the
certificate of title to which it refers. Indeed, said Section, in also
providing that the annotation, "... when made ... shall bear the
same date ..." as the entry, may be said to contemplate
unspecified intervals of time occurring between the making of a
primary entry and that of the corresponding annotation on the
certificate of title without robbing the entry of the effect of being
equivalent to registration. Neither, therefore, is the implication in
the appealed resolution that annotation must annotation entry
immediately or in short order justified by the language of Section
56.
Furthermore, it is amply clear that the four-year hiatus between
primary entry and proposed annotation in this case has not been of
DBP's making. Though it was under no necessity to present the
owner's duplicates of the certificates of title affected for purposes
of primary entry, since the transaction sought to be recorded was
an involuntary transaction, 9 and the record is silent as to whether
it presented them or not, there is nonetheless every probability
that it did so. It was the mortgagee of the lands covered by those
titles and it is usual in mortgage transactions that the owner's
duplicates of the encumbered titles are yielded into the custody of
the mortgage until the mortgage is discharged. Moreover, the
certificates of title were reconstituted from the owner's duplicates,
10
and again it is to be presumed that said duplicates were
presented by DBP, the petitioner in the reconstitution proceedings.
It is, furthermore, admitted that the requisite registration fees were
fully paid and that the certificate of sale was registrable on its face.
11
DBP, therefore, complied with all that was required of it for
purposes of both primary entry and annotation of the certificate of
sale. It cannot be blamed that annotation could not be made
contemporaneously with the entry because the originals of the
subject certificates of title were missing and could not be found,
since it had nothing to do with their safekeeping. If anyone was
responsible for failure of annotation, it was the Register of Deeds
who was chargeable with the keeping and custody of those
documents.
It does not, therefore, make sense to require DBP to repeat the
process of primary entry, paying anew the entry fees as the
appealed resolution disposes, in order to procure annotation which
through no fault on its part, had to be deferred until the originals of
the certificates of title were found or reconstituted. That it is hardly
just or equitable to do so also seems to have occurred to the
Solicitor General, who dilutes his argument in support of the
appealed resolution with the suggestion that "... the making of a
new entry ... would be the more orderly procedure," and that DBP
should not be made to pay filing fees anew. 12
Jurisprudence on the subject, while it has not been entirely
consistent, is not wanting. In Government vs. Aballe, 13 this Court
ruled that " ... (a)lthough a notice of attachment has not been
noted on the certificate of title, its notation in the book of entry of
the register of deeds produces all the effects which the law gives
to its registration or inscription." Seemingly, that ruling was
abandoned in the wartime case of Basa vs. De la Rama, 14 where it
was held that the entry of an instrument in the primary entry book
produces no legal effect unless a memorandum thereof is noted on
the certificate of title. Villasor vs. Camon, 15 however, clarified that
Aballe was never really abandoned or reversed insofar as it applied
to involuntary transactions. Said the Court in that case, which
involved a voluntary transactions — a deed of assignment of rights
in a parcel of land and its improvements:
The appellant cannot invoke in support of her
contention, the ruling laid down in the case of
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Aballe, 60
Phil., 986, which was followed in Director of Lands
vs. Abad, 61 Phil. 479, to the effect that an
attachment entered upon the entry book is duly
registered although the duplicate certificate is not
presented at the time of registration to the register
of deeds. Appellant cannot invoked said ruling, not
because it has been abandoned by the Supreme
Court during the Japanese occupation in the case
of Bass VS. De la Rama, et al., ... in which it was
said that "we are constrained to abandon the
ruling in said two cases,"- it was not abandoned for
the decision was concurred by only two justices or
less than a majority, and said statement was not
necessary or an obiter dictum and against the law,
as correctly stated by the two associate justices
who dissented and only concurred in the result, but
because said ruling, subsisting and in force, does
not support appellant's contention, for it is only
applicable to registration of involuntary
instruments, such as attachment, or other liens
and adverse claims of any description. This ruling
is correct or in conformity with the provisions of
section 72 of Act No. 496, which do not require the
production by the registrant of the duplicate
certificate of the land to be affected, ... (emphasis
supplied)
The decision in Villasor also quoted with approval the following
excerpt from an earlier case, Philippine National Bank vs.
Fernandez. 16
Coming now to the second ground on which the
appellant bases his claims, we find that when
Simona Fausa executed the document, Exhibit 3,
on October 17, 1928, conveying her interest in the
land to the appellant, her interest therein had
already been attached by the provincial sheriff and
also by him at public auction to the Philippine
National Bank, and the certificate of sale filed in
the office of the register of deeds in accordance
with the law (sections 429 and 450 of the Code of
Civil Procedure). It was not necessary for the sheriff
to present the owner's duplicate of the certificate
of title when he filed notice of attachment with the
register of deeds, nor was it necessary for the
Philippine National Bank to present the owner's
duplicate when the bank filed its certificate of sale
for registration (sections 71 and 72 of Act No. 496).
Later cases appear to have applied the Aballe ruling that entry in
the day book, even without the corresponding annotation on the
certificate of title, is equivalent to, or produces the effect of,
registration to voluntary transactions, provided the requisite fees
are paid and the owner's duplicates of the certificates of title
affected are presented. Thus, in Levin vs. Bass, et al., 17 it was
held:
... Under the Torrens system the act of registration
is the operative act to convey and affect the land.
Do the entry in the day book of a deed of sale
which was presented and filed together with
owner's duplicate certificate of title which the
office of the Registrar of Deeds and full payment of
registration fees constitute a complete act of
registration which operates to convey and affect
the land? In voluntary registration, such as a sale,
mortgage, lease and the like, if the owner's
duplicate certificate be not surrendered and
presented or if no payment of registration fees be
made within 15 days, entry in the day book of the
deed of sale does not operate to convey and affect
the land sold. In involuntary registration, such as
an attachment, levy upon execution, lis pendens
and the like entry thereof in the day book is a
sufficient notice to all persons of such adverse
claim. ... The pronouncement of the court below is
to the effect that an innocent purchaser for value
 has no right to the property because he is not a
holder of a certificate of title to such property
acquired by him for value and in good faith. It
amounts to holding that for failure of the Registrar
of Deeds to comply and perform his duty, an
innocent purchaser for value loses that character-
he is not an "innocent holder for value of a
certificate of title." ... Neither violence to, nor
stretching of the meaning of, the law would be
done, if we should hold that an innocent purchaser
for value of registered land becomes the registered
owner and in contemplation of law the holder of a
certificate thereof the moment he presents the
owner's duplicate certificate of title to the property
sold and pays the full amount of registration fees,
because what remains to be done lies not within
his power to perform. The Registrar of Deeds is in
duty bound to perform it. We believe that is a
reasonable and practical interpretation of the law
under considerations-a construction which would
lead to no inconsistency and injustice. (emphasis
supplied)
A similar ruling was made in Potenciano vs. Dineros, et al., 18
concerning land a deed of sale of which was entered in the day
book upon payment of the corresponding fees and presentation of
the owner's duplicate of the covering certificate of title, on
November 4, 1944. However, due to the confusion arising from the
bombing of Manila (this having happened during the final months
of the Japanese Occupation), the papers presented by the
registrant were either lost or destroyed, no certificate of title was
issued to him and as far as the records of the Register of Deeds
showed, the property remained in the name of the vendor. Another
party later sued the vendor, obtained judgment against him and
purchased the property on execution sale. In affirming judgment
annulling the execution sale in an action brought by the original
purchaser, this Court held:
The judgment creditor contends that entry of the
deed in the day book is not sufficient registration.
Both upon law and authority this contention must
be rejected. Section 56 of the Land Registration Act
says that deeds relating to registered land shall,
upon payment of the filing fees, be entered in the
entry book — also called day book in the same
section — with notation of the year, month, day,
hour, and minute of their reception and that "they
shall be regarded as registered from the moment
so noted." And applying this provision in the cases
of Levin vs. Bass, etc., G.R. Nos. L-4340 to 4346,
decided on May 28, 1952, this Court held that "an
innocent purchaser for value of registered land
becomes the registered owner and in
contemplation of law the holder of a certificate
thereof the moment he presents and files a duly
notarized and lawful deed of sale and the same is
entered on the day book and at the same time he
surrenders or presents the owner's duplicate
certificate of title to the property sold and pays the
full amount of registration fees, because what
remains to be done lies not within his power to
perform."
Current doctrine thus seems to be that entry alone produces the
effect of registration, whether the transaction entered is a
voluntary or an involuntary one, so long as the registrant has
complied with all that is required of him for purposes of entry and
annotation, and nothing more remains to be done but a duty
incumbent solely on the register of deeds.
Therefore, without necessarily holding that annotation of a primary
entry on the original of the certificate of title may be deferred
indefinitely without prejudice to the legal effect of said entry, the
Court rules that in the particular situation here obtaining,
annotation of the disputed entry on the reconstituted originals of
the certificates of title to which it refers is entirely proper and
justified. To hold said entry "ineffective," as does the appealed
resolution, amounts to declaring that it did not, and does not,
protect the registrant (DBP) from claims arising, or transactions
made, thereafter which are adverse to or in derogation of the
rights created or conveyed by the transaction thus entered. That,
surely, is a result that is neither just nor can, by any reasonable
interpretation of Section 56 of PD 1529, be asserted as warranted
by its terms.
The qualms implicit in the query of the respondent (and present
appellee) register of deeds about making annotation of an entry
effected before he assumed that office are more imagined than
real. He would only be making a memorandum of an instrument
and of its entry based on or reciting details which are already of
indubitable record and, pursuant to the express command of the
law, giving said memorandum the same date as the entry. No part
of that function is exclusive to the incumbent of the office at the
time entry was made or is forbidden to any of his successors.
7 Docketed as AC-G.R. SP No. 06693.
8 Resolution of February 26, 1987; Record, pp. 31-
33.
9 Section 72 of Act No. 496, now section 71 of PD
1529 see also citations from Villasor vs. Camon and
Phil. National Bank vs. Fernandez, infra.

WHEREFORE, the appealed resolution of the Acting Commissioner 10 Record of LRC Consulta No. 1411, pp- 8, 9.
of Land Registration is SET ASIDE. The respondent-appellee
Register of Deeds of Nueva Ecija, or his successor, is ordered to 11 Id., at p. 2.
annotate on the originals of the reconstituted Transfer Certificates
of Title Nos. NT-149033 and NT-149034 of his Registry a 12 Brief for the Appellee, at p. 25 of Record p. 18.
memorandum of the certificate of sale in favor of appellant
Development Bank of the Philippines as entered under Entry No.
8191 dated June 13, 1980 of the Primary Entry (Day) Book of said 13 60 Phil. 986; see also Director of Lands vs.
Registry. No pronouncement as to costs. Abad, 61 Phil. 479.

SO ORDERED. 14 73 Phil. 682.

Cruz, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur. 15 89 Phil. 404, 410.

16 61 Phil. 448.

Footnotes 17 91 Phil. 420. 15 97 Phil. 196.

1 The Property Registration Decree. 18 97 Phil. 196.

2 Record of LRC Consulta No. 1411, pp. 2, 4. Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
3 Record of LRC Consulta No. 1411, pp. 5-6.
EN BANC
4 Id., pp. 2-3.
G.R. No. L-15680 May 30, 1962
5 Id., p. 3.
LUZON STEVEDORING CORPORATION, petitioner,
6 Record of LRC Consulta No. 1411, pp. 18-21. vs.
LAND REGISTRATION COMMISSION and REGISTER OF DEEDS
OF PAMPANGA, respondents.
C. R. Tiongson, B. L. Rillo and L. V. Simbulan for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General for respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
Appeal by the Luzon Stevedoring Corporation from a resolution
adopted on 15 June 1959 by the Land Registration Commission
upholding the refusal by the Register of Deeds of Pampanga to
register a contract entitled Merger Agreement without the fees for
its registration being paid first (LRC Consulta No. 247).
On 16 October 1958 the Luzon Stevedoring Company, Inc.
(LUSTEVECO), and the Visayan Stevedore Transportation Company,
Inc. (VISTRANCO), both domestic corporations, entered into a
Merger Agreement (Annex B) Stipulating that —
LUSTEVECO hereby conveys, assigns and transfers all of its
business, property, assets and goodwill ... and in short, the
totality of all its assets reflected in the Balance Sheet of
LUSTEVECO as of June 30, 1958, . . .
to the Visayan Stevedore Transportation Company, Inc., whose
corporate name was to be changed to Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation. On 18 February 1959 the Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation requested the Registrar of Deeds of Pampanga to
cancel transfer certificates of title Nos. 10099, 6040, 8820, 8819,
8822 and 8821 covering several parcels of land owned by the
Luzon Stevedoring Company, Inc. in Pampanga and to issue the
"corresponding number of certificates" "in the name of Luzon
Stevedoring Corporation without the payment of registration
fees ..." (Annex A). On 23 February 1959 the Registrar of Deeds of
Pampanga replied that the merger agreement involved transfer or
conveyance of property and that unless the fees for its registration
be paid first the agreement could not be registered (Annex F). In
another letter dated 26 February 1959 the Luzon Stevedoring
Corporation disagreed with such view, on the ground that the
transfer of assets involved in the merger was not that
contemplated by paragraphs C-16 and C-17 of Republic Act No.
928 and requested the Registrar of Deeds of Pampanga to
reconsider his refusal to register the instrument, or, if the refusal
be not reconsidered, to elevate en consulta the case to the Land
Registration Commission (Annex G). As requested the case was
brought en consulta to the Land Registration Commission. After
notice (Annex H), hearing (Annex M) and consideration of the
memoranda submitted by the parties (Annexes I and K), on 15 June
1959 the Land Registration Commission adopted the resolution
(Annex N) now under review by this Court.
The question to determine is whether the absorption or acquisition
by the Visayan Stevedore Transportation Company, Inc., the name
of which was later on changed to Luzon Stevedoring Corporation,
the herein appellant, of the assets or property of the Luzon
Stevedoring Company, Inc. (LUSTEVECO), as stipulated in the
Merger Agreement entered into by and between the two
corporations, is a transfer or conveyance contemplated by
Republic Act No. 928 subject to payment of registration fees.
In the merger agreement two juridical persons took part as parties
thereto: the Luzon Stevedoring Company, inc. (LUSTEVECO) and
the Visayan Stevedore Transportation Company, Inc. (VISTRANCO).
The former was merged into the latter. The disposition of property
of the former is stipulated in paragraph 1 of the merger agreement
(Annex B), quoted on page 1 of this opinion, and in paragraph 3
which provides in part: .1äwphï1.ñët
VISTRANCO hereby accepts the conveyance, assignments,
and transfers mentioned hereinabove . . . .
Under said paragraphs it is clear that the Luzon Stevedoring
Company, Inc. (LUSTEVECO) conveyed, assigned, transferred,
parted with, passed to and vested in the Visayan Stevedore
Transportation Company, Inc. (VISTRANCO), later on changed to
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation, the ownership, possession, use
and control of all its business, property, assets and goodwill,
including its real property, etc. It hardly could be claimed and
contended that in the merger agreement in question no transfer or
conveyance of property was effectuated which would take it away
from the payment of fees required by paragraphs C-16 and C-17,
section 114, Act 496, otherwise known as the Land Registration
Act, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 117 and 928.
The appellant also contends that "the transfer or conveyance
contemplated in par. C-16 of Republic Act No. 928 is that in which
a consideration is an essential requisite for its efficacy." The
contention is without merit. Not the consideration of a transfer or
conveyance of property but the service to be rendered by the
Registrar of Deeds is the reason for the requirement of the
payment of Republic Act No. 928 expressly provides that —

C. Fees payable to the Register of Deeds. — The register of

deeds shall collect fees for all services rendered by him
under this Act in accordance with the following schedule:

xxx xxx xxx

16. For the registration of a deed of sale, conveyance,

transfer, exchange, partition or donation; . . . (Emphasis
supplied).

The provisions of section 35, Commonwealth Act No 466, as

amended by Republic Act No. 1921, on tax upon gain derived from
the sale of property cannot be invoked to support the appellant's
claim because the same deal with tax and not fee for services
rendered.

The resolution appealed from is affirmed, with costs against the

appellant.

Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Paredes and

Dizon, JJ., concur.
Labrador, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. L-38354 June 30, 1989
BEL AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
VIRGILIO V. DIONISIO, defendant-appellant.
STIPULATION OF FACTS
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This case was certified to us by the Court of Appeals pursuant to
Section 31 of the Judiciary Act on the ground that only questions of
law are involved.
The antecedent facts are summarized in the decision of the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal. Seventh Judicial District, Branch 20,
Pasig, Rizal in Civil Case No. 16980 to wit:
On January 22, 1972, plaintiff filed a complaint
against the defendant in the municipal court of
Makati, Rizal, for the collection of the amount of P
2,100 plus penalty of 12% per annum and P 751.30
as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation. The
sum of P 2,100 represents the association dues
assessed on the lot owned by the defendant as
member of the plaintiff association. On February
16, 1972, defendant filed an answer traversing all
the material allegations of the complaint and set
up the following special defenses; 1) That there is
no privity of contract between the plaintiff and the
defendant; 2) that the collection of alleged dues
from its members is in reality an unlawful exercise
of the power of taxation which is beyond the
corporate power of the plaintiff, 3) that the amount
sought to be collected is unreasonable and
oppressive, 4) that the assessment of the dues
upon the defendant in so far as he has not
voluntarily affiliated with plaintiff is illegal,
immoral, contrary to law and public policy, and 5)
that the acts of plaintiff in compelling the
defendant to be a member is unconstitutional and
outside the scope of its corporate power.
Defendant therefore sets up the counterclaim of P
2,000 as attorney's fees and expenses of litigation.
On May 19, 1972, the parties submitted the
following stipulation of facts and prayed for
judgment to be rendered therein in accordance
with said stipulation of facts:
COME NOW the undersigned attorneys for the
plaintiff and the defendant in the above-entitled
case, and to this Honorable Court respectfully
submit the following stipulation of facts:
1. That plaintiff was incorporated as corporation
way back in August 25, 1957 for the purposes
stated in its Articles of Incorporation, copy of which
as amended is attached hereto as Annex 'A';
2. That the By-laws of the association, copy of
which as amended is attached hereto as Annex 'B',
provides for automatic membership in the
association for every owner and purchaser of lots
located inside the Bel Air Village as defined and
bounded in the Articles of Incorporation;
3. That without applying for membership in plaintiff
association, defendant in this case, like the other
members, automatically became a member
because he is the registered owner of a lot located
inside the Bel Air Village;
4. That in accordance with the By-Laws of the
plaintiff, the association is run and managed by a
Board of Governors who (sic) exercises, among
other things, the power to assess and collect
against every owner of the lot inside the Bel Air
Village, certain amounts for the operation and
activities of the association;
5. That pursuant to the powers granted under the
By-Laws, the Board of Governors have assessed
the owners of the lots inside the Bel Air Village, a
sum to be paid either quarterly, semi-annually or
annually, computed on the basis of the area per
square meter of the lot owned by every member as
follows:
square meters under Transfer Certificate of Title
No. 81136 of the Register of Deeds of Rizal;
8. That pursuant to the powers granted under the
By-laws of the association, the Board of Governors
has made the following assessment on defendant's
property on the basis of the area per square meter
of the lot owned by him as follows:
1962—525 sq. meters x P 0.30—P 157.50
1963—525 sq. meters x P 0.30—P 157.50
1964—525 sq. meters x P 0.30—P 157.50

a. During the period from 1962- 1965—525 sq. meters x P 0.35—P 183.75
1964, the basis of the assessment
is P 0.30 for every square meter of 1966—525 sq. meters x P 0.35—P 183.75
lot owned by the members inside
the Bel Air Village compound;
1967—525 sq. meters x P 0.35—P 183.75
b. From l965-1968, the assessment
was increased to P 0.35 for every 1968—525 sq. meters x P 0.35—P 183.75
square meter;
1969—525 sq. meters x P 0.40—P 210.00
c. From 1969-1971, the
assessment was further increased 1970—525 sq. meters x P 0.40—P 210.00
to P 0.40 for every square meter;
1971—525 sq. meters x P 0.40—P 210.00
d. Starting 1972, the assessment
was changed to P0.50 for every 1972—525 sq. meters x P 0.50—P 262.50
square meter of the lot owned by
the members;
TOTAL--------P 2,100.00
6. That under the By-laws, the foregoing
assessments if not paid when due, constitute a lien 9. That the total amount of P 2,100 alleged in
on the lots of the owners inside the Bel Air Village; paragraph 4 of the complaint represents the
assessments of the plaintiff on the defendant in
accordance with the computation stated in
7. That defendant is the owner of a lot located paragraph 8 above;
inside the Bel Air Village with an area of 525
10. That defendant protested the above
assessments and refused to pay the same inspite
of repeated demands:
11. That as per Resolution No. 2-65 of the Board of
Governors, copy hereof is attached as Annex 'C', all
annual association dues not paid on or before
September 30 are considered delinquent and
imposed an interest of 12% per annum until fully
paid;
12. That they are attaching to this stipulation as
Annex 'D', the brochure of the association which
embodies the deed of restriction and rules &
regulations governing the lot owners inside the Bel
Air Village.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that
judgment be rendered with the foregoing
stipulation of facts.
Manila for Makati, Rizal
May 18th, 1972.
(SGD.) FRANCISCO S. DIZON (SGD.) F.R.
ARGUELLES, JR.
Counsel for Defendant Counsel for Plaintiff
Suite 311 ABC Building 517 Federation Center
Bldg.
Escolta, Manila Binondo, Manila
The parties submitted an addendum to stipulation
of facts as follows:
ADDENDUM TO STIPULATION OF FACTS
DATED MAY 18, 1972
COME NOW the undersigned attorneys for plaintiff
and defendant in the above a title case, and to his
Honorable Court hereby respectfully submit the
following additional stipulation by incorporating to
he Stipulation of Facts , dated May 18, 1972, the
Bel Air Village Association, Inc. 1971 Annual
Report, to be marked as Annex "E" and made an
integral part thereof.
Manila for Makati, Rizal
June 3, 1972.
(SGD.) FRANCISCO DIZON (SGD.) F.R. ARGUELLES,
JR.
Counsel for Plaintiff Counsel for PLaintiff
517 Federation Center Bldg. 517 Federation Center
Bldg.
Binondo, Manila Dasmarinas cor. Muelle de
Binondo, Manila
The parties having filed their respective
memoranda, the inferior court rendered its
decision dated July 31, 1972 in favor of the plaintiff
pertinent portion of which reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
ordering defendant to pay plaintiff the principal
amount of P 2,100.00 plus interest thereon at the
rate of 12% annually from the year 1962 until the
 aforesaid amount is fully paid and to pay plaintiff
the amount of P 300.00 as and for attorney's fees
and to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Appeal was perfected pursuant to Republic Act No.
6031.
This Court after examining the pleadings doubted
its appellate jurisdiction because issues not
capable for pecuniary estimation were raised and
decided in said inferior court. Upon suggestion of
the Court the parties on May 30, 1973 agreed in a
joint manifestation for this Court to decide the case
in its original jurisdiction in order to cure the
defect. They likewise agreed to submit the case for
decision based on the stipulation of facts,
heretofore quoted and the memoranda filed in the
inferior court. Upon suggestion of the Court the
plaintiff filed its supplemental memorandum on
June 20, 1973." (At pp. 31-37, Rollo)
The decision of the Municipal Court of Makati was affirmed.
Defendant Dionisio then filed a petition for review of the Court of
First Instance decision with the Court of Appeals. As stated earlier,
the appellate court elevated the case to us the issues raised being
purely questions of law.
The resolution of the petition hinges on whether or not the
respondent association can lawfully collect the questioned dues
from the petitioner.
The petitioner insists that he is not liable to pay the dues on the
following grounds:
1) The questioned assessment is a property tax
outside the corporate power of respondent
association to impose.
2) Respondent association has no power to compel
the petitioner to pay the assessment for lack of
privity of contract.
3) The questioned assessment should not be
enforced for being unreasonable, arbitrary,
oppressive, confiscatory and discriminatory.
4) Respondent association is exercising
governmental powers which should not be
sanctioned.
There is no dispute that Transfer Certificate of Title No. 81136
covering the subject parcel of land issued in the name of the
petitioner contains an annotation to the effect that the lot owner
becomes an automatic member of the respondent Bel-Air
Association and must abide by such rules and regulations laid
down by the Association in the interest of the sanitation, security
and the general welfare of the community. It is likewise not
disputed that the provision on automatic membership was
expressly annotated on the petitioner's Transfer Certificate of Title
and on the title of his predecessor-in-interest.
The question, therefore, boils down to whether or not the petitioner
is bound by such annotation.
Section 39 of Art. 496 (The Land Registration Act) states:
Sec. 39. Every person receiving a certificate of title
in pursuance of a decree of registration, and every
subsequent purchaser of registered land who takes
a certificate of title for value in good faith shall
hold the same free of all encumbrances except
those noted on said certificate ... (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, in the case of Tanchoco v. Aquino, (154 SCRA 1 [1987]), we
ruled that purchasers of a registered land are bound by the
annotations found at the back of the certificate of title covering the
subject parcel of land. We stated:
 ... that when petitioners purchased on April 6, 1964
from Rafael Viola an undivided (1/2) portion of Lot
314 and then on January 5, 1965 a 6/7 portion of
the other half of Lot 314 there was at the back of
TCT No. 11682 covering Lot 314 an annotation of a
notice of lis pendens in favor of Donato Lajom,
under Entry No. 19553/T-14707 (Rollo, p. 23), as
follows:
Entry No. 19553/T-14707; Kind-Lis pendens in favor
of Donato Lajom; Conditions-1/2 of the properties
described in this title is the object of a complaint
filed in Civil Case No. 8077 of the C.F.I. of N.E.;
date of instrument-Dec. 16, 1949; Date of
Inscription-Jan. 11, 1950 at 2:00 p.m.
Petitioner Pastor Tanchoco who holds office as
Asst. Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija (Rollo, p. 30)
could not have missed the import of such
annotation. It was an announcement to the whole
world that a particular real property is in litigation,
serving as a warning that one who acquires an
interest over said property does so at his own risk,
or that he gambles on the result of the litigation
over said property. Since petitioners herein bought
the land in question with the knowledge of the
existing encumbrances thereon, they cannot
invoke the right of purchasers in good faith, and
they cannot likewise have acquired better rights
than those of their predecessors in interest
(Constantino v. Espiritu, 45 SCRA 557 [1972])"
In effect, the petitioner's contention that he has no privity of
contract with the respondent association is not persuasive. When
the petitioner voluntarily bought the subject parcel of land it was
understood that he took the same free of all encumbrances except
notations at the back of the certificate of title, among them, that
he automatically becomes a member of the respondent
association.
One of the obligations of a member of the respondent association
is to pay certain amounts for the operation and activities of the
association which is being collected by the Board of Governors. The
dues collected are intended for garbage collection, salary of
security guards, cleaning and maintenance of streets and street
lights and establishments of parks. The amount to be paid by each
lot owner is computed on the basis of the area per square meter of
the lot owned by every member.
The mode of payment as well as the purposes for which the dues
are intended clearly indicate that the dues are not in the concept
of a property tax as claimed by the petitioner. They are shares in
the common expenses for necessary services. A property tax is
assessed according to the value of the property (Philippine Transit
Association v. Treasurer of the City of Manila, et al. 83 Phil. 722
[1949]) but the basis of the sharing in this case is the area of the
lot. The basis appears reasonable. The dues are fees which a
member of the respondent association is required to pay as his
contribution to the expenses incurred by the respondent
association in hiring security guards, cleaning and maintaining
streets, street lights and other community projects for the benefit
of all residents within the Bel-Air Village. These expenses are
necessary, valid, and reasonable for the particular community
involved.
The petitioner also objects to the assessment on the ground that it
is unreasonable, arbitrary, discriminatory, oppressive and
confiscatory. According to him the assessment is oppressive
because the amount assessed is not based on benefits but on the
size of the area of the lot, discriminatory and unreasonable
because only the owners of the lots are required to pay the
questioned assessment and not the residents who are only renting
inside the village; and confiscatory because under the by-Laws of
the respondent association, the latter holds a lien on the property
assessed if the amount is not paid.
We agree with the lower court's findings, to wit:
The limitations upon the ownership of the
defendant as clearly imposed in the annotations of
TCT No. 81136 do not contravene provisions of
laws, morals, good customs, public order or public
policy. Since these limitations have been imposed
upon the contract of sale as admitted in the
stipulation of facts, it is obvious that the annotation
of said lien and encumbrance that the defendant
automatically becomes a member of the plaintiff
association and subject to its rules, regulations or
resolutions is valid, binding and enforceable.
The contention that this lien collides with the
constitutional guarantee of freedom of association
is not tenable. The transaction between the
defendants and the original seller (defendant's
immediate predecessor) of the land covered by
TCT No. 81136 is a sale and the conditions have
been validly imposed by the said vendor/the same
not being contrary to law, morals and good
customs and public policy. The fact that it has been
approved by the Land Registration Commission did
not make it a governmental act subject to the
constitutional restriction against infringement of
the right of association. The constitutional
proscription that no person can be compelled to be
a member of an association against his will applies
only to government acts and not to private
transactions like the one in question.
The defendant cannot legally maintain that he is
compelled to be a member of the association
against his will because the limitation is imposed
upon his ownership of property. If he does not
desire to comply with the annotation or lien in
question he can at any time exercise his inviolable
freedom of disposing of the property and free
himself from the burden of becoming a member of
the plaintiff association. After all, it is not imposed
upon him personally but upon his ownership of the
property. The limitation and restriction is a
limitation that follows the land whoever is its
owner. It does not inhere in the person of the
defendant.
The Court therefore holds that the lien or
encumbrance or limitation imposed upon TCT No.
81136 is valid.
The second question has reference to the
reasonableness of the resolution assessing the
monthly dues in question upon the defendant. The
exhibits annexed to the stipulation of facts
describe the purpose or goals for which these
monthly dues assessed upon the members of the
plaintiff including the defendant are to be
disbursed. They are intended for garbage
collection, salary of security guards, cleaning and
maintenance of streets, establishment of parks,
etc. Living in this modern, complex society has
raised complex problems of security, sanitation,
communitarian comfort and convenience and it is
now a recognized necessity that members of the
community must organize themselves for the
successful solution of these problems. Goals
intended for the promotion of their safety and
security, peace, comfort, and general welfare
cannot be categorized as unreasonable. Indeed,
the essence of community life is association and
cooperation for without these such broader welfare
goals cannot be attained. It is for these reasons
that modem subdivisions are imposing
encumbrance upon titles of prospective lot buyers
a limitation upon ownership of the said buyers that
they automatically become members of
homeowners' association living within the
community of the subdivision.
Even assuming that defendant's ownership and
enjoyment of the lot covered by TCT No. 81136 is
limited because of the burden of being a member
of plaintiff association the goals and objectives of
the association are far greater because they apply
to and affect the community at large. It can be
justified on legal grounds that a person's
enjoyment of ownership may be restricted and
limited if to do so the welfare of the community of
which he is a member is promoted and attained.
These benefits in which the defendant participates
more than offset the burden and inconvenience
that he may suffer.
It is contended that the dues are assessed not only
upon owners who have residences and houses on
 their lots but even upon those owners whose lots
are vacant or are being leased to others. It is
therefore argued that this is discriminatory. The
Court disagrees. When the defendant bought the
lot in question, it is assumed that he is going to
reside in this place. The limitation or encumbrance
assailed in the case at bar is for the assurance that
the buyer of the lot will bird his house and live in
the Bel Air Village. Otherwise, the defendant can
just speculate and sell his lot a higher price and
defeat the very purposes for which the
encumbrance is imposed.

The Court holds that the limitation or lien imposed

upon TCT No. 811136 is reasonable. (pp.. 38-42,
Rollo)

The lower court states that the defendant has occupied the lot for
ten years up to the time of the rendition of judgement. On grounds
of equity alone, he should contribute his share in the community
expenses for security, street lights, maintenance of streets, and
other services.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of

merit. The questioned decision of the trial court is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Fernan, C. J., (Chairman), Bidin and Cortes, JJ.,concur.

Feliciano, J., took no part.

 The following chronology will' explain the controversy between the
parties:
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-28529 April 30, 1979
L. P. LEVISTE & COMPANY, INC., and NITA U. BERTHELSEN,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. ANTONIO H. NOBLEJAS in his capacity as Land
Registration Commissioner, THE REGISTER OF DEEDS OF
RIZAL, and MARIA VILLANUEVA, respondents.
Roberto E. Falgui for petitioners.
Felino S. Megino for private respondent.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari from the Resolution of the Land
Registration Commission in LRC Consulta No. 555 issued on
October 20, 1967.
The property involved, situated in Parañaque, Rizal has a total area
of approximately 1.6 hectares and is covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. 108425 of the Province of Rizal in the name
of Z. Garcia Realty, Inc, (Garcia Realty, for short), a corporation
duly organized and existing under our laws. On a date that does
not appear of record, the property was converted into a subdivision
called the Garville Subdivision. This subdivision has blocks and
certain lots and the controversy in this case centers on Lot 6, Block
4 (subsequently Lot 16, plan (LRC) Psd-56800).
September 7, 1964 — Notice of lis pendens (Entry
No. 7115), presented by Melecio B. Emata, noting
the pendency of Civil Case No. 2489-P of the Court
of First Instance of Rizal entitled Vivencio R. de
Guzman vs. Z. Garcia & Company referring
specifically to Lot 3, redesignated as Lot 5 of the
new subdivision plan. The block number was not
indicates.
It is to be noted that the lis pendens does not refer
to Lot 6, Block 4.
April 28, 1966 — Affidavit of Adverse Claim (Entry
No. 55209)covering Lot 1, Block 5 presented by J.
Antonio Leviste, Executive Vice President of
petitioner company, based on an assignment in his
favor by one Leticia P. Ramos, buyer of said lot
from Garcia Realty.
Also to be noted is that this has no reference to Lot
6, Block 4.
May 6, 1966 — Affidavit of Adverse Claim (Entry
No. 55804) covering Lot 6, Block 4 (subsequently
Lot 16, plan (LRC) Psd 56800), consisting of 510
square meters presented by respondent Maria
Villanueva based on an agreement to sell in her
favor executed by Garcia Realty.
This is the Disputed Lot.
July 19, 1966 — Attachment (Entry No. 62224)
presented by petitioner Nita U. Berthelsen
"affecting all rights, interests and participation of
defendants Z. Garcia Realty Inc., in the property
described in this certificate of title in Accordance
with Notice of Attachment or Levy issued by the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal in Civil Case, No Court of
 First Instance of Manila, , entitled Nita U.
Berthelsen versus, Garcia Realty, Inc., etc.
The attachment covers the Disputed Lot.
July 25, 1966 — Attachment (Entry No. 62748)
presented by Leviste & Co. "affecting all rights,
interests and participation of the defendant Garcia
Realty, Inc., in the property described by the
certificate of title, in accordance with the Notice of
Attachment or Levy issued by the Provincial Sheriff
of Rizal, in Civil Case No. 9269 of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal entitled L P. Leviste. Inc., versus
Z. Garcia Realty, Inc."
This attachment also covers the Disputed Lot.
November 18, 1966 — Attachment, (Entry No.
73465) "affecting all rights, interest and
participation of the defendants, Z. Garcia & Co. in
the property described herein, in accordance with
the Notice of Attachment or Levy issued by the
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal in Civil Case No. 2489-P of
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, entitled
Vivencio R, de Guzman vs. Z. Garcia & Co.
Again, the attachment covers the Disputed Lot.
May 29,1967 — Garcia Realty and respondent
Villanueva consummated a contract of sale over
the Disputed Lot.
Respondent Villanueva sought to have the sale registered and title
issued in her favor, free of any encumbrance, but petitioners
Leviste and Berthelsen objected alleging that they had registered
adverse claims and attachments. The Register of Deeds refused to
issue a new title to Villanueva without carrying over (A) the two
annotations registered prior to Villanueva's adverse claim, namely,
the notice of lis pendens (Entry No. 7115) made on September 7,
1964 referring to a pending Civil Case No. 2489-P in the Court of
First Instance of Rizal entitled Vivencio R. de Guzman vs. Z. Garcia
Realty, Inc.; and the adverse claim (Entry No. 55205) of J. Antonio
Leviste registered on April 28, 1966 according to the deed of
assignment in his favor executed by one Leticia P. Ramos; and (B)
the attachments covering the entire property annotated on the
title subsequent to Villanueva's adverse claim, namely, the
Berthelsen attachment on July 19, 1966 (Entry No. 62224), the
Leviste attachment on July 25, 1966 (Entry No. 62748), and the
attachment issued in connection with Civil Case No. 2489P of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal on November 18, 1966 (Entry No.
73465).
The position taken by the Register of Deeds was predicated on the
following reasons:
1. A registered adverse claim is only a claim and
not a lien or encumbrance on the property, Hence,
the superior rights of lienholder establish by law
cannot be involved in this case.
The case would have been otherwise, if the
agreement itself were the one registered.
2. From the annotations of the said attachments on
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 108425, it appears
clearly that the whole property known as Lot 1 E-2,
describe therein is being attached; therefore, it is
no longer necessary to make any distinction.
Upon the request of respondent Villanueva, the Register of Deeds
elevated the matter en consults to the Land Registration
Commission, which on October 20, 1967, issued its Resolution, the
decretal portion of which is worded thus:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Commission
holds that the deed of sale may be registered;
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 108425 may be
partially cancelled; and a new transfer certificate of
title covering Lot 16 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
66800 may be issued to Maria Villanueva free of
any encumbrance.
1
SO ORDERED.
In disposing of the consulta, the Commission opined:
A registered notice of adverse claim takes priority
over all subsequent encumbrances and becomes
subject only to all annotations registered prior to it,
except legal liens While the notice of adverse claim
of Maria Villanueva appears to be subject to the
notice of lis pendens filed in connection with Civil
Case No. 2489-P of the Court of First Instance of
Rizal and to the notice of adverse claim of J.
Antonio C. Leviste, both having been registered
ahead, yet, as said notice of lis pendens and
adverse claim refer to specific lots other than Lot 6,
Block 4, sold to Maria Villanueva, her notice of
adverse claim becomes free of any encumbrances,
much less of the attachments subsequently
annotated.
Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, they
interposed this appeal by certiorari, with the following Assignments
of Error:
I
THE HONORABLE COMMISSIONER ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT MARIA
VILLANUEVA'S ADVERSE CLAIM HAS FOR IT'S BASIS
AN UNREGISTERED 'AGREEMENT TO SELL.' SAID
ADVERSE CLAIM, THEREFORE, HAS NO FORCE AND
EFFECT AND, HENCE, A NULLITY AS FAR AS
PETITIONERS ARE CONCERNED.
II
THE HONORABLE COMMISSIONER ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT MARIA
VILLANUEVA ACTED IN BAD FAITH WHEN SHE
ENTERED INTO A CONTRACT OF ABSOLUTE SALE
WITH Z. GARCIA REALTY, INC. AS REGARDS THAT
PARCEL OF LAND (LOT 6, BLOCK 4, OF THE
SCHEME PLAN OF GARVILLE SUBDIVISION AND
COVERED BY TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE NO.
108425).
III
THE HONORABLE COMMISSIONER ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THE FACT THAT RESPONDENT,
MARIA VILLANUEVA, FAILED TO EXHAUST THE
REMEDY OF REGISTERING THE 'AGREEMENT TO
SELL' SHE EXECUTED WITH Z. GARCIA REALTY, INC.
2
Petitioners take the position that:
The registered adverse claim or lien of J. Antonio
Leviste under Entry No. 55209 involving Lot 5 of
Block 5 of the Garville Subdivision, according to the
deed of assignment executed by Leticia Ramos is
prior to and superior to that of petitioner Maria
Villanueva (herein respondent). Hence, the hen
annotated in favor of Leviste holds preference over
that of Maria Villanueva.
The agreement to sell in favor of Maria Villanueva
was not registered. Hence, the rights of a
lienholder established by law cannot be invoked in
favor of petitioner (herein respondent).
On the other hand, respondent Villanueva contends that her
adverse claim is valid; that it conforms with the requirements of
Section 110 of Act 496, and until found to be frivolous, vexatious or
unmeritorious by a Court of competent jurisdiction, it is an interest
or hen protected by law. Moreover, a registered adverse claim is a
lien or encumbrance on the property, specifically on the particular
portion which it covers. Furthermore, Section 110 of Act 496 does
not require registration as the basis of the adverse claim, referring
to the agreement to sell in this case, it being sufficient that a
statement be made setting forth the basis of the claim.
The rule is that between two involuntary documents, the earlier
entry prevails. 3 Ordinarily, therefore, the notice of lis pendens
entered on September 7, 1964, and Leviste's adverse claim
annotated on April 28, 1966, both registered prior to respondent
Villanueva's adverse claim, which was entered on May 6, 1966, are
entitled to precedence over the latter. However, inasmuch as the
aforesaid lis pendens refers to Lot 3 (redesignated as Lot 5) and
Leviste's adverse claim to Lot 1, Block 5, notwithstanding their
prior registration, they cannot affect Villanueva's adverse claim
over Lot 6, Block 4. The aforesaid inscriptions, therefore, need not
be carried over to the new title to be issued in Villanueva's favor.
The question to resolve is the priority between Villanueva's
adverse claim and the attachments of Berthelsen, Leviste, and that
in Civil Case No. 2489- P of the Court of First Instance of Rizal all
registered subsequent to Villanueva's adverse claim. The answer
would depend on whether Villanueva's adverse claim is, in fact,
registerable, and if so, whether it can be preferred over the
attachments.
Section 110 of Act 496 provides:
Whoever claims any right or interest in registered
land adverse to the registered owner, arising
subsequent to the date of the original registration,
may, if no other provision is made in the Land
Registration Act for registering the same, make a
statement in writing setting forth fully his alleged
right or interest, and how or under whom acquired,
and a Reference to the volume and page of the
certificate of title of the registered owner, and a
description of the land in which the right or interest
is claimed. The statement shall be signed and
sworn to, and shall state the adverse claimant's
residence, and designate a place at which all
notices may be served upon him. This shall be
entitled to registration as an adverse claim, and
the court, upon a petition of any party in interest,
shall grant a speedy hearing upon the question of
the validity of such adverse claim and shall enter
such decree therein as justice and equity may
require. If the claim is adjudged to be invalid, the
registration shall be cancelled. If in any case the
court after notice and hearing finds that claim thus
registered was frivolous or vexatious, it may tax
the adverse claimant double or treble costs in its
discretion.
The basis of respondent Villanueva's adverse claim was an
agreement to sell executed in her favor by Garcia Realty. An
agreement to self is a voluntary instrument as it is a wilful act of
the registered owner. As such voluntary instrument, Section 50 of
Act No. 496 expressly provides that the act of registration shall be
the operative act to convey and affect the land. And Section 55 of
the same Act requires the presentation of the owner's duplicate
certificate of title for the registration of any deed or voluntary
instrument. As the agreement to see involves an interest less than
an estate in fee simple, the same should have been registered by
filing it with the Register of Deeds who, in turn makes a brief
memorandum thereof upon the original and owner's duplicate
certificate of title. 4 The reason for requiring the production of the
owner's duplicate certificate in the registration of a voluntary
instrument is that, being a wilful act of the registered owner, it is to
be presumed that he is interested in registering the instrument and
would willingly surrender, present or produce his duplicate
certificate of title to the Register of Deeds in order to accomplish
such registration. 5 However, where the owner refuses to surrender
the duplicate certificate for the annotation of the voluntary
instrument, the grantee may file with the Register of Deeds a
statement setting forth his adverse claim, as provided for in
Section 110 of Act No. 496. 6 In such a case, the annotation of the
instrument upon the entry book is sufficient to affect the real
estate to which it relates, although Section 72 of Act No. 496
imposes upon the Register of Deeds the duty to require the
production by the Registered owner of his duplicate certificate for
the inscription of the adverse claim. 7 The annotation of an adverse
claim is a measure designed to protect the interest of a person
over a piece of real property where the registration of such interest
or right is not otherwise provided for by the Land Registration Act,
and serves as a notice and warming to third parties dealing with
said property that someone is claiming an interest on the same or
a better right than the registered owner thereof. 8
In Register of Deeds of Quezon City vs. Nicandro (1 SCRA 1334
[1961]), it was held that for the special remedy of adverse claim to
be availed of, it must be shown that there is no other provision in
the law for registration of the claimant's alleged right or interest in
the property. In said case, the basis of the adverse claim was a
perfected contract of sale. As the Land Registration Act specifically must have to be carried over to the new transfer certificate of title
prescribes the procedure for registration of the vendee's right on a to be issued to respondent Maria Villanueva.
registered property (Section 57), the filing of an adverse claim was
held ineffective for the purpose of protecting the vendee's right. No pronouncement as to costs.

In the case at bar, it does not appear that Villanueva attempted to SO ORDERED.
register the agreement to sell under Section 52 of Act No. 496 and
that the registered owner, Garcia Realty, refused to surrender the
duplicate certificate for the annotation of said instrument. Instead, Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez, Guerrero, and De
Villanueva merely filed an adverse claim based on said agreement Castro, JJ., concur.
to sell Considering that Section 62 of the Land Registration Act
prescribes the procedure for the registration of Villanueva's
interest less than an estate in fee simple on the disputed lot and
there being no showing of her inability to produce the owner's #Footnotes
duplicate certificate, the remedy provided in Section 110 of Act
496, which was resorted to by Villanueva, is, therefore, ineffective
for the purpose of protecting her right or interest on the disputed 1 p. 35, Original Record.
lot.
2 pp. 6-7, Petitioner's Brief.
Inasmuch as the adverse claim filed by Villanueva was not valid,
the same did not have the effect of a conveyance of her right or 3 see Santos vs. Robledo, 28 Phil. 245; Co-Trongco
interest on the disputed lot and could not prejudice any right that vs. Co-Gura, 1 Phil. 210.
may have arisen thereafter in favor of third parties. Consequently,
the attachments of Berthelsen, Leviste, and that in Civil Case No. 4 Section 52, Act No. 496.
2489-P of the Court of First Instance of Rizal covering the disputed
lot are superior to that acquired by Villanueva and will have to be
carried over to the new title to be issued in her favor. Thus, Section 5 Ramirez vs. Causing, 101 Phil. 1009 (1957);
of Act 496 provides that: Villasor vs. Camon, 89 Phil. 404, 412 [1951].

If at the time of any transfer there appear upon the
registration book encumbrances or claims adverse
to the title of the registered owner, they shall be
stated in the new certificate or certificates, except
so far as they may be simultaneously released or
discharged.
6 Register of Deeds of Manila vs. Tinoco, 95 Phil.
818 [1954].
7 Villasor vs. Camon, supra.
8 Ty Sin Tei vs. Lee Dy Piao, 103 Phil. (1958).

WHEREFORE, the Resolution of the Land Registration Commission

in LRC Consults No. 555 decreeing the issuance of a new transfer
certificate of title covering Lot 16 of subdivision plan (LRC) Psd-
56800 in the name of Maria Villanueva free of any encumbrance is
hereby set aside. The attachments of Nita U. Berthelsen (Entry No.
62224). Leviste & Co. (Entry No. 62748) and that in Civil Case No.
2489-P of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Entry No. 73465),