PERSONS VICARIOUSLY LIABLE

Definition: (Vicarious Liability)

A legal doctrine in tort law that imposes responsibility upon one person for the
failure of another or assigns liability for an injury to a person who did not cause the injury
but with whom the person has special legal relationship to exercise such care as
reasonably prudent person would use under similar circumstances (US Tort Law
Dictionary).
Legal Basis:
Article 2180 of the Civil Code enumerates those who are subject to this vicarious
liability:
A. Persons Exercising Parental Authority
1. Parents
2. Guardians
3. Other Persons Exercising Parental Authority
B. Teachers and Schools
C. Owners/ Managers of Establishments/ Employers
D. State
________________________________________________________

A. PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY

1. Parents

Article 2180, Civil Code

“The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

The father, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, is responsible for the
damages caused by the minor children who live in their company. The liability
treated in this article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that
they observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

LIBI V. INTERMIDIATE APPELATE COURT

G.R. No. 70890, September 18, 1992

FACTS: Herein petitioners and respondents are the parents of deceased Julie Ann
Gotiong and Wendell Libi. These two minors were then sweethearts until they broke up
as Julie Ann found Wendell to be sadistic and irresponsible. Wendell’s attempts of
reconciliation did not work out prompting him to resort to threats against Julie Ann. Until

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one time, both were found dead with inflicted gunshot wound from the same firearm
licensed after the name of Cresencio Libi, Wendell’s father.

The parents of Julie Ann submitted that Wendell caused their daughter’s death by
shooting her then shot himself to suicide. Wendell somehow got hold of the key to the
drawer where said gun was kept under lock without defendant-spouses ever knowing
that said gun had been missing from that safety box. Wendell had a picture taken proudly
displaying said gun and dedicated this picture to Julie Ann. A case was then filed against
the parents of Wendell based on Article 2180.

ISSUE: Whether or not the parents of Wendell are vicariously liable.

HELD: YES. The diligence of a good father of a family required by law in a parent and
child relationship consists, to a large extent, of the instruction and supervision of the
child.
Defendants-appellees utterly failed to exercise all the diligence of a good father of
the family by means of the gun of defendants-appellees which was freely accessible to
their son for they have not regularly checked whether said gun was still under lock, but
learned that it was missing from the safety box after the crime had been committed.

The Supreme Court stated: “We believe that the civil liability of parents for quasi-
delicts of their minor children, as contemplated in Article 2180 of the Civil code, is
primary and not subsidiary.

TAMARGO V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. 85044, June 3, 1992

Doctrine: There has to be actual custody and control of the minor for the doctrine of
vicarious liability to apply.

FACTS: Adelberto Bundoc, 10 years old, shot Jennifer Tamargo with an air rifle which
led to her death. During this incident, Adelberto was living with his natural parents. Prior
to this, spouses Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the minor Adelberto. This petition
for adoption was granted after Adelberto shot Jennifer.

A case for damages was filed against Adelberto’s natural parents, who claimed
that, since adoption retroacts to the filing of the petition, the proper party to be sued are
the adoptive parents.

ISSUE: Whether or not the adoptive parents are vicariously liable.

HELD: NO. Retroactive effect may be given to permit the accrual of some benefit in favor
of the child., but not to burden the adoptive parents with liability for a tortious act, which
they could not have foreseen or prevented. The SC ruled that the natural parents are still
liable, since they had the actual control and custody at the time of the commission of the
act.

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 The civil law assumes that when an unemancipated child living with its parents
commits a tortious act, the parents were negligent in the performance of their legal and
natural duty closely to supervise the child who is in their custody and control.

2. GUARDIANS

Article 2180, Civil Code

“The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s acts or
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.

Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or incapacitated persons
who are under their authority and live in their company. The liability treated in this
article shall cease when the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed
all the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

3. OTHER PERSONS EXERCISING PARENTAL AUTHORITY

a. Family Code:

Article 216. In default of parents or a judicially appointed guardian, the

following persons shall exercise substitute parental authority over the child
in the order indicated:
(1) The surviving grandparent, as provided in Art. 214;
(2) The oldest brother or sister, over twenty-one years of age, unless
unfit or disqualified; and
(3) The child’s actual custodian, over twenty one years of age, unless
unfit or disqualified.

Art. 217. In case of foundlings, abandoned, neglected or abused children

and other children similarly situated, parental authority shall be entrusted in
summary judicial proceedings to heads of children’s hones, orphanages
and similar institutions duly accredited by the proper government agency.

Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall
civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions
of their unemancipated children living in their company and under their
parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.

B. TEACHERS AND SCHOOLS

1. Under the Civil Code

Article 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for
one’s acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is
responsible. Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall
be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices, so long
as they remain in their custody. The liability treated in this article shall cease when
the persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good
father of a family to prevent damage.
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 PALISOC V. BRILLANTES
G.R. No. L-29025, Oct. 5, 1988

***“…so long as they remain in their custody”. – its meaning.

FACTS: Dominador Palisoc, 16-year old, and Virgilio Daffon were classmates at the
Manila Technical Institute. During an afternoon recess time, in the laboratory room,
Daffon and another classmate were working on a machine while Palisoc was looking on
at them. Daffonmade a remark to the effect that Palisoc was acting like a foreman.
Because of this remark, Palisoc slapped slightly Daffon on the face.Daffon, in retaliation,
gave Palisoc a strong flat blow on the face, which was followed by other fist blows on the
stomach. Palisoc retreated to avoid the blows but Daffon followed and both exchanged
blows until Palisocstumbled falling face downward. Palisoc fainted and eventually died.
Postmortem findings showed cause of death as shock due to traumatic fracture of ribs,
contusion of the pancreas and stomach intragastric hemorrhage and hemorrage on the
brain.
Defendants in civil case were the parents of Palisoc, a member of the board of
directors of the school, the owner and the president of the school, the instructor of the
class to which the deceased belonged, and VirgilioDaffon.

The trial court absolved the officials of the school holding that the school officials
could be held liable under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code only if the victim “lived and boarded
with his teacher or the other defendants officials of the school”. In the case at bar, the
trial court reasoned that there is no evidence that the accused Daffon lived and boarded
with his teacher or the other officials of the school.

ISSUE: Whether or not the school officials were correctly absolved by the lower court
from liability under Art.2180 of the Civil Code.

HELD: NO. The Supreme Court explained that the phrase “so long as they remain in
their custody” means the protective and supervisory custody that the school and its
heads and teachers exercise over the pupils and students for as long as they are at
attendance in the school, including recess time.

“There is nothing in the law that requires that for such liability to attach the pupil or
student who commits tortious act must live and board in the school as erroneously held
by the lower court…”

*** Article 2180 applies to all schools, academic as well as non-academic (technical or
vocational in nature) – the interpretation of this provision: “Lastly, teachers or heads of
establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and
students or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.”

AMADORA V. COURT OF APPEALS

G.R. No. L-47745, April 15, 1988

FACTS: Pablito Daffonshot his classmate, Alfredo Amadora, 3 days before graduation
day in high school. Amadora went to the San Jose Recolitos and while at the auditorium,
he was shot by Daffon. Victim’s parents filed a civil action for damages under Article
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2180 of the Civil Code against Colegio de San Jose Recoletos, its rector the high school
principal, the dean of boys, and the physics teacher.

Daffon’s parents contended that their son was in school to show his physics
experiment as a prerequisite for graduation; hence, he was under the custody of the
private respondents. The private respondents submit that Amadora had gone to the
school only for the purpose of submitting his physics report and that he was no longer in
their custody because the semester had already ended.

The trial court ruled holding private respondents liable for damages. On appeal,
the CFI reversed the decision and all defendants were completely absolved. CFI
ratiocinated that Article 2180 of the Civil Code was not applicable as the Colegio de San
Jose-Recoletos was not a school of arts and trades but an academic institution of
learning. It also held that the students were not in the custody of the school at the time of
the incident as the semester had already ended.

ISSUE: Whether or not the school officials and the teacher are liable.

HELD: NO. In the view of the Court, the student is in the custody of the school authorities
as long as he is under the control and influence of the school within its premises, whether
the semester has not yet begun or has already ended. However, the SC absolved the
school officials and the teacher for failure to prove negligence on their part.

The rector, the high school principal and the dean of boys cannot be held liable
because none of them was the teacher-in-charge. Each of them was exercising only a
general authority over the student body and not the direct control and influence exerted
by the teacher placed in charge of particular classes or sections and thus immediately
involved in its discipline.

Assuming that the physics teacher was the teacher-in-charge, there is no showing
that he was negligent in enforcing discipline upon Daffon or that he waived observance of
the rules and regulations of the school or condoned their non-observance. His absence
when the tragedy happened cannot be considered against him because he was not
supposed ore required to report to school on that day.

SALVOSA V. IAC
G.R. No. 70458, Oct. 5, 1988

*** The school is not liable for tortious acts of the student after dismissal

FACTS: Within the premises of the Baguio Colleges Foundation is an ROTC Unit under
the control of the AFP. The ROTC Unit had Jimmy Abonas its duly appointed armorer by
the AFP. Not being an employee of BCF, Abon received his salary from the AFP.Abon
was at the same time a commerce student of BCF.

One night at around 8:00 pm in the parking space, Abon shot Napoleon Castro, a
student of the University of Baguio, using an unlicensed firearm from the armory. Castro
died and Abonwas convicted of homicide.
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 Subsequently, the heirs of Castro sued for damages, impleading Jimmy Abon,
ROTC Commandant Ungos, President Benjamin Salvosa, EVP Jesus Salvosa,
Executive Trustee of BCF - Quetolio, and BCF Inc. The trial court rendered its decision
sentencing Abon, President Salvosa, and BCF Inc. jointly and severally liable, and
absolving the other defendants.

ISSUE: Whether or not President Salvosa and BCF Inc. can be held solidarily liable with
Abon for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

HELD: NO. The SC absolved the school, since Abon was no longer under its custody
when the incident happened. It held that he was not in recess, he was no longer in
attendance in the school at that time. He was already dismissed. Circumstance shows
that Abon was supposed to be working in the armory with definite instructions from his
superior, the ROTC Commandant, when he shot Castro. He was instructed “not to leave
the office and to keep the armory well guarded”.

2. Under the Family Code

Doctrine of in loco parentis

School heads and teachers are subject to this vicarious liability because
they stand, to a certain extent, as their pupils and students, in loco parentis or as
a substitute parents. Schools exercise their educational functional principally
through their administrators and teachers, while parents exercise their parental
authority by sending their children to school to comply with their duty to educate
them according to their means as provided in Article 220 of the Family Code, and
Article 72 of the Child and Youth Welfare Code, as amended.

Art. 218. The school, its administrators and teachers, or the individual, entity or
institution engaged in child care shall have special parental authority and
responsibility over the minor child while under their supervision, instruction, or
custody.
ST. MARY’S ACADEMY V. CARPITANOS
G.R. Mo. 143363, Feb. 6, 2002

*** The act or omission considered as negligent must be the proximate cause of
injury. Proximate causation needs to be proven rather than presumed.

FACTS: St. Mary’s Academy conducted an enrollment drive for the school year 1995-
1996. A facet of the enrollment campaign was the visitation of schools from where
prospective enrollees were studying. As a student of St. Mary’s Academy, Sherwin
Carpitanos was part of the campaigning group. Accordingly, the jeep the students were
riding, owned by defendant Villanueva, was driven by James Daniel II then 15-year old
and a student of the same school. Allegedly,Daniel drove the jeep in reckless manner
and as a result the jeep turned turtle. Carpitanos died as a result of the injuries he
sustained from the accident.
Facts proved as admitted by Daniel spouses and Villanueva that the immediate
cause of accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide of the jeep. The trial
court rendered its judgment finding St. Mary’s Academy liable for damages as the
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principal obligor. The CA promulgated a decision reducing the actual damages; hence,
St. Mary’s Academy filed this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the school is liable for damages.

HELD: NO. For petitioner to be liable, there must be a finding that the act or omission
considered as negligent was the proximate cause of the injury caused because the
negligence must have causal connection to the accident. In this case, respondents failed
to show that the negligence of petitioner was the proximate cause of the death of the
victim.

Respondents Daniel spouses and Villanueva admitted the documentary exhibits

establishing that the cause of the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel
guide of the jeep. Hence, the cause of the accident was not the recklessness of James
Daniel but the mechanical defect in the jeep of Villanueva. Spouses Carpitanos did not
dispute the report and testimony of the traffic investigator who stated that the cause of
the accident was the detachment of the steering wheel guide that caused the jeep to turn
turtle.

Hence, the respondents reliance on Article 219 of the Family Code that those
given authority and responsibility under the preceding Article shall be principally and
solidarily liable for damages caused by acts or omissions of the unemancipated minor
was unfounded.

ST. JOSEPH COLLEGE V. MIRANDA

G.R. No. 182353, June 29, 2010

FACTS: Inside St. Joseph Colleges (SJC), the class of Jayson Miranda under teacher
Rosalinda Tabugo was conducting a science experiment about fusion of sulphur powder
and iron fillings in a test tube. The chemical suddenly spurted out from the test tube
hitting Jayson Miranda’s eyes when he was looking at it. He underwent surgery due to
the injury he sustained.
The parents of Jayson demanded from the school that the latter should shoulder
all the medical expenses. The school refused explaining that the accident occurred by
reason of Jayson’s failure to comply with the written procedure for the experiment and his
teacher’s repeated warnings and instructions that no student must face, much less to
look into, the opening of the test tube until the heated compound has cooled. The trial
court held the school solidarily liable and the same was affirmed by the CA; hence, this
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not the school is liable for damages.

HELD: YES. Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized activities whether
inside or outside the premises of the school, entity or institution.

As found by both lower courts, the proximate cause of Jayson’s injury was the
concurrent failure of petitioners to prevent the foreseeable mishap that occurred during
the conduct of the science experiment. Petitioners were negligent by failing to exercise
the higher degree of care, caution and foresight incumbent upon the school, its
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administrators and teachers. Petitioner school did not provide protective gears and
devices, specifically goggles, to shield students from expected risks and dangers and
teacher Tabugo was not inside the classroom the whole time her class conducted
experiment, specifically, when the accident occurred.

C. OWNERS/MANAGERS OF ESTABLISHMENTS / EMPLOYERS

1. Distinguishing the 4th and the 5th paragraph of article2180

a. Paragraph 4 of article 2180 refers to owners and managers of

establishments and enterprises. In effect, the owners are employers if they
are also managers of their establishments or enterprises while paragraph 5
made it clear that the employers referred to need not be engaged in
business or industry.

b. The 4th paragraph covers negligent acts of employees committed either in

the service of the branches or on the occasion of their functions, while
paragraph 5 encompasses negligent acts of employees acting within the
scope of their assigned task.

Negligent acts of employees whether or not the employer is engaged in business

and industry are covered as long as they were acting within the scope of their
assigned task.

PHILIPPINE RABBIT v. PHIL-AMERICAN

“The terms employers and owners and managers of an establishment or enterprise do
not include the manager of the corporation who himself is just an employee.”

2. When paragraph 4 and paragraph 5 of Article 2180 applicable

a. There must be an Employee-Employer Relationship.

SPS. JAYME v. APOSTOL

Before an employer be held liable, employee-employer relationship must be
proved and not be presumed. It is incumbent upon the plaintiff to prove the
existence of employment relationship by preponderance of evidence.

R TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. YU
Article 2180 states that, employers are liable for the damages caused by their
employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. Once negligence
on the part of the employee is established, a presumption instantly arises that
the employer was remiss in the selection and/or supervision of the negligent
employee.

b. Within The Range of Designed Tasks

This includes any act done by an employee in furtherance of the interests of
the employer or for the account of the employer at the time of the infliction of
the injury or damage.

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 FILAMER v. IAC
Funtecha need not have an official appointment for a driver’s position in order
that FILAMER may be held responsible for his grossly negligent act, it being
sufficient that the act of driving at the time of the incident was for the benefit of
FILAMER.”

c. Presumption of Negligence
Once negligence on the part of the employee is established, a presumption
instantly arises that the employer was negligent in the selection and/or
supervision of said employee.

d. Rebuttal of Presumption
In order to rebut the presumption of negligence, the employer must present
adequate and convincing proof that he exercised care and diligence in the
selection ad supervision of his employees.

LAMPESA v. DE VERA
In order to rebut the presumption of negligence, the employer must present
adequate and convincing proof that he exercised care and diligence in the
selection ad supervision of his employees.

MERCURY v. HUANG
The liability of the employer under article 2180 is direct and immediate. It is not
conditioned on a prior recourse against the negligent employee or prior
showing of insolvency of such employee. To relieve him from liability, the
petitioner should show that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection of the employee and supervision of the performance of
his duties.

D. STATE
The state is only liable for the negligent acts of its officers, agents and employees
when they are acting as special agents.
SPECIAL AGENT
One who receives a definite and fixed order of commission , foreign to the
exercise of the ordinary duties of his office
TWO SITUATIONS PRESENTED IN PARAGRAPH 6 OF ARTICLE 2180
1) When the state acts through special agent
In here the state is subject to liability for damages caused by the agent.

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2) When the act is performed by an official upon whom previously devolved the duty
of doing the act performed.
In here it is the official and not the state who is liable for damages caused by
the act he performed.

FONTANILLA v. MALIAMAN
When the state is engaged in private business or enterprises, it becomes
liable as an ordinary employer.”

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