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New Delhi Wants to Ascertain Production, Export Rights

of Russia-India FGFA Project

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Thursday, January 05, 2017

By: Sputnik

Source Link: Click Here

India and Russia are expected to sign the detailed design and development contract of Fifth
Generation Fighter Aircraft (FGFA) in the next two to three months.This will enable Moscow
to retain its position as the prime supplier of Indian Air Force's fighting strength.

India has signaled that negotiations on R&D are almost final except for some issues related to
rights over export to third countries. "Secondary round i.e. R & D round is almost finalized
except some issues related to the future of the aircraft. Because, when R&D phase will get
over and you are not able to produce and sell, what is the point in developing? Whether we
will have right to produce because there will be some IPRs over which Russia will have
claimed. All these important aspects are being clarified properly," says Manohar Parrikar,
India's Defense Minister in New Delhi.

Sources told Sputnik that a Russian delegation is arriving in New Delhi in the next few weeks
to discuss all these aspects. The Indian government feels that before embarking on
commercial production, every issue needs to be sorted out such as the aircraft's stealth
capabilities or the right to export right. Parrikar said two to three months does not hold much
importance for the project with a time frame of 10-15 years. Currently, both the countries are
not discussing the number of aircraft to be produced under the project.

"We are trying to ascertain quantum of stealth, transfer of technology and whether we will be
able to manufacture and sell jointly. All these aspects are being discussed because when we
invest huge money ($5-6 billion) you are commercially not only producing for ourselves but
considering exports as well. Secondly, stealth aspects should also be in conformity. So all
these technical aspects are being looked into before going forward," Parrikar said.

The Russian-Indian FGFA has stealth capabilities and is based on the Russian T-50 prototype
jet. The FGFA project came about following the signing of a Russian-Indian cooperation
agreement on October 18, 2007. Both the countries signed the primary contract in December
2010. India has spent $242 million on the primary contract.

The Indian Air Force has proposed building an indigenous FGFA called the Advanced
Medium Combat Stealth Aircraft (AMCSA), but it still remains at the conceptual stage.
Sweden's SAAB has offered to help in the development of AMCSA but the Indian
establishment is yet to respond. Meanwhile, China exhibited its fifth generation stealth fighter
aircraft J-20 in November this year. The J-20 is expected to provide long range, hard-to-
detect strike capacity to the PLA Air Force from 2018 onwards

India needs to cool its Missile Fever :: Chinese Media

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Thursday, January 05, 2017

By: Global Times

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On Monday, India successfully tested its long-range ballistic missile, Agni-IV, which can
travel 4,000 kilometers and carry a nuclear warhead, in the wake of an earlier successful test-
firing of Agni-V that has a range of more than 5,000 kilometers. The country's media were
elated in their reports, stressing that India's tests of the nuclear-capable ballistic missile
"covers entire China." "Agni-V can deter China," said The Times of India.

China claims that India has broken the UN's limits on its development of nuclear weapons
and long-range ballistic missile. The US and some Western countries have also bent the rules
on its nuclear plans. New Delhi is no longer satisfied with its nuclear capability and is
seeking intercontinental ballistic missiles that can target anywhere in the world and then it
can land on an equal footing with the UN Security Council's Five permanent members.

India is "promising" in vying for permanent membership on the UN Security Council as it is

the sole candidate who has both nuclear capability and economic potential.

China should realize that Beijing wouldn't hold back India's development of long-range
ballistic missiles.

However, Chinese don't feel India's development has posed any big threat to it. And India
wouldn't be considered as China's main rival in the long run. It is simply believed that
currently there is a vast disparity in power between the two countries and India knows what it
would mean if it poses a nuclear threat to China. The best choice for Beijing and New Delhi
is to build rapport.

If the Western countries accept India as a nuclear country and are indifferent to the nuclear
race between India and Pakistan, China will not stand out and stick rigidly to those nuclear
rules as necessary. At this time, Pakistan should have those privileges in nuclear development
that India has.

China is sincere in developing friendly ties with India. But it will not sit still if India goes too
far. Meanwhile, New Delhi understands that it does little good to itself if the Sino-Indian
relations are ruined by any geopolitical tricks.
In general, it is not difficult for India to produce intercontinental ballistic missiles which can
cover the whole world. If the UN Security Council has no objection over this, let it be. The
range of Pakistan's nuclear missiles will also see an increase. If the world can adapt to these,
China should too.

India still maintains a strategic defensive posture before China. The Chinese people should
not be led astray by India's extreme words online about its deterrence ability against China.
There are similar rhetorics targeting at India in China's cyber world. But, these aggressive
online rhetorics count for little.

At present, India's GDP accounts for about 20 percent of China's. China's strategic nuclear
missiles have long ago realized global coverage, and China's overall military industrial
capacity is much better than that of India.

For India, China is something to inspire ambition and invoke patriotism. However, India
should realize that owning several missiles does not mean it is a nuclear power. Even though
India does become a nuclear power, it will be a long time before it can show off its strength
to the world.

Why India cannot win Wars against its neighbours (and

why that doesn’t even matter)
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Wednesday, January 04, 2017

By: Scroll.in

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Let alone China, India cannot even win a war against Pakistan. And this has nothing to do
with the possession of nuclear weapons – the roles of nuclear and conventional weapons are
separate in the war planning of India, China and Pakistan.

The reason India would be at a disadvantage in a war with Pakistan is because while Pakistan
has built military power, India focused on building military force. In this difference lies the
capability to win wars.

Military force involves the mere collection of “war-withal”, that is, building up of troops and
war-waging materiel; military power is about optimal utilisation of military force. It entails
an understanding of the adversaries and the quantum of threat from each, the nature of
warfare, domains of war, how it would be fought, and structural military reforms at various
levels to meet these challenges. All this comes under the rubric of defence policy (also called
political directive) and higher defence management, which in India’s case is either absent or
anachronistic and in urgent need of transformation.

A measure of this can be gauged from the (then) Defence Minister Arun Jaitley’s comment
on Pakistan in October 2014. He said, “Our [India’s] conventional strength is far more than
theirs [Pakistan’s]. If they persist with this [cross-border terrorism], they’ll feel the pain of
this adventurism.” Given that the Pakistan Army unabashedly continues its proxy war against
India, Jaitley and his successors should wonder why the mere 6 lakh strong Pakistan Army is
not deterred by the 13 lakh strong Indian Army.

Even after 26 years of proxy war, the Indian leadership continues to confuse military force
with military power and, consequently, dismisses Pakistan as an irritant, based on number-
If India were to undertake military reforms, the army alone could reduce 300,000 troops over
three to five years, and the defence services would be able to provide optimal value without
an increase in annual defence allocations.

Military power has geopolitical implications. Pakistan today is sought after by the United
States, China, Russia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, the Central Asian Republics and the
littoral countries of South Asia. It has emerged as a critical geopolitical pivot on the Eurasian
chessboard. India, on the other hand, remains an important but certainly not geostrategic
player. While geostrategic players have the capacity, capability and national will to exercise
influence beyond their borders to impact geopolitical affairs, geopolitical pivots are nations
whose importance is directly proportional to the number of geostrategic players that seek
them out.

US strategist Zbigniew Brzezinski wrote in his book The Grand Chessboard, “It should also
be noted at the outset that although all geostrategic players tend to be important and powerful
countries, not all important and powerful countries are automatically geostrategic players.”

India’s northern frontiers, both on the east and the west, are not what Indian policymakers
imagine them to be. Since 1963, China has supported Pakistan with war-withal –
conventional and nuclear – to keep India boxed in on the subcontinent. This has ensured that
India’s foreign policy remains shackled by the two military lines with Pakistan and China.
Understanding the dynamics of these military lines in peace and wartime is not a mere
defence matter. It is critical to India’s relations with major powers and will help India think
strategically through a top-down approach – something it has never done because of lack of

Today the partnership between China and Pakistan – where both need the other equally – has
two serious implications for India.

First, since the military power of both has achieved interoperability, which far exceeds that of
the US and the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) forces at the height of the Cold
War, India’s military strategy of a two-front war is no longer relevant.

Interoperability is the ability of two armed forces to operate with ease as one whole in a
combat environment. This helps strengthen deterrence, manage crises, shape battlefields and
win wars. The invigorated Pakistan military – which would be supported by China’s People’s
Liberation Army (PLA) in all conventional war domains (land, sea, air, space,
electromagnetic and cyber) without showing its hand – is the new military threat facing India.

The other implication is geopolitical. From the time China supplied Pakistan with war-
waging equipment (nuclear and conventional) to keep its strategic rival India imbalanced in
South Asia, Beijing’s strategy, since 2013, has evolved in keeping with its global ambitions.
China, set on replacing the US as the foremost geostrategic player in this century, has forged
a deep, all-encompassing relationship with Pakistan. As a result, from being a lackey,
Pakistan has emerged as China’s most trusted and crucial partner for its geostrategic designs,
which are unfolding through the wide-sweeping One Belt One Road (OBOR) project.

The OBOR project seeks economic connectivity both on the Eurasian continent and in the
Asia-Pacific and Indian Ocean regions. China has deduced that the viability and success of its
OBOR project hinges on the flagship China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), which will
link Kashgar in China to the Gwadar Port in Pakistan. China believes, and with reason, that
the triumph of the CPEC will convince the world that its OBOR is not an amorphous concept
but a result-oriented venture which will change the balance of power in the world.

This is the reason China now desires that India and Pakistan have peace. After Pakistan,
China wants India to become part of the OBOR project, which President Xi Jinping has been
marketing as a win-win mechanism for China and the region. As more Asian countries, and
Russia, jump on China’s OBOR bandwagon, they recognise that the unsettled India-Pakistan
relationship – with Kashmir as the millstone – is preventing the region from realising its
economic and political potential. Speaking at the first session of the Indian External Affairs
Ministry-supported Raisina Dialogue in March 2016, former Sri Lankan President Chandrika
Kumaratunga said as much: “The conflict between India and Pakistan has prevented South
Asian integration for a long time. There have been disastrous consequences because of Indo-
Pak mistrust. The need is for cooperating more than making security concerns an excuse for
not cooperating.”

Kumaratunga was clearly speaking for other Asian countries, too, which have no issues with
Pakistan and hence cannot empathise with repeated Indian attempts to turn Pakistan into an
international pariah. Even Afghanistan, which has suffered Pakistani machinations as much
as India, if not more, understands the importance of Islamabad for regional stability and
economic prosperity as China unleashes its ambitious connectivity plans with Pakistan’s help.

India cannot look forward if its neck is arched backward.

Instead of viewing China and Pakistan as two separate adversaries bound by an unholy nexus,
India needs to understand that the road to managing an assertive China runs through Pakistan
– both strategically and militarily. Only this will ensure space for India in Eurasia. For this
reason, an Indian study about managing China should begin with an understanding of
Pakistan’s security policy and military power. Whether we like it or not, the path to India
becoming a leading power is through Pakistan. Without optimal regional integration through
the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which has not happened
since its inception, India cannot claim its rightful place in Asia and the world – a void which
China has been stepping into boldly for several years now.

If India can grasp this reality, it will be able to understand China’s grand strategy for global