G.R. No.

178301 April 24, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff/Appellee,

vs.
ROLANDO "Botong" MALIBIRAN Accused,
and BEVERLY TIBO-TAN, Accused/Appellant.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ J.:

For review is the November 13, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 02167 which affirmed the Joint
Decision2 dated September 23, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Special Court for Heinous Crimes, Branch 156, of Pasig City,
Metro Manila, finding Rolando "Botong" Malibiran (Rolando) and Beverly Tibo-Tan (appellant) guilty of Murder and Parricide,
respectively, and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The conviction arose from the death of Reynaldo Tan (Reynaldo) on February 5, 1995. The antecedents that led to Reynaldo's death,
however, go way back in the 70's when Reynaldo left his common-law wife, Rosalinda Fuerzas (Rosalinda), and their two (2)
children, Jessie and Reynalin, in Davao, and went to Manila to seek greener pastures. While in Manila, Reynaldo met and had a
relationship with appellant. They eventually married in 1981. Reynaldo and appellant begot three (3) children – Renevie, Jag-Carlo
and Jay R.

In 1984, Reynaldo's and Rosalinda's paths crossed again and they resumed their relationship. This led to the "souring" of Reynaldo's
relationship with appellant; and in 1991, Reynaldo moved out of the conjugal house and started living again with Rosalinda, although
Reynaldo maintained support of and paternal ties with his children.

On that fateful day of February 5, 1995, Reynaldo and appellant were in Greenhills with their children for their usual Sunday
gallivant. After finishing lunch at the Kimpura restaurant, the family separated at around 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon to do some
shopping. Later, they regrouped and purchased groceries at Unimart. At around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, the family stepped out of
the shopping mall and Reynaldo proceeded to the parking lot to get his red Honda Accord, while the rest of his family stayed behind
and waited. Immediately thereafter, the family heard an explosion coming from the direction where Reynaldo parked his car.
Appellant and Renevie got curious and proceeded to the parking lot. There, they saw the Honda Accord burning, with Reynaldo lying
beside the driver's seat, burning, charred and bleeding profusely. A taxi driver named Elmer Paug (Elmer) appeared and pulled
Reynaldo out of the car. Reynaldo was then rushed to the Cardinal Santos Medical Hospital where he eventually died because of the
severe injuries he sustained.3 The underlying cause of his death was Multiple Fracture & Multiple Vascular Injuries Secondary to
Blast Injury.4

An investigation was conducted by the police after which two separate Informations for Murder and Parricide, dated September 10,
1997, were filed against appellant, Rolando and one Oswaldo Banaag (Oswaldo).

The Information in Criminal Case No. 113065-H accused Rolando and Oswaldo of the crime of Murder, to wit:

On February 5, 1995, in San Juan, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, conspiring and
confederating with Beverly Tibo-Tan, and three other individuals whose identities are still unknown, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously, with intent to kill, treachery, evidence (sic) premeditation and with the use of explosion, plan, plant the
explosive, and kill the person of Reynaldo C. Tan, by placing said grenades on the driver’s side of his car, and when said victim
opened his car, an explosion happened, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of
his death.

The accused Oswaldo, without having participated in said crime of murder as principal, did and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take part, as an accomplice, in its commission, by cooperating in the execution of the offense by previous and
simultaneous acts.

Contrary to law.5

The Information in Criminal Case No. 113066-H accused appellant of the crime of Parricide, to wit:

On February 5, 1995, in San Juan Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused, while still married to
Reynaldo C. Tan, and such marriage not having been annulled and dissolved by competent authority, conspiring and confederating
with Rolando V. Malibiran, and three other individuals whose identities are still unknown, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously with intent to kill, treachery, evidence (sic) premeditation and with the use of explosion, plan, plant the explosive, and kill
the person Reynado C. Tan, by placing said grenades on the driver’s side of his car, and when said victim opened his car, an explosion
happened, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wound which was the direct and immediate cause of his death.

Contrary to law.6

Rolando and appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment.7 Their co-accused, Oswaldo, was later discharged and utilized as one of the
prosecution witnesses.

The prosecution presented Jessie Tan, Inspector Silverio Dollesin, Elmer Paug, Police Inspector Wilson Lachica, Supervising
Investigating Agent Reynaldo Olasco, Rosalinda Fuerzas, Janet Pascual (Janet), and Oswaldo, as its witnesses.
For its part, the defense presented the following witnesses, namely: Renevie Tan, Romulo Bruzo (Romulo), Tessie Luba, Emily
Cuevas, Jose Ong Santos, Victorino Feliz, Virgilio Dacalanio and accused Rolando. Appellant did not testify in her behalf.

The RTC summed up the testimonies, as follows:

THE EVIDENCE FOR THE PROSECUTION

1. Jessie Tan, a son of Reynaldo with Rosalinda Fuerzas, testified that he moved to Manila from Davao in 1985 to study at
the instance of his father Reynaldo and to enable then to bring back time that had been lost since his father left his mother
Rosalinda and the latter’s children in Davao (TSN, Jan. 27, p.14); In 1991 Reynaldo moved to their house because his
relationship with Beverly was worsening, and to exacerbate matters, Beverly had then a lover named Rudy Pascua or
Pascual, a contractor for the resthouse of Reynaldo. Reynaldo and Beverly were then constantly quarreling over money
(TSN, February 10, 1999, pp. 28-29); Jessie had heard the name of Rolando Malibiran sometime in 1994 because one day,
Reynaldo came home before dinner feeling mad since he found Rolando Malibiran inside the bedroom of Beverly at their
White Plains residence; Reynaldo had his gun with him at the time but Malibiran ran away (TSN, January 27, 1999, pp. 19-
21). He eventually came to learn about more details on Rolando Malibiran from Oswaldo Banaag, the family driver of
Beverly who was in the house at White Plains at the time of the incident (Ibid, p. 22). One night in December of the same
year (1994) Jessie overheard Reynaldo talking to Beverly over the phone, with the latter fuming mad. After the phone
conversation he asked his father what happened because the latter was already having an attack of hypertension and his father
told him that Beverly threatened him and that "he, (Reynaldo) will not benetit from his money if he will continue his move
for separation" (p. 40 ibid). This threat was taped by Reynaldo in his conversation with Beverly (Exh. "B") Jessie himself has
received threat of his life over the phone in 1989 (p. 30 ibid).

At the lounge at Cardinal Santos Hospital, on the day of the mishap, Jessie testified on the emotional state of his mother
Rosalinda while in said Hospital; that she was continuously crying while she was talking to Jessie’s uncle. When asked where
Beverly was and her emotional state, he said that Beverly was also at the lounge of the said hospital, sometimes she is seated
and then she would stand up and then sit again and then stand up again. He did not see her cry "hindi ko po syang nakitang
umiyak" (pp. 52-23 ibid). When asked if his father had enemies when he was alive, he said he knows of no one (p.54 ibid).
Jessie was informed by his mother (Rosalinda) few months after the death of Reynaldo that there was a letter by Rosalinda
addressed to his uncle which stated that "if something happened to him, Beverly has a hand in it" (p. 56 ibid, Exh. "D" Letter
dated March 24, 1999)

On cross examination, he admitted having gone to Mandaluyong City Jail and talked with Oswaldo Banaag about latter’s
claim that both accused have planned to kill his father. When asked if he knows the consequences if Beverly is convicted, on
the matter of Conjugal Partition of Property, Jessie knows that Beverly’s share would be forfeited. Counsel confirmed
Jessie’s request of whatever property of his father remaining shall shared equally by the legitimate and illegitimate children.
Thus, Jessie confirmed as the agreement between them (p. 28, March 24, 1999 TSN).

2. Mr. Salonga, a locksmith in Greenhills Supermarket whose work area is at the entrance door of the grocery of Unimart
testified that he can duplicate any key of any car in five (5) minutes. And that he is accessible to any one passing to
Greenhills Shopping Complex (p. 45, March 24, 1999 TSN). The Honda Car representative on the other hand testified that
the Honda Accord of the deceased has no alarm, that the Honda Accord key can be duplicated without difficulty. And the
keyless entry device of the said vehicle can be duplicated (pp. 46-47 ibid, Stipulation. Order p. 335 record Vol. 1).

3. Insperctor Selverio Dollesin, the Chief of the Bomb Disposal Unit of the Eastern Police District, and the Police Officer
who conducted the post aftermath report of the incident whose skills as an expert was uncontroverted, testified that the
perpetrator knew who the intended vicitim was and has reliable information as to his position when opening the vehicle. If
the intended victim does not usually drive and usually sits on the rear portion of the vehicle (p. 49, April 14, 1999 TSN)
Inspector Dollesin’s conclusion states that the device (bomb) was placed in front of the vehicle in between the driver’s seat
and the front door because the perpetrator had information about the victim’s movements, otherwise he could have placed the
device underneath the vehicle, in the rear portion of the vehicle or in any part thereof (p. 53 ibid). He testified that persons
who have minimal knowledge can set up the explosive in the car in five (5) minutes (p. 65 ibid). The explosion will
commence at about 4-7 seconds (p. 66 ibid).

4. Elmer Paug, the taxi driver, testified that on February 5, 1995 he was just dropping a passenger to Greenhills Shopping
Complex when he heard a loud explosion at the parking level. Being curious of the incident he hurriedly went out to look for
a parking, then proceeded to the area where the explosion occurred. He saw a man wearing a shirt and short who is about to
give assistance to a man who was a down on the ground bloodied. Finding that the man could not do it on his own, Elmer
rushed through to give aid. He held both arms of the victim, grabbed him in the wrists and dragged him out and brought him
farther to the burning car. (pp. 7 July 7, 1999 TSN). The man lying on the pavement has burnt fingers and hair, chest
bloodied and skin already sticking to Elmer’s clothes (p. 8 Ibid). He noticed two women at about two armlength from the car
where he was. The younger woman shouted "Daddy, Daddy, kaya mo iyan". She was crying had wailing (p. 10 ibid). He said
that the older woman gestured her left hand exclaimed in a not so loud voice "wala bang tutulong sa amin?" while her right
hand clutched her shoulder bag (p. 11 ibid). When asked if the older woman appears to be alarmed, Elmer testified that he
cannot say, and said she looked normal; he did not notice her crying. Neither of the two female rendered assistance to drag
the victim, they just followed him when he pulled him out. The older woman never touched the victim. (p. 12 ibid).
Considering that his Taxi is quite far where the victim was lying, he flagged a taxi, and the victim was brought to Cardinal
Santos Hospital (pp. 15-16 ibid).

On cross examination, he was asked what the meaning of normal is, and he said "natural Parang walang nangyari" It looks
like nothing happened (p. 42 ibid). Her was uncertain as to whether the two females joined the deceased in the taxi cab (p.
43) as he left.
5. Police Inspector Wilson Lachica testified that he was the police officer who investigated the case. In the Cardinal Santos
Hospital he was able to interview Beverly Tan. He asked her name, address, name of the victim, how the incident happened
and who their companions were. She answered those questions in a calm manner (p. 13, Sept. 21, 1999 TSN). As per his
observation which was told to his superiors, he has not seen remorse on the part of the victim, (meaning the wife) for an
investigator that is unusual. Based on his more than six years of experience as an investigator, whenever a violent crime
happened, usually those relatives and love ones appears hysterical, upset and restless. Her reaction at the time according to
him is not normal, considering that the victim is her husband. He interviewed persons close to the victim even at the wake at
Paz Funeral in Quezon City. He was able to interview the daughter of the lady-accused; the other lady and family or relatives
of the victim, the same with the driver of the lady accused. He came to know the identity of the policeman linked with the
lady accused, named Rolando Malibiran. He testified that he obtained the information that he desired from the widow
nonchalantly and marked with blithe unconcern, which in his observation is unusual since she is supposed to be the one who
would diligently push through in the investigation. When asked the level of interest as regards accused Malibiran, witness
testified that because of the manner of the commission of the crime through the use of explosives, only a trained person can
do that job (pp. 15-16 ibid).

6. Supervising Investigating Agent Reynaldo Olasco testified that his only observation on the demeanor of Beverly Tan is
that she did not give her statement readily without the assistance of her counsel which for the investigator is quite irregular.
Considering that she is the legal wife, he could not see the reason why Beverly would bring a counsel when she is supposed
to be the complainant in the case (p. 11, April 5, 2000 TSN). He testified that after having interviewed a representative from
Honda, they had set aside the possibility that it was a third party who used pick lock in order to have access to the Honda
Accord and the presumption is that the duplicate key or the main key was used in opening the car. The assessment was
connected with the statement of Renevie that she heard the clicking of all the locks of the Honda Accord, which she was sure
of when they left the car in the parking lot (p. 12 ibid) In 1998 they arrested Rolando Malibiran in Candelaria Quezon, he was
fixing his owner type jeep at that time. The arresting officers waited for Beverly Tan, and after thirty minutes they were able
to arrest Beverly Tan on the same place (p 8, May 31, 2000 TSN). They searched the premises of the place where they reside
and found a white paper which he presumed to be "kulam" because there’s some oracle words inscribe in that white piece of
paper and at the bottom is written the same of Jessie (pp. 8-9 ibid). On cross examination, he admitted that 70% of the
information on the case was given by Oswaldo Banaag through the persistence of the NBI which convinced him to help solve
the case. It was disclosed to the investigating officer after he was released, that’s the only time he gave in to the request (p.
14, may 31, 2000 TSN). As to how the NBI operatives effected the arrest, it was through an information from the Lucena
Sub-Office (p. 17, Ibid).

7. Rosalinda Fuerzas testified that her life in Makati was "medyo magulo lnag kase nanggugulo sya sa amin." When asked
who this "siya" was, she said Beverly. That one day Beverly called on her and harassed her, and one day she received a
murder letter threatening that she (Rosalinda) would be around the newspaper saying that she would be killed, like what they
did in the news papers, puputu-putulin iyong mga dodo o anuman dahil mang-aagaw daw ako (Rosalinda) ng asawa (p. 11
ibid, June 27, 2000 TSN). She stated that her husband wanted to separate with Beverly because he found out that the latter
has paramour named Rudy Pascua contractor of Jollibee (pp. 13-14 ibid). She had never seen Beverly appeared to be lonely
when her husband was then kidnapped. A telephone conversation with Beverly was recorded by Reynaldo which was a
quarrel regarding money. In the Cardinal Santos Hospital, she did not see Beverly’s appearance to be lonely but appeared to
be a criminal, and Beverly did not cry (pp. 13-17 ibid). She mentioned the letter of Reynaldo that if something happened to
him, Beverly is the one who killed him (p. 26 Ibid; pp. 24-25, Exh. "D, Vol. 1-A Record).

8. Janet Pascual testified that she was able to know Rolando Malibiran, because on March 1993 when she was in White
Plains, Beverly showed her a picture of him (Malibiran) and said to her that he is her boy friend. Witness told her that he was
handsome. She was close to Beverly that she frequently stayed in White Plains when Beverly and Reynaldo is no longer
living in the same roof. They played mahjong, chat and has heard Beverly’s hurtful emotions by reason of her philandering
husband Reynaldo. Beverly told her of how she felt bad against underwear not intented for her (p. 9, Oct. 11, 2000 TSN); that
on August 1994, Malibiran told Beverly that he has a "kumapre" who knows how to make "kulam" for an amount of
₱10,000.00. That Reynaldo would just sleep and never wake up. Witness testified that they went to Quiapo to buy the needed
ingredients but nothing happened (p. 14 Ibid). The accused wanted to kill Reynaldo in a way that they would not be
suspected of having planned it, and for him just to die of "bangungot". She testified that they wanted to separate their
properties but it did not push through, referring to Beverly and Reynaldo. That Beverly heard of the house being built in
Corinthian intended for Rosalinda and family. In July 1994 Malibiran told witness testified that she heard this on their way to
Batangas, it was Beverly’s birthday (p. 16 ibid). On October 1994 she asked by Malibiran to convince Beverly to marry him,
this was asked at the time when Beverly was in Germany (p. 17 ibid).

When asked whether Beverly and Rolando ever got married the witness testified that the two got married on November 8,
1994. (p. 155 Vol. 1-A records Exh. "JJ" Certificate of Marriage). That she executed an affidavit of corroborating witnesses
for Beverly and Malibiran to facilitate the processing of their exemption in obtaining marriage license requirement (p. 128
Ibid; Exh. "BB"). She is an employee of the Municipality of San Juan. After getting married they discussed how Malibiran
would get inside the car of Reynaldo. On December of 1994, Beverly was able to duplicate Reynaldo’s key at the time when
they have shopped for many things, Reynaldo asked her to bring the goods to the car in the compartment as the kids would
still shop (p. 17 ibid). After having done so, she proceeded to a key duplicator in Virra Mall and had the key duplicated.
Thereafter on the succeeding days or weeks, she was able to give the duplicate to Malibiran. That they would use the grenade
since Malibiran has one in his house but his only problem is how to get inside the car and place the grenade (p. 18, Oct. 11,
2000 TSN; Vide p. 35 ibid)

As to when the killing would take place, the witness heard that they will do it during the baptism of the child of Gloria,
Rolando Malibiran’s sister. They chose that date so that they would not be suspected of anything and that pictures would be
taken in the baptism to reflect that Malibiran took part in the same (pp. 17-18 ibid). During Reynaldo’s internment when
asked whether Beverly looked sad, witness said that she did not see her sad (p. 20 ibid). On February 8, 1995, during the
wake, witness met Malibiran in a canteen in White Plains and they rode a Canter owned by Beverly, on the road while the
vehicle was cruising along Katipunan avenue near Labor Hospital, Malibiran told her among others that on the day he placed
 a grenade on Reynaldo’s car he saw a security guard roving and so what he did was to hurriedly tie the wire in the grenade (p.
21 ibid) not connected with the wire unlike the one intended for Reynaldo which has a connection (p. 21 ibid). As far as she
knows, there were four or five grenades placed. She told this secret to another friend so that in case something happened to
her, it was the doing of Malibiran and Beverly.

On Cross examination, she was asked whether Malibiran did it alone, she said that he has a look out as what Malibiran told
him (p. 26 ibid). When confronted why she was testifying only now, she said she was bothered by her conscience. As to how
did she get the information of key duplication, she said that it was told to her by Beverly (p. 35 ibid). It was also disclosed
that she did ask Atty. Morales for a sum of P5,000.00 for he to buy medicine.

9. Oswaldo Banaag (or Banaag) testified that Beverly told him that she and Malibiran had a relationship (p. 39, April 1994
TSN). He testified that on April 10, 1994 Beverly asked him to look for a hired gunman, if he could not find one, he just look
for a poison that would kill Reynaldo, ten thousand (₱10,000.00) pesos was given him for this (p. 14 Ibid). In his sworn
statement he said that Beverly asked him to seek means for Reynaldo to die. That she will pay any amount just for him to get
out of her life. He has driven for her in going to Hilltop Police Station, Taytay Rizal to see Rolando Malibiran. That
Malibiran blames Beverly of the reason why Reynaldo is still alive and then volunteered himself to remedy the situation, that
he would seek a man that would kill Reynaldo he made an example of a man they killed and threw in Antipolo "Bangin" with
Beverly, Malibiran and two other persons who appear to be policeman because they have something budging in their waste
[sic] which is assumed to be a gun, they went to Paombong Bulacan via Malabon. He heard that they would fetch a man in
Bulacan that knows how to place a bomb in a vehicle. Near the sea they talked to a person thereat. From Paombong they rode
a banca and went to an islet where the planning was discussed as to how much is the fee and how the killing will be had.
They ordered him to return back to the vehicle and just fetched them in Binangonan.

He swore that on February 5, 1995 around 10:30 a.m. Beverly asked one of her siblings to call Reynaldo for them to be
picked up because every Sunday, the family would go out for recreation. Around 12:00 pm he was asked by Beverly to
follow where they will go and when they are already parked, he was instructed to fetch Malibiran in Caltex, Katipunan near
Shakeys and bring them to the place where Reynaldo was parked. In the Caltex station he saw Malibiran with two persons
who looked like policemen and another person he previously saw in Bulacan. He drove the L300 Van, and brought them to
the parking lot where Reynaldo’s Honda Car was parked and Malibiran told him just drove [sic] in the area and come back.
At around 3:00 p.m. after half an hour he saw Malibiran and company and I picked them up. He heard from the person in
Bulacan "Ayos na, siguradong malinis ito." Then he was asked to drive them to Hilltop Police Station. He discovered the
death of Reynaldo when he saw and read newspaper, he called Beverly to confirm this incident and he was asked to be hired
again and drove for her. When he was in White Plains already, he was asked by Beverly and Malibiran not to squeal what he
knows of, otherwise, his life will just be endangered. That Beverly and Malibiran were lovers since March 1993, when they
met each other in a piggery in Marikina. There was an incident that Reynaldo saw Malibiran in their own bedroom, and there
was almost a gunshot incident, he was there because he was asked to drive the vehicle. Beverly Tan’s source of money was
from Reynaldo Tan, that he (Banaag) was asked frequently by Beverly who in turn would give it to Malibiran (Exh. "y", pp.
122-125 Vol. 1-A, Sworn Statement November 29, 1996).

On March 29, 1996 he was no longer driving for Beverly because he was arrested by the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission for his alleged involvement in the kidnapping of the father of the classmate of Renevie Tan. He was later on
acquitted (p. 16, Feb. 20, 2001 TSN) and released from incarceration on May 7, 1997. When asked whether Jessie Tan helped
him to be acquitted in the kidnapping case, he said no (p. 16 ibid).

On Cross examination, he was asked how many times did Jessie Tan visit him in prison, he said that it was Atty. Olanzo who
visited him for about six times and that he saw Jessie when he was already out of jail (pp. 24-25 ibid). He testified that there
was one incident when Reynaldo and Mabiliran almost had a shootout in the bedroom downstairs because Malibiran was
inside the bedroom where Beverly was, Reynaldo have a gun at that time bulging in his waste [sic] (p. 40 ibid).

Further on Cross, he testified that sometime in June 1994, he with Beverly went to Hilltop Police Station and fetched
Malibiran and company to go to Paombong Bulacan, they passed by Malabon before going to Bulacan. When they reached
the bridge near the sea, they rode a banca, about six of them plus the one rowing the boar towards an Island. In the Island,
there was one person waiting (p. 44-45 ibid). he stayed there for just for about ten (10) minutes, and during that period, at
about one arms length he overheard their conversation concerning a man to bring the bomb in the car. When asked who was
in the banca then, he said it was Beverly, Botong (Malibiran), Janet and the man they picked up at Hilltop. He was told to
return the L300 and just wait for them in Binangonan, hence he rode a banca to return to the bridge and then drove the L300
Van towards Binangonan (p. 50 ibid). When asked if he knows that Malibiran is engaged in the fishing business of bangus,
he had no idea (p. 45 ibid).

DEFENSE EVIDENCE

For the defense, in opposition to the testimony of Elmer Paug, it called to the witness stand Renevie Tan. She testified that she believe
that her mother (Beverly) did not kill her dad because she was with them at the time of the incident (p. 6 Feb. 5, 2002 TSN). That it is
not true that they did nothing when his dad was lying on the ground at the time of the incident. That her mom screamed at that time
and did tried to pull her dad who was under the car that she kept going around to find a safer place to pull him out because the car was
burning and so they could not pick her dad without burning. Her mother tried crawling underneath the car so she can reach him but he
pulled her mom aside and pulled dad risking himself from burning (p. 11 ibid) She found out that the person who helped them was the
taxi driver, Elmer Paug.

That a driver of a Ford Fiera or Toyota Tamaraw of some kind of delivery van boarded her dad with her mom and headed for Cardinal
Santos Hospital. She said that if is not true that her mom appeared unaffected or acting normal as if nothing happened. That it is
likewise not true when Elmer Paug said that he alone carried her dad’s body, and said that there was another man who helped put her
dad on the car (p. 14 ibid). She swore that her mom was shocked and was crying at that time (pp. 112-115, Exh. "U" Sworn Statement
of Renevie Tan). She admitted that it was only the taxi driver who pulled out his dad from the danger area to a safer place at about
four (4) meters, while Elmer Paug was dragging her dad, they where there following him (p. 43 February 5, 2002, TSN). That she
touched her father when they where (p. 45 ibid). It was confirmed in her testimony that it was the taxi drivers who looked for a taxi
cab ( p. 46 ibid). She asked if she observed whether her mom carried a portion of her dad’s body or arms, hands, legs or buttocks of
her father, she said she could not remember (p. 7-8, February 12, 2002 TSN). When asked whether her mom has a shoulder bag at that
time, she could not remember.

She testified that her parents keep quarreling to each other may be in 1988-89 and stopped in 1991. it was a once a month quarrel (pp.
23-24 ibid). A certain Janet Pascual frequently stayed in their house in the months of October 1994 until February of 1995, and her
mom’s relationship with Janet was cordial (pp. 27-28, ibid). As regards to Malibiran, she knows him at the month of August or
September of 1994 but no knowledge of a marriage that took place between her mom and Malibiran on November of the same year (p.
30 ibid).

Romulo Bruzo, the security guard of Tan Family at White Plains testified that there was an offer of half a million to him by an
unknown person and a demand for him to leave the employ of Beverly Tan and a threat to his life should he testify before the Court.
He testified that Banaag was a family driver of the Tan in White Plains from March 1993 until August 1994, after said date, he was
taken by Reynaldo Tan as driver at Winreach. He testifies that the statement of Oswaldo Banaag that he came over to White Plains on
February 5, 1995, drove the L300 Van and followed the family to Greenhills Shopping Complex is false. Because at that time, the
L300 was still parked inside White Plains, it was just a concocted statement of Banaag because he has a grudge on Mrs. Tan as she did
not help him when he was incarcerated in Camp Crame (p.47-48 ibid).

He was told by Banaag that they were supposed to kidnap the three siblings of Beverly Tan but he took pity on them because Beverly
is a nice person to him. He stated that Jessie Tan helped him to be acquitted (p. 49 ibid) and promised good job and house to live in.

As regards Janet Pascual, he testified that he had an altercation with her (Janet) because there was an instruction for him by Renevie
for Janet not to let inside the house. That Janet got mad at them because she is not been [sic] treated the way Renevie’s mom did not to
her. Likewise, Renevie has refused to give her ₱5,000.00 allowance as her mom did before to Janet for the latter’s medicine (pp. 50-
51).

On account of said incident, she made a threatening remark that if she will not be treated fairly and the ₱5,000.00 allowance be not
given to her, she will go to the Tan Brother and she will testify Mrs. Tan. When asked whom she was angry of Bruzo said it was
against Renevie and Atty. Morales. She was angry with the latter because she thought that Atty. Morales was telling Renevie not to
give her allowance anymore and refuse access inside the white plains (p. 51 ibid).

When asked if he knows Malibiran, he said that he was able to join him twice when there was a delivery of rejected bread for fish
feeds in Bulacan. That he saw him eight (8) times in a month in 1994 and just twice a week in the month of August, September and
October of said year. (p. 52 ibid). He also saw him on July of 1994 on the occasion of Beverly’s Birthday.

That on February 5, 1994, Beverly called on him to relay to Roger to fetch the three kids in Green Hills. When asked the tone of
Beverly at the time of the phone call, he said the tone was that she was scared and confused (p. 63 ibid)

Tessie Luba, the caretaker of Manila Memorial Park testified that she was paid by Beverly to take care of the tomb of Reynaldo and
that in some points in time Jessie took over and later her services were not availed of anymore (p. 23, April 30, 2002 TSN) That she
saw Beverly with Banaag on November 1996 (p. 8 ibid) and Jessie with Banaag in one occasion in going to the tomb on November
1997 (p. 47 ibid) and in April 2001 (p. 20 ibid).

Emily Cuevas, one of the friends of Beverly testified that Janet Pascual is a back fighter and a traitor, that Janet tried to convince her
to testify against Beverly and if witness will be convinced, Janet will receive a big amount of money about three (3) million from
another source. Testified that it is not true that Beverly and Malibiran orchestrated or masterminded the death of Reynaldo, and that
Janet testified because she needed money because she is sick and diabetic (p. 7, May 21, 2002 TSN). She knows such fact by heart
that they are innocent and that they are good people (p. 20 ibid).

Victorino Felix, a police officer testified that Malibiran is a member of the Aquarius Multi-Purpose Cooperative, a cooperative that is
engaged in the culture of fish particularly "Bangus" at Laguna De Bay particularly Bagumbong, Binangonan, Laguna.

He testified that sometime in 1994, he together with Malibiran waited at Tropical Hut, Cainta for them to be picked up for Bulacan to
purchase fingerlings. They were fetched by an L300 Van driven by Oswaldo Banaag and they were around six or seven at that time
that headed first to Dampalit, Malabon, Metro Manila to meet the owner of the fish pond, finding that the owner thereof was already in
Bulacan they proceeded thereat, at Taliptip, Bulacan. In said place, they left the L300 Van along the bridge, near the sea and from
there they rode a motor banca in going to the fingerlings ponds. He testified that Oswaldo was not with them in going to the pond from
Taliptip (pp. 11-13, Sept. 3, 2002 TSN). When asked where he was, he said he drove the L300 back (p. 14 ibid). The pond was about
three kilometers from Talilip, and they were able to buy fingerlings, loaded it in another water transport going to Laguna Lake from
Bulacan traversing Pasig River and thereafter they returned back to Binangonan (p. 15 ibid).

On Cross, he testified that has met Banaag many times because he used to deliver rejected for bangus feeds, but said that it was only
once when Banaag drove with him, that is sometimes in 1994 (p. 20 ibid). he testified that Malibiran together with him went to Talilip,
Bulacan to procure some fingerlings sometime in June 1995 to mid 1996 (Joint Order, Sept. 3, 2002, p. 366 Vol. III record).

Virgilio Dacanilao testified that on February 5, 1995 at about 12:00 noon he was at the residence of one Gloria Malibiran Santos and
from there, he saw accused Rolando Malibiran together with his wife and children, witness’ parents-in-law and sisters-in-law. When
asked who his parents-in-law is, he said Fernando Malibiran and Jovita Malibiran, the parents of Rolando Malibiran (p. 5, Sept. 17,
2002 TSN). He said that they left the occasion at around 5:00pm and at that time, accused Malibiran, with Boy Santos and Eduardo
was still playing "pusoy". When asked if there was such a time that Malibiran left the house of Gloria Santos, he said, he did not go
out of the house sir (pp. 5-7 ibid).

On Cross examination, it was disclosed that he knows Malibiran at the time witness was still his wife, the sister of Malibiran, that was
sometime in 1988. when asked if he considered Malibiran to be close to him as the brother of his wife, he said yes sir (p. 10 ibid).
Asked if his relationship with him is such that he would place Malibiran in a difficult situation, he answered, it depends on the
situation (p. 11 ibid). Witness was asked how long it would take to reach Unimart Supermarket from his residence in Malanday, he
estimate it to be more or less half an hour (p. 13 ibid). He testified that no game was ever stop [sic] on the reason that they have to
wait for Malibiran.

Said witness testimony was corroborated by Jose Ong Santos, the father of the child who was baptized on said occasion. He testified
that he played "pusoy" with Malibiran at around 2:00pm, until 6:30 to 7:00 pm and there was never a time that Malibiran left the table
where they were playing except when he feels like peeing (p. 10 July 16, 2002 TSN). It was estimated at abut five times, and it took
him about three to five minutes everytime he would rise to pee and return to the table. That Malibiran may have left their house at
around 6:30 or 7:00 in the evening on February 5, 1995 (p. 11, ibid)

On Cross examination, he testified that the idea of baptism was rushly scheduled, because he won in a cockfight three to four days
before the baptism of his child at about February 1 or 2 of 1995. That amount was about ₱50,000.00 (pp. 20-21 ibid). Malibiran did
not take any participation in the baptism nor was he present at the church, but was already at the reception with his family, for lunch.
He testified that Malibiran left by call of nature, to pee, about four to five times and a span of five minutes (p. 31 ibid).

Accused Rolando Malibiran in his Counter-Affidavit said that he does intelligence work for seven years. He doesn’t know Banaag as
to reckless discuss a supposed plot to kill somebody within his hearing. That would be inconsistent with the entire training and
experience as a police officer. Especially when the expertise is intelligence work. Banaag drove for them in June or July 1995 not in
June of 1994 (for months after the death of Reynaldo) [pp. 147-152, Exh. "HH" Vol. 1-a record].

He testified that he met Banaag sometime in the last quarter of 1993 at the piggery of Beverly Tan (pp. 12-13, Oct. 8, 2002 TSN). He
admitted that he was with Banaag using the L300 Van of Beverly in one occasion, in 1994 when they purchased fingerlings from
Bulacan. They procured the same because their cooperative was culturing "bangus" in Barangay Bombon, Binangonan, Rizal (pp. 14-
15). He testified that in Bulacan, Banaag was left at the foot of the bridge where the L300 was parked (p. 19 ibid) and heard that
Beverly told Banaag to go back, in White Plains (p. 21, ibid). After procuring the fingerlings, they rode a big banca called "pituya"
then they went back to Pritil, Binangonan. In Pritil, they waited for Banaag (P. 26 ibid).

He denied having met Janet Pascual on Wednesday at about February 8, 1995 because since Tuesday (February 7, 1995) he was
already confined in the Camp by Order of his Unit Commander, Chief Inspector Florentin Sipin (p. 5, January 21, 2003 TSN) because
he was under investigation by the Presidential Anti-Crime Commission. He admitted that he met Beverly in the last quarter of 1993 (p.
8, October 22, 2002) but denied having intimate relations with her (p. 21 ibid).

He testified that he met Janet Pascual only once, on November 1994, but said that they never talked (p. 12, November 12, 2002 TSN).
He denied having married Beverly Tan nor did he ever requested Janet Pascual to secure a license for them to get married. He denied
having had a trip with Janet in Bulacan and admitted that he went to Zamables once, with Beverly, kids and yaya as well as his father
(p. 25, ibid), that was sometime in 1994, before Reynaldo died. He testified that he used his own vehicle with his father in going to
Zamables. He denied seeing Reynaldo; he said he just heard him based on his conversation with Beverly Tan which took place in the
piggery in Marikina. In sum, the place of incidents where he managed to meet and talk with Beverly Tan was in the piggery in
Marikina; at Camp station in Taytay Rizal; in Bulacan when they procured fingerlings in Binangonan; Malabon; Zambales; White
Plains and Cainta. (pp. 30; 32; 35 ibid).

He testified that he was arrested in Candelaria Quezon on December 1998 (p. 11 January 21, 2003) but denied living with Beverly Tan
at the time of the arrest. He said he just saw Beverly thirty (30) minutes after his arrest in the town proper of Candelaria, Quezon (P.
21, ibid). He denied that he uttered the remark "its better to kill Rene since you are not benefiting from him" (p. 38 ibid); never have
access to grenades; never asked Beverly Tan how he could get inside Reynaldo’s Car never claimed to be a sharp shooter and had
never went to Batangas uttering the remarks mentioned by Janet Pascual nor went to Batangas at the time of Beverly’s birthday.

On Cross examination, he said that he never talk to Janet at the time of his restriction and thereafter. He had no commercial dealing
with Janet nor have any romantic relations with her (p. 8, ibid). It was only when the case was filed he was able to talk to her (p. 5,
February 4, 2003 TSN). He testified that he evaded arrest because there was a pending petition for review filed by his lawyer before
the Department of Justice despite the fact that there is an existing warrant of arrest which he found out at the end of 1997 (p. 15 ibid).

On September 23, 2003, the RTC found Rolando guilty of Murder and appellant, of Parricide. The dispositive portion of the Joint
Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds both accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt as charged. Accused Rolando Malibiran for the crime of
Murder in Criminal Case No. 113065-H and accused Beverly Tibo-Tan for Parricide in Criminal Case No. 113066-H defined and
penalized under Article 248 and Article 246, respectively, of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, in relation to Republic Act No.
7659 with the attendant circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and use of explosion and sentencing both accused the
supreme penalty of DEATH, and ordering them to pay jointly and severally to the heirs of Reynaldo Tan the amount of Fifty
Thousand (₱50,000.00) Pesos as indemnity for death, Eighty Thousand (₱80,000.00) Pesos as actual damages; Fifty Thousand
(₱50,000.00) as moral damages; and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.8

Appellant then appealed to this Court; the appeal was, however, referred to the CA pursuant to People v. Mateo.9
In its Decision dated November 13, 2006, the CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC. The CA, however, took judicial notice of
Republic Act No. 9346 prohibiting the imposition of the death penalty and thus reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua. The
dispositive portion of the said Decision reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the joint decision dated September 23, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Special Court for
Heinous Crimes, Branch 156, Pasig City in Criminal Case No. 113065-H for Murder and Criminal Case No. 113066-H for Parricide is
hereby AFFIRMED with Modification in that the supreme penalty of death imposed on both accused-appellants is hereby reduced
to RECLUSION PERPETUA.

SO ORDERED.10

As manifested by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), Rolando did not file a Motion for Reconsideration or a Notice of Appeal
from the CA Decision.11 For all intents and purposes, the judgment of conviction as to Rolando became final and executory on
December 14, 2006. This was confirmed by CA Resolution dated January 29, 2007, which noted that "pursuant to the report dated
January 23, 2007 of the Judicial Records Division that no motion for reconsideration or notice of appeal had been filed by counsel for
appellant Rolando Malibiran, entry of judgment is issued against said appellant x x x." 12

This review shall therefore pertain only to appellant Beverly Tibo-Tan's conviction.

Appellant and the OSG were required by the Court in its Resolution dated October 3, 2007 to file supplemental briefs, if they so
desired. The OSG filed a Manifestation and Motion that it would no longer file any supplemental brief. As regards appellant, records
show that, as of even date, she had not filed any supplemental brief, despite due notice.13

In the Brief she filed with the Court prior to the endorsement of the case to the CA, appellant raised the following assignment of
errors:

I.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEVERLY TIBO TAN GUILTY OF
THE CRIME OF PARRICIDE BASED MERELY ON CIRCUMSTANCIAL EVIDENCE, THE REQUISITES THEREOF NOT
HAVING BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY ESTABLISHED;

II.

THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT SHOULD HAVE NOT APPRECIATED THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION WITNESS
OSWALDO BANAAG AS ITS BASIS FOR ESTABLISHING CONSPIRACY BETWEEN ACCUSED-APPELLANT
MALIBIRAN AND ACCUSED-APPELLANT BEVERLY TAN, SUCH TESTIMONY BEING HEARSAY ON SOME PARTS
AND REPLETE WITH INCONSISTENCIES;14

Before proceeding to the merits of appellant's arguments, the Court takes note of the RTC's observation regarding appellant's stoic
stance during and after the incident and her non-presentation as witness. The RTC took this negatively against appellant. The Court
differs therefrom.

Appellant's seeming indifference or lack of emotions cannot be categorically quantified as an indicium of her guilt. There is no hard
and fast gauge for measuring a person's reaction or behavior when confronted with a startling, not to mention horrifying, occurrence. It
has already been stated that witnesses of startling occurrences react differently depending upon their situation and state of mind, and
there is no standard form of human behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. The
workings of the human mind placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and people react differently — some may shout, some
may faint and others may be shocked into insensibility. 15

Also, appellant's failure to testify in her defense should not be taken against her. The Court preserves the rule that an accused has the
right to decline to testify at the trial without any inference of guilt drawn from his failure to be on the witness stand. 16 The
constitutional right to be presumed innocent still prevails.

This notwithstanding, the totality of the circumstantial evidence presented against appellant justifies her conviction of the crime of
Parricide.

Appellant claims that the circumstantial evidence proven during trial only shows that there was a possibility that appellant may have
conspired with Rolando, but nevertheless claims that it came short of proving her guilt beyond reasonable doubt. 17

Appellant further argues that the testimony of Oswaldo was in some parts hearsay and replete with inconsistencies. 18 Specifically,
appellant contends that the testimony of Oswaldo that "he overheard a conversation between Malibiran (Rolando) and Beverly
(appellant) that they will fetch a man in Bulacan that knows how to place a bomb in a vehicle" is hearsay.19 Likewise, in her Reply
Brief,20 appellant claims that the testimony of Janet is hearsay.

Contrary to the claim of appellant, the testimonies of Oswaldo and Janet are not covered by the hearsay rule.

The hearsay rule states that a witness may not testify as to what he merely learned from others either because he was told, or he read
or heard the same. This is derived from Section 36, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court, which requires that a witness can testify only to
those facts that he knows of or comes from his personal knowledge, that is, that are derived from his perception. Hearsay testimony
may not be received as proof of the truth of what he has learned. 21
The law, however, provides for specific exceptions to the hearsay rule. One is the doctrine of independently relevant statements,
where only the fact that such statements were made is relevant, and the truth or falsity thereof is immaterial. The hearsay rule does not
apply; hence, the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for
the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact. 22 The witness who
testifies thereto is competent because he heard the same, as this is a matter of fact derived from his own perception, and the purpose is
to prove either that the statement was made or the tenor thereof.23

In this case, Oswaldo's testimony that he overhead a conversation between Rolando and appellant that they would fetch a man in
Bulacan who knew how to place a bomb in a vehicle is admissible, if only to establish the fact that such statement was made and the
tenor thereof. Likewise, Janet may testify on matters not only uttered in her presence, since these may be considered as independently
relevant statements, but also personally conveyed to her by appellant and Rolando.

Appellant further argues that Oswaldo's testimony to the effect that he drove the L300 van of the Tan family and brought Rolando to
the parking lot where Reynaldo’s Honda Accord was parked, was refuted by defense witness Romulo, the security guard of the Tan
family. Romulo testified that the L300 van never left White Plains on the day of the incident. 24

While the defense may have presented Security Guard Romulo to refute the testimony of Oswaldo, it is settled that when credibility is
in issue, the Supreme Court generally defers to the findings of the trial court, considering that it was in a better position to decide the
question, having heard the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment during trial. 25 Thus, in the absence of any palpable
error, this Court defers to the trials court's impression and conclusion that, as between Oswaldo and Romulo, the former's testimony
deserved more weight and credence.1awphi1

There is nothing on record to convince the Court to depart from the findings of the RTC. On the contrary, the testimony of Janet as
corroborated by Oswaldo, though circumstantial, leaves no doubt that appellant had in fact conspired with Rolando in bringing about
the death of her husband Reynaldo. As a rule of ancient respectability now molded into tradition, circumstantial evidence suffices to
convict, only if the following requisites concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are
derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. 26

The case of the prosecution was primarily built around the strength of the testimonies of Janet and Oswaldo. The salient portions of
Janet's testimony are extensively quoted hereunder:

Q. Anything else significant that happened in the remaining of 1994, Ms. Pascual?

A. After they were married, they talked about what they're gonna do for Rene.

Q. Where did they discuss it?

A. Inside the car, Botong was asking Beverly how would he be able to get inside the car since he has no key and
Beverly said that she can do something about it and so it was in the last week of November 1994 of first week of
December 1994 when they shopped for so many things.

Q. Who is (sic) with him?

A. Rene, Beverly and her three kids. Rene asked her since Rene and kids would still shop, Rene asked her to brings the goods
to the car in the compartment.

Q. And then?

A. And after Beverly placed the things inside the compartment, she had with her the key, she proceeded to a key
duplicator in Virra Mall and had the key duplicated.

Q. When did she give the key to Malibiran, if you know?

A. That was already December, I cannot recall the exact date, sir.

Q. Why did Mr. Malibiran need the key?

A. Because they planned, since they cannot use the gun Butch said that they would use grenade instead because he had
a grenade in his house. But their only problem is how to get inside the car.

COURT:

Who is Butch?

A. Mr. Malibiran, your Honor.

COURT

Butch and Botong are one and the same person?

A. Yes, your Honor.

Q. Did they discuss how, where and when they would planted the grenade in the car of Rene?

A. I heard from them that they would do it during the baptismal of the child of Gloria who is the sister of Butch.

Q. And Butch is Botong?

A. Botong, sir.

Q. Do you know when that binyag when supposed to be held?

A. The baptismal be held on February 5, 1995, sir.

Q. Why did they choose that date of the binyag?

A. So that if a picture was taken during the baptism, there would be witnesses that they were in the baptism, they would not
be suspected that they have something to do with that.27

xxxx

Q. What day of the week was this?

A. Sunday, Ma'm.

Q. What kind of kind [sic] was duplicated?

A. The key in the new car of Rene the Honda Accord.

Court:

But in the first place, you were not there when it was duplicated? How you were [sic] able to know that it was indeed
duplicated?

A. Because after Beverly had duplicated the key, she told me that she was able to have the key duplicated and she told
me how she did it and she told me that she will give the key to Butch.

Q. Did she show you the duplicated key?

A. Ginanoon niya lang.

Q. What does it looked [sic] like?

A. Iyong mahaba na malaki. Hindi ko na inano basta susi, nag-iisa.

Q. On what occasion did she tell you about this?

A. None, I was just in White Plains.

Q. When was this?

A. That was December, 1994.

Q. What was their decision when they will execute the plan?

A. It will be during the baptismal of the child of Gloria because Butch is one of the sponsors. 28 (Emphasis Supplied)

In addition, Oswaldo testified on the occurrences on the day of the incident, in this wise:

Q: Why did you go to Greenhills?

A. I was told by Ate Beverly to follow them wherever they go.

Q. What time did she tell you to go there?

A. After lunch, sir.

Q. What vehicle did you use to follow her?

A. L300, sir.

Q. Upon whose instruction?

A. Ate Beverly, sir.

Q. Did you in fact follow her?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What time did they reach. the[W]hiteplains?

A. Almost 1 o'clock, sir.

Q. Incidentally, who was with Beverly?

A. Kuya Rene Tan, Beverly Tan, Renebie, Jag and JR.

Q. What car did they use?

A. Honda Accord.

Q. Color?

A. Red, sir.

Q. Who drived [sic]?

A. Kuya Rene, sir.

Q. What part of Greenhills did they go?

A. The parking lot infront [sic] of Unimart, sir.

Q. What did you do when they come [sic] to Greenhills?

A. When I found out they already parked and Kuya Rene got in I went straight to Katipunan.

Q. Why?

A. Because I was told by Ate to fetch Botong.

Q. Where in Katipunan?

A. In Caltex near Shakeys.

COURT

Who is Botong?

A. Rolando Malibiran, Your Honor.

Q. The accused in this case?

A. Yes, your Honor.29

xxxx

Q. You picked up Malibiran at Caltex on February 5, 1995?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. What time was that?

A. Around 2 o'clock, sir.

Q. Who if any was with him?

A. Two guys. One whom I saw in [sic] Bulacan and the one whom we sinakay at Hilltop.

Q. When did you go in [sic] Bulacan?

A. In June 1994, sir.

Q. With whom?

A. Botong, Beverly, Janet, I and two guys in Hilltop because that is the instruction of Beverly.

Q. Do you know the name of the two guys from Hilltop?

A. If given the chance I can recognize them but I do not know them by name.

Q. What did you do in Bulacan?

A. We went to the Island near the sea.

Q. What did you do at that Island?

A. They talked to a person.

Q. What if you know the date [sic] all about?

A. As far as I remember they talked about the plans about the killing of Kuya Rene. 30

xxxx

Q. Where did they ride on Feb. 5, 1995?

A. In Katipunan, sir.

Q. What did they ride?

A. L300 that I was driving, sir.

Q. Where if any did you go after picking them up?

A. From Caltex we proceeded to Greenhills.

Q. Why?

A. Because that is the instruction of Ate Beverly. Where they were, I will drop them there.

Q. Did you do that?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Where exactly did you drop them on?

A. In the place where Kuya Rene was parked.31

xxxx

COURT: x x x What happened while they were inside the vehicle while you were going back to the place as instructed by
Beverly?

A. After that I brought them where the car of Kuya Rene was parked, Your Honor. Before they alighted, Botong asked, dito
na ba?32

Atty. Rondain:

So you replied Opo, dyan po pumasok si Kuya Rene?

A. After I alighted they just go [sic] around.

Q. Where?
 A. In Greenhills, sir.

Q. Then, what happened?

A. After half an hour I saw Kuya Botong, the three of them. Then they stopped me and the three of them boarded the
vehicle.

Q. What happened?

A. After they boarded, the man from Bulacan said, ano pare, malinis na paggawa nito. Then, I was told by Botong to
bring them to Hilltop.33

Based on the foregoing, the testimonies of Janet and Oswaldo clearly link appellant to the planning of the crime. True, as intimated by
appellant, she may not have been at the scene of the crime at the time of the explosion;34 but then again, if she was, then she would
have suffered the same fate as Reynaldo. Moreover, the nature of the crime and the manner of its execution, i.e., via a booby trap, does
not demand the physical presence of the perpetrator at the very time of its commission. In fact, the very manner in which it was carried
out necessitated prior scheming and execution for it to succeed. Thus, appellant's absence from the actual scene of the crime does not
negate conspiracy with Rolando in plotting the death of her husband. A conspiracy exists even if not all the parties committed the
same act, but the participants performed specific acts that indicated unity of purpose in accomplishing a criminal design. 35 Moreover,
direct proof of previous agreement to commit an offense is not necessary to prove conspiracy -- conspiracy may be proven by
circumstantial evidence.36

The testimonies of Janet and Oswaldo established the following set of circumstances which, if taken collectively, show the guilt of
appellant: that appellant and Rolando conspired, planned and agreed to kill Reynaldo using a grenade; that appellant duplicated the
key to the red Honda Accord of Reynaldo so that Rolando could gain access to the car; that appellant thereafter gave the duplicate key
to Rolando; that on February 5, 1995, appellant told Oswaldo to follow the red Honda Accord of Reynaldo until the latter parked the
car; that appellant told Oswaldo to thereafter pick up Rolando at Katipunan and bring the latter to where Reynaldo parked his red
Honda Accord. Reynaldo died soon after due to injuries he sustained from an explosion caused by grenades planted in his car.

Another notable fact is that according to the expert opinion of Inspector Selverio Dollesin, Chief of the Bomb Disposal Unit of the
Eastern Police District, the perpetrator had information about the victim's movements. Dollesin also observed that the perpetrator
knew his intended victim, since the grenade was specifically placed in between the driver's seat and the front door. That the
perpetrator knew the victim's movements was further corroborated by the affidavits executed by the Tan children, Renevie 37 and Jag
Carlo38 , attesting that while they spent their Sundays with their father, this was the only time that they spent a Sunday in Greenhills.
Only someone who had close personal contact with Reynaldo would know his movements, where the car would be parked, and that he
was the one who usually drove the red Honda Accord, such that it was precisely positioned to ensure damage to the intended victim.

There is no doubt that, based on the testimony of Janet, it was Rolando who planted the grenades inside the car of Reynaldo, to wit:

Q. Where did you go?

A. When I was inside the Canter, Botong (Rolando) was asking me while the vehicle was moving slowly. He asked me what
happened in the funeral parlor.

Q. And what did you say?

A. I told him that Major Penalosa called me for an interview but I did not say anything.

Then were already in front of the V. Luna Hospital.

COURT

What Hospital?

A. V. Luna, your Honor, along Katipunan.

COURT

Luna in Katipunan?

A. V. Luna is going to Katipunan, your Honor. It was Labor Hospital, your Honor and not V. Luna. Then Botong told me
that on the day he placed the grenade, he was seeing a guard roving and so what he did since he was already
perspiring at that time he hurriedly tied the wire in the grenade.

Atty. Rondain:

Iqoute na lang natin.

COURT
 Dinali-dali niyang ibinuhol ang alambre. That's her term.39 (Emphasis Supplied)

What sealed appellant's fate was that, as observed by the RTC, there were already outstanding warrants of arrest against appellant and
Rolando as early as September 11, 1997; yet they evaded arrest and were only arrested on December 4, 1998. 40 It is well settled that
flight, when unexplained, is a circumstance from which an inference of guilt may be drawn. "The wicked flee, even when no man
pursueth; but the righteous are as bold as a lion." 41Appellant did not even proffer the slightest explanation for her flight.

All told, this Court is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant is guilty of the crime as charged. Moreover, considering the
manner in which appellant and Rolando planned and executed the crime, the RTC was correct in appreciating the aggravating
circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and use of explosives. Thus, appellant is guilty of the crime of Parricide as
provided in the Revised Penal Code, to wit:

Article 246. Parricide- Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. (Emphasis
Supplied)

Moreover, the Revised Penal Code provides for death as the proper penalty:

Article 63. Rules for the application of indivisible penalties.

xxxx

In all cases in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the following rules shall be observed in the
application thereof:

When in the commission of the deed there is present only one aggravating circumstance, the greater penalty shall be applied.

However, as observed by the CA, with the effectivity of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9346 entitled "An Act Prohibiting the Imposition of
Death Penalty in the Philippines" on June 24, 2006, the imposition of the penalty of death has been prohibited. Thus, the proper
penalty to be imposed on appellant as provided in Section 2, paragraph (a) of said law is reclusion perpetua.42 The applicability of
R.A. No. 9346 is undeniable in view of the principle in criminal law that favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa restrigenda. Penal laws
that are favorable to the accused are given retroactive effect. 43

In addition, appellant is not eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346, which states:

SECTION 3. Persons convicted with reclusion perpetua, or those whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua, by reason of
this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

Lastly, as to the award of damages, the RTC awarded the following amounts: (1) ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity for death, (2)
₱80,000.00 as actual damages, and (3) ₱50,000.00 as moral damages.1avvphi1

In the recent case of People v. Regalario,44 the Court stated:

While the new law prohibits the imposition of the death penalty, the penalty provided for by law for a heinous offense is still death
and the offense is still heinous. Consequently, the civil indemnity for the victim is still ₱75,000.00. x x x the said award is not
dependent on the actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the
death penalty attended the commission of the offense.

As to the award of moral and exemplary damages x x x. Moral damages are awarded despite the absence of proof of mental and
emotional suffering of the victim's heirs. As borne out by human experience, a violent death invariably and necessarily brings about
emotional pain and anguish on the part of the victim's family. If a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance, either
qualifying or generic, an award of exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil Code. This kind of damage is
intended to serve as deterrent to serious wrongdoings and as vindication of undue sufferings and wanton invasion of the rights of an
injured, or as a punishment for those guilty of outrageous conduct. However, consistent with recent jurisprudence on heinous crimes
where the imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion perpetua pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346, the award of moral
damages should be increased from ₱50,000.00 to ₱75,000.00 while the award of exemplary damages should be increased from
₱25,000.00 to ₱30,000.00.

Consistent therewith, the RTC's award should be modified: the civil indemnity should be increased to ₱75,000.00, and moral damages
to ₱75,000.00.

Moreover, although not awarded by the RTC and pursuant to Regalario, exemplary damages in the amount of ₱30,000.00 is likewise
warranted because of the presence of the aggravating circumstances of intent to kill, treachery, evident premeditation and the use of
explosives. The imposition of exemplary damages is also justified under Art. 2229 of the Civil Code in order to set an example for the
public good.45

However, the award of ₱80,000.00 by the RTC as actual damages is deleted for lack of competent evidence to support it. Only
substantiated and proven expenses, or those that appear to have been genuinely incurred in connection with the death, wake or burial
of the victim will be recognized by the court.46 In lieu thereof, appellant should pay temperate damages in the amount of ₱25,000.00,
said amount being awarded in homicide or murder cases when no evidence of burial and funeral expenses is presented in the trial
court,47 and in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence.48 Under Article 2224 of the Civil Code, temperate damages "may be awarded
when the Court finds that some pecuniary loss has been suffered but its amount cannot, from the nature of the case, be proved with
certainty."

Finally, Section 11, Rule 122 of the Rules of Court provides that:

An appeal taken by one or more of several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the
appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.

Since Rolando did not appeal the decision of the CA, only portions of this judgment that are favorable to Rolando may affect him. On
the other hand, portions of this judgment that are unfavorable to Rolando cannot apply to him. Thus, he cannot be made liable to pay
for exemplary damages, as the same were not awarded by the RTC. 49However, he benefits from this Court's finding that, instead of
actual damages, only temperate damages should be awarded to the heirs of the victim.

WHEREFORE, the Court of Appeals Decision dated November 13, 2006 and Resolution dated September 23, 2003, finding
appellant Beverly Tibo-Tan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Parricide and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION
PERPETUA are hereby AFFIRMED. Appellant is ineligible for parole and is further ordered to pay, jointly and severally with
Rolando Malibiran, the heirs of Reynaldo Tan the amounts of ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱75,000.00 as moral damages and
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages. In addition, appellant is solely liable to pay the heirs of Reynaldo Tan the amount of ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman Case Digest

Richard A. Cambe vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al./Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. Vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et
al./Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. Vs. Office of the Ombudsman, et al./Richard A. Cambe Vs. Office of the Ombudsman,
et al./John Raymund De Asis Vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et al./Ronald John Lim Vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et al./Janet
Lim Napoles Vs. Conchita Carpio Morales, et al./Mario L. Relampagos, et al. Vs. Sandiganbayan and People of the Philippines
G.R. Nos. 212014-15/G.R. Nos. 212427-28/G.R. Nos. 212694-95/G.R. Nos. 213477-78/G.R. Nos. 213532-33/G.R. Nos. 213536-
37/G.R. Nos. 218744-59. December 6, 2016

Facts
Before this Court are consolidated petitions filed by petitioners Senator Ramon "Bong" Revilla, Jr. (Sen. Revilla), Richard A. Cambe
(Cambe), Janet Lim Napoles (Napoles or Janet Napoles), John Raymund De Asis (De Asis), and Ronald John Lim (Lim), which
commonly assail the Joint Resolution dated March 28, 2014 and the Joint Order dated June 4, 2014 of the Office of the Ombudsman
(Ombudsman) in OMB-C-C-13-0316 and OMB-C-C-13-0395 finding probable cause to indict them, along with several others, for the
crimes of Plunder, defined and penalized under Section 2 in relation to Section 1 ( d) (1 ), (2), and ( 6) of Republic Act No. (RA)
7080, as amended (one [1] count) and/or of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 30195 (sixteen [16] counts).

Petitioners are all charged as co-conspirators for their respective participations in the illegal pillaging of public funds sourced from the
Priority Development Assistance Fund (PD.AF) of Sen. Revilla for the years 2006 to 2010, in the total amount of P517,000,000.00.

As alleged, the PDAF scheme commences with Napoles meeting with a legislator -in this case, Sen. Revilla -with the former giving an
offer to "acquire" his PDAF allocation in exchange for a "commission" or "kickback" amounting to a certain percentage of the PDAF.
Upon their agreement on the conditions of the PDAF acquisition, including the project for which the PDAF will be utilized, the
corresponding Implemeting Agencies (IA) tasked to implement the same, and the legislator's "commission" or "kickback" ranging
from 40-60% of either the project cost or the amount stated in the Special Allotment Release Order (SARO), the legislator would then
write a letter addressed to the Senate President for the immediate release of his PDAF, who in tum, will endorse such request to the
DBM for the release of the SARO. By this time, the initial advance portion of the "commission" would be remitted by Napoles to the
legislator. Upon release of the SARO, Napoles would then direct her staff -including whistleblowers Benhur Luy (Luy), Marina Sula
(Sula), and Merlina Suñas (Suñas) -to prepare PDAF documents containing, inter alia, the preferred JLN-controlled NGO that will be
used as a "conduit" for the implementation of the project, the project proposals of the identified NGO, and the endorsement letters to
be signed by the legislator and/or his staff, all for the approval of the legislator; and would remit the remaining portion or balance of
the "commission" of the legislator, which is usually delivered by her staff, Lim and De Asis.

Once the documents are approved, the same would be transmitted to the IA which would handle the preparation of the Memorandum
of Agreement (MOA) to be executed by the legislator's office, the IA, and the chosen NGO. Thereafter, the DBM would release the
Notice of Cash Allowance (NCA) to the IA concerned, the head/official of which, in tum, would expedite the transaction and release
of the corresponding check representing the PDAF disbursement, in exchange for a ten percent (10%) share in the project cost. Among
those tasked by Napoles to pick up the checks and deposit them to the bank accounts of the NGO concerned were Luy, Suñas, and De
Asis. Once the funds are in the account of the JLN-controlled NGO, Napoles would then call the bank to facilitate the withdrawal
thereof. Upon withdrawal of the said funds by Napoles's staff, the latter would bring the proceeds to the office of JLN Corporation for
accounting. Napoles would then decide how much will be left in the office and how much will be brought to her residence in Taguig
City. De Asis, Lim, Luy, and Suñas were the ones instructed to deliver the money to Napoles's residence. Finally, to liquidate the
disbursements, Napoles and her staff would manufacture fictitious lists of beneficiaries, liquidation reports, inspection reports, project
activity reports, and similar documents that would make it appear that the PDAF-funded projects were implemented when, in fact,
they were not since they were actually inexistent or, in other words, "ghost" projects. Under this modus operandi, Sen. Revilla, with
the help of petitioners, among others, allegedly funneled his PDAF amounting to around P517,000,000.00 to the JLN-controlled
NGOs and, in return, received "commissions" or "kickbacks" amounting to at least P224,512,500.00.
In his defense, Revilla filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 16, 2014, contending that: (a) his and Cambe's signatures in the
PDAF documents were forgeries; (b) the utilization of his PDAF had "always been regular and above-board."; (c) his involvement in
the release of his PDAF is limited; and (d) there is "no credible proof" to show that he committed said illegal acts and that conspiracy
exists between him and all the other persons involved in the PDAF scam.

Cambe, on the other hand, filed his Counter-Affidavit dated January 20, 2014 and Supplemental Counter-Affidavit dated March 12,
2014, maintaining that: (a) his signatures in the PDAF documents were all forgeries; and (b) he did not receive any money from Sen.
Revilla's PDAF nor connive with any of the alleged co-conspirators to acquire ill-gotten wealth.

In a Joint Resolution68 dated March 28, 2014 (March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution), the Ombudsman found probable cause to indict,
among others, petitioners Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim of one (1) count of Plunder, and all the petitioners (along
with several others), except Lim, of sixteen (16) counts of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019.

Thus, the Ombudsman held that probable cause exists against Sen. Revilla, Cambe, Napoles, De Asis, and Lim for Plunder,
considering that: (a) Sen. Revilla was a public officer at the time material to the charges; ( b) with the help of his co-accused, who are
public officers and private individuals, Sen. Revilla amassed, accumulated, or acquired HI-gotten wealth through their intricate modus
operandi as described above; and ( c) such ill-gotten wealth amounted to at least P224,512,500.00, way more than the threshold
amount of P50,000,000.00 required in the crime of Plunder..

Cambe seeks to annul and set aside the Ombudsman's March 14, 2014 Joint Order which denied his motion to suspend proceedings,
arguing that the COA's issuance of an Order of Execution is a condition precedent to the filing of the criminal complaints against him.

Sen. Revilla seeks to annul the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and the June 4, 2014 Joint Order of the Ombudsman finding probable
cause against him for the crimes charged. Among others, Sen. Revilla faults the Ombudsman for allegedly disregarding his defense of
forgery, and further contends that in the absence of other competent testimony, the Ombudsman cannot consider the whistle blowers'
testimonies who purportedly were his co-conspirators in the PDAF scam, pursuant to the res inter alias acta rule.

Napoles similarly seeks to nullify the Ombudsman's March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution and June 4, 2014 Joint Order finding probable
cause against her for Plunder and for violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019. Essentially, she argues that the complaints did not
establish the specific acts of the crimes she supposedly committed. She likewise contends that since she is not a public officer, she
cannot be subjected to prosecution by the Ombudsman before the Sandiganbayan. Napoles's

Issues:
1. Whether the COA's issuance of an Order of Execution is a condition precedent to the filing of the criminal
complaints.
2. Whether the Ombudsman's finding of probable cause against all petitioners are correct.

Rulings
1. No. The Court disagrees. The administrative aspect of the cases against Cambe and Sen. Revilla in relation to the COA's audit is
clearly separate and distinct from the criminal aspect covering the charges of Plunder and/or of violation of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019
against them. Hence, the incidents related to it should have no effect on the filing of the latter.

2. Yes, there is probable cause against the petitioners should therefore stand trial for the crimes they were charged.
Probable Cause against Revilla.
The finding of probable cause against Sen. Revilla is amply supported by the evidence on record. At the forefront are the PDAF
documents, consisting of the written endorsements signed by Sen. Revilla himself requesting the IAs to release his PDAF funds to the
JLN-controlled NGOs, as well as other documents that made possible the processing of his PDAF, e.g., the MOAs executed by the
legislator's office, the IA, and the chosen NGO. All these documents -even those not actually signed by Sen. Revilla -directly
implicate him for the crimes charged, as they were nonetheless, all issued under the authority of his Office as Senator of the Republic
of the Philippines. In Belgica v. Ochoa (Belgica), this Court observed that "the defining feature of all forms of Congressional Pork
Barrel would be the authority of legislators to participate in the post-enactment phases of project implementation. At its core,
legislators -may it be through project lists, prior consultations or program menus -have been consistently accorded post-enactment
authority to identify the projects they desire to be funded through various Congressional Pork Barrel allocations." It is through this
mechanism that individual legislators, such as Sen. Revilla, were able to practically dictate the entire expenditure of the PDAF
allocated to their offices throughout the years.

Anent Sen. Revilla's claim that his signatures in the documentary evidence presented were forged, it must be emphasized that "the
findings of the x x x prosecutor [on the issue of forgery) should be ventilated in a full-blown trial[.] [This] is highlighted by the
reality that the authenticity of a questioned signature cannot be determined solely upon its general characteristics, or its similarities or
dissimilarities with the genuine signature. The duty to determine the authenticity of a signature rests on the judge who must conduct an
independent examination of the signature itself in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity. Accordingly, Sen.
Revilla's evidence of forgery, including the findings of his purported handwriting experts, Rogelio G. Azores (Azores) and Forensic
Document Examiner Atty. Desiderio A. Pagui, (Pagui) cannot be readily credited at this stage of the proceedings.

It is significant to emphasize that the Ombudsman had thoroughly passed upon the veracity of Sen. Revilla's signatures on the PDAF
documents. As explicitly stated in the March 28, 2014 Joint Resolution: "[a]t all evei;its, the Special Panel members, after a prima
facie comparison with their naked eyes of the questioned signatures appearing in the PDAF documents and the original signatures of
[Sen.] Revilla and Cambe in their respective counter-affidavits, opine that both sets of signatures, which bear the same style and
flourish, were written by one and the same hands. Findings of fact by the Office of the Ombudsman are conclusive when supported by
substantial evidence, as in this case.
The testimonies of the whistleblowers -which the prosecution submitted before the Ombudsman -are, in fact, the most integral
evidence against Sen. Revilla, since they provide a detailed account on the inner workings of the PDAF scam to which Sen. Revilla
was directly involved. It should be pointed out that, of all the Senators, only the Offices ' of Sen. Revilla, Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile (Sen.
Enrile ), and Sen. Jinggoy: Estrada (Sen. Estrada) were explicitly implicated to have dealt with in the plunder of their PDAF. Also, it
is apparent that whistleblowers Suñas, Sula, and Luy had personal knowledge of the conspiracy since they were employees of JLN
Corporation -the epicenter of the entire PDAF operation -and in their respective capacities, were individually tasked by to prepare the
pertinent documents, liquidate the financial transactions, follow up the release of the NCAs with the DBM, and/or facilitate the
withdrawal of PDAF funds deposited in the NGOs' accounts.

In any event, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alias acta were to apply during preliminary investigation, the treatment of
the whistleblowers' statements as hearsay is bound by the exception on independently relevant statements. "Under the doctrine of
independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is relevant. The
hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such
a fact. Undoubtedly, the testimonies of the whistleblowers are independently relevant to prove the involvement of Sen. Revilla and his
co-accused in the present controversy, considering their respective participations in the entire PDAF scam.

Probable Cause against Cambe.

The same conclusion obtains with respect to the petition of Cambe in G.R. Nos. 212794-95 assailing the Ombudsman's finding of
probable cause against him. is no dispute that Ca:mbe was Sen. Revilla's trusted aide, being his Chief of Staff. By such authority, he
also exercised operational control over the affairs of Sen. Revilla's office, including the allocation of his PDAF. In fact, Cambe' s
signatures explicitly appear on several PDAF documents, such as the MOAs allowing the IAs to transfer Sen. Revilla's PDAF funds
allocated for certain projects to various JLN-controlled NGOs. Cambe was personally identified by the whistleblowers to have
received PDAF money for himself and for Sen. Revilla.

In simple terms, Cambe allegedly acted as a liaison between Sen. Revilla and Napoles. For the same reasons above-discussed, there
should be 'no valid objection against the appreciation of the PDAF documents and whistle blowers' testimonies as evidence to
establish probable cause against Cambe at this stage of the proceedings. He also has no right to be furnished copies of the counter-
affidavits .of his co-respondents.

Probable Cause against Napoles.

Records clearly show that Napoles, in all reasonable likelihood, played an integral role in the illegal utilization, diversion, and
disbursement of Sen. Revilla's PDAF. In fact, she was tagged as the mastermind of the PDAF scam.

Based on the evidence in support thereof such as the PDAF documents, whistleblowers' testimonies, the accounts of the IA officials,
and the COA report, as well as the field verifications of the FIO, Ombudsman, this Court is convinced that there lies probable cause
against Janet Napoles for the charge of Plunder as it has been prima facie established that she, in conspiracy with Sen. Revilla, Cambe,
and other personalities, was significantly involved in the afore-described modus operandi to obtain Sen. Revilla's PDAF amounting to
at least P50,000,000.00 in "kickbacks." In the same manner, there is probable cause against Napoles for violations of Section 3 (e) of
RA 3019, as it is ostensible that their conspiracy to,illegally divert PDAF Funds to "ghost" projects caused undue prejudice to the
government. That a private individual, such as Napoles, could not be charged for Plunder and violations of Section 3 ( e) of RA 3019
because the offenders in those crimes are public officers is a complete misconception. It has been long-settled that while the primary
offender in the aforesaid crimes are public officers, private individuals may also be held liable for the same if they are found to
have conspired with said officers in committing the same. This proceeds from the fundamental principle that in cases of conspiracy
the act of one is the act of all. In this case, since it appears that Napoles has acted in concert with public officers in the pillaging of
Sen. Revilla's PDAF, the Ombudsman correctly indicted her as a co-conspirator for the aforementioned crimes.

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of merit. The findings of probable cause against all petitioners are
hereby AFFIRMED and the Sandiganbayan, as trial court, is DIRECTED to commence/continue with the necessary proceedings in
these cases with deliberate dispatch.

Laws SIGN IN

[ G.R. No. 222730, November 07, 2016 ]

BUENAFLOR CAR SERVICES, INC., PETITIONER, VS. CEZAR DURUMPILI DAVID, JR., RESPONDENT.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari[1] are the Decision[2] dated November 3, 2015 and the Resolution[3] dated February 9,
2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 139652, which affirmed with modification the Resolutions dated November
28, 2014[4] and February 9, 2015[5] of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC No. 11-002727-14, finding
respondent Cezar Durumpili David, Jr. (respondent) to have been illegally dismissed, and holding petitioner Buenaflor Car Services,
Inc. (petitioner) solely liable for the monetary award.
 The Facts

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Respondent was employed as Service Manager by petitioner, doing business under the trade name "Pronto! Auto Services." In such
capacity, he was in charge of the overall day-to-day operations of petitioner, including the authority to sign checks, check vouchers,
and purchase orders.[6]

In the course of its business operations, petitioner implemented a company policy with respect to the purchase and delivery of
automotive parts and products. The process begins with the preparation of a purchase order by the Purchasing Officer, Sonny D. De
Guzman (De Guzman), which is thereafter, submitted to respondent for his review and approval. Once approved and signed by
respondent and De Guzman, the duplicate copy of the said order is given to petitioner's supplier who would deliver the goods/supplies.
De Guzman was tasked to receive such goods and thereafter, submit a copy of the purchase order to petitioner's Accounting Assistant,
Marilyn A. Del Rosario (Del Rosario), who, in turn, prepares the request for payment to be reviewed by her immediate
supervisor,[7] Finance Manager and Chief Finance Officer Ruby Anne B. Vasay (Vasay). Once approved, the check voucher and
corresponding check are prepared to be signed by any of the following officers: respondent, Vasay, or Vice President for Operations
Oliver S. Buenaflor (Buenaflor).[8] It was company policy that all checks should be issued in the name of the specific supplier and not
in "cash," and that the said checks are to be picked up from Del Rosario at the company's office in Muntinlupa City. [9]

On August 8, 2013, Chief Finance Officer Cristina S. David (David) of petitioner's affiliate company, Diamond IGB, Inc., received a
call from the branch manager of ChinaBank, SM City Bicutan Branch, informing her that the latter had cleared several checks issued
by petitioner bearing the words "OR CASH" indicated after the payee's name. Alarmed, David requested for petitioner's Statement of
Account with scanned copies of the cleared checks bearing the words "OR CASH" after the payee's name. The matter was then
immediately brought to petitioner's attention through its President, Exequiel T. Lampa (Lampa), and an investigation was
conducted.[10]

On August 22, 2013, Lampa and petitioner's Human Resource Manager, Helen Lee (Lee), confronted Del Rosario on the questioned
checks. Del Rosario readily confessed that upon respondent's instruction, she inserted the words "OR CASH" after the name of the
payees when the same had been signed by all the authorized signatories. She also implicated De Guzman, who was under respondent's
direct supervision, for preparing spurious purchase orders that were used as basis in issuing the subject checks, as well as petitioner's
messenger/driver, Jayson G. Caranto (Caranto), who was directed to encash some of the checks, with both persons also gaining from
the scheme.[11] Her confession was put into writing in two (2) separate letters both of even date (extrajudicial confession). [12]

As a result, respondent, together with Del Rosario, De Guzman, and Caranto, were placed under preventive suspension [13] for a period
of thirty (30) days, and directed to submit their respective written explanations. The ensuing investigation revealed that there were
twenty-seven (27) checks with the words "OR CASH" inserted after the payee's name, all signed by respondent and either Vasay or
Buenaflor, in the total amount of P1,021,561.72. [14]

For his part,[15] respondent vehemently denied the charges against him. He claimed that he has no control over the company's finance
and billing operations, nor the authority to instruct Del Rosario to make any check alterations, which changes, if any, must be made
known to Vasay or Buenaflor.

On September 20, 2013, respondent and his co-workers were served their respective notices of termination[16] after having been found
guilty of violating Items B (2), (3) and/or G (3) of the company's Code of Conduct and Behavior, particularly, serious misconduct and
willful breach of trust. Aggrieved, respondent, De Guzman, and Caranto filed a complaint [17] for illegal dismissal with prayer for
reinstatement and payment of damages and attorney's fees against petitioner, Diamond IGB, Inc., and one Isagani Buenaflor before the
NLRC, docketed as NLRC RAB No. NCR-10-13915-13.

In the meantime, Lee, on behalf of petitioner, filed a criminal complaint [18] for twenty-seven (27) counts of Qualified Theft through
Falsification of Commercial Documents against respondent, De Guzman, Caranto, and Del Rosario, before the Office of the
Muntinlupa City Prosecutor, alleging that the said employees conspired with one another in devising the afore-described scheme. In
support thereof, petitioner submitted the affidavits of Buenaflor [19] and Vasay,[20] which stated that at the time they signed the
questioned checks, the same did not bear the words "OR CASH," and that they did not authorize its insertion after the payee's name.
While the City Prosecutor initially found probable cause only against Del Rosario in a Resolution[21] dated November 25, 2014, the
same was reconsidered[22] and all the four (4) employees were indicted in an Amended Information[23] filed before the Regional Trial
Court of Muntinlupa City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 14-1065.

The LA Ruling

In a Decision dated September 29, 2014, the Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that respondent, De Guzman, and Caranto were illegally
dismissed, and consequently, awarded backwages, separation pay and attorney's fees. [24] The LA observed that petitioner failed to
establish the existence of conspiracy among respondent, De Guzman, Caranto, and Del Rosario in altering the checks and that the
latter's extrajudicial confession was informally made and not supported by evidence. [25]

Dissatisfied, petitioner appealed to the NLRC.

 The NLRC Ruling

In a Resolution[26] dated November 28, 2014, the NLRC affirmed with modification the LA's Decision, finding De Guzman and
Caranto to have been dismissed for cause, but sustained the illegality of respondent's termination from work.

In so ruling, the NLRC held that since De Guzman prepared the purchase orders that were the basis for the issuance of the questioned
checks, it could not be discounted that the latter may have participated in the scheme, benefited therefrom, or had knowledge thereof.
Similarly, it did not give credence to Caranto's bare denial of the illegal scheme, noting that he still encashed the questioned checks
upon the instruction of Del Rosario despite knowledge of the company's policy on the matter. On the other hand, the NLRC found Del
Rosario's extrajudicial confession against respondent insufficient, holding that the records failed to show that the latter had a hand in
the preparation and encashment of the checks; hence, his dismissal was without cause and therefore, illegal.[27]

Unperturbed, petitioner filed a motion for partial reconsideration, [28] which the NLRC denied in a Resolution[29] dated February 9,
2015, prompting the former to elevate the matter to the CA via a petition for certiorari.[30]

The CA Ruling

In a Decision[31] dated November 3, 2015, the CA found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in holding that
respondent was illegally dismissed. It ruled that Del Rosario's extrajudicial confession only bound her as the confessant but constitutes
hearsay with respect to respondent and the other co-accused under the res inter alios acta rule. Moreover, while respondent was a
signatory to the checks in question, the CA noted that at the time these checks were signed, the words "OR CASH" were not yet
written thereon. As such, the CA held that no substantial evidence existed to establish that respondent had breached the trust reposed
in him.

However, the CA absolved petitioner's corporate officer, Isagani Buenaflor, from payment of the monetary awards for failure to show
any malicious act on his part, stating the general rule that obligations incurred by the corporation, acting thru its directors, officers, and
employees, are its sole liabilities. In the same vein, Diamond IGB, Inc. was also absolved from liability, considering that, as a
subsidiary, it had a separate and distinct juridical personality from petitioner. [32]

Petitioner moved for partial reconsideration,[33] which the CA denied in a Resolution[34] dated February 9, 2016; hence, the instant
petition.

The Issue Before the Court

The essential issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA committed reversible error in upholding the NLRC's ruling that
respondent was illegally dismissed.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Fundamental is the rule that an employee can be dismissed from employment only for a valid cause. The burden of proof rests on the
employer to prove that the dismissal was valid, failing in which, the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.[35]

Article 297 of the Labor Code, as renumbered, [36] enumerates the just causes for termination of an employment, to wit:

ART. 297. Termination by Employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes:

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Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in
(a)
connection with his work;

(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative;

Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family
(d)
or his duly authorized representatives; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. (Emphases supplied)

In the case at bar, respondent's termination was grounded on his violation of petitioner's Code of Conduct and Behavior, which was
supposedly tantamount to (a) serious misconduct and/or (b) willful breach of the trust reposed in him by his employer.

Misconduct is defined as an improper or wrong conduct. It is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, a
forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. [37] For
serious misconduct to be a just cause for dismissal, the concurrence of the following elements is required: (a) the misconduct must be
serious; (b) it must relate to the performance of the employee's duties showing that the employee has become unfit to continue
working for the employer; and (c) it must have been performed with wrongful intent. [38]

On the other hand, for loss of trust to be a ground for dismissal, the employee must be holding a position of trust and confidence, and
there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence. [39] While loss of trust and confidence should be genuine, it does
not require proof beyond reasonable doubt, it being sufficient that there is some basis for the misconduct and that the nature of
the employee's participation therein rendered him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.[40]

Petitioner's claims of serious misconduct and/or willful breach of trust against respondent was hinged on his alleged directive to
petitioner's Accounting Assistant, Del Rosario, to insert the word "OR CASH" in the checks payable to petitioner's supplier/s after the
same had been sigued by the authorized officers contrary to company policy. Accordingly, respondent was accused of conspiring with
his co-employees in the irregular issuance of twenty-seven (27) checks which supposedly resulted in the defraudation of the company
in the total amount of P1,021,561.72.[41]

While there is no denying that respondent holds a position of trust as he was charged with the overall day-to-day operations of
petitioner, and as such, is authorized to sign checks, check vouchers, and purchase orders, he argues, in defense, that he had no control
over the company's finance and billing operations, and hence, should not be held liable. Moreover, he asserts that he had no power to
instruct Del Rosario to make any check alterations, which changes, if any, must be made known to Vasay or Buenaflor.

Although respondent's statements may be true, the Court, nonetheless, observes that it is highly unlikely that respondent did not have
any participation in the above-mentioned scheme to defraud petitioner. It is crucial to point out that the questioned checks would not
have been issued if there weren't any spurious purchase orders. As per company policy, the procurement process of petitioner begins
with the preparation of purchase orders by the Purchasing Officer, De Guzman. These purchase orders have to be approved by
respondent himself before the delivery and payment process can even commence. It is only after the issuance of the approved
purchase orders that petitioner's suppliers are directed to deliver the ordered goods/supplies, and from there, requests for payment and
the issuance of checks (through Del Rosario) would be made. Thus, being the approving authority of these spurious purchase orders,
respondent cannot disclaim any culpability in the resultant issuance of the questioned checks. Clearly, without the approved purchase
orders, there would be no delivery of goods/supplies to petitioner, and consequently, the payment procedure would not even begin.
These purchase orders were, in fact, missing from the records, and respondent, who had the primary authority for their approval, did
not, in any manner, account for them.

Notably, the fact that respondent signed the checks prior to their alterations does not discount his participation. To recall, the checks
prepared by Del Rosario were first reviewed by her immediate supervisor, Finance Manager and Chief Finance Officer, Vasay, and
once approved, the check vouchers and corresponding checks were signed by respondent, followed by either Vasay, or Vice President
for Operations Buenaflor. To safeguard itself against fraud, the company implemented the policy that all checks to its suppliers should
be issued in their name and not in "cash." Thus, if the checks would be altered prior to the signing of all these corporate officers, then
they would obviously not pass petitioner's protocol. It is therefore reasonable to conclude that the alterations were calculated to be
made after all the required signatures were obtained; otherwise, the scheme would not come into fruition.

Respondent was directly implicated in the controversy through the extrajudicial confession of his co-employee, Del Rosario, who had
admitted to be the author of the checks' alterations, although mentioned that she did so only upon respondent's imprimatur. The
NLRC, as affirmed by the CA, however, deemed the same to be inadmissible in evidence on account of the res inter alios acta rule,
which, as per Section 30,[42] Rule 130 of the Rules of Court, provides that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act,
declaration, or omission of another. Consequently, an extrajudicial confession is binding only on the confessant and is not admissible
against his or her co-accused because it is considered as hearsay against them.[43]

However, the NLRC should not have bound itself by the technical rules of procedure as it is allowed to be liberal in the application of
its rules in deciding labor cases.[44] The NLRC Rules of Procedure state that "[t]he rules of procedure and evidence prevailing in courts
of law and equity shall not be controlling and the Commission shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each
case speedily and objectively, without regard to technicalities of law or procedure x x x." [45]

In any case, even if it is assumed that the rule on res inter alios acta were to apply in this illegal dismissal case, the treatment of the
extrajudicial confession as hearsay is bound by the exception on independently relevant statements. "Under the doctrine of
independently relevant statements, regardless of their truth or falsity, the fact that such statements have been made is relevant. The
hearsay rule does not apply, and the statements are admissible as evidence. Evidence as to the making of such statement is not
secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a fact in issue or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such
a fact."[46] Verily, Del Rosario's extrajudicial confession is independently relevant to prove the participation of respondent in the
instant controversy considering his vital role in petitioner's procurement process. The fact that such statement was made by Del
Rosario, who was the actual author of the alterations, should have been given consideration by the NLRC as it is directly, if not
circumstantially, relevant to the issue at hand.

Case law states that "labor suits require only substantial evidence to prove the validity of the dismissal." [47] Based on the foregoing, the
Court is convinced that enough substantial evidence exist to support petitioner's claim that respondent was involved in the afore-
discussed scheme to defraud the company, and hence, guilty of serious misconduct and/or willful breach of trust which are just causes
for his termination. Substantial evidence is defined as such amount of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion,[48] which evidentiary threshold petitioner successfully hurdled in this case. As such, the NLRC
gravely abused its discretion in holding that respondent was illegally dismissed. Perforce, the reversal of the CA's decision and the
granting of the instant petition are in order. Respondent is hereby declared to be validly dismissed and thus, is not entitled to
backwages, separation pay, as well as attorney's fees.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated November 3, 2015 and the Resolution dated February 9, 2016, of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 139652 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

ADELA G. RAYMUNDO, EDGARDO R. RAYMUNDO, G.R. No. 171036

LOURDES R. RAYMUNDO, TERESITA N. RAYMUNDO,
EVELYN R. SANTOS, ZENAIDA N. RAYMUNDO, LUIS N.
RAYMUNDO, JR. and LUCITA R. DELOS REYES, Present:

Petitioners,
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,

CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,

VELASCO, JR., and

BRION, JJ.

- versus -

ERNESTO LUNARIA, ROSALINDA RAMOS and HELEN Promulgated:

MENDOZA,

Respondents.
October 17, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review are the Court of Appeals Decision[1] dated October 10, 2005 and the Resolution[2] dated January 10,
2006 in CA-G.R. CV No. 75593.

The facts in this case are as follows:

Sometime in May 1996, petitioners approached respondent Lunaria to help them find a buyer for their property situated at Marilao, Bulacan
with an area of 12,126 square meters for the amount of P60,630,000. Respondent Lunaria was promised a 5% agents commission in the
event that he finds a buyer. After respondents found a buyer, Cecilio Hipolito, an Exclusive Authority to Sell[3] was executed embodying the
agreement made by the parties. After the corresponding Deed of Absolute Sale of Real Property[4] was registered in the Registry of Deeds, a
copy thereof was given to the Far East Bank and Trust Co., which was then holding in escrow the amount of P50,000,000 to be disbursed or
paid against the total consideration or price of the property.

On February 14, 1997, Ceferino G. Raymundo, one of the co-owners, advised respondents to go to the bank to receive the amount
of P1,196,000 as partial payment of their total commission. Also, respondents were instructed to return after seven days to get the
balance of the commission due them.

On February 21, 1997, respondents returned to the bank. However, the check covering the balance of their commission was
already given by the bank manager to Lourdes R. Raymundo, the representative of the petitioners. Respondents tried to get the check
from the petitioners, however, they were told that there is nothing more due them by way of commission as they have already divided
and distributed the balance of the commissions among their nephews and nieces.

For their part, petitioners counter that there was a subsequent verbal agreement entered into by the parties after the execution of the
written agreement. Said verbal agreement provides that the 5% agents commission shall be divided as follows: 2/5 for the agents, 2/5 for
Lourdes Raymundo, and 1/5 for the buyer, Hipolito. The share given to Lourdes Raymundo shall be in consideration for the help she would
extend in the processing of documents of sale of the property, the payment of the capital gains tax to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and in
securing an order from the court. The 1/5 commission given to Hipolito, on the other hand, will be used by him for the payment of realty
taxes.

Hence, for failure of the respondents to receive the balance of their agents commission, they filed an action for the collection of a sum
of money before the Regional Trial Courtof Valenzuela City, Branch 172. On January 22, 2002, the trial court rendered a
Decision[5] in favor of the respondents. The dispositive portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1) Ordering the defendants, jointly and severally, to pay the plaintiffs the amount of P1,834,900.00, representing the
unpaid commission, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the filing of this case until fully paid;

2) Ordering the defendants to, jointly and severally, pay the plaintiffs the amount of P200,000.00 as moral damages
and the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages; and

3) Ordering the defendants [to], jointly and severally, pay the plaintiffs the amount of P150,000.00 as attorneys fees,
plus the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.[6]

Aggrieved, petitioners appealed. In a Decision dated October 10, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
with the modification that the amount of moral and exemplary damages awarded to respondents shall be reduced. The dispositive
portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision dated January 22, 2002 is affirmed, subject to the modification that
the award of moral damages is reduced to P50,000.00 and exemplary damages to P25,000.00.

SO ORDERED.[7]

On October 28, 2005, petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration. [8] However, it was denied in a Resolution dated January
10, 2006. Hence, the instant petition raising the following issues:

I.

THE HONORABLE COURT SERIOUSLY ERRED IN APPLYING THE PAROLE EVIDENCE RULE IN THIS
CASE (DECISION, PAGE 7, PARAGRAPH 1). THIS PRINCIPLE HAS NO APPLICATION TO THE FACTS OF
THE INSTANT CASE.

II.

FURTHER, IT ERRED IN REQUIRING, ALBEIT IMPLICITLY, THE PETITIONERS TO ESTABLISH THE

VERBAL AGREEMENT MODIFYING THE EARLIER WRITTEN AGREEMENT (THE EXCLUSIVE
AUTHORITY TO SELL) BY MORE THAN A PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (DECISION, PAGE 8).
THIS IS PLAINLY CONTRARY TO LAW THAT MERELY REQUIRES PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE
IN CIVIL CASES.

III.

FINALLY, EVEN CONCEDING FOR THE SAKE OF ARGUMENT THAT PETITIONERS STILL OWE THE
RESPONDENTS THE BALANCE OF THEIR COMMISSION, THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN
RULING THE PETITIONERS ARE EACH JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY [LIABLE] FOR THE PAYMENT OF
THE ENTIRE BROKERS FEES. THIS RULING HAS NO LEGAL BASIS AND IS CONTRARY TO ART. 1207
OF THE NEW CIVIL CODE.[9]

Plainly stated, the issues for resolution are: Did the Court of Appeals err (1) in applying the parol evidence rule; (2) in
requiring petitioners to establish their case by more than a preponderance of evidence; and (3) in holding petitioners jointly and
severally liable for the payment of the entire brokers fees?
 Anent the first issue, petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred in applying the parol evidence rule to the facts of the
case because the verbal agreement was entered into subsequent to the written agreement. Further, they aver that there is no rule that
requires an agreement modifying an earlier agreement to be in the same form as the earlier agreement in order for such modification or
amendment to be valid.

Conversely, respondents argue that the Court of Appeals did not apply the parol evidence rule in this case. Although the
appellate court stated and emphasized the general legal principle and rule on parol evidence, it did not apply the parol evidence rule
with regard to the evidence adduced by the petitioners.

We rule for the respondents. To begin with, we agree with petitioners claim that the parol evidence rule does not apply to the
facts of this case. First, the parol evidence rule forbids any addition to or contradiction of the terms of a written instrument by
testimony or other evidence purporting to show that, at or before the execution of the parties written agreement, other or different
terms were agreed upon by the parties, varying the purport of the written contract. [10] Notably, the claimed verbal agreement was
agreed upon not prior to but subsequent to the written agreement. Second, the validity of the written agreement is not the matter which
is being put in issue here. What is questioned is the validity of the claim that a subsequent verbal agreement was agreed upon by the
parties after the execution of the written agreement which substantially modified their earlier written agreement.

Nonetheless, even if we apply the parol evidence rule in this case, the evidence presented by the petitioners fell short in
proving that a subsequent verbal agreement was in fact entered into by the parties. We subscribe to the findings of both the trial court
and the appellate court that the evidence presented by petitioners did not establish the existence of the alleged subsequent verbal
agreement. As pointed out by the trial court:

Note that no written evidence was presented by the defendants to show that the plaintiffs [herein
respondents] agreed to the above-sharing of the commission. The fact is that the plaintiffs are denying having ever
entered into such sharing agreement. For if the plaintiffs as sales agents indeed agreed to share the commission they
are entitled to receive by virtue of the Exclusive Authority to Sell with Lourdes G. Raymundo and Hipolito, it passes
understanding why no written agreement to that effect was ever made. The absence of such written agreement is
mute but telling testimony that no such sharing arrangement was ever made. [11]

As to the second issue, petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in requiring them to prove the existence of the
subsequent verbal agreement by more than a mere preponderance of evidence since no rule of evidence requires them to do so. In
support of this allegation, petitioners presented petitioner Lourdes Raymundo who testified that she was given 2/5 share of the
commission pursuant to the verbal sharing scheme because she took care of the payment of the capital gains tax, the preparation of the
documents of sale and of securing an authority from the court to sell the property.

For their part, respondents counter that the appellate court did not require petitioners to prove the existence of the subsequent
oral agreement by more than a mere preponderance of evidence. What the appellate court said is that the petitioners failed to prove
and establish the alleged subsequent verbal agreement even by mere preponderance of evidence.

Petitioners abovecited allegation has no merit. By preponderance of evidence is meant that the evidence as a whole adduced
by one side is superior to that of the other.[12]It refers to the weight, credit and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is
usually considered to be synonymous with the term greater weight of evidence or greater weight of the credible evidence. It is
evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto. [13]

Both the appellate court and trial court ruled that the evidence presented by the petitioners is not sufficient to support their
allegation that a subsequent verbal agreement was entered into by the parties. In fact, both courts correctly observed that if Lourdes
Raymundo was in reality offered the 2/5 share of the agents commission for the purpose of assisting respondent Lunaria in the
documentation requirement, then why did the petitioners not present any written court order on her authority, tax receipt or sales
document to support her self-serving testimony? Moreover, even the worksheet allegedly reflecting the commission sharing was
unilaterally prepared by petitioner Lourdes Raymundo without any showing that respondents participated in the preparation thereof or
gave their assent thereto. Even the alleged payment of 1/5 of the commission to the buyer to be used in the payment of the realty taxes
cannot be given credence since the payment of realty taxes is the obligation of the owners, and not the buyer. Lastly, if the said
sharing agreement was entered into pursuant to the wishes of the buyer, then he should have been presented as witness to corroborate
the claim of the petitioners. However, he was not.

As to the third issue, petitioners contend that the appellate court erred in holding that the petitioners were each jointly and
severally liable for the payment of the brokers fees. They contend that the Civil Code provides that unless the parties have expressly
agreed to be jointly and severally liable for the entire brokers fees, each of the petitioners should only be held liable to the extent of
their pro-indiviso share in the property sold.

For their part, respondents argue that the appellate court did not err in affirming the joint and several liability of the
petitioners. They aver that if there was error on the part of the trial court, it was not raised or assigned as error by petitioners in their
appeal. It was also not included in the Statement of Issues in their brief which they submitted for resolution by the Court of Appeals.
In fact, the same was never mentioned, much less questioned, by petitioners in their brief.

On this score, we agree with respondents. The general rule is that once an issue has been adjudicated in a valid final judgment of a
competent court, it can no longer be controverted anew and should be finally laid to rest.[14] In this case, petitioners failed to address the
issue on their solidary liability when they appealed to the Court of Appeals. They are now estopped to question that ruling. As to them,
the issue on their liability is already valid and binding.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Decision dated October 10, 2005 and the Resolution
dated January 10, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 75593 are AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS SENATOR ESTRADA v. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN G.R. Nos. 212140-41, 21 January 2015
Quantum of proof necessary in preliminary investigations Prof. Ramon S. Esguerra
OCTOBER 2, 2017

Facts:

Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman served on Sen. Estrada two (2) criminal complaints for plunder,
among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-affidavits between 9 December
2013 and 14 March 2014. On 20 March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of
the Other Respondents, Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the “Request”). Sen. Estrada’s request was made “[p]ursuant
to the right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’ (Section
3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman).” The Ombudsman denied Sen. Estrada’s Request, which is not the subject of the present certiorari
case.

Issue: What is the quantum of evidence necessary during preliminary investigation?

Held:

First, there is no law or rule which requires the Ombudsman to furnish a respondent with copies of the counter-affidavits of his co-
respondents. Sections 3 and 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as well as Rule II of Administrative Order No. 7,
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman do not provide for the relief sought by Sen. Estrada in his Request.

Second, it should be underscored that the conduct of a preliminary investigation is only for the determination of probable cause, and
“probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be determined in a summary manner. A preliminary investigation is not
a part of the trial and it is only in a trial where an accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and
cross-examine his accusers to establish his innocence.” Thus, the rights of a respondent in a preliminary investigation are limited to
those granted by procedural law.

A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is sufficient ground to
engender a well-founded belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is
probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in preliminary investigation is such
evidence sufficient to “engender a well-founded belief” as to the fact of the commission of a crime and the respondent’s probable guilt
thereof. A preliminary investigation is not the occasion for the full and exhaustive display of the parties’ evidence; it is for the
presentation of such evidence only as may engender a well-grounded belief that an offense has been committed and that the accused is
probably guilty thereof. We are in accord with the state prosecutor’s findings in the case at bar that there exists prima facie evidence of
petitioner’s involvement in the commission of the crime, it being sufficiently supported by the evidence presented and the facts
obtaining therein.

Third, the technical rules on evidence are not binding on the fiscal who has jurisdiction and control over the conduct of a preliminary
investigation. If by its very nature a preliminary investigation could be waived by the accused, we find no compelling justification for
a strict application of the evidentiary rules.

Fourth, the quantum of evidence in preliminary investigations is not akin to those in administrative proceedings as laid down in the
landmark doctrine of Ang Tibay. The quantum of evidence needed in Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, is greater than the evidence
needed in a preliminary investigation to establish probable cause, or to establish the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant
the prosecution of a case. Ang Tibay refers to “substantial evidence,” while the establishment of probable cause needs “only more than
‘bare suspicion,’ or ‘less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction’.” In the United States, from where we borrowed the
concept of probable cause, the prevailing definition of probable cause is this:

In dealing with probable cause, however, as the very name implies, we deal with probabilities. These are not technical; they are the
factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act. The standard of
proof is accordingly correlative to what must be proved.

Thus, probable cause can be established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay
evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation because such investigation is merely preliminary,
and does not finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties. However, in administrative cases, where rights and obligations are
finally adjudicated, what is required is “substantial evidence” which cannot rest entirely or even partially on hearsay evidence.
Substantial basis is not the same as substantial evidence because substantial evidence excludes hearsay evidence while substantial
basis can include hearsay evidence. To require the application of Ang Tibay, as amplified in GSIS, in preliminary investigations will
change the quantum of evidence required in determining probable cause from evidence of likelihood or probability of guilt to
substantial evidence of guilt.

G.R. No. 183830 October 19, 2011

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
DELFIN CALISO, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

The decisive question that seeks an answer is whether the identification of the perpetrator of the crime by an eyewitness who did not
get a look at the face of the perpetrator was reliable and positive enough to support the conviction of appellant Delfin Caliso (Caliso).

Caliso was arraigned and tried for rape with homicide, but the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 21, in Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte
found him guilty of murder for the killing of AAA, 1 a mentally-retarded 16-year old girl, and sentenced him to death in its decision
dated August 19, 2002.2 The appeal of the conviction was brought automatically to the Court. On June 28, 2005, 3 the Court transferred
the records to the Court of Appeals (CA) for intermediate review pursuant to the ruling in People v. Mateo. 4 On October 26, 2007,5 the
CA, although affirming the conviction, reduced the penalty to reclusion perpetua and modified the civil awards. Now, Caliso is before
us in a final bid to overturn his conviction.

Antecedents

The information dated August 5, 1997 charged Caliso with rape with homicide perpetrated in the following manner:

That on or about the 5th day of June, 1997, at Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge upon one AAA, who is a minor of 16 years old and a mentally retarded girl, against her will and
consent; that on the occasion of said rape and in furtherance of the accused’s criminal designs, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously, with intent to kill, and taking advantage of superior strength, attack, assault and use personal violence upon said AAA
by mauling her, pulling her towards a muddy water and submerging her underneath, which caused the death of said AAA soon
thereafter.

CONTRARY to and in VIOLATION of Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to R.A. 7659, otherwise known as the
"Heinous Crimes Law".6

At his arraignment on November 12, 1997,7 Caliso pleaded not guilty to the charge.

The records show that AAA died on June 5, 1997 at around 11:00 am in the river located in Barangay Tiacongan, Kapatagan, Lanao
Del Norte; that the immediate cause of her death was asphyxia, secondary to drowning due to smothering; that the lone eyewitness,
34-year old Soledad Amegable (Amegable), had been clearing her farm when she heard the anguished cries of a girl pleading for
mercy: Please stop noy, it is painful noy!;8 that the cries came from an area with lush bamboo growth that made it difficult for
Amegable to see what was going on; that Amegable subsequently heard sounds of beating and mauling that soon ended the girl’s
cries; that Amegable then proceeded to get a better glimpse of what was happening, hiding behind a cluster of banana trees in order
not to be seen, and from there she saw a man wearing gray short pants bearing the number "11" mark, who dragged a girl’s limp body
into the river, where he submerged the girl into the knee-high muddy water and stood over her body; that he later lifted the limp body
and tossed it to deeper water; that he next jumped into the other side of the river; that in that whole time, Amegable could not have a
look at his face because he always had his back turned towards her;9 that she nonetheless insisted that the man was Caliso, whose
physical features she was familiar with due to having seen him pass by their barangay several times prior to the incident; 10 that after
the man fled the crime scene, Amegable went straight to her house and told her husband what she had witnessed; and that her husband
instantly reported the incident to the barangay chairman.

It appears that one SPO3 Romulo R. Pancipanci declared in an affidavit 11 that upon his station receiving the incident report on AAA’s
death at about 12:45 pm of June 5, 1997, he and two other officers proceeded to the crime scene to investigate; that he interviewed
Amegable who identified the killer by his physical features and clothing (short pants); that based on such information, he traced Caliso
as AAA’s killer; and that Caliso gave an extrajudicial admission of the killing of AAA. However, the declarations in the affidavit
remained worthless because the Prosecution did not present SPO3 Pancipanci as its witness.

Leo Bering, the barangay chairman of San Vicente, Kapatagan, Lanao Del Norte, attested that on the occasion of Caliso’s arrest and
his custodial interrogation, he heard Caliso admit to the investigating police officer the ownership of the short pants recovered from
the crime scene; that the admission was the reason why SPO3 Pancipanci arrested Caliso from among the curious onlookers that had
gathered in the area; that Amegable, who saw SPO3 Pancipanci’s arrest of Caliso at the crime scene, surmised that Caliso had gone
home and returned to the crime scene thereafter.12
Municipal Health Officer Dr. Joseph G.B. Fuentecilla conducted the post-mortem examination on the body of AAA on June 6, 1997,
and found the following injuries, to wit:

EXTERNAL FINDINGS:

1. The dead body was generally pale wearing a heavily soiled old sleeveless shirt and garter skirts.

2. The body was wet and heavily soiled with mud both nostrils and mouth was filled with mud.

3. The skin of hands and feet is bleached and corrugated in appearance.

4. 2 cm. linear lacerated wound on the left cheek (sic).

5. Multiple small (sic) reddish contusions on anterior neck area.

6. Circular hematoma formation 3 inches in diameter epigastric area of abdomen.

7. Four erythematus linear abrasion of the left cheek (sic).

8. Presence of a 6x8 inches bulge on the back just below the inferior angle of both scapula extending downwards.

9. The body was wearing an improperly placed underwear with the garter vertically oriented to the right stained with
moderate amount of yellowish fecal material.

10. Minimal amount of pubic hair in the lower pubis with labia majora contracted and retracted.

11. There’s no swelling abrasion, laceration, blood hematoma formation in the vulva. There were old healed hymenal
lacerations at 5 and 9 o’clock position.

12. Vaginal canal admits one finger with no foreign body recovered (sic).

13. Oval shaped contusion/hematoma 6 cm at its greatest diameter anterior surface middle 3rd left thigh.

14. Presence of 2 contusion laceration 1x0.5 cm in size medial aspect left knee. 13

Dr. Fuentecilla also conducted a physical examination on the body of Caliso and summed up his findings thusly:

P.E. FINDINGS:

1. Presence of a 7x0.1 cm. horizontally averted linear erythematus contusion left side of neck (Post ▲).

2. 8x0.2 cm. reddish linear abrasion (probably a scratch mark) from the left midclavicular line extending to the left
anterioraxillary line.

3. Presence of 2 erythematus abrasion 3 cmx0.1 cm in average size dorsal surface (probably a scratch mark) middle 3rd left
arm.

4. 2.5 cm. abrasion dorsal surface middle and right forearm.

5. Presence of a linear erythematus contusion (probably a scratch mark) 2x7 cm. in average size lateral boarder of scapula
extending to left posterior axillary line.

6. Presence of 2 oblique oriented erythematus contusion (probably a scratch mark) 14x022 cm. and 5x0.2 cm. in size
respectively at the upper left flank of the lower back extending downward to the midline.

7. Presence of 5 linear reddish pressure contusion parallel to each other with an average 5 cm left flank area. 14

In his defense, Caliso denied the accusation and interposed an alibi, insisting that on the day of the killing, he plowed the rice field of
Alac Yangyang from 7:00 am until 4:00 pm.

Yangyang corroborated Caliso’s alibi, recalling that Caliso had plowed his rice field from 8 am to 4 pm of June 5, 1997. He further
recalled that Caliso was in his farm around 12:00 noon because he brought lunch to Caliso. He conceded, however, that he was not
aware where Caliso was at the time of the killing.

Ruling of the RTC

After trial, the RTC rendered its judgment on August 19, 2002, viz:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, accused DELFIN CALISO is hereby sentenced to death and to indemnify the
heirs of AAA in the amount of ₱50,000.00. The accused is also hereby ordered to pay the said heirs the amount of ₱50, 000.00 as
exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.15

The RTC found that rape could not be complexed with the killing of AAA because the old-healed hymenal lacerations of AAA and
the fact that the victim’s underwear had been irregularly placed could not establish the commission of carnal knowledge; that the
examining physician also found no physical signs of rape on the body of AAA; and that as to the killing of AAA, the identification by
Amegable that the man she had seen submerging AAA in the murky river was no other than Caliso himself was reliable.

Nevertheless, the RTC did not take into consideration the testimony of Bering on Caliso’s extrajudicial admission of the ownership of
the short pants because the pants were not presented as evidence and because the police officers involved did not testify about the
pants in court.16 The RTC cited the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength to raise the crime from homicide to murder,
regarding the word homicide in the information to be used in its generic sense as to include all types of killing.

Ruling of the CA

On intermediate review, the following errors were raised in the brief for the accused-appellant,17 namely:

i. The court a quo gravely erred in convicting the accused-appellant of the crime of murder despite the failure of the
prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt;

ii. The court a quo gravely erred in giving weight and credence to the incredible and inconsistent testimony of the
prosecution witnesses.

iii. The court a quo gravely erred in appreciating the qualifying aggravating circumstance of taking advantage of superior
strength and the generic aggravating circumstance of disregard of sex[; and]

iv. The court a quo gravely erred in imposing the death penalty.

As stated, the CA affirmed Caliso’s conviction for murder based on the same ratiocinations the RTC had rendered. The CA also relied
on the identification by Amegable of Caliso, despite his back being turned towards her during the commission of the crime. The CA
ruled that she made a positive identification of Caliso as the perpetrator of the killing, observing that the incident happened at noon
when the sun had been at its brightest, coupled with the fact that Amegable’s view had not been obstructed by any object at the time
that AAA’s body had been submerged in the water; that the RTC expressly found her testimony as clear and straightforward and
worthy of credence; that no reason existed why Amegable would falsely testify against Caliso; that Caliso did not prove the physical
impossibility for him to be at the crime scene or at its immediate vicinity at the time of the incident, for both Barangay San Vicente,
where AAA’s body was found, and Barangay Tiacongan, where the rice field of Yangyang was located, were contiguous; that the
attendant circumstance of abuse of superior strength qualified the killing of AAA to murder; that disregard of sex should not have
been appreciated as an aggravating circumstance due to its not being alleged in the information and its not being proven during trial;
and that the death penalty could not be imposed because of the passage of Republic Act No. 9346, prohibiting its imposition in the
Philippines.

The CA decreed in its judgment, viz:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court dated August 19, 2002, finding appellant guilty of Murder, is hereby
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant Delfin Caliso is sentenced to reclusion perpetua, and is directed to pay the
victim’s heirs the amount of P50,000.00 as moral damages, as well as the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary damages, in addition to
the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 he had been adjudged to pay by the trial court.

SO ORDERED.18

Issue

The primordial issue is whether Amegable’s identification of Caliso as the man who killed AAA at noon of July 5, 1997 was positive
and reliable.

Ruling

The appeal is meritorious.

In every criminal prosecution, the identity of the offender, like the crime itself, must be established by proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Indeed, the first duty of the Prosecution is not to prove the crime but to prove the identity of the criminal, for even if the commission
of the crime can be established, there can be no conviction without proof of identity of the criminal beyond reasonable doubt.19

The CA rejected the challenge Caliso mounted against the reliability of his identification as the culprit by Amegable in the following
manner:20
As to the first two errors raised, appellant contends that the testimony of Soledad Amegable was replete with discrepancies. Appellant
avers, for instance, that Soledad failed to see the assailant’s face. Moreover, considering the distance between where Soledad was
supposedly hiding and where the incident transpired, appellant states that it was inconceivable for her to have heard and seen the
incident. According to appellant, witness Soledad could not even remember if at that time, she hid behind a banana plant, or a coconut
tree.

At bench, the incident happened at noon, when the sun was at its brightest. Soledad could very well recognize appellant. Furthermore,
notwithstanding the fact that it was his back that was facing her, she asserted being familiar with the physical features of appellant,
considering that he frequented their barangay. Even during her cross-examination by the defense counsel, Soledad remained steadfast
in categorically stating that she recognized appellant:

Q: Mrs. Amegable, you said during your direct examination that you saw Delfin Caliso, the accused in this case, several
times passed by your barangay, am I correct?

A: Several times.

Q: By any chance prior to the incident, did you talk to him?

A: No, sir.

Q: Are you acquainted with him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Even if he is in his back position?

A: Yes, sir. (Emphasis Supplied)

Given the circumstances as stated above, it was even probable that Soledad caught glimpses of the profile of the appellant at the time
of the incident. She related, in addition, that when the victim was being submerged in the water, there was no object obstructing her
view.

The inconsistencies as alleged by appellant, between Soledad Amegable’s declaration in court and her affidavit, such as the tree or
plant from where she was hiding behind at the time of the incident, are insignificant and cannot negate appellant’s criminal liability.
Her whole attention was riveted to the incident that was unfolding before her. Besides, any such inconsistencies are minor. Slight
contradictions are indicative of an unrehearsed testimony and could even serve to strengthen the witness’ credibility. A witness who is
telling the truth is not always expected to give a perfectly concise testimony, considering the lapse of time and the treachery of human
memory.

In fact, the testimony of a single eye-witness is sufficient to support a conviction, so long as such testimony is found to be clear and
straightforward and worthy of credence by the trial court. Furthermore, over here, witness Soledad had no reason to testify falsely
against appellant.

Besides, the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court, because of its unique
opportunity to observe the witnesses firsthand and to note their demeanor, conduct and attitude.lawphi1 Findings of the trial court on
such matters are binding and conclusive on the appellate court.

Contrary to the CA’s holding that the identification of Caliso based on Amegable’s recognition of him was reliable, the Court
considers the identification not reliable and beyond doubt as to meet the requirement of moral certainty.

When is identification of the perpetrator of a crime positive and reliable enough for establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

The identification of a malefactor, to be positive and sufficient for conviction, does not always require direct evidence from an
eyewitness; otherwise, no conviction will be possible in crimes where there are no eyewitnesses. Indeed, trustworthy circumstantial
evidence can equally confirm the identification and overcome the constitutionally presumed innocence of the accused. Thus, the Court
has distinguished two types of positive identification in People v. Gallarde,21 to wit: (a) that by direct evidence, through an eyewitness
to the very commission of the act; and (b) that by circumstantial evidence, such as where the accused is last seen with the victim
immediately before or after the crime. The Court said:

xxx Positive identification pertains essentially to proof of identity and not per se to that of being an eyewitness to the very act
of commission of the crime. There are two types of positive identification. A witness may identify a suspect or accused in a criminal
case as the perpetrator of the crime as an eyewitness to the very act of the commission of the crime. This constitutes direct evidence.
There may, however, be instances where, although a witness may not have actually seen the very act of commission of a crime, he
may still be able to positively identify a suspect or accused as the perpetrator of a crime as for instance when the latter is the
person or one of the persons last seen with the victim immediately before and right after the commission of the crime. This is
the second type of positive identification, which forms part of circumstantial evidence, which, when taken together with other pieces
of evidence constituting an unbroken chain, leads to only fair and reasonable conclusion, which is that the accused is the author of the
crime to the exclusion of all others. If the actual eyewitnesses are the only ones allowed to possibly positively identify a suspect or
accused to the exclusion of others, then nobody can ever be convicted unless there is an eyewitness, because it is basic and elementary
that there can be no conviction until and unless an accused is positively identified. Such a proposition is absolutely absurd, because it
is settled that direct evidence of the commission of a crime is not the only matrix wherefrom a trial court may draw its conclusion and
finding of guilt. If resort to circumstantial evidence would not be allowed to prove identity of the accused on the absence of direct
evidence, then felons would go free and the community would be denied proper protection. 22

Amegable asserted that she was familiar with Caliso because she had seen him pass by in her barangay several times prior to the
killing. Such assertion indicates that she was obviously assuming that the killer was no other than Caliso. As matters stand, therefore,
Caliso’s conviction hangs by a single thread of evidence, the direct evidence of Amegable’s identification of him as the perpetrator of
the killing. But that single thread was thin, and cannot stand sincere scrutiny. In every criminal prosecution, no less than moral
certainty is required in establishing the identity of the accused as the perpetrator of the crime. Her identification of Caliso as the
perpetrator did not have unassailable reliability, the only means by which it might be said to be positive and sufficient. The test to
determine the moral certainty of an identification is its imperviousness to skepticism on account of its distinctiveness. To achieve such
distinctiveness, the identification evidence should encompass unique physical features or characteristics, like the face, the voice, the
dentures, the distinguishing marks or tattoos on the body, fingerprints, DNA, or any other physical facts that set the individual apart
from the rest of humanity.

A witness’ familiarity with the accused, although accepted as basis for a positive identification, does not always pass the test of moral
certainty due to the possibility of mistake.

No matter how honest Amegable’s testimony might have been, her identification of Caliso by a sheer look at his back for a few
minutes could not be regarded as positive enough to generate that moral certainty about Caliso being the perpetrator of the killing,
absent other reliable circumstances showing him to be AAA’s killer. Her identification of him in that manner lacked the qualities of
exclusivity and uniqueness, even as it did not rule out her being mistaken. Indeed, there could be so many other individuals in the
community where the crime was committed whose backs might have looked like Caliso’s back. Moreover, many factors could have
influenced her perception, including her lack of keenness of observation, her emotional stress of the moment, her proneness to
suggestion from others, her excitement, and her tendency to assume. The extent of such factors are not part of the records; hence, the
trial court and the CA could not have taken them into consideration. But the influence of such varied factors could not simply be
ignored or taken for granted, for it is even a well-known phenomenon that the members of the same family, whose familiarity with one
another could be easily granted, often inaccurately identify one another through a sheer view of another’s back. Certainly, an
identification that does not preclude a reasonable possibility of mistake cannot be accorded any evidentiary force.23

Amegable’s recollection of the perpetrator wearing short pants bearing the number "11" did not enhance the reliability of her
identification of Caliso. For one, such pants were not one-of-a-kind apparel, but generic. Also, they were not offered in evidence. Yet,
even if they had been admitted in evidence, it remained doubtful that they could have been linked to Caliso without proof of his
ownership or possession of them in the moments before the crime was perpetrated.

Nor did the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of Amegable to impute the killing to Caliso guarantee the reliability and accuracy
of her identification of him. The dearth of competent additional evidence that eliminated the possibility of any human error in
Amegable’s identification of Caliso rendered her lack of bad faith or ill motive irrelevant and immaterial, for even the most sincere
person could easily be mistaken about her impressions of persons involved in startling occurrences such as the crime committed
against AAA. It is neither fair nor judicious, therefore, to have the lack of bad faith or ill motive on the part of Amegable raise her
identification to the level of moral certainty.

The injuries found on the person of Caliso by Dr. Fuentecilla, as borne out by the medical certificate dated June 9, 1997, 24 did not
support the culpability of Caliso. The injuries, which were mostly mere scratch marks, 25 were not even linked by the examining
physician to the crime charged. Inasmuch as the injuries of Caliso might also have been due to other causes, including one related to
his doing menial labor most of the time, their significance as evidence of guilt is nil.

In the absence of proof beyond reasonable doubt as to the identity of the culprit, the accused’s constitutional right to be presumed
innocent until the contrary is proved is not overcome, and he is entitled to an acquittal, 26 though his innocence may be doubted.27 The
constitutional presumption of innocence guaranteed to every individual is of primary importance, and the conviction of the accused
must rest not on the weakness of the defense he put up but on the strength of the evidence for the Prosecution. 28

WHEREFORE, the decision promulgated on October 26, 2007 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE for insufficiency of evidence, and
accused-appellant Delfin Caliso is ACQUITTED of the crime of murder.

The Director of the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa City is directed to forthwith release Delfin Caliso from confinement, unless
there is another lawful cause warranting his further detention.

No pronouncement on costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 171129 April 6, 2011

ENRICO SANTOS, Petitioner,

vs.
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondent.

DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

The lessee in this case resists ejectment by the lessor on the ground that the leased property has already been foreclosed and is now
owned by a third person.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 dated September 6, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 89464 which recalled and set aside the Decision2 dated April 1, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos City, Bulacan,
Branch 15 in Civil Case No. 651-M-04. Likewise assailed is the CA’s Resolution3dated January 3, 2006 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration thereto.

Factual Antecedents

On February 10, 2004, petitioner Enrico Santos filed a Complaint 4 for Unlawful Detainer in the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sta.
Maria, Bulacan. He claimed therein that he is the registered owner of the property located at No. 49, National Road, Barrio
Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. On January 2, 1998, he entered into a Contract of Lease 5with respondent National Statistics Office
for the lease of 945 square meters (sq m) of the first floor of the structure on said property for a monthly rental of ₱74,000.00.
Subsequently, the parties agreed to renew the lease for a period of one year from January 1, 2003 to December 31, 2003, covering a
bigger area of the same floor for an increased monthly rental of ₱103,635.00. 6 As the area leased by respondent was not sufficient for
its use, petitioner and respondent again entered into another Contract of Lease 7 dated September 11, 2003 which covered an additional
space for a monthly rental of ₱45,000.00. For failing to pay despite demand the rentals for the months of December 2003 and January
2004 in the total amount of ₱297,270.00, and for its refusal to vacate the property even after the termination of the lease contracts on
December 31, 2003, petitioner sent respondent a formal demand8 for the latter to pay its unpaid monthly rentals and to vacate the
property. Notwithstanding receipt, respondent still refused to pay and to vacate the property. Hence, the complaint.

In its Answer,9 respondent through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) alleged that petitioner and his wife obtained a
loan10 from China Banking Corporation (China Bank) in the amount of ₱20 million, the payment of which was secured by a Real
Estate Mortgage11 constituted over the subject property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-95719(M). It claimed
that when petitioner entered into a contract of lease with it in 1998, he did not inform respondent of the existence of said loan. When
petitioner failed to pay his obligation with China Bank, the property was eventually sold in an extrajudicial foreclosure sale where said
bank emerged as the highest bidder. Since petitioner likewise failed to redeem the property within the redemption period, title to the
same was consolidated in favor of China Bank and TCT No. T-370128(M) was issued in its name on August 21, 2000. Despite this
and again without informing respondent, petitioner misrepresented himself as still the absolute owner of the subject property and
entered into the second and third contracts of lease with respondent in February and September 2003. According to respondent, it was
only in November 2003 that it knew of the foreclosure of the subject property when it received a letter 12 from China Bank informing it
that as early as August 2000, title to the property had already been effectively consolidated in the name of the bank. Hence, China
Bank advised respondent that as the new and absolute owner of the subject property, it is entitled to the rental payments for the use
and occupancy of the leased premises from the date of consolidation. Petitioner having ceased to be the owner of said property,
respondent believed that the second and third contracts of lease it entered with him had ceased to be in effect. Hence, petitioner has no
legal right to demand that respondent pay him said rentals and vacate the leased premises. Conversely, respondent has no legal
obligation to pay to petitioner the rentals for the use and occupancy of the subject property. Moreover, petitioner failed to exhaust
administrative remedies as there was no indication that he filed a money claim before the Commission on Audit (COA) as required by
Act No. 308313 as amended by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1445.14 Lastly, respondent alleged that petitioner is without any legal
personality to institute the complaint because he is neither the owner, co-owner, legal representative or assignee of China Bank,
landlord or a person entitled to the physical possession of the subject property. By way of counterclaim, respondent asserted that
petitioner is obligated under the law and the equitable principle of unjust enrichment to return to respondent all rental payments
received, with legal interests, from August 2000 to November 2003 in the total amount of ₱4,113,785.00.

Ruling of the Municipal Trial Court

The MTC rendered its Decision15 on September 6, 2004. It held that while it can provisionally resolve the issue of ownership as raised
by respondent, it did not do so because of the latter’s admission that it originally leased the subject property from petitioner.
According to said court, when respondent admitted that it was a lessee of the premises owned by petitioner, it took away its right to
question petitioner’s title and ownership thereof. The MTC then reiterated the well settled rule that a tenant cannot, in an action
involving the possession of leased premises, controvert the title of his landlord. As the evidence showed that respondent was no longer
paying rents in violation of its obligation under the second and third contracts of lease, and since said contracts already expired and no
new contract was entered into by the parties, the MTC declared respondent a deforciant lessee which should be ejected from the
property. The dispositive portion of the MTC Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant, ordering the
latter to:

1. Vacate the premises known as No. 49 National Road, Bagbaguin, Santa Maria, Bulacan and peacefully surrender
possession thereof to the plaintiff;

2. Pay the plaintiff rental arrearages amounting to Two Hundred Ninety Seven Thousand Two Hundred Seventy Pesos
(₱297,270.00) for the period up to January 2004;

3. Pay the plaintiff the monthly amount of Seventy Four Thousand Pesos (₱74,000.00) from February 2004 up to the time
that it finally vacates the subject premises;

4. Pay the plaintiff the amount of Thirty Thousand Pesos (₱30,000.00) as and by way of attorney’s fees, and
 5. Cost of the suit.

SO ORDERED.16

Hence, respondent appealed to the RTC.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

Respondent faulted the MTC in not resolving the issue of ownership in order to determine who has the better right of possession. It
emphasized that it is not an ordinary entity which may be compelled to pay under private contracts. As an agency of the government
tasked in generating general purpose statistics, it is bound by government auditing rules to make payments only for validly executed
contracts with persons lawfully entitled thereto. Thus, it is necessary to ascertain the ownership of the subject property in order to
determine the person lawfully entitled to the rental payments. And as it is clear in this case that title to the property had already been
consolidated in the name of China Bank, respondent properly paid the rentals to said bank. Respondent argued that as between
petitioner, who had ceased to have legal title to the property, and itself, which continuously pays rentals to China Bank, it is the one
which has the better right of possession. In addition, respondent insisted that petitioner should return the amount of ₱4,113,785.00
wrongfully paid to him, with legal interest, until fully paid.

On the other hand, petitioner countered that even if respondent is a government agency, it cannot be permitted to deny his title over
the property, he being the lessor of the same. To support this, he cited Section 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court17 and Article 1436
of the Civil Code.18 Petitioner thus prayed that the RTC affirm in toto the assailed MTC Decision.

In its Decision19 dated April 1, 2005, the RTC agreed with the MTC’s declaration that respondent is a deforciant lessee which should
be ejected from the leased premises. This was in view of the settled rule that the fact of lease and the expiration of its terms are the
only elements in an action for ejectment, which it found to have been established in this case. According to said court, a plaintiff need
not prove his ownership and defendant cannot deny it. If defendant denies plaintiff’s ownership, he raises a question which is
unessential to the action. The RTC further held that if there was an issue of ownership, it is a matter between China Bank and
petitioner to settle in an appropriate proceeding. Hence, the RTC found the appeal to be without merit, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises [considered], the assailed Decision of the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Maria, Bulacan, is hereby
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.20

Petitioner promptly moved for the issuance of a writ of execution. 21 This was, however, denied by the RTC22 in view of the
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) issued by the CA through its May 5, 2005 Resolution 23 in CA-G.R. SP No. 89464 - the Petition
for Review brought by respondent before said court.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Before the CA, respondent asserted that the RTC and MTC cannot turn a blind eye on the transfer of ownership of the subject property
to China Bank. As petitioner fraudulently executed the last two lease contracts with respondent, he having entered into the same
despite knowledge that ownership of the subject property had already passed on to China Bank, the rule that the lessee cannot deny the
title of his landlord does not apply. This is because petitioner was no longer the owner of the leased premises at the time of the
execution of the last two contracts. Respondent also believed that said contracts are void because to hold otherwise would be to
condone the anomalous situation of a party paying rentals to one who is no longer the owner and who no longer has the right of
possession over the leased property. It likewise insisted that it is entitled to recover the rentals paid to petitioner from the time
ownership of the subject property was transferred to China Bank under the principle of solutio indebiti. Lastly, respondent emphasized
that petitioner failed to first file a money claim before the COA.

Petitioner, for his part, basically reiterated the arguments he raised before the RTC. In addition, he pointed out that the defense of
ownership is being invoked by respondent on behalf of another party, China Bank. What respondent therefore would want the lower
courts to do was to rule that the subject property is owned by another person even if said person is not a party to the ejectment case. To
petitioner, this cannot be done by the lower courts, hence, there was no error on their part when they decided not to touch upon the
issue of ownership.

It is noteworthy that before the petition was resolved, the CA first issued a Resolution 24 dated July 15, 2005 granting respondent’s
prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction which enjoined the enforcement of the RTC’s April 1, 2005 Decision. Thereafter, the CA
proceeded to decide the case and thus issued a Decision25 dated September 6, 2005.

In its Decision, the CA recognized the settled rule that a tenant, in an action involving the possession of the leased premises, can
neither controvert the title of his landlord nor assert any rights adverse to that title, or set up any inconsistent right to change the
relation existing between himself and his landlord. However, it declared that said doctrine is subject to qualification as enunciated
in Borre v. Court of Appeals26 wherein it was held that "[t]he rule on estoppel against tenants x x x does not apply if the landlord’s title
has expired, or has been conveyed to another, or has been defeated by a title paramount, subsequent to the commencement of lessor-
lessee relationship." In view of this, the CA concluded that the RTC erred when it relied mainly on the abovementioned doctrine
enunciated under Sec. 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court and skirted away from resolving the issue of ownership. The CA noted that
respondent was able to prove that title to the subject property has already been effectively consolidated in the name of China Bank.
Hence, it found petitioner to be in bad faith and to have acted with malice in still representing himself to be the owner of the property
when he entered into the second and third contracts of lease with respondent. Under these circumstances, the CA declared that
respondent was justified in refusing to pay petitioner the rents and thus, the ejectment complaint against respondent states no cause of
action.
In addition, the CA opined that there was no landlord-tenant relationship created between the parties because the agreements between
them are void. The element of consent is wanting considering that petitioner, not being the owner of the subject property, has no legal
capacity to give consent to said contracts. The CA, however, denied respondent’s prayer for the return of the rentals it paid to
petitioner by ratiocinating that to grant the same would be to effectively rule on the ownership issue rather than merely resolving it for
the purpose of deciding the issue on possession.

The CA disposed of the case in this wise:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition for review is GRANTED, the assailed decision is RECALLED and SET
ASIDE, and a new one entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 651-M-04 (MTC Civil Case No. 1708). No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.27

Both parties moved for reconsideration28 of the above Decision but were, however, unsuccessful as the CA denied their motions in a
Resolution29 dated January 3, 2006.

Undeterred, petitioner now comes to us through this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issues

Petitioner raises the following issues:

I. Whether x x x the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in overturning the respective decisions of the RTC-Malolos City,
Bulacan and MTC-Sta. Maria, Bulacan which both held that a lessor has the better right of possession over a realty.

II. Whether x x x the Honorable Court of Appeals - in resolving the issue of who between the lessor and the lessee has better
possession of the premises known as No. 49, National Road, Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan – erred in delving on the issue
of ownership in resolving the issues raised in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 89464.

III. Whether x x x the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not awarding damages to the Petitioner, the lessor of the premises
known as No. 49, National Road, Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan. 30

The Parties’ Arguments

Petitioner contends that the ruling in Borre does not apply to this case because here, there is nothing to show that his title to the subject
property had expired, or had been conveyed to another, or had been defeated by a title paramount. In fact, petitioner informs this Court
that the dispute between him and China Bank concerning the ownership of the subject property is still pending litigation before Branch
17 of RTC-Malolos, Bulacan. Hence, petitioner asserts that there are yet no factual and legal bases for the CA to rule that he lost his
title over the property. Besides, petitioner believes that ownership is not an issue in actions for ejectment especially when the parties
thereto are the landlord and tenant. Moreover, petitioner contends that based on Fige v. Court of Appeals,31respondent as lessee cannot
be allowed to interpose a defense against him as lessor without the former first delivering to him the leased premises. Petitioner also
claims that he is entitled to payment of damages in the form of fair rental value or reasonable compensation for the use and occupation
of the property. In sum, petitioner wants this Court to reverse and set aside the assailed CA Decision and Resolution and to reinstate
the respective Decisions of the MTC and RTC.

Respondent, for its part, negates petitioner’s claim that he has not yet lost his title to the property by emphasizing that such title has
already been effectively consolidated in the name of China Bank. And, considering that government auditing rules preclude
respondent from paying rentals to a party not entitled thereto, it was proper for it to pay the same to the new owner, China Bank.
Moreover, respondent imputes bad faith upon petitioner for not informing it of the change in ownership of the property and for still
collecting rental payments despite such change. Thus, respondent prays that the petition be denied for lack of merit.

Our Ruling

We find no merit in the petition.

The conclusive presumption found in Sec. 2(b), Rule 131 of the Rules of Court known as estoppel against tenants provides as follows:

Sec. 2. Conclusive presumptions. – The following are instances of conclusive presumptions:

xxxx

(b) The tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation of landlord and
tenant between them. (Emphasis supplied).

It is clear from the above-quoted provision that "[w]hat a tenant is estopped from denying x x x is the title of his landlord at the time of
the commencement of the landlord-tenant relation. If the title asserted is one that is alleged to have been acquired subsequent to the
commencement of that relation, the presumption will not apply." 32 Hence, "the tenant may show that the landlord’s title has expired or
been conveyed to another or himself; and he is not estopped to deny a claim for rent, if he has been ousted or evicted by title
paramount."33
Thus, we declared in Borre v. Court of Appeals34 that:

The rule on estoppel against tenants is subject to a qualification. It does not apply if the landlord’s title has expired, or has been
conveyed to another, or has been defeated by a title paramount, subsequent to the commencement of lessor-lessee relationship [VII
Francisco, The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines 87 (1973)]. In other words, if there was a change in the nature of the title of
the landlord during the subsistence of the lease, then the presumption does not apply. Otherwise, if the nature of the landlord’s title
remains as it was during the commencement of the relation of landlord and tenant, then estoppel lies against the tenant. (Emphasis
supplied.)

While petitioner appears to have already lost ownership of the property at the time of the commencement of the tenant-landlord
relationship between him and respondent, the change in the nature of petitioner’s title, as far as respondent is concerned, came only
after the commencement of such relationship or during the subsistence of the lease. This is precisely because at the time of the
execution of the second and third contracts of lease, respondent was still not aware of the transfer of ownership of the leased property
to China Bank. It was only in November 2003 or less than two months before the expiration of said contracts when respondent came
to know of the same after it was notified by said bank. This could have been the reason why respondent did not anymore pay
petitioner the rents for the succeeding months of December 2003 and January 2004. Thus, it can be said that there was a change in the
nature of petitioner’s title during the subsistence of the lease that the rule on estoppel against tenants does not apply in this case.
Petitioner’s reliance on said conclusive presumption must, therefore, necessarily fail since there was no error on the part of the CA
when it entertained respondent’s assertion of a title adverse to petitioner.

We also find untenable petitioner’s argument that respondent cannot assert ownership of the property by a third person considering
that China Bank, as such third person, is not a party to the ejectment case. As earlier said, a tenant in proper cases such as this, may
show that the landlord’s title has been conveyed to another. In order to do this, the tenant must essentially assert that title to the leased
premises already belongs to a third person who need not be a party to the ejectment case. This is precisely what respondent was trying
to do when it endeavored to establish that the property is now owned by China Bank.

From the above discussion, it is not difficult to see that the question of possession is so intertwined with the question of ownership to
the effect that the question of possession cannot be resolved without resolving the question of ownership. This is the reason why we
are upholding the CA’s resolution of the issue of ownership in this ejectment case. "It bears emphasizing that in ejectment suits, the
only issue for resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim of ownership by any
of the party litigants."35However, "[i]n cases where defendant raises the question of ownership in the pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of ownership, the court may proceed and resolve the issue of ownership but
only for the purpose of determining the issue of possession. [Nevertheless], the disposition of the issue of ownership is not final, as it
may be the subject of separate proceeding[s] specifically brought to settle the issue." 36 Hence, the fact that there is a pending case
between petitioner and China Bank respecting the ownership of the property does not preclude the courts to rule on the issue of
ownership in this case.1avvphi1

Paragraph 3 of the Complaint for Unlawful Detainer states that petitioner is the registered owner of the property located at No. 49,
National Road, Barrio Bagbaguin, Sta. Maria, Bulacan.37 It is in fact by virtue of this alleged ownership that he entered into contracts
of lease with respondent and was ejecting the latter by reason of the expiration of said contracts. However, we note that petitioner, as
plaintiff in the Complaint for Unlawful Detainer, failed to discharge his burden of showing that he indeed owned the property. "In
civil cases, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. If he claims a right granted or
created by law, he must prove his claim by competent evidence. He must rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the
weakness of that of his opponent." 38 On the other hand, respondent has satisfactorily shown that title to the property has already been
conveyed to China Bank. It submitted the following documents: (1) the Promissory Note 39 executed by petitioner and his spouse in
favor of China Bank for a loan of ₱20 million and the (Real Estate) Mortgage 40 over the subject property; (2) the Petition for
Extrajudicial Foreclosure of said Real Estate Mortgage;41(3) the Notice of Auction Sale By Notary Public, Certificate of Posting,
Affidavit of Publication and Certificate of Sale in favor of China Bank,42 all in connection with the extrajudicial foreclosure sale of the
leased premises; (4) the Affidavit of Consolidation43 executed by China Bank’s Vice-President to inform the Registry of Deeds of
Meycauayan, Bulacan that the one-year period of redemption has expired without petitioner redeeming the property and to request
said office to issue the corresponding TCT under the bank’s name; and (5) TCT No. T-370128 (M)44issued on August 21, 2000 in the
name of China Bank covering the leased property. Said documents, particularly TCT No. T-370128 (M), undeniably show that China
Bank is the owner of the property and not petitioner. "As a matter of law, a Torrens Certificate of Title is evidence of indefeasible title
of property in favor of the person in whose name the title appears. The title holder is entitled to all the attributes of ownership of the
property, including possession, subject only to limits imposed by law." 45 Not being the registered titleholder, we hold that petitioner
does not have a better right of possession over the property as against respondent who is in actual possession thereof and who claims
to derive its right of possession from the titleholder, China Bank, to whom it pays rents for its use. Hence, petitioner’s action for
unlawful detainer must fail. This being settled, it is obvious that petitioner is likewise not entitled to payment of damages for the fair
rental value or reasonable compensation for the use and occupation of the property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated September 6, 2005 and Resolution dated January 3, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89464 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 131131. June 21, 2001]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ABELARDO SALONGA, accused-appellant.

DECISION
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:

This case was certified to this Court pursuant to Section 13, Rule 124[1] of the Rules of Court from a decision rendered by the
Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. CR NO. 18551 which modified the decision of the Regional Trial Court [3] (RTC) of Makati, Branch
142 in Criminal Case No. 33127, by increasing the penalty imposed on the accused to reclusion perpetua.
Abelardo Salonga, Flaviano Pangilinan, Amiel Garcia and Ricardo Licup were charged with the crime of Qualified Theft
through Falsification of Commercial Document in an information [4] that reads:

That on or before the 23rd day of October, 1986, in the Municipality of Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating with one another and mutually helping and aiding
one another, and as such had access to the preparation of checks in the said Metrobank and Trust Company, with grave abuse of
confidence, intent of gain and without the knowledge and consent of the owner thereof, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away the total amount of P36,480.30 by forging the signature of officers authorized to sign the said
check and have the said check deposited in the account of Firebrake Sales and Services, the supposed payee when in truth and in fact
there is no such transaction between Firebrake and Metrobank, thereby causing the preparation and use of a simulated check described
as Check No. 013702 in the amount of P36,480.30 making it appear genuine and authorized, through which they succeeded in its
encashment, enabling them to gain for themselves the total sum of P36,480.30, to the damage and prejudice of Metrobank and Trust
Company in the total amount of P36,480.30.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

On January 7, 1991, Salonga was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. His co-accused, Flaviano Pangilinan,
Amiel Garcia and Ricardo Licup are still at large.
On July 19, 1993, the RTC rendered its decision finding Salonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Qualified Theft through
Falsification of Commercial Document, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds the accused Abelardo Salonga GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of QUALIFIED THEFT THRU FALSIFICATION OF COMMERCIAL DOCUMENT. Absent any circumstance
which attended the commission of the crime he is hereby sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

The trial court summarized the evidence for the prosecution, upon which it based its conviction of accused-appellant in this wise:

Prosecution:

x x x (T)he Loans and Placement Department of Metropolitan Band and Trust Company (Metrobank) issued Metrobank Cashiers
Check No. CC 013702 dated October 23, 1986 in the amount of P36,480.30 which purports to have been signed by Antonio L.
Manuel, as manager of the said department and authorized signatory of the check and which had been cleared and encashed (Exhibits
A, A-1 to A-4).

On January 20, 1987, Arthur Christy Mariano, lead examiner of Metrobanks Loans and Placement Department, conducted a spot audit
of the Loans and Placement Department of Metrobank. The outcome of the spot audit as embodied in the Reports dated February 12,
1987 and March 26, 1987, is as follows:

Unauthorized Issuance of Cashiers check

Test-verification of the daily issuance of cashiers checks by the Loans and Placement Department disclosed the following:

1. There was a cashiers check issued on October 23, 1986 under CC No. 013702 payable to a certain Firebreak Sales
and Services for P36,480.30 the xerox copy of which is shown as EXHIBIT A.

2. The signatures of the authorized signatories appearing on the subject cashiers check have an apparent dissimilarity
with their genuine signature particularly that of Mrs. Antonia L. Manuel, Manager of Loans and Placement
Department.

3. At the back portion of the Cashiers check, it was traced that the same was deposited to Account No. 3021-3900-53
maintained at BPI-Ayala Ave. Branch. However, we were not able to establish the name/owner of the account at
BPI.

4. On the day of issuance of the cashiers check, it was found out that the corresponding debit and credit balances
appearing in the proof sheet of Loans and Placement Department are balanced.However, the supporting accounting
ticket debiting Accounts payable was short by P36,480.30, the amount of the cashiers check while the credit
accounting ticket for the Cashiers and Gift Checks account reflects the correct total of issuances for the day but the
signature of the Authorized Signature space is forged as shown in Exhibit B.
 5. The Cashiers check in question was properly recorded in the register maintained at the FX/Loans Accounting
Section. It passed to the usual clearing procedure except for the signature verification of the authorized
signatories. Thus, the unauthorized issuance/dissimilarity of the signatures could not be readily detected.

6. The matter was brought to the attention of the Division Heads concerned who immediately confronted the
responsible officers, Mr. Abelardo A. Salonga, Acting Asst. Cashier and Custodian of the unissued cashiers check
at the Loans & Placement Department and Mr. Flaviano M. Pangilinan, Asst. Manager of FX/Loans Accounting
Section. Both admitted their participation on the irregularity/unauthorized issuance of said cashiers check.

7. The case was already endorsed to the Department of Internal Affairs by the Controller.

UNAUTHORIZED ISSUANCE OF CASHIERS CHECK

Except _for the unauthorized issuance of Cashiers Check No. 013702 for P36,480.30 on October 23, 1986, we found out that the
transactions involving Accounts payable account are in order per verification conducted from October to December 1986. All items
lodged under said account were properly accounted for. As have been reported, the perpetrators on this particular scheme are Messrs.
Flaviano M. Pangilinan and Abelardo A. Salonga, Assistant Manager and Acting Assistant Cashier, respectively. Mr. Pangilinan made
a payment of P17,500.00 on January 28, 1987 under O.R. No. 65696 while no payment was received from Mr. Salonga as of this
writing.

(Exhibits M, M-1, N, N-1).

Antonia Manuel and Arthur Christy Mariano both testified that the signature of the former appearing on the subject check and on
Metrobank Debit (Local) Ticket TR No. 8 dated October 23, 1986 which was prepared by accused Amiel S. Garcia (Exhibits 1, 1-1, 1-
2) corresponding to the subject check, is a forgery after comparison thereof with the genuine signature of Antonia Manuel appearing
on the cashiers checks also issued by the Loans and Placement Department of Metrobank (Exhibits D, D-1, D-2, E, E-1, E-2; F, F-1,
F-2; G, G-1 G-2; H, H-1, H-2).

Arthur Mariano declared that while the amount of accounts payable for October 23, 1986 as reflected in the proof sheet of Metrobanks
Loans and Placement Department is P97,112.17 (Exhibits J, J-1, J-2), the total amount of accounts payable by said department for
October 23, 1986 under Metrobank Debit (Local) Tickets TR No. 8 both dated October 23, 1986 is P60,631.87 (P60,390.58 +
P241.29) (Exhibits K, K-1, K-2; L, L-1, L-2, respectively), which two amounts under normal circumstances, should be equal. The
difference of the two aforesaid amounts totaled P36,480.30 which is equivalent to the amount stated in the subject cashiers check,
which allegedly shows that the check was issued bereft of any transaction.

By virtue of the alleged anomaly surrounding the issuance of the subject cashiers check, accused Abelardo Salonga was summoned to
appear before Valentino Elevado, Assistant Accountant, Department of Internal Affairs of Metrobank. After allegedly appraising
Abelardo Salonga of his constitutional right to remain silent and to counsel, an interview in a question and answer from was
conducted. Accused Abelardo Salonga allegedly waived his constitutional rights and submitted himself to the interview. In the course
of the interview, accused Abelardo Salonga admitted having issued the subject cashiers check without any legitimate transaction, to
accused Amiel Garcia as accused who was then encountering financial difficulties. That out of the amount of the check, P8,500.00
went to the personal benefit of accused Abelardo Salonga.

After the interview, accused Abelardo Salonga executed a written statement which he authenticated by affixing his signature thereon
(Exhibits B to B-7). Questions and Answers Nos. 7, 8, 9, 19 and 21 stated in the written statement read as follows:

7. Q: Placement Section, Metrobank, Head Office, Makati, Metro Manila, what are your duties and responsibilities?

A: I have the control of the issuance of cashier checks for Loans and placement transactions of Metrobank, and others.

8. Q: In connection with your duties of issuing cashiers checks regarding loans and placement transactions of Metrobank,
have you come across Cashiers Check No. CC 013702 dated October 23, 1987, payable to Firebreak Sales and
Services in the amount of P36,480.30?

A: I issued this check in blank to Mr. Amiel Garcia, messenger on October 23, 1986.

9. Q: Why did you issue this blank Cashiers check No. 013702 to Mr. Amiel Garcia, was there a legitimate transaction in
loans or in placement?

A: There was no legitimate or legal transaction in loans neither in placement, but I issued this to Mr. Garcia because Mr.
Flaviano Pangilinan, Assistant Manager, Accounting Department who is my compadre and I have plan to make
money and I want to help Mr. Amiel Garcia who is financially handicapped.

19. Q: Was this check cleared by Metrobank?

A: Yes, because Mr. Flaviano Pangilinan is the Assistant Manager of the Acounting Section downstairs in the basement,
their section cleared this check.

21. Q: Did Mr. Flaviano Pangilinan give you any amount as your share?
 A: After about three days, at about after lunch, he called me outside the bank, (beside the bank), and he handed me an
envelope with P17,000.00 plus, he said pare, eto oh, ganon lang.

(Exhibits B-8 to B-11).

A letter dated September 15, 1987 was addressed by accused Abelardo Salonga to Atty. Severino Tobias of Metrobank Head Office
wherein the former signified his intention to compromise the case (Exhibits C to C-3).

Upon the other hand, accused-appellant relied on denial as his defense; attributed to simple negligence the loss of the check
which was admittedly in his custody and also repudiated his extra-judicial confession. The evidence for the defense was summarized
by the trial court as follows:

Defense:

x x x x Abelardo Salonga testified that from 1973 to 1987, he was employed by Metrobank as an acting assistant cashier. In such
capacity, he was in charge of managing money market placements and payments of maturing money placement investments. Before
accused Abelardo Salonga may prepare and issue a cashiers check, he must first be instructed by his manager to do so. Then the
prepared check will be back to the Accounting Section for examination, then back to the manager for his signature and to the other
officer for his counter-signature, the check is then returned to accused Abelardo Salonga for eventual release to the banks client.

According to Abelardo Salonga, he first learned that he was being accused of the present charge after the audit of his department was
concluded. Two persons from the Internal Affairs Department invited him to an investigation. These two persons allegedly forced
(him) to go with them and even dragged him into the car and brought him to the Departments Office at PS Bank, Ayala Avenue.

During the investigation, accused Abelardo Salongas alleged statement was typewritten but he was neither asked any questions nor did
the investigators talk to him. He was given an opportunity to read his statement but only for a limited period of time. He allegedly
affixed his signature involuntarily on the typewritten statement after the investigators threatened him and hit him on the nape. The
investigators never informed him of his right to counsel and neither did they believe this claim of innocence.

Upon learning that a criminal complaint was filed against him, accused Abelardo Salonga sought the assistance of a lawyer and wrote
a letter to the Personnel Head of Metrobank. In the said letter, accused Abelardo Salonga admitted his negligence in connection with
the subject check because of the threats employed by the investigators and that he has never been employed nor has he any interest
whatsoever with Firebreak Sales and Services.

In the letter which accused Abelardo Salonga sent to Atty. Severino Tabios of Metrobank (Exhibit C prosecution), said accused
offered to pay the bank the amount of P8,500.00 just to finish the case so that he can earn a living and get a new job.

The rebuttal evidence of the prosecution was summarized by the trial court thus:

x x x, Benito Cuan, bank officer of the Department of Internal Affairs of Metrobank, testified that he, together with Valentino Elevado
composed the investigating team tasked with the investigation of the cashiers check anomaly. Also present during the investigation
were the following: Cristina Cubangay, Susan Trinidad, and Atty. Narciso Belasa. The investigation transpired at the PS Bank
building, Ayala Avenue which housed the Department of Internal Affairs of Metrobank.

Benito Cuan declared that upon orders of his superior, he was instructed to go to Metrobank plaza located along Buendia Avenue to
invite accused Abelardo Salonga to an interview to shed light on the cashiers check anomaly. The said accused allegedly voluntarily
acceded to the invitation and the two then proceeded to PS Bank building. No force or coercion was employed to procure the
attendance of Abelardo Salonga in the said investigation. In the contrary, Abelardo Salonga voluntarily and of his own free will
accompanied Benito Cuan to PS BANK Building. x x x (Decision, Criminal Case No. 33127, pp. 2-7).

Giving full credence to the evidence of the prosecution, the trial court convicted accused-appellant of the crime charged. The
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial courts Decision convicting accused-appellant, however, the appellate court ruled that the penalty
imposed was erroneous and modified the same by increasing the penalty imposed to reclusion perpetua, The Court of Appeals
disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, pursuant to the above-quoted provisions of Rules on Criminal Procedure and Article VIII, Section 5 of the 1987
Constitution of the Philippines and finding Abelardo Salonga guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Theft through
Falsification of Commercial Document, as defined and penalized under Article 48 in relation to Articles 309, 310 and 172, RPC, as
amended with the penalty of reclusion perpetua, We certify this case to the Honorable Supreme Court for final determination and
appropriate action (People vs. Demecillo, 186 SCRA 161, 164).

Having imposed reclusion perpetua on accused-appellant, the Court of Appeals as earlier noted, refrained from entering
judgment and certified the case to the Supreme Court for review, in conformity with Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court.
Hence, this appeal before this Court.
In his Supplemental Brief , accused-appellant adopts the following first and second assigned errors found in the Appellants Brief
dated February 7, 1996 filed with the Court of Appeals, to wit:
I
 THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE ALLEGED EXTRA JUDICIAL
CONFESSION/ADMISSION (EXH. `B') OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT ABELARDO SALONGA WHICH WAS
OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO COUNSEL.
II
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RELYING ON OTHER EVIDENCE WHICH ARE NOT SUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN
CONVICTION BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT FOR THEY ARE BASED ON SPECULATIONS, CONJECTURES
AND PROBABILITIES.
with the addition of the following third assigned error:
III
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT ABELARDO SALONGA GUILTY
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME OF QUALIFIED THEFT THROUGH FALSIFICATION OF
COMMERCIAL DOCUMENT WITH THE PENALTY OF RECLUSION PERPETUA.
The foregoing assignment of errors may be reformulated into these three issues or topics: (1) admissibility of accused-appellants
extra-judicial confession/admission; (2) credibility of the witnesses and sufficiency of the prosecution evidence; (3) propriety of the
penalty imposed.
First, we reject accused-appellants argument that his so-called extra-judicial confession/admission taken on January 27,
1987[5] marked as Exhibit B is inadmissible in evidence on the ground that the waiver of his right to counsel was made without the
assistance of counsel in violation of Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution which mandates that x x x (a)ny person under
investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. x
x x Any confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence.
Applying said provision of the 1973 Constitution, the Court in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile[6] laid down the guidelines to be observed
strictly by law enforcers during custodial investigation:

At the time a person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for the arrest and he must be
shown the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to remain silent and to counsel, and that any
statement he might make could be used against him. The person arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or anyone he chooses by the most expedient means by telephone if possible - or by letter or messenger. It shall be the
responsibility of the arresting officer to see to it that that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted unless it
be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested, by any person on his behalf, or appointed by the court upon petition
either of the detainee himself or by anyone on his behalf. The right to counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless
made with the assistance of counsel. Any statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or
inculpatory, in whole or in part, shall be inadmissible in evidence.

Clearly, the constitutional right to counsel as enunciated in the aforecited case may be invoked only by a person under custodial
investigation for an offense. Accused-appellants extra-judicial confession was properly admitted and considered by the trial court
considering that when accused-appellant gave his statement he was not under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation is the
stage where the police investigation is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular
suspect taken into custody by the police who carry out a process of interrogation that lends itself to elicit incriminating
statements.[7] Indeed, custodial investigation refers to questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. [8]
In this case, when Arthur Christy Mariano of the spot audit group discovered that there was a discrepancy in the proof sheet
brought about by the issuance of a cashiers check numbered 013702 made payable to Firebrake Sales and Services in the amount of
Thirty Six Thousand, Four Hundred Eighty pesos and Thirty centavos (P36,480.30), accused-appellant was summoned to appear
before Valentino Elevado, Assistant Accountant, Department of Internal Affairs of Metrobank for questioning. It bears stressing that
Elevado is not a police officer or law enforcer but a private person who was a bank officer.In the course of the interview, accused-
appellant admitted having issued the subject cashiers check without any legitimate transaction, to his co-accused Amiel Garcia who
was then encountering financial difficulties. He also admitted that out of the amount of the check, P8,500.00 went to his personal
benefit. His admissions were reduced into writing and offered as Exhibit B by the prosecution. It is well-settled that the legal
formalities required by the fundamental law of the land apply only to those extra-judicial confessions obtained during custodial
investigation.[9]
Second, in view of our ruling on the admissibility of the extra-judicial confession, we must likewise reject accused-appellants
contention that his conviction was based merely on speculations, possibilities, suspicions and conjectures. According to him, while it
was established that as Assistant Cashier he had access to the preparation and releasing of Metrobank cashiers checks, there was no
evidence that he was seen in the actual act of falsifying the check; releasing it; or encashing the same. He argues further that
conspiracy with his co-accused in the commission of the offense was not proved clearly and convincingly. Evidently, accused-
appellants arguments are still premised on the inadmissibility of his written extra-judicial confession which we have already affirmed
as admissible. As mentioned earlier, accused-appellant admitted in said extra-judicial confession that he issued the subject cashiers
check without a legitimate transaction to Amiel Garcia; that his co-conspirators were Garcia and Pangilinan; and that he got a share of
P8,500.00 from the sum encashed.
We are in accord with the findings of both the trial court and appellate court that the prosecution established beyond reasonable
doubt the participation of accused-appellant in the crime charged. It was established that accused-appellant was the custodian of the
blank Metrobank cashiers check which was processed and encashed. Arthur Christy Mariano of the spot audit group testified that the
amount of accounts payable for October 23, 1986 as reflected in the proof sheet did not tally with the debit tickets of the same date,
showing that the check was issued without any transaction. He also testified that after finding basic differences in the signature of
bank manager Antonia Manuel appearing on the subject check with other specimens he conferred with the latter who told him that the
signature appearing therein was not hers. Manager Antonia Manuel likewise testified that the signature appearing in the cashiers check
varies with the way she signs. Significantly, in a letter dated September 15, 1987 to Atty. Severino S. Tabios of Metrobank marked as
Exhibit C, accused-appellant confirmed the statements in his extra-judicial confession and offered to return the amount of P8,500.00,
portions of which we quote:

x x x.

This is with reference to the banks criminal case against me, which was filed through your lawyers and is now subject of arraignment
at the at the Makati Fiscals Office, documented as Case No. 87-3791.

I will not expound further my involvement in this case as I have already admittingly confessed during the companys investigation. An
involvement in which I could not still fathom and still repenting in having so, relinquisihing all the years of stay in your company
where Ive learned a lot and reared my family. x x x

x x x.The amount involve is only very minimal (involved is P8,5000.00) of which I am willing to pay back the bank by Janaury 1988.

Furthermore, Assistant Accountant Valentino Elevado (Internal Affairs) who investigated the anomalies surrounding the issuance of
the check testified that he personally interviewed accused-appellant regarding the matter. Benito T. Cuan testified that he was present
during the entire interview and signing of the statement by accused-appellant and that no force or coercion was employed against
accused-appellant during the interview. It is a well-entrenched rule that this Court will not interfere with the trial courts assessment of
the credibility of the witnesses absent any indication or showing that the trial court has overlooked some material facts or gravely
abused its discretion, especially where, as in this case, such assessment is affirmed by the Court of Appeals. [10] Verily, we find that the
evidence for the prosecution deserves credence and that the same is sufficient for conviction.
Lastly, we come to the correctness of the penalty imposed. The crime charged is Qualified Theft through Falsification of
Commercial Document. The information alleged that the accused took P36,480.30 with grave abuse of confidence by forging the
signature of officers authorized to sign the subject check and had the check deposited in the account of Firebrake Sales and Services, a
fictitious payee without any legitimate transaction with Metrobank. Theft is qualified if it is committed with grave abuse of
confidence.[11] The fact that accused-appellant as assistant cashier of Metrobank had custody of the aforesaid checks and had access
not only in the preparation but also in the release of Metrobank cashiers checks suffices to designate the crime as qualified theft as he
gravely abused the confidence reposed in him by the bank as assistant cashier. Since the value of the check is P38,480.30, the
imposable penalty for the felony of theft is prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods and one year of each additional ten
thousand pesos in accordance with Article 309, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code. [12] However, under Article 310 of the Revised
Penal Code,[13] the crime of qualified theft is punished by the penalties next higher by two (2) degrees than that specified in Article
309 of the Revised Penal Code. Two (2) degrees higher than prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods is reclusion
temporalin its medium and maximum periods. In addition, forging the signatures of the bank officers authorized to sign the subject
cashiers check was resorted to in order to obtain the sum of P36,480.30 for the benefit of the accused. As correctly held by the courts a
quo, falsification of the subject cashiers check was a necessary means to commit the crime of qualified theft resulting in a complex
crime. Hence, we apply Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides that, x x x where an offense is a necessary means for
committing the other, the penalty for the more serious crime in its maximum period shall be imposed. Considering that qualified Theft
is more serious than falsification of bank notes or certificates which is punished under Article 166 (2) of the Revised Penal
Code with prision mayor in its minimum period,[14] the correct penalty is fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion
temporal as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 4, 1997 is hereby AFFIRMED with the
MODIFICATION that the penalty is reduced to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months of reclusion temporal as minimum to twenty
(20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum.
SO ORDERED.

Case Digest: Vinzons-Chato v. HRET

G.R. No. 204637: April 16, 2013

LIWAYWAY VINZONS-CHATO,Petitioner,v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ELMER

E. PANOTES,Respondents.

REYES, J.:

FACTS:

On May 24, 2010, Chato filed an electoral protest claiming that in four of the seven municipalities comprising the Second District of
Camarines Norte, the following irregularities occurred: (a) the Precinct Count Optical Scan (PCOS) machines rejected and failed to
count the votes, which if manually counted and visually appreciated, were in fact validly cast for her; (b) the PCOS machines broke
down in some clustered precincts (CPs) and the ballots were inserted in contingency machines at later times rendering uncertain the
actual inclusion of the votes in the final tally; (c) the protocols prescribed by the COMELEC relative to the installation of the PCOS
machines and Canvassing and Consolidation System (CCS), counting of ballots, canvassing and transmission of results, and closing of
the voting were either not followed or modified making it possible for the tampering and manipulation of the election results; (d)
several compact flash (CF) cards in the PCOS machines were reconfigured on the eve of the May 10, 2010 elections; (e) there were
errors or lapses in transmitting results from several PCOS machines to the CCS of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers (MBOCs)
resulting to the need to manually insert CF cards into the CCS, but in some instances, the insertions were made after significant and
unaccounted lapse of time in cases where before transporting the CF cards to the MBOCs, the members of the Boards of Election
Inspectors (BEIs) went home first or did private business; and (f) after the closing of the polls, some CF cards failed to show recorded
results.

On March 21, 2011, the HRET started the initial revision of ballots in 25% of the pilot protested CPs. The revision ended on March
24, 2011. Per physical count, Chatos votes increased by 518, while those cast for Panotes decreased by 2,875 votes.

On March 22, 2012, the HRET issued Resolution No. 12-079 directing the continuance of the revision of ballots in 75% of the
contested CPs. The proceeding commenced on May 2, 2012 and ended on May 9, 2012.

There was a substantial discrepancy between the figures indicated in the ERs/Statements of Votes by Precinct (SOVPs) on one hand,
and the results of the physical count during the revision, on the other. Thereafter, the HRET issued Resolution No. 11-208 directing
the decryption and copying of the picture image files of ballots (PIBs). The proceeding was conducted within the COMELEC
premises. However, Chato alleged that the back-up CF card for CP No. 44 of the Municipality of Daet and the CF card for CP No. 29
of the Municipality of Mercedes did not contain the PIBs. Chato filed before the HRET an Urgent Motion to Prohibit the Use by
Protestee of the Decrypted and Copied Ballot Images. The HRET denied Chatos motion through Resolution No. 11-321 issued on
June 8, 2011.

Panotes filed before us a petitionassailing HRET Resolution No. 12-079. On her part, Chato instituted a petitionchallenging HRET
Resolution No. 11-321. We ordered the consolidation of the two petitions, and both were dismissed in a decision which we rendered
on January 22, 2013.

ISSUE: Whether or not the HRET committed grave abuse of discretion when it disregarded the results of the physical count in the 69
CPs when the HRET had previously held that the integrity of the ballot boxes was preserved and that the results of the revision
proceedings can be the bases to overturn those reflected in the election return.

HELD: The decision of the HRET is sustained.

POLITICAL LAW election

It bears stressing that the HRETs Order dated April 10, 2012 was issued to resolve Panotes motion to suspend the continuance of the
revision proceedings in 75% of the contested CPs. The HRETs findings then anent the integrity of the ballot boxes were at the most,
preliminary in nature. The HRET was in no way estopped from subsequently holding otherwise after it had the opportunity to
exhaustively observe and examine in the course of the entire revision proceedings the conditions of all the ballot boxes and their
contents, including the ballots themselves, the MOV, SOVs and ERs.

Need not be labor the second and third issues raised herein as the same had been resolved in the following wise in Liwayway Vinzons-
Chato v. HRET and Elmer Panotesand Elmer E. Panotes v. HRET and Liwayway Vinzons-Chato:

Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369 defines "official ballot" where AES (Automated Election System) is utilized as the "paper ballot,
whether printed or generated by the technology applied, that faithfully captures or represents the votes cast by a voter recorded or to
be recorded in electronic form."

The May 10, 2010 elections used a paper-based technology that allowed voters to fill out an official paper ballot by shading the oval
opposite the names of their chosen candidates. Each voter was then required to personally feed his ballot into the Precinct Count
Optical Scan (PCOS) machine which scanned both sides of the ballots simultaneously, meaning, in just one pass. As established
during the required demo tests, the system captured the images of the ballots in encrypted format which, when decrypted for
verification, were found to be digitized representations of the ballots cast.

As such, the printouts thereof PIBs are the functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for
purposes of revision of votes in an electoral protest.

The HRET found Chatos evidence insufficient. The testimonies of the witnesses she presented were declared irrelevant and immaterial
as they did not refer to the CF cards used in the 20 precincts in the Municipalities of Basud and Daet with substantial variances.

To substitute our own judgment to the findings of the HRET will doubtless constitute an intrusion into its domain and a curtailment of
its power to act of its own accord on its evaluation of the evidentiary weight of testimonies presented before it. Thus, for failure of
Chato to discharge her burden of proving that the integrity of the questioned cards had not been preserved, no further protestations to
the use of the picture images of the ballots as stored in the CF cards should be entertained.

Chato attempts to convince us that the integrity of the physical ballots was preserved, while that of the CF cards was not. As
mentioned above, the integrity of the CF cards is already a settled matter. Anent that of the physical ballots, this is a factual issue
which calls for a re-calibration of evidence. Generally, we do not resolve factual questions unless the decision, resolution or order
brought to us for review can be shown to have been rendered or issued with grave abuse of discretion.

For a petition for certiorari to prosper, there must be a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion. There is
also grave abuse of discretion when there is a contravention of the Constitution, the law or existing jurisprudence.

In the case at bar, the HRET disposed of Chatos electoral protest without grave abuse of discretion. The herein assailed decision and
resolution were rendered on the bases of existing evidence and records presented before the HRET. The instant petition is dismissed
for lack of merit.

Case Digest: Mayor Maliksi v. COMELEC

G.R. No. 203302 : April 11, 2013

MAYOR EMMANUEL L. MALIKSI, Petitioner,v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HOMER T. SAQUILAYAN,

Respondents.
BERSAMIN, J.:

FACTS:

During the 2010 Elections, Saquilayan was proclaimed as winner for the position of Mayor of Imus, Cavite. Maliksi, the candidate
who garnered the second highest number of votes, brought an election protest in the RTC in Imus, Cavite alleging that there were
irregularities in the counting of votes in 209 clustered precincts. Subsequently, the RTC held a revision of the votes, and, based on the
results of the revision, declared Maliksi as the duly elected Mayor of Imus commanding Saquilayan to cease and desist from
performing the functions of said office. Saquilayan appealed to the COMELEC. In the meanwhile, the RTC granted Maliksi's motion
for execution pending appeal, and Maliksi was then installed as Mayor.

The COMELEC First Division, without giving notice to the parties, decided to recount the ballots through the use of the printouts of
the ballot images from the CF cards. Thus, it issued an order dated requiring Saquilayan to deposit the amount necessary to defray the
expenses for the decryption and printing of the ballot images. Later, it issued another order for Saquilayan to augment his cash deposit.

The First Division nullified the decision of the RTC and declared Saquilayan as the duly elected Mayor.

Maliksi filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that he had been denied his right to due process because he had not been notified
of the decryption proceedings. He argued that the resort to the printouts of the ballot images, which were secondary evidence, had
been unwarranted because there was no proof that the integrity of the paper ballots had not been preserved.

The COMELEC En Banc denied Maliksi's MR.

Maliksi then came to the Court via petition for certiorari, reiterating his objections to the decryption, printing, and examination of the
ballot images without prior notice to him, and to the use of the printouts of the ballot images in the recount proceedings conducted by
the First Division.

The Supreme Court via petition for certiorari dismissed the same. The Court then pronounced that the First Division did not abuse its
discretion in deciding to use the ballot images instead of the paper ballots, explaining that the printouts of the ballot images were not
secondary images, but considered original documents with the same evidentiary value as the official ballots under the Rule on
Electronic Evidence; and that the First Divisions finding that the ballots and the ballot boxes had been tampered had been fully
established by the large number of cases of double-shading discovered during the revision.

ISSUE: Whether the Supreme Court erred in dismissing the instant petition despite a clear violation of petitioner's constitutional right
to due process of law considering that decryption, printing and examination of the digital images of the ballots were done
inconspicuously upon motu propio directive of the COMELEC First Division sans any notice to the petitioner and for the first time on
appeal.

HELD: The decision of the court a quo is granted.

POLITICAL LAW notice to parties

Based on the pronouncement in Alliance of Barangay Concerns (ABC) v. Commission on Elections, the power of the COMELEC to
adopt procedures that will ensure the speedy resolution of its cases should still be exercised only after giving to all the parties the
opportunity to be heard on their opposing claims. The parties right to be heard upon adversarial issues and matters is never to be
waived or sacrificed, or to be treated so lightly because of the possibility of the substantial prejudice to be thereby caused to the
parties, or to any of them. Thus, the COMELEC En Banc should not have upheld the First Divisions deviation from the regular
procedure in the guise of speedily resolving the election protest, in view of its failure to provide the parties with notice of its
proceedings and an opportunity to be heard, the most basic requirements of due process.

The picture images of the ballots are electronic documents that are regarded as the equivalents of the original official ballots
themselves.In Vinzons-Chato v. House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal, G.R. No. 199149, January 22, 2013the Court held that
"the picture images of the ballots, as scanned and recorded by the PCOS, are likewise official ballots that faithfully capture in
electronic form the votes cast by the voter, as defined by Section 2(3) of R.A. No. 9369. As such, the printouts thereof are the
functional equivalent of the paper ballots filled out by the voters and, thus, may be used for purposes of revision of votes in an
electoral protest."

That the two documents the official ballot and its picture image are considered "original documents" simply means that both of them
are given equal probative weight. In short, when either is presented as evidence, one is not considered as weightier than the other.

But this juridical reality does not authorize the courts, the COMELEC, and the Electoral Tribunals to quickly and unilaterally resort to
the printouts of the picture images of the ballots in the proceedings had before them without notice to the parties. Despite the equal
probative weight accorded to the official ballots and the printouts of their picture images, the rules for the revision of ballots adopted
for their respective proceedings still consider the official ballots to be the primary or best evidence of the voters will. In that regard,
the picture images of the ballots are to be used only when it is first shown that the official ballots are lost or their integrity has been
compromised.

G.R. No. 162704 November 19, 2004

MEMORIA G. ENCINAS and ADOLFO A. BALBOA, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL BOOKSTORE, INC., respondent.
 DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Two certificates of title in the names of two different persons cover one and the same piece of land. The question in this case is who is
the rightful owner of the property.

The land in question is located at the corner of Epifanio de los Santos Avenue (EDSA) and Aurora Boulevard, Quezon City. It was
originally part of a larger piece of land designated as Lot No. 4-B-2-B of the subdivision plan Psd-20172,1 being a portion of Lot 4-B-
2 of Plan SWO-16797, per original survey for Valentin Afable, et. al. dated March 3, 1944. Lot No. 4-B-2-A of said plan was in the
name of Valentin Afable, while Lot No. 4-B-2-B of the same plan was in the name of Eugenio Evangelista. Lot 4-B-2-B had an area
of 8,371 square meters.2

Lot 4-B-2-B was later recorded in the names of the Heirs3 of one Simeon Evangelista under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-
219636, issued on June 22, 1976.4 The title indicated that the land was originally registered under Act No. 496 on October 3, 1927, in
the registration book of the Register of Deeds of Rizal, Vol. T-51, Page 218, pursuant to Decree No. 917, G.L.R.O. Record No. 197. 5

On December 4, 1978, the Heirs of Simeon Evangelista executed a deed of sale with mortgage of Lot 4-B-2-B in favor of the spouses
Nereo and Gloria Paculdo, resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. 219636 and the issuance of TCT No. 251175 6 in the names of the
Paculdo spouses, with the mortgage lien annotated thereon. For failure of the Paculdo spouses to pay their obligation under the
mortgage contract, the mortgage was extra-judicially foreclosed and the land sold at public auction to the Heirs of Simeon
Evangelista. On August 7, 1981, on the basis of the Sheriff's Certificate of Sale 7 executed in favor of the Heirs, TCT No. 251175 of the
Paculdo spouses was cancelled and TCT No. 279654 8 was issued in the name of the Heirs9 of Simeon Evangelista.

In 1982, an unsegregated portion measuring 906 square meters of Lot 4-B-2-B was expropriated by the Government for the widening
of Aurora Boulevard. The unsegregated portion was designated as Lot 4-B-2-B-1. The remaining portion of 7,465 square meters was
designated as Lot 4-B-2-B-2, the subject land. On May 23, 1983, the Heirs of Simeon Evangelista sold the subject land, to respondent
National Bookstore Inc. through a Deed of Sale with Real Estate Mortgage.10 Respondent took possession of the subject land, declared
the same for taxation purposes11 and was issued TCT No. 30086112 covering the subject land.

In 1994, petitioner Memoria G. Encinas, through her attorney-in-fact and herein co-petitioner Adolfo Balboa, filed a Petition13 for the
administrative reconstitution of her title, TCT No. 179854, which was supposedly burned in the fire that razed the Registry of Deeds
of Quezon City on June 11, 1988. To support her petition, she presented a copy of her Tax Declaration No. B-040-0163914 for the year
1985 allegedly covering the subject property and a certification15from the Acting Chief of the Revenue Collection Office of the
Quezon City Treasurer stating that the real property taxes on the said property have been paid up to 1994 under Tax Declaration No.
1639. On October 20, 1994, the Administrator of the Land Registration Authority (LRA), after investigation and verification that the
titles to be reconstituted do not overlap other properties, issued an order 16 reconstituting several transfer certificates of title, including
petitioner Encinas' TCT No. 179854. Pursuant to the order, the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City issued TCT No. RT-10302217 in
petitioner Encinas' name on November 9, 1994.

Petitioner offered the property covered by the reconstituted title for sale to Alfredo C. Ramos, the president of respondent. It was then
that respondent discovered that its TCT No. 300861 and petitioner's TCT No. RT-103022 referred to the same property, Lot No. 4-B-
2-B-2.

On July 17, 1997, after conducting an investigation on titles alleged to have been illegally reconstituted, the LRA Reconstitution
Officer issued a Supplemental Order dated July 17, 1997 and an Order dated June 8, 1999 which set aside the previous order of
reconstitution dated October 20, 1994, and in particular, directed the exclusion of the reconstitution of the original of TCT No. T-
179854.18

On February 28, 1996, respondent as plaintiff filed an action for quieting of title before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 215, alleging that it was the true and lawful owner of Lot 4-B-2-B-2 as evidenced by its TCT No. 300861. The complaint was
docketed as Civil Case No. Q-96-26716.

Petitioner Encinas as defendant denied respondent's allegations and stubbornly claimed that she was the real and absolute owner in fee
simple of the subject property and neither she nor her predecessor-in-interest ever sold the property to anybody. She relied on the
legality and regularity of the reconstitution of her title to the subject property. 19

On June 21, 1999, the RTC decided in favor of respondent. The trial court declared that while a reconstituted title has a prima facie
appearance of legality, the reconstitution of said title is subject to the proviso that no other certificate of title covering the same parcel
of land exists in the records of the registry. A certificate of title considered lost or destroyed, if found or recovered, prevails over the
reconstituted title. In Civil Case No. Q-96-26716, the original transfer certificate of title covering the property, TCT No. 300861 in
respondent's name, is on file with the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City and is one of the titles which were not burned in the fire of
June 1988. The owner's duplicate copy of the title is intact and in respondent's possession. Furthermore, respondent was able to show
how it acquired the property from its immediate predecessors and was able to account for the previous major transactions involving
the subject property until ownership thereof was transferred to respondent.
Petitioner Encinas, on the other hand, failed to present any evidence to show how she acquired ownership of the property. She merely
alleged that she was the owner in fee simple. To support her claim of ownership, she presented a tax declaration covering the property.
But it was shown that said tax declaration was tampered with and apparently falsified. Petitioner Encinas relied mainly on the
presumption of validity of her reconstituted title. However, as the trial court noted, the LRA Administrator eventually issued the
Supplemental Order of July 17, 1997 and Order of June 8, 1999 excluding petitioner Encinas' title from the reconstitution order. To
the trial court, not only was respondent able to prove its ownership of the subject property with preponderant evidence, but the case
had already become moot and academic by virtue of the LRA's cancellation of petitioner Encinas' reconstituted title. Hence, it upheld
respondent's title to the subject property and ordered the cancellation of petitioner Encinas' reconstituted title.20

Petitioners promptly moved for reconsideration. On November 10, 1999, the trial court granted the same and set aside its earlier
Decision.21 In a complete reversal of its previous ruling, the trial court upheld the validity of petitioner Encinas' title. According to the
trial court, petitioner Encinas' title, TCT No. 179854, was registered and issued on August 25, 1972 which should have served as
constructive notice to respondent whose title, TCT No. 300861, was issued only on June 6, 1983. The trial court also pointed out that
there is a manifest defect in respondent's title as to its origin: respondent's title is a derivative of an original certificate of title issued
pursuant to Decree No. 917, GLRO Record No. 197; however, said GLRO Record No. 197 referred to a piece of land located in
Bataan, not Quezon City. Respondent's title referred to a piece of land in Bataan and not the subject property. Hence, in the Order
dated November 10, 1999, the RTC nullified respondent's title, and declared petitioner Encinas' reconstituted title valid.

Respondent appealed the RTC Order of November 10, 1999 to the Court of Appeals. On October 27, 2003, the Court of Appeals
reversed and set aside the RTC Order and reinstated the RTC Decision of June 21, 1999. 22 The appellate court found that the
antecedents leading to respondent's acquisition of the property were clearly shown in the records and even annotated in its TCT No.
300861. On the other hand, petitioner Encinas failed to describe the circumstances of her ownership or possession of the land and to
identify her predecessor-in-interest or the manner by which she acquired the property. Petitioners again raised the argument that the
erroneous entry of the GLRO record number in respondent's title is a fatal defect which proves the title's invalid source. However, the
appellate court concluded that based on the testimony of petitioners' own witnesses, 23 the variance was merely a typographical or
clerical error. The same witnesses testified that in cases of such clerical errors, it is the technical description which controls. The
technical description in respondent's title described the subject property, Lot 4-B-2-B-2, located in Quezon City.

On the other hand, the technical description in petitioner Encinas' title refers to a different parcel of land. Her title describes a parcel of
land which is a portion of Lot 2-E-2 of plan SWO-16797, certainly not the subject property.

The Court of Appeals also observed that respondent was able to present tax declarations and real property tax bill receipts in its name
and in the name of its immediate predecessor, the Evangelista clan. While petitioners also presented a tax declaration and certification
from the Revenue Collection Office of Quezon City, upon closer scrutiny, said documents showed that petitioners had declared Lot 4-
B-2-B-1 for taxation purposes, and not Lot 4-B-2-B-2, the property subject of this case.24 It should be remembered that Lot 4-B-2-B-1
refers to the portion which was expropriated by the government.

Petitioners timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration25 of the appellate court's decision but this was denied on March 12,
2004.26 Hence, they filed this Petition for Review on Certiorari, alleging that the Court of Appeals "committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction in upholding the validity of [respondent's] purported TCT No. 300861
notwithstanding the abundance of competent evidence demonstrating positively that said title is spurious and fake." Petitioners insist
that the variance in the entries in respondent's TCT No. 300186 and GLRO Record No. 197 is not a mere typographical or clerical
error, but instead an indication of the fraudulent nature of respondent's title.

Petitioners submit that respondent's evidence failed to show that it proved its ownership of the subject property. In particular,
petitioners take issue with the Court of Appeals' alleged disregard of its evidence which allegedly demonstrates that respondent's title
to the subject property is fake and spurious. Petitioners harp on the supposed incongruity between the entries in the GLRO Record
Numbers in respondent's and petitioner's respective titles to the property.

Respondent, in its Comment, seeks to have the Petition dismissed on the ground that it raises only questions of fact which this Court
cannot entertain via a petition for certiorari.27

Indeed, this Court has held that factual findings of the trial court, when adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, are final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. However, there are several exceptions to the rule, namely: (1) when the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded
entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts;
(5) when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case
and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary
to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based;
(9) when the Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are premised on the
absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. 28

This case falls under one of the exceptions, as the factual conclusions of the trial court and the appellate court are in conflict with each
other. Hence, although the petition raises questions of fact since it entails a review of the evidence at hand, it may be entertained by
this Court.

The issue before this Court is whether petitioners were able to discharge their burden of proving the superiority of their title over the
title of respondent. The Court of Appeals upheld the initial Decision of the RTC and found the quantum of evidence presented by
petitioners insufficient. A review of the evidence reveals no compelling reason to reverse the appellate court's ruling.
In civil cases, the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of evidence. "Preponderance of
evidence" is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the
term "greater weight of the evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase which, in the
last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is
offered in opposition thereto.29a

Respondent as plaintiff was able to overcome the burden of proof and prove by preponderant evidence that it has a superior right and
title to the subject property. In contrast, petitioners as defendants seem to rely only on the alleged weakness of respondent's evidence,
without asserting any proof other than her reconstituted title to the subject property.

From the evidence, respondent derived its title from the title of its vendor, the Heirs of Simeon Evangelista, via a deed of sale. The
Heirs obtained their title from their predecessor-in-interest Simeon Evangelista. Prior to the transfer of the title to respondent, the
Heirs had sold the subject property to the Paculdo spouses in whose names another title was issued. However, the Heirs were able to
reclaim the property upon the failure of the Paculdo spouses to pay their mortgage obligation on the property. All these transactions
involving the property are well-documented.29 From the time respondent obtained the property, it protected its interest therein by
fencing off the property and designating security guards around its perimeter. 30 Respondent also exercised its obligation as owner by
paying real property taxes on the property it had acquired, evidenced by tax declarations issued in its name by the Quezon City
Assessor's Office.31

In contrast, petitioner Encinas asserts her right to the subject property via a reconstituted title, also presented in evidence. However,
other than the allegation in her Answer to respondent's Complaint (for quieting of title) that she is the owner in fee simple of the
subject property, petitioner Encinas failed to disclose before any of the judicial levels how she was able to acquire title to the property.
The trial court had intimated during the hearings that to get to the truth of the matter, it is important to trace the origins or source of the
titles of the properties.32 Counsel for petitioners had manifested time and again that petitioner Encinas herself, who was then in
Detroit, Michigan, would be presented to testify on the acquisition of the property, 33 but the hearings terminated without petitioner
Encinas ever making an appearance. Neither was her co-petitioner and attorney-in-fact Adolfo A. Balboa able to shed light on the
matter, as he clearly had no knowledge of the circumstances of petitioner Encinas' acquisition of the property. 34

Petitioners also cannot rely on Tax Declaration No. B-040-01639 allegedly issued in petitioner Encinas' name, since a tax declaration
with the same number was also issued in the name of respondent. Indeed, according to petitioner's witness, Dante M. Veloria,
Assistant City Assessor of Quezon City, there are many cases of duplication of tax declaration numbers in their office, and such
duplication does not necessarily mean that the duplicate tax declaration is spurious. The Assessor's Office rectifies the duplication by
adjusting the tax declaration number and annotating the correction at the back of the tax declaration and notifying the persons
concerned. The same witness noted that trouble arises when such duplications are not corrected, as in this case.

Instead of presenting evidence to prove the superiority of petitioner Encinas' title, petitioners rely only on the apparent weakness of
respondent's title, that is, the alleged fatal defect in GLRO Record No. 197 perpetuated in the titles of respondent and its predecessors-
in-interest.

Petitioners cite Lorenzana Food Corporation v. Court of Appeals35 in arguing that these errors cannot simply be qualified as mere
typographical errors. However, the facts of the cited case differ from the case at bar, and the ruling thereon cannot be blindly applied
to this case.

The Lorenzana case involved a large tract of land traversed by a railroad and divided into two parcels designated as Lots 1 and 2, both
parcels covered by a reconstituted title Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. (1020) RO-9. A separate OCT for Lot 1, OCT No.
(1898) RO-58 was issued, while Lot 2 remained covered by OCT No. (1020) RO-9. Lots 1 and 2 were subsequently subdivided and
titles to the resulting parcels of land were issued. However, the TCTs covering the subdivided parcels of Lot 1, while correctly
indicating OCT No. (1898) RO-58 of Lot 1 as its source, contained the technical description lifted from the OCT No. (1020) RO-9
covering Lot 2. Subsequent transactions of the subdivided parcels of land of Lot 1 resulted in the issuance of TCTs containing the
incorrect technical description as well as the inaccurate description of the location of the properties. The controversy arose when
Lorenzana, et al., learned that the same parcels were being claimed by therein respondent B.E. San Diego, Incorporated, based on
titles registered in the latter's name. The trial court found for respondent B.E. San Diego, as its titles were "not blemished by any
defect and were regularly issued." The trial court also considered in respondent B.E. San Diego's favor its open, adverse and
continuous possession of the disputed land since 1966 and its consistent payment of taxes thereon. This Court upheld the ruling of the
trial court. The defects appearing on the titles of Lorenzana, et al. relating to the lots' mother title, technical descriptions and
locations—judicially admitted by Lorenzana, et al.—were too glaring that they could not be dismissed as clerical and harmless in
character. The discrepancies in Lorenzana, et al.'s titles cannot be upheld against the unblemished titles of B.E. San Diego.

The same cannot be said of the alleged defect in respondent's title in the case at bar. In Lorenzana, the erroneous entries were too
numerous and evident, and involved significant portions of the titles. On the other hand, the claimed flaw in respondent's title and the
title of its predecessors-in-interest is GLRO Record No. 197, which petitioners assert should be GLRO Record No. 917. It is obvious
that such a defect involves only an interchanging of numbers. It is certainly believable that such variance in the copying of entries
could be merely a typographical or clerical error. Furthermore, as the Court of Appeals pointed out, petitioners' own witnesses
explained that the inconsistency in the entries in the GLRO record number could be due to clerical error, and in such case, the
technical description in the title should prevail over the record number.

It must be noted, too, that the original of respondent's title still exists and is with the Register of Deeds of Quezon City as it was not
one of the titles that were destroyed by the fire. Petitioner Encinas' title, on the other hand, is a reconstituted title, which was later
withdrawn by the same office which issued it, pursuant to the Supplemental Order dated July 17, 1997 and Order dated June 8, 1999. 36

Respondent has established by preponderant evidence that it is the rightful owner of the subject property. Petitioners have not.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED, no reversible error on the part of the Court of Appeals having been
adduced. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 115625. January 23, 1998]

ESMUNDO B. RIVERA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, AMY ROBLES, PEREGRINO MIRAMBEL and MERLINA
MIRAMBEL, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

In deciding this appeal, the Court relies on the rule that a party who has the burden of proof in a civil case must establish his
cause of action by a preponderance of evidence. When the evidence of the parties is in equipoise, or when there is a doubt as to where
the preponderance of evidence lies, the party with the burden of proof fails and the petition/complaint must thus be denied.

Statement of the Case

The foregoing dictum is applied by this Court in denying this petition for review on certiorari assailing the February 21, 1994
Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals[2] in CA-G.R. SP No. 32360, which held:

ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition for review is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[3]

The petition for review dismissed by the Court of Appeals challenged the decision[4] of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela,
Branch 172,[5] which disposed as follows:

The evidence on record presented by the plaintiff does not also show that his parents and himself have prior possession of the land in
question. The evidence presented by the defendants, however, show that they have been the caretaker of the said public land located at
Malinta, Valenzuela and adjacent to private lot of plaintiff since the year 1969 which was applied for by their principal, Jose Bayani
Salcedo under Miscellaneous Sales Application No. (111-6) 131 now MLI (13-1) 33-2D.

It is very evident that the defendants are not squatters on the private land of the plaintiff.

Accordingly, therefore, the Joint Decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court dated March 18, 1993 is hereby set aside and the three
complaints, Civil Case Nos. 5740, 5741 and 5742 of the Court a quo are hereby dismissed without pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.[6]

The Antecedent Facts

The facts are narrated by Respondent Court of Appeals as follows:

On July 19, 1990, petitioner filed complaints for ejectment against private respondents Amy Robles Peregrino Mirambel, and Merlina
Mirambel, docketed as Civil Case Nos. 5740, 5741 and 5742, respectively, before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Valenzuela, Branch
81.

On August 8, 1990, movant Jose Bayani A. Salcedo filed an urgent motion for intervention on the ground that he has a legal interest in
the subject for he applied for title of the public land under MSA No. (11-6) 131 (now MII [131-1] 33-D), which was denied on
January 2, 1991.

On August 8, 1990, private respondents filed their answers, respectively.

After submission of their position papers, the (Metropolitan Trial Court) rendered joint judgment in favor of the petitioner and against
the private respondents on March 18, 1993, the dispositive portion of which herein-below quoted:

In fine, by evidence plaintiff has preponderably established his cause of action.

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against each of the above-named defendants and any/all
persons claiming rights respectively under each of them, ordering the latter as follows:

1. In Civil Case No. 5740

a). To remove her house and to vacate plaintiffs land, together with all persons claiming rights under her;

b). To pay plaintiff reasonable compensation for her use and occupancy of the land from May 29, 1990 up to the
time that she actually vacates the same, at the rate of P500.00 a month;

c). To pay plaintiff attorneys fees in the sum of P3,500.00; and

d). To pay the costs of suit.

2. In Civil Case No. 5741

a). To remove his house and to vacate plaintiffs land, together with all persons claiming rights under him;

b). To pay plaintiff reasonable compensation for his use and occupancy of the land from May 29, 1990 up to the
time that he actually vacates the same, at the rate of P500.00 a month;

c). To pay plaintiff attorneys fees in the sum of P3,500.00; and

d). To pay the costs of suit.

3. In Civil Case No. 5742

a). To remove her house and to vacate plaintiffs land, together with all persons claiming rights under her;

b). To pay plaintiff reasonable compensation for her use and occupancy of the land from May 29, 1990 up to the
time that she actually vacates the same, at the rate of P500.00 a month;

c). To pay plaintiff attorneys fees in the sum of P3,500.00; and

d). To pay the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Dissatisfied, private respondent filed an appeal before the (Regional Trial Court) which rendered the assailed judgment on September
21, 1993 reversing and setting aside the decision of the (Metropolitan Trial Court). [7]

Thereafter, petitioner appealed to Respondent Court of Appeals, raising the following assignment of errors:
I
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT RESPONDENTS HOUSES ARE LOCATED ON
THE PUBLIC LAND APPLIED FOR BY COL. ATTY. JOSE BAYANI SALCEDO BASED MERELY ON A
LETTER DATED JUNE 7, 1971 BY THE DISTRICT LAND OFFICER OF THE BUREAU OF LAND ADDRESSED
TO EULOGIO J. RIVERA, PETITIONERS FATHER.
II
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONER AND HIS
PARENTS/PREDECESSOR-IN-INTEREST NEVER HAD PRIOR POSSESSION OF THE LAND AND THAT
INSTEAD IT WAS RESPONDENTS WHO HAVE BEEN IN OCCUPANCY THEREOF SINCE 1969 AS
CARETAKER OF COL. ATTY. JOSE BAYANI SALCEDO.
III
RESPONDENT JUDGE GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT PETITIONERS LAND ENCROACHED UPON
THE PUBLIC LAND APPLIED FOR BY COL. ATTY. JOSE BAYANI SALCEDO BY AN AREA OF MORE OR
LESS 400 SQUARE METERS DUE TO RESURVEYS MADE BY PETITIONER AND HIS PARENTS. [8]
As earlier noted, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for failure of petitioner, as plaintiff before the trial court, to prove a
cause of action. Hence, this petition for review.[9]

Public Respondents Ruling

In dismissing the petition, the Court of Appeals ruled as follows:

Petitioner maintains that the respondent court committed grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the decision of the trial court
particularly in finding that the lots where private respondents built their houses are outside of the land owned by the petitioner, it
appearing that such finding lacks evidentiary basis.

In the case at bar, petitioner seeks to eject herein private respondents who allegedly illegally constructed their house on his land. The
Metropolitan Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioner and ordered the private respondents to vacate the subject premises. On appeal,
however, the respondent court reversed the appealed judgment taking into consideration that the land where the house of the private
respondents stand is outside of the area owned by the petitioner, hence, there was no cause of action.

The decisive issue in the case at bar is whether or not the lot where private respondents constructed their abode within the land
[owned] by the petitioner.

The trial court believes so while the respondent court ruled otherwise and stated that the houses are located in a public land. After a
careful scrutiny of the decisions of the courts a quo, We find that both decisions are not supported by substantial evidence. The
decision of the trial court stated that: The evidence on hand indubitably (sic) show however that a title on the property has been issued
to herein plaintiff (petitioner herein). The claim of the defendants therefore that they are occupying a public land cannot be taken as
gospel truth. It must be noted, however, that there is no showing that the evidence on hand showed that the lot on which private
respondents constructed their abode are [sic] located in the titled property of the petitioner.The decision of the trial court disclosed that
its Order dated August 12, 1991, directing the Land Management Bureau to conduct a field survey and to submit a report thereof to
enable the Court to determine whether the land subject matter of these cases is a public or private land, was never implemented. It can
be seen that there is no certainty that the houses of the private respondents are located on the lot owned by the petitioner. Nor was
there an ocular inspection sanctioned by the court where the parties were duly represented. The Court cannot rely solely on the survey
commissioned by one party for it may be self-serving absent a thorough verification thereof.

The respondent courts reliance of a letter dated June 7, 1971 of the District Land Officer Jesus B. Tabao to petitioners predecessor-in-
interest informing him that his application cannot be given due course because of the prior application of Jose Bayani Salcedo (June
26, 1969) is misplaced for it does not proved anything. The abovementioned observations as pertaining to the trial courts finding that
the private land of the petitioner and his parents encroached upon the subject land of the public domain to an area of more or less 400
square meters due to re-survey made by the plaintiff and his parents.

In fine, We find that the courts a quo failed to make a definitive ruling on the issue of whether or not the houses constructed by the
private respondents are within the private land owned by the petitioner or a public land. The parties should have conducted a field
survey directed by the court below or to have an ocular inspection of the subject premises.

Verily, it appears that petitioner, as plaintiff failed to establish a cause of action, hence, the complaint must perforce be dismissed.[10]

The Issue

In his Memorandum dated February 22, 1996, Petitioner Esmundo B. Rivera formulated the issue as follows: whether private
respondents houses lie inside petitioners land, and whether petitioner was able to prove that fact. [11] Put differently, the issue for
resolution is whether or not petitioner proved his cause of action.

The Courts Ruling

The petition is unmeritorious.

Proof Required in Civil Cases

Basic is the rule in civil cases that the party having the burden of proof must establish his case by a preponderance of
evidence.[12] By preponderance of evidence is meant simply evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing than that which
is offered in opposition to it.[13] In the present ejectment case, petitioner (as plaintiff) has the burden of proving that the houses of
private respondents were located within his titled land. To justify a judgment in his favor, petitioner must therefore establish a
preponderance of evidence on this essential fact.
Petitioner points out that the field survey, verification and measurement of his land by his privately hired geodetic engineer,
Ildefonso Padigos, found that private respondents houses are situated inside the same. [14] Insisting on the findings of this private
survey, petitioner assails the Respondent Court of Appeals for considering the same undeserving of credence and belief and
insufficient to prove his case.[15]
This Court is not persuaded. The extant records of this case support the finding of the Court of Appeals that the aggregate of
evidence submitted by both parties was insufficient to determine with certainty whether the private respondents houses were inside the
petitioners titled property. As noted by Respondent Court, private respondents claim that their houses were built on public land, which
Attorney Salcedo applied for, is not convincing because petitioner has a transfer certificate of title over the same parcel of
land. Likewise unconvincing is the private survey commissioned by the petitioner himself to prove that the houses of private
respondents encroached on his property. The reliability of the survey would have been indubitable had it been properly authenticated
by the Bureau of Lands or by officials thereof.[16]
 Moreover, the field survey ordered by the Metropolitan Trial Court was never conducted. Neither was an ocular inspection of the
premises held in the presence of both parties. As correctly concluded by the Court of Appeals, the absence of both processes precluded
the final determination of the main issue.
Where the evidence on an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates[,] the party
having the burden of proof fails upon that issue. [17]Therefore, as neither party was able to make out a case, neither side could establish
its cause of action and prevail with the evidence it had. They are thus no better off than before they proceeded to litigate, and, as a
consequence thereof, the courts can only leave them as they are. In such cases, courts have no choice but to dismiss the
complaints/petitions.[18]
In any event, we are here called upon essentially to review the public respondents assessment of the weight of the evidence
presented by both parties. This factual question, however, may not be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. This rule is subject to well-recognized exceptions,[19] but petitioner failed to prove that this case falls under one of them. If for
this reason alone, the petition should be denied.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 117970. July 28, 1998]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ULYSSES M. CAWALING, ERNESTO TUMBAGAHAN,

RICARDO DE LOS SANTOS, and HILARIO CAJILO, accused-appellants.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

It is axiomatic that once an accused-appellant admits killing the victim, he bears the burden of establishing the presence of any
circumstance like self-defense, performance of a lawful duty or, for that matter, double jeopardy, which may relieve him of
responsibility, or which may mitigate his criminal liability. [1] If he fails to discharge this burden, his conviction becomes inevitable. In
this Decision, we also reiterate the following doctrines: (1) the regional trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over
informations for murder committed by public officers, including a town mayor; (2) the assessment of trial courts on the credibility of
witnesses and their testimonies deserve great respect; (3) the equipoise rule cannot be invoked where the evidence of the prosecution
is overwhelming; (4) alibi cannot be believed in the face of credible testimony identifying the appellants; and (5) conspiracy may be
proven by circumstantial evidence.

The Case

Before us is an appeal from the 34-page Decision[2] dated October 21, 1994, promulgated by the Regional Trial Court of Romblon in
Criminal Case No. OD-269. Convicted of murder were former Mayor Ulysses M. Cawaling and Policemen Ernesto
Tumbagahan,[3] Ricardo De los Santos and Hilario Cajilo.
Prior to the institution of the criminal case against all the appellants, an administrative case [4] had been filed before the National
Police Commission, in which Policemen Ernesto Tumbagahan, Ricardo De los Santos, Hilario Cajilo (three of herein appellants) and
Andres Fontamillas were charged by Nelson Ilisan[5] with the killing of his brother Ronie[6] Ilisan. On April 6, 1986, Adjudication
Board No. 14[7] rendered its Decision which found Tumbagahan, De los Santos, Cajilo and Fontamillas guilty of grave misconduct and
ordered their dismissal from the service with prejudice. [8] On June 26, 1986, the Board issued a resolution,[9] dismissing the
respondents motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.
Subsequently, on June 4, 1987, Second Assistant Provincial Fiscal Alexander Mortel filed, before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Odiongan, Romblon,[10] an Information for murder[11]against the appellants and Andres Fontamillas. The accusatory portion
reads:

That on or about the 4th day of December 1982, at around 9:00 oclock in the evening, in the Poblacion, [M]unicipality of San Jose,
[P]rovince of Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with intent to kill,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there, by means of treachery and with evident premeditation
and taking advantage of their superior strenght [sic] willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot RONIE ILISAN,
with the use of firearms, inflicting upon the latter multiple mortal injuries in different parts of his body which were the direct and
immediate cause of his death.

Accused Tumbagahan, De los Santos, Cajilo and Fontamillas, with the assistance of their lawyers Atty. Abelardo V. Calsado and
Juanito Dimaano, pleaded not guilty when arraigned on February 15, 1988; [12] while Accused Cawaling, assisted by Counsel Jovencio
Q. Mayor, entered a plea of not guilty on March 16, 1988.[13]
After due trial,[14] the court a quo[15] rendered its Decision dated October 21, 1994,[16] the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, this Court finds the accused (1) ULYSSES M. CAWALING, (2) ERNESTO TUMBAGAHAN, (3) RICARDO
DELOS SANTOS, (4) HILARIO CAJILO, AND (5) ANDRES FONTAMILLAS GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER under the Information, dated June 4, 1987, and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with the
accessory penalties of the law.

The accused, jointly and severally, are ORDERED to pay Nelson Elisan the sum of P6,000.00 as actual damages and the heirs of the
deceased Ronie Elisan the sums of P116,666.66 by way of lost earnings and P50,000.00 as indemnity for death, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

The bail bonds of all the accused are ORDERED CANCELLED and all said accused are ORDERED immediately confined in jail.

The slug (Exh. A); the .38 caliber revolver (with 3 empty shells and 3 live bullets) (Exh. G); and the slug of bullet (Exh. H) are
confiscated in favor of the government.

After the judgment has become final, the Officer-in-Charge, Office of the Clerk of Court, this Court, is ordered to deliver and deposit
the foregoing Exhibits A, F, G and H, inclusive, to the Provincial Director, PNP, of the Province of Romblon properly
receipted. Thereafter, the receipt must be attached to the record of the case and shall form part of the record.

The period of preventive imprisonment the accused had undergone shall be credited in their favor to its full extent pursuant to Article
29 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

The case against co-accused ALEX BATUIGAS who is at large is ORDERED ARCHIVED pending his arrest. [17]

Hence, this appeal.[18]

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

The trial court gives this summary of the facts as viewed by the prosecution witnesses:

The killing occurred on December 4, 1982 at around 9:00 oclock in the evening at the ricefield of Poblacion, San Jose, Romblon when
the bright moon was already above the sea at an angle of about 45 degrees, or if it was daytime, it was about 9:00 oclock in the
morning (Imelda Elisan Tumbagahon, on direct examination, tsn, Jan. 17, 1989, p. 5, and on cross examination, tsn, April 18, 1989, p.
22).

On December 4, 1982, about 8:00 oclock or 8:30 oclock in the evening, Vicente Elisan and his elder brother Ronie Elisan, the victim,
were drinking tuba at C & J-4 Kitchenette of co-accused Andres Fontamillas in Poblacion, San Jose, Romblon. When they stood up to
go home, Luz Venus, the wife of Diosdado Venus, told them not to go out because the accused were watching them outside about
three (3) meters from the restaurant. Diosdado Venus accompanied them upon their request and they went out and walked towards
home. About a hundred meters from the restaurant, the six (6) accused, that is, Mayor Cawaling, the four (4) policemen, namely,
Hilario Cajilo, Andres Fontamillas, Ernesto Tumbagahan and Ricardo delos Santos, and civilian Alex Batuigas, the mayors brother-in-
law, flashlighted them and Diosdado Venus ran going back. The two (2) brothers also ran towards home to the house of their elder
sister Imelda Elisan Tumbagahon. Co-accused Andres Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo blocked them on the gate of the fence of their
sisters house. Ronie Elisan ran towards the ricefield. The accused were chasing them. Vicente Elisan saw his brother Ronie f[a]ll
down on the ricefield while he ran towards the bushes and la[y] on the ground. Ronie Elisan rose up by kneeling and raising his two
(2) hands. All the six (6) accused approached him with their flashlights and shot him. Ronie fell down about twenty (20) meters from
the bushes where Vicente Elisan hid behind the coconut tree. Co-accused Cawaling said []you left him, he is already dead.[] Mayor
Cawaling was armed with .45 caliber, policemen Andres Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo were both with armalites, Ernesto
Tumbagahan and Ricardo delos Santos were both with .38 caliber and so with civilian Alex Batuigas. They left towards the house of
Mayor Cawaling. After they were gone, Vicente Elisan ran towards the house of his older brother Nelson Elisan. Upon seeing him,
Vicente told Nelson that Ronie was already dead. Nelson said nothing. While they were there, elder sister Imelda Elisan Tumbagahon,
who was crying came. She said: Manong, patay ron si Ronie. (Brother, Ronie is already dead). Nelson said []do not be noisy; they
might come back and kill all of us.[] Imelda stopped crying.

After a while, brothers Nelson and Vicente Elisan went to the house of barangay captain Aldolfo Tumbagahon. The three (3) went to
the townhall and called the police but there was none there. Going to the house of the Chief of Police Oscar Montero, they were told
by his wife that Commander Montero was in the house of Mayor Cawaling. They proceeded to the place where Ronie Elisan was
shot. The cadaver was brought to the house of Nelson Elisan. Vicente Elisan found an empty shell of a .45 caliber about three (3) arms
length from the body of the victim. They surrendered it to the Napolcom.[19]

Dr. Blandino C. Flores described the gunshot wounds of the victim as follows:

Gunshot Wounds:

1. Shoulder:

Gun shot wound x inch in diameter shoulder right 2 inches from the neck with contussion [sic] collar s[u]rrounding the wound.

2. Right Axilla:
Gun shot wound x inch in diameter, 2 inches below the right nipple with contussion [sic] collar s[u]rrounding the wound.

3. Left Axilla:

Exit of the gun shot wound from the right axilla, measuring x inch with edges everted, one inch below the axilla and one inch below
the level of the nipple.

4. Back:

Gun shot wound measuring x inch, along the vertebral column, right at the level of the 10th ribs with contussion [sic]collar.

5. Leg, Left:

Gun shot wound measuring x anterior aspect upper third leg with contussion [sic] collar, with the exit x posterior aspect upper third
leg, left.[20]

Based on the death certificate (Exhibit E) issued by Dr. Flores, Ronie Ilisan died of severe hemorrhage and gun shot wo[unds].[21]

Version of the Defense

Appellant Cawaling, in his 47-page Brief,[22] presented his own narration of the incident as follows:

At around 7:00 in the evening of December 4, 1982, Ulysses Cawaling, then the mayor of the [M]unicipality of San Jose in the
[P]rovince of Romblon, arrived aboard a hired motorized boat from Manila in the seashore of San Jose. From the seashore, he
immediately proceeded to his home. At around 7:30 in the evening, Cawaling went to the municipal hall to check on administrative
matters that piled up in the course of his trip to Manila. He also went inside the police station (located inside the municipal building)
to be apprised of any developments, afterwhich he went out and joined Pfc. Tumbagahan and Pfc. Cajilo who were standing near the
flagpole in front of the municipal building. The three engaged in a conversation. Cawaling learned that the two police officers were
the ones assigned for patrol/alert for that night. The three of them went inside the INP office and there Cawaling informed the two
policemen that he received information from reliable persons that certain persons were plotting to kill him and a member of the towns
police force. It is to be noted that this occurred at the height of the communist insurgency and political violence in the countryside in
the early 80s. Hence, such information was taken very seriously, having been relayed by sources independent of each other.

Cawaling, as town chief then empowered with supervisory authority over the local police, accompanied Pfc. Tumbagahan and Pfc.
Cajilo in conducting patrol and surveillance operations around the small municipality. He usually did this as routine since Romblon
was then plagued with political assassinations and armed conflict. On their way to the seashore, they passed by C & J-4 Kitchenette,
and chanced upon Ronnie Ilisan and his brother Vicente Ilisan drinking liquor and discussing in very loud voices. They stopped right
in the front of the restaurant and there they heard Ronnie Ilisan state in a every loud voice that he will kill a person that night. Inside
the restaurant, without the knowledge then of Cawaling and the two police officers, witness Gil Palacio, who was buying cigarettes
and Luz Venus, the cook/server of the restaurant, saw Ronnie Ilisan, very drunk, brandishing in the air a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson
revolver with a protruding screw.

Initially dismissing Ronnie Ilisans statement as just another hollow swagger of an intoxicated person (salitang lasing), Cawaling and
the two policemen proceeded on their way. After the patrol, they returned to the municipal building and stationed themselves in
front. At around 8:30 in the evening, Ronnie Elisan passed by the municipal hall walking towards the direction of the house of Nelson
Ilisan, another brother, and shouted the challenge, gawas ang maisog, meaning THOSE WHO ARE BRAVE, COME OUT. Cawaling
and the two police officers again brushed aside [the] challenge as just another foolish drunken revelry [o]n the part of Ronnie Ilisan, a
well-known troublemaker in the small municipality.

A few moments later, after Ronie Ilisan had passed by, they distinctly heard a gunshot and hysterical female voices shouting, pulis,
tabang meaning POLICE! HELP! four times. Impelled by the call of duty, Cawaling and the two policemen immediately ran in the
direction of the gunshot and the desperate female voices until they reached the house of Nelson Ilisan in San Jose Street. At this point,
they saw Ronnie Ilisan holding a .38 caliber revolver. They also saw Vicente Ilisan, Francisco Tesnado, Fe Ilisan, the wife of Nelson
and Delma Ilisan, the wife of Vicente, the latter two being the same persons who cried pulis, tabang four times. Cawaling then told
Ronnie to surrender his gun but the latter responded by pointing the gun at Cawaling and pulling the trigger.

At the precise moment that the gun fired, Cawaling warned the two policemen to drop to the ground by shouting dapa. Fortunately,
Cawaling was not hit. Ronnie Ilisan then turned around and ran towards the church. The two policemen gave chase. Cawaling, still
shaken and trembling after the mischance was initially left behind but followed shortly. When Ronnie Ilisan reached the church, he
turned around and again fired at the pursuing Pfc. Cajilo. Fortunately, the gun misfired. When they finally reached the ricefield, Pfc.
Cajilo fired two (2) warning shots in the air for Ronnie to surrender. Ronnie responded by firing once again at Pfc. Tumbagahan but
failed to hit the latter. At that instance, Pfc. Cajilo counter-fired at Ronnie Ilisan hitting him. Pfc. Tumbagahan also fired his weapon
in the heat of exchange and also hit Ronnie Ilisan. As a result of the gunshot wounds, Ronnie Ilisan later on succumbed.

Pfc. Tumbagahan picked up the gun still in the hand of the dead Ronnie Ilisan and gave it to Pfc. Cajilo. The three, Cawaling, who
subsequently caught up with them after the incident, and the two police officers, then proceeded to the police station located in the
municipal building to formally report the incident in their station blotter. [23]
 The Brief for All of the Accused-Appellants filed by Atty. Napoleon U. Galit and the Brief for Appellants Ernesto Tumbagahan
and Hilario Cajilo submitted by Atty. Joselito R. Enriquez merely repeated the facts as narrated by the trial court.

Ruling of the Trial Court

Finding the prosecution witnesses and their testimonies credible, the court a quo convicted the appellants. The killing was
qualified to murder because of the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength and treachery. The trial court ruled that
there was a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and his assailants, as the latter were greater in number and armed with
guns. It further ruled that abuse of superior strength absorbed treachery, as it ratiocinated:

Certain cases, an authority wrote, involving the killing of helpless victim by assailants superior to them in arms or numbers, or victims
who were overpowered before being killed, were decided on the theory that the killing was treacherous, when perhaps the correct
qualifying circumstance would be abuse of superiority. In these cases the attack was not sudden nor unexpected and the element of
surprise was lacking. (Id., I Aquino, pp. 423-424). In the instant case, we earlier ruled that the qualifying treachery should be
considered as an exception to the general rule on treachery because it was not present at the inception of the attack. The killing was
not sudden nor unexpected and the element of surprise was lacking. It is for this reason that we hold that alevosia should be deemed
absorbed or included in abuse of superiority. Even assuming ex-gratia argumenti that it should be the other way around, the situation
will not be of help, penaltywise, to the accused.[24]

The defenses raised by the appellants were dismissed and their witnesses declared unworthy of belief for the following reasons:

1. It was highly improbable that Defense Witness Tesnado would not tell his wife (Dory) and Bebelinia Ilisan Sacapao about the
incident he had allegedly witnessed; more so when Sacapao was the victims first cousin.

2. The spot report prepared by Station Commander Oscar M. Montero, the testimonies of Cajilo and Tumbagahan and the medical
findings of Dr. Flores contradicted one another on the following details: the caliber of the gun used in shooting the victim, the wounds
inflicted and the whereabouts of Cawaling during the shoot-out.

3. Cawaling and his men, armed with guns, could have immediately disarmed the victim at the initial encounter. The court could not
understand why the victim was able to fire his gun, run, then stop and again fire his gun, without being caught.

4. The positive identification made by the prosecution witnesses prevails over the alibi posed by De los Santos and Fontamillas, a
defense that was not corroborated by any other witness.

5. The .38 caliber revolver, allegedly owned by the victim, was in fact owned and used by Alex Batuigas.

6. The defense presented a photo and a sketch to prove that Imelda Ilisan Tumabagahan had an obstructed view of the killing. The trial
court ruled that such evidence was misleading, because the window, from where said witness allegedly saw the incident, was at the
eastern side of her house, and thus afforded a clear view of the incident, while the window referred to by the defense was at the
southern portion.

7. The questioned testimonies of Dr. Flores, Nelson Ilisan and Provincial Prosecutor Pedro Victoriano, Jr., though not formally offered
as evidence, may be admitted because of the failure of the defense to object thereto at the time they were called to testify.

8. The defense failed to prove that the prosecution witnesses had any ill motive to testify falsely against the appellant.

9. Appellants had a motive to kill the victim. Nelson Ilisan testified that his brother Ronie (the victim) had witnessed Bonifacio
Buenaventura (a former chief commander of the San Jose Police Force) kill a certain Ruben Ventura. Cawaling, who was
Buenaventuras first cousin, wanted Ronie dead, because the latter had not followed his instruction to leave town to prevent him from
testifying in said case.

Assignment of Errors

The appellants, through their common counsel, Atty. Napoleon Galit, assign the following errors to the lower court:

1. The trial court gravely erred in sustaining prosecutors theory of conspiracy and thus renders nugatory or has totally forgotten that
policemen when in actual call of duty normally operate in group but not necessarily in conspiracy.

2. The trial court gravely erred in believing the theory of the prosecution that accused-appellant Ulysses Cawaling was one of the
alleged co-conspirators in the killing of the deceased Ronnie Elisan.

3. The trial court gravely erred in not believing the defense of accused-appellant Ulysses Cawaling that he has nothing to do with the
shooting incident except to shout to arrest the accused[,] which prompted his co-accused policemen to chase the accused and sho[o]t
him when he resisted, after he fired at Mayor Cawaling.

4. The trial court gravely erred in not giving weight to accused-appellant policemen[s] testimonies which carry the presumption of
regularity.
5. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting all the accused-appellants by applying the equipoise rule thereby resulting [i]n
reasonable doubts on the guilt.[25]

In their joint brief,[26] Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo cite these other errors:

1. The trial court gravely erred in relying on the theory of the prosecution that accused-appellants Ernesto Tumbagahan and Hilario
Cajilo were alleged co-conspirators in the killing of the victim, Ronie Ilisan.

2. The trial court gravely erred in not believing the defense that herein accused-appellants merely did a lawful duty when the shooting
incident happened which led to the death of Ronnie Ilisan.

3. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting herein accused-appellants by applying the equipoise rule, thereby resulting in
reasonable doubt on their guilt.

4. Prescinding from the foregoing, herein accused-appellants do press and hold, that the lower court committed grave, serious
and reversible error in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of treachery (alevosia).

5. The lower court committed grave, serious and reversible error in convicting both accused-appellants of murder, instead merely of
homicide, defined and penalized under the Revised Penal Code.

6. The lower court committed grave, serious and reversible error in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of
superior strength.

7. The consummated crime being merely homicide, the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender should be considered to lower
the penalty of homicide.

8. The lower court committed error in not considering double jeopardy.

9. The lower court committed error in not dismissing the case for want of jurisdiction. [27]

Appellant Cawaling imputes these additional errors to the court a quo:

1. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting herein accused-appellant, Ulysses M. Cawaling, considering that he had no part in the
killing and the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt;

2. The trial court gravely erred in not finding the shooting incident a result of hot pursuit and shoot-out between the deceased Ronnie
Ilisan and the police officers in the performance of their duty and self-defense, and in sustaining the prosecutions conspiracy theory;

3. The trial court gravely erred in not acquitting Accused-Appellant Ulysses M. Cawaling considering that there was blatant absence
of due process in the proceedings tantamount to mistrial. [28]

This Courts Ruling

We affirm the conviction of the appellants. In so ruling, we will resolve the following issues: (1) jurisdiction of the trial court, (2)
double jeopardy, (3) credibility of prosecution witnesses and their testimonies, (4) self-defense, (5) performance of lawful duty, (6)
alibi, (7) conspiracy, (8) rule on equipoise, (9) qualifying circumstances, (10) damages and (11) attending circumstances as they affect
the penalty.
We shall address the first two issues as important preliminary questions and discuss the merits of the remaining ones, which we
have culled from the errors cited by the appellants in their aforementioned briefs.

First Issue:
Jurisdiction of the Trial Court

Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo argue that the trial court erred when it assumed jurisdiction over the criminal case. They
insist that the Sandiganbayan, not the regular courts, had jurisdiction to try and hear the case against the appellants, as they were
public officers at the time of the killing which was allegedly committed by reason of or in relation to their office.
We do not agree.
The jurisdiction of a court to try a criminal case is determined by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action. Once
the court acquires jurisdiction, it may not be ousted from the case by any subsequent events, such as a new legislation placing such
proceedings under the jurisdiction of another tribunal. The only recognized exceptions to the rule, which find no application in the
case at bar, arise when: (1) there is an express provision in the statute, or (2) the statute is clearly intended to apply to actions pending
before its enactment.[29]
The statutes pertinent to the issue are PD 1606, as amended;[30] and PD 1850, as amended by PD 1952 and BP 129.
Section 4 of PD 1606[31] reads:
Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. -- The Sandiganbayan shall exercise:

(a) Exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

xxxxxxxxx

(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those employed in
government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, that offenses or
felonies mentioned in this paragraph where the penalty prescribed by law does not exceed prision correccional or imprisonment for six
(6) years or a fine of P6,000.00 shall be tried by the proper Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court and
Municipal Circuit Trial Court.

xxxxxxxxx
However, former President Ferdinand Marcos issued two presidential decrees placing the members of the Integrated National
Police under the jurisdiction of courts-martial. Section 1 of PD 1952,[32] amending Section 1 of PD 1850, reads:

SECTION 1. Court Martial Jurisdiction over Integrated National Police and Members of the Armed Forces. Any provision of law to
the contrary notwithstanding -- (a) uniformed members of the Integrated National Police who commit any crime or offense cognizable
by the civil courts shall henceforth be exclusively tried by courts-martial pursuant to and in accordance with Commonwealth Act No.
408, as amended, otherwise known as the Articles of War; (b) all persons subjects to military law under Article 2 of the aforecited
Articles of War who commit any crime or offense shall be exclusively tried by courts-martial or their case disposed of under the said
Articles of War; Provided, that, in either of the aforementioned situations, the case shall be disposed of or tried by the proper civil or
judicial authorities when court-martial jurisdiction over the offense has prescribed under Article 38 of Commonwealth Act Numbered
408, as amended, or court-martial jurisdiction over the person of the accused military or Integrated National Police personnel can no
longer be exercised by virtue of their separation from the active service without jurisdiction having duly attached beforehand unless
otherwise provided by law:

PROVIDED FURTHER, THAT THE PRESIDENT MAY, IN THE INTEREST OF JUSTICE, ORDER OR DIRECT, AT ANY
TIME BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT, THAT A PARTICULAR CASE BE TRIED BY THE APPROPRIATE CIVIL COURT.

As used herein, the term uniformed members of the Integrated National Police shall refer to police officers, policemen, firemen, and
jail guards.

On the other hand, the jurisdiction of regular courts over civil and criminal cases was laid down in BP 129, the relevant portion
of which is quoted hereunder:

Sec. 20. Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases. -- Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the
exclusive jurisdiction of any court, tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the latter. [33]

In relation to the above, Section 4-a-2 of PD 1606, as amended by PD 1861, quoted earlier, lists two requisites that must concur
before the Sandiganbayan may exercise exclusive and original jurisdiction over a case: (a) the offense was committed by the accused
public officer in relation to his office; and (b) the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccionalor imprisonment for six
(6) years, or higher than a fine of six thousand pesos (P6,000).[34] Sanchez vs. Demetriou[35] clarified that murder or homicide may be
committed both by public officers and by private citizens, and that public office is not a constitutive element of said crime, viz.:

The relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall
into the intent of the Constitution, the relation has to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the office. In
other words, the office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as, for instance, the crimes defined
and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the Revised Penal Code.

Public office is not the essence of murder. The taking of human life is either murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or
public servant, and the penalty is the same except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary, took advantage of his office, as
alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is increased.

But the use or abuse of office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an aggravating circumstance, its materiality
arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals are public officials but from the manner of the
commission of the crime.

Furthermore, the Information filed against the appellants contains no allegation that appellants were public officers who
committed the crime in relation to their office. The charge was for murder, a felony punishable under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code. As clarified in Aguinaldo, et al. vs. Domagas, et al.,[36] [I]n the absence of such essential allegation, and since the present case
does not involve charges of violation of R.A. No. 3019 (the Anti-Graft etc. Act), the Sandiganbayan does not have jurisdiction over
the present case. (Bartolome vs. People, 142 SCRA 459 [1986] Even before considering the penalty prescribed by law for the offense
charged, it is thus essential to determine whether that offense was committed or alleged to have been committed by the public officers
and employees in relation to their offices.
Jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information.[37] In the absence of any allegation that the offense
was committed in relation to the office of appellants or was necessarily connected with the discharge of their functions, the regional
trial court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. [38]
 Second Issue:
Double Jeopardy

In seeking their acquittal, Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo also invoke their right against double jeopardy. They argue that the
first jeopardy attached when a criminal case for murder was filed before the Judge Advocate Generals Office (JAGO), which was
allegedly dismissed after several hearings had been conducted. [39] We are not persuaded.
There is double jeopardy when the following requisites are present: (1) a first jeopardy has attached prior to the second; (2) the
first jeopardy has been validly terminated; and, (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as that in the first. And the first jeopardy
attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered;
and (e) when the accused was acquitted or convicted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.[40]
For a better appreciation of appellants argument, we must consider PD 39 [41] and its implementing rules,[42] which prescribe the
procedure before a military commission. A summary preliminary investigation shall be conducted before trial for the purpose of
determining whether there is prima facie evidence to pursue trial before a military commission. The investigation report shall contain
a summary of the evidence, the acts constituting the offense or offenses committed, and the findings and recommendations of the
investigating officer. Thereafter, the report shall be forwarded to the judge advocate general, who shall determine for either the
defense secretary or for the AFP chief of staff whether the case shall be referred for trial to a military commission.[43] Where a prima
facie case is found against the accused, formal charges shall be signed by a commissioned officer designated by the judge advocate
general.[44] The accused shall then be arraigned, during which the charge and specification shall be read and the accused shall enter his
plea.[45] After hearings, a record of the trial shall be forwarded to the AFP chief of staff for proper action. [46]
In the present case, the appellants have presented no sufficient and conclusive evidence to show that they were charged,
arraigned and acquitted in a military commission, or that the case was dismissed therein without their consent. The defense merely
offered as evidence certain disposition forms[47] and a letter,[48] dated March 8, 1983, recommending that the case against Appellants
Tumbagahan, Cajilo and De los Santos be dropped and considered closed. [49] No charge sheet and record of arraignment and trial were
presented to establish the first jeopardy.
As pointed out by the solicitor general, appellants were never arraigned, they never pleaded before the Judge Advocate Generals
Office, there was no trial, and no judgment on the merits had been rendered. [50]

Third Issue:
Credibility of Witnesses

As a general rule, the factual findings of trial courts deserve respect and are not disturbed on appeal, unless some facts or
circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or misinterpreted, and would otherwise materially
affect the disposition of the case.[51] This rule, however, does not apply when the judge who penned the decision was not the same one
who had heard the prosecution witnesses testify,[52] as in the present case. Nonetheless, we have carefully perused and considered the
voluminous records of this case, and we find no reason to alter the findings of the court a quo in regard to the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses and their testimonies.
Vicente Ilisan, the victims brother, narrated before the trial court the circumstances relevant to the crime:
Q. In the evening of December 4, 1982, at about 8:00 or 8:30, where were you?
A. I was inside the restaurant of Andres Fontamillas.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. What were you doing there?
A. I was drinking tuba.
Q. When you were about to finish drinking tuba, what did you do?
A. I stood up preparing to go home.
Q. Were you able to leave that restaurant actually?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why?
A. Luz Venus told us not to go out when [I] stood up to go home.
Q. Do you know why you were advise[d] not to go out?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Why?
A. Because we were being watched by Mayor Cawaling, Andres Fontamillas, Hilario Cajilo and Alex Bat[ui]gas.
xxxxxxxxx
Q. When you were informed by Luz Venus that you should not go out because Mayor Cawaling and the persons you mentioned
were outside watching for you, what did you do?
A. We did not go out.
Q. Since you remained inside, what did you do?
A. I also viewed thru the window.
Q. Did you see them?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. How far were they from the restaurant?
A. About three meters.
Q. What were they doing outside the restaurant?
A. They were also viewing us.
Q. For how long did they remain there viewing you?
A. Just a short time.
Q. And later on, do you know where did they go? [sic]
A. No, sir. I went out from the restaurant and when I went out, I did not see them anymore.
Q. Before you went out of the restaurant, what did you do?
A. Diosdado Venus accompanied us.
Q. Why did you ask Diosdado Venus to accompany you?
A. Yes, sir. Because we were aware that we were being watched from outside so we asked to be accompanied by Diosdado Venus.
Q. From the restaurant accompanied by Diosdado Venus, what did you do?
A. Towards home.
Q. Were you able to reach home?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why, what happened on the way?
A. Diosdado Venus ran going back because we were lighted by a flashlight.
Q. How many flashlight[s] were trimed [sic] to you?
A. Six.
Q. Did you come to know who trimed [sic] the flashlight towards you?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Who were they?
A. Mayor Cawaling, Andres Fontamillas, Hilario Cajilo, Ernesto Tumbagahan, Ricardo delos Santos and Alex Batuigas.
Q. How were you able to recognize them when that was night time?
A. Because the flashlight[s] were bright.
Q. When Diosdado Venus ran back to his restaurant, what did your brother Ronie Elisan and you do?
A. We also ran towards home.
Q. To whose house?
A. That of my older sister Imelda [E]lisan.
Q. Were you able to reach that house?
A. No, sir.
Q. Why, what happened when you ran away?
A. Andres Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo were blocking us on the gate of the fence of my sisters house.
Q. Since your way was blocked, where did Ronie Elisan go?
A. We ran towards the ricefield.
Q. When you ran, what did Mayor Cawaling do?
A. They were chasing us.
Q. What about Alex Batuigas, what did he do?
A. He also followed helping chasing us. [sic]
Q. What about the four policemen, what did they do?
A. The same. They were also chasing us.
 Q. About how far is that restaurant [from] the spot where you were first lighted by the flashlight of the accused?
A. About one hundred meters.
Q. Now, according to you, you ran towards the ricefield, what happened while you were running towards the ricefield?
A. I saw my brother fell [sic] down.
Q. Fell down where?
A. On the ricefield.
Q. What about you, where were you when your brother fell down in the ricefield?
A. I ran towards the bushes.
Q. What did you do upon reaching the bushes?
A. I la[y] on the ground with my belly touch[ing] on the ground behind the coconut tree.
Q. When your brother according to you had fallen on the ricefield, what did he do thereafter?
A. He rose up, [raised] his hands and surrender[ed] to them.
Q In rising, what was his position?
A. He was rising like this. (Witness demonstrating by kneeling [and] raising his two hands).
Q. While Ronie Elisan was kneeling and raising both of his hands, what happened?
A. Mayor Cawaling approached him together with the four policemen and his brother-in-law and they shot him.
Q. Do you know what weapon[s] were used in shooting your brother?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What weapon were used?
A. The weapon of Mayor Cawaling is .45 caliber and that of Andres Fontamillas and Hilario Cajilo were both armalite and that of
Ernesto Tumbagahan, Alex Batuigas and Ricardo delos Santos were .38 caliber.
Q. How were you able to identify their weapons?
A. Because the flashlight[s] were bright.
Q. Now, what happened to your brother when he was fired upon by the accused in this case?
A. He fell down.
Q. And how far is that spot where your elder brother had fallen down to the spot where Diosdado Venus left you when he returned
to the restaurant?
A. To my estimate it is about 300 meters.
Q. After your brother had fallen down, what did the accused do?
A. Mayor Cawaling said, []you left him, he is already dead.[]
Q. Where did they go?
A. They went towards the house of Mayor Cawaling.[53]
Imelda Tumbagahan was at home feeding her child when she heard her brother Ronie shouting for help. After getting a flashlight
and looking through the window of her house, she saw Cawaling and Alex Batuigas chasing Ronie who was running towards her
house. Tumbagahan and De los Santos prevented Ronie from entering the fence of her house, as a result of which, her brother ran
towards a rice field nearby. There, on bended knees and with hands raised, Ronie was shot by Cawaling and his men. [54]
Nelson Ilisan also heard his younger brother Ronie shouting for help while being chased by the group of Cawaling. As Cajilo and
Fontamillas blocked Ronie from entering the gate of Imeldas house, the victim ran towards a rice field. Nelson stopped Cawaling and
asked, Nong, basi guinalagas ninyo ang acon hali? (Nong, why do you chase my brother?) But the mayor merely continued chasing
Ronie. Thereafter, Nelson saw his brother, on his knees with both hands raised, shot by appellants. [55]
The three aforementioned witnesses narrated in detail the assault against their brother Ronie and positively identified the
appellants as the perpetrators. The trial court cannot be faulted for relying on their testimonies and accepting them as
true,[56] especially when the defense failed, to prove any ill motive on their part. [57] In addition, family members who have witnessed
the killing of their loved one usually strive to remember the faces of the assailants. [58] Thus, the relationship per se of witnesses with
the victim does not necessarily mean that the former are biased. On the contrary, it is precisely such relationship that would impel
them to seek justice and put the real culprit behind bars, rather than impute the offense to the innocent.[59]
Appellant Cawaling submits that the prosecution witnesses tampered with the evidence by cleaning the cadaver before an
autopsy could be done. Such irregular washing of the cadaver by a close relative of the deceased, who is educated and who
presumably knew perfectly well the need to preserve it in its original state for the medico-legal examination[,] is highly suspicious. It
points to the fact that the relatives of the deceased wanted to hide, or erase something that would bolster and assist the defense (that is,
state of drunkenness, powder burns or lack thereof, indicating the firing of a weapon or the proximity of the weapon used on the
deceased, etc.).[60]
 Such contention is unavailing. First, Bebelinia Sacapao merely cleaned the cadaver and made no further
examination. Second, appellants had an opportunity to have the body examined again to determine or prove important matters, such as
whether Ronie was drunk, if he fired a gun, how many and what caliber of guns were used in shooting him; they did not, however,
avail themselves of this opportunity. As public officers, appellants knew that it was within their power to request or secure from the
court, or any other competent authority, an order for another autopsy[61] or any such evidence as may affirm their
innocence. Third, their conviction lies in the strong and convincing testimonial evidence of the prosecution, not in the corroborative
testimony of Bebelinia Sacapao.
Relying on the testimonies of Luz Venus and Gil Palacio, Appellant Cawaling also pointed out that [t]he power of observation of
alleged eyewitness Vicente was severely affected by his intoxication. It may be inferred that an intoxicated persons sense[s] of sight
and hearing and of touch are less acute than those of a sober person and that his observation are inexact as to what actually
occurred.[62]
This argument is not persuasive. The evidence presented fails to show that Vicente was so intoxicated that night as to affect his
powers of observation and retrospection. Defense Witness Palacio merely saw the witness drinking tuba on the night of the
killing.[63] Meanwhile the whole testimony of Luz on the matter mainly reveals that Ronie was the person she was referring to as
drunk, as shown by this portion:[64]
Q When Ronie and Vicente both surnamed Ilisan entered the C & J-4 kitchenette what if any did you observe?
A I saw them so dr[u]nk (Nakita ko sila lasing na lasing).
Q Who was lasing na lasing or so dr[u]nk?
A Ronie Ilisan sir.
Granting that Vicente was drunk, the conviction of the appellants is still inevitable in view of the positive declarations of
Witnesses Nelson and Imelda, who unequivocally identified appellants as perpetrators of the senseless killing of their brother Ronie.
Appellant Cawaling also questions the trial courts reliance on the testimonies of Dr. Blandino Flores, [65] Nelson
Ilisan[66] and Prosecutor Pedro Victoriano, Jr.,[67] for failure of the prosecution to offer them as evidence. In People vs. Java,[68] this
Court ruled that the testimony of a witness, although not formally offered in evidence, may still be admitted by the courts, if the other
party does not object to its presentation. The Court explained: Section 36 of [Rule 132] requires that an objection in the course of the
oral examination of a witness should be made as soon as the grounds therefor shall become reasonably apparent. Since no objection to
the admissibility of evidence was made in the court below, an objection raised for the first time on appeal will not be considered. In
the present case, a cursory reading of the stenographic notes reveals that the counsel for the appellants did not raise any objection
when said witnesses testified on the matters now being impugned. Moreover, they repeatedly cross-examined the witnesses, which
shows that they had waived their objections to the said testimonies of such witnesses.
Lastly, Appellant Mayor Cawaling questions the motive of Prosecutor Pedro Victoriano Jr. This contention is likewise bereft of
merit. Unlike judges who are mandated to display cold neutrality in hearing cases,[69] prosecutors are not required to divest themselves
of their personal convictions and refrain from exhibiting partiality. In this case, there is reasonable ground for Prosecutor Victoriano to
believe that an offense has been committed and that the accused was probably guilty thereof. [70] Under the circumstance, it is his
sworn duty to see that justice is served.[71] Thus, [h]e may prosecute with earnestness and vigor - - indeed, he should do so. But, while
he may strike hard blows, he is not at liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every legitimate means to bring about a just one.[72] Further,

Under the prevailing criminal procedure, the fiscals sphere of action is quite extensive, for he has very direct and active intervention in
the trial, assuming as the Governments representative the defense of society, which has been disturbed by the crime, and taking public
action as though he were the injured party, for the purpose of securing the offenders punishment, whenever the crime has been proved
and the guilt of the accused as the undoubted perpetrator thereof established. [73]

Fourth Issue:
Self-Defense

To escape criminal liability, the appellants also invoke the justifying circumstances of self-defense and lawful performance of
duty.[74] Allegedly, Ronie was firing his gun and shouting Guwa ang maisog! (Come out who is brave!). Then the mayor and the
policemen arrived at the scene to pacify him. Ronie fired at them, which forced them to chase him and return fire.
We find this scenario bereft of plausibility.
Unlawful aggression on the part of the victim is a condition sine qua non for the successful invocation of self-defense.[75] As
factually found by the trial court, unlawful aggression did not start with the victim, but rather with the appellants. Cawaling and his
men proceeded to the C & J-4 Kitchenette and waited for Ronie to come out. When the victim did, they chased and shot him without
giving him any opportunity to defend himself.
Granting arguendo the veracity of the defenses factual version, it is important to note that appellants admitted that Ronie was
running away from them when they chased and shot him.Thus, unlawful aggression -- assuming it was initially present had ceased,
and the appellants no longer had any right to pursue the offender. Basic is the rule that when unlawful aggression ceases, the defender
no longer has the right to kill or even wound the former aggressor. Upon the cessation of the unlawful aggression and the danger or
risk to life and limb, there should be a corresponding cessation of hostilities on the part of the person defending himself. [76]
Furthermore, the means employed to ward off the attack was unreasonably excessive. Being armed, the appellants could have
easily ordered the victim to surrender. Even the first shot at his shoulder would have been sufficient to immobilize him, yet they fired
a succession of shots at him while he was in no position to put up a defense.
 Jurisprudence teaches that when an accused admits having committed the crime but invokes self-defense to escape criminal
liability, the burden of proof is reversed and shifted to him.He must then prove the elements of self-defense.[77] It necessarily follows
that he must now rely on the strength of his own evidence and not on the weakness of that of the prosecution; for even if the latter
evidence were weak, it could not be disbelieved after the accused has admitted the killing. [78] Thus, appellants must establish with
clear and convincing evidence that the killing was justified, and that they incurred no criminal liability therefor.[79] They failed to do
so, and their conviction thus becomes inevitable.[80]

Fifth Issue:
Lawful Performance of Duties

Appellants contend that the killing of Ronie resulted from the lawful performance of their duties as police officers. However,
such justifying circumstance may be invoked only after the defense successfully proves that (1) the accused acted in the performance
of a duty, and (2) the injury or offense committed is the necessary consequence of the due performance or lawful exercise of such
duty.[81] These two requisites are wanting in this case.
The appellants, except Mayor Cawaling, were men in uniform who happened to be on duty when they killed Ronie. The victim
was not committing any offense at the time. Killing the victim under the circumstances of this case cannot in any wise be considered a
valid performance of a lawful duty by men who had sworn to maintain peace and order and to protect the lives of the people. As aptly
held in People vs. De la Cruz,[82] Performance of duties does not include murder. That Ronie was a troublemaker in their town is not
an excuse; as the Court declared in the same case of People vs. De la Cruz, Murder is never justified, regardless of the victim.

Sixth Issue:
Alibi

We likewise brush aside the defenses of alibi and denial raised by Appellant De los Santos. Prosecution witnesses positively
identified him and Fontamillas as part of the group which chased and shot Ronie Ilisan. It is elementary that alibi and denial are
outweighed by positive identification that is categorical, consistent and untainted by any ill motive on the part of the eyewitness
testifying on the matter. Alibi and denial, if not substantiated by clear and convincing evidence, are negative and self-serving evidence
undeserving of weight in law.[83]
In fact, De los Santos failed to establish with clear and convincing evidence that it was physically impossible for him to have
been at the scene of the crime during its commission.[84] The evidence he had presented demonstrated only that, at the time, he was
sleeping in his house, which was near the locus criminis.
Alibi is always considered with suspicion and received with caution, not only because it is inherently weak and unreliable, but
also because it is easily fabricated and concocted.[85] It is therefore incumbent upon the appellant to prove that he was at another place
when the felony was committed, and that it was physically impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime at the time it was
committed.[86] This he failed to prove.

Seventh Issue:
Conspiracy

The trial court correctly appreciated the presence of conspiracy. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it. Direct proof of conspiracy is rarely found, for criminals do
not write down their lawless plans and plots. The agreement to commit a crime, however, may be deduced from the mode and manner
of the commission of the offense or inferred from acts that point to a joint purpose and design, concerted action, and community of
intent.[87] It does not matter who inflicted the mortal wound, as the act of one is the act of all, and each incurs the same criminal
liability.[88] We concur with the trial courts elucidation:

All of the accused chased the victim and his brother; four (4) of whom blocked their ways, first, to their elder brother Nelson Elisans
house and, second, to their elder sister Imelda Elisan Tumbagahons house. Having changed course by proceeding to the ricefield in
their desperate attempt to evade the accused, all the six (6) armed accused continued their pursuit. Their victim, having fallen on the
rice paddy, and rising and kneeling on it with raised hands, all the said accused with their flashlights beamed on their victim, in a
united and concerted manner, shot him. After Ronie Elisan had fallen down, co-accused Mayor Cawaling was even heard as saying
(Y)ou left [sic] him, he is already dead. x x x.[89]

Eighth Issue:
Equipoise Rule

We reject appellants position that the equipoise rule should apply to this case. [90] In People vs. Lagnas,[91] the Court through Mr.
Justice Florenz D. Regalado described this rule, as follows:

Once again, albeit in effect a supportive and cumulative consideration in view of the preceding disquisition, the equipoise rule finds
application in this case, that is, if the inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is
consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral
certainty, and is not sufficient to support a conviction.
 In this case, the inculpatory facts point to only one conclusion: appellants are guilty. As amplified in the discussion above, the
Court agrees with the trial court that the guilt of the appellants was proven beyond reasonable doubt.

Ninth Issue:
Murder or Homicide?

The Information alleges three qualifying circumstances: treachery, evident premeditation and taking advantage of superior
strength. If appreciated, any one of these will qualify the killing to murder. However, Appellants Tumbagahan and Cajilo posit that
there was no treachery, reasoning that Ronie was not an unsuspecting victim, as he had been forewarned by Diosdado Venus of the
presence of the appellants inside the restaurant and there had been a chase prior to the killing. Further, they contend that abuse of
superior strength is deemed absorbed in treachery, and that the addition of abuse of superior strength to qualify the case to murder is
nothing more than mere repetition - a legal chicanery, so to say. Similarly, where treachery is not proved, there can be no abuse of
superior strength, vice-versa.[92]
We partly agree.
Treachery exists when the malefactors employ means and methods that tend directly and especially to insure their execution
without risk to themselves arising from the defense which the victims might make. The essence of treachery is the sudden and
unexpected attack without the slightest provocation on the part of the person attacked.[93] While we do not disregard the fact that the
victim, together with his brother Vicente, was able to run towards a rice field, we still believe that treachery attended the killing.
In People vs. Landicho,[94] we ruled that treachery might still be appreciated even when the victim was warned of danger to his
person, for what is decisive is that the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
The appellants waited for Ronie to come out of the restaurant. All of them chased the victim and prevented him from seeking
refuge either in the house of his sister Imelda or that of his brother Nelson. All of them carried firearms and flashlights. They fired
their guns at the victim while he was on his knees with arms raised, manifesting his intention not to fight back.
We cannot appreciate the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, however, as we have consistently ruled that it
is deemed absorbed in treachery.[95]
We also affirm the finding of the trial court that the prosecution failed to prove the attending circumstance of evident
premeditation. To prove this aggravating circumstance, the prosecution must show the following: (1) the time when the offender
determined to commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the offender clung to his determination; and (3) a lapse of time,
between the determination to commit the crime and the execution thereof, sufficient to allow the offender to reflect upon the
consequences of his act.[96] Nothing in the records shows how and when the plan to kill was hatched, or how much time had elapsed
before it was carried out.

Tenth Issue:
Damages

The trial court awarded the following: (a) P50,000.00, as civil indemnity; (b) P6,000.00, as actual damages; and (c) P116,666.66,
for lost earnings. In computing the latter, the trial court used the following formula:

Total annual net income = 10% x total annual gross income

= .10 x P25,000.00
= P2,500.00
xxx xxx xxx

Loss of earning capacity of Ronie Elisan = 2/3 (90-20) x P2,500.00 = P116,666.66.[97]

Consistent with jurisprudence, we affirm the ruling of the trial court awarding the amount of P50,000 as civil indemnity to the
heirs of the victim.[98]
We cannot do the same to the award of actual damages and lost earnings, however. The award of actual damages has no basis, as
no receipts were presented to substantiate the expenses allegedly incurred. An alleged pecuniary loss must be established by credible
evidence before actual damages may be awarded.[99] Similarly erroneous is the award for loss of earning capacity, which should be
computed as follows:[100]

2/3 x [80 - age of victim at the time of death] x [reasonable portion of the annual net income which would have been received as
support by heirs]

As testified to by Nelson Ilisan, the deceased had been earning an average of P100 daily or P3,000 monthly.[101] From this
monthly income must be deducted the reasonable amount of P1,000 representing the living and other necessary expenses of the
deceased. Hence, the lost earnings of the deceased should be computed as follows:

= 2/3 x [80 - 22] x [P24,000]

= 2/3 x [58] x [P24,000]
= 2[P 1,392,000]
3
= P2,784,000
 3
= P928,000.

Eleventh Issue:
Aggravating and Mitigating Circumstances

Prior to the amendment of Section 248 of the Revised Penal Code, [102] the imposable penalty for murder was reclusion
temporal in its maximum period to death. In their Brief, Appellants Cajilo and Tumbagahan argue for the imposition of the lower
penalty of reclusion temporal, contending that their filing of bail bonds/property bonds, before the order for their arrest was issued,
should be treated as voluntary surrender.[103]
We cannot accept this contention. In the first place, it has no factual basis. The warrant for the arrest of herein appellants was
issued on August 18, 1987,[104] but appellants counsel filed the Urgent Motion for Bail only thereafter, on September 2, 1987. [105] In
the second place, appellants failed to prove the requisites for voluntary surrender, which are: (1) the offender has not been actually
arrested; (2) the offender surrenders himself to a person in authority or to the latters agent; and (3) the surrender is voluntary.[106] The
records reveal that a warrant of arrest was actually served on Tumbagahan and Cajilo [107] on September 2, 1987 and that they were in
fact detained.[108]
In view of the absence of any other aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the trial court correctly imposed reclusion perpetua.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS: (1) the award of P6,000 as actual damages is DELETED,and (2) the award for loss of earning capacity
is INCREASED to P928,000. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.

SPS. ALBERTO and JOCELYN G.R. No. 157593

AZANA,

Petitioners, Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,

- v e r s u s - CORONA,

AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.

CRISTOPHER LUMBO and

ELIZABETH LUMBO-JIMENEZ,

Respondents. Promulgated:

March 22, 2007

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

In this appeal by certiorari, spouses Alberto and Jocelyn Azana assail the decision [1] dated September 17, 2002 and resolution [2] dated
March 12, 2003 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60973. After a re-evaluation of the evidence on record, the
appellate court held that the trial courts factual findings were contrary to the evidence presented and, on that basis, reversed the latters
ruling.
Originally, respondents filed an action for quieting of title [3] in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Kalibo, Aklan. The subject matter of
the action was a piece of real property located in the island of Boracay, a prime tourist destination. It was designated as Lot 64 during
the national reservation survey of Boracay on April 14, 1976.

Respondents alleged that they were the owners of Lot 64. They claimed that, in a deed of absolute sale dated December 1,
1996, the spouses Emilio and Estela Gregorio sold Lot 64 to petitioners. This cast a cloud over their title.

To support their claim of ownership, respondents stated that Lot 64 was originally part of the 8.0488-hectare land bought in a
public auction by their parents, which they inherited entirely; that such sale in the public auction was evidenced by a final bill of sale
dated September 18, 1939; that Lot 64 was separately designated during the national reservation survey only because it was also being
claimed by the spouses Gregorio; and that, if Lots 63 and 64 were combined, the boundaries of the resulting lot coincided with the
boundaries of the lot purchased under the final bill of sale.

For their part, petitioners claim that they purchased Lot 64 from the spouses Gregorio in good faith; that the spouses Gregorio became
the lawful owners of Lot 64 by virtue of a deed of absolute sale dated March 25, 1976 executed by Ignacio Bandiola in favor of Estela
Gregorio whereby Bandiola transferred to Gregorio a parcel of land with an area of 3.4768 hectares; and that Lot 64 was part of this
3.4768-hectare land.

According to the RTC of Kalibo, Aklan, respondents failed to establish the identity of the lot sold under the final bill of sale.
Consequently, their claim of title over Lot 64 also had to fail. In the words of the court a quo:

Assaying the evidence presented by the parties in relation to their respective submissions, the Court noted
that the land acquired by [respondents] parents at the public auction is not solely bounded on the North and East by
[the] Visayan Sea, but also by Anunciacion Gelito and Guillermo Sualog, respectively. Indeed, [respondents] own
survey plan discloses that Lots 63 and 64 [are] bounded by Lot 62 and seashore.

Hence, it is not clear that the land acquired by [respondents] parents at an auction sale includes Lot 64. The Court
could probably sustain [respondents] theory if the said land is solely bounded on the North and East by [the]
Visayan Sea or seashore. There would be no space for any intervening lot. [4] (citations omitted)

Finding equiponderance of evidence[5], the trial court ruled in favor of petitioners and upheld the validity of the sale of Lot 64 to them.

On review, the CA arrived at a different conclusion. It declared respondents as owners of Lot 64 and nullified the sale by the spouses
Gregorio to petitioners. The appellate court agreed with respondents that Lot 64 was part of the 8.0488-hectare property described in
the final bill of sale. As opposed to the findings of the trial court, the appellate court was satisfied that the boundaries of the lot
resulting from the merger of Lots 63 and 64 coincided with the boundaries of the 8.0488 hectare property. Moreover, the CA noted
that the areas of Lots 63 and 64 were 7.0300 hectares and 1.2012 hectares respectively, meaning that the area resulting from the
combination of the two lots was equivalent to 8.0000 hectares, more or less, which [was] the total area being claimed by the
[respondents].[6]

Aggrieved, the spouses Gregorio and the spouses Azana filed in this Court separate petitions for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The petitions were separately docketed as G.R. No. 157617 [7] and G.R. No. 157593, respectively. The Court
instantly denied both petitions for essentially raising questions of fact which are generally beyond our review.

Thereafter, both the Gregorios and petitioners filed their respective motions for reconsideration. The Court denied the MR [8] of the
spouses Gregorio, in effect denying G.R. No. 157617 with finality.

Meanwhile, the MR of the spouses Azana was granted. As a general rule, it is not the Supreme Courts function to
review, examine and evaluate or weigh the probative value of the evidence presented. [9] The factual findings of the trial and
appellate courts are binding on this Court and are given great weight and respect. [10] However, the rule is not absolute. In
instances where there is divergence in the findings and conclusions of the trial court, on one hand, and the appellate court, on the
other, the Court may give the petition due course and re-examine the evidence on record.[11] Satisfied that the foregoing exception
applies to this case, the Court ordered the reinstatement of G.R. No. 157593 (this petition).
Respondents oppose the petition on the ground that it is already barred by prior judgment. They argue that the dismissal of the
Gregorios petition (G.R. No. 157617) was a final judgment constituting a bar to the institution of a similar petition.

Respondents position is incorrect. Res judicata calls for the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) there is final judgment or
order; (2) the court rendering it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the judgment or order is on the merits and
(4) there is, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and causes of action.[12] Here, the first requisite is absent. The
Courts resolution denying the spouses Gregorios petition is not the final judgment contemplated by the first requisite. Rather, final
judgment entails a decision which perpetually settles the controversy and lays to rest all questions raised. At that point, there was no
final judgment because the spouses Azanas appeal of the CA decision was still pending before us. Stated differently, there was yet no
final judgment which could be entered and executed.

We now proceed to consider the documents relied upon by the parties.

To prove their claim, petitioners submitted a deed of absolute sale of real property[13] dated March 25, 1976 to show that Ignacio
Bandiola sold to Estela Gregorio 3.4768 hectares of land located in Manoc-Manoc, Malay, Aklan. The property was particularly
described as follows:

THE PORTION SOLD CONSISTS of 3.4768 hectares, more or less, located at the southern side of the whole parcel
and with the following pertinent boundaries: on the North by Visayan Sea and Ernesto Bandiola; on the East by
Visayan Sea; on the South by Felicitas Lumbo, D. Pelayo, and D. Magapi; and on the West by Teodorica
Bandiola.[14]

They also presented the corresponding tax declaration[15] which reiterated the same property boundaries.

Petitioners point out that a portion of this property was separately declared for realty tax purposes under ARP/TD No. 93-
011-1020/1021 as Lot 64 with an area of 1.48 hectares. [16] The tax declaration indicated that the boundaries of Lot 64 were:

North: Visayan Sea South: Lot 63

West: lot 99-pt East: Visayan Sea

In the hope of strengthening their case, petitioners narrated the supposed origin of the disputed property. They claimed that
the 3.4768-hectare property was taken from the consolidated lots owned by Ignacio Bandiola, i.e., three contiguous parcels of land
with individual areas of 8.7766 hectares, 6550 square-meters and 4994 square-meters.[17]From this land mass, Ignacio Bandiola carved
out 3.4768 hectares and sold the same to Estela Gregorio. Allegedly, this portion included Lot 64 which Estela Gregorio, in turn, sold
to petitioners.

Granting for the sake of argument that petitioners preceding allegations are true, it follows that Ignacio Bandiolas lots, if taken as one,
must have extended to the Visayan Sea in the east to have roped in Lot 64. It also follows that at least one of the lots should have the
Visayan Sea as its eastern boundary. However, this conclusion is belied by the tax declarations petitioners themselves presented. Not
one of the tax declarations stated that any of Bandiolas lots was bound in the east by the Visayan Sea. On the contrary, all the tax
declarations stated that each of the lots was bound in the east by a particular land mass:

Tax Declaration No. 3066

Land Area: 8.7766 hectares

Boundaries: North Visayan Sea

East Lorenzo Lumbo,

Vanancio Maming
 West Conchita Tirol, Visayan Sea

South Moises Pelayo, Paula Gelito[18]

Tax Declaration No. 3087

Land Area: 0.6550 hectare

Boundaries: North Visayan Sea

East Felicitas Alag de Lumbo

West Felicitas Alag de Lumbo

South Quirica Lumbo[19]

Tax Declaration No. 3068

Land Area: 0.4994 hectare

Boundaries: North Ignacio Bandiola

East Anunciacion Gelito and

F.A. Lumbo

West Ignacio Bandiola

South Gertrudes Casimero &

Salvador Magapi[20]

Petitioners strained to explain the discrepancy by pointing out that Lot 64 was but a mere portion of the three parcels of land covered
by the [three] tax declarations. xxx. It [was] therefore, quite unlikely that Lot 64 would have the exact same boundaries as any or all of
these [three] parcels.[21]

We find their explanation wanting. If, indeed, Lot 64 was part of Ignacio Bandiolas mass of properties it would have been in its south-
east corner, occupying part of its southern and eastern perimeter. [22] Therefore, the parcels of land covered by the three tax
declarations must reflect southern and/or eastern boundaries similar to those of Lot 64. But, as explained earlier, none of the lots was
enclosed or partly enclosed in the east by the sea. It is highly unlikely that the corner portion of the mother property would not have
similar boundaries as those of the latter on at least two sides.

The Court is not inclined to pronounce which of the documents presented by petitioners is true and correct. It is enough to
say that the evidence they presented cast doubt on the validity of their claim. Petitioners failed to establish, by preponderance of
evidence, the exact perimeters of the land which they claim as their own.

On the other hand, respondents anchor their claim over Lot 64 on a final bill of sale [23] dated September 18, 1939. Apparently, the
document was executed in favor of Lorenzo and Felicitas Lumbo who bought an 8.0488-hectare property in a public auction. It stated:

That on September 30, 1937, the real property under Tax Declaration No. 6523 was forfeited to the Government in
the manner and form prescribed by Act 3995 known as the Assessment Law, for non-payment of land taxes
corresponding to the years 1931 to 1937, inclusive, the description of which follows:

A parcel of cocal land situated in the barrio of Manocmanoc, municipality of Buruanga, province
of Capiz, Philippines, having an area of 80, 488 square meters more or less. Bounded on the North
by Visayan Sea; on the East by the property of Guillermo Sualog and Visayan Sea; on the South
 by the property of Moises Pelayo; and on the West by the properties of Venancio Maming and
Lucino Gelito, and assessed at P1040.00. x x x.[24]

The trial court discredited the final bill of sale by highlighting the fact that the property bought at the public auction was not solely
bound on the north and east by the Visayan Sea but also by the properties of Anuncion Gelito and Guillermo Sualog, respectively.
With this, the trial court deduced that there was an intervening space which should not have been there if the lot referred to in the
document included Lot 64. Thus, the final bill of sale must pertain to a different parcel of land.

We find the trial courts conclusion inaccurate. The Gelito and Sualog properties were not located between the Visayan Sea and the
disputed property. Otherwise, the tax declarations and final bill of sale would have indicated that the Lumbo property was solely
bound in the north by the Gelito property and in the east by the Sualog property. A cursory look at the survey map [25] reveals that the
perimeter of the Lumbo property ran along the Visayan Sea and Gelitos property in the north, and the Visayan Sea and Sualogs
property in the east. Naturally, the tax declarations and final bill of sale included the two properties mentioned as part of the
boundaries of the Lumbo property.

Petitioners underscore the seeming irregularities in the description of the property under the final bill of sale, a deed of sale dated May
20, 1939 and the tax declarations for the years 1991 and 1993 in the names of respondents. They posit that these irregularities negate
respondents claim of legal or equitable title and ultimately justify the resolution of the case in their favor.

A deed of absolute sale[26] was executed on May 20, 1939 between Pantaleon Maming and the respondents parents, stipulating the sale
to the Lumbos of an approximate area of [five hectares], being a part of the land under Tax No. 6523 in the name of Pantaleon
Maming.[27] Petitioners emphasize the fact that the property sold under the final bill of sale was the same lot under Tax Declaration
No. 6523. This discrepancy supposedly blurred the identification of the property claimed by respondents.

We disagree.

The CA sufficiently reconciled the difference in the land areas in the two deeds:

xxx. It may be asked why there were two deeds of sale covering the same property. We find credence in
[respondents] explanation. The public auction was held on 13 September 1938 and therefore Pantaleon Maming had
up to 13 September 1939 to redeem the property. Before the expiration of the period of redemption, Lorenzo Lumbo
bought [five] hectares of the [eight]-hectare property in an attempt, as [respondents] put it, to persuade Maming not
to redeem the property. This can be inferred from the price of P500.00 he paid for the [five] hectares while in the
auction sale held, he bought the entire 8.0488 hectares for only P56.78. xxx.[28]

Next, petitioners highlight the tax declarations filed by respondents for the years 1991 [29] and 1993[30] covering Lot 63 only. In the
absence of contrary evidence, tax declarations, being official documents, enjoy a presumption of truth as to their contents. Petitioners
contend that, unlike them, respondents never actually declared Lot 64 as theirs and cannot therefore claim ownership of the property.

Jurisprudence is consistent that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership of the properties stated therein. [31] A
disclaimer is even printed on their face that they are issued only in connection with real property taxation [and] should not be
considered as title to the property. At best, tax declarations are an indicia of possession in the concept of an owner.[32] However, non-
declaration of a property for tax purposes does not necessarily negate ownership. [33]

From the foregoing, the fact that both tax declarations in the names of respondents covered Lot 63 only did not necessarily mean they
did not own Lot 64 as they were in fact able to present a document evidencing ownership of both properties ― the final bill of sale.

Clearly, respondents have been able to establish by preponderance of evidence that they are the rightful owners of Lot 64.

When an owner of real property is disturbed in any way in his rights over the property by the unfounded claim of others, he may bring
an action for quieting of title. The purpose of the action is to remove the cloud on his title created by any instrument, record,
encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid and prejudicial to his title.[34]

Here, the deeds of sale executed in favor of petitioners and the spouses Gregorio were prima facie valid and enforceable. However,
further scrutiny and investigation established that petitioners predecessor-in-interest, Ignacio Bandiola, could not have owned the
disputed lot. Consequently, the subsequent conveyances of Lot 64 to the spouses Gregorio and thereafter, to petitioners, were null and
void. Therefore, respondents, as the adjudged owners of Lot 64, are entitled to have the aforementioned deeds of sale nullified to
remove any doubt regarding their ownership of the lot.

While the appellate court adequately explained its decision, it failed to categorically declare the deeds of sale as null and void in its
dispositive portion. Since it is the dispositive portion of the decision which shall be carried out, it is important that the status of the
deeds of sale be clearly stated therein.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision dated September 17, 2002 and resolution dated March 12,
2003 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMEDwith the MODIFICATION that the deed of absolute sale dated March 25, 1976, in so
far as it covers Lot 64, and the deed of absolute sale dated December 1, 1996 are hereby declared null and void. Costs against
petitioners.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 115430 November 23, 1995

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ELIZABETH GANGUSO Y DECENA, accused-appellant.
DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The accused-appellant appeals from the joint decision 1 of Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal
Cases Nos. 92-1932 and 92-1933 convicting her of the violation of Section 15, Article III of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, and of illegal possession of firearms. This decision was rendered after a motion for new
trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence 2 was granted.3The earlier judgment of conviction was set aside.4

The accusatory portions of the informations under which the appellant was tried and convicted read as follows:

Criminal Case No. 92-1932

That on or about the 26th day of November, 1992 in Pasay City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Elizabeth Ganguso y Decena, without authority of law did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver to another Methamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu), a
regulated drug.

Contrary to law. 5

Criminal Case No. 92-1933

That on or about the 26th day of November, 1992 in Pasay City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, Elizabeth Ganguso y Decena with intent to use, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in her possession, custody and control a .38 cal (Paltik) revolver, without
the necessary license to possess the same.

Contrary to law.6

The evidence for the prosecution is summarized by the trial court as follows:

That at about 7:30 in the evening of November 26, 1992, Major Juvenile Sulapas, Officer-in-charge, Dangerous
Drugs Enforcement Section, Pasay City Police Station, received confidential report from an informant about
rampant trafficking of drugs by a certain "Beth Tomboy", who lives at house No. 2445, Celedonia Street, Pasay
City; that a buy-bust operation was planned by subject officer and a briefing conducted wherein PO3 Dennis
Vermug was to act as poseur-buyer, backed-up by SPO1 Lumapat, SPO1 Gabutin, PO3s Mendoza and Garcia with
SPO3 Fucanan as team leader; Major Sulapas provided PO3 Vermug with a P500.00 bill, the serial number of which
was entered in the police blotter. Proceeding to the target area aboard two (2) tricycles at about 8:10 P.M., "Beth
Tomboy" was pointed at by the informant to PO3 Vermug, who lost no time in offering to buy P500.00 worth of
shabu, to the suspect while the rest of the team members were observing from a distance; that "Beth Tomboy", after
accepting the money, went into an interior alley to get the stuff from a man to whom she also handed the money;
that as soon as she returned, she handed an aluminum packet (Exh. "B-1-a") to PO3 Vermug who, upon executing a
pre-arranged signal to his companions arrested the suspect. When frisked subsequent to the arrest by SPO2
Prudencio Lumapat, the suspect yielded a .38 caliber Paltik revolver; that PO3 Vermug ran after the man in the alley
to recover the buy-bust money but failed to catch him. The suspect, who turned out to be Elizabeth Ganguso y
Decena, a tomboy, was brought to Headquarters and accordingly charged of drug pushing and illegal possession of
firearm. The testimony of PO3 Dennis Vermug was corroborated in material points by SPO2 Prudencio Lumapat
and SPO3 Dalmacio Fucanan.

The prosecution marked and offered following documentary exhibits which the Court admitted in evidence: For
Criminal Case No. 92-1932: Exhibit "A", letter request for laboratory examination; Exhibit "B", white letter
envelope containing Exhibit "B-1", transparent plastic bag and Exhibit "B-1-a", aluminum foil containing shabu;
Exhibit "C", certification and DDB Report No. DD 92-1439, which found the specimen positive for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride; and, Exhibit "E", affidavit of arrest (both for Crim. Cases No. 92-1932 and 92-
1933). For Criminal Case No. 92-1933: Exhibit "A", FEO Certification that accused is not a licensed firearm holder;
Exhibit "B", .38 caliber revolver; and Exhibit "C" and "D" live .38 caliber bullets.7

On the other hand, the appellant testified that at around 8:00 p.m., of 26 November 1992, she was washing clothes by the side of her
house at No. 2445 Celedonia Street corner Decena Street, Pasay City. At that time, there were two other persons in her house, namely,
her cousin Elvira de Leon and her cousin's maid, Ligaya Rojas. Suddenly, seven police officers barged into her house and, in her
presence, searched the premises without a search warrant. They also searched her person. The policemen found nothing illegal in the
house nor did they find anything on her. She was made to board a tricycle and was brought to the police station. At the station, a
police officer by the name of Carbonell asked her who was selling shabu in their place, but she could not give him any name as she
did not know. She denied selling shabu to PO3 Vermug. She also denied that a .38 caliber revolver was recovered from her.8

At the new trial, the defense presented Elvira de Leon and Lilia Magallanes, who tried to show that no firearm was confiscated from
the appellant and that no buy-bust operation took place. Lilia claimed that she saw the arrival of five policemen riding on two
tricycles. The policemen entered the house of the appellant without talking to anyone at the door. According to Elvira, she heard the
appellant and the policemen arguing inside the house, with the former asking the policemen whether they had a warrant and the latter
answering that they needed none as they were just going to ask her a few questions.
The trial court considered as credible the narration by the police witnesses of the events which led to the arrest of the accused. It
disregarded the appellant's defense of alibi as well as the testimonies of her witnesses at the new trial which it found as "untruthful and
contradictory to each other on material points."9 It then convicted the accused of both charges and sentenced her as follows: (1) in
Criminal Case No. 92-1932 — to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00, plus costs; and (2) in
Criminal Case No. 92-1933 — to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve
years and one day, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P17,000.00, plus costs.

In this appeal, the appellant urges us to acquit her because the trial court erred

IN FINDING THAT THE PROSECUTION HAS FULLY MET THE TEST OF MORAL CERTAINTY AS TO
THE GUILT OF THE ACCUSED ON BOTH CHARGES OF VIOLATION OF SECTION 15, ARTICLE III OF
REPUBLIC ACT 6425 AND PESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 1866;

II

IN ADMITTING AS EVIDENCE THE .38 CALIBER [REVOLVER] (EXHIBIT "B") AGAINST THE ACCUSED
DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF A BUY-BUST OPERATION JUSTIFYING WARRANTLESS ARREST UNDER
SECTION 5, RULE 113 OF THE RULES OF COURT.

In the first assigned error, the appellant assails the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses as inconsistent and unconvincing. She
points out that both SPO2 Lumapat and SPO3 Fucanan could not have seen the object of the transaction between her and PO3
Vermug, since they were watching from a distance. She further asserts that the absence of prior surveillance and the non-presentation
of the marked money cast doubt on her guilt for the crime charged.

In her second assigned error, the appellant maintains that since her warrantless arrest did not come under Section 5, Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court, the same was unlawful; hence, the warrantless search and seizure of the firearm, assuming that she had it, was also
unlawful. Elsewise stated, if an arrest without a warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made, nothing that happens or is discovered
afterwards can make it lawful, for the fruit of a poisoned tree is necessarily tainted. 10

In its Brief, the Appellee, through the Office of the Solicitor General, submits that the trial court committed no error in finding the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged but asks for a modification of the penalties imposed. It recommends
that in the light of the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 7659 to R.A. No. 6425, as amended, and of the decision of this Court
in People vs. Simon,11 the penalty to be imposed in Criminal Case No. 92-1932 should be an indeterminate sentence of two to four
years of prision correccional. 12 It, however, asks this Court to review and clarify its ruling in Simon regarding the application of
penalties and then submits that the adoption in R.A. No. 7659 of the penalties in the Revised Penal Code does not make the offense
under the Dangerous Drugs Act punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and that the said Act as thus further amended by R.A. No.
7659 remains a special law; hence, under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, "the imposable penalty should be that whose minimum
term should not be less than the minimum prescribed by the special law (the Dangerous Drugs Act); i.e., not lower than six (6) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional." The Appellee also contends that the imposable penalty in Criminal Case No. 92-1933 should
be "seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, as minimum, to twenty (20) years, both of reclusion temporal, respectively,
pursuant to the first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. 1866." 13

An accused has in his favor the presumption of innocence which the Bill of Rights guarantees. 14 Unless his guilt is shown beyond
reasonable doubt,15 he must be acquitted. This reasonable doubt standard is demanded by the due process clause of the Constitution
which protects the accused from conviction except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.16 The burden of proof is on the prosecution, and unless it discharges that burden the accused need not even
offer evidence in his behalf, and he would be entitled to an acquittal. 17 Proof beyond reasonable doubt does not, of course, mean such
degree of proof as excluding possibility of error, produces absolute certainty. Moral certainty only is required, or that degree of proof
which produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind.18 The conscience must be satisfied that the accused is responsible for the offense
charged.19

The evidence for the prosecution has established that when the poseur-buyer, PO3 Vermug, was already in front of the appellant, the
former asked her if he could buy P500.00 worth of "S" (shabu). After she received the money, she went toward the interior where she
met a man to whom she handed the money. The man then gave her something. She returned to where Vermug was and gave to him
that something she received from the man. Thereupon, Vermug placed it in his pocket and arrested the appellant. Thus:

Q So when you approached her, wearing a white t-shirt, what happened next?

A I handed P500.00 to Beth.

Q You immediately handed to her P500.00 without telling her anything?

A First, I talked to her and asked her if I could buy P500.00 worth
of "S".

Q How did you talk to her?

A I approached her and told her that I was going to buy P500.00 worth of "S" and handed to her
the P500.00.
 Q What are the exact words that you told her?

A "Beth PABILI NG WORTH P500.00 NG "S".

Q What did Beth Tomboy say if any?

A She got the money.

Q Without telling you anything?

A By saying: "SANDALI LANG".

xxx xxx xxx

Q After Beth received the P500.00, what did she do, if any?

A She went inside an interior and talked with a man, a tall and well built man.

Q How far was this man from your position?

A More or less five (5) meters away, sir.

Q After Beth approached this man, what happened next?

A That man gave something to Beth.

Q If you know what was that something handed down by the man to Beth?

A The shabu we were buying.

Q After the man handed Beth something as you said the shabu, what did Beth do, if any?

A She returned to me and delivered to me the stuff.

Q Did you receive the stuff?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did you do next?

A I held my head with my left hand, as our pre-arranged signal.

Q Where was Beth that time?

A Just in front of me.

Q What happened next?

A Immediately after delivering to me the stuff, I held my head and at the same time introduced
myself as police officer and held Beth, after that, my companions arrived and took hold of Beth.
On my part, I ran after the man whom Beth talked to earlier. 20

We cannot, even by any stretch of the imagination, say that the appellant was merely used by PO3 Vermug to buy shabu. In the first
place, she was the target of the buy-bust operation, there having been an information received at the police station that she was
engaged in selling drugs. Second, she did not know Vermug; hence, she could not be expected to oblige him by buying a dangerous
drug for him. Third, it was to her that Vermug's offer to buy was made.

The version offered by the prosecution is susceptible of two interpretations though. One of which is that the appellant was engaged in
the buy-and-sell of dangerous drugs. When Vermug offered to buy P500.00 worth of "S" and the appellant got the money without
asking what "S" meant, it was apparent that she already understood what "S" stood for. There was, therefore, a meeting of minds upon
a definite object and upon the price. The appellant's acceptance of the payment was an indication that she had given her consent to the
contract of sale. It was a clear evidence that the contract between her and Vermug was perfected and was even partially fulfilled and
executed.21

The appellant did not, however, have in her possession or disposition the object of the sale. Article 1459 of the Civil Code provides in
part that the vendor must have a right to transfer the ownership of the subject sold at the time it is delivered. This means that the seller
must be the owner of the thing sold at the time of delivery. But, he need not be the owner at the time of the perfection of the
contract.22 There is no doubt that the appellant had already a right to dispose of the prohibited stuff at the time she delivered it to
Vermug, for ownership thereof was acquired by her from the moment it was delivered to her by the man from the interior after her
payment of the price therefor.23 Two transactions were then consummated, viz., that between the appellant and Vermug, with the
appellant as the seller, and that between the appellant and the man from the interior, with the former as the buyer.

The other interpretation is that the appellant was merely acting as an agent of the supplier or seller of dangerous drugs. In either way,
she is criminally liable. In the first interpretation, she is culpable for selling dangerous drugs, and in the second, for delivering such
drugs, Section 15 of R.A. No. 6425, as further amended by R.A. No. 7659, provides:

Sec. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation, and Distribution of Regulated Drugs. — The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall
be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or distribute any
regulated drug. (emphasis supplied)

The fact that Vermug did not open the aluminum foil given by the appellant to him does not destroy the evidence for the prosecution.
It must be noted that when the man in the interior handed that "something" to the appellant, Vermug believed that the same was shabu,
thus:

Q After Beth approached this man, what happened next?

A That man gave something to Beth.

Q If you know what was that something handed down by the man to Beth?

A The shabu we were buying.24

It was understandable that he did not bother to open that "something," as he was apparently in a hurry to arrest the appellant and the
man from whom the stuff was obtained. He kept the stuff in his pocket, and upon reaching their office, he turned it over to Antonio
Conlu, who then marked it with his initials "AC." When the latter opened the foil, Vermug saw a crystalline substance which, upon
examination by the Forensic Chemist, gave a positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, confirming therefore his belief that
it was shabu.

The fact that SPO2 Lumapat and SPO3 Fucanan were not able to see at close range the object of the transaction between the appellant
and Vermug does not adversely affect the evidence for the prosecution. Their testimonies regarding the buy-bust operation, being
merely corroborative, are not indispensable for the conviction of the appellant. Neither are prior surveillance and the presentation in
evidence of the marked money. It has been held that a prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment
operation25 especially when the buy-bust team members were accompanied to the scene by their informant.26 The absence of the
marked money neither creates a hiatus in the evidence for the prosecution so long as the sale of the dangerous drugs is adequately
proven27 and the drug subject of the transaction is presented before the court. 28

There being proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto in the act of selling shabu, her conviction
must stand.

The penalty imposed on her should, however, be modified in view of R.A. No. 7659. Notably, the trial court's decision was rendered
on 12 January 1994 and promulgated on 10 March 1994. R.A. No. 7659 took effect on 31 December 1993 yet. The trial judge must
not have been aware of that law yet or was hesitant to apply it to this case. Being patently favorable to the appellant, that amendatory
law should be applied retroactively to the instant case.

It is now settled that where the quantity of methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu) is less than 200 grams, the penalty is prision
correccional to reclusion temporal depending upon the quantity. The shabu sold by and confiscated from the appellant weighs 0.1954
grams only. Applying R.A. No. 7659, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and the People vs. Simon29 case, and there being neither
aggravating nor mitigating circumstances, the proper penalty should be that within the range of arresto mayor in its medium period, as
minimum, to prision correccional in its medium period, as maximum.

The submission of the Appellee that the minimum term to be imposed on the appellant should not be less than the minimum
prescribed in R.A. No. 6425, as further amended by R.A. No, 7659, must be rejected. This Court's ruling on this matter in
the Simon case is clear. Thus:

It is true that Section 1 of [the Indeterminate Sentence Law], after providing for indeterminate sentence for an
offense under the Revised Penal Code, states that "if the offense is punished by any other law, the court shall
sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence, the maximum term of which shall not exceed the maximum fixed
by said law and the minimum shall not be less than the minimum term prescribed by the same." We hold that this
quoted portion of the section indubitably refers to an offense under a special law wherein the penalty imposed was
not taken from and is without reference to the Revised Penal Code, as discussed in the preceding illustrations, such
that it may be said that the "offense is punished" under that law.

There can be no sensible debate that the aforequoted rule on indeterminate sentence for offenses under special laws
was necessary because of the nature of the former type of penalties under said laws which were not included or
contemplated in the scale of penalties in Article 71 of the Code, hence there could be no minimum "within the range
of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense," as is the rule for felonies therein. . . .

We repeat, Republic Act No. 6425, as now amended by Republic Act. No. 7659, has unqualifiedly adopted the
penalties under the Revised Penal Code in their technical terms, hence with their technical signification and effects.
 In fact, for purposes of determining the maximum of said sentence, we have applied the provisions of the amended
Section 20 of said law to arrive at prision correccional and Article 64 of the Code to impose the same in the medium
period. Such offense, although provided for a special law, is now in effect punished by and under the Revised Penal
Code. Correlatively, to determine the minimum, we must apply the first part of the aforesaid Section 1 which directs
that "in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by the Revised Penal Code, or its amendments, the court
shall sentence the accused to an indeterminate sentence the maximum term of which shall be that which, in view of
the attending circumstances, could be properly imposed under the rules of said Code, and the minimum which shall
be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by the Code for the offense." (Emphasis ours.)

This Court, however, has serious doubts about the alleged confiscation of the firearm from the accused. SPO2 Lumapat declared in a
cavalier fashion that he just happened to touch the accused's right waistline and felt something hard which turned out to be a rusty
firearm with a string attached to its handle, and when he remarked, "O may baril ka," the accused told him that the gun was not hers.
Thus:

Q After Dennis Vermug surrendered this person who looked like a man to you, what did you do?

A After Dennis Vermug handed to me the person of the accused I happened to touch something
hard at the waistline of the suspect sir.

Q Which waistline did you touch?

A Right waistline sir.

Q After you were able to touched [sic] hard object on the right waistline of the suspect, what did
you do next?

A I did not release it anymore and I took it and I found it to be a gun sir.

Q What did you see [sic] if any to the suspect after you got the said gun from her right waistline?

A I was only able to utter "O may baril ka."

Q What was the reply of the suspect?

A According to her the gun was not hers sir.

Q Can you describe to us the gun which you recovered?

A It was something rusty and the handle has a string sir.

Q What kind of gun is it?

A .38 caliber sir.30

Yet, team leader Fucanan testified on direct examination that it was only in their office that he actually saw the gun and
learned that it was a .38 caliber. Thus:

Q Why do you know that it is a .38 caliber?

A We saw it in our office.31

According to Lumapat, the gun is somewhat rusty with a string attached to the handle. Absent any evidence of any
derogatory report against her as a possessor of an unlicensed firearm, this Court finds it incredulous for the appellant to keep
in her waistline a rusty firearm, the handle of which was merely tied or bound together by a copper wire. Then too, she was
not even investigated on the firearm and made to sign any paper wherein she acknowledged that a firearm was taken from
her. Neither did Lumapat issue her a receipt for the firearm. She should therefore be acquitted, there being a reasonable doubt
that she had in her possession an unlicensed firearm at the time she was arrested.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is partly GRANTED, and the challenged decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 92-1932 and 92-1933 of
Branch 114 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City is hereby MODIFIED. As modified, accused-appellant ELIZABETH
GANGUSO Y DECENA is hereby ACQUITTED in Criminal Case No. 92-1933 on ground of reasonable doubt. The penalty imposed
on her in Criminal Case No. 92-1932 is hereby reduced to an indeterminate sentence of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to three (3) years of prision correccional, as maximum.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 94187 November 4, 1992

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
TIRSO GARCIA and VICENTE TORREJAS, accused.

VICENTE TORREJAS, appellant.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Appellant Vicente Torrejas appeals from the decision, promulgated on 20 April 1990, of Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Bohol in Criminal Case No. 5696 the dispositive portion of which provides:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that accused Vicente Torrejas is GUILTY beyond doubt (sic) of the crime charged
for which he is hereby sentenced to life imprisonment and to pay the costs. He is also ordered to pay the heirs of
Flaviano Gonzales legal indemnity of P30,000.00 as well as reimbursement of (sic) the stolen articles in the sum of
P5,600.00.

SO ORDERED.1

Together with Tirso Garcia, appellant was charged with the crime of robbery with homicide in an information which reads:

The undersigned, Third Assistant Provincial Fiscal, hereby accuses Tirso Garcia alias Mamerto, Maming, Ranny
and Vicente Torrejas both of Kinan-oan, Trinidad, province of Bohol, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, (sic) conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with each other,
with intent to gain and by the use of violence or intimidation upon persons did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously enter the inhabited house of Flaviano Gonzales and once inside the said house, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and felonoiusly take, steal and carry away therefrom against the consent of the owner thereof,
money in cash in the amount of Five Thousand Six Hundred Pesos (P5,600.00) Philippine Currency, and assorted
family documents on real properties belonging to and owned by the said Flaviano Gonzales, and by reason or on
occasion of the said robbery the accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with intent to
kill and without justifiable cause, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault attack and hit the
victim Flaviano Gonzales with the use of blunt instruments thereby inflicting physical injuries or mortal wounds on
the said victim which resulted to his immediate death and to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of the deceased in
an amount to be proved during the trial of the case.

Acts committed contrary to the provisions of Article 293 and 294 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Art. 48 of
the same Code, with the aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strenght (sic) and disregard of the respect
due the offended party on account of his age, the later being already 78 years old at the time of the incident. 2

Accused Tirso Garcia disappeared after the incident and remains at large.

Only appellant was arraigned; because of his plea of not guilty, trial on the merits ensued. The version of the prosecution, as testified
to by witnesses Socorro Gonzales, Eusebio Nagulada and Dr. Dalmacio Javellana, is summarized by the People in its Appellee's Brief
as follows: 3

In the early morning of June 30, 1988, Socorro Gonzales left her house at Kinan-oan, Trinidad, Bohol and
proceeded to the market of Trinidad to sell tobacco, as it was her town's market day (pp. 2-3, tsn, June 14, 1989).
Her 79-year-old husband Flaviano Gonzales, also known as "Falab," who was then not suffering from any serious
illness, just stayed at their home (ibid).

Later that same morning, Eusebio Nagulada called at Flaviano's house at Kinan-oan, Trinidad, Bohol to ask him the
amount of P40.00 as payment for services rendered as errand boy and all-around helper of Flaviano and his wife,
which amount he intended to spend on the market (pp. 2-5, tsn, June 13, 1989). Flaviano, however, handed to him
the amount of P100.00 (ibid.). Subsequently, Nagulada left Flaviano and proceeded to the market at Trinidad,
Bohol. After he had purchased what he needed, he gave the P60.00 change of Flaviano to the latter's wife, Socorro,
who was also at the market. Socorro, instead, returned to him the amount of P26.00 and requested Nagulada to buy
rice, battery (sic), fish and sugar for delivery to her husband (pp. 6-8, tsn, June 13, 1989). Nagulada complied and
upon completing his errand proceeded to the house of Flaviano to deliver the articles purchased (pp. 7-8, tsn, June
13, 1989) When he arrived there at past 2:00 o'clock p.m., he saw Tirso Garcia and appellant Vicente Torrejas
standing near the banana plants outside Flaviano's house (pp. 8-9, tsn, June 13, 1992). Consequently, he greeted
them. As neither of the two answered him, he proceeded to call at the main door of Flaviano's house but nobody
answered so he just entered through the door, which was not locked. Afterwards, he went to the kitchen and placed
the articles he purchased on top of an aparador (pp. 10-11, tsn, June 13, 1989). As he turned to go out, he saw the
dead body of Flaviano with his head partly hidden under the stove where the fuel was placed (pp. 10-12, tsn, June
13, 1989). Shocked at this discovery, he rushed outside but Tirso Garcia and appellant, who were still standing near
the banana plants, saw him (pp. 11-12, tsn, June 13, 1989). Subsequently, Tirso Garcia summoned him and told him
not to tell anybody about Flaviano's death or else, he would be the next victim. At that time, appellant just stood
looking at Nagulada and Garcia as they were conversing about three (3) fathoms away (pp. 12-14, 15-16, tsn, June
13, 1989).
 Consequently, Nagulada, who felt scared of Garcia's threat, retraced his steps, left the premises and proceeded to his
house about 200 meters away (pp. 14-15, tsn, June 13, 1989). He did not tell anyone, except his wife Basilia, that
Flaviano is (was) already dead. (ibid.).

Meanwhile, Socorro Gonzales left her stall in the market in Trinidad, Bohol and just walked towards her home at
about 3:30 p.m. (pp. 4-5, tsn, June 14, 1989). At about 4:00 o'clock P.M., she called at the main door of her house,
but no one answered her (ibid.). Consequently, she went through the kitchen door and thereupon found her husband,
Flaviano, lying under the stove with his head covered by a coconut husk. Forthwith, she set down the things she
brought with her and knelt down to massage her husband's chest and stomach. Afterwards, she removed the coconut
husk from his face and there and then discovered that his ears had been smashed (pp. 4-13, tsn, June 14, 1989).
Consequently, she rushed outside shouting for help from her neighbors. Subsequently, she saw Tibo Apao, a nine-
year old boy, and requested him to go to the store to inquire if persons there may have witnessed what had happened
to her husband. (ibid.)

Immediately thereafter, she returned to her husband's side and, in the process, discovered that he had many wounds
(pp. 5-6, tsn, June 14, 1989; Exhs. "B", "B-1"). Near her husband's dead body lay a pestle, his cane which was
already broken, a "buri" hat and a "chako" ( Exhs. "B", "D", "E", "F" and "G"). Close examination thereof disclosed
that the lower end of the pestle, as well as of the chako, showed fresh blood stains. Socorro recognized the "buri" hat
as the one used by Tirso Garcia when he passed by their house two (2) days before the incident, while the "chako"
was the same one owned by Tirso Garcia's younger brother, Edilberto Garcia, which she had previously seen
Edilberto use before the incident (pp. 7-8, tsn, June 14, 1989). Socorro likewise discovered that their ceiling had
been opened. She did not see any revolver therein although her husband had previously informed her that he kept
there the .38 caliber revolver pledged to him by Tirso Garcia as collateral for the P300.00 he (Flaviano) loaned to
him (pp. 9-10, tsn, June 14, 1989). Furthermore, she saw that their two (2) wooden trunks appeared to have been
forcibly opened and land titles and cash of about P5,000.00 out of their recent sales of coconuts, "palay," and
cassavas (sic) kept therein were already missing (pp. 9-13, tsn, June 14, 1989).

Subsequently, Dr. Dalmacio Javellana, Municipal Health Officer of Trinidad, Bohol, upon request of the INP
Station Commander of Trinidad, Bohol, who was notified of the killing, conducted post-mortem (sic) examination
on Flaviano's body at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening of June 30, 1988 (pp. 2-3, tsn, May 26, 1989; Exh. "A"; p. 5,
rec.). Dr. Javellana placed the time of the victim's death between 2:00 to 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon, or five hours
before the post-mortem examination. His findings indicated (sic) as follows:

A male individual in cadaveric spasm showing severe contusion of the right ear with concomittant
(sic) fracture of the parietal bone with blood coming out from the ears (,) nose and mouth, hands
raised and flexed with semi-clinched (sic) fist (,) with laceration of the skin at the postero-distal
part of the right arm "2" x 4, contusion of the left and right supra orbital regions.

(Exh. A, p. 5, rec.)

Thereafter, Dr. Javellana issued a Medico-Legal Post-Mortem Report which stated the cause of the victim's death as
follows:

Cause of death: Cerebro-Vascular Accident Secondary to Cerebro Hemorrhage; Skull Fracture; Cerebral
Concussion.

(ibid); pp. 2-6, tsn, May 26, 1989; Exhs. "B", "B").

As a result of Flaviano's death, Socorro incurred expenses for his funeral.

On July 11, 1988, Nagulada gave his statement before the police station at Trinidad, Bohol regarding the incident
which, among others, declared that he saw Tirso Garcia and appellant outside the house of the deceased Flaviano at
about 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of June 30, 1988 and that Garcia warned him that if he would tell anybody about
the death of Flaviano, he will be the next person to be killed, while appellant merely looked at them some three (3)
fathoms away (Exh. "C"; pp. 18-14, 15-16, 21-22, June 13, 1989)."

The appellant's version, on the other hand, as summarized by the People in its Brief, is based on the testimonies of the appellant
himself and his witnesses, namely Roberto Infuesto, Pedro Daclan and Francisco Gonzales: 4

Appellant is a resident of Tugas, Jetafe, Bohol. On June 11, 1988, he brought his sick father to the house of his
brother-in-law Pedro Daclan at Kinan-oan, Trinidad, Bohol. On the same occasion, he met Roberto Infuesto, his
former co-worker at the logging company of one Quirino Gonzales (pp. 2-4, tsn, June 19, 1989; pp. 2-3, tsn, June
15, 1989). In the early morning of June 30, 1988, he (appellant) and Allan Daclan went to select good cassavas (sic)
of Pedro Daclan at Sitio Katipunan, Trinidad, Bohol, one kilometer away from Pedro Daclan's house, which were
(sic) intended for delivery to Philstarch. They finished the task at past 1:00 o'clock in the afternoon. Afterwards, he
and Allan went to Daclan's house. His brother-in-law later commanded him to get a sack of corn grits and a sack of
fertilizer from the store of Nena Daclan and load it on the cart. Accordingly, he went to the store and did as he was
told. Upon reaching the store, appellant took the sacks of corn grits and fertilizer and loaded them on the cart. On his
way to Daclan's house, he saw Infuesto plowing his field. He arrived at Daclan's house at past 2:00 o'clock and saw
Daclan talking to Francisco Gonzales, who has (sic) just arrived. When Gonzales saw appellant, he attempted to
borrow money from the latter but he told him that he has mortgaged his property. Francisco Gonzales chatted with
them until past 3:00 o'clock when he returned to the poblacion (pp. 2-4, tsn, June 15, 1988; pp. 2-4, tsn, June 19,
 1989). At around 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon, appellant, his wife, and Daclan heard shouts apparently coming from
the house of Flaviano Gonzales, which prompted Daclan to investigate. Daclan came back at past six in the
afternoon and informed appellant and his companions that Flaviano had died in his house (p. 5, tsn, June 15, 1989;
pp. 2-4, tsn, June 19, 1989).

During the trial, appellant testified that he has (sic) never met Nagulada prior to his (appellant's) imprisonment at the
municipal jail of Trinidad, Bohol, (pp. 6-8, 13, tsn, June 15, 1989).

We find the foregoing summary to be amply supported by the evidence adduced by the parties.

The conviction of the appellant is based solely on the trial court's observations that (a) there existed no previous misunderstanding
between him and the prosecution witness Eusebio Nagulada; it is the latter who testified having seen the appellant and Tirso Garcia
together a few meters from the house of the victim at past 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the day of the incident; (b) the appellant left
for Jetafe, Bohol on the day after the incident; (c) the appellant lied when he claimed that he did not know the victim; and (d) at the
time the victim was killed, the appellant was, as he had testified, in the house of his brother-in-law, Pedro Daclan, a mere 100 meters
from the house of the victim; it was, therefore, not physically impossible for the appellant to be at the crime scene when the crime was
committed.

In his Brief, 5 appellant submits the following assignment of errors :

I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING ACCUSED-APPELLANT VICENTE TORREJAS BASED

SOLELY ON CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING VICENTE TORREJAS GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
OF THE CRIME OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE.

Appellant contends that he was convicted on the basis of a single circumstance which does not clearly implicate him, namely his
having been seen, by witness Nagulada, with co-accused Tirso Garcia at past 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the day of the killing
near the house of the victim, Flaviano Gonzales. There was no eyewitness to the crime. Otherwise stated, appellant avers that the
cirsumstantial evidence presented did not prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In a gesture of utmost objectivity and fairness, which is but proper and to be expected of it under all circumstances, the Office of the
Solicitor General, in the Brief for the Appellee, 6 concurs with the appellant and recommends the reversal of the appealed decision and
acquittal of the appellant. 7 In support thereof, it contends that only the circumstance that can be appreciated against appellant is the
statement of prosecution witness Eusebio Nagulada that he saw Tirso Garcia and the appellant standing near the banana plants about
five (5) and fifteen (15) meters away, respectively, from the house of Flaviano minutes before he (Nagulada) discovered the latter had
been killed; the appellant remained in the same place and watched as Garcia warned him (Nagulada) not to tell anyone that Flaviano
was dead or else he would be the next victim.

The Solicitor General opines that appellant should be convicted only if it could be proven that he had conspired with his co-accused
Tirso Garcia. In view of the rule obtaining in this jurisdiction that conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence,
appellant's mere presence at the place of the incident, absent any corroborating circumstance, cannot be considered as sufficient to
establish his having conspired with Tirso Garcia to kill and rob Flaviano. 8

We find merit in the appeal and do not hesitate to acquit the accused for sheer failure of the prosecution to present evidence that would
establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt. We note at the same time, to Our dismay, the failure of the trial court to accord with profound
reverence the solemn mandate of the Constitution that an accused is presumed innocent until the contrary is proven and to remain
faithful to the firmly settled doctrine that in order to overcome said presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be
established by the prosecution. Save in certain circumstances, as where the accused admits the commission of the imputed criminal act
but interposes justifying circumstances, that burden is never shifted to the accused or diminished by the weakness of the defense. For
indeed, unless the prosecution discharges that burden, the accused need not even offer evidence in his behalf. He would be entitled to
an acquittal. As We stated in People vs. Dramayo: 9

Accusation is not, according to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt. It is incumbent on the prosecution to
demonstrate that culpability lies. Appellants were not even called upon then to offer evidence on their behalf. Their
freedom is forfeit (sic) only if the requisite quantum of proof necessary for conviction be in existence. Their guilt
must be shown beyond reasonable doubt. To such a standard, this Court has always been committed. There is need,
therefore, for the most careful scrutiny of the testimony of the state, both oral and documentary, independently of
whatever defense is offered by the accused. Only if the judge below and the appellate tribunal could arrive at a
conclusion that the crime had been committed precisely by the person on trial under such an exacting test should the
sentence be one of conviction. It is thus required that every circumstance favoring his innocence be duly taken into
account. The proof against him must survive the test of reason; the strongest suspicion must not be permitted to
sway judgment. The conscience must be satisfied that on the defendant could be laid the responsibility for the
offense charged; that not only did he perpetrate the act but that it amounted to a crime. What is required then is
moral certainty.

We have this dictum not only because the accused "faces the full panoply of state authority with all "The People of the Philippines"
arrayed against him," hence the need "to equalize the positions of the prosecution and the defense by presuming the innocence of the
accused until the state is able to refute the presumption by proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt," 10 but also for the cogent reasons
that "[t]he accused during a criminal prosecution has at stake interests of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he
may lose his liberty upon conviction and because of the certainty that he would be stigmatized by the conviction. Accordingly, a
society that values the good name and freedom of every individual should not condemn a man for commission of a crime when there
is reasonable doubt about his guilt. . . . Moreover, use of the reasonable doubt standard is indispensable to command the respect and
confidence of the community in applications of the criminal law. It is critical that the moral force of the criminal law not be diluted by
a standard of proof that leaves people in doubt whether innocent men are being condemned. It is also important in our free society that
every individual going about his ordinary affairs have confidence that his government cannot adjudge him guilty of a criminal offense
without convincing a proper factfinder of his guilt with utmost certainty. 11

This reasonable doubt standard has constitutional stature for the Due Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except
upon proof beyond reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged. 12

Absolute certainty as to the guilt of the accused is, of course, not required. 13 Only moral certainty, or that degree of proof which
produces conviction in an unprejudiced mind, is needed. 14

In the instant case, nobody witnessed the taking of the property subject of the robbery and the killing of the victim. There is no
evidence to show that either or both deeds took place inside the house, specifically, in the kitchen where the victim's dead body was
discovered. The only circumstance that could possibly link the appellant to the incident is his alleged presence near the victim's house
at the time of the commission of the crime. Conceding, ex gratia, such presence to have been adequately proven — although such
averment was vigorously denied by appellant — thereby effectively according full faith and credit to the testimony of prosecution
witness Eusebio Nagulada, such testimony provides a single circumstance only. In order that circumstantial evidence may sustain a
conviction, there must exist, inter alia, more than one circumstance. Section 4, Rule 133 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 4. Circumstantial evidence, when sufficient. — Circumstantial evidence is sufficient for conviction if:

(a) There is more than one circumstance;

(b) The fact from which the inferences are derived are proven; and

(c) The combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

The lone allegation that appelant was standing near the victim's house minutes after the offense was committed, unsupported by any
other credible or competent evidence, can not even engender a belief that he committed a crime. Suspicion is not proof. Of course, as
correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, it would have been entirely different if conspiracy between the appellant and
Tirso Garcia was established. The rule is well settled that the same degree of proof is required to support a finding of the presence of
conspiracy, that is, it must be shown to exist as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense itself. 15 Direct proof,
however, is not essential; it may be shown by acts and circumstances from which may logically be inferred the existence of a common
design among the accused to commit the offense charged. 16 In the instant case, the prosecution miserably failed to show other facts
and circumstances, except the appellant's suppossed presence near the house of the victim, from which it may be reasonably and
logically inferred that both the appellant and Tirso Garcia had agreed to rob and kill the victim and actually decided to commit it.
Mere passive presence at the scene of the crime does not make a person liable therefor. 17

We note the trail court's attempt to supply the missing piece, so to speak, to the prosecution's evidence by taking into account the
appellant's departure on the day after the incident and the weakness of his defense of alibi. As to the first, the court relied on the rule
that flight is indicative of guilt. Indeed, as written in the literature of the Old Testament, "the wicked man flees though no one pursues,
but the righteous is as bold as the lion." 18 Unfortunately, however, no such flight could be ascribed from the appellant. The trial court
lost sight of the fact that the appellant was then a resident of Tugas, Jetafe, Bohol and that he happened to be in Kinan-oan, Trinidad,
Bohol on 11 June 1988 because he brought his sick father to the house of his brother-in-law, Pedro Daclan. Flight, in order to be
considered as an indication of guilt, presupposes that a person escapes from the authorities to evade prosecution. It does not
contemplate a situation where the accused, like the appellant in the case at bar, returns to his home where at any time, he may be
picked up for questioning in connection with or arrested for having committed a crime. If there is anyone upon whom flight can be
appreciated against, it is Tirso Garcia who remains at large.

As the alibi, the trail court should have disregarded the same altogether because reliance on it is entirely unnecessary. The prosecution
having miserably failed to prove appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the weakness of his defense should not have been even
made to come into the picture. The weakness of his alibi could not strengthen the prosecution's case, for settled is the rule that the
prosecution must rely on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.

No court, when confronted with issues that affect the life and liberty of citizens in a free society, should treat flippantly the latter's
constitutional guarantees and supply deficiencies in the evidence for the prosecution with its own bias, suspicion or speculation.

All told, Our minds cannot rest easy upon the certainty of guilt on the part of the appellant on the basis of the scant and unreliable
evidence presented by the prosecution.

One final word. The trial court imposed the penalty of life imprisonment on the appellant. Under the first paragraph of Article 294 of
the Revised Penal Code, the penalty for robbery with homicide is reclusion perpetua to death. In view of the first paragraph of Section
19, Article III of the 1987 Constitution, only reclusion perpetua may be imposed. This penalty is not the same as life imprisonment.
We have reiterated this time and again 19 and admonished judges to employ the proper legal terminology in the imposition of
imprisonment penalties because of their different accompanying legal accessories and effect. Failure to heed this pronouncement can
no longer be excused.
WHEREFORE, for lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, the appealed decision of Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court of Bohol in
Criminal Case No. 5696 is REVERSED and appellant VICENTE TORREJAS is hereby ACQUITTED. His immediate release from
detention is hereby ordered, unless he is being held for another lawful cause.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 178202

Plaintiff-Appellee,

Present:

CORONA, J., Chairperson,

- versus -
VELASCO, JR.,

PERALTA,

BERSAMIN,* and

MENDOZA, JJ.
NORMAN SITCO and RAYMUNDO BAGTAS
(deceased),

Accused-Appellants. Promulgated:

May 14, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is an appeal from the October 19, 2006 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00038 entitled People of
the Philippines v. Norman Sitco y De Jesus and Raymundo Bagtas y Caparas, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 72 in Malabon, in Criminal Case Nos. 19456-MN to 19459-MN for violation of Sections 15 and 16 of Republic
Act No. (RA) 6425 or The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The affirmed RTC decision adjudged accused-appellants Raymundo Bagtas
and Norman Sitco guilty in Crim. Case No. 19456-MN for drug pushing and sentenced them to reclusion perpetua. For illegal
possession of drugs, Bagtas was sentenced to two months and one day of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one year and one day
of prision correccional, as maximum, in Crim. Case No. 19458-MN, and reclusion perpetua in Crim. Case No. 19459-MN. While the
RTC convicted Sitco in Crim. Case No. 19457-MN, the CA would later overturn his conviction in this case.

The Facts

In Crim. Case No. 19456-MN, Sitco and Bagtas were charged with drug pushing in an information reading:

That on or about the 11th day of May 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being private persons and without authority of law, conspiring[,] confederating
and mutually helping with one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver, in
consideration of the sum of P2,000.00+, most of which were boodle or fake money to a poseur buyer[,] two (2) heat-
sealed transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance with net weight of 108.40 grams and 105.84
grams respectively, which substance when subjected to chemistry examination gave positive result for
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, otherwise known as Shabu, a regulated [drug]. [1]

The other informations for illegal possession of drugs that were separately filed against either Sitco or Bagtas read as follows:
 Crim. Case No. 19457-MN against Sitco (illegal possession)

That on or about the 11th day of May 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being [a] private person and without authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in [his] possession, custody and control One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag,
containing white crystalline substance with net weight of 20.29 grams, which substance when subjected to chemistry
examination gave positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as Shabu, a regulated
drug.[2]

Crim. Case No. 19458-MN against Bagtas (illegal possession)

That on or about the 11th day of May 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being [a] private person and without authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control One (1) heat-sealed transparent plastic bag,
containing white crystalline substance with net weight of 1.31 grams, which substance when subjected to chemistry
examination gave positive result for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride otherwise known as Shabu, a regulated drug.

Crim. Case No. 19459-MN against Bagtas (illegal possession)

That on or about the 11th day of May 1998, in Navotas, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, being [a] private person and without authority of law, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession, custody and control One (1) brick of suspected marijuana with
net weight of 887.01 grams, which is a regulated drug.[3]

During the arraignment, both accused-appellants entered a not guilty plea to all the charges. A joint trial then ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

From the testimony of the prosecution witness, Police Officer 3 (PO3) Alex Buan, the following version is gathered:

Acting on a tip from an informant, Senior Inspector Gatlet of the Navotas Police Station ordered the conduct of a buy-bust
operation against accused-appellants, who were allegedly selling illegal drugs on Espina St. in Navotas, Metro Manila. The team
consisted of Buan, as poseur-buyer, a confidential informant, and several police operatives as back-up. Marked money, consisting of
four (4) PhP 500 bills for a total of PhP 2,000 and boodles or fake money amounting to PhP 196,000, was prepared.

On May 11, 1998 at 11:15 in the evening, the team proceeded to a house in the target place where Bagtas answered the
knocking of the door. Thereupon, the confidential informant introduced him to Buan who, then and there, expressed his desire to
buy shabu. Bagtas replied that he did not have enough supply of shabu, but manifested that marijuana was available. Buan, however,
insisted on buying only shabu.[4]

Bagtas informed Buan that someone would be delivering more shabu. After waiting for a few minutes, a man, who turned out to be
Sitco, arrived. After the usual introductions, Sitco told Buan to follow him to his motorcycle. He asked for the payment and took out a
bag with two plastic bags of shabu inside. Buan examined the contents, then identified himself as a police officer, and arrested Sitco.
The back-up officers joined the scene and frisked Sitco and Bagtas. Sitco was found to have in his possession a loaded caliber
.38 paltik revolver, the buy-bust money, and more shabu. Bagtas had in his possession marijuana and shabu.[5]

The seized items were sent to Forensic Chemist Grace N. Eustaquio for laboratory examination and were found positive
for shabu and marijuana per Physical Science No. D-411-98.

During trial, Buan identified accused-appellants, the four (4) PhP 500-bill marked money used, the shabu confiscated from both
accused-appellants, and the marijuana seized from Bagtas. Buan explained during his testimony that the boodle money placed in-
between the genuine marked money the buy-bust team used was unavailable as it had been confiscated by a policeman named Barlin
when he himself (Buan) was arrested for violating Sec. 27 of the Dangerous Drugs Act. [6]

Version of the Defense

The evidence for the defense consists of the testimonies of Sitco and Bagtas.

Bagtas branded as fabricated the accusations against him and Sitco. According to him, on the day of the alleged buy-bust operation, he
was busy cleaning his motorcycle when, all of a sudden, policemen, led by Buan, entered his house. Buan came armed with an
armalite rifle and a .45 caliber pistol, but did not show any document to justifying the police officers entry into his (Bagtas) home. The
intruders pointed guns at Bagtas, his common-law wife, his nephew, a certain Boy Macapagal, a certain Malou, a helper in his store, a
girl applying for work as a househelper, and Sitco, who was visiting Buan at the time. They were ordered to lie face down as Bagtas
house was being searched. He was told that he was a suspect in the killing of a Navotas policeman named Ira. After the search was
done, no illegal drugs were found. Yet the police officers took his camera, tape recorder, and the cash from his stores sales. The pieces
of jewelry they were wearing, including his ring and necklace, were also confiscated. Afterwards, all of them were handcuffed and
asked to board the police officers vehicles. Two motorcycles belonging to Sitco and Bagtas were also seized. [7]

At the police headquarters, Buan and the other police officers demanded payment for the release of Bagtas group. After some
haggling, the group relented and paid some amount for their freedom. Sitco and Bagtas, however, were detained. Instead, they were
handcuffed to a steel post after being blindfolded by the police. [8] Bagtas overheard the police officers dividing the jewelry among
them. He was then beaten along with Sitco to extort money for their release. The police officers eventually told them to pay a reduced
amount, which they still could not afford to give. Complaints were thus filed against them, with the police officers manufacturing the
evidence used by the prosecution. Bagtas ended his testimony with a declaration that he was filing complaints against the police
officers once he was released from detention.[9]

Sitco corroborated Bagtas testimony, adding that Buan had already been dismissed from the service. [10] He testified that the police
officers frisked him and confiscated his wallet, watch, ring, and motorbike. He was told that they were suspects in the killing of a
Navotas policeman. At the headquarters, he claimed being tortured. Eventually, he fell asleep. When he woke up, he saw Buan with
two others sniffing shabu. He declined Buans invitation to join the session. The police officer likewise instructed him to produce PhP
100,000 for his release. Sitco informed Buan that he could not afford the amount. The next day, May 12, Buan took some shabu from
the cabinet and told Sitco that the charge against him would push through if he did not pay. Sitco was also warned about the difficulty
of posting bail once charged. Since he could not raise the money, the police officers brought him to the prosecutors office for inquest
where manufactured evidence allegedly taken from him and Bagtas were shown to the fiscal. [11] On cross-examination, he admitted to
having been previously arrested for possession of shabu and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866.[12]

Ruling of the Trial Court

The RTC gave full credence to the testimony of Buan and, mainly on that basis, convicted Bagtas and Sitco of the crimes charged.

The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision[13] reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding the two accused, namely Norman Sitco y
de Jesus and Raymundo Bagtas y Caparas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged against them in
these cases. In the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances and applying the provisions of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law (where applicable), the two accused are hereby sentenced as follows:

1) In Crim. Case No. 19456-MN: for drug pushing under Section 15, Article III, RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659,
involving more than 200 grams of shabu, for each of them to suffer imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and for each
of them to pay a fine in the amount of Php500,000.00;

2) In Crim. Case No. 19457-MN against Sitco only for illegal possession of 20.29 grams of shabu under Section 16,
Article III, RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, to a prison term ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS of arresto mayor as
minimum, to SIX (6) years of prision correccional, as maximum;

3) In Crim. Case No. 19458-MN against Bagtas only for illegal possession of 1.31 grams of shabu under Section 16,
Article III, RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, to a prison term ranging from TWO (2) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY of arresto mayor, as minimum, to ONE (1) YEAR and ONE (1) DAY of prision correccional, as maximum;
 4) In Crim. Case No. 19459-MN against Bagtas only for illegal possession of 887.01 grams of marijuana under
Section 8, Article II, RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, said accused is sentenced to suffer the prison term
of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of P500,000.00.

Since the death penalty was imposed, the case came to this Court on automatic review. In accordance with People v.
Mateo,[14] however, we ordered the transfer of the case to the CA for intermediate review.

Pending CA review of the case, or on May 5, 2006, Bagtas died at the National Bilibid Prison Hospital.

Ruling of the Appellate Court

Before the CA, Sitco argued against the credibility of Buan as witness, the latter having been involved in drug-related activities and
was in fact dismissed from the service in March 1999. He also claimed that the alleged drug sale involving him was improbable as no
one would sell drugs to a stranger.

On October 19, 2006, the CA acquitted Sitco of illegal possession of drugs but affirmed his conviction of the other offenses charged.
It reasoned that Buans testimony was focused only on the two (2) plastic bags of shabu which were the object of the buy-bust; no
attempt was made to make a distinction between the said bags and the additional bag of shabu supposedly recovered from Sitco when
he was frisked. The quantum of proof necessary to sustain a conviction for illegal possession of shabu was, thus, not met.However, as
to the other charges, the CA ruled that the factual findings of the trial court on Buans credibility must be respected and upheld.

The fallo of the CAs Decision[15] reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Joint Decision dated August 26, 1999 of the RTC of
Malabon, Metro Manila, Branch 72 in Criminal Case Nos. 19456-MN to 19459 is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification ACQUITTING accused-appellant Norman Sitco y De Jesus in Criminal Case No. 19457-MN for
violation of Sec. 16, Art. II of RA 6425, as amended by RA 7659, on the basis of reasonable doubt. The rest of the
Joint Decision stand[s].

SO ORDERED.

On November 14, 2006, Sitco filed his Notice of Appeal of the appellate courts Decision.

On September 24, 2007, this Court required the parties to submit supplemental briefs if they so desired. The People, represented by
the Office of the Solicitor General, manifested that it was submitting the case for decision based on the records previously submitted.
In his Supplemental Brief, Sitco submits that PO3 Buan is not a credible witness given his arrest on drug charges and dismissal from
the service.

The Issue

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AFFIRMING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS CONVICTION

ON THE BASIS OF AN UNRELIABLE WITNESS.

The Ruling of the Court

We find sufficient compelling reasons to acquit the surviving accused-appellant Sitco.

Credibility of Buan as Witness

We start with the credibility of the lone prosecution witness, Buan, whose testimony Sitco has assailed at every turn. Sitco insists and
with reason that Buan cannot competently make a plausible account of something of which he himself was equally culpable.

Sitcos assault on the credibility of Buan is well-taken. As it were, Buans involvement as a police officer in illegal drug
activities makes him a polluted source and renders his testimony against Sitco and Bagtas suspect, at best. It is like a pot calling a
kettle black.

To be believed, testimonial evidence should come only from the mouth of a credible witness. [16] Given his service record,
Buan can hardly qualify as a witness worthy, under the limited confines of this case, of full faith and credit. And lest it be overlooked,
Buan is a rogue cop, having, per his own admission, been arrested for indulging in a pot session, eventually charged and dismissed
from the police service. [17] It would appear, thus, that Buans had been a user. His arrest for joining a pot session only confirms this
undesirable habit.

The Court, to be sure, has taken stock of the well-settled rule that prosecutions involving illegal drugs depend largely on the credibility
of police buy-bust operators, and that the trial courts finding on the police-witness credibility deserves respect. Juxtaposed with this
rule, however, is the postulate that when confronted with circumstances that would support a reasonable doubt in favor of the accused,
then acquittal or the least liability is in order. Buans involvement in drugs and his alleged attempt to extort money from appellant Sitco
in exchange for his freedom has put his credibility under a heavy cloud.

The imperative of proof beyond reasonable doubt has a vital role in our criminal justice system, the accused, during a
criminal prosecution, having a stake interest of immense importance, both because of the possibility that he may lose his freedom if
convicted and because of the certainty that his conviction will leave a permanent stain on his reputation and name. [18] As articulated
in Rabanal v. People:
 Law and jurisprudence demand proof beyond reasonable doubt before any person may be deprived of his
life, liberty, or even property. Enshrined in the Bill of Rights is the right of the petitioner to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved, and to overcome the presumption, nothing but proof beyond reasonable doubt must be
established by the prosecution. The constitutional presumption of innocence requires courts to take a more
than casual consideration of every circumstances or doubt proving the innocence of petitioner.[19] (Emphasis
added.)

Chain of Custody

But over and above the credibility of the prosecutions lone witness as ground for acquittal looms the matter of the custodial chain, a
term which has gained traction in the prosecution of drug-related cases.

In prosecutions involving narcotics and other illegal substances, the substance itself constitutes part of the corpus delicti of the offense and the fact of
its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt.[20] Of chief concern in drug cases then is the requirement that
the prosecution prove that what was seized by police officers is the same item presented in court. This identification, as we have held
in the past, must be established with moral certainty[21] and is a function of the rule on chain of custody. The chain of custody
requirement is essential to ensure that doubts regarding the identity of the evidence are removed through the monitoring and tracking
of the movements of the seized drugs from the accused, to the police, to the forensic chemist, and finally to the court.[22]

The procedure to be followed in adhering to the chain of custody requirements is found in Sec. 21 of RA 9165:

Section 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources
of Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or
Laboratory Equipment. The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of
dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or
laboratory equipment so confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the
media and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof;

(2) Within twenty-four (24) hours upon confiscation/seizure of dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment, the
same shall be submitted to the PDEA Forensic Laboratory for a qualitative and quantitative examination.

The trial court summarized the chain of custody over the evidence as follows:

x x x [Sitco] asked for the money and then took from a covered part of the motorcycle a plastic bag inside
[of] which were two plastic bags with shabu which Sitco gave to Buan. Buan examined the same and upon being
satisfied that it was really shabu, identified himself as a policeman and arrested Sitco. Buans companions then
approached and Sitco and Bagtas were frisked. Found from Sitco was a caliber .38 paltik revolver with six bullets,
the buy-bust money and additional shabu. The marijuana earlier shown to Buan by Bagtas was also recovered along
with the additional shabu found in the motorcycle of Bagtas which was parked nearby.

The buy-bust shabu, the marijuana and the confiscated additional shabu from Sitco and Bagtas were sent to a
Forensic Chemist for laboratory examination (Exhibit A) and were found to be positive for being shabu and
marijuana, respectively, by examining PNP Forensic Chemist Grace N. Eustaquio under an initial laboratory report
(Exhibit B) and a final report (Physical Science No. D-411-98) marked as Exhibit C.[23]

From this narration and an examination of the records, a number of disturbing questions arise as to the identification and handling of
the prohibited drugs seized. It is unclear at the outset whether Buan himself made the inventory of the seized items. There is no detail
as to who brought the specimens to the forensic laboratory and who received it prior to the examination by the forensic chemist. It is
also uncertain who took custody of the specimens before they were presented as evidence in court. There are, thus, glaring gaps or
missing links in the chain of custody of evidence, raising doubt as to the identity of the seized items and necessarily their evidentiary
value. This broken chain of custody is especially significant given that what are involved are fungible items that may be easily altered
or tampered with.[24]

It cannot be over-emphasized that pertinent provisions of RA 9165 require that the seized illegal items shall, after their inventory, be
photographed in the presence of the drug dealer, representatives of media, the Department of Justice, or any elected public official
who participated in the operation. The records do not yield an indication that this particular requirement has been complied with.

The Court reiterates that, on account of the built-in danger of abuse that it carries, a buy-bust operation is governed by specific
procedures on the seizure and custody of drugs, separately from the general law procedures geared to ensure that the rights of persons
under criminal investigation and of the accused facing a criminal charge are safeguarded.[25] To reiterate, the chain of custody
requirement is necessary in order to remove doubts as to the identity of the evidence, by monitoring and tracking custody of the seized
drugs from the accused, until they reach the court. We find that the procedure and statutory safeguards prescribed for compliance by
drug enforcement agencies have not been followed in this case. A failure to comply with the aforequoted Sec. 21(1) of RA 9165
implies a concomitant failure on the part of the prosecution to establish the identity of the seized illegal items as part of the corpus
delicti.[26]

Although the non-presentation of some of the witnesses who can attest to an unbroken chain of custody of evidence may, in some
instances, be excused, there should be a justifying factor for the prosecution to dispense with their testimonies. [27] In People v.
Denoman,[28] the Court discussed the saving mechanism provided by Sec. 21(a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations
of RA 9165.[29] Denoman explains that the aforementioned provision contains a saving mechanism to ensure that not every case of
non-compliance will permanently prejudice the prosecutions case. The saving mechanism applies when the prosecution recognizes
and explains the lapse or lapses in the prescribed procedures. [30] In this case, the prosecution did not even acknowledge and discuss the
reasons for the missing links in the chain.

To reiterate, in prosecutions involving dangerous drugs, the substance itself constitutes the key part of the corpus delicti of the offense
and the fact of its existence is vital to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. [31] Taken with the uncorroborated
testimony of Buan, the broken chain of custody over the marijuana and shabu in the instant case creates reasonable doubt on accused-
appellants guilt.

In a string of cases,[32] we declared that the failure of the prosecution to offer the testimony of key witnesses to establish a sufficiently
complete chain of custody of a specimen of shabu, and the irregularity which characterized the handling of the evidence before it was
finally offered in court, fatally conflicts with every proposition relative to the culpability of the accused.

As in People v. Partoza,[33] this case suffers from the failure of the prosecution witness to provide the details establishing an unbroken
chain of custody. In Partoza, the police officer testifying did not relate to whom the custody of the drugs was turned over. The
evidence of the prosecution likewise did not disclose the identity of the person who had the custody and safekeeping of the drugs after
its examination and pending presentation in court.

Given the prosecutions failure to abide by the rules on the chain of custody, the evidentiary presumption that official duties have been
regularly performed cannot apply to this case. This presumption, it must be emphasized, is not conclusive. Not only is it rebutted by
contrary proof, as here, but it is also inferior to the constitutional presumption of innocence. [34] On this score, we have held that while
an accuseds defense engenders suspicion that he probably perpetrated the crime charged, it is not sufficient for a conviction that the
evidence establishes a strong suspicion or probability of guilt. It is the burden of the prosecution to overcome the presumption of
innocence by presenting the quantum of evidence required. [35] This quantum of evidence has not been met in the instant case.

WHEREFORE, the assailed CA Decision in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00038 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accused-appellant
Norman Sitco y De Jesus is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt and is ordered immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is
confined for any other lawful cause. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is DIRECTED to IMPLEMENT this Decision and to
report to this Court the action taken hereon within five (5) days from receipt.

SO ORDERED.