SPE 77506
World Energy Beyond 2050
Arlie M. Skov
Copyright 2002, Society of Petroleum Engineers Inc.
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Abstract
Today’s total world energy demand is near 200 million
BOEPD, up five-fold from 1950; over 80% is supplied by
fossil fuels and nearly 60% by oil and gas. Many forecasters
believe oil and gas production will decline before mid-century,
but population growth and economic development combine to
drive energy demand ever upward. Dramatic changes must
occur in both the nature and magnitude of the various sources
of energy supply, and of the various natures of demand,
beyond 2050.
Yet, vast sources of energy exist. About 1.4x1019 BTU of
solar radiation hits Earth’s cross sectional area daily, 13,000
times current total energy use. Another 5 to 8x1014 BTU,
roughly equal to current use, is conducted to Earth’s surface
daily from its interior. Einstein’s equation assures that every
pound of material on earth is equivalent to nearly 4x1013 BTU.
Thus, the mass in each barrel of oil contains over 2 billion
times more energy than is available by its combustion. Fully
exploited as “atomic energy,” 0.1 BOPD, about 4 gallons,
could meet current total world energy demand.
Major problems exist in effectively capturing, converting,
storing, transporting, and utilizing these forms of energy while
meeting society’s diverse and changing economic,
environmental, political, cultural, geographic, and aesthetic
needs and desires. Development and application of
technology, though difficult, is required and almost
certainly achievable.
This paper analyzes perceived world energy supply and
demand beyond 2050, using a range of existing and new
forecasts for fossil fuel availability and prospects for other
forms of energy. Scenarios are developed for demand based
on projected relationships between energy use and world
economic and population growth. Responses to some earlier
energy shortages are analyzed, and the pace and sweep of
technological innovation needed are described in broad terms.
Introduction
Many forecasters predict an imminent shortage of oil and gas,
which supply nearly 60% of the world’s energy needs. A
recent book1 even predicts world oil production will peak
between 2004 and 2008, only 2 to 6 years from now, and then
decline. Others have made similar predictions in recent
years3,9,10, often based upon Hubbard’s 4 mathematical “curve
fit” method for predicting future oil production peaks, a
method that once worked well for the U.S. lower 48 states. In
an older but more comprehensive long-term prediction by
Bookout2 , Figure 1, peak world oil production occurred
in 2020.
By contrast, in the latest EIA (U.S. DOE) forecast8 , oil and
gas production increases continuously and monotonically
through 2020, the forecast period. Absent geopolitical or
environmental constraints, current forecasts of early peaks in
oil supply are likely as wrong as so many others have been
since 1875 when the Pennsylvania Geological Society issued
one of the first such warnings.
Nonetheless, someday an actual physical limit, or
“shortage” of oil and gas, and perhaps of coal, too, will be
experienced, and even though this may not happen in the next
two decades, it seems likely that it might occur at least by
2050, if population growth and economic
development continue.
One likely scenario is that a growing concern about global
warming thought to be exacerbated by carbon dioxide released
from burning fossil fuels may limit their use in the future.
Hence, we must consider how to meet energy demand in the
second half of this century, and prospects for coping with
either diminished availability or use of fossil fuels .
The term “shortage of fossil fuels” isn’t entirely
appropriate. In the real world, supply and demand are equal,
forced so by price in a free market economy, or by
government edict in an un-free one, or a combination of both.
But temporary interruptions can and do cause genuine
economic problems. A free and thriving market economy
likely offers better assurances that emerging technologies will
alleviate periods of economic pain resulting from spiking
energy costs.
2 ARLIE M. SKOV
Changes in Mankind’s Activities and Energy Use Since
1850. The year 2050 is a fifty-year leap into the future. For a
proper perspective on the overall pace of change in society, it
is illuminating to review how technology and energy use have
progressed since 1850 in 50-year increments.
In 1850, wood supplied about 70% of the world’s
“commercial” energy2 . Use of muscle power (horses, oxen,
mules, and people) “fueled” by biomass (“renewables” in
today’s lexicon) likely exceeded that of all “commercial”
energy. Muscle power was widely used in transportation and
in industry, and almost exclusively in agriculture. Steam
engines, fueled mostly by coal, were rapidly increasing in use
as the industrial revolution swept Western Europe and
America. Wood, water and wind power were also used.
Railroad locomotives fueled by coal and sometimes wood
were used for transport of bulk goods on land (replacing
canals and muscle power), and at sea, wind power was used
almost exclusively. Light came from open fires, candles,
whale oil, and, in the larger cities, “city gas” (synthetic gas
from coal). The world’s military forces moved troops, arms,
and supplies by foot, or with horses on land, and by wind
at sea.
By 1900, coal-fueled railroads provided most intercity land
transportation for bulk goods and people. Horses were widely
used for shorter trips and almost exclusively in agriculture. At
sea, coal-fired steam engines were rapidly replacing wind.
Kerosene, the first widespread use of petroleum, had mostly
displaced other forms of energy for lighting, and, in cities, was
rapidly being displaced in turn by electricity generated by
burning coal. Military land forces hadn’t changed
significantly, but at sea, coal had replaced wind. Population
growth was accelerating.
In 1950, the internal combustion engine had displaced
steam engines and petroleum had largely displaced coal in
industry and railroads. Automobiles, buses, trucks, and piston-
engine aircraft had replaced horses and were strong
competitors of railroads (now fueled mostly by oil) for
movement of both people and bulk goods. Agriculture was
rapidly being mechanized. Telephones and radio were in
widespread use, and television had been introduced.
Electricity had displaced kerosene lamps for lighting, even in
many rural areas; coal and hydropower were primary sources
of energy for its generation. Military forces had changed
dramatically. On land, internal combustion engines had
replaced horses for movement of men, equipment and
supplies, and engine-powered armor and artillery had been
developed and deployed effectively. Aircraft, fueled by high-
octane gasoline, had become a decisive factor. At sea, aircraft
carriers and submarines, all petroleum-powered, had
supplanted coal-fired dreadnaughts and battle ships. Nuclear
weapons of mass destructive power had been invented. The
first antibiotics had been developed, and improvements in
medical care were contributing to population growth by
greatly reducing infant mortality and extending adult
life spans.
In 2000, even more startling changes had taken place.
Nuclear energy to generate electricity was providing 2560
SPE 77506
billion kWh per year worldwide, or 13 MMBOEPD − the
same amount of energy used in total a century earlier. Aircraft
carriers and submarines were now also nuclear powered, and
aircraft, both civilian and military, were powered by jet
engines. Space exploration was underway, and man had set
foot on the moon. Rocket-launched orbiting satellites provided
enhanced electronic communications and navigational
capabilities undreamed of in earlier times, as well as remo te
sensing for greatly improved knowledge of our own planet.
Computers had been devised and were in widespread use for a
diverse variety of purposes in industry, education, and homes,
in the military and in commerce, having a major impact on
almost every aspect of human activity. Communications
included television, cellular telephones, facsimile transmission
of documents, and electronic, or e-mail. Military capabilities
had moved into space with ICBM’s and multiple
thermonuclear warheads (MIRV’S), as fusion weapons
replaced fission. The combined effects of the “pill,” many
more working women, preference for smaller families as
wealth increased, and the spread of AIDS in Africa and
elsewhere was having a dramatic impact in reducing rates of
population growth.
This brief review illustrates both the immense impact that
new developments in technology have on all aspects of human
activity, and the unpredictable nature of those advances.
To put these changes in a numerical context, Table 1
illustrates the growth in the world’s population and energy
use, total and per capita, in 50-year increments. In 1850, world
population was about one billion people and total energy
consumption (excluding muscle power and the biomass which
fueled it) was about 6 MMBOEPD or 2.2 BOEPY per capita.
By 2000, these had grown to 6.1 bn, 190 MMBOEPD, and
11.4 BOEPY per capita. An estimate of population in the year
2050 of 9.1 bn (UN most recent medium variant projection) is
also added to Table 1 as an illustration of what the future
may hold.
Table 1: World Population & Energy Use, 1850-2000
Year Population, Energy Use, BOE/Year
Bn MMBOEPD Per Capita
1850 1.0 6 2.2
1900 1.6 14 3.2
1950 2.7 35 4.7
2000 6.1 190 11.4
2050 9.1e Unknown Unknown
Table 2 expresses the same data as average annual
percentage growth rate by 50-year periods. Population growth
increased from 0.9% in the first 50-year period to 1.6% in the
last, a significant 70% increase. But, in the most recent 10-
year period, the rate dropped to 1.0%, and it is anticipated that
the growth rate will decline further to an average 0.8% from
SPE 77506 WORLD ENERGY BEYOND 2050 3

2000 to 2050. Growth of energy use accelerated from 1.7% operating at 33% efficiency; thus, BOE and BTU’s, as
annually to 2.1 %, but in the most recent 10 years, decreased reported, are three times higher than the electricity actually
to only 1.3% annually. Of most significance perhaps is the generated. Since these “barrels” never actually existed, and
ratio of growth rates, energy use to population. This ratio were never consumed, the numbers are misleading, and there
remained almost constant at near 2 for 150 years, but is a danger they may be misused, such as in calculating carbon
decreased to 1.3 for the most recent 10-year period. If this, dioxide emissions that don’t exist. Oddly, BP treats nuclear
along with a decrease in the rate of population growth, is a power in the same fashion, but not hydropower.
reliable harbinger of the future, our energy “problem” may not Using historical data for the last decade from these
be as serious as usually believed. different sources yields average worldwide energy
consumption growth rates of 1.30% (World Bank), 1.15%
(BP), and 1.13% (EIA). While these differences seem small,
Table 2: Historical Growth Rates, %/Year
extrapolating them for a century compounded continuously, as
Period Population Energy Use Ratio some forecasters have, yields differences up to nearly 20%.
As BP does not report renewables, and World Bank and
1850-1900 0.94 1.70 1.80 EIA do, there is an interesting opportunity to calculate
1900 -1950 1.05 1.85 1.75 percentage renewable energy usage by each nation. This
shows poorer nations use a larger percentage of renewables
1950-2000 1.63 3.38 2.08 than richer ones: those with national per capita incomes below
1990-2000 1.00 1.30 1.30
$1,000 use 28.2% renewables; those in the range of $1,000 to
$20,000 use 4.1%, and those over $20,000 use 0.8%.
2000-2050 0.8e Unknown Unknown Ironically, the industrialized nations who mostly phased
out the use of wood and biomass long ago now consider them
important future sources of fuel, and the poorer nations remain
Table 3 illustrates how our “fuels” mix has changed from significant users of biomass, but are striving to achieve
70% wood and 19% coal in 1850 to 63% oil and gas, 22% industrialization by emulating the historical pattern of their
coal, and 8% nuclear in 2000. wealthier neighbors by turning increasingly to fossil fuels.

Table 3: Historical Energy Use by Type of Fuel, % The Basic Natural Sources of Energy
For eons, two or three primary sources of energy have enabled
Oil & Hydro & and nurtured essentially all life on Earth − solar, geothermal,
Year Wood Coal Gas Nuclear Other
and to a lesser degree, tidal energy. Quantitatively, about
1850 70 19 - - 7 1.4x1019 BTU of solar radiation hits Earth’s cross sectional
area daily and another 5 to 8x1014 BTU is conducted to the
1900 27 67 4 - 2
earth’s surface from its interior. Geothermal energy, from the
1950 4 50 38 - 8 Earth’s molten interior (generated currently by gravitational
compression and radioactive decay of naturally occurring
2000 - 22 63 8 7
radioactive substances), is about equal to today’s actual energy
use of 200 million BOEPD while total incoming solar
Sources of Data, Current, Historical, and Limitations radiation is some 13,000 times greater. Tidal energy is less at
The principal sources of data for historical use of energy about 2.8 x 1014 BTU per day or 50 MMBOEPD, about one-
employed herein are BP, World Bank, and EIA 5,7,19. fourth of current worldwide energy use.
Understandably, statistical data for past centuries is not well Solar energy can be used directly as heat or converted to
documented. Much of the fuel used for heating, cooking, and electricity via photoelectric cells. Solar energy also generates
even for early steam engines was wood or other biomass numerous other secondary sources, which can either be used
harvested locally, and not consistently recorded, if at all. directly or converted into electricity, such as wind, ocean
Even current data are not uniformly reported, either waves and currents, precipitation for hydropower and biomass
numerically or philosophically, partly because the raw data through photosynthesis. Biomass can be either used directly as
itself is elusive, and partly because sources often report them fuel or converted into other products such as methanol and
differently. BP reports only “commercially traded” fuels (oil, ethanol, which in turn can also be used as fuel or as feedstock
gas, coal, nuclear, and hydropower), wh ile EIA and the World for fuel cells or petrochemical plants. More exotic applications
Bank endeavor also to report “renewables,” i.e., solar, wind, of “solar energy” exist, such as focusing mirrors that track the
wood, waste, geothermal, etc. Moreover, to convert non-oil sun to generate steam for turbine-driven electric generators,
energy sources to BOE, BP uses 5.5 million BTU’s per barrel, use of deep ocean temperature gradients for power generation,
while EIA uses 5.8, a difference of 6%. To convert electricity or space-based photovoltaic generation of electricity
generated by nuclear and hydropower to BOE, EIA and World transmitted to Earth as microwave energy.
Bank assume a hypothetical “equivalent” fossil fuel fired plant
4 ARLIE M. SKOV SPE 77506

Storms created by solar energy also generate large and increase in the use of petroleum for lighting drove whale oil
often destructive local energy (thunderstorms, including prices back to $0.60/gal and less after 187512 .
lightning, tornados and hurricanes), but “harvesting” these is In more recent times, the twin oil price shocks of 1973 −
fraught with difficulties. Over geologic time, solar energy has the October (Yom Kippur) War and the ensuing Arab oil
provided oil, gas, and coal, or “fossil fuels,” by the embargo − and 1979-80 Iran-Iraq War decimated world
accumulation and conversion of biomass through deep burial economic growth.
and the effects of heat, pressure, and time. This process is still Table 4 illustrates its impact on the U.S. economy; a four-
happening, but is believed to be occurring at a very much fold increase in inflation rate and a near doubling of
slower rate than fossil fuels are being extracted and used, unemployment after 1973, and another doubling of inflation
hence fossil fuels are regarded as “depleting.” and near doubling of unemployment after 1980. After oil
About half of total incoming solar radiation (insolar) is lost prices dropped in early 1986, U.S. inflation and
immediately through reflection, scattering, absorption by the unemployment rates have remained near the pre-1973 levels
atmosphere, and/or re-radiation, so the amount hitting Earth’s for nearly 20 years, with a small price spike, and a shallow
cross sectional area averages 77 BOEPD/acre (5.5 x 106 watts recession in 1991 caused by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and
per acre, or as it is more frequently cited, 1367 watts per Desert Storm.
square meter). Moreover, as the sun is visible only during
daylight hours, it is often obscured further by clouds, fog, or Table 4: Impact of Oil Price Shocks on U.S. Economy
dust, varies in strength between summer and winter, and
diminishes at higher latitudes, fixed, land-based photoelectric Inflation Rate, Unemployment Long Term
Time Period % Rate, % Int. Rate, %
cells must be accompanied by storage batteries or other energy
storage techniques to provide a reliable power supply. Pre 1973 3 5 7
Geothermal energy is used commercially in very limited
Post 1973 11 9 8
quantities, mostly from steam or hot water from wells to
generate electricity, and mostly where near-surface magma 1978 6 6 8
intrusions generate temperatures and temperature gradients
Post 1979 13 10 14
significantly higher than normal. Geothermal energy also
drives plate tectonics, which generates volcanoes, geysers, and Post 1985 3 5 5
earthquakes, forms of geothermal energy that are often
immensely destructive but difficult to “harvest.” It is believed
As another measure of the economic impact of high oil
that tectonic forces, equivalent to 450 million BOEPD,
prices, U.S. GDP grew at just over 6% prior to 1973. From
generate about 2.6 X 1015 BTU/day. If human activities moved
1973 to 1985, it grew at less than 3%. Extrapolating pre-1973
underground − residences, offices, shops, factories, etc. − big
growth rate suggests nearly a 40% loss in the U.S. GDP by
energy savings for space heat and air conditioning would be
1985. Moreover, every U.S. recession in the last 30 years (a
possible, but for most peoples would also be
total of 4) has been associated with a sudden increase in
culturally unacceptable.
energy prices, including the longest and deepest in 1974.
Earth also loses significant energy through radiation. As an
Lastly, although the economic consequences of the
ideal “black body” with an average surface temperature of
1973-85 oil price shocks were severe, they were man-made
50ºF, the earth would radiate about 1.5 x 1021 BTU/day
and unrelated to any fundamental shortage of oil resources.
(Stefan-Boltzmann law), or 100 times as much energy as
comes daily from the sun. Actual loss is believed to be only
Effects of Growing Population and Wealth on
about 2.6 x 10 BTU/day (or 450 MMBOEPD), just over twice
Energy Demand
current total world energy consumptions. Without its
Growth of energy demand in the industrially developed
protective layer of greenhouse gases, Earth would be a cold
nations correlates well with growth in GDP, both over time
and uninhabitable planet!
and across ranges of GDP. The latter is illustrated in Figure 2
for the 34 largest (population and/or energy use) nations in the
Shortages of Years Past
world today. The “scatter” in Figure 2 incorporates some
Energy “shortages” have affected mankind’s activities for a
sensitivity to population density, since, as might be
long time. Firewood shortages in England in the early 14th and
anticipated, sparsely populated nations such as Canada, the
16th centuries caused both exceedingly high prices for
U.S., Russia, and Australia generally require more energy per
firewood and increased use of coal for heating long before the
unit of GNP than more densely populated areas such as Japan
industrial age12 . Even ancient Rome suffered occasional food
and Western Europe, due in part to greater
shortages when adverse winds precluded grain supplies from
transportation needs.
crossing the Mediterranean in a timely fashion by boat. In the
Some forecasters use the relationship of energy use to
U.S., whale oil supply, used extensively for home lighting,
GNP to predict future energy demand, although this requires
peaked in about 1850, resulting in a subsequent four-fold
also an estimate, or assumption, as to GNP growth. Others
wholesale price increases to $1.50/gal in 1865. A rapid
have observed that energy demand tends to stabilize in fully
SPE 77506 WORLD ENERGY BEYOND 2050
developed countries as a function of population, which
requires a forecast, or assumption, as to future
population growth.
In mature industrial economies, intensity of energy use
(defined as energy consumption per unit of GDP), declines
with time. A French study20 , Figure 3, spanning most of the
industrial revolution, noted an early increase in energy
intensity, a peak, and a decline of energy intensity in
individual industrializing countries as they matured. The UK,
with the longest history, demonstrated a long-term average
annual decline of 1% for nearly a century (from 1882 to
1980). In the U.S., the decline was 1.2% and was 1.3% in
Germany (1925-85 for both nations). In France, it was
0.8% (1935-85).
Bookout2 in a major study of both historical energy use
and a comprehensive long range forecast, calculated an
average annual energy intensity decline of 1.8% from 1970 to
1986 in the industrialized nations while energy prices were
high, and of 0.5% for the twenty year period 1950 to 1970
when energy prices were low, suggesting a measure of price
elasticity. His forecast of future energy demand was actually
based upon population growth, but implicitly, he assumed
future energy intensity declines in the range of 2.5 to 3% in
early years. His forecast of energy use has stood the test of
time remarkably well to date. In 1985, he projected oil use for
the year 2000 at 69 MMBOEPD − actual was 70. He
underestimated gas use by 7%, overestimated coal by 22%,
and overestimated total commercial energy use by a mere 4%.
Energy intensity in the U.S. has decreased recently at
about 2.0%/year (1985-00), as noted in the National Energy
Policy, May 200121 . Data5 for the U.S. (1990-99), published
by World Bank, shows a GDP increase of 5%/year and an
energy growth rate of 1.7%/year, for a net 3.3%/year decrease
in energy intensity while the most recent 20-year forecast by
EIA sees future GDP increasing at 3.2% per year and energy
at 2.2% per year for a net 1% per year decrease in
energy intensity.
Assumptions of 2 to 3% annual declines in energy
intensity seem reasonable with current technology and
economic relationships, and could likely become much higher
with either sharply increased energy prices, or breakthroughs
in advanced technologies, or both.
Forecasting Future Energy Demand
Forecasting energy needs in 2050 is a hazardous undertaking
at best, but scenarios based upon assumptions of likely trends
in GDP growth, population growth, and reductions in energy
intensity can be developed.
From 1980 to 1990, world GDP grew at 3.2% annually,
but dropped to 2.5% annually from 1990 to 19995 . As noted
above, future GDP growth rates in the U.S. have been
projected at 3.2%. All of these numbers are actually near the
range of likely decreases in energy intensity, suggesting that
no energy increase at all may be needed, or at worst, perhaps
only 1 or 2% per year.
5
The EIA and IEA have projected growth rates in energy
demand for the next 20 years using growth rates of 2%
annually for oil and 3% for gas; both seem high compared to
actual growth rates for the last decade of 1% for oil and 2%
for gas. Sustained growth rates at even these low numbers for
the next 50 years yields a total world energy demand of 330 to
660 MMBOEPD, as compared to Bookout’s forecast of about
285, of which only about 90 were oil and gas combined, and
110 were coal.
Reliable estimates of population growth are also elusive.
The UN has repeatedly revised them downward in recent
years, as actual fertility rates have dropped all around the
world until many nations are now below the “replacement”
rate of 2.1 children per woman. Using the current UN
“medium variant” projection of a world population of 9.1
billion in 2050 yields an energy demand then of 300
MMBOEPD, assuming a constant average energy
consumption of 11.5 barrels annually, as at present, per capita.
Table 5 illustrates another aspect of energy use and
national wealth. World Bank data5 separates nations into
groups designated as low, medium, and high income. Only
15% of the world’s population are in the high-income group
but possess 78% of the world’s wealth and consume 50% of
its energy. By contrast, the low-income group represents 40%
of the population, but have only 3% of its wealth and consume
13% of its energy. The high-income group consumes nearly
10 times as much energy per capita, but the low-income group
consumes nearly 9 times as much energy per unit of GNP.
Depending upon which yardstick is used, either group could
rationally be accused of “wasting” energy.
Table 5: World Population, Wealth (GNP)
& Energy Use by Income Level
Low Mid High
Income Income Income World
Population, % 40 45 15
Wealth, % 3 18 78
Energy Use, % 13 37 50
GNP/Capita $400 $2,000 $25,700 $4,900
BOE/Capita 4 10 39 12
BOE/$GNP $8.9 $4.9 $1.0 $2.4
More to the point, if the entire world used as much energy
per capita as the high-income group, world consumption
would over three times as high as it actually is, or about 680
MMBOEPD, and if the world were all high-income and used
energy as inefficiently as the low-income group, consumption
would be nearer four times higher or 720 MMBOEPD.
Hence, energy demand by 2050 can be forecast using
economic growth, population growth, combinations of both,
changes in energy intensity, or projections of increases in
current demand. Doing so yields results ranging from 200
MMBOEPD, the same as at present, to over 700, a range so
6 ARLIE M. SKOV SPE 77506

broad as to be of little practical guidance except to suggest However, other constraints may effectively limit future use
there may be substantial built-in “adaptability” to changing of fossil fuels. First are environmental concerns, particularly
energy supplies and costs. as to the increase of carbon dioxide in the Earth’s atmosphere
from combustion of fossil fuels and the postulated ill effects of
Meeting Future Energy Needs global warming. This constraint may become limiting based as
The future energy needs of the planet seem certain to be met much upon perception, politics, and economics as hard
increasingly by renewable energy resources, including nuclear science, but the Kyoto Protocol is a reality for much of the
power, and incorporating many technological advances in both world. Next, an increasingly complex set of world political
energy supply and consumption. First, a review of and geopolitical issues, often further magnified by local issues
conventional energy availability is appropriate. and by global economic and environmental concerns,
associated with both the production and consumption of fossil
Fossil Fuel: A “Depleting” Resource? Although many fuels, will likely limit their future use. And lastly, fossil fuels
believe a critical shortage of fossil fuels, particularly oil, will themselves may simply become priced out of contention in the
occur long before the year 2050, and that both the shortfall, future by rapid decreases in costs of emerging alternatives, as
and efforts to alleviate it, will irreparably damage both the occurred with whale oil, and even coal, as oil and gas became
world’s economic structure and its environment, it is by no widely available at lower cost.
means certain this will happen. Current fossil fuel reserves and
resources, their rates of use, and particularly the ratio of Nuclear Power: A Depleting, or an Infinite Resource?
reserves to current production rates, (R/P), or “years of life” Nuclear power began generating electricity commercially in
demonstrate why. the US in 1957 at Shippingport, PA, but not until 1969 did it
Table 6 presents the data. Current consumption rates and provide as much as 1% of U.S. electrical supply. That grew to
proved reserves are from BP7 and resources are from various 10% by 1977 and stabilized near 20% by 1988 with just over
sources quoted by IPCC18 and Lomborg 17 . Earlier estimates of 100 nuclear plants installed and in operation. Prior to 1988,
both reserves and resources, particularly for oil and gas, have nuclear plants typically operated at 50 to 60% of capacity, but
proven to be too low17 . Estimates of resources are particularly by 2001 the average was 90%, and 769 million MWh were
difficult as is suggested by the ranges of numbers in Table 6. produced, equivalent to 1.2 MMBOEPD. By year-end 2001, a
total of 104 nuclear plants were in operation in the U.S.
Table 6: Fossil Fuels, Consumption Rates, Twenty-eight had been built and shut down, and 122 orders
Reserves, Resources for new plants had been cancelled, mostly from 1974 to 1984,
as construction delays, cost overruns, and public concerns
Oil Gas Coal Total
about safety, security and waste disposal converged.
Use, 2000, MMBOEPD 74 44 44 162 Worldwide, 2,635 million MWh of nuclear power was
generated in 2001, equivalent to about 4.1 MMBOEPD.
Reserves, Bn BOE 1,050 945 3,650 5,645
Recent growth has been greatest in France and Japan.
Ranges of Resource 1,400+ 2,800 to 13,100 to 17,300 to Most nuclear power today is generated in light water
Estimates, Bn BOE 3,240 30,300 34,940 cooled reactors using U235 (usually enriched from 0.7% of
natural occurring uranium to “several percent”). Sufficient
Perhaps the most surprising numbers are R/P’s shown in economically recoverable uranium is believed to exist to last
Table 7 for the years 1980 and 2000. These have increased for for at least another 100 years at current production rates with
both oil and gas over this 20-year period even incorporating current technology. Hence, conventional wisdom regards
actual production increases in the denominator (16 and 62% nuclear power as a “depleting” resource, like fossil fuels, but
respectively), suggesting an infinite supply. For a “depleting" actually there are good technical reasons for
resource, this defies both common sense and conventional thinking otherwise.
wisdom. However, it illustrates dramatically the uncertainty The available energy in natural uranium could be increased
that exists in estimates of remaining oil and gas. R/P numbers 100-fold or more, to an estimated 14,000-year supply, by
based upon resources, instead of proved reserves, are in the reprocessing “spent nuclear fuel” and adding plutonium (either
range of 300 to 600 years for all fossil fuels. also recovered from spent nuclear fuel or from obsolete or
dismantled warheads) to create MOX, or mixed oxide fuels.
Table 7: Fossil Fuels, Remaining Years of Life Even greater nuclear energy is available with fast breeder
reactors using a known technical process that actually
Oil Gas Coal Total generates more plutonium than is consumed, making nuclear
power essentially infinite. It therefore seems more accurate to
R/P, Years, 1980 29 47 ~230
classify nuclear power as a “renewable” form of energy rather
R/P, Years, 2000 40 60 227 96 than a “depleting” one.
A major impediment to the use of fast breeder reactor
R/P, Years, 2000, 52 175 to 820 to 300 to
Based on Resources 205 1900 600 technology, and to a lesser degree, to MOX, is a concern that
plutonium may be diverted either illegally or inadvertently,
SPE 77506 WORLD ENERGY BEYOND 2050
and be made into nuclear weapons by either terrorists or
rogue nations.
Nuclear energy may also be a fusion process in the future.
Fusion theoretically has infinite energy potential. It is also
fraught with enormous technical problems. It is estimated that
the world has spent over $20 billion on fusion research.
Currently, ITER is designing a “tokamak” vessel expected to
generate a net 500 MW from an investment of $2.8 billion.
Although ITER’s design is not meant to be commercial, at
$5.6 million per MW, this is very near the present cost in the
US for a new fission plant, $5 million per MW ($5 billion for
a 1000-MW plant).
Although ITER is likely nearer commercially, many other
groups and organizations are also researching other potential
designs. Interestingly, surprising new potential fusion sources
continue to surface. In the nineties, “cold fusion” emerged at
the University of Utah, and is still being studied as “deuterated
metals research,” and this spring, Oak Ridge reported an
interesting study of possible “cool fusion” from bubble
collapse in acetone. While both of these are generally viewed
with some skepticism, they illustrate that much is still to be
learned about fusion.
The Conventional “Renewables”
The term “renewable energy” is usually limited to incoming
solar energy, geothermal energy, and tidal energy, and
derivatives thereof, which may all be used either directly as
heat or mechanical energy, or secondary solar sources such as
hydropower, wind, and biomass, each of which may also be
used directly or further converted.
Solar. Table 8 illustrates the current usage levels of solar
energy in all its forms, and judgments that have been made
(IPCC and Craig) as to the “Long Term Technical Potential”
of each. It should be noted that these judgments are very
subjective, and prone to substantial error; they should be
treated as order of magnitude estimates.
Table 8: Renewable Energy – Current Use and
Ranges of Long Term Potential
Source Current Use, Potential, Potential, Frac.
MMBOEPD MMBOEPD Current Use
Solar 0.01 1,164 5.8
Hydro 4.6 40 to 60 0.2 to 0.3
Wind 0.05 60 to 280 0.3 to 1.4
Biomass 17.7 580 2.9
Currently, biomass use amounts to about 18 MMBOEPD,
or 9% of the world’s energy use, while hydropower
contributes 4.6 MMBOPEPD or 2.3% (hydropower numb ers
are from BP for 2000, and biomass is calculated as the
difference between BP’s 1997 tabulation of world
“commercial” energy use and World Bank data, which
7
includes “renewables,” most of which is used in the poorer
countries and is assumed to be all bio mass).
Today, use of either wind and solar power is insignificant,
but long term technical potential is judged to be high − nearly
6 times total current world energy use for solar and up to
almost 1.5 times for wind power. The estimates of current use
are total installed MW at year-end 200114 calculated at 20%
year-round efficiency.
Hydropower is judged to have the long-term technical
potential to produce 9 to 13 times as much power as today, or
20 to 30% of today’s total world demand. Future hydropower
projects face difficult environmental obstacles, as people
increasingly place esthetic value on free flowing streams.
Direct. Solar power has heated Earth for several billion
years, and is expected to do so for several billion more. This
energy can be transformed directly into electrical energy
through photoelectric cells, or focused to provide a more
concentrated form of direct heat for steam driven generators.
Total capacity of all photoelectric cells installed through
2001 is about 1643 MW (396 MW in 2001 alone, up 38%
from 2000).14 Some 86% are single crystal or polycrystalline
silicon, and most of the remainder are amorphous silicon thin
film on various substrates. Efficiencies have improved
dramatically in the last 25 years (from a range of 6 to 8% in
1976 to 12 to 20% today), while prices have dropped. The
trends suggest increasing use of photoelectric cells in the
future, both for stationary sources of electricity and for use in
mobile fuel cells. Hence, the belief that the long term technical
potential of solar power is up to 6 times the world’s total
current energy requirements.
At present, however, significant subsidies are usually
required for photoelectric cells to be economically
competitive, except in special cases. In a recent example, the
roof of a post office in Los Angeles was covered with an array
of 1000 photoelectric cells rated at 127 kW. Total cost was $1
million, of which over 75% was paid by City and State
subsidies. The full cost is $7900 per kW, which is 7 or 8 times
the initial cost of a new nuclear power plant (although future
operating costs are of course much less). A flat roof of some
30,000 square feet was covered, for an average of 4 W per
square foot, or about 40 W per square meter.
In addition to cost, photoelectric power suffers from
intermittency, a mismatch in timing between peak generating
capacity and demand, deterioration of performance with time,
and must be kept clean for best performance. Normally, some
battery storage is also required to mitigate the intermittency
problem, which increases total cost.
Hydropower. Hydropower has been in use for centuries
with water wheels powering mills for grinding grain, etc., but
with the advent of widespread use of electricity, it is used
today mostly for that purpose. It is one of the cleanest sources
of electricity, and lakes required for the necessary hydraulic
head and water supply also have other beneficial uses for
agriculture, recreation, and flood control (although some of
8 ARLIE M. SKOV
these uses are subject to conflicting water
management objectives).
In 2000, an average of nearly 5 million MMBOEPD was
generated with a growth rate of about 2% per year. Long-term
technical potential is believed to be 9 to 12 times current use,
but increasingly, environmental concerns are blocking the
construction of new dams.
Wind. Wind, generated mostly by the sun, has been used
as a power source for centuries, and for even longer, was the
principal source of power for marine transport. After the
industrial revolution began, wind has been largely replaced by
fossil fuels. Recently, wind has been rediscovered, as it is both
“free” and “renewable,” and significant technology advances
have been made for harvesting it, e.g., wind turbines.
Moreover, its long term technical potential is believed
significant, up to 1.4 times total current world energy use, or
over 5,000 times greater than today.
Total world installed capacity increased from 14,000 MW
in 1999 to 18,500 MW in 2000 or 32%, and in the US, from
2,600 to 4,300 MW, or 65%. Installed capacity does not
translate directly to MWh produced (intermittency of wind,
mismatches in timing with peak electrical demand,
transmission line access, maintenance, etc). In the U.S.,
calculated average effective capacity utilized in 1999 and
2000 was 20% and 16% respectively.
Cost of wind power installations has dropped by an order
of magnitude in the last quarter century, and wind power is
now believed competitive with new coal fired-plants where
consistent and strong winds exist in proximity to centers of
electrical power demand or transmission lines. Intermittency,
timing, and geography are still detriments to broader use.
Biomass. Biomass has been used directly as a source of
energy for mankind since the invention and use of fire, and
indirectly as food for mu scle power before that.
Photosynthesis turns sunlight into biomass at a quite
inefficient rate of about 0.1%. Photoelectric cells do much
better at present, and as costs drop, the comparison will be
even more favorable to them.
With the advent and growth of the industrial revolution
powered largely by fossil fuels, the wealthier nations have
largely abandoned the use of biomass except in special niches,
such as ethanol as an oxygenate additive for gasoline and
locally where wood waste or other biomass products are
gathered for other reasons (pulp mills, municipal garbage,
etc.). Low energy density per ton and low density of tons per
acre makes transportation costs high.
In the U.S., two billion gallons (or about 80 MBOEPD) of
ethanol were used as gasoline additives in 2000 comprising
1.6% of all gasoline usage. About 64 TWh of electricity were
produced from 11 GW of installed generating capacity (about
1.7% of U.S. total).14
Geothermal. Geothermal energy is used around the world
(Italy, New Zealand, and Iceland) mostly for generating
electricity, but also for space heat. In the U.S., it accounts for
SPE 77506
about 0.3 % of total energy use, and its use has declined about
20% from its peak in 1994 as some of the principal sources
deplete, and economics for new developments
appear marginal.
Prospects for extensive future use of geothermal are
considered marginal for most areas of the world without
significant technical advances. However, heat flowing upward
from Earth’s interior is quite large in total.
Some Unconventional Sources
The Oceans. The world’s oceans (hydrosphere) contain about
1.8 x 109 tons of water. A change of just one degree F in
temperature would amount to about 3.7 x 1021 BTU’s
equivalent to 6.4 x 1014 BOE, or over two hundred times more
than the 3 trillion barrels of oil resources believed to have
existed worldwide initially. In addition, there is a significant
temperature gradient from a surface temperature of 50º to 70º
F to 27º F in ocean depths, which can be employed to generate
electricity. Harvesting these oceanic sources of energy is
difficult, but potentially significant.
The Atmosphere. Earth’s atmosphere contains only about
0.3% of the mass of the oceans, or about 5.6 x 107 tons and
heat capacity is per unit of mass is also lower. A change of
one degree F in the average atmospheric temperature still
involves significant energy, roughly equivalent to one trillion
BOE, or about 15 years supply at the world’s current energy
consumption rate. As in the case of the oceans, harvesting this
energy is quite difficult, but some effort is worthwhile, as this
would also limit any adverse impacts of global warming,
manmade or natural.
Energy in Global Climate Changes. At the peak of the last
“Ice Age,” (Last Glacial Maximum) roughly 21,000 years ago,
sea levels are believed to have been 380 to 440 feet lower than
at present. Thus, some 7.4 x 1016 tons of seawater had been
evaporated, and redeposited on continents as ice occupying
about 1.8 million cubic miles by volume.
Heat input required to evaporate this volume of water
(latent heat of vaporization) is about 1.4 x 1023 BTU’s, and a
total of 1.7 x 1023 BTU’s were released as it condensed and
froze, accumulating on land as ice. An additional 2 x 1022
BTU’s converted the ice back to water (latent heat of fusion).
Over recent geologic time, very significant energy transfers in
and out of the ocean have occurred naturally, though at a
somewhat slower pace than mankind uses it. For example, if
this transfer of energy occurred over 10,000 years, which
seems reasonable, the rate of exchange is about 21 million
BOEPD, over roughly 10% of the world’s total current annual
energy usage.
Natural Radioactive Decay. Natural radioactive decay of
uranium, thorium, and potassium in the earth’s crust release
3.1 x 1015 BTU/day, equivalent to about 3 times current total
daily world energy consumption. If these three elements exist
in the same relative abundance below the crust, total heat
release is 3.9 x 1017 BTU/day, or about 360 times total daily
SPE 77506 WORLD ENERGY BEYOND 2050
energy consumption. Uranium concentration in the earth’s
crust is only 4 ppm and thorium is 12; potassium is much
more abundant (2.6%), but releases less than 0.004% as much
energy on decay as uranium.
Gas Hydrates. Immense volumes of natural gas exist in the
form of gas hydrates both in and under permafrost on land and
below the sea floor in oceans. Hydrates form under
combinations of low temperature and high pressure. Methane
forms hydrates at pressures greater than 400 psi at
temperatures of 32º F or less, while heavier hydrocarbon
gasses do so at only 50 psi (for gas gravities of 1.0). Hence,
vast areas of ocean, covering 70% of the planet, particularly in
water depths of 1,000 feet or deeper provide environmental
conditions for the formation of gas hydrates. Global resources
of natural gas existing as hydrates are estimated to exceed
twice the world’s reserves of all conventional deposits of oil,
gas, and coal combined. Harvesting these resources is at
present believed to be uneconomic, although research
continues, particularly in Japan, where most energy must
be imported.
Methane is 56 times more potent as a greenhouse gas than
carbon dioxide. If sea levels dropped 400 feet, as happened in
the last episode of continental glaciation, the reduced pressure
at the sea floor likely caused enormous quantities of hydrates
to disassociate into methane, and as this methane entered the
atmosphere, it would have tended to reverse the process of
continental glaciation. Similarly, rising sea levels tend to trap
more methane in the form of sub sea hydrates.
Other. This brief listing of “unconventional” sources of
energy is by no means exhaustive. Enormous sources of
kinetic energy are available in the rotation of the earth about
its own axis, and about the sun, and in the moon’s rotation
about the earth. While these sources are huge, they are also
extraordinarily difficult to “harvest” for mankind’s use
without causing secondary undesirable effects. For example,
the frictional effects of lunar tides currently slow Earth’s rate
of rotation by about 2 seconds every 10,000 years, and also
cause the moon to move farther away with time.
The Transportation Challenge
One of the more significant challenges facing us as
conventional liquid hydrocarbon fuels phase out (whether due
to scarcity, environmental concerns, or cost), is how to fuel
transportation − automobiles, trucks, locomotives, aircraft, and
ships. In the U.S. in 2001, transportation accounted for 28% of
all energy use and 70% of all liquid petroleum use; 97% of
transportation fuel needs was met by petroleum. Replacing
this relatively portable, inexpensive, and reasonably safe fuel
with its high BTU content per unit weight and volume, will be
most difficult for aircraft and perhaps ships, easiest perhaps
for locomotives, less so for automobiles, trucks, and tractors.
Likely scenarios include phased, multi-faceted switches to
other fuels or sources of power. First, to hybrid vehicles
(liquid fuels plus electric motors, batteries, and regenerative
9
braking), followed by or perhaps concurrently with,
penetration of the historical hydrocarbon liquid fuels market
by GTl (gas to liquid) technology, coal to liquids, and biomass
to liquids (including ethanol and perhaps methanol). Later,
switches to either pure electric or fuel cell power or both (with
fuel cells powered initially by hydrocarbon or biomass liquids,
later by hydrogen), and lastly perhaps a switch to pure
hydrogen, either via fuel cells or combustion in IC engines,
or both.
It is unnecessary, and unlikely, that there will be a
sustained transportation fuels “crisis,” as there are too many
evolving solutions, and technology will be developed and
applied as needed and appropriate.
Conclusions
1. A look back at 150 years of human activities, advances in
technology, and their combined impacts on types of
energy and its use, suggest that technology will continue
to have a significant and accelerating impact on future
energy, both as to needs and as to how they are met.
2. World population is expected to grow by 50% over the
next 50 years, but abrupt worldwide decreases in fertility
have recently caused significant downward revisions. If
consumption per capita remains constant, the current UN
medium variant of 9.1 bn people in 2050 implies a 50%
increase in energy needs.
3. Global economic development, generally considered a
favorable objective, could add enormously to energy
demand. Today the wealthiest 15% of the world’s
population consumes 50% of its energy, and the poorest
40% consume only 13%. If the entire world were
suddenly as wealthy as the top 15%, and the relationship
between economic wealth and energy consumption were
unchanged, world energy demand would jump by a factor
of three. Similarly, if the entire world were as inefficient
in converting energy to wealth or GDP as the poorest 40%
of the world, consumption would also jump by a factor of
three without any increase in world wealth.
4. The future world supply of fossil fuels over the long term,
and their costs, is likely to be impacted more by political,
geopolitical, environmental, technological and economic
factors than by actual physical shortages.
5. There are enormous supplies of naturally occurring
energy available − solar, including wind and biomass, and
geothermal − but their relatively “diluted” forms are a
challenge, as is intermittency of availability and location.
6. Nuclear power, particularly with reprocessing of spent
nuclear fuel and use of breeder reactors has huge potential
for meeting future electrical needs. As and when
technology develops effective fusion reactors, this energy
supply is essentially infinite
7. Rapidly increasing efficiencies and decreasing costs of
photoelectric cells seems certain to increase direct use of
10 ARLIE M. SKOV SPE 77506

solar power to generate electricity. Wind and hydropower,
though lower in total long-term technical potential, are
already competitive with new coal fired electric
generating plants.
8. Use of electricity to: 1) initially provide fuel for
transportation, by conversion of natural gas, coal, or
biomass to liquids for both IC engines and fuel cells, and
2) eventually provide hydrogen, is promising.
9. It is incorrect to speak of a “shortage of energy.” Supply
and demand are always equal, and balance is achieved by
price in free economies or government edict in those
which are not. Price also drives development of
technology, which in turn makes newer and cheaper
sources of energy available, working most effectively in
free economies.
Nomenclature
BOE: Energy expressed as Barrels of Oil Equivalent, assumed
equal to 5.5 to 5.8 million BTU’s per barrel.
MMBOEPD: Millions of Barrels of Oil Equivalent Per Day
GDP: Gross Domestic Product, meaning the total output of
goods and services produced by a nation’s labor and property
valued at market price.
GNP: Gross National Product, meaning GDP as above plus
net “factor” income received from or paid to the rest of the
world (largely dividends, interest, and reinvested earnings of
individuals and multi-national corporations). For most nations,
the difference between GDP and GNP is less than on or
two percent.
7 BP plc, BP Statistical Review of World Energy, London,
June 2001.
8 Energy Information Administration, Annual Energy Review
2000, US DOE, Washington, D. C., August 2001.
9 Duncan, R. C., “The Peak of World Oil Production and the
Road to the Olduvai Gorge,” Summit 2000, Geological Society
of America, Reno, NV, November 13, 2000.
10 Campbell, C. J., & Laherrere, J. H., “The End of Cheap Oil,”
Scientific American, March 1998. p78-83.
11 Parker, H. W., “After Petroleum Is Gone, What Then?” World
Oil, September 2001, p 70-76.
12 McCabe, P. J., “Energy Resources – Cornucopia or Empty
Barrel?” AAPG Bulletin, v. 82, No. 11, November 1998, p
2110-21345.
13 Simon, J. L., “The Ultimate Resource,” Princeton, Princeton
University Press, 1981, 415 pl.
14 Baldwin, S. F., “Renewable Energy: Progress and Prospects,”
Physics Today, Vol. 55, No. 4, April 2002, p62-67.
15 Marcus, G. H., & Levin, A. E., “New Designs for the Nuclear
Renaissance,” Physics Today, Vol. 55, No. 4, April 2002 ibid
p54-60.
16 Ogden, J. M., “Hydrogen, The Fuel of the Future?” Physics
Today, Vol. 55, No. 4, April 2002, p69-75.
17 Lomborg, B., The Skeptical Environmentalist, Cambridge
University Press, 2001.
18 IPCC, “A Special Report on Emission Scenarios,” Working
Group III, Cambridge University Press, 2000.
19 Monthly Energy Review, EIA, DOE, Washington, D. C., April
2002.
20 “Hot Stuff,” Economist, September 15, 1990, p85.
21 National Energy Policy, U.S. Government, Washington, D.C.,
May 2001.

Ppm: Parts per Million

Acknowledgements
The very able and most timely assistance of Harriet Whaley
(whaley@aol.com) in preparing figures and tables in graphic
and electronic format, in editing and proofreading, and in
converting text to PDF is gratefully acknowledged.

References

1 Deffeyes, Kenneth S., Hubbert’s Peak, The Impending World

Oil Shortage, Princeton University Press, Princeton, N.J., 2001.
2 Bookout, J. F., “Two Centuries of Fossil Fuel Energy” presented
at the International Geological Congress, Washington, D. C.,
July 10, 1985.
3 Meadows, D. H., et al, The Limits to Growth, Universe Books,
New York City, 1972.
4 Hubbard, M. K., “Degree of Advancement of Petroleum
Exploration in the United States,” Bulletin AAPG, November
1967. p2207.
5 “World Development Report, 2000/2001,” World Bank, Oxford
University Press, September 2000.
6 Aguado, E., and Burt, J. E., Understanding Weather & Climate,
Prentice Hall, 2nd Edition, 2001.
SPE 77506 WORLD ENERGY BEYOND 2050 11

Figure 1: World Energy Balance

Millions of Barrels Per Day

300 (Oil Equivalent)

200

100

0
1860 1900 1940 1980 2020 2060 2100

Figure 2: Energy Use and National Wealth

100,000

10,000
GNP Per Capita

1,000

100

Argentina Australia Bangladesh Belgium Brazil Canada China

Columbia Egypt Ethiopia France Germany India Indonesia
10 Iran Italy Japan Korea Mexico Netherlands Nigeria
Pakistan Phillipines Polland Russia South Africa Spain Thailand
Turkey Ukraine U.K. U.S. Venezuela Vietnam

1
1 10 100

BOE Per Capita

12 ARLIE M. SKOV SPE 77506

Source: The Economist