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(b) of
[G.R. No. 88114 : December 20, 1990.]
the Rules of Court which provides:
192 SCRA 492
"Sec. 12. Property exempt from execution. — Except as otherwise expressly provided
PENTAGON SECURITY and INVESTIGATION AGENCY, Petitioner, by law, the following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:
vs.VICENTE T. JIMENEZ, ET AL., and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
'(b) Tools and implements necessarily used by him in his trade or employment;'"
COMMISSION, SECOND DIVISION, Respondents.
Respondents contend that from the above provision, three (3) things can be deduced,
PADILLA, J.:
viz:
FACTS:
"(a) Except in paragraphs (j) and (m), Sec. 12, Rule 39, Rules of Court, the exemptions
Petitioner, a single proprietorship engaged in security services, was ordered to are accorded to individual debtors.
pay the amount of ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED
(b) The exempt properties are used personally by the debtor or his family, or as tools or
NINETEEN PESOS AND FOUR CENTAVOS (P157,119.04) representing wages and
implements of the debtor in his trade or employment.
COLA differentials due its employees, as computed in a Decision of the NLRC dated
21 February 1986. On 22 June 1988, a notice of garnishment was issued against (c) The properties are necessary for the livelihood of the debtor and his family."
petitioner, addressed to the PC-SUSIA c/o Col. Norberto M. Lina, Camp Crame,
The term "tools and implements" refers to instruments of husbandry or manual labor
EDSA, Q.C. On 5 June 1988, Deputy Sheriff Silvino B. Santos issued a Notice of
needed by an artisan craftsman or laborer to obtain his living. Here petitioner is a
Levy and Sale on Execution of Personal Properties against herein petitioner, which
business enterprise. It does not use the firearms personally, but they are used by its
personal properties are the licensed firearms in question.
employees. Not being a natural person, petitioner cannot claim that the firearms are
Petitioner filed an urgent petition to quash Notice of Levy and Sale on Execution, necessary for its livelihood. Private respondent invites the Court to take judicial notice
claiming exemption from execution under Sec. 12, par. (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of of the fact that there are security guards rendering service without firearms.
Court.
Petitioner without filing any reply moves for the resolution of the petition.
Labor Arbiter Eduardo Magno denied the petition. The Motion for Reconsideration
ISSUE:
was likewise denied. On 21 March 1989, the NLRC issued its resolution which is the
subject of this petition. W/N there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in upholding
the sheriff's issuance of Notice of Levy and Sale on Execution against licensed
The NLRC held:
firearms owned and used by the petitioner, a security agency, in its operations?
"Respondent is a security agency. It is admitted that the licensed firearm is an
HELD: NO!
important implement used in the business but this licensed firearm is not the
tools and implements exempted from execution. The question, therefore is There is no question, in our mind, that a security agency without firearms to equip its
whether a person can run his trade or employment without such licensed guards is useless.
firearm. The answer is in the affirmative since the person can still run the
However, it would appear that the exemption contemplated by the provision
business or engage in his trade even without such firearm because there are
involved is personal, available only to a natural person, such as a dentist's dental
other alternatives open to him.
chair and electric fan (Belen v. de Leon, G.R. No. L-16412, 30 Nov. 1962). As
"Besides, there is no showing that the levied firearms are the only firearms pointed out by the Solicitor General, if properties used in business are exempt
that the respondent-appellant has in its possession. We affirmatively believe from execution, there can hardly be an instance when a judgment claim can be
therefore that there are firearms still hidden in its armory sufficient enough to enforced against the business entity.
answer the call of its security trade or business. In the remote assumption that
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED. However, for security reasons, and to
no firearms remains in respondent's custody, as practically flowing from the
prevent the possibility that the firearms to be sold at the execution sale may fall into
view of Labor Arbiter Magno, respondent can lease or buy from legitimate
the hands of lawless and subversive elements, the sale at public auction should be with
sources. There (sic) are some of the alternatives which even common layman
the prior clearance and under supervision of the PC-INP authorities.
can expediently comprehend."
The Solicitor General's as well as private respondent's comments submit that firearms
writ despite the fact that more than five years had elapsed since the RTCs decision of November
G.R. No. 149053 6, 1991 became final and executory. Invoking Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules, petitioner
insisted that the RTC decision could no longer be enforced by mere motion but only by
CENTRAL SURETY AND INSURANCE COMPANY, court action.
Petitioner, Present: The CA dismissed the petition for patent lack of merit. It held that:
PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC., While it is true that the judgment sought to be executed became
Respondent.Promulgated: final and executory on March 12, 1993, it bears stressing that the delay was
caused by petitioners dilatory maneuvers filed in this Court and all the way
March 7, 2007 to the Supreme Court, viz: the Very Urgent Motion to Set Aside Resolution
of December 7, 1992 and to Re-Open the Appeal with Prayer for
CORONA, J.: Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order which resulted in the
issuance of the Court of Appeals Resolution dated March 3, 1994 enjoining
FACTS: respondents from enforcing the subject decision; the Motion for
Sometime in 1977, Ernesto Olson entered into a dealership agreement with respondent Reconsideration of [the] Court of Appeals Resolution dated March 24, 1994;
Planters Products, Inc. whereby he agreed to purchase, in cash or credit, fertilizers and and Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court which was ultimately
agricultural chemicals from respondent for resale. To secure Olsons faithful compliance of his dismissed by the High Court on July 11, 1994.
obligations, Vista Surety and Insurance, Co. (Vista Insurance) and petitioner executed a surety
undertaking in favor of respondent. Petitioner filed an MR but this was likewise denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
After several deliveries, Olson failed to pay respondent prompting the latter to claim the amount
due from petitioner and Vista Insurance. However, both refused to settle their liabilities to ISSUE:
respondent as Olsons sureties. W/N the execution of a final judgment may be made by mere motion despite the lapse
On June 25, 1979, respondent filed an action for collection of sum of money against of five years?
Olson, Vista Insurance and petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 58.
Summons were accordingly served (except as to Olson whose address could not be located). HELD: YES! In this case, we answer in the affirmative.
The trial court found petitioner and Vista Insurance liable to respondent. They
were ordered to pay the following: (1) P372,502 representing the unpaid principal amount plus Under Rule 39, Section 6, the rule is that a final judgment may be executed by
interest; (2) 25% of the total amount recoverable as attorneys fees and (3) cost of suit. mere motion within five years from the date of entry of judgment. However, the rule is not
Petitioner alone appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). absolute and admits one notable exception and that is when the delay in enforcing the
On December 7, 1992, the CA dismissed petitioners appeal for failure to pay the required judgment is caused by the party assailing the filing of the motion.
docket fees. On March 12, 1993, the dismissal of petitioners appeal became final and executory; In Republic v. Court of Appeals, we declared that, on meritorious grounds, execution
entry of judgment followed on May 27, 1993. of final judgment by mere motion may be allowed even after the lapse of five years when delay
On October 12, 1993, respondent filed in the RTC a motion for execution of judgment following in the execution is caused or occasioned by the actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred
the CAs dismissal of petitioners appeal. The RTC issued the writ on October 21, 1993. The writ, for his benefit.
however, was not implemented so respondent filed an ex parte motion for the issuance of an Similarly, in Camacho v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the five-year period allowed
alias writ of execution which the trial court granted on February 24, 1994. for enforcement of judgment by mere action is deemed effectively interrupted or suspended
In the CA, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion to Set Aside the CA Resolution of when the delay in the execution is occasioned by the oppositors own initiatives in order to gain
December 7, 1992 and to Re-Open Appeal with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction/Temporary an undue advantage.
Restraining Order. On March 3, 1994, the appellate court issued a resolution restraining the RTC Based on the attendant facts, the present case falls within the exception. Petitioner
judge and the deputy sheriff from enforcing the writ but, on motion of respondent, the CA lifted triggered the series of delays in the execution of the RTCs final decision by filing numerous
the TRO and dismissed petitioners urgent motion on March 24, 1994. motions and appeals in the appellate courts, even causing the CAs issuance of the TRO
Through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner elevated the CAs enjoining the enforcement of said decision. It is obvious that petitioner is merely resorting to
dismissal of its urgent motion to this Court. In its petition, petitioner argued that it failed to pay dilatory maneuvers to skirt its legal obligation.
the docket fees only because the CAs judicial records division did not re-send the notice for it to Lastly, in Republic and Camacho, we ruled that the purpose of the law in
pay said fees. On July 11, 1994, we dismissed the petition and this dismissal became final on prescribing time limitations for enforcing a judgment or action is to prevent a party from
September 14, 1994. sleeping on his rights. Far from sleeping on its rights, respondent pursued its claim by
On June 18, 1999 or 6 years from the entry of judgment of the RTCs decision, respondent persistently seeking the execution of the RTCs final judgment of November 6, 1991. It
filed another motion for issuance of alias writ of execution in the trial court. On August 20, would be unjust to frustrate respondents effort to collect payment from petitioner on sheer
1999, the trial court issued an order granting the writ. Petitioner filed an MR of said order but technicality. While strict compliance to the rules of procedure is desired, liberal
the RTC denied it. interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve
Petitioner thereafter went to the CA via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule the ends of justice.
65 of the Rules ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC judge for issuing the
the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the
G.R. No. 168913 March 14, 2007 data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in
ROLANDO TING,Petitioner, doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their
vs. duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and
HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A. LIRIO, AMELIA L. ROSKA, not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically
AURORA L. ABEJO, ALICIA L. DUNQUE, ADELAIDA L. DAVID, EFREN A. called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration
LIRIO and JOCELYN ANABELLE L. ALCOVER, Respondents. proceedings."
As for petitioner’s claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading:
CARPIO MORALES, J.: SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of
FACTS: its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-983, limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be
then Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 7, enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by
granted the application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for registration action before it is barred by the statute of limitations, the December 10, 1976 decision
of title to Lot No. 18281 (the lot) of the Cebu Cadastral 12 Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787. became "extinct" in light of the failure of respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-
The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on January 29, 1977. Judge interest to execute the same within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.
Marigomen thereafter issued an order of November 10, 1982 directing the Land
Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration and the Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al. 13 enunciates the raison d’etre why Section 6, Rule 39 does
certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio. not apply in land registration proceedings, viz:
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION
of Cebu an application for registration of title to the same lot. The application was docketed RENDERED IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR
as LRC No. 1437-N.1 TWENTY SIX YEARS AGO, HAS NOT YET BECOME FINAL AND
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio, Amelia L. Roska, UNENFORCEABLE.
Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L. David, Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment
Anabelle L. Alcover, who were afforded the opportunity to file an opposition to petitioner’s may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an
application by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer calling attention to the action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not
December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become final and executory on applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a
January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing of petitioner’s application on the party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against
ground of res judicata. the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, on motion of as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In
respondents, dismissed petitioner’s application on the ground of res judicata. special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial
ISSUE: declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except
W/N the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata in LRC No. 1437-N? when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning
party desires to oust him therefrom.
HELD: YES! Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39,
The petition fails. regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the
Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration
provides: case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further
SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree. – The judgment action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty
days to be counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal may be
taken from the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases.
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court’s approval in
LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza’s application for registration of
the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world including petitioner.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the
decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of
G.R. No. L-31077 March 17, 1978 coordinate jurisdiction.
ARABAY, INC.,petitioner, Pascual opposed the motion to dismiss. He cited the rule that a sheriff
vs. has no authority to attach the property of a person other than the
Hon. SERAFIN SALVADOR, Presiding Judge of the Court of First judgment debtor.
Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City Branch, and BENJAMIN M. The Caloocan court in its order of may 19, 1969 denied the motion to
PASCUAL,respondents. dismiss and reiterated its prior order that upon the filing or a bond in the
Araneta, Mendoza & Papa for petitioner. sum of P5,000 a writ of injunction should be issued to enjoin the auction
AQUINO, J.: sale. The motion for the reconsideration of that order was denied in the
court's order of July 11, 1969.
FACTS: On October 13, 1969 Arabay, Inc. filed in this court the instant petition
In a decision dated October 7, 1968 in Civil Case No. 71710 of for certiorari and prohibition wherein it assailed the injunction order.
the Court of First Instance of Manila, "Arabay, Inc. vs. Florencio A.
Soyangco", Judge Manuel P. Barcelona ordered Soyangco to pay ISSUE:
the plaintiff the sum of P36,874.49 plus six percent interest from W/N at the instance of a third-party claimant the Caloocan
January 10, 1967 and P2,000 as attorney's fees. court can enjoin the sheriff from selling the properties which he has
Soyangco did not appeal. Pursuant to the writ of execution issued in that levied upon to satisfy the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
case, a deputy sheriff of Rizal levied upon forty pieces of personal Manila?
property found in Soyangco's residence at Navotas, Rizal and served
notice that the same would be auctioned off to the highest bidder on HELD: YES!
March 8, 1969. We hold that the Caloocan court can stop the execution of the Manila
On March 6, 1969 Benjamin M. Pascual filed a third-party court's judgment against properties not belonging to the judgment
claim with the sheriff. He alleged that he owned the said pieces of debtor. The injunction in that case would not constitute an interference
personal property because they were sold to him by the deputy with the process of a court of coordinate and co-equal jurisdiction.
sheriff of Caloocan City for P8,106.16 to satisfy a judgment against as a third-party claimant, Pascual has the right to vindicate his
Soyangco in Civil Case No. 61193, "Esteban F. Ferrer vs. Florencio claim to the properties levied upon by means of a proper action.
Soyangco"of the Court of First Instance of Manila, as shown in the That right is recognized in Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which
certificate of sale dated June 30, 1967. provides:
On March 13, 1969 Arabay, Inc. posted an indemnity bond for SEC. 17. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. —If
P8,106.16 in favor of the sheriff. The auction sale was rescheduled on property levied on be claimed by any other person than the
March 28, 1969 but the sale did not take place because Pascual sued the judgment debtor or his agent, and such person make an affidavit of
sheriff and Arabay, Inc. in Civil Case No. C-1545 of the Court of First his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the
Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City Branch XIV. Pascual prayed in that grounds of such right or title, and serve the same upon the officer
case that the auction sale be enjoined, that the levy be declared void and making the levy, and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, the
that the defendants be ordered to pay moral damages and attorney's fees. officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such
The Caloocan court in an ex parte order dated March 26, 1969 enjoined judgment creditor or his agent, on demand of the officer, indemnify
the sheriff from proceeding with the auction sale. the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater such
Arabay, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss the injunction suit. It than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as
invoked the rule that no court has the power to interfere by to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the
injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or writ of execution.
The third-party claimant is to obligated to file an action for damages branches of the same court.
against the sheriff in case an indemnity bond was filed by the judgment That rule is not violated when the judge of another branch, who annuls
creditor. The third-party claimant may file a separate and or modifies the order issued by another judge, acts in the same case and
independent action to establish ownership to the property levied belongs to the same court (Eleazar vs. Zandueta, 48 Phil. 193).
upon by the sheriff. In that action, he may secure an injunction to On the other hand, it should be noted that a Court of First Instance or a
restrain the sale of the attached property. branch thereof has the authority and jurisdiction to take cognizance of,
When the sheriff, acting beyond the bound of his authority, seizes a and to act in, a suit to annul a final and executory judgment or order
stranger's property, the writ of injunction, which is issued to stop the rendered by another Court of First Instance or by another branch of the
auction sale of that property, is not an interference with the writ of same court. In such a case, there is no interference by one branch of the
execution issued by another court because the writ of execution issued court with the judgment of another branch of the same court because
by another court because the writ of execution was improperly after a case had been finally terminated in one branch and an action to
implemented by the sheriff. Under that writ, he could attach the property annul the judgment is filed in another branch, the cause of action in the
of the judgment debtor. He is not authorized to levy upon the property of second case would be different from that in the first case.
the third-party claimant.
In the instant case, respondent Judge acted within his
jurisdiction and did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
enjoining the auction sale because, as already stated, "a sheriff has
no authority to attach the property of any person under an
execution except that of the judgment debtor. If he does so, the writ
of execution affords him no justification for the action is not in
obedience to the mandate of the writ. So long as the officer confines
his acts which are not justified by the writ are without authority of
law. An injunction is a proper remedy to prevent a sheriff from selling
the property of one person for the purpose of paying the debts of
another.".