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of a security agency are not exempt from execution under Rule 39, Sec. 12, par.

(b) of
[G.R. No. 88114 : December 20, 1990.]
the Rules of Court which provides:
192 SCRA 492
"Sec. 12. Property exempt from execution. — Except as otherwise expressly provided
PENTAGON SECURITY and INVESTIGATION AGENCY, Petitioner, by law, the following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:
'(b) Tools and implements necessarily used by him in his trade or employment;'"
Respondents contend that from the above provision, three (3) things can be deduced,
"(a) Except in paragraphs (j) and (m), Sec. 12, Rule 39, Rules of Court, the exemptions
Petitioner, a single proprietorship engaged in security services, was ordered to are accorded to individual debtors.
(b) The exempt properties are used personally by the debtor or his family, or as tools or
NINETEEN PESOS AND FOUR CENTAVOS (P157,119.04) representing wages and
implements of the debtor in his trade or employment.
COLA differentials due its employees, as computed in a Decision of the NLRC dated
21 February 1986. On 22 June 1988, a notice of garnishment was issued against (c) The properties are necessary for the livelihood of the debtor and his family."
petitioner, addressed to the PC-SUSIA c/o Col. Norberto M. Lina, Camp Crame,
The term "tools and implements" refers to instruments of husbandry or manual labor
EDSA, Q.C. On 5 June 1988, Deputy Sheriff Silvino B. Santos issued a Notice of
needed by an artisan craftsman or laborer to obtain his living. Here petitioner is a
Levy and Sale on Execution of Personal Properties against herein petitioner, which
business enterprise. It does not use the firearms personally, but they are used by its
personal properties are the licensed firearms in question.
employees. Not being a natural person, petitioner cannot claim that the firearms are
Petitioner filed an urgent petition to quash Notice of Levy and Sale on Execution, necessary for its livelihood. Private respondent invites the Court to take judicial notice
claiming exemption from execution under Sec. 12, par. (b), Rule 39 of the Rules of of the fact that there are security guards rendering service without firearms.
Petitioner without filing any reply moves for the resolution of the petition.
Labor Arbiter Eduardo Magno denied the petition. The Motion for Reconsideration
was likewise denied. On 21 March 1989, the NLRC issued its resolution which is the
subject of this petition. W/N there is grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in upholding
the sheriff's issuance of Notice of Levy and Sale on Execution against licensed
The NLRC held:
firearms owned and used by the petitioner, a security agency, in its operations?
"Respondent is a security agency. It is admitted that the licensed firearm is an
important implement used in the business but this licensed firearm is not the
tools and implements exempted from execution. The question, therefore is There is no question, in our mind, that a security agency without firearms to equip its
whether a person can run his trade or employment without such licensed guards is useless.
firearm. The answer is in the affirmative since the person can still run the
However, it would appear that the exemption contemplated by the provision
business or engage in his trade even without such firearm because there are
involved is personal, available only to a natural person, such as a dentist's dental
other alternatives open to him.
chair and electric fan (Belen v. de Leon, G.R. No. L-16412, 30 Nov. 1962). As
"Besides, there is no showing that the levied firearms are the only firearms pointed out by the Solicitor General, if properties used in business are exempt
that the respondent-appellant has in its possession. We affirmatively believe from execution, there can hardly be an instance when a judgment claim can be
therefore that there are firearms still hidden in its armory sufficient enough to enforced against the business entity.
answer the call of its security trade or business. In the remote assumption that
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED. However, for security reasons, and to
no firearms remains in respondent's custody, as practically flowing from the
prevent the possibility that the firearms to be sold at the execution sale may fall into
view of Labor Arbiter Magno, respondent can lease or buy from legitimate
the hands of lawless and subversive elements, the sale at public auction should be with
sources. There (sic) are some of the alternatives which even common layman
the prior clearance and under supervision of the PC-INP authorities.
can expediently comprehend."

The Solicitor General's as well as private respondent's comments submit that firearms
writ despite the fact that more than five years had elapsed since the RTCs decision of November
G.R. No. 149053 6, 1991 became final and executory. Invoking Rule 39, Section 6 of the Rules, petitioner
insisted that the RTC decision could no longer be enforced by mere motion but only by
Petitioner, Present: The CA dismissed the petition for patent lack of merit. It held that:

PLANTERS PRODUCTS, INC., While it is true that the judgment sought to be executed became
Respondent.Promulgated: final and executory on March 12, 1993, it bears stressing that the delay was
caused by petitioners dilatory maneuvers filed in this Court and all the way
March 7, 2007 to the Supreme Court, viz: the Very Urgent Motion to Set Aside Resolution
of December 7, 1992 and to Re-Open the Appeal with Prayer for
CORONA, J.: Preliminary Injunction/Temporary Restraining Order which resulted in the
issuance of the Court of Appeals Resolution dated March 3, 1994 enjoining
FACTS: respondents from enforcing the subject decision; the Motion for
Sometime in 1977, Ernesto Olson entered into a dealership agreement with respondent Reconsideration of [the] Court of Appeals Resolution dated March 24, 1994;
Planters Products, Inc. whereby he agreed to purchase, in cash or credit, fertilizers and and Petition for Certiorari before the Supreme Court which was ultimately
agricultural chemicals from respondent for resale. To secure Olsons faithful compliance of his dismissed by the High Court on July 11, 1994.
obligations, Vista Surety and Insurance, Co. (Vista Insurance) and petitioner executed a surety
undertaking in favor of respondent. Petitioner filed an MR but this was likewise denied by the CA. Hence, this petition.
After several deliveries, Olson failed to pay respondent prompting the latter to claim the amount
due from petitioner and Vista Insurance. However, both refused to settle their liabilities to ISSUE:
respondent as Olsons sureties. W/N the execution of a final judgment may be made by mere motion despite the lapse
On June 25, 1979, respondent filed an action for collection of sum of money against of five years?
Olson, Vista Insurance and petitioner in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Branch 58.
Summons were accordingly served (except as to Olson whose address could not be located). HELD: YES! In this case, we answer in the affirmative.
The trial court found petitioner and Vista Insurance liable to respondent. They
were ordered to pay the following: (1) P372,502 representing the unpaid principal amount plus Under Rule 39, Section 6, the rule is that a final judgment may be executed by
interest; (2) 25% of the total amount recoverable as attorneys fees and (3) cost of suit. mere motion within five years from the date of entry of judgment. However, the rule is not
Petitioner alone appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA). absolute and admits one notable exception and that is when the delay in enforcing the
On December 7, 1992, the CA dismissed petitioners appeal for failure to pay the required judgment is caused by the party assailing the filing of the motion.
docket fees. On March 12, 1993, the dismissal of petitioners appeal became final and executory; In Republic v. Court of Appeals, we declared that, on meritorious grounds, execution
entry of judgment followed on May 27, 1993. of final judgment by mere motion may be allowed even after the lapse of five years when delay
On October 12, 1993, respondent filed in the RTC a motion for execution of judgment following in the execution is caused or occasioned by the actions of the judgment debtor and/or is incurred
the CAs dismissal of petitioners appeal. The RTC issued the writ on October 21, 1993. The writ, for his benefit.
however, was not implemented so respondent filed an ex parte motion for the issuance of an Similarly, in Camacho v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the five-year period allowed
alias writ of execution which the trial court granted on February 24, 1994. for enforcement of judgment by mere action is deemed effectively interrupted or suspended
In the CA, petitioner filed a Very Urgent Motion to Set Aside the CA Resolution of when the delay in the execution is occasioned by the oppositors own initiatives in order to gain
December 7, 1992 and to Re-Open Appeal with Prayer for Preliminary Injunction/Temporary an undue advantage.
Restraining Order. On March 3, 1994, the appellate court issued a resolution restraining the RTC Based on the attendant facts, the present case falls within the exception. Petitioner
judge and the deputy sheriff from enforcing the writ but, on motion of respondent, the CA lifted triggered the series of delays in the execution of the RTCs final decision by filing numerous
the TRO and dismissed petitioners urgent motion on March 24, 1994. motions and appeals in the appellate courts, even causing the CAs issuance of the TRO
Through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, petitioner elevated the CAs enjoining the enforcement of said decision. It is obvious that petitioner is merely resorting to
dismissal of its urgent motion to this Court. In its petition, petitioner argued that it failed to pay dilatory maneuvers to skirt its legal obligation.
the docket fees only because the CAs judicial records division did not re-send the notice for it to Lastly, in Republic and Camacho, we ruled that the purpose of the law in
pay said fees. On July 11, 1994, we dismissed the petition and this dismissal became final on prescribing time limitations for enforcing a judgment or action is to prevent a party from
September 14, 1994. sleeping on his rights. Far from sleeping on its rights, respondent pursued its claim by
On June 18, 1999 or 6 years from the entry of judgment of the RTCs decision, respondent persistently seeking the execution of the RTCs final judgment of November 6, 1991. It
filed another motion for issuance of alias writ of execution in the trial court. On August 20, would be unjust to frustrate respondents effort to collect payment from petitioner on sheer
1999, the trial court issued an order granting the writ. Petitioner filed an MR of said order but technicality. While strict compliance to the rules of procedure is desired, liberal
the RTC denied it. interpretation is warranted in cases where a strict enforcement of the rules will not serve
Petitioner thereafter went to the CA via a special civil action for certiorari under Rule the ends of justice.
65 of the Rules ascribing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC judge for issuing the
the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the
G.R. No. 168913 March 14, 2007 data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. However, if they are in
ROLANDO TING,Petitioner, doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their
vs. duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and
HEIRS OF DIEGO LIRIO, namely: FLORA A. LIRIO, AMELIA L. ROSKA, not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically
AURORA L. ABEJO, ALICIA L. DUNQUE, ADELAIDA L. DAVID, EFREN A. called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration
LIRIO and JOCELYN ANABELLE L. ALCOVER, Respondents. proceedings."
As for petitioner’s claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading:
CARPIO MORALES, J.: SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. – A final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the date of
FACTS: its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the statute of
In a Decision of December 10, 1976 in Land Registration Case (LRC) No. N-983, limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived judgment may also be
then Judge Alfredo Marigomen of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch 7, enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of its entry and thereafter by
granted the application filed by the Spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza for registration action before it is barred by the statute of limitations, the December 10, 1976 decision
of title to Lot No. 18281 (the lot) of the Cebu Cadastral 12 Extension, Plan Rs-07-000787. became "extinct" in light of the failure of respondents and/or of their predecessors-in-
The decision in LRC No. N-983 became final and executory on January 29, 1977. Judge interest to execute the same within the prescriptive period, the same does not lie.
Marigomen thereafter issued an order of November 10, 1982 directing the Land
Registration Commission to issue the corresponding decree of registration and the Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al. 13 enunciates the raison d’etre why Section 6, Rule 39 does
certificate of title in favor of the spouses Lirio. not apply in land registration proceedings, viz:
On February 12, 1997, Rolando Ting (petitioner) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) THAT THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN ORDERING THAT THE DECISION
of Cebu an application for registration of title to the same lot. The application was docketed RENDERED IN THIS LAND REGISTRATION CASE ON NOVEMBER 28, 1931 OR
The herein respondents, heirs of Diego Lirio, namely: Flora A. Lirio, Amelia L. Roska, UNENFORCEABLE.
Aurora L. Abejo, Alicia L. Dunque, Adelaida L. David, Efren A. Lirio and Jocelyn Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment
Anabelle L. Alcover, who were afforded the opportunity to file an opposition to petitioner’s may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an
application by Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, filed their Answer calling attention to the action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the Rules refers to civil actions and is not
December 10, 1976 decision in LRC No. N-983 which had become final and executory on applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. This is so because a
January 29, 1977 and which, they argued, barred the filing of petitioner’s application on the party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against
ground of res judicata. the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time
After hearing the respective sides of the parties, Branch 21 of the Cebu RTC, on motion of as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. In
respondents, dismissed petitioner’s application on the ground of res judicata. special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition or fact; in land
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be
established. After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial
ISSUE: declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except
W/N the decision in LRC No. N-983 constitutes res judicata in LRC No. 1437-N? when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning
party desires to oust him therefrom.
HELD: YES! Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec. 6, Rule 39,
The petition fails. regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the proceedings to place the
Section 30 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 or the Property Registration Decree winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession. The decision in a land registration
provides: case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further
SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree. – The judgment action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.
rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty
days to be counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal may be
taken from the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases.
The land registration proceedings being in rem, the land registration court’s approval in
LRC No. N-983 of spouses Diego Lirio and Flora Atienza’s application for registration of
the lot settled its ownership, and is binding on the whole world including petitioner.
Petitioners insist that the duty of the respondent land registration officials to issue the
decree is purely ministerial. It is ministerial in the sense that they act under the orders of
G.R. No. L-31077 March 17, 1978 coordinate jurisdiction.
ARABAY, INC.,petitioner, Pascual opposed the motion to dismiss. He cited the rule that a sheriff
vs. has no authority to attach the property of a person other than the
Hon. SERAFIN SALVADOR, Presiding Judge of the Court of First judgment debtor.
Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City Branch, and BENJAMIN M. The Caloocan court in its order of may 19, 1969 denied the motion to
PASCUAL,respondents. dismiss and reiterated its prior order that upon the filing or a bond in the
Araneta, Mendoza & Papa for petitioner. sum of P5,000 a writ of injunction should be issued to enjoin the auction
AQUINO, J.: sale. The motion for the reconsideration of that order was denied in the
court's order of July 11, 1969.
FACTS: On October 13, 1969 Arabay, Inc. filed in this court the instant petition
In a decision dated October 7, 1968 in Civil Case No. 71710 of for certiorari and prohibition wherein it assailed the injunction order.
the Court of First Instance of Manila, "Arabay, Inc. vs. Florencio A.
Soyangco", Judge Manuel P. Barcelona ordered Soyangco to pay ISSUE:
the plaintiff the sum of P36,874.49 plus six percent interest from W/N at the instance of a third-party claimant the Caloocan
January 10, 1967 and P2,000 as attorney's fees. court can enjoin the sheriff from selling the properties which he has
Soyangco did not appeal. Pursuant to the writ of execution issued in that levied upon to satisfy the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
case, a deputy sheriff of Rizal levied upon forty pieces of personal Manila?
property found in Soyangco's residence at Navotas, Rizal and served
notice that the same would be auctioned off to the highest bidder on HELD: YES!
March 8, 1969. We hold that the Caloocan court can stop the execution of the Manila
On March 6, 1969 Benjamin M. Pascual filed a third-party court's judgment against properties not belonging to the judgment
claim with the sheriff. He alleged that he owned the said pieces of debtor. The injunction in that case would not constitute an interference
personal property because they were sold to him by the deputy with the process of a court of coordinate and co-equal jurisdiction.
sheriff of Caloocan City for P8,106.16 to satisfy a judgment against as a third-party claimant, Pascual has the right to vindicate his
Soyangco in Civil Case No. 61193, "Esteban F. Ferrer vs. Florencio claim to the properties levied upon by means of a proper action.
Soyangco"of the Court of First Instance of Manila, as shown in the That right is recognized in Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, which
certificate of sale dated June 30, 1967. provides:
On March 13, 1969 Arabay, Inc. posted an indemnity bond for SEC. 17. Proceedings where property claimed by third person. —If
P8,106.16 in favor of the sheriff. The auction sale was rescheduled on property levied on be claimed by any other person than the
March 28, 1969 but the sale did not take place because Pascual sued the judgment debtor or his agent, and such person make an affidavit of
sheriff and Arabay, Inc. in Civil Case No. C-1545 of the Court of First his title thereto or right to the possession thereof, stating the
Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City Branch XIV. Pascual prayed in that grounds of such right or title, and serve the same upon the officer
case that the auction sale be enjoined, that the levy be declared void and making the levy, and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor, the
that the defendants be ordered to pay moral damages and attorney's fees. officer shall not be bound to keep the property, unless such
The Caloocan court in an ex parte order dated March 26, 1969 enjoined judgment creditor or his agent, on demand of the officer, indemnify
the sheriff from proceeding with the auction sale. the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater such
Arabay, Inc. filed a motion to dismiss the injunction suit. It than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as
invoked the rule that no court has the power to interfere by to such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the
injunction with the judgments or decrees of a court of concurrent or writ of execution.
The third-party claimant is to obligated to file an action for damages branches of the same court.
against the sheriff in case an indemnity bond was filed by the judgment That rule is not violated when the judge of another branch, who annuls
creditor. The third-party claimant may file a separate and or modifies the order issued by another judge, acts in the same case and
independent action to establish ownership to the property levied belongs to the same court (Eleazar vs. Zandueta, 48 Phil. 193).
upon by the sheriff. In that action, he may secure an injunction to On the other hand, it should be noted that a Court of First Instance or a
restrain the sale of the attached property. branch thereof has the authority and jurisdiction to take cognizance of,
When the sheriff, acting beyond the bound of his authority, seizes a and to act in, a suit to annul a final and executory judgment or order
stranger's property, the writ of injunction, which is issued to stop the rendered by another Court of First Instance or by another branch of the
auction sale of that property, is not an interference with the writ of same court. In such a case, there is no interference by one branch of the
execution issued by another court because the writ of execution issued court with the judgment of another branch of the same court because
by another court because the writ of execution was improperly after a case had been finally terminated in one branch and an action to
implemented by the sheriff. Under that writ, he could attach the property annul the judgment is filed in another branch, the cause of action in the
of the judgment debtor. He is not authorized to levy upon the property of second case would be different from that in the first case.
the third-party claimant.
In the instant case, respondent Judge acted within his
jurisdiction and did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
enjoining the auction sale because, as already stated, "a sheriff has
no authority to attach the property of any person under an
execution except that of the judgment debtor. If he does so, the writ
of execution affords him no justification for the action is not in
obedience to the mandate of the writ. So long as the officer confines
his acts which are not justified by the writ are without authority of
law. An injunction is a proper remedy to prevent a sheriff from selling
the property of one person for the purpose of paying the debts of

It is noteworthy that, generally, the rule, that no court has authority to

interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a concurrent or
coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the injunctive relief,
is applied in cases, where no third-party claimant is involved, in
order to prevent one court from nullifying the judgment or process of
another court of the same rank or category, a power which devolves
upon the proper appellate court.
The raison d'etre for that rule is that an effective ordering of legal
relationships in civil society is possible only when each court is granted
exclusive jurisdiction over the property brought to it. To allow
coordinate courts to interfere with each other's judgments or decrees by
injunctions would obviously lead to confusion and might seriously
hinder the proper administration of justice, especially if they are
G.R. No. 84497 November 6, 1989 was issued directing the respondents to refrain from proceeding with the public
ALFONSO ESCOVILLA, JR., CECILIO M. MERIS and CUISON auction sale scheduled on February 14, 1985.
ENGINEERING and MACHINERY CO., INC.,petitioners, However on March 6, 1985, after the temporary restraining order had lapsed
vs. and upon motion of Cuison Engineering & Machinery Co., the RTC of Davao
THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS, SIBAGAT TIMBER City issued an order in Civil Case No. 13699 directing Deputy Sheriff
CORPORATION and CONCHITA DEL ROSARIO,respondents. Escovilla to proceed with the auction sale of the subject motor launch "Pixie
Boy No. 5" with authority to lawfully retrieve the same wherever it may be
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: stored or berthed.
Pursuant to such order, Escovilla took custody of the motor launch and set the
FACTS: auction sale on March 27, 1985.
In Civil Case No. 13699, entitled Cuison Engineering and Machinery Co., Despite the orders of the court in Special Civil Case No. 454 directing the
Inc. v. del Rosario and Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc.", a decision dated Sheriff to return the motor launch and to desist from proceeding with the
March 24, 1981 was rendered by the then Court of First Instance, Branch II, auction sale, the auction sale was conducted upon motion of Cuison
Davao City awarding to Cuison Engineering and Machinery Co., Inc. a certain Engineering and Machinery Co., Inc. and upon order of Judge Saludares in
sum of money and damages. The Court of Appeals eventually affirmed the Civil Case No. 13699.
decision which became final and executory on June 29, 1984. Thereafter, On March 27, 1985, the subject motor launch was sold at public auction by
Cuison Engineering and Machinery Co. sought the execution of the subject Deputy Sheriff Joseymour R. Robiza in lieu of Escovilla who was then in Gen.
decision and a corresponding writ of execution was issued on December 27, Santos City, South Cotabato.
1984 by the RTC, Branch IX, Davao City. Trial on the merits was held in Special Civil Case No. 454, and on
On January 26, 1985, petitioner Deputy Sheriff Alfonso Escovilla, Jr. levied June 5, 1986, the court rendered a decision Commanding respondent
and seized one (1) unit electric welding machine. A third party claim over said Sheriff Alfonso Escovilla, Jr. to return the motor launch Pixie Boy No. 5 at
item was filed by Mariano Rana office manager of Sibagat Timber his own expense to its rightful owner Conchita C. del Rosario in Butuan
Corporation, one of the private respondents. City in the same condition when it was taken in 1985; or, in the event of
Because of such levy, Special Civil Case No. 454 which was an action for loss or inability to recover said motor launch, to pay its value of
prohibition with preliminary injunction and damages was filed on February 5, P500,000.00;
1985 before the RTC, Branch IV of Butuan City entitled, "Sibagat Timber They are also ordered to pay Sibagat limber Corporation in the sum of
Corp., Petitioner v. Alfonso Escovilla, Jr. and Cuison Engineering and P22,500.00 as actual and compensatory damages for the deprivation of the use
Machinery Corp., Inc., Respondents." of the electric welding machine;
On February 7, 1985, petitioner Deputy Sheriff Cecilio M. Meris seized Both respondents are also ordered to pay, jointly and severally, P15,000.00 as
and levied one (1) unit motor launch named "Pixie Boy No. 5" by virtue of the and for attorney's fees, plus the cost of this suit.
writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 13699. From said decision, the petitioners appealed to the Court of Appeals
On February 8, 1985, private respondent Conchita del Rosario, claiming which affirmed the decision of the RTC, Butuan City with some
ownership over the motor launch filed a third party claim over the subject modifications, to wit:
property. Hence this petition.
Consequently, a sheriff's indemnity bond filed for the third party claim of
Conchita del Rosario was approved by the Davao Court. ISSUE:
On the same date, February 8, 1985, petitioner Cecilio M. Meris prepared the W/N AN ACTION FOR PROHIBITION WILL STILL PROSPER AS
notice of sale setting the auction sale of the motor launch on February 14, A REMEDY FOR ACTS ALREADY ACCOMPLISHED?
On February 11, 1985, Special Civil Case No. 454 was amended to include as HELD: YES!
additional petitioner, Conchita del Rosario and as additional respondent, The petitioners' contention is untenable.
Cecilio M. Meris. As prayed for in the petition, a temporary restraining order There is no dispute that the private respondents are indeed the actual
owners of the subject properties by virtue of a sale in their favor by Del From the start, the petitioners were cognizant of the third-party claims filed
Rosario and Sons Logging Enterprises, Inc. Such finding is based on with the sheriff and the separate action instituted against them so they were
evidence on record which this Court does not find any reason to disturb. fully aware of their liabilities to these third-party claimants who were not even
Moreover, there is nothing in the petition nor in the petitioners' parties to the case sought to be executed.
memorandum to suggest that the properties sold in execution of the The rule is clear. If a third party claim is filed, the sheriff is not bound to
judgment in Civil Case No. 13699 belonged to the judgment-debtor in that proceed with the levy of the property unless he is given by the judgment
case. This petition merely attacks the procedure adopted by the creditor an indemnity bond against the claim. The judgment creditor, by
respondents. giving an indemnity bond, assumes the direction and control of the
In such a case, the point to be borne in mind is that the power of the court sheriffs action; so far as it might constitute a trespass and thus he
in the execution of judgments extends only over properties unquestionably becomes, to that extent, the principal and the sheriff, his agent. This
belonging to the judgment debtor. As the Court stated in Bayer Philippines, makes him responsible for the continuance of the wrongful possession and
Inc. v. Agana, (63 SCRA 355 [1975] ): for the sale and conversion of the goods and for all real damages which the
We intimated that the levy by the sheriff of a property by virtue of a writ owner might sustain.
of attachment may be considered as made under authority of the court only Thus, in this case, even if the auction sale has been conducted and the
when-the property levied upon unquestionably belongs to the defendant. If he sheriffs certificate of sale was issued in favor of the winning bidder, the
attaches properties other than those of the defendant, he acts beyond the limits liability of the judgment creditor and consequently, the purchaser to the real
of his authority. Otherwise stated, the court issuing a writ of execution is owners of the properties levied and executed is not extinguished. We also take
supposed to enforce its authority only over properties of the judgment debtor, note of the trial court's finding that Sheriffs Escovilla and Meris misled the
and should a third party appear to claim the property levied upon by the Davao court as to the ownership of the properties they had seized knowing
sheriff, the procedure laid down by the Rules is that such claim should be the quite well that the petitioners in Special Civil Case No. 454, the prohibition
subject of a separate and independent action. case, were the actual owners of the property. This brings us to the other point
This is precisely the very nature of the proceedings in the action for prohibition raised in this petition.
with preliminary injunction filed by the private respondents with the Regional Corollary to the main issue raised is the argument that the Regional Trial Court
Trial Court of Butuan City which is sanctioned by Section 17, Rule 39 of the of Butuan City cannot restrain or interfere with the orders issued by the
Rules of Court. As held in Rivera vs. Florendo (144 SCRA 643 [1986] ): Regional Trial Court of Davao City which is its coordinate and co-equal
Another fundamental rule which appears to have been violated in the case authority on matters properly brought before it. This issue has been clearly
at bar is that no advantage may be given to one to the prejudice of the settled in the case of Traders Royal Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, (133
other, a court should not by means of a preliminary injunction transfer SCRA 141 [1984] ) where the Court held:
the property in litigation from the possession of one party to another Generally, the rule that no court has the power to interfere by injunction
where the legal title is in dispute and the party having possession asserts with the judgments or decrees of a concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction
ownership thereto. (Rudolfo V. Alonso, 76 Phil. 225, February 28, 1946). having equal power to grant the injunctive relief sought by injunction, is
Similarly, the primary purpose of an injunction is to preserve the status quo, applied in cases where no third-party claimant is involved, in order to
that is the last actual peaceable uncontested status which preceded the prevent one court from nullifying the judgment or process of another
controversy. court of the same rank or category, a power which devolves upon the
In the instant case, the private respondents properly instituted Special Civil proper appellate court (Arabay Inc. v. Salvadro, 82 SCRA 138). The
Case No. 454 which is a separate and independent action to vindicate their purpose of the rule is to avoid conflict of power between different courts of
claims over the subject properties. If at all the petitioners had any doubts as to coordinate jurisdiction and to bring about a harmonious and smooth
the veracity of the third-party claims, then the separate action instituted was functioning of their proceedings.
the proper forum to ventilate such protestations. The action for prohibition was
filed on February 5, 1985. On February 18, 1985 the respondent Sheriffs
admitted having seized the disputed properties but assured the court that they
will not remove them from its jurisdiction nor sell or dispose of the same.
A.M. No. P-92-766 March 27, 1995 In a resolution dated June 30, 1994, the Court referred the case for
LOURDES SUMALJAG EVANGELISTA,complainant, investigation, report and recommendation to the Executive Judge
vs. Francisco H. Escano, Jr. of the RTC of Ormoc City, Branch 12.
LUISA PENSERGA,respondent. During the hearing and investigation of the case, a dispute arose as to
BIDIN, J.: whether the property owned by complainant included that presently
occupied by the Aguirres, the judgment debtors. The parties consented
FACTS: to an ocular inspection of the premises in dispute. Judge Escano
Herein complainant was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 2171 of the appointed the Clerk of Court of the RTC to act as Commissioner to
MTCC of Ormoc City for unlawful detainer against defendant spouses conduct the ocular inspection and submit a report thereon.
Jose and Zoila Aguirre. Judgment was rendered by the MTCC of Ormoc The ocular inspection revealed that complainant's lot, Lot No. 1326, is
City in favor of complainant, ordering the defendant spouses to vacate alleged by her to be facing the Agua Dulce Street and from there
the subject property (a parcel of land described as Lot 1326 with a house continues down to the edge of the Malbasag River. The house of the
thereon) and to pay complainant the sum of P8,120.00 in accrued Aguirres stands on an old abandoned river bed, which respondent claims
rentals. On appeal, the decision of the MTCC was affirmed by the RTC is public land. While not contesting complainant's claim that the
of Ormoc City. Thereafter, the trial court issued a writ of execution on boundary of her property is the Malbasag River, respondent contends
April 28, 1992. The writ was implemented by herein respondent as that said boundary is only up to the Aguirres' house since the river
Clerk of Court IV and Ex-Oficio Sheriff of the MTCC of Ormoc City. flowed through and over the land where the Aguirres' house now stands
On April 30, 1992, the writ was returned by respondent, who stated in before it changed its course. No one could say with certainty when the
her return that the writ was partially satisfied and that the defendants river changed its course and whether complainant's lot covers the area
had already vacated the subject house. In satisfaction of the money down to the present location of the Malbasag River.
judgment, respondent accepted the sum P100.00 and a promissory note The Commissioner refrained from making a pronouncement in his
from the defendants/judgment debtors promising to pay P100.00 report as to whether the Aguirres' house is inside or outside the property
monthly until the entire amount of P8,120.00 is fully paid. Respondent of complainant. He recommended that a surveyor be appointed at the
alleged that she accepted the sum of money and the promissory note expense of the parties to determine whether the house the Aguirres were
from the defendants because she found that none of the movables found occupying at the time the writ was served is on the land of complainant.
in the house where the defendants were staying belonged to them. This recommendation was not acted upon by Executive Judge Escano.
When respondent turned over the payment to the complainant, the latter The latter in turn submitted a Report to this Court based on the
objected to the manner of implementation of the writ, alleging that the Commissioner's findings and the testimonies of the witnesses of both
same was contrary to the court's judgment, and maintaining that the parties.
defendants were still occupying the subject property. Respondent In his Report, Judge Escano pointed out that respondent misled the court
explained that the defendant showed her documents evidencing their in making it appear in her return that the defendants had already vacated
granddaughter's title to and ownership of the house they were the house subject of the decision when in fact defendants were still
occupying, as well as their son-in-law's ownership of the movables in living in the same house standing on the same lot but already renovated
the said house. by defendant's daughter's common law husband, Raymundo Codilla.
Complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against
respondent for unreasonably refusing to implement the writ of ISSUE:
execution in Civil Case No. 2171 alleging among others that the W/N should have continued to implement the writ of execution
documents referred to by respondent were already considered by despite the presence of an alleged claim of a third person on the
the court in the ejectment case. subject property?
Under the law, respondent was only authorized to do the following: oust
HELD: NO! the Aguirres from the subject property; place complainant in possession
thereof; satisfy back rentals out of the personal properties of the
After a careful examination of the record, We find that no valid reasons Aguirres, and if personal properties could not be found, satisfy the
exist to warrant respondent's inability to implement the writ insofar as money judgment out of the real property of the Aguirres, as required by
effecting the ejectment of the Aguirres from the disputed house is Sections 13 and 15 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
concerned. Respondent should have continued to implement the writ of Respondent failed to follow the procedure laid down by the Rules
execution despite the presence of an alleged claim of a third person on of Court on execution of final judgment. She simply should have filed
the subject property pursuant to and as provided for in Sections 13, 15 a return stating why she could not execute the writ of execution
and 17 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. instead of entering into the "compromise" with the judgment debtors
(the Aguirres), which she is not authorized to do.
This Court had occasion to rule on the remedies of a third person In the present case, respondent's duty was to implement the Writ of
whose property was seized by a sheriff to answer for the obligation Execution. His claim that third persons happen to claim the subject
of a judgment debtor. The third party owner may invoke the property does not justify his partial enforcement of the writ.
supervisory power of the court which authorized such execution. From the foregoing, it is very clear that respondent failed to observe the
Upon due application by the third person and after summary proper procedures laid down by the Rules on execution of final
hearing, the court may command that the property be released from judgments when the property to be levied upon is claimed by third
the mistaken levy and restored to the rightful owner or possessor persons. Instead, she opted to settle issues raised by the alleged third
(Sy v. Discaya, 181 SCRA 382 [1990]). persons/owners of the subject property which is beyond her power to do.
As a sheriff, respondent is bound to discharge her duties with prudence,
Another remedy which the third person may avail of is the remedy caution and attention which careful men usually exercise in the
known as terceria as provided in Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of management of their affairs. The sheriff, an officer of the court upon
Court. This is done by serving on the officer making the levy an whom the execution of a final judgment depends must be circumspect
affidavit of his title and a copy thereof upon the judgment creditor. and proper in his behavior
According to the said rule, the officer shall not be bound to keep the
property, unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on demand of the
officer, indemnifies the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum
not greater than the value of the property levied on. An action for
damages may be later on brought against the sheriff.
The above mentioned remedies are without prejudice to any proper
action that a third-party claimant may deem suitable, to vindicate
his claim to the property. This proper action is distinct and separate
from that in which the judgment is being enforced (Ong v. Tating, 149
SCRA 265 [1987]). Hence, a person other than the judgment debtor who
claims ownership or right over levied properties is not precluded from
taking other legal remedies to prosecute his claim (Consolidated Bank
and Trust Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 158 [1991]).
Respondent acted without and in excess of her official duty in securing
such manner of payment from the judgment debtors.
G.R. No. L-37051 August 3l, 1977 and the deputy sheriff proceeded once more to respondent's premises on October 1,
ANITA U. LORENZANA,petitioner, 1959 and moved the fence where it was illegally placed by them on July 27, 1959. On
vs. the same day, October 1, 1959, respondent filed an urgent motion for the suspension of
POLLY CAYETANO and COURT OF APPEALS,respondents. the execution of the writ of demolition, which motion was denied by the court the next
GUERRERO, J.: day, October 2, 1959.
The records further establish that on November 27, 1959, petitioner, her lawyer, Atty.
FACTS: Paculdo, and Sheriff Cruz went back and moved the fence 1 Meter more into the
The records show that 'In 1958, petitioner filled n the Municipal Court of Manila premises of the respondent; that on February 19, 1960, the respondent filed an ex-
ejectment cases for non-payment of rentals against her tenants occupying different parte motion to withdraw the petition for contempt on the ground that "conferring with
stalls in that quonset hut situated in the San Lazaro Estate with a floor area of 360 Judge Bayona after this petition was heard, the petitioner was informed that not being
square meters. leased by her from the Manila Railroad Company and later from the a party to the above-numbered cases, she is like an intruder to act on her petition.".
Bureau of Lands together with the use of the land north and south of the Quonset hut On October 1, 1959, the respondent Polly Cayetano filed in the Court of First Instance
with an area of 340 square meters. of Manila, Civil Case No. 42001 against the petitioner Anita U. Lorenzana, Atty. Nereo
The private respondent, on the other hand, occupied the area north of the quonset J. Paculdo and Deputy Sheriff Jose L. Cruz for damages with mandatory injunction.
hut which area was also leased by her from the Manila Railroad Company and The defendants therein filed a motion to dismiss, which was opposed by the plaintiff,
subsequently from the Bureau of Lands, and on which her house stood. and the Court, Branch XVII, denied on December 19, 1959 the motion to dismiss and
Hence, the areas occupied by the two principal protagonists are adjacent to each the petition for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction. The defendants filed
other. their answers.
The ejectment. cases having been decided by the Municipal Court in favor of the Under date of March 9, 1962, the Court issued the Decision dismissing the complaint
petitioner, the same were appealed to the Court of First Instance of Manila, of the plaintiff as well as the counterclaim of the defendants Anita U. Lorenzana and
Branch I. The Court affirmed the decision of the municipal court and ordered the Atty. Nereo J. Paculdo for lack of sufficient evidence. A motion for reconsideration
defendants-tenants to vacate the premises leased. Upon refusal of the tenants to was filed by the plaintiff but denied by the Court. Not satisfied with the Decision of
vacate the premises, the court granted a partial execution of the judgment and on July the Court, Polly Cayetano appealed to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals
20, 1959, a writ of demolition was issued, specifically commanding the Sheriff of reversed the decision appealed from, and ordered "defendant-appellee Lorenzana
Manila "to demolish the premises subject of the above-name cases". to restore to appellant the possession of the property invaded and occupied by her
Thereupon on July 27, 1959, Petitioner together with her counsel, Atty. Nereo Paculdo as shown in Exh. L-1 to L-4; to put back appellant's fence and other valuable
and Deputy Sheriff Jose L. Cruz proceeded and entered the premises of the respondent improvements in their place before the writ of demolition was served; ordering
and in spite of her protests that she was not a party to the ejectment cases in which the defendants, Lorenzana and Cruz, to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiff-
demolition order was secured and that her premises was not subject of said ejectment appellant the sum of P5,500.00 as actual and moral damages, and pay the costs,
cases, they destroyed the latter's fence including flower pots trellises and electric except defendant, Paculdo."
installations and carted away the materials thereof and built another fence 5 meters The above Decision is now sought to be reviewed in the instant petition for certiorari.
into the premises of the respondent, boring holes into the cemented garden or patio of
her house. ISSUE:
On August 3, 1959, respondent presented to the court a motion to declare W/N the issuance of the writ of demolition by Judge Bayona could legally
petitioner, her counsel and the sheriff guilty of contempt; that they be punished effected against the respondent?
and held liable in damages to the petitioner. The presiding judge held the motion
in abeyance until the decision of the court in the ejectment cases shall have been HELD: NO!
rendered. There is no merit to this contention and We find no error in the ruling of the
Acting upon the petitioner's ex-parte motion and urgent motion for demolition in the Court of Appeals that the writ of demolition could not be legally effected against
two appealed ejectment cases, Civil Case No. 29664 and Civil Case No. 29665, the the respondent.
court on September 28, 1959 ordered that "a writ of demolition be issued ordering the It must be noted that respondent was not a party to any of the 12 ejectment cases
Sheriff of Manila or any of his deputies to demolish any or all improvements erected wherein the writs of demolition had been issued; she did not make her appearance in
and existing on the parcel of land subject of the above- entitled cases. which consists and during the pendency of these ejectment cases. Respondent only went to court to
of an area of about 700 square meters.". The writ of demolition was issued by the protect her property from demolition after the judgment in the ejectment cases had
Sheriff on September 30, 1959. become final and executory. Hence, with respect to the judgment in said ejectment
Upon procurement of this order or demolition, petitioner, together with her counsel cases, respondent remains a third person to such judgement, which does not bind
her; 1 nor can its writ of execution be enforced against her since she was not of her right to pursue the proper action or remedy provided to her by the Rules of
afforded her day in court in said ejectment cases. 2 Court. It is of no moment that the respondent did not file a motion to quash the writ of
We also find no merit in the contention of the petitioner that respondent having execution or file a petition for relief under Rule 38 of the Revised Rules of Court or
been duly heard by the Court, she was not deprived of her day in court and was file a petition for certiorari and prohibition with a higher court after her petition to
accorded the due process of law. suspend the writ of demolition had been denied as suggested by petitioner. The law has
It cannot be said that the constitutional requirements of due process were sufficiently specifically given her the remedies to vindicate her claim to the property. When the
complied with because the respondent had been duly heard. Indeed, respondent was property of one person is unlawfully taken by another, the former has a right of action
heard but simply hearing her did not fulfill the basic conditions of procedural due against the latter for the recovery of the property or for damages for the taking or
process in courts. When respondent appeared before the court to protect and preserve retention, and he is entitled to his choice of these two remedies. 7
her property, the Court had not lawfully acquired jurisdiction over the property of the We find no legal compulsion for respondent to pursue the remedies suggested by the
respondent because the premises of the respondent was not included in the ejectment petitioner, for the rights of a third party claimant should not be decided in the action
cases and the judgment in said cases could not affect her property, much less demolish where the third-party claim has been presented, but in a separate action to be instituted
the same. by the third person.
the requirements of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present
namely: No court has power to interfere by injunction with the judgments or decrees of a
(1) There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and court of concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction having equal power to grant the relief
determine the matter before it; sought by injunction.
(2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant For this doctrine to apply, the injunction issued by one court must interfere with the
or over the property which is the subject of the proceedings: judgment or decree issued by another court of equal or coordinate jurisdiction and the
(3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard; and relief sought by such injunction must be one which could be granted by the court
(4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing. which rendered the judgment or issued the decree.
Intervening as a prejudiced owner of improvements being wrongly Under Section 17 of Rule 39 a third person who claims property levied upon on
demolished merely to oppose such order of demolition upon learning that the said execution may vindicate such claim by action. A judgment rendered in his favor —-
order was directed against premises not her own, is not the same as being a party declaring him to be the owner of' the property — would not constitute interference
to the suit to the extent of being bound by the judgment in the case where such with the powers or processes of the court which rendered the judgment to enforce
order of demolition was issued. 5 Furthermore, it must be noted that said petitions which the execution was levied. If that be so — and it is so because the property, being
were filed after the promulgation of the decision in the ejectment cases and while in that of a stranger, is not subject to levy — then an interlocutory order, such as
the process of execution. It is not proper to speak of an intention in a case already injunction, upon a claim and prima facie showing of ownership by the claimant,
terminated by final judgment . cannot be considered as such interference either
Respondent, not being bound thereby, may avail herself of the proper action The right of a person who claims to be the owner of property levied upon on execution
afforded by Section 17, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court which provides the to file a third-party claim with the sheriff is not exclusive, and he may file an action to
proceedings where property levied upon is claimed by a third person, stating as vindicate his claim even if the judgment creditor files an indemnity bond in favor of
follows: the sheriff to answer for any damages that may be suffered by the third-party claimant.
...Tile officer is not liable for damages, for the taking or keeping of the property to By "action," as stated in the Rule, what is meant is a separate and independent action.
any third-party claimant unless a claim is made by the latter- and unless an With respect to the fourth assignment of error, petitioner's contention appears to
action for damages is brought by him against the officer within one hundred be quite tenable in that under See. 14, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court
twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the bond. But nothing herein which the Court of Appeals applied, the notice required before demolition of the
contained shall prevent such claimant o any third person ffrom windicating his improvements on the property subject of the execution, is notice to the judgment
claim to the property by any proper action... debtor, and not to a stranger or third party to the case like the private respondent
Respondent acted within and exercised her right when she filed the proper action herein. Nonetheless, the claim that the Court of Appeals misconstrued the
to vindicate her claim afforded to her by Sec. 17, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of aforecited Rule is as immaterial and inconsequential as the application of this
Court, against the instruders or trespassers before the Court of First Instance of legal provision is superflous and unnecessary for the affirmance of the Court's
Manila, Branch XVII, in Civil Case No. 42001 for dam with mandatory injunction. If decision.
she did not insist on her motion for contempt which the court held in abeyance and
was later withdrawn by her, if she did not appeal from the order of the court denying
her motion to suspend the writ of demolition, such failure did not amount to a waiver
G.R. No. L-49576 November 21, 1991 auction on May 15, 1978.
JOSEFINA B. CENAS and THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF On the other hand, private respondents, spouses Antonio P. Santos and
RIZAL,petitioners, Dra. Rosario M. Santos, apprised of the impending auction sale of the
vs. said property, filed an affidavit of adverse claim with the Provincial
SPS. ANTONIO P. SANTOS and DRA. ROSARIO M. SANTOS Sheriff of Rizal, claiming that they had become the absolute owners of
and HON. PEDRO C. NAVARRO, Presiding Judge, CFI-Rizal, Br. the property by virtue of Certificate of Redemption, dated July 20, 1977,
III,respondents. issued by the City Sheriff of Quezon City; and on May 11, 1978, filed
W. Espiritu Taganas for petitioners. with the respondent court a verified Petition for Prohibition with
Sta. Ana & Fonacier Law Office for private respondents. Preliminary Injunction to enjoin the Provincial Sheriff of Rizal from
proceeding with the public auction sale of the property in question.
FACTS: Private respondents filed a Motion to Amend Petition together with the
On May 3, 1976, the spouses Jose Pulido and Iluminada M. Pulido Amended Petition, which was opposed by the petitioners. The trial
mortgaged to Pasay City Savings and Loan Association, Inc. their land court, in its Order of July 17, 1978, denied the motion and ordered the
covered by TCT No. 471634, subject of this case, to secure a loan of parties to submit simultaneous memoranda.
P10,000.00. The said mortgage was registered with the Registry of The trial court rendered its judgment dated August 28, 1978 in
Deeds on the same date and was duly annotated in the title of the favor of private respondents,
property. The trial court held that the redemption of the subject property
On May 18, 1976, the said mortgaged land was levied upon by the effected by the herein private respondents, "wipe out and
City Sheriff of Quezon City pursuant to a writ of execution issued by extinguished the mortgage executed by the Pulido spouses favor of
the then Court of First Instance of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q- the Pasay City Savings and Loan Association, Inc."
2029 entitled, "Milagros C. Punzalan vs. Iluminada Manuel-Pulido"; Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the trial court, in its
and eventually, on July 19, 1976, the same was sold to herein petitioner Order of December 4, 1978, denied the same.
Josefina B. Cenas who was the highest bidder in the execution sale. Hence, the instant petition.
On January 18, 1977, Pasay City Savings and Loan Association, Inc.
assigned to petitioner Cenas all its rights, interests, and participation to ISSUE:
the said mortgage, for the sum of P8,110.00, representing the unpaid W/Nthe redemption of the questioned property by herein private
principal obligation of the Pulidos as of October 6, 1976, including respondents wiped out and extinguished the pre-existing mortgage
interest due and legal expenses. Thus, petitioner became the purchaser at obligation of the judgment debtor, Iluminada M. Pulido for the security
the public auction sale of the subject property as well as the assignee of of which (mortgage debt) the subject property had been encumbered.
the mortgage constituted thereon.
On July 19, 1977, herein private respondent Dra. Rosario M. Santos HELD: NO!
redeemed the said property, paying the total sum of P15,718.00, and was The answer is in the negative.
accordingly issued by the City Sheriff of Quezon City a Certificate of Section 30, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, provides for the time,
Redemption. manner and the amount to be paid to redeem a sold by virtue of a
On April 17, 1977, petitioner Cenas, as the assignee of the mortgage writ of execution. Pertinent portion reads:
loan of the Pulidos which remained unpaid, filed with the Office of the Sec. 30. Time and manner of, and amounts payable on, successive
Provincial Sheriff of Rizal, a verified petition for extra-judicial redemptions. Notice to be given and filed. — The judgment debtor, or
foreclosure of the mortgage constituted over the subject property. redemptioner, may redeem the property from the purchaser, at any
Accordingly, the subject property was advertised for sale at public time within twelve (12) months after the sale, on paying the
purchaser the amount of his purchase, with one per centumper provide whether or not the redemption of the property sold in
month interest thereon in addition, up to the time of redemption, execution sale freed the redeemed property from prior liens. However,
together with the amount of any assessments or taxes which the where the prior lien consists of a mortgage constituted on the property
purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and interest on redeemed, as in the case at bar, such redemption does not extinguish
such last-named amount at the same rate; and if the purchaser be the mortgage (Art. 2126). Furthermore, a mortgage previously
also a creditor having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other registered, like in the instant case, cannot be prejudiced by any
than the judgment under which such purchase was made, the amount subsequent lien or encumbrance annotated at the back of the certificate
of such other lien, with interest. . . . . of title.
Under the above-quoted provision, if the purchaser is also a creditor Moreover, it must be stressed that private respondents redeemed the
having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, other than the judgment property in question as "successor in interest" of the judgment debtor,
under which such purchase was made, the redemptioner has to pay, in and as such are deemed subrogated to the rights and obligations of the
addition to the prescribed amounts, such other prior lien of the creditor- judgment debtor and are bound by exactly the same condition relative to
purchaser with interest. the redemption of the subject property that bound the latter as debtor
In the instant case, it will be recalled that on May 3,1976, the and mortgagor (Sy vs. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 125 [1989]; citing
Pulidos mortgaged the subject property to Pasay City Savings and Loan the case of Gorospe vs. Santos, G.R. No. L-30079, January 30, 1976, 69
Association, Inc. who, in turn, on January 8, 1977, assigned the same to SCRA 191). Private respondents, by stepping in the judgment
petitioner Cenas. Meanwhile, on July 19, 1976, pursuant to the writ of debtor's shoes, had the obligation to pay the mortgage debt,
execution issued in Civil Case No. Q-2029 (Petitioner Cenas is not a otherwise, the debt would and could be enforced against the
party in this case No. Q-2029), the subject property was sold to property mortgaged (Tambunting vs. Rehabilitation Finance
petitioner Cenas, being the highest bidder in the execution sale. On July Corporation, 176 SCRA 493 [1989]).
19, 1977, private respondent Dra. Rosario M. Santos redeemed the
subject property. Therefore, there is no question that petitioner Cenas as
assignee of the mortgage constituted over the subject property, is also a
creditor having a prior (mortgage) lien to that of Dra. Rosario M.
Santos. Accordingly, the acceptance of the redemption amount by
petitioner Cenas, without demanding payment of her prior lien — the
mortgage obligation of the Pulidos — cannot wipe out and extinguish
said mortgage obligation. The mortgage directly and immediately
subjects the property upon which it is imposed, whoever the possessor
may be, to the fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was
constituted (Art. 2126, Civil Code). Otherwise stated, a mortgage
creates a real right which is enforceable against the whole world. Hence,
even if the mortgaged property is sold (Art. 2128) or its possession
transferred to another (Art. 2129), the property remains subject to the
fulfillment of the obligation for whose security it was constituted.
It will be noted that Rule 39 of the Rules of Court is silent as to the
effect of the acceptance by the purchaser, who is also a creditor,
having a prior lien to that of the redemptioner, of the redemption
amount, without demanding payment of her prior lien. Neither does it
predicated upon a writ of possession which was ineffective as against them, being third
G.R. No. L-53798 November 8, 1988 parties. Thus, the order is null and void. They also insist that the private respondent should
ALBERTO C. ROXAS and NENITA DE GUIA,petitioners, file an independent action to recover the property, otherwise, there will be a violation of
vs. due process of law if they are not given their day in court to prove their adverse claim.
ATILANO G. NANQUIL,respondents. W/N respondent court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction in issuing the order complained of, upon the theory that it was predicated
FACTS: upon a writ of possession which was ineffective as against the petitioners, being third
On August 19, 1975, Arcadio Valentin constituted a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage on parties?
a two-storey residential house and lot in favor of private respondent, Marina Buan, to
secure the loan of P78,328.08 granted by the latter to the former. HELD: NO!
Upon failure of Valentin to pay the loan on its maturity date, Buan applied for an The Court finds petitioners' contention without any legal or factual basis.
extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage which was duly published and advertised for public Under Sec. 35, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which was made applicable to
auction by Olongapo City Sheriff Ramon Y. Pardo on September 29, 1977. Private the extrajudicial foreclosure of real estate mortgages by Sec. 6 Act No. 3135, the
respondent was the winning bidder in the auction sale and the City Sheriff issued a possession of the mortgaged property may be awarded to a purchaser in extrajudicial
Certificate of Sale duly registered with the Office of the Register of Deeds on October 26, foreclosures "unless a third party is actually holding the property adversely to the
1977. Valentin had a period of one (1) year from the date of registration within which to judgment debtor."
redeem the mortgaged properties. The period for the redemption of the property in question As explained by the Court in IFC Service Leasing and Acceptance Corp. v. Nera,
having expired without the property being redeemed by Valentin, a Final Bill of Sale was ... The applicable provision of Act No. 3135 is Section 6 which provides that, in cases in
thereafter issued by the City Sheriff or, November 3, 1978. which an extrajudicial sale is made, "redemption shall be governed by the provisions of
After Valentin failed to deliver possession of the properties, Buan filed before the Court of sections four hundred and sixty-four to four hundred and sixty-six, inclusive, of the Code of
First Instance of Zambales a "Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Possession." As this was Civil Procedure in so far as these are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act."
not contested, a decision was rendered by respondent court on June 19, 1979 Sections 464-466 of the Code of Civil Procedure were superseded by Sections 25-27
A writ of possession addressed to the Provincial Sheriff of Zambales was issued on August and Section 31 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which in turn were replaced by
22, 1979. The return on the writ as embodied in the Sheriff's Report dated August 28, 1979 Sections 29-31 and Section 35 of Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court. Section 35 of
showed that when Deputy Sheriff Atilano G. Nanquil tried to execute the writ of the Revised Rules of Court expressly states that "If no redemption be made within twelve
possession, he found that petitioners were occupying the premises and refused to vacate the (12) months after the sale, the purchaser, or his assignee, is entitled to a conveyance and
same, on the alleged claim of Atty. Roxas that he bought the house and lot in question from possession of the property ..." The possession of the property shall be given to the
Valentin in the amount of P100,00.00. Atty. Roxas also told Sheriff Nanquil that he purchaser or last redemptioner by the officer unless a party is actually holding the property
introduced improvements consisting of one bungalow house and one store and that Valentin adversely to the judgment debtor.
is no longer residing in the premises. Assuming this to be true, it is readily apparent that Roxas holds title to and
In view of the petitioners' refusal to abide by the writ of possession, private respondent possesses the property as Valentin's transferee. Any right he has to the property is
filed on August 30, 1979 a "Motion for Contempt" against Alberto Roxas and Nenita de necessarily derived from that of Valentin. As transferee, he steps into the latter's
Guia. On September 12, 1979, the petitioners through counsel filed with the respondent shoes. Thus, in the instant case, considering that the property had already been sold at
court their answer thereto arguing that they cannot be held guilty of contempt of court public auction pursuant to an extrajudicial foreclosure, the only interest that may be
because they were not made parties to the main action. transferred by Valentin to Roxas is the right to redeem it within the period prescribed
On January 16, 1980, the respondent trial court, finding merit in petitioners' position that by law. Roxas is therefore the successor-in-interest of Valentin, to whom the latter had
they could not be declared in contempt. conveyed his interest in the property for the purpose of redemption. Consequently,
The respondents Atty. Alberto Roxas and Mrs. Nenita de Guia are, however, ordered to Roxas' occupancy of the property cannot be considered adverse to Valentin.
immediately vacate the disputed house and lot in question within a period of fifteen (15) It does not matter that petitioner Roxas was not specifically named in the writ of
days from receipt of this Order under pain of contempt of Court. possession, as he merely stepped into the shoes of Valentin, being the latter's successor-in-
Disagreeing with the portion of the order directing them to vacate the property, petitioners interest. On the other hand, petitioner de Guia was occupying the house as Roxas' alleged
filed a Motion for Reconsideration on January 28, 1980. However, the respondent court, tenant. Moreover, respondent court's decision granting private respondent Buan's petition
denied their motion on February 28, 1980. for the issuance of a writ of possession ordered the Provincial Sheriff of Zambales or any of
Thus, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition on April 12, 1979. his deputies to remove Valentin or any person claiming interest under him" from the
This Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order on May 19, 1980. property. Undeniably, petitioners fell under this category.
The petitioners maintain that the respondent court gravely abused its discretion amounting As petitioners have failed to establish that grave abuse of discretion, as would warrant the
to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the order complained of, upon the theory that it was issuance of the writ of certiorari and prohibition prayed for, tainted the issuance of the
assailed order, the petition must fail. deducted from the monthly power bills of defendant the sums equivalent to
G.R. No. 87140 September 7, 1989 25% thereof, as shown graphically in Exh. 'A-2- Motion' from October 15,
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION,petitioner, 1983 to October 11, 1985. As reflected in Exh. 'A-Motion' an amount of P
vs. 51,745,319.15 was due to defendant as of December 31, 1982 and after
HON. ARSENIO M. GONONG, Judge, RTC, Manila, Br. 8, deducting the 25%, a balance of P37,532,763.17 was left due to defendant.
DOMINADOR B. ADRIANO, Deputy Sheriff, ALLIED CONTROL & However, ... when defendant ceased operation in 1985 it left unpaid electric
ELECTRIC CORPORATION, and PHILIPPINE NATIONAL power bills in the amount of P15,941,625.35 plus interest of P2,643,514.76 as
BANK,respondents. of August, 1986 or in the total amount of P18,585,140.11; deduct this from the
NARVASA, J.: P37,532,763.17 and a balance of P18,947.623.06 was left due to defendant but
Mr. Vinoya further testified that it is not due to Batong Buhay Gold Mines, Inc.
FACTS: but a balance of the advances made by Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc. in the
The case had been instituted by Allied Control and Electric Corporation construction of the power lines.
(hereafter, simply ACEC) to recover a sum of money from Batong Buhay Gold On the strength of this testimony -- which included, it must be stressed, a
Mines, Inc. (hereafter, BBGMI). The judgment ordered BBGMI to pay ACEC denial by the witness that the amount of P18,947,623.06 was due to BBGMI,
its indebtedness of P 264,401.00 interest thereon at the rate of 16% per annum this being "but a balance of the advances made by ... (the latter) in the
and "penalty charge" at 3% per month beginning May 15, 1985, and the further construction of the power lines respondent Judge resolved to direct the NPC to
sum of P 66,100.00 equivalent to 25% of the overdue obligation as attorney's pay ACEC "its judgment rendered in October 8,1987 out of the remaining
fees. The judgment having become final, execution was ordered by the Court credit NPC holds in favor of defendant," and ordered his deputy sheriff
at ACEC's instance on December 18, 1987. (respondent Adriano) "to garnish and attach the said credit due Batong Buhay
Evidently the attempt at execution failed. Hence, ACEC filed on August 19, Gold Mines, Inc." In justification His Honor invoked Section 15, Rule 39 of
1988 an "Ex-Parte Motion for Examination of Debtor of Judgment Debtor," the Rules of Court, authorizing the sheriff charged with execution of a
alleging that the National Power Corporation (NPC) was a debtor of BBGMI money judgment to levy on "debts" and "credits" 3 in addition to "real
and praying that certain officials of the NPC be required to appear before the property, stocks, shares, .. and other personal property, or any interest in
Court and examined regarding its debt to BBGMI. This was granted by either real or personal property," pointing out, too, that the NPC official,
respondent Judge, who scheduled the examination 49 on September 28, 1988 Vinoya, had later admitted that "this amount of P18,947,623.06 is due to
and on posterior dates." The Manager of NPCs General Accounts Division, defendant Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc." Sheriff Adriano accordingly
Ariel Vinoya, appeared in response to subpoena and was duly examined on garnished such of the funds of the NPC on deposit at the Philippine National
oath. The gist of his testimony is set out in respondent Judge's Order of Bank, Escolta, Manila, as were "sufficient to cover the sum" required to be
November 15,1988 2 viz: paid by respondent Judge's Decision of October 8, 1987.
... Witness testified that sometime in 1980, National Power Corporation and Hence, the present action of certiorari instituted by NPC praying for "the
defendant Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc. entered into an agreement, whereby setting aside of respondent Judge's Order dated November 15, 1988 ..and
at that time Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc. needed the supply of electricity commanding respondent to desist from executing the writ of garnishment
from NPC, however, at that time there was no transmission lines connecting issued by respondent Sheriff in Civil Case No. 87-39301."
the mining site to the lines of NPC and it was not yet within the program of
activities of NPC to construct those lines. Thus, Batong Buhay ... offered to ISSUE:
finance the construction of the line which they did . Under that arrangement, W/N respondent Judge correctly ordered the respondent to desist
NPC is going to reimburse Batong Buhay Gold Mines Inc. the amount that from executing the writ of garnishment issued by respondent Sheriff?
they have spent for the construction of the line by crediting 25% of defendant's
monthly electric power bills until the actual cost shall have been fully paid and HELD: NO!
without interest.
(T)he transmission lines were in fact erected and installed by defendant For the reasons shortly to be explained, the Court decreed on March 15,
and NPC supplied electric power to the mining site and as agreed upon NPC 1989 the issuance of a temporary restraining order "enjoining the respondents
from enforcing and/or implementing the (challenged) Order," and a
preliminary mandatory injunction "commanding respondent Deputy Sheriff Section 42 reads as follows:
Dominador B. Adriano and/or Allied Control and Electric Corporation to SEC. 42. Order for application of property and income in satisfaction of
RETURN to respondent Philippine National Bank the amount of judgement.- The judge may order any property of the judgment debtor, or
P828,806.20 ... debited from petitioner's ... Account SA No. 010-572194-3." money due him, not exempt from execution, in the hands of either himself
The Court subsequently gave due course to the petition and required the or other person, or of a corporation or other legal entity, to be applied to
parties to submit memoranda. Said memoranda have since been received. the satisfaction of the judgment, subject to any prior rights over such
The Court rules that in authorizing the execution of the judgment in Civil Case property, ....
No. 87-39301 against l stranger to the action, on the theory that the latter was a
"debtor of the judgment debtor," respondent Judge was guilty of grave abuse of Section 45, on the other hand, states the following:
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction. SEC. 45. Proceedings when in debtedness denied or another person claims
It is true that Rule 39 empowers a Court to order the examination of a the property. - If it appears that a person or corporation, alleged to have
judgment debtor. This is clear from Section 39 of the rule: property of the judgment debtor or to be indebted to him claims an
SEC. 39. Examination of debtor of judgment debtor.- After an execution interest in the property adverse to him or denies the debt, the court or
against the property of a judgment debtor has been returned unsatisfied judge may authorize, by an order made to that effect, the judgment
in whole or in part, and upon proof, by affidavit of a party or otherwise, to creditor to institute an action against such person or cor poration for the
the satisfaction of the judge, that a person, corporation, or other legal recovery of such interest or debt, forbid a transfer or other disposition of
entity has property of such judgment debtor, or is indebted to him, the such interest or debt until an action can be commenced and prosecuted to
judge may, by an order, require such person, corporation or other legal judgment, and may punish disobedience of such order as for contempt.
entity, or any officer or member thereof, to appear before the judge, or a Such order may be modified or vacated by the judge granting the same, or
commissioner appointed by him, at a time a place within the province in by the court in which the action is brought at anytime, upon such terms as
which the order is served, to answer concerning the same. The service of may be just.
an order shall bind all credits due the judgment debtor and all money and .. the only power of the court in proceedings supplemental to execution is
property of the judgment debtor in the possession or in the control of such to make an order authorizing the creditor to sue in the proper court to recover
person, corporation, or legal entity from the time of service; and the an indebtedness due to the judgment debtor. The court has no jurisdiction to try
judgment may also require notice of such proceedings to be given to any summarily the question whether the third party served with notice of execution
party to the action in such manner as he may deem proper. and levy is indebted to defendant when such indebtedness is denied. To make
It was thus clearly within respondent Judge's prerogative to require the an order in relation to property which the garnishee claimed to own in his own
appearance, by subpoena, of officials of the NPC to appear and be questioned right, requiring its application in satisfaction of judgment of another, would be
regarding the latter's claimed indebtedness to the judgment debtor, BBGMI. to deprive the garnishee of property upon summary proceeding and without
But just as clearly, it was not within His Honor's power to order the payment due process of law.
by the alleged debtor of the judgment debtor to pay the claimed debt without The only disposition that said Court could legitimately have made in
indubitable admission or conclusive proof that the debt existed and was the premises, was that indicated in Section 46 of Rule 39, above quoted,
demandable. The applicable provision is not, as was respondent Judge's i.e., authorize ACEC, as judgment creditor, to bring a separate action
erroneous notion, Section 15 of Rule 39, which merely states the procedure against NPC, as alleged debtor of BBGMI, the judgment debtor, for
that the sheriff should follow in the enforcement of a money judgment establishment by satisfactory proof of the postulated indebtedness of NPC
against the judgment debtor himself, i.e., to levy on property of the to BBGMI, and consequent payment to it ACEC of so much of that
judgment debtor, including "debts" or "credits," and sell the same, etc., indebtedness as corresponds to the amount of its judgment.
but which obviously does not at all treat of the propriety and requisites for
collecting such "debts" or "credits" from third persons. The relevant
provisions are those embodied in Sections 42 and 45 of the same Rule 39.
certificate of sale was registered on July 25, 1995, the twelve-month period ended on
SECOND DIVISION July 19, 1996, considering that the latter year was a leap year.However, thinking that
[G.R. No. 132497. November 16, 1999] the last day of the period of redemption was on July 25, 1996, private respondent
LUIS MIGUEL YSMAEL and JOHANN C.F. KASTEN V, petitioners vs. COURT Pacifico Lejano went to the office of Atty. Arguelles on said date and tendered to him
OF APPEALS and Spouses PACIFICO LEJANO and ANASTACIA LEJANO, two cashiers checks drawn on Far East Bank and Trust Company in the total amount of
respondents. P784,000.00.One check was for P700,000.00, representing the purchase price at the
D EC I S I O N execution sale, and another was for P84,000.00, representing 1% interest per month on
MENDOZA, J.: the purchase price from July 25, 1995 to July 25, 1996.The checks came with a letter,
dated July 25, 1996, giving notice of private respondents intention to exercise their
FACTS: right of redemption.Atty. Arguelles, however, refused to accept the payment. In a
Petitioners brought suit for sum of money against private respondents in the then note to private respondent Pacifico Lejano, Atty. Arguelles claimed he had no authority
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 29, and obtained judgment in their favor on to receive payment for petitioner Luis Ysmael.
October 2, 1980. Accordingly, private respondent called up petitioner Ysmaels office, but he was
The decision remained unexecuted for a long time as petitioners were unable to informed that petitioner Ysmael was not in, and it was not known when he would
locate property belonging to private respondents. However, in 1989, before the right of return.Unable to make a tender of payment, private respondent filed the next day, July
action upon the judgment could prescribe, petitioners filed a case for the revival of the 26, 1996, a motion for consignation in the trial court.Petitioners opposed the motion,
judgment in the Regional Trial Court, Branch 70, Pasig City, which on March 14, arguing that the period of redemption had already expired and that there was no valid
1990, rendered a decision reviving the judgment in Civil Case No. 3039. tender of payment because the cashiers checks were insufficient to cover the total
Private respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals, but their appeal was dismissed redemption price.
in a resolution dated October 8, 1992 of the appellate court. Private respondents In the order dated October 21, 1996, the trial court granted private
brought the matter to this Court which likewise dismissed private respondents petition respondents motion for consignation,
on January 11, 1993. This was well within the redemption period which expired on July 19, 1996 per
Accordingly, on September 9, 1993, the trial court issued a writ of execution, as a computation of the period made by the plaintiffs. Plaintiffs or the Sheriff never
result of which the rights, interests, and participation of private respondents in several bothered to answer the letter.In this regard, plaintiffs further argue that they cannot be
parcels of lands, covered by TCT Nos. T-47699, T-50009, T-54010, T-50011, T-50391, faulted for their failure to give defendants a statement of the total amount of the
T-50392, T-50393, T-50394, and 16274 of the Register of Deeds of Batangas, were redemption price since that is so provided in Sec. 30, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court
levied on execution.On March 15, 1995, private respondents rights, interests, and (Rejoinder, par. C).Be that as it may, since the aforecited section in providing for the
participation in said lands were sold at public auction to petitioners,represented by amount payable to the purchaser (herein plaintiffs) by way of redemption speaks of the
their counsel of record Atty. Fernando R. Arguelles, Jr., who offered the highest bid for amount of his (their) purchase, with one per centum per month interest thereon in
P700,000.00. The sale to petitioners was registered in the Office of the Register of addition, up to the time of the redemption,
Deeds of Nasugbu, Batangas on July 25, 1995. The certificate of sale stated in togetherwiththeamountofanyassessmentsortaxeswhichthepurchasermayhavepaidthereo
pertinent parts: nafterpurchase,andinterestonsuchlast-namedamountatthesamerate; x x x (underlining
The periodof redemptionof the real properties described above will expire one (1) supplied), there would appear to be a need for the judgment debtor or redemptioner to
year from and after the date of registration of this Certificate of Sale. inquire as to the total amount of redemption money to be paid and, therefore, it would
It is hereby required of said highest bidder, that a statement of any amount of not be proper to argue that the plaintiffs or the Sheriff to whom the aforestated letter
assessment or taxes which may have been paid on account of this purchase and such was addressed could not be faulted for not answering the query.Thus the delay in
other liens chargeable to the redemptioners, with PROOF hereof, be submitted within paying the correct amount of the redemption price could not be solely attributed to the
thirty (30) days immediately preceding the expiration of the period of redemption, defendants since the plaintiffs or the Sheriff are partly to blame.At least the defendants
furnishing the defendants a copy thereof, as required by law, for purposes of have shown their good faith in trying to settle the redemption price within the period
computing the actual amount payable by the defendants in case of redemption. provided by law which was simply ignored by the plaintiffs who appeared to profit
On July 16, 1996, private respondents counsel wrote to petitioners counsel more if the properties are not redeemed by reason of the higher value of said
Atty. Fernando R. Arguelles, Jr. and Deputy Sheriff Sofronio M. Villarin, properties.
informing them that private respondents were exercising their right of As to the other argument that there was no valid tender of payment of the redemption
redemption. Private respondents asked petitioners for a computation of the price because the cashiers checks are not considered legal tender, suffice it to state that
redemption price. in Ramon Tan v. Court of Appeals, et al., (G.R. No. 100555, December 20, 1944), the
The twelve-month period of redemption expired on July 19, 1996. Although the Supreme Court ruled:
Now, what was presented for deposit in the instant case was not just an ordinary before July 19, 1996, the 360th day after July 25, 1995 considering that 1996 was
check but a cashiers check payable to the depositor himself. A cashiers check is a a leap year.
primary obligation of the issuing bank and accepted in advance by its mere However, apparently equating the phrase twelve (12) months in Rule 39, 30 with
issuance.By its very nature, a cashiers check is a banks order to pay drawn upon itself, one year of 365 days, private respondents reckoned the period of redemption as
committing in effect its total resources, integrity and honor behind the check.A ending on July 25, 1996 since the sale was registered on July 25, 1995.Indeed, the
cashiers check by its peculiar character and general use in the commercial world is certificate of sale stated that the period of redemption . . . will expire one (1) year from
regarded substantially to be as good as the money which it represents. . . . and after the date of registration. . .There was thus an honest mistake on a question of
Anent the objection that the total amount covered by the two cashiers checks falls short law. Rule 39, 28 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure now provides that the period
of the correct amount of the redemption price tendered by the defendants, the same of redemption shall be at any time within one (1) year from the date of
should be rectified by requiring them to pay the right amount. registration of the certificate of sale, so that the period is now to be understood as
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration.As their motion was denied, composed of 365 days.Neither petitioners nor the sheriff corrected private respondents
they filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus in the Court of mistaken impression, leading the latter to believe that July 25, 1996 was indeed the last
Appeals.However, the appellate court dismissed their petition on January 26, day of the period of redemption.
1998. Moreover, private respondents on July 16, 1996 and July 17, 1996, i.e.,within 12-
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. month period as provided in Rule 39, 30 of the former Rules of Court, gave notice to
Deputy Sheriff Sofronio and petitioners counsel of their intention to redeem the lands
ISSUE: sold. In the same letter, private respondents requested a statement of the redemption
W/N the petitioner is still entitled for redemption? price which petitioners and the deputy sheriff chose to ignore.When private respondent
Lejanos tender of payment was refused by Atty. Arguelles, Jr., private respondents
HELD: YES! consigned payment in the trial court on July 26, 1996. The combination of these
First.Rule 39, 30 of the 1964 Rules of Court provided that within twelve months circumstances makes it inequitable to rule that private respondents lost the right of
after the sale, the judgment debtor may redeem the property sold at public auction, redemption by his delay of six days to redeem the property. Both the trial court and
thus: the Court of Appeals correctly held that private respondents had tried in good
Sec. faith to exercise their right of redemption.As the appellate court stated:
30.Timeandmannerof,andamountspayableon,successiveredemptions.Noticetobegivena . . .such special circumstances exist, namely: (1) the highest bidders (petitioners) did
ndfiled. - The judgment debtor, or redemptioner, may redeem the property from the not submit a statement of any amount of assessment or taxes which may have been
purchaser, at any time within twelve (12) months after the sale, on paying the paid on account of their purchase to be submitted within 30 days immediately
purchaser the amount of his purchase, with one per centum per month interest thereof preceding the expiration of the period of redemption, furnishing the defendants
in addition, up to the time of redemption, together with the amount of any assessments (private respondents) a copy thereof, as directed in the certificate of sale; (2) despite
or taxes which the purchaser may have paid thereon after purchase, and interest on receipt of the letters from private respondents, petitioners and deputy sheriff Villarin
such last named amount at the same rate. . . never made a reply; (3) notwithstanding that petitioners counsel was their agent in the
Written notice of any redemption must be given to the officer who made the sale auction sale in which the properties in question were sold to petitioners, said counsel,
and a duplicate filed with the registrar of deeds of the province, and if any assessments Atty. Fernando R. Arguelles, Jr., when private respondents wanted to exercise their
or taxes are paid by the redemptioner or if he has or acquires any lien other than that right of redemption went into technicalities by saying his authority was limited to just
upon which the redemption was made, notice thereof must in like manner be given to the bidding.
the officer and filed with the registrar of deeds; if such notice be not filed, the property
may be redeemed without paying such assessments, taxes, or liens.
Under Art. 13 of the Civil Code, a month, unless designated by name, is understood to
be equivalent to 30 days, while a year is understood to be of 365 days.Thus, the rulings
of this Court under the 1964 Rules stated that the 12-month period of redemption
under Rule 39, 30 is equivalent to 360 days counted from the registration of the
certificate of sale. Within the said period, the redemptioner must pay the purchaser the
full amount of the redemption price, otherwise the redemption is ineffectual.
In the instant case, there is no question that the certificate of sale was
registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Nasugbu, Batangas on July 25,
1995.Consequently, the right of redemption should have been exercised on or
petitioner as judgment obligor and setting his examination on 22 March 2002. On the same
[G.R. No. 156829. June 8, 2004] day the motion for examination was granted, petitioner filed with the court a Manifestation
RAMON D. MONTENEGRO, petitioner, vs.MA. TERESA L. MONTENEGRO, for alleging that the grant of the motion for examination was premature because he still would
herself and as the mother and natural guardian of the minors, ANTONIO AMELO have 30 days from receipt of the motion, or until April 14, 2002, within which to file a
and ANA MARIA PIA ISABEL, both surnamed MONTENEGRO, respondents. comment or opposition thereto as agreed upon during the conference on 6 March 2002.
DECISION On 22 March 2002, neither petitioner nor his counsel appeared for the scheduled hearing.
DAVIDE, JR., C.J.: On that date, the trial court issued an order re-scheduling the hearing to 10 April 2002 and
requiring the petitioner to explain why he should not be held in contempt of court for
FACTS: disobeying the 19 March 2002 Order.
On 14 June 1994, respondent Ma. Teresa V. Lizares-Montenegro, for herself and as On 26 March 2002, petitioner filed a Compliance with Motion to Re-schedule Proceedings.
mother and guardian of her two minor children Antonio Amelo and Ana Maria Pia Isabel, He explained that he did not attend the 22 March 2002 hearing because he was under the
filed with the trial court below a complaint for support against her husband, herein impression that he still had 30 days from the filing of the motion to examine him as
petitioner Ramon D. Montenegro. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 94-8467. Four judgment obligor within which to respond to the motion; besides, his counsel was not
years after the filing of the complaint, petitioner and respondent Teresa executed a available on 22 March 2002 due to previously scheduled hearings.
compromise agreement which was submitted to the trial court for approval on 13 October At the hearing on 4 April 2002 of the Compliance with Motion to Re-schedule Proceedings,
1998. counsel for petitioner manifested that his client already left for Canada on 26 March 2002
On the same date, the trial court rendered a Decision approving the compromise and will be unable to attend the 10 April 2002 hearing, and that petitioner would be
agreement and ordering the parties to comply with it. The parties did not appeal from the available for examination on the last week of July or first week of August 2002. Counsel
Decision; hence, it became final and executory. prayed that the hearing be thus reset accordingly. The trial court denied the motion and
Under the terms of the compromise agreement, petitioner obligated himself to: informed the parties that the hearing scheduled on 10 April 2002 will proceed as scheduled.
(1) Pay the respondent the amount of One Million Pesos (P1,000,000) representing her On 5 April 2002, petitioner filed a manifestation reiterating that he would be unable to
entire share in their conjugal partnership of gains, Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000) of attend the 10 April 2002 hearing because he was already in Canada. Counsel for petitioner
which is payable upon signing of the compromise agreement while the remaining balance likewise manifested that he would also be unavailable on the said date because he would be
of Five Hundred Thousand (P500,000) must be paid within one (1) year from the execution in Manila to attend to his other cases.
of the compromise agreement. On 17 June 2002, the trial court issued an Order directing the petitioner to show cause why
(2) Establish a trust fund in the amount of Three Million Pesos (P3,000,000) in favor of his he should not held in contempt of court for failure to appear on the 10 April 2002 hearing
children Antonio Amelo and Ana Maria Pia Isabel within sixty (60) days from the approval for his examination as judgment obligor. In his Compliance and Explanation filed on 28
of the compromise agreement. June 2002, petitioner alleged that he was unable to attend the 10 April 2002 hearing
(3) Obtain an educational plan or an investment plan to cover tuition and other because he was in Canada and had no intention to abscond from his obligation.
matriculation fees for the college education of Ana Maria Pia Isabel within one (1) year On 13 June 2002, the trial court issued an Order setting the case for the examination of the
from the approval of the compromise agreement. petitioner on 3 July 2002. A subpoena was issued against the petitioner and served at his
Since petitioner failed to comply with his obligations under the compromise address of record.Respondent Teresa also caused the service of the subpoena at
agreement despite the lapse of the periods provided therein, respondent Teresa filed a 8051 Estrella Avenue, San Antonio
motion for the execution of the judgment. The trial court granted the motion and issued a Village, MakatiCity where petitioner is allegedly residing.
writ of execution on 15 February 1999. The 3 July 2002 hearing did not push through as the petitioner filed a Motion to Quash
A second writ of execution and a notice of garnishment, issued by the trial court on 21 May Subpoena Ad Testificandum on 28 June 2002. In the motion, petitioner admitted that 8051
2001 and on 28 May 2001, respectively, were returned unsatisfied. Estrella Avenue, San Antonio Village, MakatiCity, is his present address but alleged that
In several conferences called by the trial court, petitioner admitted his failure to comply Makati City is more than 100 kilometers away from Bacolod City; thus, he may not be
with his obligations under the compromise agreement but alleged that he was no longer in a compelled by subpoena to attend the 3 July 2002 hearing in Bacolod City. In this motion,
position to do so as he was already insolvent. In the conference held on 6 March 2002, petitioner did not allege that he was still in Canada.
respondent Teresa manifested that she would file a motion for examination of petitioner as In its Order of 2 September 2002, the trial court denied the Motion to Quash Subpoena Ad
judgment obligor. The trial court gave her 30 days within which to file the appropriate Testificandum, but re-scheduled the hearing to 23 October 2002. On 22 October 2002, the
motion and informed petitioner that he would have 30 days to file a comment or reply to day before the scheduled hearing, petitioner filed a manifestation informing the trial court
the motion. that he was still in Canada and would not be able to attend the 23 October 2002 hearing;
On 14 March 2002, respondent Teresa filed a motion to examine petitioner as however, he would be in Manila on the first week of December 2002. He moved that the
judgment obligor under Sections 36 and 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. In her hearing be re-scheduled on 9 December 2002. The manifestation, however, did not contain
motion, she alleged that there is an urgency for the examination to be conducted at the a notice of hearing.
earliest time since petitioner was about to migrate to Canada. Acting on the said motion, the On 23 October 2002, petitioner did not appear at the scheduled hearing, prompting the trial
trial court issued on 19 March 2002 an Order granting the motion for examination of court to issue an order citing him in contempt of court.
In its Order of 8 November 2002, the trial court declared petitioner in contempt failure to obey such order or subpoena or to be sworn, or to answer as a witness or to
of court under Section 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court and imposed on him the subscribe his deposition, may be punished for contempt as in other cases. This provision
penalty of imprisonment for three months and ordered him to pay a fine of P20,000. relates specifically to Section 3(b) of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.
His motion for reconsideration of the Order having been denied by the trial court in Indirect contempt may either be initiated (1) motu proprio by the court by issuing an order
its Order of 3 January 2003, petitioner filed the petition in the case at bar. or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be
punished for contempt or (2) by the filing of a verified petition, complying with the
ISSUE: requirements for filing initiatory pleadings. In the present case, the trial court initiated the
W/N the trial court erred in holding the petitioner guilty of indirect contempt? proceedings for indirect contempt by issuing two orders directing the petitioner to show
cause why he should not be punished for indirect contempt.
We rule in the negative. In the present case, the contemptuous act was the petitioners refusal to attend a
The totality of petitioners acts clearly indicated a deliberate and unjustified refusal to hearing for his examination as judgment obligor, upon motion by the respondent Teresa. It
be examined as a judgment obligor at the time the examination was scheduled for hearing must be pointed out that the purpose of Section 36 of Rule 39 is to provide the judgment
by the trial court. His acts tended to degrade the authority and respect for court processes obligee a remedy in case where the judgment obligor continues to fail to comply with its
and impaired the judiciary's duty to deliver and administer justice. Petitioner tried to obligation under the judgment. Petitioners refusal to be examined, without justifiable
impose his will on the trial court. reason, constituted indirect contempt which is civil in nature.
Contempt of court involves the doing of an act, or the failure to do an act, in such a manner Petitioners deliberate willfulness and even malice in disobeying the orders of the trial
as to create an affront to the court and the sovereign dignity with which it is clothed. It is court are clearly shown in the pleadings he himself had filed before the trial court.
defined as disobedience to the court by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and Section 36 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court allows, as a matter of right, the plaintiff
dignity. The power to punish contempt is inherent in all courts, because it is essential to the who is a judgment obligee to examine the defendant as judgment obligor, at any time after
preservation of order in judicial proceedings, and to the enforcement of judgments, orders the return of the writ of execution is made. Section 36 reads as follows:
and mandates of the courts; and, consequently, to the due administration of justice. Sec. 36. Examination of judgment obligor when judgment unsatisfied. When the return of a
The Rules of Court penalizes two types of contempt, namely, direct contempt and writ of execution issued against property of a judgment obligor, or any one of several
indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed in the presence of or so near a court as to obligors in the same judgment, shows that the judgment remains unsatisfied, in whole or in
obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, and includes disrespect toward the part, the judgment obligee, at any time after such return is made, shall be entitled to an
court, offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a order from the court which rendered the said judgment, requiring such judgment obligor
witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do so. to appear and be examined concerning his property and income before such court or
On the other hand, Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of Court enumerates particular before a commissioner appointed by it, at a specified time and place; and proceedings may
acts which constitute indirect contempt, thus: thereupon be had for the application of the property and income of the judgment obligor
(a) Misbehavior of an officer of a court in the performance of his official duties or in towards the satisfaction of the judgment. But no judgment obligor shall be so required to
his official transactions; appear before a court or commissioner outside the province or city in which such obligor
(b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process, order, or judgment of a resides or is found.
court, including the act of a person who, after being dispossessed or ejected from any Thus, the trial court committed no abuse of discretion in scheduling the examination
real property by the judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, of petitioner on 22 March 2002. On the contrary, it acted with utmost judiciousness to
enters or attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property, for the avoid a miscarriage of justice because petitioner was reported to be about to leave for
purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in any manner disturbs the Canada, a fact which petitioner did not refute in his Manifestation of 19 March 2002.
possession given to the person adjudged to be entitled thereto; In the present case, however, the act which the trial court ordered the petitioner to do
(c) Any abuse of or any unlawful interference with the processes or proceedings of a has already been performed, albeit belatedly and not without delay for an unreasonable
court not constituting direct contempt under section 1 of this Rule; length of time. As such, the penalty of imprisonment may no longer be imposed despite the
(d) Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or fact that its non-implementation was due to petitioners absence in the Philippines.
degrade the administration of justice; We are not unmindful of the nature of the judgment from which the present controversy
(e) Assuming to be an attorney or an officer of a court, and acting as such without arose. Six years have elapsed from the time the compromise agreement for the support of
authority; the children of petitioner and respondent was executed. We take judicial notice of the
(f) Failure to obey a subpoena duly served; amount of expenses which a travel outside the country, particularly to Canada, entails,
(g) The rescue, or attempted rescue, of a person or property in the custody of an much more so when the person traveling to Canada is trying to establish himself in the said
officer by virtue of an order or process of a court held by him. country as an immigrant. Petitioners claim for insolvency is negated by his frequent travels
In relation to the foregoing, Section 38 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court also provides to Canada. We thus exhort the parties, specifically the petitioner, to resort to all reasonable
that a party or other person may be compelled, by an order or subpoena, to attend before means to fully satisfy the judgment for support based on the compromise agreement, for the
the court or commissioner to testify as provided in the two preceding sections, and upon paramount interests of their minor children.
petitioners brief; b) in resolving issues not raised at the trial and on appeal; c) in increasing
G.R. No. L-65935 September 30, 1988 the amount of moral damages; and (d) in adhering to its decision in Edilberto Rebosura et
FILINVEST CREDIT CORPORATION,petitioner, al. vs. Rogaciano Oropeza, CA-G.R. No. 63048-R, as well as to Batasan Bill No. 3075,
vs. which is yet to be enacted into law, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and NESTOR B. SUÑGA JR.,respondents. of jurisdiction?
FACTS: WE hold that the respondent court committed a grave abuse of discretion in
This is a case for damages filed by Nestor B. Sunga Jr., businessman and owner of the increasing extravagantly the award of moral damages and in granting litigation expenses.
NBS Machineries Marketing and the NAP-NAP Transit. Plaintiff alleged that he purchased a In those respects, the petition is granted and to that extent the questioned decision is modified.
passenger minibus Mazda from the Motor center, Inc. at Calasiao, Pangasinan on March 21, "Well settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that whenever an appeal is taken in a civil case
1978 and for which he executed a promissory note to cover the amount of P62,592.00 payable an appellee who has not himself appealed cannot obtain from the appellate court any affirmative
monthly in the amount of P2,608.00 for 24 months due and payable the 1st day of each month relief other than the ones granted in the decision of the court below."
starting May 1, 1978 thru and inclusive of May 1, 1980. Verily the respondent court disregarded such a well settled rule when it increased the
On the same date, however, a chattel mortgage was executed by him in favor of the Motor award for moral damages from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, notwithstanding the fact that the
center, Inc. The Chattel Mortgage and Assignment was assigned to the Filinvest Credit private respondent did not appeal from the judgment of the trial court, an act indicative of grave
Corporation with the conformity of the plaintiff. abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.
Nestor Sunga claimed that on October 21, 1978, the minibus was seized by two (2) Certiorari lies when a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
employees of the defendant Filinvest Credit Corporation upon orders of the branch manager Mr. discretion. 'without jurisdiction' means that the court acted with absolute want of jurisdiction.
Gaspar de los Santos, without any receipt, who claimed that he was delinquent in the payments There is "excess of jurisdiction" where the court has jurisdiction but has transcended the same or
of his vehicle. acted without any statutory authority. "Grave abuse of discretion" implies such capricious and
The plaintiff reported the loss to the PC and after proper verification from the office of the whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or in other words, where
Filinvest, the said vehicle was recovered from the Crisologo Compound which was later released the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal
by Rosario Fronda Assistant Manager of the Filinvest, and Arturo Balatbat as caretaker of the hostility, and it must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a
compound. The police blotter of the Integrated National Police of Dagupan City shows that virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.
Nestor Sunga and T/Sgt. Isidro Pascual of the 153rd PC Company sought the assistance of the (F)or certiorari to lie, there must be capricious, arbitrary, and whimsical exercise of power,
Dagupan police and one Florence Onia of the Filinvest explained that the minibus was the very antithesis of the judicial prerogative in accordance with centuries of civil law and
confiscated because the balance was already past due. After verification that his accounts are all common law tradition."
in order, Florence Onia admitted it was their fault. The motor vehicle was returned to the We had occasion to state that "there is no hard and fast rule in the determination of what would
plaintiff upon proper receipt. be a fair amount of moral damages, since each case must be governed by its own peculiar
circumstances." 25 Be that as it may and in amplification of this generalization, we set the
After trial, the court a quo rendered its decision: criterion that "in the case of moral damages, the yardstick should be that the "amount awarded
(1) ORDERING the defendant Filinvest Credit Corporation to pay the plaintiff Nestor Sunga Jr. should not be palpably and scandalously excessive" so as to indicate that it was the result of
the following damages, to wit: passion, prejudice or corruption on the part of the trial court. Moreover, the actual losses
(a) Moral Damages P30,000.00 sustained by the aggrieved parties and the gravity of the injuries must be considered in arriving
(b) Loss on Income of the minibus for three days 600.00 at reasonable levels ... ." 26
(c) Actual damages 500.00 There is no dispute that the private respondent, a businessman and owner of the NBS
(d) Litigation expenses 5,000.00 Machineries Marketing and NAP-NAP Transit, is entitled to moral damages due to the
(e) Attorney's Fees 10,000.00 unwarranted seizure of the minibus Mazda, allegedly because he was delinquent in the payment
(2) And to pay the costs. of its monthly amortizations, which as stated above, turned out to be incorrect. 27 No doubt such
intent tainted private respondent Sunga's reputation in the business community, thus causing him
Dissatisfied with the aforecited decision, the defendant (petitioner herein), interposed a timely mental anguish, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and
appeal with the respondent court. social humiliation. "damages are not intended to enrich the complainant at the expense of a
On September 30, 1983, the latter promulgated its decision affirming in toto the decision of the defendant. They are awarded only to enable the injured parties to obtain means, diversions or
trial court dated July 17, 1981, "except with regard to the moral damages which, under the amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral sufferings the injured parties have undergone
circumstances of the accounting error incurred by Filinvest, is hereby increased from P30,000.00 by reason of defendant's culpable action.
to P50,000.00." 7 As the reconsideration of said decision proved futile in view of its denial by We do not agree with private respondent's argument that the increase in the award of moral
the respondent court in its resolution of December 16, 1983, the petitioners come to us thru this damages is justified by the prayer in its brief, to wit: FURTHER REMEDIES AND RELIEFS
instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. DEEMED JUST AND EQUITABLE UNDER AND WITHIN THE PREMISES ARE PRAYED
FOR. Such statement is usually extant in practically all pleadings as a final statement; it is
ISSUE: rhetorical flourish as it were and could not be a substitute for appeal as required by the rules for
W/N the respondent court a) in allegedly ignoring the various assigned errors in "the appellee cannot seek modification or reversal of the judgment or affirmative relief, unless
he has also appealed therefrom." lot (Lot No. 489-C) which was not the area covered by his fishpond permit and that he
G.R. No. 48766 February 9, 1993 transferred his rights and interests over the said area without the approval of the Secretary
GODELIVA S. DULAY,Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE MINISTER OF of Agriculture and Natural Resources
NATURAL RESOURCES, as a formal party and in his Official Capacity, THE That the Philippine Fisheries Commissioner dismissed the protest on October 16,
DIRECTOR OF THE BUREAU OF FISHERIES & AQUATIC RESOURCES, in his 1964 and declared that Lot No. 489-C was the same area granted to Juan Quibete under his
Official Capacity, and ANGELES DICO, in her Private Capacity,Respondents. fishpond permit and not any other lot
That from the decision private respondent Angeles Dico brought her case to the
NOCON, J.: Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources who dismissed her appeal on December 7,
FACTS: That after denial of a motion for reconsideration, she appealed to the Office of the
Petitioner Godeliva S. Dulay comes to this Court and asks Us to confine public President. Her appeal was in turn dismissed in the decision of November 14, 1969
respondent Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources within his
jurisdiction and to uphold the principle of res judicata in administrative proceedings by 2. Re: DANR Case No. 3447
nullifying (1) his February 24, 1978 order giving due course to the letter-petition of private entitled "F.P.A. No.V-3-3852, Angeles Dico,
respondent Angeles D. Dico requesting for the reopening of Fishpond Conflict case of Mrs. Applicant-Appellant v. Juan Quibete, Claimant-Appellee"
Angeles Dico against Juan Quibete, Petronilo Retirado and petitioner Mrs. Godeliva S. The facts of the case are as follows:
Dulay and the "Cancellation of Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 2165 of Mrs. Godeliva S. That on November 13, 1965, while DANR Case No. 2898, supra, was still pending
Dulay" and (2) his telegrams dated August 14, 1978 stating that petitioner's motion for decision by the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, private respondent Angeles
reconsideration of said February 24, 1978 interlocutory order "cannot be entertained" and Dico filed with the Director of Lands a free patent application for a 4-hectare dry portion of
advising petitioner of the continuation of the formal investigation of the private Lot 489-C covered by Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E of Juan Quibete
respondent's letter-petition scheduled for September 4 to 9, 1978. That Juan Quibete, claiming preferential right over the area applied for, protested to
This present conflict stems from two earlier cases decided by the Office of the President, the application
both of which have attained finality. As condensed by the Office of the Solicitor General, That the Director of Lands, in a decision dated May 30, 1967, rejected the application
these are as follows: of private respondent Dico and directed Juan Quibete to file the appropriate public land
application, if qualified, for the 4-hectare dry portion
1. Re: DANR Case No. 2898 That a motion for reconsideration having been denied, private respondent Dico
entitled "Angeles Dico v. Juan Quibete" appealed to the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
The salient antecedent facts stated in the decision of the Office of the President dated That under the same set of facts found in DANR Case No. 2898 aforesaid, the
November 14, 1969, are as follows: Secretary affirmed on July 9, 1970 the decision of the Director of Lands, stating that the 4-
That by a barter agreement entered into between Juan Quibete and Jose Padios hectare area subject of the appeal covered a portion of the same tract of land which was the
sometime in 1932, the former exchanged his parcel of land situated at Sitio Palaypay, subject matter of DANR Case No. 2898
municipality of San Dionisio, province of Iloilo, for the latter's fishpond area of about 24 That private respondent Dico moved to reconsider the Secretary's decision, Annex
hectares located at sitio Talaba-an, municipality of Cadiz, province of Negros Occidental "F", but her motion was denied on January 26, 1971. A second motion for reconsideration
That Juan Quibete, also in 1932, applied for a Fish and Game Special Permit over the was likewise denied per Order dated May 5, 1971.
area (F.P.L.A. No. 1709). The application was disapproved because the area covered 3. As already stated, Petronilo Retirado became the successor-in-interest of Juan Quibete by
thereby was not yet declared available for fishpond purposes. The records of that virtue of a deed of transfer of rights and improvements executed by Juan Quibete in favor
application were lost during World War II so much so that Juan Quibete had to renew his of Petronilo Retirado on February 29, 1964 over the area covered by Fishpond Permit No.
application in 1945 (Fp. A. No. 716). His application was approved on February 10, 1949 F-738-E of Juan Quibete
and Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E was issued 4. Ultimately, petitioner (Godeliva S. Dulay) succeeded to the rights and interests over the
That on February 6, 1958, private respondent (Angeles Dico) filed her fishpond area in question. On May 21, 1973, the heirs of Petronilo Retirado executed a "Deed of
application (Fp. A. No. 18206) to occupy the area covered by petitioner's fishpond lease Sale of Fishpond Improvements and Transfer of Rights" transferring their rights and
agreement interests in favor of the petitioner over a portion of Lot No. 489-C consisting of 19.15
That her application was disapproved on the ground that the area she applied had hectares, more or less, and covered by their Fishpond Permit No. 158-2.
already been awarded to Juan Quibete, predecessor-in-interest of the petitioner, under 5. On October 22, 1974, after application with the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E, and that a motion for reconsideration thereon was denied Resources, petitioner was issued a fishpond lease agreement (No. 2169) over a portion of
That on February 29, 1964, Juan Quibete meanwhile sold and/or transferred his rights Lot 489-C consisting of 18.3675 hectares, expiring on December 31, 1998.
and interests over the area under Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E to one Petronilo Retirado 6. On October 28, 1977, private respondent (Angeles Dico) submitted a letter-petition to
That on April 28, 1964, private respondent Angeles Dico filed a protest with the the respondent officials requesting for a "reopening of fishpond conflict of Angeles Dico
Philippine Fisheries Commission alleging that Juan Quibete was occupying and improving vs. Juan Quibete, Petronilo Retirado and Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay based on newly
discovered evidence". It was there alleged that Fishpond Permit No. F-738-E of Juan 1965; Patrolman Eligio O. Javier, member of the police force of Cadiz, Negros Occidental,
Quibete did not cover the area in question (Lot No. 489-C) located in Sitio Talaba-an, dated October 22, 1963 and Melecio Quibete, son of Juan, executed in May 1964.
Municipality of Cadiz (now Cadiz City) but Lot No. 487 located in Barrio Luna, Cadiz
City. She prayed that petitioner's Fishpond Lease Agreement No. 2169 be cancelled and, in ISSUE:
lieu thereof, a new one be issued in her name.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual W/N the Res Judicata will set in the case at bar?
law library
7. Petitioner moved to dismiss the letter-petition on the ground of res judicata(Annex "M"). HELD: YES!
She argued that the two administrative decisions in DANR Case No. 2898 and DANR Case We grant the petition and make permanent the temporary restraining order
No. 3447 (Annexes "A" and "F"), involving the same parties, subject matter and cause of issued earlier on September 7, 1978.
action, have already become final and settled the matter once and for all Private respondent's letter-petition, filed October 28, 1977, states clearly that it is a
8. Claiming that res judicata is not applicable, private respondent opposed the motion to "Request for Reopening of Fishpond Conflict of Mrs. Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete,
dismiss. This was the subject of a rejoinder which was again excepted to by private Petronilo Retirado and Mrs. Godeliva S. Dulay based on New Discovered Evidence . . . ."
respondent on the argument that res judicata does not apply in cases where the government It is already well-settled in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of
has to exercise its inherent power to regulate. administrative agencies rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have,
Respondent Director held resolution of the motion to dismiss in abeyance. In an upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview
"Interlocutory Order" dated February 24, 1978, he reserved to resolve the motion "until of the doctrine of res judicata. The rule of res judicata which forbids the reopening of a
after termination of the investigation" brought about by private respondent's letter-petition. matter once judicially determined by competent authority applies as well to the
By reason of the denial not only of her Motion to Dismiss the letter-petition of judicial and quasi-judicial acts of public, executive or administrative officers and
respondent Angeles Dico dated October 28, 1977 but also the denial of her motion for boards acting within their jurisdiction.
reconsideration5and the insistence of respondent Director in conducting his investigation on
September 4 to 9, 1978 at the Bacolod City Fisheries Office, 6the situation had become DANR Case No. 2898, entitled "Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete" was decided by the Office
urgent for petitioner. of the President on November 14, 1969. Since the same was not brought to the courts for
Thus, she filed the instant petition praying for the issuance of a writ of preliminary judicial review, the same has long become final and executory.
injunction or restraining order claiming that unless one is immediately issued, respondent
will proceed with the investigation as scheduled, and if petitioner refuses or fails to appear DANR Case No. 3447, entitled "Angeles Dico vs. Juan Quibete" involved Free Patent
in said investigation by reason of this petition, the respondents will proceed with the Application No. V-3-385 of private respondent Dico. The Director of Lands in a decision
investigation and reception of evidence ex-parte as clearly threatened by the respondent dated May 30, 1967 rejected her application. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Director in his telegrams to the petitioner and his counsel, marked as Annexes "I", "U", Resources affirmed the same on July 9, 1970. 12The findings of fact in said DANR case,
"W" and "W-1" herein. which were found by the Secretary to be the same facts in DANR Case No. 2898, are
Private respondent Angeles Dico's request for the reopening of the case of "Dico vs. deemed conclusive by operation of law. 13Said DANR case, not having been brought
Quibete, et al." and the cancellation of the Fishpond Lease Agreement of petitioner likewise to the courts for judicial review has also become final and executory.
Godeliva S. Dulay on the ground of fraud committed by Juan Quibete and Petronila
Retirado is anchored, allegedly, on the following pieces of newly-discovered evidence, to To sum up, the matter of which lot Juan Quibete improved as a fishpond and which rights
wit: he sold to Retirado was investigated TWICE after the Philippine Fisheries Commission
(1) Order of then Philippine Fisheries Commissioner Arsenio N. Rolden, dated May 12, reinstated private respondent's Fishpond Application No. 18206 in its Order of May 12,
1964, recognizing the fishpond application (No. 18206) of private respondent, dated Feb. 6, 1964. Both investigations - more than three years apart with investigators from different
1958, over the area in question located at Barrio Daga, Talaba-an, Diotay, Cadiz City offices - showed that Juan Quibete occupied and improved Lot 489-C although in the
(2) The Plan of the Bureau of Lands for the entire area of Lot 489 of which the subject area different documents, including maps, which make up this case, it was designated as Lot
is a portion 487. Thus, no merit can be given to private respondent's alleged pieces of evidence, number
(3) The Fishpond Application (No. 18950) of Juan Quibete (herein petitioner's successor- 2 and 5(page 7-8, supra) as all these HAD already been studied thoroughly by both
in-interest) for 5 hectares covered by Lot 489-B (25 hectares), situated at Barrio Daga, Investigator Alelis and Atty. Bautista in these separate
Talaba-an, Diotay, Cadiz City, was denied by Hon. Jose R. Montilla Assistant Director of investigations.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
Fisheries on May 19, 1960 because Juan Quibete was already a holder of a previously
approved fishpond application under Permit No. 738-E under Lot 487 covering a 20- The matter having become final as of August or September 1970, 27it was grave abuse
hectare area situated at Barrio Luna, Cadiz City of discretion on the part of public respondent Director of the Bureau of Fisheries and
(4) The Plan of the aforesaid Lot 487 Aquatic Resources to give due course to private-respondent's letter-petition of
(5) Affidavits of three (3) persons who attest to the fact that Juan Quibete's fishpond area October 28, 1977 requesting for a re-opening of the fishpond conflict involved herein.
(Lot 487) is located at Barrio Luna, Cadiz City. The witnesses are Mansueto D. Alarcon,
then Municipal Secretary of the Municipality of Cadiz, Negros Occidental dated January 6,
Teodoro G. Salud was able to answer Guerrero's Complaint. After trial, the trial court
dismissed the Complaint on January 10, 1982. It held that the late Guerrero had no
G.R. No. 100156 June 27, 1994 right to redeem the litigated property as its sale "is not in esse." The Court of Appeals,
ISIDORA SALUD,petitioner, in G.R. No. CV-2529, also affirmed this Decision.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and MELANIA GUERRERO,respondents. The controversy between the parties did not die down. To frustrate the right of redemption
granted to the deceased Clemente Guerrero in Civil Case No. 3022, petitioner Isidora Salud
PUNO, J.: initiated Civil Case No. BCV-86-60, dubbed an Action to Quiet Title/Remove Cloud from
Title, Declaratory Relief plus Damages before the RTC of Imus, Cavite. Sued was
FACTS: Clemente's widow, private respondent Melania Guerrero. The latter moved to dismiss the
Petitioner Isidora Guerrero Salud and her late husband, Eusebio B. Salud, are the complaint on ground, among others, of res judicata.
registered owners of an undivided one-half (½) share in certain parcels of land situated in In an Order 4 dated March 19, 1987, the trial court granted the motion to dismiss. Petitioner
Bacoor, Cavite. They are referred to as the Poblacion and Habay properties and the San appealed to the respondent Court of Appeals which, however, rendered an affirmance.
Nicolas property, respectively covered by TCT No. RT-9269 and TCT No. RT-9268 of the Hence, this petition.
Cavite City Register of Deeds. 1 To be exact, these properties are registered in the name of
"Isidora Guerrero . . . married to Eusebio Salud, and Clemente Guerrero . . . married to ISSUE:
Melania Andico." Petitioner Isidora Guerrero Salud and Clemente Guerrero are sister and W/N Res Judicata will set in the case?
brother. The latter is the deceased husband of private respondent.
On October 20, 1967, petitioner and her late husband, executed a deed wherein they sold HELD: NO!
their one-half (1/2) share in the Poblacion property to their daughter Maripol Guerrero for
TWO THOUSAND PESOS (P2,000.00), while the Habay property was sold to their The rules of res judicata are of common law origin and they initially evolved from court
children Norma Salud Vianzon and Eusebio G. Salud, Jr., for FIVE THOUSAND PESOS decisions. It is now considered a principle of universal jurisprudence forming a part of the
(P5,000.00). 2 legal system of all civilized nations. 5 In our jurisdiction, the principle of res judicata was
incorporated as part of our statutory law.
On November 3, 1967, petitioner and her late husband, also sold their one-half (½) share in
the San Nicolas property in favor of their children Eusebio Salud, Jr., and Teodoro G. Salud The principle was enacted as sections 306 and 307 of Act No. 190. 6 Later, it became
for THREE THOUSAND PESOS (P3,000.00). 3 sections 44 and 45 of former Rules 39. 7 Under the present Rules of Court, it appears in
section 49 of Rule 39, viz:
After the execution of the deeds, it is alleged that petitioner and her late husband changed Sec. 49. Effect of judgments. — The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court
their minds. They did not register the deeds of sale. Instead, they continued in possession of or judge of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be
the properties, and exercised other acts of ownership, including the mortgaging of the lots as follows:
subject of the deeds. xxx xxx xxx
The relationship between the Salud and Guerrero families soured. (b) In other cases the judgment or order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or
On June 4, 1980, the late Clemente Guerrero, husband of private respondent, filed as to any other mater that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the
with the Court of First Instance (CFI), now Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cavite, two parties and their successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the
(2) complaints docketed as Civil Cases No. 3022 and 3023. In Civil Case No. 3022, he action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in
sued Eusebio Salud, Jr., the spouses Norma Salud and Artemio Vianzon and Maripol the same capacity;
Guerrero. In Civil Case No. 3023, he sued Eusebio Salud, Jr., and Teodoro G. Salud. (c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-in-interest, that only
He sought to exercise his right of redemption as a co-owner of the controverted is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment which appears upon its face to have
properties. been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included therein or necessary
In Civil Case No. 3022, defendants were declared in default. Petitioner claims that said thereto.
defendants were then in the United States and were unable to answer the Complaint. On The above rule expresses the two (2) aspects of res judicata. As pointed out by Moran, the
February 19, 1982, the then CFI of Cavite rendered a decision granting the late first aspect is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of a second action upon
Guerrero the right to redeem the properties in question. The Court of Appeals the same claim, demand or cause of action. The second aspect precludes the relitigation of a
affirmed the decision which became final and executory on July 31, 1986. Efforts of particular fact of issue in another action between the same parties on a different claim or
petitioner to intervene in the appellate court were in vain. cause of action. 8 The first aspect is known in traditional terminology as merger or bar; in
modern terminology, it is called claim preclusion. The second aspect is traditionally known
as collateral estoppel; in modern terminology, it is called issue preclusion. 9
On the other hand, the Complaint in Civil Case No. 3023 was tried on its merit.
There is universal agreement on the principles underlying res judicata, 10 viz: answered the Complaint. The case was tried on its merit and the trial court dismissed the
. . . . Two maxims of the English common law best summarize the general policies Complaint of Guerrero. It found that the right of preemption of Guerrero was not yet in
underlying this doctrine. esse.
They are: first, that no person should be twice vexed by the same claim; and second, that it
is in the interest of the state that there be an end to litigation. The difference in the results of Civil Cases No. 3022 and 3023 accentuates the necessity
Thus, principles of res judicata serve both private and public interests. not to give res judicata effect to the default judgment in Civil Case No. 3022 where
The interest of the judicial system in preventing relitigation of the same dispute recognizes petitioner was a non-party. The demands of due process present a weightier consideration
that judicial resources are finite and the number of cases that can be heard by the court is than the need to bring an end to the parties' litigation. For more important than the need to
limited. Every dispute that is reheard means that another will be delayed. In modern times write finis to litigation is to finish it justly, and there can be no justice that satisfies unless
when court dockets are filled to overflowing, this concern is of critical importance. the litigants are given the opportunity to be heard. The constitutional right to due process of
Res judicata thus conserves scarce judicial resources and promotes efficiency in the interest petitioner cannot be defeated by the argument that petitioner is a privy of her children in
of the public at large. Civil Case No. 3022, and hence is bound by its judgment. Case law, both here and in the
Once a final judgment has been rendered, the prevailing party also has an interest in the United States, recognizes privity of interest under the following situation: 12
stability of that judgment. Parties come to the courts in order to resolve controversies; a The historic and most common situation in which privity is upheld exists when a person
judgment would be of little use in resolving disputes if the parties were free to ignore it and acquires an interest in the subject matter of the suit after it was filed or decided.
to litigate the same claims again and again. Although judicial determinations are not Successors-in-interest, whether they obtain their interests by virtue of an assignment, by
infallible, judicial error should be corrected through appeals procedures, not through inheritance or by law are bound along with their predecessors by the rules of res judicata
repeated suits on the same claim. Further, to allow relitigation creates the risk of and collateral estoppel. This is necessary in order to preserve the finality of judgments;
inconsistent results and presents the embarrassing problem of determining which of two otherwise a person confronted with an adverse decision might subject the winning party to
conflicting decisions is to be preferred. Since there is no reason to suppose that the second the prospect of continual litigation simply by transferring his interest in the subject matter
or third determination of a claim necessarily is more accurate than the first, the first should of the suit to another who could begin the suit anew.
be left undisturbed. A second well-defined privity relationship arises when legal appointed representative
In some cases the public at large also has an interest in seeing that rights and liabilities once parties, such as trustees and executors, are involved; those individuals are deemed in privity
established remain fixed. If a court quiets title to land, for example, everyone should be with those whom they represent. Since parties litigating in representative capacity have no
able to rely on the finality of that determination. Otherwise, many business transactions interests of their own, but either sued or are sued on behalf of the beneficiaries whom they
would be clouded by uncertainty. Thus, the most important purpose of res judicata is to serve.
provide repose for both the party litigants and the public. As the Supreme Court has Privity also has been universally recognized when it is determined that the newly named
observed, "res judicata thus encourages reliance on judicial decision, bars vexatious party in the second suit actually controlled or participated in litigating the first action.
litigation, and frees the courts to resolve other disputes." Although the non-party will not be bound by res judicata because different claims are
involved, identical issues that were necessarily and actually litigated will be precluded.
In our age, where courts are harassed by crowded dockets and complaints against slow foot Having received one opportunity to defend or prosecute those issues, he may not be
justice, frequent technical reliance on the preclusive breadth of res judicata is allowed another.
understandable. The importance of judicial economy and avoidance of repetitive suits are Petitioner does not fall in any of the above categories. She is not a successor-in-interest of
strong norms in a society in need of swift justice. Be that as it may, there should not be a her children in Civil Case No. 3022. Petitioner's children were not sued in Civil Case No.
mechanical and uncaring reliance on res judicata where more important societal values 3022 in a representative capacity. It is also clear that petitioner did not control or participate
deserve protection. So we held in Suarez vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 11 in Civil Case No. 3022 for her motion to intervene was denied. Petitioner's interest,
therefore, was not at all represented in Civil Case No. 3022 where judgment was obtained
The case at bench presents an exceptional instance where an inflexible application of by default. The doctrine of res judicata is a rule of justice and cannot be rigidly applied
the doctrine of res judicata will not serve our constitutional policy favoring fairness, where it will result in injustice.
the heart of due process. Petitioner was not a party in Civil Case No. 3022 and was not
given any chance to contest the claim of Guerrero. Her children, then in the United States,
were the ones sued. They failed to answer, and were declared in default. Thus, the late
Clemente Guerrero, husband of private respondent, obtained a favorable judgment by
default from the trial court pursuant to which he was given the right of preemption over the
contested lots. Petitioner attempted to intervene in the case but unfortunately, her motion
for intervention was denied. The late Guerrero, therefore, prevailed primarily because his
claim was not disputed. In contrast was the result in Civil Case No. 3023 where Guerrero
claimed the same right of preemption against the other children of petitioner. In this case,
however, one of the children of petitioner sued by Guerrero, was in the Philippines and he
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court laid down the guidelines in the
interpretation and application of Art. 48 of the Family Code, one of which concerns the role of
the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the State:
ANCHETA vs. ANCHETA (8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to
Facts:Marietta and Rodolfo were married in 1959. They had 8 children. In 1992, Rodolfo left appear as counsel for the state. No decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General
the conjugal home and abandoned Marietta and their children. Two years after, Marietta filed a issues a certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating therein his reasons for
complaint for the dissolution of the conjugal partnership and judicial separation of property with his agreement or opposition, as the case may be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along
a plea for support and support pendente lite. At that time, Marietta lived in Las Pinas. The parties with the prosecuting attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen (15) days
entered into a compromise agreement wherein their property located in Carmona, Cavite was from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution of the court. The Solicitor General
adjudicated to Marietta and her children. The court rendered judgment based on the compromise shall discharge the equivalent function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.
agreement. Conformably thereto, Marietta and her children moved and began residence at the The task of protecting marriage as an inviolable social institution requires vigilant and zealous
said Carmona property. participation and not mere pro-forma compliance. The protection of marriage as a sacred
In 1995, Rodolfo, wanting to marry again, filed a case for the declaration of nullity of his institution requires not just the defense of a true and genuine union but the exposure of an
marriage with the Marietta on the ground of psychological incapacity. Although the Rodolfo invalid one as well.
knew that the Marietta was already residing in Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in his A grant of annulment of marriage or legal separation by default is fraught with the danger of
petition that the Marietta was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, collusion. Hence, in all cases for annulment, declaration of nullity of marriage and legal
Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila. The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the petition separation, the prosecuting attorney or fiscal is ordered to appear on behalf of the State for the
by substituted service on the the parties’ son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his residence purpose of preventing any collusion between the parties and to take care that their evidence is
in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite. not fabricated or suppressed. If the defendant-spouse fails to answer the complaint, the court
Marietta failed to file an answer and was declared in default. Rodolfo was allowed adduce cannot declare him or her in default but instead, should order the prosecuting attorney to
evidence ex-parte. On July 7, 1995, the trial court issued an Order granting the petition and determine if collusion exists between the parties. The prosecuting attorney or fiscal may oppose
declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio. The clerk of court issued a Certificate of the application for legal separation or annulment through the presentation of his own evidence, if
Finality of the Order of the court on July 16, 1996. in his opinion, the proof adduced is dubious and fabricated.
Our constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening the family as a basic social
On July 7, 2000, the Marietta filed a verified petition against the Rodolfo with the Court of institution. Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is not a mere contract, but a
Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the annulment of the order of the social institution in which the State is vitally interested. The State can find no stronger anchor
RTC. than on good, solid and happy families. The break-up of families weakens our social and moral
fabric; hence, their preservation is not the concern of the family members alone. Whether or not
Marietta, alleged, among others, that the order of the trial court nullifying her and the Rodolfo’s a marriage should continue to exist or a family should stay together must not depend on the
marriage was null and void for the court a quo’s failure to order the public prosecutor to conduct whims and caprices of only one party, who claims that the other suffers psychological
an investigation on whether there was collusion between the parties, and to order the Solicitor imbalance, incapacitating such party to fulfill his or her marital duties and obligations (Ancheta
General to appear for the State. vs. Ancheta, G.R. No. 145370, March 4, 2004)
Held: The records show that for the petitioner’s failure to file an answer to the complaint, the
trial court granted the motion of the respondent herein to declare her in default. The public
prosecutor condoned the acts of the trial court when he interposed no objection to the motion of
the respondent. The trial court forthwith received the evidence of the respondent ex-parte and
rendered judgment against the petitioner without a whimper of protest from the public
prosecutor. The actuations of the trial court and the public prosecutor are in defiance of Article
48 of the Family Code, which reads:
Article 48. In all cases of annulment or declaration of absolute nullity of marriage, the Court
shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned to it to appear on behalf of the State to
take steps to prevent collusion between the parties and to take care that evidence is not
fabricated or suppressed.
In the cases referred to in the preceding paragraph, no judgment shall be based upon a
stipulation of facts or confession of judgment.
The trial court and the public prosecutor also ignored Rule 18, Section 6 of the 1985 Rules of
Court (now Rule 9, Section 3[e] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure) which provides:
Sec. 6. No defaults in actions for annulment of marriage or for legal separation.— If the
defendant in an action for annulment of marriage or for legal separation fails to answer, the court
shall order the prosecuting attorney to investigate whether or not a collusion between the parties
exits, and if there is no collusion, to intervene for the State in order to see to it that the evidence
submitted is not fabricated.