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Kant meant that existence was similar to, say, location. Joe can be
today at New York and tomorrow at Washington. Joe's location would
change, but Joe himself would not change. If Joe ceases to exist, in a
way he himself would change.. but arguably his concept would not.
That's why Kant went on to argue in terms of concepts and
judgements, rather than in terms of entities and properties. He argued
that predicating existence of a thing does not "enlarge" or "increase"
that thing's concept. Relatedly, he argued that the judgement "x
exists" is always synthetic rather than analytic (that is tautological, true
by virtue of mere meaning).
Anselm has had his supporters over the years. But more people have attacked
the ontological argument. The eighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel
Kant was one. He claimed that the concept of an absolutely necessary being is not
proved by the fact that reason apparently requires it.
To understand Kant’s criticism, ask yourself this: Under what conditions will a
triangle have three sides? Obviously, when and where there is a triangle. In other
words, if there is a triangle, it has three sides. But if is conditional—that is, what
follows it may not be. “If there is a triangle” does not imply that there necessarily
is a triangle. Likewise, “If there is a perfect being, then a perfect being exists” does
not mean a perfect being does exist. Kant claims that Anselm is defining God into
existence—that he is asking us to form a concept of a thing in such a way as to include
existence within the scope of its meaning. Undoubtedly, Anselm would object that
it is contradictory to posit a triangle and yet reject its three sides. Kant would agree.
But he would add that there is no contradiction in rejecting the triangle along with
its three sides: “The same holds true of the concept of an absolutely necessary being.
If its existence is rejected, we reject the thing itself with all its predicates; and no
question of contradiction can then arise.”6
But a perfect being is unique. Because Anselm thought nonexistence was an
imperfection and therefore inconsistent with the nature of a perfect being, he
argued that a perfect being must exist. And he was right, assuming that existence
adds to a thing. But imagine a perfect companion. Attribute to it all the properties
that will make it perfect. Then ask yourself, “Does its existence add anything to the
concept?” The point is that to assert existence is not to add a property but to assert
a relationship between the thing conceived and the world. In other words, you do
not add anything to the creature of your fantasy by positing its existence; you merely
establish its relationship to other things. This is what Kant meant when he wrote:
“When I think of a being as the supreme reality, without any defect, the question still
remains whether it exists or not.”7
Objections to Anselm. Anselm has had his supporters over the years. But many
more philosophers seem to have attacked the ontological argument than have
supported it. The eighteenth-century German philosopher Immanuel Kant, many
people feel, identified the fundamental problem with the ontological argument
when he wrote:
Existence is not a real predicate, that is, it is not a kind of concept that can be
added to the concept of a thing. Existence is merely the positing of a thing [in the
real world]. . . . Now, if I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (omnipo-
tence, etc.), and say: God exists, or, There is a God, I add no new predicate to the
concept of God, I merely affirm the existence of God with all His predicates . . .
However many predicates—even all the predicates that completely determine what
it is—I may think belong to a thing, I do not in the least add anything at all to its
concept when I add the statement: This thing exists. . . . Even if I think of a being
as the highest reality, without defect or imperfection, the question will still remain,
Does this being exist or not?6
6 Immanuel Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, trans. Norman Kemp Smith (New York: St. Martin’s, 1929;
original work published 1781), 504–505.
KANT, Immanuel
INTRODUCCIÓN
2. Hay un Dios.
3. Observación.
4. Conclusión.
Por otra parte, él mismo señala que esta prueba suya es a priori: "El
fundamento que proponemos para demostrar la existencia de Dios se
basa en la simple razón de que algo es posible. Por lo mismo, se trata de
una prueba que puede muy bien formularse a priori. No presupone ni mi
existencia ni la de otros espíritus ni la del mundo físico" (p. 87). Pero no
es una demostración de tipo analítico, como la del argumento
ontológico, que Kant siempre rechazará.
La segunda parte del libro se cierra con una consideración que lleva
por titulo "De la suprema suficiencia de Dios". Dios es soberanamente
suficiente. Todo cuanto existe, sea posible o real, es algo únicamente en
tanto que viene dado por El´ (cfr. p. 146). Subraya Kant una vez más que
las posibilidades de las cosas se encuentran fundamentadas en Dios. La
armonía, el orden que vemos en las cosas de la naturaleza, junto con las
leyes generales que las rigen, todo se da ya de antemano en las
posibilidades de las cosas, "y es sólo entonces que la sabiduría podrá
actuar para elegir entre dichas posibilidades. ¡Cuántas limitaciones se
impondrían al absoluto por obra de un principio extraño si esas
posibilidades mismas no se hallaran fundadas en él!" (p. 146). Se trata
de poner de manifiesto que concibiendo la naturaleza divina como
supremamente suficiente, ese concepto nos ayuda "como medio auxiliar
para deducir de la naturaleza divina la posibilidad ajena de las cosas,
como quien del principio deduce la consecuencia" (p. 147). Y es mejor
hablar en Dios, señala Kant, de suprema suficiencia que de infinitud,
atributo divino del que hablamos habitualmente para designar la máxima
perfección que a Dios compete; suprema suficiencia es más adecuado,
asevera Kant, por cuanto el concepto de infinito tiene siempre una
connotación matemática.
VALORACIÓN DOCTRINAL
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