July 9, 2014. G.R. No. 176598.

*
PETRONIO CLIDORO, DIONISIO CLIDORO, LOLITA CLIDORO, CALIXTO CARDANO, JR.,
LOURDES CLIDORO-LARIN, MATEO CLIDORO and MARLIZA CLIDORO-DE UNA,
petitioners, vs. AUGUSTO JALMANZAR, GREGORIO CLIDORO, JR., SENECA CLIDORO-
CIOCSON, MONSERAT CLIDORO-QUIDAY, CELESTIAL CLIDORO-BINASA, APOLLO
CLIDORO, ROSALIE CLIDORO-CATOLICO, SOPHIE CLIDORO and JOSE CLIDORO, JR.,
respondents.

Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Revival of Judgments; An action for revival of judgment is
no more than a procedural means of securing the execution of a previous judgment which has
become dormant after the passage of five years without it being executed upon motion of the
prevailing party.—It should be borne in mind that the action for revival of judgment is a totally
separate and distinct case from the original Civil Case No. T-98 for Partition. As explained in
Saligumba v. Palanog, 573 SCRA 8 (2008), to wit: An action for revival of judgment is no more
than a procedural means of securing the execution of a previous judgment which has become
dormant after the passage of five years without it being executed upon motion of the prevailing
party. It is not intended to reopen any issue affecting the merits of the judgment debtor’s case
nor the propriety or correctness of the first judgment. An action for revival of judgment is a
new and independent action, different and distinct from either the recovery of property case
or the reconstitution case [in this case, the original action for partition], wherein the cause of
action is the decision itself and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment
sought to be enforced is rendered.

PERALTA,J.:
This deals with the Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
praying that the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated October 17, 2006, and its
Resolution2 dated February 6, 2007, denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of
the Decision, be reversed and set aside.
The antecedent facts, as set forth in the CA Decision, are undisputed, to wit:
The instant appeal stemmed from a complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. T-2275 for revival
of judgment filed by Rizalina Clidoro, et al. against Onofre Clidoro, et al., praying that the
Decision dated November 13, 1995 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 19831,
which affirmed with modification the RTC Decision dated March 10, 1988 in Civil Case No. T-98
for partition, be revived and that the corresponding writ of execution be issued.
 On September 3, 2003, defendants-appellees except Gregoria Clidoro-Palanca, moved to
dismiss the said complaint on the following grounds: “1.) The petition, not being brought up
against the real parties-in-interest, is dismissible for lack of cause of action; 2.) The substitution
of the parties defendant is improper and is not in accordance with the rules; 3.) Even if the
decision is ordered revived, the same cannot be executed since the legal requirements of Rule
69, Section 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure has not been complied with; and 4.) The
Judgment of the Honorable Court ordering partition is merely interlocutory as it leaves
something more to be done to complete the disposition of the case.”
Plaintiffs-appellants moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Order with prayer to admit
the attached Amended Complaint impleading the additional heirs of the interested party
Josaphat Clidoro and the original plaintiffs Rizalina Clidoro-Jalmanzar, Cleneo Clidoro and
Aristoteles Clidoro. The same was, however, denied in the second assailed order. x x x3

Respondents then appealed to the CA, and on October 17, 2006, the CA promulgated its
Decision reversing and setting aside the Orders of the RTC, and remanding the case to the
RTC for further proceedings. Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the Decision was
denied per Resolution dated February 6, 2007.
Hence, the present petition where the following issues are raised:

Issue/s:

Whether the complaint for revival of judgment may be dismissed for lack of cause of action
as it was not brought by or against the real parties-in-interest.

Held:

In this case, it was alleged in the complaint for revival of judgment that the parties therein
were also the parties in the action for partition. Applying the foregoing test of hypothetically
admitting this allegation in the complaint, and not looking into the veracity of the same, it would
then appear that the complaint sufficiently stated a cause of action as the plaintiffs in the
complaint for revival of judgment (hereinafter respondents), as the prevailing parties in the
action for partition, had a right to seek enforcement of the decision in the partition case.
 It should be borne in mind that the action for revival of judgment is a totally separate and
distinct case from the original Civil Case No. T-98 for Partition. As explained in Saligumba v.
Palanog,9 to wit:
An action for revival of judgment is no more than a procedural means of securing the
execution of a previous judgment which has become dormant after the passage of five years
without it being executed upon motion of the prevailing party. It is not intended to reopen any
issue affecting the merits of the judgment debtor’s case nor the propriety or correctness of the
first judgment. An action for revival of judgment is a new and independent action, different
and distinct from either the recovery of property case or the reconstitution case [in this
case, the original action for partition], wherein the cause of action is the decision itself
and not the merits of the action upon which the judgment sought to be enforced is
rendered. x x x 10

Moreover, it would appear that petitioners are mistaken in alleging that respondents are not
the real parties-in-interest.

Verily, the trial court erred in dismissing the complaint for revival of judgment on the ground
of lack of, or failure to state a cause of action. The allegations in the complaint, regarding the
parties’ interest in having the decision in the partition case executed or implemented, sufficiently
state a cause of action. The question of whether respondents were the real parties-in-interest
who had the right to seek execution of the final and executory judgment in the partition case
should have been threshed out in a full-blown trial.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated October
17, 2006, and its Resolution dated February 6, 2007 in C.A.-G.R. No. 82209, are
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed in toto.

December 3, 2014. G.R. No. 174996.*

BRO. BERNARD OCA, FSC, BRO. DENNIS MAGBANUA, FSC, MRS. CIRILA MOJICA,
MRS. JOSEFINA PASCUAL and ST. FRANCIS SCHOOL OF GENERAL TRIAS, CAVITE, INC.,
petitioners, vs. LAURITA CUSTODIO, respondent.
 Status Quo Order; Unlike a temporary restraining order (TRO) or a preliminary injunction, a
status quo order is more in the nature of a cease and desist order (CDO), since it neither directs
the doing or undoing of acts as in the case of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief.—
Jurisprudence tells us that a status quo order is merely intended to maintain the last, actual,
peaceable and uncontested state of things which preceded the controversy. It further states
that, unlike a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, a status quo order is more
in the nature of a cease and desist order, since it neither directs the doing or undoing of acts as
in the case of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief.
Same; An application for a status quo order which in fact seeks injunctive relief must
comply with Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court: i.e., the application must be verified aside
from the posting of the requisite bond.—It is settled in jurisprudence that an application for
a status quo order which in fact seeks injunctive relief must comply with Section 4, Rule 58 of
the Rules of Court: i.e., the application must be verified aside from the posting of the requisite
bond. In the present case, the Manifestation and Motion, through which respondent applied for
injunctive relief or in the alternative a status quo order, was merely signed by her counsel and
was unverified.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,J.:

The factual backdrop of the case

The facts of this case, as narrated in the assailed September 16, 2005 Decision of the Court
of Appeals, are as follows:
On July 9, 1973, petitioner St. Francis School of General Trias Cavite, Inc. (School) was
organized and established as a non-stock and nonprofit educational institution. The organization
and establishment of the school was accomplished through the assistance of the La Salle
Brothers without any formal agreement with the School. Thus, the incorporators of the School
consist of the following persons: private respondent Custodio, petitioner Cirila Mojica (Mojica),
petitioner Josefina Pascual (Pascual), Rev. Msgr. Feliz Perez, Bro. Vernon Poore, FSC. The
five original incorporators served as the School’s Members and Board of Trustees until the
deaths of Bro. Poore and Msgr. Perez.
 Petitioners declare that the membership of the DLSG Brothers in the Board of Trustee[s] as
its officers was valid since an election was conducted to that effect.
On the other hand, Custodio challenges the validity of the membership of the DLSG Brothers
and their purported election as officers of the School. The legality of the membership and
election of the DLSG Brothers is the main issue of the case in the lower court.

Custodio alleges that clearly the composition of the membership of the School had no basis
there being no formal admission as members nor election as officers.
It appears that the legality of the membership and assumption as officers of the DLSG
Brothers was questioned by Custodio following a disagreement regarding a proposed MOA that
would replace the existing MOA with the DLSG Brothers and her removal as Curriculum
Administrator through the Board of Trustee[s].
On June 7, 2002, Custodio filed a Complaint in the RTC of Trece Martirez City, questioning
the legality of the Board of the School. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. TMCV-0033-
02, entitled Laurita Custodio v. Bro. Bernard Oca, et al. Custodio prayed for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction for the purpose of preventing
Bro. Oca as President of the corporation, from calling a special membership meeting to remove
Custodio as Member of the School and the Board of Trustees. The case was dismissed on July
4, 2002.6

Issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS, CONTRARY TO LAW AND

JURISPRUDENCE, COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN RULING THAT THE TRIAL
COURT DID NOT GRAVELY ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN DISREGARDING THE
PROVISIONS OF THE INTERIM RULES OF PROCEDURE FOR INTRA-CORPORATE
CONTROVERSIES PERTAINING TO THE ISSUANCE OF A STATUS QUO ORDER AND THE
REQUIREMENTS THEREOF.27

Held:

Respondent maintains that the manner of the issuance of the assailed Orders of the trial court
did not violate the due process rights of petitioners. Respondent also claims that a valid ground
for the issuance of the assailed Status Quo Order dated August 21, 2003 did exist and that the
alleged failure of the trial court to require the posting of a bond prior to the issuance of a status
quo order was mooted by the assailed Order dated October 8, 2003 which required respondent
and Reynante to file a bond in the amount of P300,000.00 each.
We find the petition to be partly meritorious.

However, with respect to the assailed Status Quo Order dated August 21, 2003, we find that
the trial court has failed to comply with the pertinent procedural rules regarding the issuance of
a status quo order.
Jurisprudence tells us that a status quo order is merely intended to maintain the last, actual,
peaceable and uncontested state of things which preceded the controversy. It further states
that, unlike a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction, a status quo order is more
in the nature of a cease and desist order, since it neither directs the doing or undoing of acts as
in the case of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief.32
Pertinently, the manner of the issuance of a status quo order in an intra-corporate suit such
as the case at bar is governed by Section 1, Rule 10 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-
Corporate Controversies which reads:
1. SECTIONProvisional remedies.—A party may apply for any of the provisional remedies
provided in the Rules of Court as may be available for the purposes. However, no temporary
restraining order or status quo order shall be issued save in exceptional cases and only after
hearing the parties and the posting of a bond.

In the case before us, the trial court’s August 21, 2003 Status Quo Order conflicted with the
rules and jurisprudence in the following manner:
First, the directive to reinstate respondent to her former position as school director and
curriculum administrator is a command directing the undoing of an act already consummated
which is the exclusive province of prohibitory or mandatory injunctive relief and not of a status
quo order which is limited only to maintaining the last, actual, peaceable and uncontested state
of things which immediately preceded the controversy. It must be remembered that respondent
was already removed as trustee, member of the corporation and curriculum administrator by the
Board of Trustees of St. Francis School of General Trias, Cavite, Inc. months prior to her filing
of the present case in the trial court.

Second, the trial court’s omission of not requiring respondent to file a bond before the
issuance of the Status Quo Order dated August 21, 2003 is in contravention with the express
instruction of Section 1, Rule 10 of the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate
Controversies. Even the subsequent order to post a bond as indicated in the assailed October
8, 2003 Order did not cure this defect because a careful reading of the nature and purpose of
the bond would reveal that it was meant by the trial court as security solely for the teachers’
retirement fund, the possession of which was given by the trial court to respondent and
Reynante. It was never intended and can never be considered as the requisite security, in
compliance with the express directive of procedural law, for the assailed Status Quo Order
dated August 21, 2003. In any event, there is nothing on record to indicate that respondent had
complied with the posting of the bond as directed in the October 8, 2003 Order except for the
respondent’s unsubstantiated claim to the contrary as asserted in her Memorandum.33

Third, it is settled in jurisprudence that an application for a status quo order which in fact
seeks injunctive relief must comply with Section 4, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court: i.e., the
application must be verified aside from the posting of the requisite bond.34 In the present case,
the Manifestation and Motion, through which respondent applied for injunctive relief or in the
alternative a status quo order, was merely signed by her counsel and was unverified.
In conclusion, we rule that no grave abuse of discretion was present in the issuance of the
assailed August 5, 2003 and October 8, 2003 Orders of the trial court. However, we find that the
issuance of the assailed August 21, 2003 Status Quo Order was unwarranted for
noncompliance with the rules. Therefore, the said status quo order must be set aside.
At this point, the Court finds it apropos to note that the Status Quo Order on its face states
that the same is effective until the application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order is
resolved. However, respondent’s prayer for a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary
injunction in her Complaint still appears to be pending before the trial court. For this reason, the
Court deems it necessary to direct the trial court to resolve the same at the soonest possible
time.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated September 16, 2005 and the Resolution dated October 9, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 79791 are hereby AFFIRMED in part insofar as they upheld the
assailed August 5, 2003 and October 8, 2003 Orders of the trial court. They
are REVERSED with respect to the assailed August 21, 2003 Status Quo Order which is
hereby SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The trial court is
further DIRECTED to resolve respondent’s application for injunctive relief with dispatch.
SO ORDERED.
Petition partly granted, judgment and resolution affirmed in part and reversed in part.
 September 17, 2014. G.R. No. 178911.*

EDUARDO D. MONSANTO, DECOROSO D. MONSANTO, SR., and REV. FR. PASCUAL D.

MONSANTO, JR., petitioners, vs. LEONCIO LIM and LORENZO DE GUZMAN, respondents.

Same; Same; Same; It is settled jurisprudence that “any decision rendered without
jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this
Court.”—In fine, since no docket or filing fees were paid, then the RTC-Branch 28 did not
acquire jurisdiction over the matter/case. It therefore erred in taking cognizance of the same.
Consequently, all the proceedings undertaken by the trial court are null and void, and without
force and effect. In, particular, the July 1, 2005 and August 30, 2005 Orders of the RTC are null
and void. It is settled jurisprudence that “[a]ny decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total
nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court.” Prescinding from
the foregoing, we hold that the RTC-Branch 28 did not acquire jurisdiction over the instant
matter/case there being no formal initiatory pleading filed as well as nonpayment of docket fees.
Consequently, all proceedings had before the RTC-Branch 28 were null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

“Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest
a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.”1
Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari2 are the March 12, 2007 Decision3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) which denied the Petition for Certiorari in C.A.-G.R. CEB S.P. No. 01343
and its July 6, 2007 Resolution4 denying the herein petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration.5
Factual Antecedents
Executive Judge Monsanto refrained from acting on the letter considering that Eduardo is his
relative; instead he reassigned the same to Judge Sibanah E. Usman (Judge Usman) 8 of
Branch 28.
In an Order9 dated May 3, 2004 and captioned “In the Matter of the Extrajudicial Foreclosure
of Mortgage Filed by the Home Development Mutual Fund (Pag-IBIG Fund),” Judge Usman
declared that on even date, RTC-Branch 28 conducted a hearing; that Atty. Cesar Lee argued
on behalf of Pag-IBIG; and that Pascual Monsanto (Pascual) appeared on behalf of Eduardo.
However, Judge Usman noted that no formal petition or complaint was actually filed which
presents a judicial issue; moreover, the acts complained of partake of administrative matter.
Consequently, Judge Usman referred the matter to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA)
for further action.

Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied in its assailed July 6,
2007 Resolution.
Hence, the present Petition.

Issues:
Petitioners raise the following grounds for the Petition:
1. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS 20TH DIVISION, CEBU CITY ERRED IN
RULING THAT NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY THE
HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT BRANCH 27, EIGHTH JUDICIAL REGION,
CATBALOGAN, SAMAR IN ITS ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION AND ITS
ISSUANCE DOES NOT NEED A MOTION FOR THE CONFIRMATION OF SALE WHICH
REQUIRES A HEARING;
2. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS 20TH DIVISION, CEBU CITY ERRED IN
AFFIRMING THE COURT A QUO’S FINDINGS THAT ALL THE PETITIONERS WERE DULY
NOTIFIED BUT FAILED TO APPEAR DURING THE HEARING ON THE MOTION FOR THE
ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF POSSESSION. IT ERRED IN ALLUDING THAT IN THE
COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THIS INSTANT CASE, PETITIONERS WERE NOT
DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW; AND
3. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS 20TH DIVISION, CEBU CITY ERRED IN
RULING THAT PETITIONERS DECOROSO AND FR. PASCUAL, JR. DO NOT HOLD THE
FORECLOSED PROPERTY ADVERSELY TO THAT OF THE PETITIONER-MORTGAGOR,
FOR BEING MERE ASSIGNEES, THEY DERIVED THEIR POSSESSORY RIGHTS FROM
PETITIONER-MORTGAGOR.25

Held:
Our Ruling
The Petition is dismissed.
 “Filing the appropriate initiatory pleading and the payment of the prescribed docket fees vest
a trial court with jurisdiction over the subject matter.”28Section 5, Rule 1 of the Rules of Court
specifically provides that “[a] civil action is commenced by the filing of the original complaint in
court.” Moreover, “[e]very ordinary civil action must be based on a cause of action.”29

No proper initiatory pleading was

filed before the trial court.
In this case, records show that no formal complaint or petition was filed in court. The case
was supposedly “commenced” through a letter of Pag-IBIG asking the intervention of Executive
Judge Monsanto on the alleged anomalous foreclosure sale conducted by De Guzman.
However, said letter could not in any way be considered as a pleading. Section 1, Rule 6 of the
Rules of Court defines pleadings as “written statements of the respective claims and defenses
of the parties submitted to the court for appropriate judgment.” To stress, Pag-IBIG’s letter could
not be considered as a formal complaint or petition. First, the parties to the case were not
identified pursuant to Section 1,30 Rule 3 and Section 1,31 Rule 7. Second, the so-called claim or
cause of action was not properly mentioned or specified. Third, the letter miserably failed to
comply with the requirements of Rule 7, Rules of Court. The letter bore no caption; it was not
even assigned a docket number; the parties were not properly identified; the allegations were
not properly set forth; no particular relief is sought; in fact, only the intervention of Executive
Judge Monsanto is requested; it was not signed by a counsel; and most of all, there is no
verification or certification against forum shopping.
In addition, it is quite unfortunate that Judge Usman proceeded to take cognizance of the
case notwithstanding his prior observation as stated in the May 3, 2004 Order that no formal
petition or complaint was actually filed and which presents a judicial issue. In fact, Judge Usman
even opined that the acts complained of partake of administrative matter and thus referred the
same to the OCA for further action. The May 9, 2005 letter of OCA directing Judge Usman to
take action on the Motion to Lift Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate could not be interpreted
as vesting Judge Usman with the authority and jurisdiction to take cognizance of the matter.
Nothing to that effect could be inferred from the tenor of the May 9, 2005 letter of OCA.
Jurisdiction is vested by law. When OCA directed Judge Usman to take action on the Motion to
Lift Writ of Execution and Notice to Vacate, it did not deprive the latter of his discretion to
dismiss the matter/case for lack of jurisdiction, if the matter/case so warrants.
In fine, there being no proper initiatory pleading filed, then the RTC-Branch 28 did not
acquire jurisdiction over the matter/case.
No payment of docket fees.
We have also noted that no docket fees were paid before the trial court. Section 1, Rule 141
of the Rules of Court mandates that “[u]pon the filing of the pleading or other application which
initiates an action or proceeding, the fees prescribed therefor shall be paid in full.” “It is
hornbook law that courts acquire jurisdiction over a case only upon payment of the prescribed
docket fee.”32
In Far East Bank and Trust Company v. Shemberg Marketing Corporation,33 we ruled thus:
A court acquires jurisdiction over a case only upon the payment of the prescribed fees. The
importance of filing fees cannot be gainsaid for these are intended to take care of court
expenses in the handling of cases in terms of costs of supplies, use of equipment, salaries and
fringe benefits of personnel, and others, computed as to man-hours used in the handling of
each case. Hence, the nonpayment or insufficient payment of docket fees can entail
tremendous losses to government in general and to the judiciary in particular.

In fine, since no docket or filing fees were paid, then the RTC-Branch 28 did not acquire
jurisdiction over the matter/case. It therefore erred in taking cognizance of the same.
Consequently, all the proceedings undertaken by the trial court are null and void, and without
force and effect. In, particular, the July 1, 2005 and August 30, 2005 Orders of the RTC are null
and void.
It is settled jurisprudence that “[a]ny decision rendered without jurisdiction is a total nullity
and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal before this Court.”34 Prescinding from the
foregoing, we hold that the RTC-Branch 28 did not acquire jurisdiction over the instant
matter/case there being no formal initiatory pleading filed as well as nonpayment of docket fees.
Consequently, all proceedings had before the RTC-Branch 28 were null and void for lack of
jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The assailed March 12, 2007 Decision and July 6,
2007 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CEB S.P. No. 01343 are ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The July 1, 2005 and August 30, 2005 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of
Catbalogan, Samar, Branch 28 are DECLARED NULL and VOID. All proceedings, processes
and writs emanating therefrom are likewise NULLIFIED and VOIDED for lack of jurisdiction.
SO ORDERED.
Petition denied, judgment and resolution annulled and set aside.
 September 24, 2014. G.R. No. 202354.*

AMADA C. ZACARIAS, petitioner, vs. VICTORIA ANACAY, EDNA ANACAY, CYNTHIA

ANACAY-GUISIC, ANGELITO ANACAY, JERMIL ISRAEL, JIMMY ROY ISRAEL and all other
persons claiming authority under them, respondents.

Same; Civil Procedure; Jurisdiction; It is well-settled that a court’s jurisdiction may be raised at
any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal.—It is well-settled that a court’s jurisdiction may
be raised at any stage of the proceedings, even on appeal. The reason is that jurisdiction is
conferred by law, and lack of it affects the very authority of the court to take cognizance of and
to render judgment on the action. Indeed, a void judgment for want of jurisdiction is no judgment
at all. It cannot be the source of any right nor the creator of any obligation. All acts performed
pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. Hence, it can never become
final and any writ of execution based on it is void.

September 8, 2014. G.R. No. 198139.*

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. FELICISIMO TARCELO and HEIRS
OF COMIA SANTOS, respondents.
Same; Same; Same; Void Judgments; A void judgment or order has no legal and binding effect,
force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is nonexistent.—The failure of NPC
to include a notice of hearing in its Motion for Reconsideration of the trial court’s September 24,
2009 Order has been rendered irrelevant considering our pronouncement that the said Order is
null and void on the matter covering the Notice of Garnishment. “A void judgment or order has
no legal and binding effect, force or efficacy for any purpose. In contemplation of law, it is
nonexistent. Such judgment or order may be resisted in any action or proceeding whenever it is
involved. It is not even necessary to take any steps to vacate or avoid a void judgment or final
order; it may simply be ignored.”