ASSEMBLY & PETITION
PRIMICIAS V. FUGOSO
G.R. No. L-1800, January 27, 1948,Feria, J.
FACTS: Primicias, via petition for mandamus,
sought to compel Fugoso to issue a permit for the
holding of a public meeting at Plaza Miranda to
petition the government for redress of grievances.
The Philippine legislature has delegated the
exercise of the police power to the Municipal
Board of the City of Manila, the legislative body of
the City. It has been granted the following
legislative powers, to wit: "(p) to provide for the
prohibition and suppression of riots, affrays,
disturbances, and disorderly assemblies, (u) to
regulate the use of streets, avenues ... parks,
cemeteries and other public places." Thus, the
Municipal Board enacted sections 844 and 1119
of the Revised Ordinances of 1927, which prohibit,
as an offense against public peace, and penalize
as a misdemeanor, "any act, in any public place,
meeting, or procession, tending to disturb the
peace or excite a riot; or collect with other persons
in a body or crowd for any unlawful purpose; or
disturb or disquiet any congregation engaged in
any lawful assembly." SEC. 1119 states that the
streets and public places of the
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city shall be kept free and clear for the use of the
public, and the sidewalks and crossings for the
pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or
occupied for other purposes as provided by
ordinance or regulation… Provided that the
holding of any parade or procession in any street
or public places shall only be done if a Mayor’s
permit is secured…
The Mayor’s reason for refusing the permit was his
reasonable ground to believe, based on previous
utterances and the fact that passions on the part
of the losing groups remains bitter and high, that
similar speeches will be delivered tending to
undermine the faith and confidence of the people
in their government, and in the duly constituted
authorities, which might threaten breaches of the
peace and a disruption of public order. However,
petitioner‘s request was for a permit "to hold a
peaceful public meeting."
ISSUE: Was the Mayor‘s refusal to grant the
permit to peaceably assemble violative of the
Constitution?
HELD: YES. The rights of freedom of speech
and to peacefully assemble and petition the
government for redress of grievances are
fundamental personal rights of the people
recognized and guaranteed by the
Constitution. The exercise of those rights is
not absolute; it may be regulated so that it
shall injure the equal enjoyment of others
having equal rights, or the rights of the
community or society. The power to regulate the
exercise of such rights is the "police power"---
the power to prescribe regulations, to promote the
health, morals, peace, education, good order or
safety, and general welfare of the people---
exercised by the legislative branch by the
enactment of laws regulating those rights, and it
may be delegated to political subdivisions, such as
towns, municipalities, and cities authorizing their
legislative bodies, called municipal and city
councils to enact ordinances for the purpose.
SEC. 1119 is susceptible to two constructions:
(1)That the Mayor has unregulated discretion
to grant or refuse to grant permit for the
holding of a lawful assembly;
-or-
(2)That the applicant has the right to a permit,
which shall be granted by the Mayor, subject
only to the latter's reasonable discretion to
determine or specify the streets or public
places to be used for the purpose, to secure
convenient use of the streets and public
places by others, and to provide adequate and
proper policing to minimize the risk of
disorder.
The Court adopted the second construction;
the ordinance only confers upon the Mayor the
discretion, in issuing the permit, to determine
or specify the streets or public places where
the meeting may be held. It does not confer
upon him unfettered discretion to refuse to
grant the license. A statute requiring persons
using the public streets to procure a special
license therefor from the local authorities is
not an unconstitutional abridgement of the
rights of
assembly, WHERE THE LICENSING
AUTHORITIES ARE STRICTLY LIMITED, in the
issuance of licenses, to consider the time,
place, and manner of the parade and
procession, with a view to conserving the
public convenience and of affording an
opportunity to provide proper policing.
Otherwise, it would be tantamount to
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authorizing the Mayor to prohibit the use of the
streets and other public places for holding of
meetings.
The Municipal Board is empowered only to
regulate the use of streets, parks, and the
other public places. "REGULATE" includes the
power to control, govern, and restrain, but not
suppress or prohibit. The legislative police
power of the Municipal Board to enact ordinances
regulating reasonably the exercise of the
fundamental personal rights of the citizens in the
streets and other public places cannot be
delegated to the Mayor by conferring upon him
unregulated discretion or without laying down
rules to guide and control his action by which
its impartial execution can be secured or partiality
and oppression prevented.
―An ordinance in that case subjects to the
unrestrained will of a single public officer the
power to determine the rights of parties under
it, when there was nothing in the ordinance to
guide or control his action. His action or non-
action may proceed from enmity or prejudice, from
partisan zeal or animosity, from favoritism and
other improper influences and motives easy of
concealment.‖
An ordinance which clothes a single individual
with such power is void. In the exercise of
police power, the council may, in its discretion,
regulate the exercise of such rights in a
reasonable manner, but cannot suppress
them, directly or indirectly, by attempting to
commit the power of doing so to the mayor or
any other officer. The discretion with which the
council is vested is a legal discretion, to be
exercised within the limits of the law, and not
discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any
city officer and arbitrary authority, making him
in its exercise a petty tyrant.
"It is only when political, religious, social, or
other demonstrations create public
disturbances, or operate as a nuisance, or
create or manifestly threaten some tangible
public or private mischief that the law
interferes."
"Ordinances to be valid must be reasonable; they
must not be oppressive; they must be fair and
impartial; they must not be so framed as to
allow their enforcement to rest on official
discretion‖
―Where the granting of the permit is left to the
unregulated discretion of a small body of city
eldermen, the ordinance cannot be other than
partial and discriminating in its practical
operation.‖ (The Court cited a U.S. case)
The power of municipalities to regulate the use
of public streets is conceded. The privilege of
a citizen to use the streets may be regulated in
the interest of all; it is not absolute. The
authority of a municipality to impose
regulations in order to assure the safety and
convenience of the people in the use of public
highways is consistent with civil liberties, a
means of safeguarding the good order upon
which they ultimately depend. Where a
restriction of the use of highways is designed to
promote the public convenience in the interest of
all, it cannot be disregarded by the attempted
exercise of some civil right which in other
circumstances would be entitled to protection. As
regulation of the use of the streets for parades and
processions is a traditional exercise of control by
local government, the question is whether that
control is exerted so as
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Based on ATTY. ADONIS V. GABRIEL lectures
not to deny or unwarrantedly abridge the right of
assembly and the opportunities for the
communication of thought and the discussion of
public questions immemorially associated with
resort to public places.
The Court, citing a U.S. case, held: ―A municipal
ordinance requiring the obtaining of a permit
for a public assembly in or upon the public
streets, highways, public parks, or public
buildings of the city and authorizing the
director of public safety, for the purpose of
preventing riots, disturbances, or disorderly
assemblage, to refuse to issue a permit (and
not merely to regulate) when after
investigation of all the facts and
circumstances pertinent to the application, he
believes it to be proper to refuse to issue a
permit, is not a valid exercise of the police
power.
Streets and parks have immemorially been
held in trust for the use of the public and have
been used for purposes of assembly,
communicating thoughts between citizens,
and discussing public questions. Such use of
the streets and public places has been a part
of the privileges, immunities, rights, and
liberties of citizens. The privilege of a citizen to
use the streets and parks for communication
of views on national questions may be
regulated in the interest of all; it is not
absolute, but relative, and must be exercised
in subordination to the general comfort and
convenience, and in consonance with peace
and good order; BUT IT MUST NOT, IN THE
GUISE OF REGULATION, BE ABRIDGED OR
DENIED.
If the Ordinance ―does not make comfort or
convenience in the use of streets or parks the
standard of official action,‖ instead, it enables
a single official to refuse a permit on his MERE
OPINION that such refusal will prevent 'riots,
disturbances or disorderly assemblage, IT IS
VOID. It can be an instrument of arbitrary
suppression of free expression of views on
national affairs.
Moreover, the power conferred upon the
Legislature to make laws cannot be delegated
by that department to any other body or
authority, except police regulation which are
conferred upon the legislative body of a municipal
corporation. The police power to regulate the use
of streets and other public places has been
conferred by the Legislature upon the Municipal
Board of the City. The Legislature has not
conferred upon the Mayor the same power.
Besides, a grant of unregulated and unlimited
power to grant or refuse a permit for the use of
streets and other public places for processions,
parades, or meetings, would be null and void.
Under our democratic system of government, no
such unlimited power may be validly granted to
any officer of the government, except perhaps in
cases of national emergency.
"FEAR OF SERIOUS INJURY cannot alone
justify suppression of free speech and
assembly. It is the function of speech to free men
from the bondage of irrational fears. To justify
suppression of free speech, there must be
reasonable ground to fear that serious evil will
result if free speech is practiced; that the
danger apprehended is imminent and the evil
to be prevented is a serious one.‖ Imminent
danger can justify prohibition ONLY IF the evil
apprehended is relatively serious. That speech
is likely to result in some violence or in
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destruction of property is not enough to justify its
suppression. There must be the probability of
serious injury to the state.
MALABANAN v. RAMENTO
G.R. No. L-62270; May 21, 1984, Fernando, J.
Facts: Petitioners were students of Gregorio
Araneta University, granted by the school
authorities to hold a meeting, however they must
comply with some terms and conditions. Instead of
following the terms and conditions, the students
continued their march to the Life Science building,
outside the area stated in the permit. Classes were
disturbed due to the noise. It was outside the area
covered by their permit. They continued their
demonstration, giving utterance to language
severely critical of the University authorities and
using megaphones in the process. There was, as
a result, disturbance of the classes being held.
Also, the non-academic employee, within hearing
distance, stopped their work because of the noise
created. Then on September 9, 1982, they were
informed through a memorandum that they were
under preventive suspension for their failure to
explain the holding of an illegal assembly in front
of the Life Science Building. The validity thereof
was challenged by petitioners both before the CFI
of Rizal and before the Ministry of Education,
Culture and Sports. Respondent, Ramento, as
director of the National Capital Region, found
petitioners guilty of the charge of holding an illegal
assembly which was characterized by the violation
of the permit granted resulting in the disturbance
of classes and oral defamation. The penalty was
suspension for one academic year.
Issues:
Whether or not the decision of responded
violates the constitutional rights of
freedom of peaceable assembly and free
speech?
Whether or not the suspension meted out
by the school authorities are not violative
of due process?
Held:
NO. As is quite clear from the opinion in Reyes v.
Bagatsing, the invocation of the right to freedom
of peaceable assembly carries with it the
implication that the right to free speech has
likewise been disregarded. Both are embraced in
the concept of freedom of expression, which is
identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and
truthfully, any matter of public interest without
censorship or punishment and which "is not to
be limited, much less denied, except on a
showing . . . of a clear and present danger of a
substantive evil that the state has a right to
prevent." In the above case, a permit was sought
to hold a peaceful march and rally from the Luneta
public park to the gates of the United States
Embassy, hardly two blocks away, where in an
open space of public property, a short program
would be held, Necessarily then, the question of
the use of a public park and of the streets
leading to the United States Embassy was
before this Court. We held that streets and
parks have immemorially been held in trust for
the use of the public and have been used for
purposes of assembly to communicate
thoughts between citizens and to discuss
public issues.
The situation here is different. The
assembly was to be held NOT in a public place
but in private premises, property of respondent
University. There is in the Reyes opinion as part of
the summary this relevant excerpt: "The
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applicants for a permit to hold an assembly
should inform the licensing authority of the
date, the public place where and the time when
it will take place. If it were a private place, only
the consent of the owner or the one entitled to
its legal possession is required." Petitioners did
seek such consent. It was granted. According to
the petition: "On August 27, 1982, by virtue of a
permit granted to them by the school
administration, the Supreme Student Council
where your petitioners are among the officers,
held a General Assembly at the VMAS basketball
court of the respondent University." There was an
express admission in the Comment of private
respondent University as to a permit having been
granted for petitioners to hold a student assembly.
The specific question to be resolved then is
whether on the facts as disclosed resulting in
the disciplinary action and the penalty
imposed, there was an infringement of the
right to peaceable assembly and its cognate
right of free speech.
Petitioners invoke their rights to peaceable
assembly and free speech. They were entitled to
do so. They enjoy the said right like the rest of the
citizens the freedom to express their views
and communicate their thoughts to those disposed
to listen in gatherings such as was held in this
case. They do not, shed their constitutional rights
to freedom of speech or expression at the
schoolhouse gate. While, therefore, the
authority of educational institutions over the
conduct of students must be recognized, it
cannot go so far as to be violative of
constitutional safeguards. On a more specific
level, there is persuasive force to this formulation
in the Fortas opinion: The principal use to which
the schools are dedicated is to accommodate
students during prescribed hours for the
purpose of certain types of activities. Among
those activities is personal
intercommunication among the students. This
is not only an inevitable part of the process of
attending school; it is also an important part of
the educational process. A student's rights,
therefore, do not embrace merely the
classroom hours. When he is in the cafeteria, or
on the playing field, or on the campus during the
authorized hours, he may express his opinions,
even on controversial subjects like the conflict in
Vietnam, if he does so without 'materially and
substantially interfer[ing] with the
requirements of appropriate discipline in the
operation of the school' and without colliding
with the rights of others. . . . But conduct by
the student, in class or out of it, which for any
reason - whether it stems from time, place, or
type of behavior - materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others is, of course,
not immunized by the constitutional guarantee
of freedom of speech."
Objection is made by private respondents to the
tenor of the speeches by the student leaders. If in
the course of such demonstration, with an
enthusiastic audience goading them on,
utterances, extremely critical, at times even
vitriolic, were let loose, that is quite
understandable. Student leaders are hardly the
timid, diffident types. They are likely to be
assertive and dogmatic. They would be ineffective
if during a rally they speak in the guarded and
judicious language of the academe. At any rate,
even a sympathetic audience is not disposed to
accord full credence to their fiery exhortations.
They take into account the excitement of the
occasion, the propensity of speakers to
exaggerate, the exuberance of
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youth. They may give the speakers the benefit
of their applause, but with the activity taking
place in the school premises and during the
daytime, no clear and present danger of public
disorder is discernible. This is without
prejudice to the taking of disciplinary action
for conduct, which "materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or
invasion of the rights of others."
One last matter. The objection was raised that
petitioners failed to exhaust administrative
remedies, That is true, but hardly decisive.
Here, a purely legal question is presented.
Such being the case, especially so where a
decision on a question of law is imperatively
called for, and time being of the essence, this
Court has invariably viewed the issue as ripe
for adjudication. What cannot be too sufficiently
stressed is that the constitutional rights to
peaceable assembly and free speech are invoked
by petitioners. Moreover, there was, and very
likely there will continue to be in the future,
militancy and assertiveness of students on
issues that they consider of great importance,
whether concerning their welfare or the
general public. That they have a right to do as
citizens entitled to all the protection in the Bill
of Rights.
It would be most appropriate then, as
was done in the case of Reyes v. Bagatsing, for
this Court to lay down the principles for the
guidance of school authorities and students alike.
The rights to peaceable assembly and free
speech are guaranteed to students of
educational institutions. Necessarily, their
exercise to discuss matters affecting their
welfare or involving public interest is not to be
subjected to previous restraint or subsequent
punishment unless there be a showing of a
clear and present danger to a substantive evil
that the state has a right to present. As a
corollary, the utmost leeway and scope is
accorded the content of the placards displayed or
utterances made. The peaceable character of an
assembly could be lost, however, by an
advocacy of disorder under the name of
dissent, whatever grievances that may be aired
being susceptible to correction through the
ways of the law. If the assembly is to be held in
school premises, permit must be sought from
its school authorities, who are devoid of the
power to deny such request arbitrarily or
unreasonably. In granting such permit, there
may be conditions as to the time and place of
the assembly to avoid disruption of classes or
stoppage of work of the non-academic
personnel.
YES. Even if, however, there be violations of its
terms, the penalty incurred should not be
disproportionate to the offense. It does not
follow however, that the petitioners can be
totally absolved for the events that transpired.
Admittedly, there was a violation of the terms
of the permit. The rally was held at a place
other than that specified, in the second floor
lobby, rather than the basketball court, of the
VMAS building of the University. Moreover, it
was continued longer than the period allowed.
According to the decision of Ramento, the
concerted activity went on until 5:30pm. Private
respondent could thus, take disciplinary action. On
those facts, however, an admonition, even a
censure certainly not a suspension could be the
appropriate penalty. While the discretion of both
respondent University and responded
Ramento is recognized, the rule of reason, the
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Based on ATTY. ADONIS V. GABRIEL lectures
dictate of fairness calls for a much lesser
penalty. If the consent of proportionally
between the offense committed and the
sanction imposed is not followed, an element
of arbitrariness intrudes. That would give rise
to a due process question. To avoid this
constitutional objection, it is the holding of
this court that a one-week suspension would
be punishment enough.
DELA CRUZ v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 126183, March 25, 1999, Bellosillo, J.
FACTS:
The respective school principals
submitted reports to the Secretary of DECS
regarding the participation of public school
teachers (petitioners) in an illegal strike and their
defiance to the return-to-work order issued by the
DECS Secretary. The Sec. of DECS on his own
filed an administrative complaint against the
petitioners for the said acts which were considered
as a violation of the Civil Service Decree of the
Philippines. For failure to submit their answers the
Sec. of DECS issued an order of dismissal against
the teachers which was implemented immediately.
Petitioners appealed to the Merit Systems
Protection Board (MSPB) and then to the Civil
Service Commission (CSC). The CSC found
petitioners guilty of "conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service" for having participated in
the mass actions and imposed upon them the
reduced penalty of six (6) months' suspension.
However, in view of the length of time that
petitioners had been out of the service by reason
of the immediate implementation of the dismissal
orders of Secretary Cariño, the CSC likewise
ordered petitioners' automatic reinstatement in the
service without back wages. Petitioners were
unhappy with the CSC decision. They initially filed
petitions for certiorari with the SC which were all
referred to the CA. The CA ruled that the
questioned resolutions of the Civil Service
Commission finding petitioners guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service were
based on reasonable and justifiable grounds; that
petitioners' perceived grievances were no excuse
for them not to conduct classes and defy the
return-to-work order issued by their superiors; that
the immediate execution of the dismissal orders of
Secretary Cariño was sanctioned under law.
Petitioners contend that the Court of
Appeals grievously erred in affirming the CSC
resolutions finding them guilty of conduct
prejudicial to the best interest of the service when
their only "offense" was to exercise their
constitutional right to peaceably assemble and
petition the government for redress of their
grievances. Moreover petitioners insist that the
mass actions of September/October 1990 were
not "strikes" as there was no actual disruption of
classes. Petitioners therefore ask for exoneration
or, in the alternative, award of back wages for the
period of three (3) years when they were not
allowed to work while awaiting resolution of their
appeals by the MSPB and CSC, deducting the
period of six (6) months' suspension eventually
meted them.
ISSUES:
WON the public school teachers were
involved in a ―strike‖?
WON the teachers should be penalized
for participating in the strike?
WON penalizing the teachers for
participation in the strike amounts to a
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denial of their right to peaceably
assemble?
HELD:
YES. The persistent refusal of the striking
teachers to call the mass actions by the
conventional term "strike" did not erase the true
nature of the mass actions as unauthorized
stoppages of work the purpose of which was
to obtain a favorable response to the teachers'
economic grievances. The mass actions staged
by Metro Manila public school teachers amounted
to a strike in every sense of the term,
constituting as they did, a concerted and
unauthorized stoppage of or absence from
work which it was said teachers' sworn duty to
perform, carried out for essentially economic
reasons — to protest and pressure the
Government to correct what,
among other grievances, the strikers perceived to
be the unjust or prejudicial implementation of the
salary standardization law insofar as they were
concerned, the non-payment or delay in payment
of various fringe benefits and allowances to which
they were entitled, and the imposition of additional
teaching loads and longer teaching hours.
YES. The teachers were penalized not because
they exercised their right to peaceably assemble
but because of the manner by which such right
was exercised, i.e., going on unauthorized and
unilateral absences thus disrupting classes in
various schools in Metro Manila which produced
adverse effects upon the students for whose
education the teachers were responsible.
Although petitioners contend that
classes were not actually disrupted because
substitute teachers were immediately
appointed by Secretary Cariño, that the prompt
remedial action taken by Secretary Cariño
might have partially deflected the adverse
effects of the mass protests did not erase the
administrative liability of petitioners for the
intended consequences thereof which were
the very reason why such prompt remedial
action became necessary. ―This Court denies
the claim that the teachers were thereby
denied their rights to peaceably assemble and
petition the government for redress of
grievances reasoning that this constitutional
liberty to be upheld, like any other liberty, must
be exercised within reasonable limits so as not
to prejudice the public welfare.‖ The public
school teachers in these mass actions did not
exercise their constitutional rights within
reasonable limits. On the contrary, they
committed acts prejudicial to the best interest
of the service by staging the mass protests on
regular school days, abandoning their classes
and refusing to go back even after they had
been ordered to do so. Had the teachers availed
of their free time - recess, after classes, weekends
or holidays - to dramatize their grievances and to
dialogue with the proper authorities within the
bounds of law, no one - not the DECS, the CSC or
even the Supreme Court - could have held them
liable for their participation in the mass actions.
NO. In Rolando Gan v. Civil Service Commission,
it was held that for the right to peaceably
assemble and petition the government for
redress of grievances to be upheld, like any
other liberty, it must be exercised within
reasonable limits so as not
San Beda College of Law
Based on ATTY. ADONIS V. GABRIEL lectures
to prejudice the public welfare. The public
school teachers in the case of the 1990 mass
actions did not exercise their constitutional rights
within reasonable limits. On the contrary, they
committed acts prejudicial to the best interest
of the service by staging the mass protests on
regular school days, abandoning their classes
and refusing to go back even after they had
been ordered to do so. Had the teachers
availed of their free time — recess, after
classes, weekends or holidays — to dramatize
their grievances and to dialogue with the
proper authorities within the bounds of law, no
one — not the DECS, the CSC or even the
Supreme Court — could have held them liable
for their participation in the mass actions
.
The argument that the rights of free
expression and assembly could not be lightly
disregarded as they occupy a preferred position in
the hierarchy of civil liberties is not applicable to
defend the validity of the 1990 mass actions
because there is a higher consideration involved
here which is the education of the youth.
PHILIPPINE BLOOMING MILLS EMPLOYEES
ORGANIZATION v. PHILIPPINE BLOOMING
MILLS CO. INC.
G.R. No. L-31195, June 5, 1973, Makasiar, J.
Facts: Sometime in 1969, petitioner decided to
stage a mass demonstration in Malacañang in
protest against alleged abuses of the Pasig
Police. Respondent Company, however
requested petitioner that the first-shift workers
should not participate in the strike for it will unduly
prejudice the normal operation of the company.
Despite the warning, all the workers including
those who were in first-shift still participated in the
rally. Prior to that, respondent company informed
that workers who belong in the first-shift, who were
without previous leave of absence approved by
the company, who shall participate in the rally shall
be dismissed for it is a clear violation of the
existing CBA and is tantamount to an illegal strike.
Respondent company then filed a charge against
petitioners and later dismissed some of its
employees.
Issues: Whether or not the constitutional
freedoms of speech and expression of the
petitioner were violated by the respondent
company in preventing some of its employees to
participate in the rally and later dismissed some of
them.
Held: No. There is need of briefly restating basic
concepts and principles which underlie the issues
posed by the case at bar.
In a democracy, the preservation and
enhancement of the dignity and worth of the
human personality is the central core as well as
the cardinal article of faith of our civilization. The
inviolable character of man as an individual must
be "protected to the largest possible extent in his
thoughts and in his beliefs as the citadel of his
person.
The Bill of Rights is designed to preserve
the ideals of liberty, equality and security
"against the assaults of opportunism, the
expediency of the passing hour, the erosion of
small encroachments, and the scorn and
derision of those who have no patience with
general principles.‖
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In the pithy language of Mr. Justice Robert
Jackson, the purpose of the Bill of Rights is to
withdraw "certain subjects from the
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place
them beyond the reach of majorities and
officials, and to establish them as legal
principles to be applied by the courts. One's
rights to life, liberty and property, to free
speech, or free press, freedom of worship and
assembly, and other fundamental rights may
not be submitted to a vote; they depend on
the outcome of no elections." Laski proclaimed
that "the happiness of the individual, not the well-
being of the State, was the criterion by which its
behaviour was to be judged. His interests, not its
power, set the limits to the authority it was entitled
to exercise.
The freedoms of expression and of assembly
as well as the right to petition are included
among the immunities reserved by the
sovereign people, in the rhetorical aphorism of
Justice Holmes, to protect the ideas that we
abhor or hate more than the ideas we cherish;
or as Socrates insinuated, not only to protect the
minority who want to talk, but also to benefit the
majority who refuse to listen. And as Justice
Douglas cogently stresses it, the liberties of one
are the liberties of all; and the liberties of one are
not safe unless the liberties of all are protected.
The rights of free expression, free assembly
and petition, are not only civil rights but also
political rights essential to man's enjoyment of
his life, to his happiness and to his full and
complete fulfillment. Thru these freedoms the
citizens can participate not merely in the
periodic establishment of the government
through their suffrage but also in the
administration of public affairs as well as in the
discipline of abusive public officers. The citizen
is accorded these rights so that he can appeal to
the appropriate governmental officers or agencies
for redress and protection as well as for the
imposition of the lawful sanctions on erring public
officers and employees.
While the Bill of Rights also protects property
rights, the primacy of human rights over
property rights is recognized. Because these
freedoms are "delicate and vulnerable, as well
as supremely precious in our society" and the
"threat of sanctions may deter their exercise
almost as potently as the actual application of
sanctions," they "need breathing space to
survive," permitting government regulation
only "with narrow specificity."
Property and property rights can be lost thru
prescription; but human rights are imprescriptible.
If human rights are extinguished by the passage of
time, then the Bill of Rights is a useless attempt to
limit the power of government and ceases to be an
efficacious shield against the tyranny of officials,
of majorities, of the influential and powerful, and of
oligarchs - political, economic or otherwise.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free
expression and of assembly occupy a preferred
position as they are essential to the
preservation and vitality of our civil and
political institutions; and such priority "gives
these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not
permitting dubious intrusions." The superiority of
these freedoms over property rights is
underscored by the fact that a mere
reasonable or rational relation between the
means employed by the law and its object or
San Beda College of Law
Based on ATTY. ADONIS V. GABRIEL lectures
purpose that the law is neither arbitrary nor
discriminatory nor oppressive would suffice to
validate a law which restricts or impairs
property rights. On the other hand, a
constitutional or valid infringement of human
rights requires a more stringent criterion,
namely existence of a grave and immediate
danger of a substantive evil which the State
has the right to prevent.
So it has been stressed that the (1)―FREEDOMS
OF SPEECH‖ and (2)―OF THE PRESS‖ as well as
(3)―OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY AND OF
PETITION FOR REDRESS OF GRIEVANCES‖
are absolute when directed against public
officials or "when exercised in relation to our
right to choose the men and women by whom
we shall be governed," even relying on the
balancing-of-interests test.
The respondent Court of Industrial Relations, after
opining that the mass demonstration was not a
declaration of strike, concluded that by their
"concerted act and the occurrence of a temporary
stoppage of work," herein petitioners are guilty of
bargaining in bad faith and hence violated the
collective bargaining agreement with private
respondent Philippine Blooming Mills Co., Inc. Set
against and tested by the foregoing principles
governing a democratic society, such a
conclusion cannot be sustained. The
demonstration held by petitioners was against
alleged abuses of some Pasig policemen, NOT
against their employer, herein private
respondent firm, said demonstration was
purely and completely an exercise of their
freedom of expression in general and of their
right of assembly and of petition for redress of
grievances in particular before the appropriate
governmental agency, the Chief Executive,
against the police officers of the municipality
of Pasig. They exercised their civil and political
rights for their mutual aid and protection from
what they believe were police excesses. As a
matter of fact, it was the duty of herein private
respondent firm to protect herein petitioner
Union and its members from the harassment of
local police officers. It was to the interest of
herein private respondent firm to rally to the
defense of, and to take up the cudgels for, its
employees, so that they can report to work free
from harassment, vexation or peril and as a
consequence perform more efficiently their
respective tasks to enhance its productivity as
well as profits. Herein respondent employer did
not even offer to intercede for its employees with
the local police. Was it securing peace for itself at
the expense of its workers? Was it also intimidated
by the local police or did it encourage the local
police to terrorize or vex its workers? Its failure to
defend its own employees all the more
weakened the position of its laborers vis-a-vis
the alleged oppressive police, who might have
been all the more emboldened thereby to
subject its lowly employees to further
indignities.
In seeking sanctuary behind their freedom of
expression as well as their right of assembly
and of petition against alleged persecution of
local officialdom, the employees and laborers
of herein private respondent firm were fighting
for their very survival, utilizing only the
weapons afforded them by the Constitution he
untrammelled enjoyment of their basic human
rights. The pretension of their employer that it
would suffer loss or damage by reason of the
absence of its employees, is a plea for the
preservation merely of their property rights.
Such apprehended loss or damage would not spell
the
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difference between the life and death of the firm or
its owners or its management. The employees'
pathetic situation was a stark reality abused,
harassed and persecuted as they believed they
were by the peace officers of the municipality. As
above intimated, the condition in which the
employees found themselves vis-a-vis the
local police of Pasig, was a matter that vitally
affected their right to individual existence as
well as that of their families. Material loss can
be repaired or adequately compensated. The
debasement of the human being broken in
morale and brutalized in spirit can never be
fully evaluated in monetary terms. The wounds
fester and the scars remain to humiliate him to
his dying day, even as he cries in anguish for
retribution, denial of which is like rubbing salt
on bruised tissues.
As heretofore stated, THE PRIMACY
OF
HUMAN RIGHTS, FREEDOM OF
EXPRESSION, OF PEACEFUL ASSEMBLY
AND OF PETITION FOR REDRESS OF
GRIEVANCES over PROPERTY RIGHTS has
been sustained. Emphatic reiteration of this basic
tenet as a coveted boon at once the shield and
armor of the dignity and worth of the human
personality, the all-consuming ideal of our
enlightened civilization becomes Our duty, if
freedom and social justice have any meaning at all
for him who toils so that capital can produce
economic goods that can generate happiness for
all. To regard the demonstration against police
officers, not against the employer, as evidence of
bad faith in collective bargaining and hence a
violation of the collective bargaining agreement
and a cause for the dismissal from employment of
the demonstrating employees, stretches unduly
the compass of the collective bargaining
agreement, is "a potent means of inhibiting
speech" and therefore inflicts a moral as well
as mortal wound on the constitutional
guarantees of free expression, of peaceful
assembly and of petition.
The collective bargaining agreement which fixes
the working shifts of the employees, according to
the respondent Court of Industrial Relations, in
effect imposes on the workers the "duty . . . to
observe regular working hours." The strained
construction of the Court of Industrial Relations
that such stipulated working shifts deny the
workers the right to stage a mass demonstration
against police abuses during working hours,
constitutes a virtual tyranny over the mind and life
of the workers and deserves severe
condemnation. Renunciation of the freedom
should not be predicated on such a slender
ground.
The mass demonstration staged by the employees
on March 4, 1969 could not have been legally
enjoined by any court, for such an injunction would
be trenching upon the freedom of expression of
the workers, even if it legally appears to be an
illegal picketing or strike. The respondent Court of
Industrial Relations in the case at bar concedes
that the mass demonstration was not a declaration
of a strike "as the same is not rooted in any
industrial dispute although there is a concerted act
and the occurrence of a temporary stoppage of
work."
The respondent firm claims that there was no
need for all its employees to participate in the
demonstration and that they suggested to the
Union that only the first and regular shift from
6 A.M. to 2 P.M. should report for work in order
that loss or damage to the firm will be averted.
This stand failed to appreciate the sine qua
non of an effective demonstration
San Beda College of Law
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especially by a labor union, namely the
complete unity of the Union members as well
as their total presence at the demonstration
site in order to generate the maximum
sympathy for the validity of their cause but
also immediate action on the part of the
corresponding government agencies with
jurisdiction over the issues they raised against
the local police. Circulation is one of the aspects
of freedom of expression. If demonstrators are
reduced by one-third, then by that much the
circulation of the issues raised by the
demonstration is diminished. The more the
participants, the more persons can be apprised of
the purpose of the rally. Moreover, the absence of
one-third of their members will be regarded as a
substantial indication of disunity in their ranks
which will enervate their position and abet
continued alleged police persecution. At any rate,
the Union notified the company two days in
advance of their projected demonstration and the
company could have made arrangements to
counteract or prevent whatever losses it might
sustain by reason of the absence of its workers for
one day, especially in this case when the Union
requested it to excuse only the day-shift
employees who will join the demonstration on
March 4, 1969 which request the Union reiterated
in their telegram received by the company at 9:50
in the morning of March 4, 1969, the day of the
mass demonstration (pp. 42-43, rec.). There was
a lack of human understanding or compassion on
the part of the firm in rejecting the request of the
Union for excuse from work for the day shifts in
order to carry out its mass demonstration. And to
regard as a ground for dismissal the mass
demonstration held against the Pasig police, not
against the company, is gross vindictiveness on
the part of the employer, which is as unchristian as
it is unconstitutional.
III
The respondent company is the one guilty of
unfair labor practice. Because the refusal on
the part of the respondent firm to permit all its
employees and workers to join the mass
demonstration against alleged police abuses
and the subsequent separation of the eight (8)
petitioners from the service constituted an
unconstitutional restraint on their freedom of
expression, freedom of assembly and freedom
to petition for redress of grievances, the
respondent firm committed an unfair labor
practice defined in Section 4(a-1) in relation to
Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875, otherwise
known as the Industrial Peace Act. Section 3 of
Republic Act No. 875 guarantees to the
employees the right "to engage in concerted
activities for . . . mutual aid or protection"; while
Section 4(a-1) regards as an unfair labor practice
for an employer "to interfere with, restrain or
coerce employees in the exercise of their rights
guaranteed in Section Three."
We repeat that the obvious purpose of the mass
demonstration staged by the workers of the
respondent firm on March 4, 1969, was for their
mutual aid and protection against alleged police
abuses, denial of which was interference with or
restraint on the right of the employees to engage
in such a common action to better shield
themselves against such alleged police indignities.
The insistence on the part of the respondent firm
that the workers for the morning and regular shifts
should not participate in the mass demonstration,
under pain of dismissal, was as heretofore stated,
"a potent means of inhibiting speech."
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Such a concerted action for their mutual help and
protection, deserves at least equal protection as
the concerted action of employees in giving
publicity to a letter complaint charging a bank
president with immorality, nepotism, favoritism
and discrimination in the appointment and
promotion of bank employees. We further ruled in
the Republic Savings Bank case, supra, that for
the employees to come within the protective
mantle of Section 3 in relation to Section 4(a-1) of
Republic Act No. 875, "it is not necessary that
union activity be involved or that collective
bargaining be contemplated," as long as the
concerted activity is for the furtherance of their
interests.
As stated clearly in the stipulation of facts
embodied in the questioned order of respondent
Court dated September 15, 1969, the company,
"while expressly acknowledging, that the
demonstration is an inalienable right of the Union
guaranteed by the Constitution," nonetheless
emphasized that "any demonstration for that
matter should not unduly prejudice the normal
operation of the company" and "warned the
PBMEO representatives that workers who belong
to the first and regular shifts, who without previous
leave of absence approved by the Company,
particularly the officers present who are the
organizers of the demonstration, who shall fail to
report for work the following morning (March 4,
1969) shall be dismissed, because such failure is
a violation of the existing CBA and, therefore,
would be amounting to an illegal strike (;)" (p. III,
petitioner's brief). Such threat of dismissal tended
to coerce the employees from joining the mass
demonstration. However, the issues that the
employees raised against the local police, were
more important to them because they had the
courage to proceed with the demonstration,
despite such threat of dismissal. The most that
could happen to them was to lose a day's wage by
reason of their absence from work on the day of
the demonstration. One day's pay means much to
a laborer, more especially if he has a family to
support. Yet, they were willing to forego their one-
day salary hoping that their demonstration would
bring about the desired relief from police abuses.
But management was adamant in refusing to
recognize the superior legitimacy of their right of
free speech, free assembly and the right to petition
for redress.
Because the respondent company ostensibly did
not find it necessary to demand from the workers
proof of the truth of the alleged abuses inflicted on
them by the local police, it thereby concedes that
the evidence of such abuses should properly be
submitted to the corresponding authorities having
jurisdiction over their complaint and to whom such
complaint may be referred by the President of the
Philippines for proper investigation and action with
a view to disciplining the local police officers
involved.
On the other hand, while the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations found that the demonstration
"paralyzed to a large extent the operations of the
complainant company," the respondent Court of
Industrial Relations did not make any finding as to
the fact of loss actually sustained by the firm. This
significant circumstance can only mean that the
firm did not sustain any loss or damage. It did not
present evidence as to whether it lost expected
profits for failure to comply with purchase orders
on that day; or that penalties were exacted from it
by customers whose orders could not be filled that
day of the demonstration; or that purchase orders
were cancelled by the customers by reason of its
failure to deliver the
San Beda College of Law
Based on ATTY. ADONIS V. GABRIEL lectures
materials ordered; or that its own equipment or
materials or products were damaged due to
absence of its workers on March 4, 1969. On the
contrary, the company saved a sizable amount in
the form of wages for its hundreds of workers, cost
of fuel, water and electric consumption that day.
Such savings could have amply compensated for
unrealized profits or damages it might have
sustained by reason of the absence of its workers
for only one day.
IV
Apart from violating the constitutional
guarantees of free speech and assembly as
well as the right to petition for redress of
grievances of the employees, the dismissal of
the eight (8) leaders of the workers for
proceeding with the demonstration and
consequently being absent from work,
constitutes a denial of social justice likewise
assured by the fundamental law to these lowly
employees. Section 5 of Article II of the
Constitution imposes upon the State "the
promotion of social justice to insure the well-being
and economic security of all of the people," which
guarantee is emphasized by the other directive in
Section 6 of Article XIV of the Constitution that "the
State shall afford protection to labor . . ."
Respondent Court of Industrial Relations as an
agency of the State is under obligation at all times
to give meaning and substance to these
constitutional guarantees in favor of the working
man; for otherwise these constitutional safeguards
would be merely a lot of "meaningless
constitutional patter." Under the Industrial Peace
Act, the Court of Industrial Relations is enjoined to
effect the policy of the law "to eliminate the causes
of industrial unrest by encouraging and protecting
the exercise by employees of their right to self-
organization for the purpose of collective
bargaining and for the promotion of their moral,
social and economic well-being." It is most
unfortunate in the case at bar that respondent
Court of Industrial Relations, the very
governmental agency designed therefor, failed to
implement this policy and failed to keep faith with
its avowed mission its raison d'etre as ordained
and directed by the Constitution.
It has been likewise established that a violation
of a constitutional right divests the court of
jurisdiction; and as a consequence its
judgment is null and void and confers no
rights. Relief from a criminal conviction secured at
the sacrifice of constitutional liberties, may be
obtained through habeas corpus proceedings
even long after the finality of the judgment. Thus,
habeas corpus is the remedy to obtain the release
of an individual, who is convicted by final judgment
through a forced confession, which violated his
constitutional right against self-incrimination; or
who is denied the right to present evidence in his
defense as a deprivation of his liberty without due
process of law, even after the accused has already
served sentence for twenty-two years.
Both the respondents Court of Industrial Relations
and private firm trenched upon these constitutional
immunities of petitioners. Both failed to accord
preference to such rights and aggravated the
inhumanity to which the aggrieved workers
claimed they had been subjected by the municipal
police. Having violated these basic human rights
of the laborers, the Court of Industrial Relations
ousted itself of jurisdiction and the questioned
orders it issued in the instant case are a nullity.
Recognition and protection of such freedoms are
imperative on all public offices including the
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courts 28 as well as private citizens and
corporations, the exercise and enjoyment of which
must not be nullified by mere procedural rule
promulgated by the Court Industrial Relations
exercising a purely delegate legislative power,
when even a law enacted by Congress must yield
to the untrammelled enjoyment of these human
rights. There is no time limit to the exercise of
the freedoms. The right to enjoy them is not
exhausted by the delivery of one speech, the
printing of one article or the staging of one
demonstration. It is a continuing immunity to
be invoked and exercised when exigent and
expedient whenever there are errors to be
rectified, abuses to be denounced,
inhumanities to be condemned. Otherwise
these guarantees in the Bill of Rights would be
vitiated by rule on procedure prescribing the
period for appeal. The battle then would be
reduced to a race for time. And in such a
contest between an employer and its laborer,
the latter eventually loses because he cannot
employ the best an dedicated counsel who can
defend his interest with the required diligence
and zeal, bereft as he is of the financial
resources with which to pay for competent
legal services.
VI.
Does the mere fact that the motion for
reconsideration was filed two (2) days late defeat
the rights of the petitioning employees? Or more
directly and concretely, does the inadvertent
omission to comply with a mere Court of Industrial
Relations procedural rule governing the period for
filing a motion for reconsideration or appeal in
labor cases, promulgated pursuant to a legislative
delegation, prevail over constitutional rights? The
answer should be obvious in the light of the
aforecited cases. To accord supremacy to the
foregoing rules of the Court of Industrial
Relations over basic human rights sheltered
by the Constitution, is not only incompatible
with the basic tenet of
constitutional government that the
Constitution is superior to any statute or
subordinate rules and regulations, but also
does violence to natural reason and logic. The
dominance and superiority of
constitutional right over the aforesaid Court of
Industrial Relations procedural rule of
necessity should be affirmed. Such a Court of
Industrial Relations rule as applied in this case
does not implement or reinforce or strengthen
the constitutional rights affected,' but instead
constrict the same to the point of nullifying the
enjoyment thereof by the petitioning
employees. Said Court of Industrial Relations
rule, promulgated as it was pursuant to a mere
legislative delegation, is unreasonable and
therefore is beyond the authority granted by
the Constitution and the law. A period of five
(5) days within which to file a motion for
reconsideration is too short, especially for the
aggrieved workers, who usually do not have
the ready funds to meet the necessary
expenses therefor. In case of the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court, a period of
fifteen (15) days has been fixed for the filing of the
motion for re hearing or reconsideration (See. 10,
Rule 51; Sec. 1, Rule 52; Sec. 1, Rule 56, Revised
Rules of Court). The delay in the filing of the
motion for reconsideration could have been only
one day if September 28, 1969 was not a Sunday.
This fact accentuates the unreasonableness of the
Court of Industrial are concerned.
San Beda College of Law
Based on ATTY. ADONIS V. GABRIEL lectures
It is a procedural rule that generally all causes of
action and defenses presently available must be
specifically raised in the complaint or answer; so
that any cause of action or defense not raised in
such pleadings, is deemed waived. However, a
constitutional issue can be raised any time, even
for the first time on appeal, if it appears that the
determination of the constitutional issue is
necessary to a decision of the case, the very lis
mota of the case without the resolution of which no
final and complete determination of the dispute
can be made. It is thus seen that a procedural rule
of Congress or of the Supreme Court gives way to
a constitutional right. In the instant case, the
procedural rule of the Court of Industrial Relations,
a creature of Congress, must likewise yield to the
constitutional rights invoked by herein petitioners
even before the institution of the unfair labor
practice charged against them and in their defense
to the said charge.
Bayan vs. Ermita
G.R. No. 169838, April 25, 2006, Azcuna, J.
Facts: Petitioners allege that they are citizens and
taxpayers of the Philippines and that their rights as
organizations and individuals were violated when
the rally they participated in on October 6, 2005
was violently dispersed by policemen
implementing Batas Pambansa (B.P.) No. 880.
Malacanang also issued a policy denominated as
―Calibrated Pre-emptive Response‖ (CPR) on all
rallies. Said ―CPR Policy‖ provides, among
others:
The rule of calibrated
preemptive response is now in
force, in lieu of maximum
tolerance. The authorities will
not stand aside while those
with ill intent are herding a
witting or unwitting mass of
people and inciting them into
actions that are inimical to
public order, and the peace of
mind of the national
community.
Unlawful mass actions
the
will be dispersed. The
majority of law-abiding citizens
have the right to be protected
by a vigilant and proactive
government.
We appeal to the
detractors of the government
to engage in lawful and
peaceful conduct befitting of a
democratic society.
They assail Batas Pambansa No. 880 as well as
the policy of ―Calibrated Preemptive
Response" or CPR and seek to stop violent
dispersals of rallies under the "no permit, no
rally" policy and the CPR policy recently
announced.
Petitioners contend that Batas
Pambansa No. 880 is clearly a violation of the
Constitution and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights and other human rights
treaties of which the Philippines is a signatory.
They argue that B.P. No. 880 requires a permit
before one can stage a public assembly
regardless of the presence or absence of a clear
and present danger. It also curtails the choice of
venue and is thus repugnant to the freedom of
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expression clause as the time and place of a public
assembly form part of the message for which the
expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not
content-neutral as it does not apply to mass
actions in support of the government. The words
"lawful cause," "opinion," "protesting or
influencing" suggest the exposition of some cause
not espoused by the government. Also, the phrase
"maximum tolerance" shows that the law applies
to assemblies against the government because
they are being tolerated. As a content-based
legislation, it cannot pass the strict scrutiny test.
Respondent‘s argue:
Petitioners have no standing because
they have not presented evidence that
they had been ―injured, arrested or
detained because of the CPR,‖ and that
―those arrested stand to be charged
with violating Batas Pambansa [No.] 880
and other offenses.‖
Neither B.P. No. 880 nor CPR is void on
its face. Petitioners cannot honestly claim
that the time, place and manner
regulation embodied in B.P. No. 880
violates the three-pronged test for such a
measure, to wit: (a) B.P. No. 880 is
content-neutral, i.e., it has no reference
to content of regulated speech; (b) B.P.
No. 880 is narrowly tailored to serve a
significant governmental interest, i.e., the
interest cannot be equally well served by
a means that is less intrusive of free
speech interests; and (c) B.P. No. 880
leaves open alternative channels for
communication of the information.
B.P. No. 880 is content-neutral as seen
from the text of the law. Section 5
requires the statement of the public
assembly‘s time, place and manner of
conduct. It entails traffic re-routing to
prevent grave public inconvenience and
serious or undue interference in the free
flow of commerce and trade.
Furthermore, nothing in B.P. No. 880
authorizes the denial of a permit on the
basis of a rally‘s program content or the
statements of the speakers therein,
except under the constitutional precept of
the ―clear and present danger test.‖
The status of B.P. No. 880 as a content-
neutral regulation has been recognized in
Osmeña v. Comelec.
Adiong v. Comelec held that B.P. No. 880
is a content-neutral regulation of the time,
place and manner of holding public
assemblies and the law passes the test
for such regulation, namely, these
regulations need only a substantial
governmental interest to support them.
Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate
Court[9] held that a local chief executive
has the authority to exercise police power
to meet ―the demands of the common
good in terms of traffic decongestion and
public convenience.‖
Furthermore, the discretion given to the
mayor is narrowly circumscribed by
Sections 5 (d), and 6 (a), (b), (c), (d), (e),
13 and 15 of the law.
The standards set forth in the law are not
inconsistent. ―Clear and convincing
evidence that the public assembly will
create a clear and present danger to public
order, public safety, public convenience,
public morals or public health‖ and
―imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil‖ both express the
San Beda College of Law
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meaning of the ―clear and present
danger test.‖
CPR is simply the responsible and
judicious use of means allowed by
existing laws and ordinances to protect
public interest and restore public order.
Thus, it is not accurate to call it a new rule
but rather it is a more pro-active and
dynamic enforcement of existing laws,
regulations and ordinances to prevent
chaos in the streets. It does not replace
the rule of maximum tolerance in B.P.
No. 880.
Respondent Mayor Joselito Atienza, for his part,
submitted in his Comment that the petition in G.R.
No. 169838 should be dismissed on the ground
that Republic Act No. 7160 gives the
Mayor power to deny a permit independently of
B.P. No. 880; that his denials of permits were
under the ―clear and present danger‖ rule as
there was a clamor to stop rallies that disrupt
the economy and to protect the lives of other
people; that J. B. L. Reyes v. Bagatsing,[11]
Primicias v. Fugoso,[12] and Jacinto v. CA,[13]
have affirmed the constitutionality of requiring
a permit; that the permit is for the use of a
public place and not for the exercise of rights;
and that B.P. No. 880 is not a content-based
regulation because it covers all rallies.
The petitions were ordered consolidated on
February 14, 2006. After the submission of all the
Comments, the Court set the cases for oral
arguments on April 4, 2006,[14] stating the
principal issues, as follows:
Issues:
On the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa No.
880, specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12 13(a) and
14(a) thereof, and Republic Act No. 7160:
Are these content-neutral or content-based
regulations?
Are they void on grounds of overbreadth or
vagueness?
Do they constitute prior restraint?
Are they undue delegations of powers to
Mayors?
Do they violate international human rights
treaties and the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights?
On the constitutionality and legality of the
policy of Calibrated Preemptive Response (CPR):
Is the policy void on its face or due to
vagueness?
Is it void for lack of publication?
Is the policy of CPR void as applied to the
rallies of September 26 and October 4, 5 and 6,
2005?
Held:
Petitioners’ standing cannot be seriously
challenged. Their right as citizens to engage in
peaceful assembly and exercise the right of
petition, as guaranteed by the Constitution, is
directly affected by B.P. No. 880 which requires a
permit for all who would publicly assemble in the
nation’s streets and parks. They have, in fact,
purposely engaged in public assemblies without
the required permits to press their claim that no
such permit can be validly required without
violating the Constitutional guarantee.
Respondents, on the other hand, have
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challenged such action as contrary to law and
dispersed the public assemblies held without the
permit.
B.P. 880 IS CONSTITUTIONAL
The first point to mark is that the right to peaceably
assemble and petition for redress of grievances is,
together with freedom of speech, of expression,
and of the press, a right that enjoys primacy in the
realm of constitutional protection. For these rights
constitute the very basis of a functional democratic
polity, without which all the other rights would be
meaningless and unprotected. As stated in Jacinto
v. CA, the Court, as early as the onset of this
century, in U.S. v. Apurado, already upheld the
right to assembly and petition, as follows:
There is no question as to the petitioners’
rights to peaceful assembly to petition the
government for a redress of grievances and,
for that matter, to organize or form
associations for purposes not contrary to law,
as well as to engage in peaceful concerted
activities. These rights are guaranteed by no
less than the Constitution, particularly Sections
4 and 8 of the Bill of Rights, Section 2(5) of Article
IX, and Section 3 of Article XIII.
Jurisprudence abounds with hallowed
pronouncements defending and promoting the
people‘s exercise of these rights. As early as the
onset of this century, this Court in U.S. vs.
Apurado, already upheld the right to assembly and
petition and even went as far as to acknowledge:
―It is rather to be expected that
more or less disorder will mark the
public assembly of the people to
protest against grievances
whether real or imaginary,
because on such occasions feeling
is always wrought to a high pitch of
excitement, and the greater, the
grievance and the more intense the
feeling, the less perfect, as a rule
will be the disciplinary control of
the leaders over their irresponsible
followers. But if the prosecution be
permitted to seize upon every
instance of such disorderly
conduct by individual members of
a crowd as an excuse to
characterize the assembly as a
seditious and tumultuous rising
against the authorities, then the
right to assemble and to petition for
redress of grievances would
expose all those who took part
therein to the severest and most
unmerited punishment, if the
purposes which they sought to
attain did not happen to be
pleasing to the prosecuting
authorities. If instances of
disorderly conduct occur on such
occasions, the guilty individuals
should be sought out and punished
therefor, but the utmost discretion
must be exercised in drawing the
line between
disorderly and seditious conduct
and between an essentially
peaceable assembly and a to stress that it is a necessary consequence of our
tumultuous uprising.‖
Again, in Primicias v. Fugoso, the Court
likewise sustained the primacy of freedom of
San Beda College of Law
Based on ATTY. ADONIS V. GABRIEL lectures
speech and to assembly and petition over
comfort and convenience in the use of streets
and parks.
Next, however, it must be remembered that the
right, while sacrosanct, is not absolute. In
Primicias, this Court said:
The right to freedom of speech, and
to peacefully assemble and petition
the government for redress of
grievances, are fundamental
personal rights of the people
recognized and guaranteed by the
constitutions of democratic
countries. But it is a settled
principle growing out of the nature of
well-ordered civil societies that the
exercise of those rights is not
absolute for it may be so regulated
that it shall not be injurious to the
equal enjoyment of others having
equal rights, nor injurious to the
rights of the community or society.
The power to regulate the exercise of
such and other constitutional rights
is termed the sovereign ―police
power,‖ which is the power to
prescribe regulations, to promote
the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety, and general
welfare of the people.
This sovereign police power is
exercised by the government through
its legislative branch by the enactment
of laws regulating those and other
constitutional and civil rights, and it may
be delegated to political
subdivisions, such as towns,
municipalities and cities by authorizing
their legislative bodies called municipal
and city councils enact ordinances for
purpose.
It is thus clear that the Court is called upon to
protect the exercise of the cognate rights to free
speech and peaceful assembly, arising from the
denial of a permit. The Constitution is quite
explicit: ―No law shall be passed abridging the
freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of
the people peaceably to assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances.‖ Free
speech, like free press, may be identified with the
liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter
of public concern without censorship or
punishment. There is to be then no previous
restraint on the communication of views or
subsequent liability whether in libel suits,
prosecution for sedition, or action for damages, or
contempt proceedings unless there be a ―clear
and present danger of a substantive evil that [the
State] has a right to prevent.‖
Freedom of assembly connotes the right of the
people to meet peaceably for consultation and
discussion of matters of public concern. It is
entitled to be accorded the utmost deference
and respect. It is not to be limited, much less
denied, except on a showing, as is the case
with freedom of expression, of a clear and
present danger of a substantive evil that the
state has a right to prevent. Even prior to the
1935 Constitution, Justice Malcolm had occasion
republican institutions and complements the right
of free speech. To paraphrase the opinion of
Justice Rutledge, speaking for the majority of the
American Supreme Court in Thomas v. Collins, it
was not by accident or coincidence that the rights
to freedom of speech and of the press were
coupled
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in a single guarantee with the right of the people
peaceably to assemble and to petition the
government for redress of grievances. All these
rights, while not identical, are inseparable. In every
case, therefore, where there is a limitation placed
on the exercise of this right, the judiciary is called
upon to examine the effects of the challenged
governmental actuation. The sole justification for a
limitation on the exercise of this right, so
fundamental to the maintenance of democratic
institutions, is the danger, of a character both
grave and imminent, of a serious evil to public
safety, public morals, public health, or any other
legitimate public interest.
Nowhere is the rationale that
underlies the freedom of expression and
peaceable assembly better expressed than in this
excerpt from an opinion of Justice Frankfurter: ―It
must never be forgotten, however, that the Bill of
Rights was the child of the Enlightenment. Back of
the guaranty of free speech lay faith in the power
of an appeal to reason by all the peaceful means
for gaining access to the mind. It was in order to
avert force and explosions due to
restrictions upon rational modes of communication
that the guaranty of free speech was given a
generous scope. But utterance in a context of
violence can lose its significance as an appeal to
reason and become part of an instrument of force.
Such utterance was not meant to be sheltered by
the Constitution.‖ What was rightfully stressed is
the abandonment of reason, the utterance,
whether verbal or printed, being in a context of
violence. It must always be remembered that this
right likewise provides for a safety valve, allowing
parties the opportunity to give vent to their views,
even if contrary to the prevailing climate of opinion.
For if the peaceful means of communication
cannot be availed of, resort to non-peaceful
means may be the only alternative. Nor is this the
sole reason for the expression of dissent. It means
more than just the right to be heard of the person
who feels aggrieved or who is dissatisfied with
things as they are. Its value may lie in the fact that
there may be something worth hearing from the
dissenter. That is to ensure a true ferment of ideas.
There are, of course, well-defined limits. What is
guaranteed is peaceable assembly. One may not
advocate disorder in the name of protest, much
less preach rebellion under the cloak of dissent.
The Constitution frowns on disorder or tumult
attending a rally or assembly. Resort to force is
ruled out and outbreaks of violence to be avoided.
The utmost calm though is not required. As
pointed out in an early Philippine case, penned in
1907 to be precise,
United States v. Apurado: ―It is rather to be
expected that more or less disorder will mark the
public assembly of the people to protest against
grievances whether real or imaginary, because on
such occasions feeling is always wrought to a high
pitch of excitement, and the greater the grievance
and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect,
as a rule, will be the disciplinary control of the
leaders over their irresponsible
followers.‖ It bears repeating that for the
constitutional right to be invoked, riotous conduct,
injury to property, and acts of vandalism must be
avoided. To give free rein to one‘s destructive
urges is to call for condemnation. It is to make a
mockery of the high estate occupied by intellectual
liberty in our scheme of values.
There can be no legal objection, absent
the existence of a clear and present danger of
a substantive evil, on the choice of Luneta as
the place where the peace rally would start.
The Philippines is committed to the view
expressed in the plurality opinion, of 1939
San Beda College of Law
Based on ATTY. ADONIS V. GABRIEL lectures
vintage of, Justice Roberts in Hague v. CIO:
―Whenever the title of streets and parks may rest,
they have immemorially been held in trust for the
use of the public and, time out of mind, have been
used for purposes of assembly, communicating
thoughts between citizens, and discussing public
questions. Such use of the streets and public
places has, from ancient times, been a part of the
privileges, immunities, rights and liberties of
citizens. The privilege of a citizen of the United
States to use the streets and parks for
communication of views on national questions
may be regulated in the interest of all; it is not
absolute, but relative, and must be exercised in
subordination to the general comfort and
convenience, and in consonance with peace and
good order; but must not, in the guise of
respondents, be abridged or denied.‖ The above
excerpt was quoted with approval in Primicias v.
Fugoso. Primicias made explicit what was implicit
in Municipality of Cavite v. Rojas, a 1915 decision,
where this Court categorically affirmed that plazas
or parks and streets are outside the commerce of
man and thus nullified a contract that leased Plaza
Soledad of plaintiff-municipality. Reference was
made to such plaza ―being a promenade for
public use,‖ which certainly is not the only purpose
that it could serve. To repeat, there can be no
valid reason why a permit should not be
granted for the proposed march and rally
starting from a public park that is the Luneta.
Neither can there be any valid objection to
the use of the streets to the gates of the US
embassy, hardly two blocks away at the Roxas
Boulevard. Primicias v. Fugoso has resolved
any lurking doubt on the matter. In holding that
the then Mayor Fugoso of the City of Manila
should grant a permit for a public meeting at
Plaza Miranda in Quiapo,
this Court categorically declared: ―Our
conclusion finds support in the decision in the case
of Willis Cox v. State of New Hampshire,
U.S., 569. In that case, the statute of New
Hampshire P.L. chap. 145, section 2, providing
that no parade or procession upon any ground
abutting thereon, shall be permitted unless a
special license therefor shall first be obtained from
the selectmen of the town or from licensing
committee,‘ was construed by the Supreme Court
of New Hampshire as not conferring upon the
licensing board unfettered discretion to refuse to
grant the license, and held valid. And the Supreme
Court of the United States, in its decision (1941)
penned by Chief Justice Hughes affirming the
judgment of the State Supreme
Court, held that ‗a statute requiring persons using the
public streets for a parade or procession to procure a
special license therefor from the local authorities is
not an unconstitutional abridgment of the rights of
assembly or of freedom of speech and press, where,
as the statute is construed by the state courts, the
licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the
issuance of licenses, to a consideration of the time,
place, and manner of the parade or procession, with
a view to conserving the public convenience and of
affording an opportunity to provide proper policing,
and are not invested with arbitrary discretion to issue
or refuse license, * * *. ―Nor should the point made
by Chief Justice Hughes in a subsequent portion of
the opinion be ignored:
―Civil liberties, as guaranteed by the Constitution,
imply the existence of an organized society
maintaining public order without which liberty itself
would be lost in the excesses of unrestricted abuses.
The authority of a municipality to impose regulations
in order to assure the safety and convenience of the
people in the use of public highways has never been
regarded as
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inconsistent with civil liberties but rather as one of
the means of safeguarding the good order upon
which they ultimately depend. The control of
travel on the streets of cities is the most
familiar illustration of this recognition of social
need. Where a restriction of the use of
highways in that relation is designed to
promote the public convenience in the interest
of all, it cannot be disregarded by the
attempted exercise of some civil right which in
other circumstances would be entitled to
protection.‖
xxx
x x x The principle under
American doctrines was given utterance by Chief
Justice Hughes in these words: ―The question, if
the rights of free speech and peaceable assembly
are to be preserved, is not as to the auspices
under which the meeting is held but as to its
purpose; not as to the relations of the speakers,
but whether their utterances transcend the bounds
of the freedom of speech which the
Constitution protects.‖ There could be danger to
public peace and safety if such a gathering were
marked by turbulence. That would deprive it of its
peaceful character. It is true that the licensing
official, here respondent Mayor, is not devoid of
discretion in determining whether or not a permit
would be granted. It is not, however, unfettered
discretion. While prudence requires that there be
a realistic appraisal not of what may possibly occur
but of what may probably occur, given all the
relevant circumstances, still the assumption –
especially so where the assembly is scheduled for
a specific public place – is that the permit must be
for the assembly being held there. The exercise of
such a right, in the language of Justice Roberts,
speaking for the American
Supreme Court, is not to be ―abridged on the plea
that it may be exercised in some other place.‖
xx
8. By way of a summary. The applicants
for a permit to hold an assembly should inform
the licensing authority of the date, the public
place where and the time when it will take
place. If it were a private place, only the
consent of the owner or the one entitled to its
legal possession is required. Such application
should be filed well ahead in time to enable the
public official concerned to appraise whether
there may be valid objections to the grant of
the permit or to its grant but at another public
place. It is an indispensable condition to such
refusal or modification that the clear and
present danger test be the standard for the
decision reached. If he is of the view that there
is such an imminent and grave danger of a
substantive evil, the applicants must be heard
on the matter. Thereafter, his decision,
whether favorable or adverse, must be
transmitted to them at the earliest opportunity.
Thus if so minded, they can have recourse to
the proper judicial authority. Free speech and
peaceable assembly, along with the other
intellectual freedoms, are highly ranked in our
scheme of constitutional values. It cannot be
too strongly stressed that on the judiciary, --
even more so than on the other departments –
rests the grave and delicate responsibility of
assuring respect for and deference to such
preferred rights. No verbal formula, no
sanctifying phrase can, of course, dispense
with what has been so felicitiously termed by
Justice Holmes ―as the sovereign prerogative
of judgment.‖ Nonetheless, the presumption
must be to
San Beda College of Law
Based on ATTY. ADONIS V. GABRIEL lectures
incline the weight of the scales of justice on
the side of such rights, enjoying as they do
precedence and primacy. x x x.
B.P. No. 880 was enacted after this Court
rendered its decision in Reyes.
The provisions of B.P. No. 880 practically
codify the ruling in Reyes:
It is very clear, therefore, that B.P. No.
880 is NOT AN ABSOLUTE BAN OF PUBLIC
ASSEMBLIES BUT A RESTRICTION THAT
SIMPLY REGULATES THE TIME, PLACE AND
MANNER OF THE ASSEMBLIES. This was
adverted to in Osmeña v. Comelec,[20] where
the Court referred to it as a ―content-neutral‖
regulation of the time, place, and manner of
holding public assemblies
A fair and impartial reading of B.P. No. 880
thus readily shows that it refers to all kinds of
public assemblies[22] that would use public
places. The reference to ―lawful cause‖ does not
make it content-based because assemblies really
have to be for lawful causes, otherwise they would
not be ―peaceable‖ and entitled to protection.
Neither are the words ―opinion,‖ ―protesting‖
and ―influencing‖ in the definition of public
assembly content based, since they can refer to
any subject. The words ―petitioning the
government for redress of grievances‖ come from
the wording of the Constitution, so its use cannot
be avoided. Finally, maximum tolerance is for the
protection and benefit of all rallyists and is
independent of the content of the expressions in
the rally.
Furthermore, THE PERMIT can only be
denied on the ground of clear and present
danger to public order, public safety, public
convenience, public morals or public health.
This is a recognized exception to the exercise of
the right even under the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights and the International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights.
Universal Declaration of Human Rights
Article 20
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of
peaceful assembly and association.
xxx
Article 29
Everyone has duties to the community in
which alone the free and full development
of his personality is possible.
In the exercise of his rights and
freedoms, everyone shall be subject only
to such limitations as are determined by
law solely for the purpose of securing due
recognition and respect for the rights and
freedoms of others and of meeting the just
requirements of morality, public order and
the general welfare in a democratic
society.
These rights and freedoms may in no
case be exercised contrary to the
purposes and principles of the United
Nations.
The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights
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Article 19.
Everyone shall have the right to hold
opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom
of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds,
regardless of frontiers, either orally, in
writing or in print, in the form of art, or
through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in
paragraph 2 of this article carries with it
special duties and
responsibilities. It may therefore be subject
to certain restrictions, but these shall only
be such as are provided by law and are
necessary:
For respect of the rights or reputations of
others;
For the protection of national security or of
public order (ordre public), or of public
health or morals.
Contrary to petitioner’s claim, THE LAW
IS VERY CLEAR and is nowhere vague in its
provisions. ―Public‖ does not have to be
defined. Its ordinary meaning is well-known.
Webster‘s Dictionary defines it, thus:
public, n, x x x 2a: an organized
body of people x x x 3: a group
of people distinguished by
common interests or
characteristics x x x.
Not every expression of opinion is a public
assembly. The law refers to “rally,
demonstration, march, parade, procession or any
other form of mass or concerted action held in a
public place.” So it does not cover any and all
kinds of gatherings.
Neither is the law overbroad. It regulates
the exercise of the right to peaceful assembly
and petition only to the extent needed to avoid
a clear and present danger of the substantive
evils Congress has the right to prevent.
There is, likewise, no prior restraint, since the
content of the speech is not relevant to the
regulation.
As to the delegation of powers to the
mayor, the law provides a precise and
sufficient standard – the clear and present
danger test stated in Sec. 6(a). The reference to
“imminent and grave danger of a substantive evil”
in Sec. 6(c) substantially means the same thing
and is not an inconsistent standard. As to whether
respondent Mayor has the same power
independently under Republic Act No. 7160[24] is
thus not necessary to resolve in these
proceedings, and was not pursued by the parties
in their arguments.
Finally, for those who cannot wait, Section 15
of the law provides for an alternative forum
through the creation of freedom parks where
no prior permit is needed for peaceful
assembly and petition at any time:
Sec. 15. Freedom parks. –
Every city and municipality in
the country shall within six
months after the effectivity of
San Beda College of Law
Based on ATTY. ADONIS V. GABRIEL lectures
this Act establish or designate at
least one suitable ―freedom
park‖ or mall in their respective
jurisdictions which, as far as
practicable, shall be centrally
located within the
poblacion where
demonstrations and meetings
may be held at any time
without the need of any prior
permit.
In the cities and
municipalities of Metropolitan
Manila, the respective mayors
shall establish the freedom
parks within the period of six
months from the effectivity this
Act.
This brings up the point, however, of
compliance with this provision.
The Solicitor General stated during the oral
arguments that, to his knowledge, only Cebu City
has declared a freedom park – Fuente Osmeña.
That of Manila, the Sunken Gardens, has since
been converted into a golf course, he added.
If this is so, the degree of observance of B.P.
No. 880’s mandate that every city and
municipality set aside a freedom park within
six months from its effectivity in 1985, or 20
years ago, would be pathetic and regrettable.
The matter appears to have been taken for
granted amidst the swell of freedom that rose
from the peaceful revolution of 1986.
Considering that the existence of such
freedom parks is an essential part of the law’s
system of regulation of the people’s exercise
of their right to peacefully assemble and
petition, the Court is constrained to rule that
after thirty (30) days from the finality of this
Decision, no prior permit may be required for
the exercise of such right in any public park or
plaza of a city or municipality until that city or
municipality shall have complied with Section
15 of the law. For without such alternative
forum, to deny the permit would in effect be to
deny the right. ―Advance notices‖ should,
however, be given to the authorities to ensure
proper coordination and orderly proceedings.
THE CPR IS NULL & VOID
The Court now comes to the matter of the CPR.
As stated earlier, the Solicitor General has
conceded that the use of the term should now be
discontinued, since it does not mean anything
other than the maximum tolerance policy set forth
in B.P. No. 880. This is stated in the Affidavit of
respondent Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita,
submitted by the Solicitor General, thus:
At any rate, the Court rules that in
view of the maximum tolerance mandated by
B.P. No. 880, CPR serves no valid purpose if it
means the same thing as maximum tolerance
and is illegal if it means something else.
Accordingly, what is to be followed is and
should be that mandated by the law itself,
namely, maximum tolerance, which
specifically means the following:
Sec. 3. Definition of terms. – For purposes of this
Act:
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xxx
(c) ―Maximum
tolerance‖ means the highest
degree of restraint that the military,
police and other peace keeping
authorities shall observe during a
public assembly or in the dispersal
of the same.
xxx
Sec. 9. Non-interference by law
enforcement authorities. – Law
enforcement agencies shall not
interfere with the holding of a public
assembly. However, to adequately
ensure public safety, a law
enforcement contingent under the
command of a responsible police
officer may be detailed and
stationed in a place at least one
hundred (100) meters away from
the area of activity ready to
maintain peace and order at all
times.
Sec. 10. Police assistance when
requested. – It shall be imperative
for law enforcement agencies,
when their assistance is requested
by the leaders or organizers, to
perform their duties always mindful
that their responsibility to provide
proper protection to those
exercising their right peaceably to
assemble and the freedom of
expression is primordial. Towards
this end, law enforcement agencies
shall observe the following
guidelines:
Members of the law enforcement
contingent who deal with the
demonstrators shall be in complete
uniform with their nameplates and
units to which they belong displayed
prominently on the front and dorsal
parts of their uniform and must
observe the policy of ―maximum
tolerance‖ as herein defined;
The members of the law
enforcement contingent shall not
carry any kind of firearms but may be
equipped with baton or riot sticks,
shields, crash helmets with visor,
gas masks, boots or ankle high
shoes with shin guards;
Tear gas, smoke grenades, water
cannons, or any similar anti-riot
device shall not be used unless the
public assembly is attended by
actual violence or serious threats of
violence, or deliberate destruction of
property.
Sec. 11. Dispersal of public
assembly with permit. – No public
assembly with a permit shall be
dispersed. However, when an
assembly becomes violent, the
police may disperse such public
assembly as follows:
At the first sign of
impending violence, the ranking
officer of the law enforcement
San Beda College of Law
Based on ATTY. ADONIS V. GABRIEL lectures
contingent shall call the attention of
the leaders of the public assembly
and ask the latter to prevent any
possible disturbance;
If actual violence starts to a
point where rocks or other
harmful objects from the participants
are thrown at the police or at the
non-participants, or at any property
causing damage to such property,
the ranking officer of the law
enforcement contingent shall
audibly warn the participants that if
the disturbance persists, the public
assembly will be dispersed;
If the violence or disturbance
prevailing as stated in the preceding
subparagraph should not stop or
abate, the ranking officer of the law
enforcement contingent shall
audibly issue a warning to the
participants of the public assembly,
and after allowing a reasonable
period of time to lapse, shall
immediately order it to forthwith
disperse;
No arrest of any leader,
organizer or participant shall also be
made during the public assembly
unless he violates during the
assembly a law, statute, ordinance
or any provision of this Act. Such
arrest shall be governed by Article
125 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended;
(d) Isolated acts or
incidents of disorder or breach of the
peace during the public assembly
may be peacefully dispersed.
xxx
Sec. 12. Dispersal of public
assembly without permit. – When
the public assembly is held without a
permit where a permit is required,
the said public assembly may be
peacefully dispersed.
Sec. 13. Prohibited acts. – The
following shall constitute violations
of the Act:
Obstructing, impeding, disrupting or
otherwise denying the exercise of
the right to peaceful assembly;
The unnecessary firing of firearms
by a member of any law
enforcement agency or any person
to disperse the public assembly;
Acts described hereunder if
committed within one hundred (100)
meters from the area of activity of
the public assembly or on the
occasion thereof:
xxx
the carrying of firearms by members
of the law enforcement unit;
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 Alliance for Alternative Action
THE ADONIS CASES 2014 Bayan, et al., Vs. of expression, and of the press, is a right that
Eduardo Ermita, et al., G.R. No. 169838 enjoys dominance in the sphere of constitutional
April 25, 2006 DIGEST protection. For this rights represent the very
basis of a functional democratic polity, without
Bayan, et al., Vs. Eduardo Ermita, et al., which all the other rights would be meaningless
G.R. No. 169838 and unprotected.
April 25, 2006
However, it must be remembered that the right,
while sacrosanct, is not absolute. It may be
Facts: The petitioners, Bayan, et al., alleged that regulated that it shall not be injurious to the
they are citizens and taxpayers of the equal enjoyment of others having equal rights,
Philippines and that their right as organizations nor injurious to the rights of the community or
and individuals were violated when the rally society. The power to regulate the exercise of
they participated in on October 6, 2005 was such and other constitutional rights is termed the
violently dispersed by policemen implementing sovereign “police power,” which is the power to
Batas Pambansa No. 880. prescribe regulations, to promote the health,
morals, peace, education, good order or safety,
Petitioners contended that Batas Pambansa No. and general welfare of the people.
880 is clearly a violation of the Constitution and
the International Covenant on Civil and Political B.P. No 880 is not an absolute ban of public
Rights and other human rights treaties of which assemblies but a restriction that simply regulates
the Philippines is a signatory. They argue that the time, place and manner of the assemblies.
B.P. No. 880 requires a permit before one can B.P. No. 880 thus readily shows that it refers to
stage a public assembly regardless of the all kinds of public assemblies that would use
presence or absence of a clear and present public places. The reference to “lawful cause”
danger. It also curtails the choice of venue and does not make it content-based because
is thus repugnant to the freedom of expression assemblies really have to be for lawful causes,
clause as the time and place of a public otherwise they would not be “peaceable” and
assembly form part of the message which the entitled to protection. Neither the words
expression is sought. Furthermore, it is not “opinion,” “protesting,” and “influencing” in of
content-neutral as it does not apply to mass grievances come from the wording of the
actions in support of the government. The words Constitution, so its use cannot be avoided.
“lawful cause,” “opinion,” “protesting or Finally, maximum tolerance is for the protection
influencing” suggest the exposition of some and benefit of all rallyist and is independent of
cause not espoused by the government. Also, the content of the expression in the rally.
the phrase “maximum tolerance” shows that the
law applies to assemblies against the Furthermore, the permit can only be denied on
government because they are being tolerated. As the ground of clear and present danger to public
a content-based legislation, it cannot pass the order, public safety, public convenience, public
strict scrutiny test. This petition and two other morals or public health. This is a recognized
petitions were ordered to be consolidated on exception to the exercise of the rights even
February 14, 2006. During the course of oral under the Universal Declaration of Human
arguments, the petitioners, in the interest of a Rights and The International Covenant on Civil
speedy resolution of the petitions, withdrew the and Political Rights.
portions of their petitions raising factual issues,
particularly those raising the issue of whether Wherefore, the petitions are GRANTED in part,
B.P. No. 880 and/or CPR is void as applied to and respondents, more particularly the Secretary
the rallies of September 20, October 4, 5 and 6, of the Interior and Local Governments, are
2005. DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the
immediate compliance with Section 15 of Batas
Issue: Whether the Calibrated Pre-emptive Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or
response and the Batas Pambansa No. 880, designation of at least one suitable freedom park
specifically Sections 4, 5, 6, 12, 13(a) and 14(a) or plaza in every city and municipality of the
violates Art. III Sec. 4 of the Philippine country. After thirty (30) days from the finality
Constitution as it causes a disturbing effect on of this Decision, subject to the giving of
the exercise by the people of the right to advance notices, no prior permit shall be
peaceably assemble. required to exercise the right to peaceably
assemble and petition in the public parks or
Held: Section 4 of Article III of the Philippine plaza in every city or municipality that has not
Constitution provides that no law shall be yet complied with section 15 of the law.
passed abridging the freedom of speech, of Furthermore, Calibrated pre-emptive response
expression, or of the press, or the right of the (CPR), insofar as it would purport to differ from
people peaceably to assemble and petition the or be in lieu of maximum tolerance, is NULL
government for redress of grievances. The right and VOID and respondents are ENJOINED to
to peaceably assemble and petition for redress REFRAIN from using it and to STRICTLY
of grievances, together with freedom of speech, OBSERVE the requirements of maximum
tolerance, The petitions are DISMISSED in all
other respects, and the constitutionality of Batas
Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED
-2015
 the interfering with or intentionally disturbing the holding of a public assembly by the use of a
motor vehicle, its horns and loud sound systems.

Furthermore, there is need to address the situation adverted to by petitioners where mayors do not
act on applications for a permit and when the police demand a permit and the rallyists could not
produce one, the rally is immediately dispersed. In such a situation, as a necessary consequence and
part of maximum tolerance, rallyists who can show the police ―an application‖ duly filed on a given
date can, after two days from said date, rally in accordance with their application without the need to
show a permit, the grant of the permit being then presumed under the law, and it will be the burden of
the authorities to show that there has been a denial of the application, in which case the rally may be
peacefully dispersed following the procedure of maximum tolerance prescribed by the law.

In sum, this Court reiterates ITS BASIC POLICY OF UPHOLDING THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF OUR
PEOPLE, ESPECIALLY FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY. In several policy
addresses, Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban has repeatedly vowed to uphold the liberty of our people and
to nurture their prosperity. He said that ―in cases involving liberty, the scales of justice should weigh heavily
against the government and in favor of the poor, the oppressed, the marginalized, the dispossessed and the
weak. Indeed, laws and actions that restrict fundamental rights come to the courts with a heavy presumption
against their validity. These laws and actions are subjected to heightened scrutiny.‖

SUMMARY:

For this reason, the so-called calibrated preemptive response policy has no place in our legal
firmament and must be struck down as a darkness that shrouds freedom. It merely confuses
our people and is used by some police agents to justify abuses.

On the other hand, B.P. No. 880

cannot be condemned as unconstitutional; it does not curtail or unduly restrict freedoms; it
merely regulates the use of public places as to the time, place and manner of
assemblies. Far from being insidious, ―maximum tolerance‖ is for the benefit of rallyists, not
the government.

The delegation to the mayors of the power to issue rally ―permits‖ is valid because it is
subject to the constitutionally-sound ―clear and present danger‖ standard.