Con Edison March Storms Report

David Warner
Associate Counsel
May 11, 2018
By Email for Electronic Filing

Honorable Kathleen H. Burgess
Secretary to the Commission
New York State Public Service Commission
Three Empire State Plaza
Albany, New York 12223-1350
Re: 18-00618 - In the Matter of Utility Preparation and

Response to Power Outages During the March 2018 Winter
Storms
Dear Secretary Burgess;
16 NYCRR Part 105.4(c) requires an electric corporation to submit to the Secretary of

the Public Service Commission a review of its preparation and restoration performance
following emergencies in which electric service restoration exceeds three days.
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.’s submits the attached report
regarding its preparation and service restoration performance relating to Winter Storms Riley
and Quinn which occurred in the first weeks of March 2018.
Sincerely,
Att:
Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.

4 Irving Place New York NY 10003 212 460 4286 212 677 5850 fax warnerd@coned.com
Report on Preparation and System Restoration Performance
Winter Storms Riley and Quinn

March 2018
May 11, 2018

Table of Contents
I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... 1

A. OVERVIEW..................................................................................................................... 1
B. LONG TERM RESILIENCY AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACTIVITIES ........... 2
1. STORM HARDENING INVESTMENTS....................................................................... 2
2. SMART METERS ........................................................................................................... 4
3. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN ................................................................................ 5
4. STORM CHALLENGES ................................................................................................. 6
5. STORM RESPONSE COSTS........................................................................................ 13
6. NEXT STEPS................................................................................................................. 13
II. PRE-EVENT PREPARATION ............................................................................................. 15
A. WEATHER FORECASTS & EVENT CLASSIFICATION ......................................... 15
1. WINTER STORM RILEY ............................................................................................. 17
2. WINTER STORM QUINN............................................................................................ 19
B. SYSTEM IMPACT ........................................................................................................ 19
C. RESOURCE MOBILIZATION ..................................................................................... 21
1. RESTORATION CREWS ............................................................................................. 23
2. MUTUAL ASSISTANCE/CONTRACTORS ............................................................... 24
3. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT ............................................................................................ 28
4. SITE SAFETY ............................................................................................................... 29
5. MUNICIPAL LIAISONS .............................................................................................. 31
III. CUSTOMER COMMUNICATIONS ................................................................................... 33
A. COMMUNICATION QUALITY .................................................................................. 33
B. CUSTOMER COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITIES ..................................................... 34
1. EMAIL, WEB, SOCIAL MEDIA .................................................................................. 34
2. OUTGOING TELEPHONE MESSAGING .................................................................. 39
3. CUSTOMER EXPERIENCE CENTER ........................................................................ 40
4. LIFE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT CUSTOMERS ............................................................ 42
5. CRITICAL FACILITIES ............................................................................................... 45
6. VOICE AND TEXT OUTAGE NOTIFICATIONS ...................................................... 45
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7. CLAIMS ......................................................................................................................... 48
8. BILL CREDITS ............................................................................................................. 48
IV. EVENT RESPONSE ............................................................................................................. 50
A. START OF RESTORATION / SAFETY ...................................................................... 50
B. RESTORATION PRIORITIES: PRIORITIES AND PLANNING ............................... 50
C. SYSTEM DAMAGE FROM FAILED TREES ............................................................. 51
D. DOWN WIRES / SITE SAFETY .................................................................................. 54
E. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT ............................................................................................ 56
F. WORK PLANNING ...................................................................................................... 58
G. ESTIMATED TIME OF RESTORATION.................................................................... 60
H. EXTERNAL COORDINATION ................................................................................... 62
1. MUNICIPALITIES ........................................................................................................ 62
2. COUNTY EMERGENCY OPERATION CENTERS ................................................... 65
3. UTILITIES ..................................................................................................................... 66
4. LOCAL OFFICIALS AND EMERGENCY RESPONDERS ....................................... 66
V. LOGISTICS ........................................................................................................................... 69
A. STAGING AREAS ........................................................................................................ 69
B. MATERIALS ................................................................................................................. 70
C. DRY ICE DISTRIBUTION ........................................................................................... 71
VI. SYSTEM AND TECHNOLOGY ISSUES DURING RESTORATION .............................. 73
A. TIMELINE OF TECHNICAL ISSUES ......................................................................... 75
B. OUTAGE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM TECHNICAL ISSUES ................................... 77
C. CUSTOMER NOTIFICATION ISSUES ...................................................................... 78
VII. LESSONS LEARNED AND ENHANCEMENTS UNDER CONSIDERATION ............... 79
A. MEETING THE EXPECTATIONS OF OUR CUSTOMERS ...................................... 79
1. UNDERSTANDING OUR CUSTOMERS’ OUTAGE JOURNEY ............................. 80
2. COMMUNICATING TIMELY AND ACCURATE ETRs .......................................... 80
3. WORKING WITH WESTCHESTER COUNTY AND ITS MUNICIPALITIES ........ 81
4. SERVING OUR LIFE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (LSE) CUSTOMERS ..................... 83
B. OPERATIONS RESPONSE: PREPARING FOR THE NEXT REGIONAL EVENT . 84
1. SITE SAFETY IMPROVEMENT ................................................................................. 84
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2. SECURING RESOURCES ............................................................................................ 84
3. REDUCING TREE IMPACT ........................................................................................ 85
4. CONTINUING STORM HARDENING INVESTMENTS .......................................... 86
5. IMPROVING DAMAGE ASSESSMENT .................................................................... 87
VIII. APPENDICES ................................................................................................................ 89
APPENDIX A-1: CON EDISON WEATHER RISK ASSESSMENTS
APPENDIX A-2: WEATHER FORECASTS FROM DTN
APPENDIX B-1: NEWS RELEASES
APPENDIX B-2: WEB PAGE UPDATES
APPENDIX B-3: FACEBOOK & INSTAGRAM POSTS
APPENDIX B-4: TWITTER POSTS
APPENDIX B-5: CUSTOMER EMAILS
APPENDIX C: OUTGOING TELEPHONE MESSAGES
APPENDIX D: DRY ICE DISTRIBUTION
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I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report reviews Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.’s (“Con Edison” or
“the Company”) system preparation and restoration efforts as a result of the prolonged wind, rain
and snow storm that impacted Con Edison’s service territory beginning Friday, March 2, 2018,
as well as the wind and snow storm that struck the Con Edison service territory on Wednesday,
March 7, 2018. Con Edison is filing this report with the Public Service Commission in
compliance with 16 NYCRR Part 105.4(c).
A. OVERVIEW
In March 2018, two consecutive nor’easters struck our communities and caused
devastating damage to our overhead electric systems across our service territory. Westchester
County was especially hard hit by prolonged high winds that were at times tropical storm force.
Winter Storms Riley and Quinn caused nearly 210,000 customer outages, second only to
Superstorm Sandy, and resulted in tremendous personal hardship for residents and businesses. To
restore power, we prepared and executed over 7,000 rebuild and repair jobs. By comparison,
Hurricane Irene caused approximately 204,000 customer power outages, but required only 2,500
repair jobs.
Con Edison faced many challenges during Winter Storms Riley and Quinn. While the
Company was able to work through these operational and restoration challenges, Con Edison
recognizes, and has acknowledged, that the accuracy of the outage and restoration information
provided to many customers did not meet our, nor our customers’ expectations. While Con
Edison restored many customers consistent with our initial estimate, other customers received
incorrect information.
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In light of the inaccurate outage and restoration information communicated to some
customers, Con Edison offered food and medicine reimbursements to customers who were
without power for three or more consecutive days. We have also met several times with some of
our municipal partners to hear, first-hand, about their concerns and suggestions on improving our
response to storms. Con Edison evaluates its performance for each storm and examines where we
can improve. This Part 105 Report is an important step in Con Edison’s work with our
regulators, customers and municipal partners to determine ways to strengthen its overall storm
preparation and response.
B. LONG TERM RESILIENCY AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACTIVITIES
Con Edison continuously invests in the electric distribution system to improve resiliency
and lessen customer impacts during storms. The Company also updates its emergency response
plans with the goal of continually improving its storm response.
1. STORM HARDENING INVESTMENTS
Superstorm Sandy was the largest storm ever to strike the Con Edison service territory
and caused over 1 million Con Edison customers to lose power. After Sandy, Con Edison used
the lessons learned to take concrete steps to protect our customers and make our infrastructure
more resilient.
Con Edison invested approximately $1 billion dollars in storm hardening projects from
2013 to 2016. These projects were planned and developed in a public process with input from
numerous stakeholders, including DPS Staff, New York City, Westchester County, the Office of
the NYS Attorney General, Local 1-2 UWUA, Con Edison’s principal union, and several
environmental and other non-government organizations. Through this public process, Con
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Edison produced a storm hardening plan with proposed infrastructure spending for each year,
from 2014 through 2016. We submitted our plan to the Public Service Commission for approval
each year. Following each submittal, the Commission invited parties to submit comments on the
plan, after which the Commission would grant approval, including modifications to the plan in
response to the parties’ comments. As part of the storm hardening process, Con Edison also held
meetings with Westchester municipalities to discuss its storm hardening plans and its proposals
for the most cost effective allocation of funds to Westchester.
Of the $1 billion total, Con Edison invested more than $200 million in storm hardening
work for its overhead system. Con Edison invested $121 million, or more than half, on
investments including some selective undergrounding, to reinforce and make the overhead
system in Westchester County more resilient. Overall, the Company installed approximately
1,650 larger and stronger Class 1 and Class H1 poles, which are 22% and 46% stronger,
respectively, than the previous standard and replaced 879 sections, or nearly 21 miles, of aerial
electric cable, which is nearly three times stronger than previously installed aerial electric cables.
Con Edison reduced the segment size on 115 4kV primary feeders and 59 autoloops in
the Bronx and Westchester County, which reduced the maximum number of customers per
segment that can be impacted by storm damage, such as when a downed tree that takes down
Company wires and poles. This was accomplished through the installation of 1,756 fuses and
fused bypass switches, and 654 sectionalizing switches.
As an additional part of this storm hardening work, Con Edison worked with its
municipal partners in New York City and Westchester to identify and harden critical
infrastructure in their communities. This work targeted Police Departments, Fire Departments,
ambulance companies, Town Hall facilities, hospitals, sanitation facilities, wastewater
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treatment facilities, waterworks facilities, heating and cooling and other facilities specifically
identified by our municipal partners. Con Edison’s work on these projects included installation
of automatic transfer switches and redundant supply sources. The Company completed 34 of
these projects, which were distributed across 32 primary feeders and 25 municipalities, from the
Bronx to the northern border of Westchester. 31 of these 34 facilities did not experience
interruptions during Riley or Quinn, and while 19 of these facilities are served by feeders that
were affected during Riley or Quinn, only one was affected.
Con Edison’s storm hardening investments in Westchester produced significant benefits,
reducing the number of customers affected by storm damage and corresponding outages. The
Company estimates that since completing all of the storm hardening plan in 2016 (except for one
project in Manhattan), over 370,000 customer outages have been prevented. For Winter Storms
Riley and Quinn alone, the Company estimates that our storm hardening investments prevented
about 60,000 customer outages in Westchester County. The Company is continuing to evaluate
how these investments benefitted our service territory during the storm and will use this
evaluation to direct future investments to further mitigate storm impacts.
2. SMART METERS
Con Edison is currently implementing its Advanced Metering Infrastructure (“AMI”)
plan. As of March 2018, Con Edison has installed 159,000 smart meters within its service
territory (123,000 in Staten Island, 36,000 in Westchester). While still in the deployment stage,
the Company was able to use limited smart meter information during the restoration process for
Winter Storms Riley and Quinn.
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During the event, Con Edison mobilized a team to remotely communicate with
approximately 7,600 smart meters to identify customer-specific outages in Westchester and was
able to avoid approximately 130 truck deployments that would have been required to verify
outages. Con Edison’s use of smart meters during Winter Storms Riley and Quinn demonstrates
the benefits that smart meters will provide during future storms. As smart meter installation is
completed, and the Company integrates its AMI system with its Outage Management System
(“OMS”), smart meters will play a significant role in managing customer outages and restoration
efforts. Smart meters will allow Con Edison to increase the accuracy of customer outage and
restoration reports and rely less on predictive models that OMS currently uses.
3. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN
As part of its continued efforts for emergency preparedness, the Company conducts
numerous drills and exercises throughout the year, and trains key employees for their roles in the
emergency response Incident Command System (“ICS”). Additionally, the Company conducts
after action reviews following every storm classified as Serious or above. Con Edison’s Electric
Emergency Response Plan (“ERP” or “Plan”) outlines the Company’s philosophy and
procedures for managing major emergencies that may disrupt electric service to customers. The
Plan defines the structure, processes, and protocols for the Company’s emergency response, and
identifies department and individual roles directly responsible for that response and for critical
support services. The foundation of the Plan is built on the ICS structure, which the Company
employs for managing, coordinating, and deploying the resources necessary for emergency
response.
Every year, Con Edison updates, and files its ERP for review and approval with the
Public Service Commission. Updates include changes based on benchmarking with other
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utilities, discussions with other New York State electric utilities, regulatory requirements, and
recommendations from Department of Public Service Staff (“DPS Staff”). In recent years,
enhancements implemented have included:
• Establishment of the Municipal Liaison Program to improve restoration coordination with

Westchester municipalities.
• Development of new trouble ticket codes within our OMS to better track and prioritize
downed wire reports from municipal officials.
• Establishment of the Utility Liaison Program to improve coordination and information
sharing with other utilities in our service territory.
• Improvements to the Life Support Equipment customer outreach process during an event.
• Improvements to the mutual assistance process, including the formation of the North
Atlantic Mutual Assistance Group (“NAMAG”), National Response Event (NRE)
guidelines, and the New York Public / Private Utility Mutual Assistance Protocol
(“NYP/PUMA”), etc.
• Enhancements to the Damage Assessment program, including the deployment of mobile
apps to streamline data collection and automate the integration of damages into the OMS.
• Establishment of an Estimated Time of Restoration (“ETR”) team focused on developing
and managing ETRs.
4. STORM CHALLENGES
Winter Storm Riley had a much greater impact and duration than predicted, and resulted
in significant damage to the electric distribution system from downed trees and tree limbs. The
tree damage was significant as whole trees came down across Westchester. The second
nor’easter, Winter Storm Quinn, in addition to causing more system damage and outages,
delayed the restoration efforts already underway. Moreover, the breadth of these overlapping
storms impacted three million customers across the Northeast and required recruitment of mutual
assistance crews from as far away as Iowa, Ontario, and Texas. In addition, technical issues with
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the Outage Management System caused some customers to receive incorrect restoration
information.
The first major challenge was a storm that far exceeded weather forecasts. Our
meteorologist’s forecast was consistent with the forecasts provided by our contract weather
service, DTN Weather Forecast, several short and long-range weather models, as well as the
National Weather Service. These forecasts called for a storm with sustained winds up to 35 mph
and gusts up to 60 mph.
Winter Storm Riley started on the evening of Thursday, March 1st. The storm, however,
was much stronger than anyone expected and pummeled the Company’s service territory with
punishing, sustained winds approaching 50 mph and peak wind gusts approaching 70 mph. The
winds were 45 percent stronger than forecasted, and maintained their higher than forecasted
strength for 36 hours. In addition, Winter Storm Riley dumped 1 to 3 inches of rain across the
Con Edison service territory and 2 to 5 inches of heavy, wet snow in Westchester County.
143,341 customers lost electric service as a result of Winter Storm Riley. To restore
electric service, Con Edison planned and executed 4,624 rebuild and repair jobs. 104,186 of the
electric service outages were in Westchester County and to restore electric service, Con Edison
planned and executed 3,649 rebuild and repair jobs. Because the storm was significantly worse
than predicted, Con Edison ramped up its resources to address the substantial damage and
outages. As the damages became known Friday morning, and rapidly increased throughout the
day, the Bronx/Westchester (“B/W”) region swiftly moved to a full scale storm classification on
Saturday, March 3rd. By the end of the storm, at 1500 hours on Saturday, the Company declared
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a full-scale emergency and activated its Corporate Emergency Response Center (“CERC”)
beginning 0700 hours on Sunday. 1
The second major challenge from Winter Storm Riley was the breadth of the storm and
its impact on our ability to acquire mutual assistance crews. Riley struck the entire northeast,
from Virginia to Maine, and disrupted service to approximately two million electric customers.
Because of the widespread impact from these storms, the Company could not rely on
neighboring utilities for mutual assistance because they were holding crews for their own needs.
As a result, we had to seek and receive resources from more distant utilities.
Picture 1: Satellite image of Winter Storm Riley
The third major challenge was the arrival of a second nor’easter before Winter Storm
Riley restoration was completed. Winter Storm Quinn struck the Con Edison service territory on
Wednesday morning, March 7th. Heavy wet snow and strong winds continued for roughly 24
1
The Company determined that this was the optimal time to start CERC to allow for a measured mobilization for
CERC that would not interfere with the ongoing storm response activities.
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hours and caused electric service outages for another 66,000 customers -- more than 51,000 of
those customers in Westchester County. Prior to Winter Storm Quinn, Con Edison had restored
service to 90 percent of customers that lost service during Winter Storm Riley. The second storm
significantly hampered restoration efforts already underway. Winter Storm Quinn also affected
Con Edison’s mutual assistance resources as neighboring utilities recalled their restoration crews.
The fourth major challenge was the severe damage to the electric distribution system
caused by downed trees and limbs. Winter Storm Riley’s brutal sustained winds and significant
rain falling on already saturated ground caused mature trees to be ripped out at their roots and
shattered others at their trunks. The heavy wet snow ushered in by Winter Storm Quinn brought
further damage to the weakened distribution system. Virtually all of the damage to the Con
Edison distribution system, and related outages, were the result of fallen trees and tree limbs. A
report prepared for Con Edison by the Davey Resource Group determined that in the hardest hit
areas, 77 percent of the surveyed damage was caused by privately owned trees and large tree
limbs outside Con Edison’s right of way (not directly under or adjacent to Company wires). Our
response went beyond restoring customers, in many areas we had to rebuild the electric
distribution system.
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Picture 2: Tree Damage in Yonkers, NY
The tree damage also resulted in many road closures, many of which involved down
wires. In response, Con Edison worked with its municipal partners to clear 501 roads from large
trees and branches and downed utility poles and wires caused by Winter Storm Riley. Another
191 road closures were caused by Winter Storm Quinn.
Picture 3: Repair Work in White Plains, NY
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Compared with Hurricane Irene, Con Edison dealt with 3 times the number of outage
jobs in Westchester County, 2.6 times more wires down reports, 2.3 times more road closures in
Westchester County, and 1.8 times more damaged poles.
The final major challenge was technical issues associated with the Company’s OMS that
affected customer communications. These issues resulted in inaccurate information being
provided to our customers and our municipal partners. Because some customers may not notify
Con Edison of their power outage, our OMS uses predictive models to make assumptions based
on outages reported by customers. By Wednesday March, 7th, after evaluating system
performance related to the predictive grouping of outages, we determined that the OMS had been
over predicting outages associated with some job tickets and providing inaccurate ETRs to some
customers.
In response, we disabled the automated reporting for restoration by municipality and
instead manually posted this information on our website. We also committed significant
engineering resources to manually updating the OMS. These technical issues, however, did not
delay Con Edison’s restoration work.
Despite these challenges, Con Edison restored approximately 50 percent of the customers
who lost service from Winter Storm Riley by Sunday at 1300 hours and approximately 90
percent by 1900 hours on Tuesday, March 6th. Likewise, Con Edison restored service to
approximately 50 percent of the customers that lost service in Winter Storm Quinn in
approximately a day by Saturday, March 8th and approximately 90 percent of those customers in
approximately 3 days by Sunday, March 11th at approximately 2300 hours. Con Edison restored
the majority of outages outside of the Bronx and Westchester region in less than 72 hours for
each event. Con Edison’s restoration process was efficient and is described herein. The process
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also benefitted from the remote switching system the Company installed as part of the Post-
Sandy storm hardening investments. We are also proud of how safely our people worked under
difficult and challenging circumstances. There were no significant injuries throughout our storm
response.
The number of customers without service system-wide and in Westchester throughout
both storms is shown in Figures 1 and 2 below. The curves represent the restoration of
customers system-wide and in Westchester only. The restoration work for Winter Storm Riley
was delayed when Quinn hit our region on Wednesday, March 7th. Prior to Winter Storm Quinn,
over 92 percent of the customers in the B/W region were restored. The Company would have
been able to restore nearly all Riley customers by Wednesday or Thursday based on the
restoration trajectory if not for the impact of Quinn.
Figure 1: System Wide Restoration Curve
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Figure 2: Bronx/Westchester Restoration Curve
5. STORM RESPONSE COSTS
As a result of Winter Storms Riley and Quinn, the Company incurred $106 million to
repair and replace equipment and to restore electric customer service interruptions. $71 million
included O&M costs, and the remaining $35 million was associated with capital and removal
costs.
6. NEXT STEPS
Following any major storm with significant customer outages, the Company undertakes a
substantial post-storm review to establish lessons learned and determine ways to improve our
response. While the Company was successful in restoring large numbers of customers, and
overcoming significant hurdles through the restoration process, the feedback from some
customers and municipal partners in Westchester County, and other stakeholders was not
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positive. We recognize that the Company’s successes in certain areas are of little consolation to
customers who were out for longer periods of time, or for those who received incorrect ETRs.
As we embark on this post storm review, we will place significant emphasis on the
improving the customer’s overall experience, especially with respect to communication.
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II. PRE-EVENT PREPARATION
A. WEATHER FORECASTS & EVENT CLASSIFICATION
Con Edison employs two meteorologists who analyze weather models to provide the
Company with daily weather forecasts. These reports and any associated system impact analyses
allow organizations across the Company to evaluate potential weather impacts and plan and
mobilize accordingly. Based on the weather forecasts and projected system impacts for both
Winter Storms Riley and Quinn, the Company took steps to prepare and mobilize in accordance
with Con Edison’s Overhead Emergency Response Procedure (Sections 3.1 – 3.10).
The following Appendices contain the weather forecasts Con Edison used during Winter
Storms Riley and Quinn: Appendix A-1: Con Edison forecasts, Appendix A-2: DTN forecasts.
Con Edison follows its ERP to prepare and mobilize for storm events and other system
emergencies. The ERP contains storm classification matrices that provides guidance on Storm
Category classifications and minimum staffing levels based on forecasted weather and
anticipated impact (e.g., number of customer outages and jobs). Con Edison developed these
Storm Classification Matrices based on actual impacts from prior storms. Table 1 is the
Bronx/Westchester Storm Classification Matrix that was in effect during Winter Storms Riley
and Quinn.
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Table 1: Bronx/Westchester Storm Classification Matrix
Actual System Damage Triggers

# Customers
Storm Weather Conditions Projected
Out of # of # of
Category Service Overhead Jobs Ladder line Jobs
• Isolated Heavy Thunderstorms,

1 – UPGRADED moving fronts
Internal Regional
Resources • Winds: Sustained 25-30 mph /
Frequent 35+ mph Up to
• Condition is short to midterm Up to 6” 7,000
30 N/A
Heavy, wet snow
• Scattered, Heavy Thunderstorms,
2A – SERIOUS Moderate Lightning
Other Con Edison
Resources and/or • Winds: Sustained up to 30 mph / Up to
Mutual Assistance Frequent 40+ mph 9,000 80 30
• Up to 8” Heavy, wet snow
• Numerous, Heavy thunderstorms,
2B – SERIOUS Frequent Lightning
• Winds: Sustained up to 35 mph / Up to
Frequent 45+ mph 15,000 125 50
• Widespread, Severe thunderstorms,
2C – SERIOUS Frequent Lightning
• Winds: Sustained up to 40 mph / Up to
200 200
Frequent 50+ mph 20,000
• Heavy Rain, Nor’easter type storms,
3A – FULL SCALE Tropical Depression
Mutual Assistance / • Winds: Sustained 50 mph / Frequent Up to
Contractor Support 400 150
60+ mph 40,000
• > 15” Heavy, wet snow
40,000-
• Tropical Depression, Tropical Storm 800 350
3B – FULL SCALE 60,000
60,000-
• >25% Damage to distribution system 1000 500
80,000
80,000-
• Conditions existing for 6-12 hours 2000 1000
100,000
CORPORATE • Hurricane Category 1-5
COASTAL • >50% Damage to distribution system See Corporate Coastal Storm Plan (CCSP)
STORM PLAN • Conditions exists for >12 hours
• Storm Stalls over operating area • Heavy foliage exists
• Heavy rain more than 8 hours • Previously saturated soil
• More than ¼ inch of ice with wind foliage • More than ½ inch of ice
• Winter thaw
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1. WINTER STORM RILEY
Con Edison’s meteorologists issued the first notification concerning Winter Storm Riley
on Monday, February 26th. Their forecast indicated that a storm system was projected to cross
the Company service territory Thursday night into Saturday with some rainfall, sustained winds
up to 30 mph, and peak gusts up to 55 mph. Based on this forecast, medium customer impact
from Winter Storm Riley was expected. At the time, there was considerable uncertainty
regarding the track and intensity of the storm.
The weather forecasts from all services were consistent with our meteorologists’
forecasts throughout the week. The Company forecasts on Thursday, March 1st and the morning
of Friday, March 2nd projected rain mixing or changing to snow across parts of Westchester with
some accumulation, sustained winds at 35 mph and peak gusts up to 60 mph.
While the Company’s storm planning and mobilization was consistent with the forecasts,
Winter Storm Riley exceeded all forecasts. Winter Storm Riley passed just south of the New
York City region and rapidly intensified (“bombing out”) as it also stalled. This led to sustained
winds that were much higher and lasted longer than expected. The peak sustained winds endured
for more than 36 hours. Con Edison’s service territory saw sustained winds from 18 mph to 51
mph, and peak gusts from 48 mph to 67 mph.
Based on the available weather forecasts and the timing of the storm, the B/W region
planned to declare a SERIOUS 2A (Overhead) ICS status with a formal ICS structure in the
afternoon on Friday, March 2nd.
On Friday morning, March 2nd, as the damages become known and rapidly increased, the
B/W region moved up the planned declaration of SERIOUS 2A (Overhead) ICS status to 1500
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hours from 1900 hours. As outages continued to rapidly increase throughout the day, the B/W
region elevated its response level to a SERIOUS 2C (Overhead) ICS Status at 1800 hours. Even
before that declaration, the region took additional steps to mobilize in the afternoon, mobilizing
additional resources for, among other things, damage assessment and site safety. By Saturday
morning, due to the level of outages, the B/W region declared a FULL SCALE 3B (Overhead)
ICS Status at 1000 hours.
The declared event classifications for all Company regions for Winter Storm Riley are
included on Table 2 below:
Table 2: Winter Storm Riley Regional Storm Classifications
Region Declared ICS Classification Status
UPGRADED at March 2nd, 0700 hours

SERIOUS 2A at March 2nd, 1500 hours
Bronx/Westchester
SERIOUS 2C at March 2nd, 1800 hours
FULL SCALE 3B at March 3rd, 1000 hours
Brooklyn/Queens UPGRADED at March 2nd, 0700 hours
Staten Island UPGRADED at March 2nd, 0700 hours
Manhattan ROUTINE
By the end of the Winter Storm Riley, at 1500 hours Saturday, Con Edison decided to
activate the CERC, beginning 0700 hours on Sunday, March 4th.
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2. WINTER STORM QUINN
Con Edison’s meteorologists provided data on the approach of Winter Storm Quinn as
early as Thursday, March 1st. At that time, the system was projected to cross the Company
service territory on Wednesday, March 7th with a rain/snow mix and breezy winds.
On Tuesday, March 6th and Wednesday March 7th, the Company’s meteorologists
forecasted 6-12 inches of snow in New York City and Southern Westchester, 10-15 inches in
Northern Westchester, with higher amounts possible. They forecasted sustained winds at 15 – 30
mph, with peak gusts of 35 – 50 mph.
On Wednesday, March 7th, Winter Storm Quinn hit the region, dropping up to 14 inches
of heavy, wet snow in Westchester County and bringing the forecasted sustained winds and wind
gusts. Although not as impactful as Winter Storm Riley, the snowfall from Winter Storm Quinn
caused more substantial damage to the electric distribution system still recovering from the
previous storm. At that time, the B/W region was already activated to a FULL SCALE 3B
(Overhead) ICS Status and CERC was in operation. As a result, Con Edison’s full scale response
was operational and ready for Winter Storm Quinn.
B. SYSTEM IMPACT
Together, Winter Storms Riley and Quinn disrupted electric service to nearly 210,000
customers, making this the Company’s second largest restoration effort. The ten most impactful
storms to hit the Con Edison service territory, and the number of customers impacted, are
provided in Table 3 below:
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Table 3: Con Edison Historical Storm Impact Comparison
Date Type of Storm Customers Impacted
10/29/2012 Superstorm Sandy 1,115,000
3/1 & 3/7/2018 Nor’easters Riley & Quinn 209,437
8/28/2011 Hurricane Irene 203,821
3/13/2010 Nor’easter 174,800
10/29/2011 Nor’easter 135,913
9/9/1985 Hurricane Gloria 110,515
9/2/2006 Tropical Storm Ernesto 78,300
2/5/2010 Snow 65,200
1/18/2006 Wind/Rain 61,486
3/31/1997 Nor’easter 45,180
Con Edison’s infrastructure was significantly damaged as a result of Winter Storms Riley
and Quinn. Table 4 below provides the impact of Winter Storms Riley and Quinn in a number of
areas.
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Table 4: Comparison of Winter Storms Riley Quinn Storm Impact
Customers Out of Service Riley Quinn Riley & Quinn Irene Sandy
CECONY 143,341 66,096 209,437 203,821 1,115,000
WESTCHESTER 104,186 51,048 155,234 105,525 320,926
Transformer
Riley Quinn Riley & Quinn Irene Sandy
Replacement Jobs
CECONY 36 25 61 74 261
WESTCHESTER 29 12 41 37 110
Wire Down Jobs Riley Quinn Riley & Quinn Irene Sandy
CECONY 1,497 960 2,457 1,741 6,274
WESTCHESTER 1,115 649 1,764 670 2,312
Road Closures Riley Quinn Riley & Quinn Irene Sandy

CECONY 501 192 693 304 921
WESTCHESTER 501 191 692 304 891
Pole Damage Riley Quinn Riley & Quinn Irene Sandy

CECONY 291 180 471 441 2,111
WESTCHESTER 188 121 309 172 977
C. RESOURCE MOBILIZATION
On Monday, February 26th, Con Edison’s meteorologists issued the first of several
weather forecasts concerning Winter Storm Riley to a broad list of Company executives,
department managers and other relevant personnel. Con Edison’s Vice President of Emergency
Preparedness also communicated this information to Con Edison’s regional Vice Presidents.
On Tuesday, February 27th, Electric Operations in the B/W region had a conference call
to discuss initial preparations for the forecasted storm. All of the relevant departments, including
B/W Electric Operations, B/W Regional Engineering, Emergency Preparedness, and Logistics,
participated on this call. At that time, based on the predicted weather forecast, B/W planned to
eventually mobilize to SERIOUS 2A (Overhead) ICS status in the afternoon of Friday, March
21
2nd. The B/W region also exercised the mutual assistance process, requesting 20 mutual
assistance full-time equivalents (“FTEs”) to supplement its workforce, who arrived on Thursday,
March 1st. Con Edison’s request, once fulfilled, would put the B/W Region above the Overhead
Restoration Crew requirements of the ERP for a SERIOUS 2A (Overhead) ICS event
mobilization.
On Wednesday, February 28th, B/W Regional Electric Operations held another call to
coordinate for the forecasted storm. At that time, the region still planned to mobilize to a
SERIOUS 2A (Overhead) ICS status in the afternoon of Friday, March 2nd. A situational
awareness email was sent to members of the Corporate Coastal Storm Plan Team in the event
that the subsequent weather forecast would warrant mobilization.
On Thursday, March 1st, Con Edison held an Inter-Regional Call to discuss storm
preparations and to plan and mobilize as required. Representatives from each region’s Electric
Operations and support organizations from across the Company participated on the call. Based
on the latest predicted weather forecast and projected system impact at that time, the Company
determined that existing internal and external resources were sufficient.
The Company activated the Distribution Engineering Situation Room (“DESR”) at 0700
hours on Friday, March 2nd. The DESR coordinates the Company-wide response to storm events
that impact multiple regions and conducts operational and planning review calls at four-hour
intervals.
On Friday, March 2nd, Winter Storm Riley was progressing faster than expected, and the
Company started to see damages and customer outages. At 1430 hours, Con Edison held an
additional Inter-Regional Call to continue to assess preparation and response.
22
At 1800 hours on Friday, March 2nd, because of earlier than anticipated and more forceful
impacts, B/W decided to elevate to a SERIOUS 2C (Overhead) ICS status to mobilize additional
resources.
At 1000 hours on Saturday, March 3rd, due to the increased outages, and in accordance
with the ERP, the Company further upgraded the B/W region to a FULL SCALE 3B (Overhead)
ICS Status. On Saturday at 1500 hours, The Company decided to activate the CERC, beginning
0700 hours on Sunday, March 4th. The CERC served as a central entity to handle overall
corporate planning, logistics, coordination, and operational governance for all of the regions to
support individual regions with restoration efforts.
1. RESTORATION CREWS
The Company began reviewing its staffing plan as early as Tuesday, February 27th.
During Winter Storm Riley, on Friday, March 2nd, 31 overhead restoration crews 2 were available
in B/W and 10 additional overhead restoration crews were moved from Staten Island to
supplement the B/W workforce, which was above the minimum requirement of 24 crews based
on the SERIOUS 2A (Overhead) ICS classification in accordance with our ERP. By Saturday,
March 3rd, after declaration of FULL SCALE 3B (Overhead) ICS classification, the Company
had ramped up staffing to 46 crews to meet the minimum requirement of 45 crews. By Monday,
March 5th, there were 51 overhead restoration crews working in the B/W region, exceeding the
ERP staffing requirements for a FULL SCALE 3B (Overhead) ICS level. The Company also
mobilized Troubleshooter and Ladder Line resources from the other regions as part of its
2
At Con Edison, a typical crew size is two FTEs.
23
restoration workforce. Figure 3 below shows the restoration workforce in B/W throughout the
winter storms:
Figure 3: B/W Restoration Workforce Summary
Overhead, Troubleshooter, and Ladder Line FTEs working in BW by Day

1,600
1,400
1,200
1,000
FTEs
800
600
400
200
0
3/2/2018 3/3/2018 3/4/2018 3/5/2018 3/6/2018 3/7/2018 3/8/2018 3/9/2018 3/10/2018 3/11/2018 3/12/2018
Mutual Aid - Ladder Line 44 44 44 0
Mutual Aid - Overhead 20 29 45 253 465 649 673 671 1,044 1,034 703
Company - Ladder Line 98 112 194 178 178 116 250 250 180 212 148
Company - TroubleShooter 26 26 26 26 26 26 28 37 28 28 28
Company - Overhead 81 91 90 102 103 106 105 124 141 134 151
2. MUTUAL ASSISTANCE/CONTRACTORS
Based on the initial storm classifications and noticing a similar forecast as the nor’easter
that struck the Con Edison service territory in January 2018, the B/W region decided to exercise
its storm response processes by bringing in external resources (i.e., mutual assistance and/or
contractors) in addition to Company crews to account for the storm’s uncertainty, even though
our ERP did not require it.
Throughout preparation and response to Winter Storms Riley and Quinn, Con Edison
solicited mutual assistance workers in keeping with the ERP (Section III: Mutual Assistance),
and in certain cases solicited more than what would have been required by its ERP.
24
Based on the system impact for Winter Storm Riley, the Company used contractors and
mutual assistance workers to supplement its workforce. Con Edison was the first utility to
initiate the pre-event mutual assistance calls with the NAMAG and through the NY
Private/Public Utility Mutual Assistance Protocol. As shown in the table below, when we
realized that the storm’s impact was much greater than predicted, we increased our requests for
mutual assistance. Because Winter Storm Riley impacted the entire Northeast, from Virginia to
Maine, many companies were also requesting assistance and others were not releasing resources.
As restoration efforts were well underway until storm Quinn arrived, Con Edison
continually analyzed resource needs, and in anticipation of more outages from Quinn, we
requested another 500 FTEs during a NAMAG call held on Tuesday, March 6th, at 1100 hours.
As Winter Storm Quinn approached, 204 mutual assistance FTEs were recalled back to their
home utilities. As a result, Con Edison needed to request mutual assistance from more distant
regions.
Through the mutual assistance process, the Company made requests to all Regional
Mutual Assistance Groups (“RMAG”) across the country, in addition to earlier requests to the
Southeastern Electric Exchange and Great Lake Mutual Assistance Group RMAGs. The Con
Edison mutual assistance calls for help for Con Edison are summarized in Table 5 below:
25
Table 5: Con Edison Mutual Assistance Call Request Summary
Date / Time Source Notes
Feb. 28, 2018 @ 9:00PM NAMAG Call At Con Edison’s request, the NAMAG initiates this
call for mutual assistance requests
Mar. 1, 2018 @ 10:00AM NAMAG Call Con Edison made requests for O&R only*
Mar. 1, 2018 @ 1:00PM NYP/PUMA Call Con Edison made requests for O&R only*
Mar. 1, 2018 @ 3:00PM NAMAG Call Con Edison made requests for O&R only*
Mar. 2, 2018 @ 10:00AM NYP/PUMA Call Requested 100 FTEs for Con Edison
Mar. 2, 2018 @ 11:00AM NAMAG Call Requested 100 FTEs for Con Edison
Mar. 2, 2018 @ 7:30PM NAMAG Call Requested 470 FTEs for Con Edison
Mar. 5, 2018 @ 10:00AM NYP/PUMA Call Requested 1000 FTEs for Con Edison
Mar. 6, 2018 @ 11:00AM NAMAG Call (Pre-Quinn call) Requested 500 FTEs for Con Edison
Mar. 9, 2018 @ 5:00PM NAMAG Call No further requests for Con Edison
Mar. 10, 2018 @ 10:30AM NAMAG Call Call cancelled, no further NAMAG calls
*Note: The FTEs requested for O&R are not included
We also contacted 84 contracting firms from across the country to directly secure additional
resources, in order to bridge the mutual assistance shortfall. As a result, crews came from as far
away as Canada, New Mexico, Texas and Arizona. Throughout, Con Edison received a total of
1,372 FTEs through the NAMAG and NYP/PUMA mutual assistance process, and contractor
26
firms (1,292 Distribution FTEs and 80 Tree FTEs). Note that these requests were made
constantly until the restoration work was complete.
Table 6 below is a daily breakdown of the mutual assistance resources that we received.
Table 6: Winter Storm Riley and Quinn Mutual Assistance (FTEs)

Mutual Assistance
Date
FTEs on property
02/27/2018 0
02/28/2018 0
03/01/2018 20
03/02/2018 20
03/03/2018 20
03/04/2018 255
03/05/2018 443
03/06/2018 625
03/07/2018 643
03/08/2018 558
03/09/2018 930
03/10/3018 1,088
03/11/2018 1,078
03/12/2018 703
As described above, the Company solicited mutual assistance resources throughout the
event in accordance with its ERP. Due to the breadth of the storm, securing mutual assistance
crews was a challenge for all utilities. All New York State and many neighboring utilities were
not releasing resources. Because we had to recruit resources from across the nation, the
additional mutual assistance crews arrived Sunday, March 4th. 3
3
As part of our continued planning on March 8th, and once the far reaching impacts and damage caused by the storm
had been realized, the Company initiated a National Response Event (NRE) call to make EEI Executives aware of a
potential declaration request of an NRE. An NRE is a natural or man-made event that causes, or is forecasted to
cause, widespread power outages impacting a significant population or several regions across the U.S. and requires
27
While the Company completed restoration in accordance with its global ETR of 90%
within four days, obtaining mutual assistance support sooner would have enhanced our ability to
execute on work packages and restore customers faster. As a result, the Company is committed
to reviewing the mutual assistance response process.
3. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
On Friday, March 2nd, B/W initially mobilized 35 damage assessors, which is more than
the ERP requirement of 10 damage assessors for a SERIOUS 2A ICS level response.
Brooklyn/Queens mobilized 19 damage assessors and Staten Island mobilized 8 assessors based
on an UPGRADED ICS level response. On Saturday, March 3rd, as the region quickly ramped
up staffing to address the higher than predicted damage and increased outages, the B/W region
increased that staffing to 215 damage assessors, more than double the FULL SCALE 3B ICS
staffing level requirement of 100. The Company mobilized damage assessment resources
throughout Winter Storms Riley and Quinn as summarized in Tables 7 and 8 below:
resources from multiple Regional Mutual Assistance Groups (RMAG). Working through NRE coordination allows
for the formal distribution of crews across multiple states. For this event, however, an NRE was not called.
28
Table 7: Winter Storm Riley Damage Assessment Staffing (FTEs)
Riley 3/2/18 3/3/18 3/4/18 3/5/18 3/6/18

B/Q FTEs 19 55 69 20 0
SI FTEs 8 5 0 0 0
B/W FTEs 35 215 187 269 208
Total Company
Damage 62 275 256 289 208
Assessment FTEs
Table 8: Winter Storm Quinn Damage Assessment Staffing (FTEs)
Quinn 3/7/18 3/8/18 3/9/18 3/10/18 3/11/18 3/12/18

B/Q FTEs 30 39 17 0 0 0
SI FTEs 8 8 8 0 0 0
B/W FTEs 119 251 247 185 121 159
Total Company
Damage 157 298 272 185 121 159
Assessment FTEs
4. SITE SAFETY
On the afternoon of Friday March 2nd, the B/W region was operating at a SERIOUS 2A
(Overhead) ICS level which required a minimum of 16 Site Safety Representatives over a 24-
hour period. The Company fulfilled this staffing requirements, with 53 Site Safety
Representatives reporting to Westchester. As the storm continued, the B/W region escalated their
mobilization to a SERIOUS 2C (Overhead) ICS and the site safety unit increased staffing
accordingly. By Saturday, March 3rd, when B/W declared a FULL SCALE 3B (Overhead) ICS
level, the number of site safety personnel was increased dramatically to 530 Site Safety
Representatives, well beyond the staffing required by the ERP. Brooklyn/Queens and Staten
Island were operating at an UPGRADED ICS level before Riley, and did not require Site Safety
staff.
29
Prior to Winter Storm Quinn, B/W was already operating at a FULL SCALE 3B
(Overhead) ICS level and so minimum staffing levels were already in place. The
Brooklyn/Queens and Staten Island regions were operating at a SERIOUS ICS level for Winter
Storm Quinn. Brooklyn/Queens required 25 Site Safety Representatives. The Company fulfilled
this requirement with 50 Site Safety Representatives reporting to Queens. In Staten Island, 10
Site Safety Representatives were required. The Company fulfilled this requirement with 30 Site
Safety Representatives reporting to Staten Island. Overall staffing requirements were met.
In addition to meeting the minimum staffing levels required under the ERP, the Company
obtained additional resources throughout the March storm events. In addition to eligible
Customer Operations Field Operations employees, the Company called in all available
contractors, including those who normally perform other work for the Company. The Company
utilized field employees from Gas Operations, and activated its System Emergency Assignment
program which assigns employees with non-field functions such as Human Resources, Law,
Auditing, etc. to assist during events. Figure 4 below summarizes the B/W Site Safety staffing
levels per day for the duration of Riley/Quinn:
30
Figure 4: B/W Restoration Workforce Summary 4
B/W Wire Guards by Day - Riley & Quinn

1600
1400
1200
1000
800
600
400
200
0
2-Mar 3-Mar 4-Mar 5-Mar 6-Mar 7-Mar 8-Mar 9-Mar 10-Mar 11-Mar 12-Mar
Wire Guards Wire Guard Coordinators Unit Leaders
5. MUNICIPAL LIAISONS
Consistent with Company practice, the Company sent email notifications to the
Company’s municipal liaisons as early as Wednesday, February 28th for possible mobilization.
As Municipalities requested the liaisons for their Emergency Operation Center (“EOC”),
designated primary Liaisons were notified and back-ups were notified as well. As the extent of
the impact became clear, the Company put all liaisons on notice and deployed as requested to
help coordinate restoration work.
4
Site Safety resources on March 7 were demobilized at approximately 2 am due to the weather from Winter Storm
Quinn, and safety reasons, and did not mobilize again until the morning of March 8.
31
On Friday, March 2nd, at approximately 1300 hours, the Company received the first
request for a municipal liaison. By the end of the day on March 2nd, 15 municipalities had
requested a liaison and we immediately deployed 12 municipal liaisons. Due to the timing of the
requests and concerns about safe travel, the other three liaisons were in place the following day.
For both Winter Storms Riley and Quinn, we were able to meet 100 percent of the liaison
requests received from 36 out of 39 municipalities.
32
III. CUSTOMER COMMUNICATIONS
A. COMMUNICATION QUALITY
Communication with customers is a critical component of a restoration event. As
described in this section, the Company includes comprehensive plans for customer
communications in its ERP. In accordance with the ERP, during Winter Storms Riley and
Quinn, the Company executed its communication plan to ensure two-way communication with
customers. The Company provided multiple communication vehicles for customer
communication, including press releases, websites, email, social media, and speaking to
Customer Service Representative. In addition, the Company provided various ways for
customers to report outages to the Company, and provided proactive notifications regarding the
status of these reported outages.
Overall, the Company took actions consistent with its plan. Throughout the course of the
events, notifications were sent to 96 percent of the customers impacted. The majority of the
customers (81%) received four or less automated notifications regarding their outage. However,
for some customers the accuracy and quality of the information regarding the status of outages
and restoration did not meet the customer or the Company’s expectations. Specifically, some
customers experienced issues including delayed outage notifications (ETRs and Restoration),
multiple changes to ETRs, receiving no ETR, and receiving conflicting information on different
communication vehicles (outage map vs. automated calls). In addition, some customers were
incorrectly predicted to be out of service or restored, and some customers received excessive
automated calls.
33
The Company understands the importance of communications during outages and we
have already started to address these issues. More information can be found in the next steps in
section VII. LESSONS LEARNED of this report. In addition, the primary source of these
communication issues are discussed in section VI. SYSTEM AND TECHNOLOGY ISSUES
DURING RESTORATION. The remainder of this section describes the various customer
communication during Winter Storms Riley and Quinn.
B. CUSTOMER COMMUNICATIONS ACTIVITIES
1. EMAIL, WEB, SOCIAL MEDIA
As the March nor’easters approached and struck Con Edison’s territory, the Company
followed the plans laid out in corporate policy, 810-2 Corporate Affairs’ Crisis Communications
Plan, which is part of our ERP. When the Company has forecasted a significant event,
Emergency Preparedness notifies our Corporate Affairs department, including Media Relations
staff. The plan calls for the Company to publish and distribute a series of press releases, website
updates, and social media messages.
The Company’s press releases include critical service-related information, including
safety tips, ways to contact the Company if service is lost, where to find outages and ETR
information, and when appropriate, dry ice distribution and customer outreach locations.
Between Thursday, March 1st and Monday, March 12th, the Company issued 33 storm update
press releases, including 11 press releases about dry ice distribution. Once the restoration work
began, the Company issued two press releases with updates each day, regularly updated the
website, and communicated information about the Company response and restoration progress
on social media. Our Government Relations group distributes news releases to elected officials
34
and government offices. Appendix B-1 contains the news releases issued throughout Winter
Storms Riley and Quinn.
Con Edison’s storm-mode conEd.com homepage templates are ready for deployment
within a matter of minutes. The storm templates provide links to information about safety,
preparing and recovering from outages, step-by-step instructions for reporting an outage,
information about equipment repairs, our outage map, and press releases. The Company adjusts
the templates as needed. As outlined in 810-2, during an outage event or emergency, the
Company webmaster posts essential and up-to-date information that can be found from the
company’s homepage.
With respect to social media, when an outage event is expected, 810-2 calls for the
Company to designate staff members to monitor various social media platforms, including but
not limited to Facebook and Twitter, to get a better sense of what is being said on those channels
regarding incidents, to improve situational awareness and share information during an
emergency. In addition to monitoring conversations, Media Relations posts safety tips,
restoration updates, dry ice locations and damage photos.
According to 810-2, and in anticipation of Riley, we issued our first storm readiness press
release and transitioned conEd.com’s homepage to storm mode on Thursday, March 1st. The
Company also posted the press release on Facebook and Twitter. On the evening of Friday,
March 2nd, Media Relations held a telephone conference briefing for news outlets in the five
boroughs and Westchester. Media Relations staff provided information on the severity of the
storm and outage and restoration updates.
35
During the Winter Storms Riley and Quinn, Con Edison CEO and Chairman John
McAvoy hosted two press conferences with news outlets from New York City and Westchester
County. We called the first press conference on Tuesday, March 6th to give an update on the
status of restoration following Riley and to provide information ahead of Quinn, forecasted for
Wednesday, March 7th. At the second press conference on Friday, March 9th, Mr. McAvoy
described the Company’s restoration efforts and mutual assistance support, tree damage, blocked
roads and urged all customers to report unsafe conditions. In addition, Mr. McAvoy said the
Company had discovered and addressed a software problem that resulted in inaccurate
information appearing on the public outage map. (The Company had previously notified the
public about this issue through a press release issued on March 7th.)
Between Thursday, March 1st and Monday, March 12th, we updated our website 58 times,
including posting 33 press releases. Among the updates to conEd.com were 11 special banners
with messages about safety, restoration information, and restoration progress. These banners
appear on the homepage of conEd.com during storm events. The banners helped provide
Westchester municipality restoration information when technical reasons prevented us from
posting accurate estimated times of restoration on our outage map. Appendix B-2 contains
screenshots of the Company homepage as it was updated throughout the storms.
As recovery progressed, our Media Relations personnel posted updates to social media
platforms about storm restoration, safety information, and dry ice distribution location.
Facebook, Twitter and Instagram were the main channels. We use each social media channel for
different reasons. Important notices and press releases were posted on Facebook and Twitter. On
Instagram, which is designed to showcase images and short descriptions, we posted more storm
photos of destruction and crews restoring power. Media Relations oversees proactive postings as
36
described above, and shared 133 such messages as the storms affected our region. Customer
Operations personnel, with social media monitoring responsibilities, respond to specific
customer inquiries in real time. Through the storm period, Con Edison received and responded to
nearly 15,800 messages from over 6,600 individuals across Twitter, Facebook, and Instagram.
Appendix B-3 contains the social media posts from the Company via Facebook and Instagram.
Appendix B-4 contains the Company’s posts via Twitter.
Reporting Outage on Con Edison’s Website and Mobile App:
In addition to Con Edison’s web content, in accordance with the Company’s ERP
(Section II. B. 3.), the Company website and mobile apps allow customers to report electric
outages online, check the status of outages and obtain an estimated time of restoration if
available, and to view the outage map. These features are available during storm and non-storm
conditions 24/7.
The report outage and check outage status functions appear in a dedicated spot on the
website’s home page, and throughout the My Account sections of the website.
The report outage function allows customers to report a variety of outages online,
including no lights, partial service, and/or various wire conditions. In the case of a no lights
condition, customers can track the status of an outage through the check outage transaction or
outage map. The check outage status function allows customers to search by account number,
telephone number and zip code, or address to obtain ETRs if available. Customers can also visit
the outage location map for general outage information and ETRs as well as searching for a
specific address or specific restoration details.
37
Throughout Winter Storms Riley and Quinn, customers used the Company’s website
extensively to obtain information about the storm recovery and their specific outage. There were
over 3.2 million page views during the Winter Storms, with nearly 292,000 average daily page
views to the site. This is on average nearly 100,000 more daily views of the website when
compared with page views during January and February of 2018. Customers reported over
46,000 outages online, and used the check outage status function 128,000 times. Finally, there
were approximately 520,000 views of the Company’s outage map during the Storm events.
Communicating with customers through email:
In addition to press releases, website updates, and social media posts, the Company sends
customer emails about storm preparation and recovery. The emails direct customers to
information on conEd.com about outages, estimated times of restoration, safety, news releases,
and signing up for text alerts, among other topics.
The Company communicated with customers through email during Winter Storm Riley.
On Saturday morning, March 3rd, to assist customers with storm recovery, Con Edison sent an
email to approximately 11,000 customers. The message directed customers to conEd.com where
they were able to report and track outages, sign up for text alerts, and get step-by-step
instructions for dealing with a power outage.
On Tuesday, March 6th, in anticipation of Winter Storm Quinn, the Company sent an
email blast to approximately 1.8 million customers. The Company sent two versions of this
email: one to New York City customers and one to Westchester customers. Both emails
encouraged customers to visit conEd.com for step-by-step instructions for dealing with a power
outage, to report and track outages, to sign up for text alerts, and to find answers to frequently
38
asked questions. In addition, the email highlighted a safety message about downed power lines
that can become hidden by snow. On Thursday, March 8th, the Company sent a post-Quinn email
to approximately 220,000 customers. The message contained essentially the same information as
the March 6th email. Appendix B-5 contains the emails sent to customers.
In addition to providing customers with outgoing email communications during Winter
Storms Riley and Quinn, the Company responded to inquiries from customers who contacted the
Company via email at customerservice@coned.com. Overall, the Company responded to 365
electric emergency related email inquiries during Winter Storm Riley and Quinn with an average
response time of one hour.
2. OUTGOING TELEPHONE MESSAGING
In accordance with Con Edison ERP (Section VII.D. Customer Communications and
XIV. Attachment 5: CSP 2-1-3: Processing Emergency Contacts; 3.5 Recorded Announcement),
the Company provided customers with timely information via recorded messages, which
broadcast continuously updated recovery status messages when customers call the call
center. The Company uses announcements to inform callers about an emergency event, status of
an emergency event, estimated restoration times by county, and dry-ice locations.
From Friday, March 2nd through Monday, March 12th, the Company regularly updated
broadcast messages and all messages aligned with the company’s communication releases. The
Company implemented 35 updates to the IVR. Appendix C contains the outgoing telephone
messages.
39
3. CUSTOMER EXPERIENCE CENTER
During a storm event, customers can interact with the Company by calling our toll free
customer service number. Customers can report electric service problems by speaking with a
Customer Service Representative (“CSR”). Customers may also report an electric service
problem through the Interactive Voice Response system (“IVR”). Customers may also obtain an
estimated restoration time by speaking with a CSR, or through the IVR. To service customers
who would like to speak to a CSR during an event, the Company staffs the call center based on
the classification of the event. When unpredictable events result in inbound lines being busy or
unavailable, calls can be rerouted to various locations using Twenty First Century
Communication’s (“TFCC”) High Volume Call Answering (“HVCA”) service. The Customer
Experience Center’s Communication Management Group (“CMG”) monitors inbound call traffic
and sends overflow calls to the HVCA based on call volume. Customers who transfer out of the
HVCA can also speak with a CSR.
In accordance with the Company’s Electric Overhead Response Plan section 6.0,
attachment 3, the Company plans staffing levels for CSRs based on the storm classification. For
Winter Storm Riley, the initial storm classification on Friday March 2nd of UPGRADED,
followed by an escalation to SERIOUS 2A (Overhead) ICS and then SERIOUS 2C (Overhead)
ICS for B/W required 180 CSRs to be available within a 24 hour period. When the status of the
response was upgraded to 3B FULL SCALE (Overhead) ICS on Saturday March 3rd, the plan
required 300 CSRs to be available within a 24-hour period. The Company met these minimum
staffing requirements. Customer Experience Center staffing on Friday, March 2nd resulted in 300
CSRs taking emergency calls during normal business hours and 100 CSRs during evening hours
for a total of 400 CSRs over the 24-hour period. The Company began augmenting Customer
40
Experience Center staffing based on the 3B FULL SCALE (Overhead) ICS storm classification
level Saturday, March 3 through Sunday, March 4. On Saturday, 170 CSRs were on duty for the
day and 120 CSRs for the evening shift, for a total of 290 CSRs over the 24-hour period. The
Company ultimately had 400 CSRs on Monday, March 5th. For the remainder of the event,
including during Winter Storm Quinn, the Company had 400 CSRs available to take calls from
customers every day.
During the peak of Winter Storm Riley and Quinn on Saturday March 3rd, 42,000
inbound calls were rerouted to our HVCA, of which 66 percent were able to report service
troubles and obtain outage information. The remaining 34 percent were routed to a CSR for
further assistance. During the period from Friday, March 2nd through Monday, March 12th, CSRs
answered 46,763 electric emergency calls, 82 percent of which were answered within 90
seconds. The lower staffing levels on the evening of Friday, March 2nd and Saturday, March 3rd
impacted call answer rate performance, average wait times, and resulted in calls being
abandoned because of the wait. The Company was aware of this issue and improved its
performance by increasing staffing as noted above. The following table provides are the call
answer percentages by day of the event:
41
Electric Emergency Calls Answered
% of Calls
Calls Answered by Calls Answered
Date Answered within 90
an Agent within 90 seconds
seconds
March 2, 2018 9,773 6,354 65.02%
March 3, 2018 6,893 2,814 40.82%
March 4, 2018 2,706 2,676 98.89%
March 5, 2018 3,640 3,640 100.00%
March 6, 2018 4,321 4,255 98.47%
March 7, 2018 7,057 6,926 98.14%
March 8, 2018 6,478 5,900 91.08%
March 9, 2018 2,939 2,930 99.69%
March 10, 2018 1,774 1,731 97.58%
March 11, 2018 626 626 100.00%
March 12, 2018 556 556 100.00%
Total 46,763 38,408 82.13%
Table 9: Company Electric Emergency Calls Answered
4. LIFE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT CUSTOMERS
During storms, the Company’s executes a number of customer communications for
customers who have registered as having Life Support Equipment (“LSE”). This process
includes pre storm calls to all LSE customers, daily reminder calls, and calls to each LSE
customer predicted or confirmed to have lost service. During Winter Storms Riley and Quinn,
the Company implemented these comprehensive processes in accordance with its ERP, but, as
noted herein, there were some minor instances where we did not comply because of human error
or administrative oversight.
Pre Storm Messaging:
42
On Thursday, March 1st, in accordance with the ERP (Sections VII.G. Life Support
Equipment), the Call Center, Communications Management Group sent automated outbound
telephone messages with pre-storm messaging to all LSE customers. Pre-storm messaging
consisted of proactively notifying all LSE customers of the weather threat and recommending
that they consider making plans if service is interrupted by going to a hospital, calling 911 or
making other arrangements such as battery back-up. The Company also provided a priority toll
free call back number, which is operated by a live customer service representative 24/7.
On Wednesday, March 7th, as storm Quinn approached, the Communications
Management Group sent automated outbound telephone messages to all LSE customers with the
same pre-storm messaging as the March 1st LSE outreach.
Communications during the Storm events:
Throughout the duration of the events (ending Monday, March 12th) the Communications
Management Group sent daily automated outbound telephone messages regarding the storm to
all LSE customers.
Additionally, Customer Service Representatives called LSE customers who were
predicted to be out of service, or the customer reported a power outage. The Company completed
a number of actions and was ultimately able to contact or refer to an agency 100 percent of LSE
customers. There were a total of 414 LSE customers affected by Winter Storms Riley and Quinn.
We made initial calls to these customers and successfully made contact with 277 (67%) within
the first 12 hours against the 80% expected goal. The primary reason for the Company not
making contact with at least 80% of the customers within 12 hours was that the customers did
not answer.
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In accordance with the Con Edison Electric ERP (section VII.G. Life Support
Equipment), for those LSE customers we were unable to make contact with initially, we made a
second attempt. Of the 137 LSE customers who were not contacted on the first attempt, 120
customers required a second attempt (The difference between the 137 customers not contacted
on first attempt and 120 requiring a second attempt was 17 customers whose phone numbers
were determined to be invalid). The Company called 116 (97 percent) customers a second time
within the 12 hour period. Four (3 percent) LSE customers did not receive a second call within
12 hours due to an execution error in completing the calls. In addition, the Company did not
meet its target in its plans to make a second attempt within 30 minutes of the first attempt due to
the volume of LSE customer outages being reported during the peak of the storm event.
In accordance with the ERP, 100 percent of LSE customers who were predicted to be out
of service are to be contacted or referred to an emergency service agency within 24 hours. Of
the 414 total affected LSE customers, the Company contacted 411 (99 percent) and/or referred to
an emergency agency within 24 hours against a target of 100 percent. The three customers who
were not contacted and/or referred to an emergency agency within 24 hours were a result of an
execution error. The Company successfully contacted these customers outside the 24 hour target
period, during the remaining days of the storm restoration event. The Company’s ERP requires
that the customer’s account is updated with information on the disposition of the referral to an
Emergency Services agency. During Winter Storms Riley and Quinn, in some instances Call
Center supervisors did not document the status updates on LSE customers provided by
emergency services agencies, due to employee oversight.
44
5. CRITICAL FACILITIES
In accordance with its ERP (Section VII.F), the Company continually communicates with
facilities which have been designated as “Critical Facilities” such as hospitals and fire
departments. On Thursday, March 1st, the Company contacted Critical Facilities customers with
automated pre-storm messaging. We provided the same messaging to Critical Facilities
customers on Wednesday, March 7th, prior to Winter Storm Quinn. The Company also sent daily
automated telephone messages to Critical Facilities customers throughout the duration of the
combined storm events (ending Monday, March 12th).
The pre-storm messaging content consisted of notifying all Critical Facility customers of
the potential storm impact in the Con Edison service territory and recommended that customers
review and initiate their emergency preparedness plan for power supply, and to contact us is
there is a power outage. Critical Facilities customers are given a dedicated toll free number that
is staffed by a CSR 24/7.
6. VOICE AND TEXT OUTAGE NOTIFICATIONS
The Company’s ERP requires the Company to provide customers automated calls and
text messages regarding the status of outage restoration. These automated communications
include predicted outages, the global ETR, customer specific ETRs, ETR updates, and
restoration confirmation. Customers must register for the text message option and they will then
be able to text the Company during storm events and receive text messages. 5 As of the
beginning of the Storm events on March 2nd, 129,160 customers were registered for the text
5
Additional information on the text message program is available at https://www.coned.com/en/services-and-
outages/text-alerts.
45
message option. Additional customers signed up for the text message option, and by the end of
the Storm event on March 12th, a total of 131,991 customers were signed up for this option.
The predicted outage message and restoration message prompt customers to indicate
whether they have or do not have power. The Company automatically updates the OMS when a
predicted out customer confirms they have no power. If the customer is contacted with a
message saying the power is back and the customer responds that it does not have power, we
automatically route them to our Customer Experience Center to speak with a representative who
will review their outage and update the OMS. Customers who do not reply to the predicted out
message will receive a restoration message, but not initial or updated ETR messages.
The following is a list of sample call and text messages sent to customers: (does not
include messages that may be sent if a customer replies to a message).
• Predicted Outage Voice Message
o “Hello, this is Con Edison at 180075CONED we believe you may be affected by

an electric power outage”
• Global ETR when Customer Reported Outage Voice Message
o Message: “Hello, this is Con Edison at 180075CONED we received your notice

about a power problem at #address#. We expect to have most service in your area
restored by #time#. Most customers will have their power restored sooner though
some could be later. We will call you back when we have an update. Visit
coned.com/outage map for more information. To repeat this message please press the
# key. Thankyou”
• Initial ETR Voice Message
o Message: “Hello, this is Con Edison we received your notice about a power problem
at #address#. Based on current conditions we expect to have power back on in your
area by #time#. If your power is not back by that time. Please call us at
180075CONED and let us know. To repeat this message please press the # key.
Thankyou”
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• Service Restored Voice Message
o “Hello, this is Con Edison at 180075CONED calling with an update on your

recent power outage #Cause Code# We believe your service has been restored,
and we apologize for the inconvenience.”
• Predicted Outage Text Message
o (“ConEd Alert: Is the power out at 123 MAIN STREET? Reply YES, NO or
UNKNOWN. For help, Reply HELP or visit coned.com/mobileapp”)
• Initial ETR Text Message
o (“ConEd Alert: We expect to have most service restored in your area by 2:00PM on
3/2 Most customers will have power restored sooner, some could be later.”)
• Service Restored Text Message
o (“ConEd Alert: Service at 123 MAIN STREET has been restored. Reply YES to
confirm, NO or UNKNOWN. Reply HELP for help or visit coned.com/mobileapp”)
During Winter Storms Riley and Quinn, customers were able respond to predicted outage
messages to confirm the status of their electric service, and received ETR updates automatically
when they were published, via automated calls and text. In addition, customers registered for
text messaging were able to report outages via text. The following table provides the number of
calls and texts made to customers for Winter Storms Riley and Quinn:
Table 10: Text and Call Communications
Message Type Text Messages Calls

Predicted 4,233 126,212
Initial ETR 6,034 39,868
Updated ETR 2,896 15,018
Restored 19,964 277,502
Total Sent 33,127 458,600
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7. CLAIMS
Given the communications issues that occurred, the Company offered reimbursement for
food and prescription medicine spoilage if the customer suffered a power outage of three or more
consecutive days.
The Company announced the reimbursement criteria in a Press Release issued on
Thursday, March 15th (link below). In the release we stated that customers may receive
reimbursements for up to $225, or up to $515 with receipts. Business owners were eligible for
food spoilage reimbursements up to $10,200 with receipts. The deadline for submitting claims
was April 15th, 2018.
https://www.coned.com/en/about-con-edison/media/news/20180315/con-edison-providing-food-
and-medicine-reimbursements-for-noreaster-customers
On that same date, we posted reimbursement forms to the web link below:
https://www.coned.com/en/services-and-outages/claim-form
At the date of this filing, the total number of settled claims and associated dollar amounts are
shown below:
• Total claims: 5,889

• Total amount: $1.7 million
8. BILL CREDITS
In accordance with the Company’s tariff and PSC requirements set forth in Case 13-M-
0061, customers who lose service for a period of time exceeding 3 days receive an outage credit
on their bill within 75 days after service is restored. The credit is based on a prorated reduction
48
of their fixed customer charge, which is charge for 30 days of service. The fixed customer
charge for residential customers is currently $15.76. The customer charge is reduced based on
the number of days of the average duration of the outage in the region (Westchester, Bronx
etc.). Commercial and Industrial customers will receive a credit using the same methodology,
based on the customer charge applicable to their service class.
The Company has met this requirement with respect to outages caused by Winter Storms
Riley and Quinn by applying credits to 58,815 customers for an aggregate credit of
$218,188. Most residential customers received a credit of approximately $3.00 or $4.00, with
credits up to approximately $584 for the largest Commercial & Industrial customers. The credit
appears as an “adjustment” to the customer’s bill, and a bill message references the specific
amount of the credit the customer is receiving and explains the reason for the credit.
49
IV. EVENT RESPONSE
A. START OF RESTORATION / SAFETY
The Start of Restoration (SOR) is when field personnel are safe and the expected level of
damage already sustained. As a result, the SOR for Winter Storm Riley began on Saturday,
March 3rd, at 1500 hours when the Company could safely dispatch restoration crews. For Winter
Storm Quinn, the start of restoration activities began on Thursday, March 8th at 0700 hours. Con
Edison’s Rule Book (General Instructions Governing Work on Overhead and Underground
Residential Development System (URD) Electrical Equipment) specifies that work on the OH
Distribution System will not be performed during stormy weather – weather that can include
thunder and lightning storms and high winds exceeding 40 mph, snowstorms, and ice storms –
unless necessary to safeguard the public.
B. RESTORATION PRIORITIES: PRIORITIES AND PLANNING
Safety is our primary concern every day, and especially during challenging restoration
work. Where practical, we adhere to the following priorities when organizing work:
• Energized Wires Down/Public Safety - Factors to consider when prioritizing crew

dispatch
o The population density of the area
o The level of pedestrian access
o The use of the area
o Proximity to facilities such as schools
o During an active storm, when it may not be feasible to safely de-energize a downed
wire, caution tape, traffic cones, and barricades may be used to warn the public of the
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hazard. As soon as it is safe to proceed, de-energizing these locations should be given
the highest priority.
• Clearing Downed Wires Blocking Priority Roadways - In Westchester County, priority

may be determined by local authorities and communicated to Muni Liaisons.
• In New York City, upon activation of the Downed Tree Task Force, the priority of road
closures will be communicated via the company liaison at NYCEM to the designated
Downed Tree Task Force Branch Director. Appropriate resources (overhead crews or
troubleshooters) will be made available to support this function. Additionally, Damage
Assessors may be assigned to prescreen jobs. The status of all jobs forwarded to the
Downed Tree Task Force will be tracked and reported back to the Company Liaison at
NYCEM.
• Downed and/or burning wires are cut and cleared, and when possible, quick service
restoration will be made.
o Transmission Lines
o Substations
o Life Support Equipment Customers (ERP, p. 14)
o Critical Facilities (Depending on the Critical Facility Level as defined in the ERP,
certain facilities may have a higher restoration priority)
o Distribution Feeders – main runs should be restored starting from the source and
working to the end or tie point. Feeders should be restored in sections, as practical,
with sectionalizing devices. Adjacent short spurs and densely populated spurs can be
restored as progress is made along the main run.
o Other primary lines and spurs
o Transformers, secondary circuits and services
o Individual services
C. SYSTEM DAMAGE FROM FAILED TREES
Tree damage was the principal cause of distribution system damage and customer outages
during Winter Storms Riley and Quinn. As described in more detail below, a vendor survey of
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tree damage indicated that approximately three quarters of tree damage came from trees outside
of the Con Edison right-of-way and that less than 10 percent of the damage was caused by tree
crown failures. This indicates that the Company’s tree trimming program has been effective, and
does not appear to be a significantly factor for this event.
Con Edison manages vegetation growth with the help of 13 employees that are certified
arborists who work on both our transmission and distribution tree clearance programs. In
Westchester, the Company trims every feeder to specification on a three- year cycle. During this
cycle, we achieve a minimum clearance of 15 feet above, 10 feet to the side and 10 feet below
our wires. This includes an expansion of the tree trimming area after Superstorm Sandy. In
Staten Island, Brooklyn, Queens, and the Bronx, our tree trimming program is the same except
for the distances, where we trim to 10 feet above, 6 feet to the side, 6 from below, as required by
the by the New York City Parks Department. Con Edison spends just over $10 million annually
company-wide on tree trimming.
As part of our regular vegetation maintenance cycle, our inspectors also identify trees in
our right-of-way that are in declining health and attempt to perform full removals; these
removals require signed approval from the land owner (homeowner, business, municipality,
highway authority). We also receive requests from municipalities for tree toppings. We will top
the tree, cutting to below our power lines, and then the municipality will remove the remaining
trunk and roots. We complete several hundred toppings a year in Westchester.
As part of our storm assessment, we requested a vendor survey of tree damage. This
review covered 12 circuits, including 140 damage sites, and concluded that outages were
primarily caused by large trees that were uprooted and failed at the trunk, outside of the tree
trimming area. Detailed findings included:
52
• 93.6% of failures were caused by trees within 50 feet of electrical wires
• 77% of the investigated outages were caused by privately owned trees outside the regular
maintenance right of way
• Less than 10% of outages were caused by crown failure. This is the area that receives the
most intensive management during cyclical maintenance
Picture 4: Tree Damage from Winter Storm Riley– Yonkers, NY
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Picture 5: Tree Damage from Winter Storm Riley – Mt. Pleasant, NY
D. DOWN WIRES / SITE SAFETY
As described in the Company’s ERP section II.C.5, the role of Site Safety is to safeguard
downed wires, provide public safety, relieve municipal personnel (police/fire department) that
may have responded to the downed wire, and maintain a safe perimeter until qualified personnel
can make the area safe.
The Company mobilizes Site Safety forces from various workout locations. Site Safety
Representatives and Site Safety Supervisors, along with clerical personnel, staff the workout
locations, which comprise the site safety unit for a storm. The Company’s ERP requires the
following with respect to Site Safety/Downed Wires:
1) Minimum regional staffing levels for Site Safety (Electric Overhead Response
Plan section 6.0, attachments 3, 6, and 9). For Site Safety staffing levels for Winter
54
Storms Riley and Quinn please see the Resource Mobilization section of this report
(section II.C.4).
2) Downed wire reports should be assigned according to a specific priority order
(ERP section IV.J).
3) For reports of a downed wire from a municipal emergency official, the Company
shall prioritize response to repair or secure the downed wire location within 36 hours of
notification (ERP section IV.J).
During Winter Storms Riley and Quinn the Company deployed Site Safety
Representatives to a total of 3,869 wire down reports. Site safety was a major challenge during
this storm, due to the extensive tree damage and downed wires. Overall, the Company followed
the processes in its ERP, however, as described below, in some cases we modified the
prioritization of fielding down wire tickets to aid customer restoration. In addition, the Company
was not able to meet specific time requirements for fielding some municipal tickets due to the
volume of tickets compared to available staffing.
Prioritization of Site Safety Tickets
Consistent with the Plan, during the storm events, the Company prioritized responding to
downed wire reports based on a number of factors. Overall, the highest priority was given to
wires that were an immediate hazard (e.g., burning, arcing or sparking) followed by locations
where municipal emergency responders (e.g., fire and police departments) were standing by.
In some cases, the Company modified its prioritization to aid the safety and restoration
efforts. Specifically, as municipal emergency responders (e.g., fire and police departments)
began to find and guard lower-priority wires (e.g. wires that were not burning, arcing or
55
sparking), the Company shifted its focus and responded to these locations. The Company also
prioritized trouble tickets where essential Company personnel – such as Damage Assessors and
Electric Operations crew members – were handling Site Safety responsibilities. The Company
made these decisions so that both municipal workers could resume their emergency response
functions, and essential utility personnel could resume outage restoration work.
Responding to Municipal down wire reports
For Winter Storm Riley, the Company received a total of 756 Municipal down wire
tickets as defined in its ERP (Section IV.J). Because Riley had a restoration period of more than
five days, based on the Company’s ERP (Section IV.J), the Company’s target was to respond to
all down wire calls within 36 hours. The Company responded to 567 total municipal tickets
within the 36-hour period target, which included all tickets where a municipal official was on
site. Due to the large volume of municipal down wire reports, the Company did not respond to
189 tickets within 36-hours, all of which were tickets where a municipal official was not on
site.
For Winter Storm Quinn, the Company received 315 total Municipal down wire tickets as
defined in its ERP (Section IV.J). Because Riley had a restoration period of more than five days,
based on the Company’s ERP (Section IV. J.), the Company’s target was to respond to all such
down wire calls within 36 hours. The Company responded to all 315 of these tickets within 36
hours.
E. DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
As described in the Company’s ERP Section II.C.4, the Damage Assessment team is
responsible for assessing and providing detailed visual reports of damage to the overhead
56
distribution system in order to determine the restoration effort required. Damage Assessors (or
other qualified responding employees such as Troubleshooters or Line crews) provide
preliminary assessments of damages and then focus on more specific areas, feeders, or jobs, as
required. Damage Assessment patrols can range from complete feeder patrols, feeder spur
sections, primary or secondary sections, or individual customer services, all to identify downed
transformers, poles, cables, or service wire.
Damage Assessors record and report their findings via the Electric Service Damage
Assessment (“ESDA”) Mobile Application. The application allows for an electronic reporting of
damages from the field to the ESDA Back Office where the data is then captured into Web
Workspace/STAR for restoration planning.
Following Winter Storm Riley, the Company used a combination of the preliminary data
available to the B/W regional Electric Control Center via Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition (“SCADA”), the OMS, and field damage assessment to gauge the level of
restoration required.
The magnitude of Winter Storm Riley challenged damage assessment. Initially, damage
assessment was impeded by the high volume of downed wires, which resulted in damage
assessors having to remain on site until the wires were made safe or they were relieved by Site
Safety personnel. In response, the Company mobilized additional Damage Assessment and Site
Safety personnel to guard downed wires to expedite damage assessment. Since the B/W region
was already at a full scale level response when Winter Storm Quinn arrived, there were no issues
in completing damage assessment in a timely manner for Winter Storm Quinn. The Damage
Assessment team completed a total of 1,441 damage patrols for both winter storms.
57
Later in the restoration process, the Company embedded Damage Assessment personnel
with the restoration crews to function as advance scouts. These embedded assessors were able
to assess damage ahead of the restoration crews, and help determine the most efficient next steps
and provide more detailed material requirements information in advance.
The Company does not currently use unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV) or “drones” as
part of its storm response. At the time of the storms, our Research and Development Department
evaluated the use of drones for damage assessment. Due to the severity of the initial impact
reports, the Company deployed a drone on a test basis to gather supplemental damage
intelligence and determine feasibility for future use.
F. WORK PLANNING
Teams worked night and day to coordinate shifts. These teams’ objective was to create a
restoration work plan that provided all materials needed to field forces without delay so that the
work could continue uninterrupted. We followed a central dispatch concept to facilitate our
work plan by managing response by “Cells.” This approach brought our Incident Command
Structure (“ICS”) leadership together with Engineering, Overhead Restoration (Mutual
Assistance and Company), Services, and our Municipal Liaison Coordinator (at the same table as
Overhead Branch Director) into a centralized location for planning and management. This
combined group was able to direct an overall strategic approach rather than one jobsite at a time.
Another efficiency of the Cell Management process is that it consolidates information
flow and enables coordination of a “task force” approach. This approach included on-site
damage assessment and coordination with major construction, Line Clearance (i.e., trees),
Services, and Ladder Line resources. It enabled immediate course correction across operations,
58
and was scalable to our work plan and crewing. For example, the Company used it to
accommodate the assignment of hundreds of Mutual Assistance FTEs.
In order to keep crews moving from job to job throughout the day, planners prioritized
work and real-time outage and damage information based on the crew’s location and availability
for the next job. We assigned crews in groups. For example, a Mutual Assistance crew with a
Damage Assessor and Ladder Line team, to support complete restoration, which would not leave
a particular crew underutilized. We also broke-up larger contingents as the work plan changed,
so that multiple assignments could be completed by smaller and more targeted contingents.
The Company’s Engineering teams made efficient use of the work package generation
process. The Engineering Team reviews the damage assessment work together with circuit status
and notes for nearby jobs. Its review includes comments on marked-up circuit prints from field
observers and review of specific job comments, such as notes from customer reports or field
progress. The team uses all of this information to prioritize work and generate work packages.
Employing a decentralized system for work dispatch alleviated switching constraints in
the control center by granting local operational switching authority for spurs and their fuses to
management teams in our Westchester headquarters. We effectively managed work packages
from this central dispatch structure, enhancing coordination of assessment, planning, package
development and dispatch. Bringing the work dispatch function to the same location as our
Engineering and Control Center teams, reduced the time from when work was assigned to when
it was distributed at our staging area two miles away. Our staging area design incorporated past
lessons learned and increased the efficiency of traffic flow and material procurement.
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G. ESTIMATED TIME OF RESTORATION
In accordance with the ERP Section II, the Company mobilized a team dedicated to
issuing ETRs during Winter Storms Riley and Quinn. This ETR Branch is a specific extension of
the Operations Sections in the ICS that is dedicated to ETR management. As required by its
ERP, the Company provided ETRs at the global, regional and local level on a timely basis after
declaring the start of restoration (SOR):
• Global ETR – The estimated time to restore at least 90% of the customers interrupted
Company-wide.
• Regional ETR – The estimated time to restore at least 90% of the customers interrupted
in a region (e.g., Bronx/Westchester).
• Local ETR– The estimated time to restore at least 90% of the customers interrupted in a
municipality, load area or network.
The Company develops ETRs with three principal inputs: available crews (or resources),
number of jobs, and estimated duration for repairs based on preliminary damage information and
first responder field reports. The Company estimates the restoration period for all customers by
determining the average number of jobs that crews can complete a day based on crew
availability. The Company further refines this estimate by prioritizing jobs based on critical
locations and the number of customers affected to develop regional and local (municipal) ETRs.
The Company based its ETR projections on the secured and expected crew contingents,
number of jobs and anticipated rate of job completions (as noted previously, it was difficult at
the storm’s outset to secure mutual assistance crews).
The Company published global, regional, and local ETRs for both Riley and Quinn
within 48 hours of the SOR as required by our ERP. The start of restoration activities for winter
60
storm Riley began at 1500 hours on Saturday, March 3rd when the Company could safely
dispatch restoration crews (the Company’s ERP provides that we should not commence
restoration until we can safety dispatch our crews). The start of restoration activities for winter
storm Quinn began at 0700 hours on Thursday, March 8th. Because the B/W service territory
sustained the greatest impact of any region during both storms, the Company initially established
the global ETR as the regional and local ETRs, and then updated the individual ETRs upon
dispatch of crews. The Company’s actual publication times for the various ETRs are shown in
Tables 11 and 12 below:
Table 11: ETRs for Winter Storm Riley
ETR Type SOR Publication of ETR

Global 3/3/2018 15:00 3/3/2018 19:00
Regional/County 3/3/2018 15:00 3/3/2018 19:00
Local/Municipal 3/3/2018 15:00 3/3/2018 19:00
Table 12 – ETRs for Winter Storm Quinn
ETR Type SOR Publication of ETR

Global 3/8/18 07:00 3/9/18 18:00
Regional/County 3/8/18 07:00 3/9/18 18:00
Local/Municipal 3/8/18 07:00 3/9/18 18:00
The Company initiated outbound communications of the global ETR on Sunday, March
4th. The global ETR for all jobs in B/W was set to Tuesday, March 6th at 2300 hours. While this
ETR was accurate for and beneficial to 90 percent of customers, the other 10 percent would not
be restored by that date. The arrival of Quinn caused longer delays for those customers.
61
H. EXTERNAL COORDINATION
1. MUNICIPALITIES
a. MUNICIPAL RESPONSE AND RESPONDING TO ROAD CLOSURES
Our crews respond to assist Municipal Department of Public Works (“DPW”) crews to
clear roadways. We train and equip our crews to de-energize and isolate our wires and other
infrastructure in order to make the area safe for municipal crews for this work. Figure 5
summarizes the crews we assigned to clear roadways.
Figure 5: B/W Restoration Workforce Summary
FTEs Dedicated to Road Closures

400
350
300
250
FTEs
200
150
100
50
0
3/2/2018 3/3/2018 3/4/2018 3/5/2018 3/6/2018 3/7/2018 3/8/2018 3/9/2018 3/10/2018
62
b. MUNICIPAL LIAISON PROGRAM
Con Edison’s overall response to Winter Storms Riley and Quinn with the Municipal
Liaison Program (“MLP”) was consistent and in accordance with the Company’s ERP (Section
II.B.4). Municipal Liaisons typically report to a municipal emergency operations center that the
municipality established for the storm and was staffed by the local police, fire, or public works
employees. The Municipal Liaison’s role is to assist the municipal leaders in prioritizing and
coordinating work involving the Company’s electric distribution system. Under this process, the
Company assigns Municipal Liaisons with one or more electrical overhead crews to assist the
municipality in clearing fallen trees and fallen wires from roadways. The Municipal Liaison also
helps coordinate restoring critical facilities such as hospitals, police and fire dispatch centers, and
water treatment plants.
Many of our Municipal Liaisons live in the communities that they serve. These liaisons
are trained to work with the emergency service personnel. We are always looking for
opportunities to improve that training and will be meeting with municipal leaders to identify
areas and suggestions for improvement.
The availability, engagement, support, and professionalism of the Municipal Liaisons and
Coordinators was an obvious strength and validated by many letters of commendation received
both internally and from the Municipalities. Additionally, having a point of contact between the
Company and the Municipality on location provides the Municipality with a direct link to
escalate issues, ask questions and seek administrative support (e.g., generate/verify municipal
trouble tickets; prioritize trouble tickets). The liaison is also a conduit for the Company to pass
information through that will benefit the Municipality (e.g., dry ice distribution locations). The
Company held conference calls twice a day with the MLP Coordinators, to address individual
63
and collective concerns. The Company acknowledges three areas of improvement for the
Municipal Liaison Program during the winter storms.
First, the Company recognizes that the storm’s large impact and delay in obtaining
mutual assistance resources impacted work with our municipalities. Although the Liaisons have
other responsibilities, a critical role is to help prioritize and coordinate road clearing and public
welfare/safety and response to critical facilities. Because we did not have needed mutual aid
support, there were delays in assigning crews to municipalities.
Second, restoration information was not always available or available in a timely
fashion. Municipal Liaisons are also expected to provide general information on daily restoration
activities. This information allows the municipalities to see restoration/work progress, observe
presence in/near their municipality and communicate with their constituents and ultimately
understand our restoration efforts and priorities.
Third, the Company recognizes the need for continued training and education of liaisons.
The Municipal Liaison role is a System Emergency Assignment and all employees in this role
receive training and tools to manage this storm role. We will also look for ways to leverage
technology to provide quicker access to information needed for this role.
c. DAILY MUNICIPAL CALLS
Con Edison’s Municipal Liaison Program (MLP) Coordinators, Westchester Regional
Community Affairs (RCA) team, and B/W Electric Operations communicated with the
Westchester municipalities in advance of and throughout restoration for Winter Storms Riley and
Quinn. Con Edison planned and conducted daily municipal calls with our municipal partners as
detailed in the ERP, Section VII.C: Municipal Calls. Con Edison invited representatives of the
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42 Westchester municipalities to 13 municipal conference calls during Winter Storms Riley and
Quinn. Westchester Regional & Community Affairs notified municipalities via email on
Thursday, March 1st of the first pre-storm municipal call on the morning of Friday, March 2nd.
Municipal calls were held daily at 1100 hours, through the final call on Wednesday, March 14th.
The municipal calls provided the following information, when available:
• Weather update
• Important company contact information
• Impact of the storm and outage information
• Geographic areas hardest impacted
• Notifications of LSE and medical hardship customers
• Number of customers out of service
• Number of crews activated and mutual assistance requests made
• Status of road clearing activities
• Dry ice locations
• Safety message
These calls continued to the end of restoration. After the Company completed restoration,
the Company maintained contact with municipal authorities regarding the rebuilding plan.
2. COUNTY EMERGENCY OPERATION CENTERS
Similar to the Municipal Liaison role, the Company also assigns liaisons to the County
Emergency Operation Centers (“EOC”) as a single point of contact to coordinate and prioritize
restoration efforts including public safety, road closures and critical facilities. Throughout, Con
Edison worked closely with County EOCs to coordinate and prioritize restoration efforts and
outage information. During the storms, New York City Emergency Management (“NYCEM”)
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and Westchester County Department Emergency Services (“WCDES”), as well as the NYC
Downed Tree Task Force (“DTTF”) were all activated. The Company was able to respond to all
EOCs liaison requests.
The presence of the liaisons at the EOCs and the DTTF, contributed to clear and timely
communication with the agencies, and expediting work for the EOCs and DTTF. The success of
the liaison program is predicated on the blue-sky relationships with these agencies and the
training we provide.
3. UTILITIES
Throughout both storm events, Con Edison established the Utility Liaison Program in
accordance to the ERP (Section II.B.4 and Attachment 2) to maintain continuous
communications with other utilities (telephone, cable, water, etc.) regarding potential or actual
impacts to critical infrastructure from the storms. Two outages affected another utility’s water
and a different utility’s telecom facilities. Con Edison prioritized and restored these facilities in
a timely manner by coordinating with the assigned Utility Liaisons. Con Edison invited all
utilities to send respective liaisons to the Company’s Emergency Operations Center for better
coordination. We also issued periodic emails to all participating utility partners with updates on
outage numbers, which were well-received.
4. LOCAL OFFICIALS AND EMERGENCY RESPONDERS
The Company’s outreach to government and municipal officials consisted of:
• Direct distribution of Company press releases
• A daily municipal call
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• A daily call with regional, state-level and Federal elected representatives
• Direct interaction with elected officials and their staff
• Support for the Muni Liaison program
a. DAILY CONFERENCE CALL WITH REGIONAL, STATE AND FEDERAL-
LEVEL ELECTED OFFICIALS
Government Relations conducted daily conference calls for Westchester County elected
officials at all levels of government beginning Monday, March 5th at 1600 hours.
Daily at 1100 hours from Friday, March 2nd through Wednesday, March 14th, Con
Edison’s Corporate Affairs staff from the Westchester County region invited representatives of
the 42 Westchester municipalities to municipal official conference calls regarding the road
clearing and restoration effort in Westchester County. After the 1100 hours call on Thursday,
March 8th, the municipal officials were invited to join the 1600 hours elected officials call that
day. County, state and federal government representatives, Public Service Commission Staff and
the Governor‘s office participated on these calls.
On Friday, March 9th, the 1600 hours elected officials call was eliminated and a
combined municipal and elected official call was held daily at 1100 hours going forward. As
stated above, these daily calls continued through Wednesday, March 14th.
b. DIRECT INTERACTION WITH ELECTED OFFICIALS AND THEIR STAFF
In addition to the ongoing coordination between Con Edison personnel and the City and
Westchester governments, the Company’s Corporate Affairs team had hundreds of interactions
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with elected officials, community boards and government officials seeking information or
assistance for specific areas and customers.
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V. LOGISTICS
A. STAGING AREAS
The Company uses staging areas for major storm responses to efficiently deploy
resources. The staging area concept was first implemented by Con Edison during Superstorm
Sandy. The staging area allows the Company to coordinate, house and feed large numbers of
mutual assistance crews in one central location in close proximity to the impacted communities.
It also provides a central location from which crew guides escort mutual assistance crews who
may not be familiar with our service territory, particularly the winding roads of Westchester
County. Our municipal partners are essential to this effort. During Winter Storms Riley and
Quinn, Rye Playland served as the staging area for Westchester restoration efforts.
Rye Playland is the biggest Con Edison staging area in the Westchester and can
accommodate approximately 1,000 vehicles overall. During Winter Storms Riley and Quinn,
there were approximately 650 vehicles at the location. The ability to accommodate all required
resources (trucks, personnel, dining, etc.) makes this a prime staging location. Rye Playland
offers easy access to highways, significantly reducing travel time to the northern part of
Westchester.
69
Picture 6: Rye Playland Staging Area
B. MATERIALS
Materials such as poles and transformers were distributed from the staging area to crews
throughout the day. To accommodate materials distribution in the northern part of the territory, a
material drop location was setup in Cortlandt.
The Logistics Section performed the following support services during Winter Storms
Riley and Quinn:
• Setup the Corporate Emergency Response Center (CERC)

• Activated the Logistics Operations Control Center (LOCC)
• Purchased and delivered dry ice to various sites throughout Westchester
o 41,121 lbs. distributed by Customer Operations from 3/4/18 to 3/11/18
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• Mobilized 1 staging site located at Rye Playland
• Secured 1,428 hotel rooms, totaling 3,130 beds, which included:
o 902 hotel rooms (1,708 beds) for the Westchester region
o 648 additional beds were setup at the Rye Playland staging site
o 526 hotel rooms (774 beds) for all other regions (Manhattan, Brooklyn/Queens,
Staten Island)
• Provided 20 coach buses to transport mutual assistance & contractor crews between
staging sites and hotels.
• Provided laundry and refueling services at the Rye Playland staging site
• Provided 60 waste dumpsters for refuse removal including scrap cable, pole butts, and
construction debris
• Mobilized 18 electric generators to the Westchester region to support various outages
• Distributed equipment and material including:
o Poles – 386
o Transformers – 249
o Cable - 413,857 ft.
C. DRY ICE DISTRIBUTION
The Company’s ERP (attachment 12: Dry Ice Procedure) calls for the distribution of dry
ice in storm events when outages are expected to be more than 48 hours. During Winter Storms
Riley and Quinn, the Company worked with local community leaders to identify locations for
dry ice distribution. The sites chosen were easily accessible and centrally located nearby
communities significantly impacted by the storm.
The Company issued 11 press releases announcing dry ice locations. We also provided
this information during media interviews and posted it on the Con Edison website, including the
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outage map. Below is the IVR message for the call center also informed customers about dry ice
locations.
"Please remain on the line to receive information about the locations of Customer
Care Representatives and where to obtain dry ice. You may also visit
www.coned.com to receive information about the locations of customer care
representatives and where to obtain dry ice.”
Appendix D lists the locations and hours of operations for dry ice distribution during Winter
Storms Riley and Quinn.
Approximately 1,500 customers accepted dry ice. The Company distributed
approximately 4,400 bags, or 41,000 pounds, of dry ice to customers. Con Edison did not
experience difficulty obtaining dry ice from its contractor suppliers and was able to meet the
daily demand.
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VI. SYSTEM AND TECHNOLOGY ISSUES DURING RESTORATION
During the event, the Company experienced technical issues with its outage management
software. While these issues had a significant impact on customer communication, the
efficiency of the restorations was not affected. The Company is continuing its review to better
understand the issues and has already taken several steps to prevent a similar occurrence in the
future.
The Company’s OMS is a predictive model that uses asset information from our mapping
system with real time SCADA system data to construct a detailed model of the electric
distribution system. Because many customers may not report their outages, the OMS combines
the locations of reported outages received to predict potential customer outages based on the
system model. The OMS model groups the outages as additional outage reports are received and
refines the prediction. This information is used to prioritize restoration activities and track
overall restoration. The overall process is shown in Figure 6.
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Figure 6: Company’s OMS Process
In addition, since Superstorm Sandy, the Company has installed over 1,000 additional
sectionalizing devices (654 in Westchester) as part of its storm hardening program, which also
resulted in changes to the OMS system model. These additional devices reduced the number of
customers attached to any segment to no more than 500 customers, but also complicates the
modeling.
The increased volume of customer outage reporting, as well as the more complex system
model, resulted in a much higher level of activity in OMS. The increased activity led to over-
prediction of customer outages and exposed a software error. The software error caused the
model to incorrectly group duplicate customer calls and created multiple outages for a single
customer. The software error also removed and repopulated ETR in some cases. The operators
74
had to manually correct the redundant outages and regroup outages. This was helpful for
restoration efforts, and the appropriate step to take under the circumstances.
All communications begin when an ETR is assigned in OMS. After Superstorm Sandy, to
improve customer communications, we decided to notify all customers who reported their outage
and predicted by the model. For predicted customer outages, we send an initial notification
requesting confirmation of their outage and a restoration notification. The predicted customers
receive ETR information, including updates only if their outage is confirmed. Normally,
customers can receive at least three messages: an initial system-wide ETR (if set), a job specific
ETR, and a message to confirm restoration. ETR information is sent to an external vendor,
approximately every 15-20 minutes. The vendor initiates customer communication, reporting
changes to ETRs. The software issues noted in the prior section, where ETRs were changing in
error, caused customers to receive updated ETR or restore messages incorrectly.
A. TIMELINE OF TECHNICAL ISSUES
• On Friday, March 2nd, at the beginning of the event, we observed a larger than usual
number of ungrouped customer outages in OMS. The operators manually grouped these
outages to existing outage jobs.
• On Monday, March 5th, we detected a software error that led to the creation of multiple
events for single outages jobs without ETRs. In addition, the OMS appeared to be
predicting higher than expected outages. This required corrections by grouping of jobs
and, in effect, “restoring” customers that had been predicted to be out of service. A
dedicated team worked to correct the issues and adjust customer outages. Subsequent to
the event we determined that the root cause was a software error and a setting in the OMS
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system. A software patch was applied to address this issue and the OMS setting was
removed.
• On Tuesday, March 6th, we observed a divergence in outage counts for Westchester
customers between internal dashboards and external outage maps. To address the issue,
the municipal dashboard for outage counts was disabled and replaced with a manual
webpage for the duration of the event. On Wednesday, March 7th at 0915 hours, having
finally determined the significance of these issues, the Company issued a press release
that stated in bold letters: “Con Edison advises that it is working to repair technical issues
with the automated outage map on its website. The map may display numbers that are
outdated.” We corrected the integration between OMS and outage maps.
• On Friday, March 9th, operators experienced a slow-down in the OMS which required a
system reboot that lasted less than an hour. Subsequent to the event we determined that
the root cause was a software configuration error. A software patch was applied to
address this issue.
• On Saturday, March 10th, a website outage for Coned.com and ORU.com lasted
approximately eight hours and prevented access to all online services, including the
outage map. The website outage was caused by a software error that prevented the
website from failing over to an alternate data center upon the loss of a hardware
component. The hardware component was replaced and a software patch was applied to
correct the software error.
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B. OUTAGE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM TECHNICAL ISSUES
After the event, we collaborated with the OMS software vendor to determine the
following root cause of the OMS technical issues observed during the event:
• Approximately 4,000 customer reported outages were unmatched in the OMS model that
led to a large number of jobs that had to be manually grouped and tracked in the OMS.
In some cases, these outages were duplicated to existing outages and this led to multiple
outage events with sometimes inaccurate ETR /restoration information. The mismatch
was associated with connectivity errors in the mapping system that is the basis of the
OMS model. The mapping system is being corrected to reduce the rate of unmatched
customers in Westchester.
• During the event, the OMS model had increased activity associated with an OMS setting
that automated operation of sectionalizing devices in the model. The increased system
activity exposed a software error. As a result of the software error, existing outages were
broken into separate and distinct outages, with the model adjusting customers as being
restored and removing the ETR. Approximately 15,500 customers received duplicate
ETR notifications as a result.
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C. CUSTOMER NOTIFICATION ISSUES
In addition to the technical issues, process changes implemented post Superstorm Sandy
contributed to the increased frequency of the customer notifications:
• During this event, some customers reported their outages on multiple occasions. In some
cases the predictive grouping rules in OMS were designed to ensure that single outages that
involved service wires being reported down were not grouped with large outages and were
tracked separately for safe restoration purposes. As a result of not grouping these jobs, some
customers received multiple notifications for ETR and restorations for the same outage, and
in a few cases that information was conflicting as they were tracked as different jobs.
• After Superstorm Sandy we initiated a new process to contact all customers when there is an
outage, whether they contacted us or we predicted them out. Previously, we would only
contact customers who had contacted us. Now, an automated process contacts all customers
who were given an outage message and if they are no longer associated with an outage, they
receive a call saying power is restored. Due to the software errors, customers were
incorrectly predicted out and ETR’s were removed, as the operators corrected these
conditions and restored the predicted outages in the model, it led to incorrect restore
notifications to customers. In some cases, under our normal practice, a customer that has a
more localized issue such as a downed service line may also be part of a larger outage and
could receive an erroneous restoration message when the larger outage was restored; this is
how we would be able to know that there is an additional issue. Approximately 49,000
customers received incorrect restore notifications during the event.
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VII. LESSONS LEARNED AND ENHANCEMENTS UNDER CONSIDERATION
Throughout this event, the Company realized the benefits associated with its storm
hardening investments in its distribution infrastructure and storm management processes.
Notwithstanding our positive and safe restoration performance, the Company is currently
examining lessons learned and exploring areas of improvement. The Company faced major
challenges as a result of the storm’s breadth, tree impacts outside of the regular maintenance
area, and technology and information management for outages and communicating customer
restoration expectations. As with every event, we are reviewing and focusing on opportunities to
improve service to customers. This evaluation will include a renewed focus on experiencing the
storm from our customers’ and the municipalities’ points of view. We are already planning
additional investments that will increase resilience and enhance our technology for
communicating with customers.
In this light, our Lessons Learned begin with the needs of our customers, and extend to
examinations of our processes and opportunities for continuous improvement.
A. MEETING THE EXPECTATIONS OF OUR CUSTOMERS
As a Company, we know that in the aftermath of storms, our customers look to us to
provide timely and accurate information about service restoration. The municipalities we serve
look to us to provide this same information as they work to restore normalcy and fundamental
requirements for public safety and social services.
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1. UNDERSTANDING OUR CUSTOMERS’ OUTAGE JOURNEY
The Company has initiated an effort to improve outage communications with its
customers by establishing a cross functional team to review the end-to-end process – from loss of
service through restoration – for a customer outage. The team will use customer surveys and
interviews to develop a deeper understanding of customer needs during a storm. We will use this
information to develop a number of actionable solutions to meet these needs, and improve the
customer experience.
2. COMMUNICATING TIMELY AND ACCURATE ETRs
The Company has acknowledged that the accuracy of information provided to customers
was an issue during Winter Storms Riley and Quinn and is committed to improvement and will
focus on two issues. The first is improving our OMS and associated communication systems to
avoid conflicting information; and the second is improving how we develop and issue customer-
specific ETRs, integrating the journey mapping initiative described above. Once smart meters are
fully deployed, we will have better and more automated information about customer outages.
Integrating the smart meter system with the OMS will verify outages and improve the accuracy
of customer information.
The Company has already begun the process of modifying its existing information
systems. Since the storms, we have taken several steps:
• Implemented software patches and configuration changes to address the software
errors observed during the event.
• Implemented website changes to enable back-op operation if there is flaw in the
primary system.
80
• Enhanced the integration between OMS and outage maps.
The Company also recognizes the need to continue to more accurately develop customer
ETRs. Items that the Company will consider include:
• Enhancing mapping systems to improve accuracy of the outage management system
model.
• Integrating real time system status information from smart meters and SCADA
switches with the outage management system, to provide more accurate
representation of field conditions and improve accuracy of customer outage
predictions.
• Complete an end-to-end technology architecture assessment to determine
enhancements necessary to improve outage systems reliability and performance.
• Complete Customer Outage Journey mapping to determine technology enhancements
necessary to achieve desired state for ETRs and customer communications
3. WORKING WITH WESTCHESTER COUNTY AND ITS MUNICIPALITIES
We need to continue to work with our municipal partners to provide better information on
outages and the status and location of restoration crews. The Company plans to develop an
information template that would be distributed prior to municipal calls so that content of the
agenda is consistent from call to call. In addition, we appreciate requests to re-evaluate the type
of data, and how we supply it, through our municipal dashboard. Con Edison has made changes
to the systems that run the municipal dashboard in recent years and some municipalities
81
preferred earlier versions. Discussions with our municipal partners will help to inform future
modifications.
The Company is investigating how to empower our municipal liaisons with more
information so that they can provide municipal leaders with better information. In this regard,
the Company is looking to enhance liaison training and research or produce new tools to
facilitate restoration work. The Company is also exploring ways to provide greater transparency
on the locations of crews and how to identify and communicate with them in the field. We will
also work to improve communication and information flow, including the identification of
critical facilities prior to storm impact.
Working together with Westchester’s municipalities, Con Edison crews cleared wires
from more than 700 closed roads. To make this partnership more effective, the Company plans
to work with the County of Westchester and its municipalities to develop prioritization criteria
for road closures, and then to communicate the resulting prioritization to all stakeholders. The
Company will also look into securing other resources to safely remove downed wires. This
includes enhancing training for site safety personnel so that they can better identify and
communicate Company and non-company property that may be blocking roads to municipalities.
This will allow for faster municipal tree removal and road clearing when the electric power lines
are not an issue.
We appreciate the efforts of the women and men of the municipalities we worked
alongside, and value their experience. Many times these municipal workers are first responders
to down wires, broken poles, and other electric distribution system damage, and their local
knowledge and skills and experience are valuable to our damage assessment and work
prioritization processes. Further, we are mindful of the safety of these workers as our own. We
82
will collaborate to identify opportunities, and input for processes and feedback loops for damage
assessment. We will also work to identify additional resources and process improvements to
validate and de-energize distribution lines in a timely manner. The Company will also review the
current roster of crews available to check wires and determine additional, non-restoration
personnel for this function.
The Company will also review its dry ice distribution process to determine if it would be
more efficient to allow towns and municipalities to distribute dry ice more locally. Finally, the
Company is considering additional staging areas or activating existing non Rye staging areas –
particularly in northern Westchester County – for storm restoration.
4. SERVING OUR LIFE SUPPORT EQUIPMENT (LSE) CUSTOMERS
While the Company ultimately contacted or referred to an agency all LSE customers
impacted by the storms, to improve execution of outreach to LSE customers, we will institute
plans which include:
• Requiring more frequent refresher training on the Company’s LSE outreach process
using our E-Learning course, by all Customer Assistance contact personnel.
• Conducting quality assurance reviews on the LSE outreach process.
• Incorporating the voice of the LSE customer in the Outage journey process to further
enhance the LSE outreach process.
• Developing improved technology to support internal employees executing of the
process of communicating with LSE customers during an event.
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B. OPERATIONS RESPONSE: PREPARING FOR THE NEXT REGIONAL EVENT
The Company believes that the restoration process worked as well as it could, given the
more extreme weather experienced than forecast. While many customers were restored on a
timely basis, we continue to seek to improve our restoration performance. These efforts are
described below:
1. SITE SAFETY IMPROVEMENT
This event was the first of its kind since the deployment of our Site Safety Management
System. We have identified areas to improve its functionality in an event of this size. We will be
enhancing training required of our employees who serve as site safety representatives, including
employees whose system emergency assignments are different from their everyday
responsibilities. We will also be adjusting the level of support staff we require for an event of
this size. We will train additional employees on functions such as dispatching so that we are
using all available resources in most efficient way. Last, we will consider new tools that could be
made available to help site safety staff be more of a resource to customers.
2. SECURING RESOURCES
Though the Company initiated the NAMAG requests, the storm’s shift to a more rapid
intensity and its broad geographic nature made securing mutual assistance crew very difficult.
The Company is evaluating various methods to provide timely access to overhead line resources
in response to storm events including increased staffing, earlier and more aggressive
mobilization of crews and developing new arrangements with contractor crews. As a part of this
evaluation, the Company will consider the cost and benefit for restoration.
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3. REDUCING TREE IMPACT
As noted in this report, a survey by an outside consultant showed that a majority of the
storm damage in the surveyed areas was caused by privately owned trees and large tree limbs
outside Con Edison’s right of way. As part of the post-Sandy storm hardening work, the
Company extended clearance distances of trees and tree branches from overhead systems along
the right of way.
In the aftermath of Sandy, the Company implemented a danger tree program to further
storm hardening efforts. Danger trees for this program are defined as trees that are outside of the
Company’s right-of-way that dead, dying, diseased, infested by insects, deformed or otherwise
unsound, but could still contact overhead lines. As shown by these storms, danger trees outside
the Company’s distribution right-of-way can cause a significant number of outages; while not
always popular with customers, the Company plans to investigate and discuss with stakeholders
the reinstitution of the Danger Tree removal program.
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Picture 7: Tree Damage in Yorktown, NY
4. CONTINUING STORM HARDENING INVESTMENTS
The Company’s investments in our distribution system resiliency produced significant
benefits throughout this event, particularly during its first hours when customer outages were
avoided and the Company was able to expedite restoration of customers with smart switches.
The storm hardening investments helped avoid the equivalent of an entire storm
(Winter Storm Quinn’s impact was over 66,000 customer outages, including 60,000 in
Westchester). Given the significant benefits of the storm hardening investments, the Company
plans to continue the storm hardening program for its overhead system, in particular in
Westchester County.
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Some customers and officials have suggested further investigation into undergrounding.
The perceived advantages of placing an existing overhead system underground are believed to
primarily reduce the frequency of customer outages due to storms. In general, underground
systems result in fewer outages than an overhead system. Because of our autoloop and 4 kV
parallel overhead system design, Con Edison’s overhead distribution system customers already
experience less than half the outages compared to the national and New York State average for
overhead systems. The repair time, however, for underground systems can be three to four
times longer than overhead systems. Undergrounding can be also be a significant cost for
customers. The decision to underground infrastructure is not straightforward; there are many
considerations to be taken into account. The Company commits to continuing this discussion
with stakeholders who want to explore selective undergrounding.
5. IMPROVING DAMAGE ASSESSMENT
The Company will continue to examine the speed and quality of damage assessment
information. We will explore opportunities, both process and technology based, to survey
damage and integrate that information digitally into our planning processes. This may include
the incorporation of field reports and pictures from municipal workers and first responders, or
the use of drones to survey damage. With respect to increased use of drones, we will need to
address regulatory restrictions. To the extent such restrictions are in place, we would need to
seek relief from them, especially during utility emergencies such as significant storms.
The Company will continue to examine the speed and quality of damage assessment
information. We will explore opportunities, both process and technology based, to survey
damage and integrate that information digitally into our planning processes. This may include
the incorporation of field reports and pictures from municipal workers and first responders, or
87
the use of drones to survey damage. With respect to increased use of drones, we will need to
address regulatory restrictions. To the extent such restrictions are in place, we would need to
seek relief from them, especially during utility emergencies such as significant storms.

New York, NY
May 11, 2018
88
VIII. APPENDICES
APPENDIX A-1: CON EDISON WEATHER RISK ASSESSMENTS
APPENDIX A-2: WEATHER FORECASTS FROM DTN
APPENDIX B-1: NEWS RELEASES
APPENDIX B-2: WEB PAGE UPDATES
APPENDIX B-3: FACEBOOK & INSTAGRAM POSTS
APPENDIX B-4: TWITTER POSTS
APPENDIX B-5: CUSTOMER EMAILS
APPENDIX C: OUTGOING TELEPHONE MESSAGES
APPENDIX D: DRY ICE DISTRIBUTION
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Con Edison March Storms Report

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Con Edison March Storms Report

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David Warner

May 11, 2018

By Email for Electronic Filing

Re: 18-00618 - In the Matter of Utility Preparation and

Dear Secretary Burgess;

16 NYCRR Part 105.4(c) requires an electric corporation to submit to the Secretary of

Consolidated Edison Company of New York, Inc.

Winter Storms Riley and Quinn

May 11, 2018

I. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ..................................................................................................... 1

compliance with 16 NYCRR Part 105.4(c).

preparation and response.

B. LONG TERM RESILIENCY AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE ACTIVITIES

plans with the goal of continually improving its storm response.

1. STORM HARDENING INVESTMENTS

for the most cost effective allocation of funds to Westchester.

fused bypass switches, and 654 sectionalizing switches.

ambulance companies, Town Hall facilities, hospitals, sanitation facilities, wastewater

were affected during Riley or Quinn, only one was affected.

Con Edison’s storm hardening investments in Westchester produced significant benefits,

evaluation to direct future investments to further mitigate storm impacts.

Con Edison is currently implementing its Advanced Metering Infrastructure (“AMI”)

Winter Storms Riley and Quinn.

3. EMERGENCY RESPONSE PLAN

enhancements implemented have included:

• Establishment of the Municipal Liaison Program to improve restoration coordination with

and gusts up to 60 mph.

beginning 0700 hours on Sunday. 1

Picture 1: Satellite image of Winter Storm Riley

191 road closures were caused by Winter Storm Quinn.

Picture 3: Repair Work in White Plains, NY

Westchester County, and 1.8 times more damaged poles.

affected customer communications. These issues resulted in inaccurate information being

on outages reported by customers. By Wednesday March, 7th, after evaluating system

In response, we disabled the automated reporting for restoration by municipality and

delay Con Edison’s restoration work.

The number of customers without service system-wide and in Westchester throughout

restoration trajectory if not for the impact of Quinn.

Figure 1: System Wide Restoration Curve

5. STORM RESPONSE COSTS

improving the customer’s overall experience, especially with respect to communication.

A. WEATHER FORECASTS & EVENT CLASSIFICATION

Actual System Damage Triggers

• Isolated Heavy Thunderstorms,

regarding the track and intensity of the storm.

some accumulation, sustained winds at 35 mph and peak gusts up to 60 mph.

mph, and peak gusts from 48 mph to 67 mph.

afternoon on Friday, March 2nd.

ICS Status at 1000 hours.

included on Table 2 below:

Table 2: Winter Storm Riley Regional Storm Classifications

Region Declared ICS Classification Status

UPGRADED at March 2nd, 0700 hours

Brooklyn/Queens UPGRADED at March 2nd, 0700 hours

Staten Island UPGRADED at March 2nd, 0700 hours

activate the CERC, beginning 0700 hours on Sunday, March 4th.

mph, with peak gusts of 35 – 50 mph.

was operational and ready for Winter Storm Quinn.

provided in Table 3 below:

Date Type of Storm Customers Impacted

10/29/2012 Superstorm Sandy 1,115,000

3/1 & 3/7/2018 Nor’easters Riley & Quinn 209,437

8/28/2011 Hurricane Irene 203,821

3/13/2010 Nor’easter 174,800