The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis

Vol. 30, No. 1, March 2018, 135－152

India–Pakistan, Limited War and Lopsided Deterrence: A Perspective

Zulfqar Khan*1

National Defence University, Islamabad, Pakistan

The paper analyzes India–Pakistan’s lopsided nuclear deterrence and military

strategies. India plans to deliberately escalate a limited war against Pakistan.
Pakistan is determined to neutralize India’s schema on different planes, a limited
conventional, limited nuclear to strategic nuclear wars. It is destabilizing and
complicating South Asia’s nuclear deterrence matrix. Pakistan’s threshold has
depleted due to its “two-frontal” security dilemma. It has considerably increased
Pakistan’s reliance on nuclear weapons. It is deduced that, India–Pakistan’s
inflexible and egocentric cultural mooring is inhibiting them from stepping back
from perilous military strategies, which can trigger miscalculations, enhance
misperceptions, or may lead to the outbreak of accidental/inadvertent limited
conventional or nuclear war. Both countries need to recognize the imperative of a
stable nuclear deterrence and peaceful coexistence instead of crafting unpredictable
and dangerous strategies. The shared risks of nuclear catastrophe should motivate
them to pursue rational and realistic policies.

Keywords: India–Pakistan, nuclear, limited war, security, strategy, power, war

Security Environment

Contemporary Pakistan is facing multi-dimensional challenges—expanding

conventional military and geo–economic asymmetry with India, and internal instability/
terrorist activities spearheaded by various non-state actors (NSAs) that are posing an
existential threat in the shape of a “two-frontal” security dilemma1 both from the Indian
and Afghan sides. In the prevalent geopolitical circumstances, Pakistan is compelled to
appropriately restructure its military/nuclear strategy. It is argued that India–Pakistan’s
military strategies are conflicting and antagonistic. India has a plan to impose a short–
duration limited war on Pakistan that could escalate to the crossing of the latter’s

*
E-mail: hodsns@ndu.edu.pk

ISSN 1016-3271 print, ISSN 1941-4641 online

© 2018 Korea Institute for Defense Analyses
http://www.kida.re.kr/kjda
136 Zulfqar Khan

nuclear threshold. Pakistan is determined to contain and defeat India’s reported schema
of a limited conventional, preemptive strike, or strategic nuclear war. It is further
destabilizing South Asia’s lopsided nuclear deterrence. Robert Jervis rationalizing the
concept of a security dilemma states that “military balance is stable at the level of all-
out nuclear war; it will become less stable at lower levels of violence.”2 Pakistan is
endeavoring to strengthen its conventional/strategic forces vis-à-vis India’s ostensible
plan to achieve escalation dominance by mechanizing its conventional and nuclear
forces through various doctrinal restructurings to coerce and impose its full-spectrum
military, strategic, geo–economic and diplomatic dominance over Pakistan.
The paper critically analyzes the changing military and geostrategic dynamics and
the escalating tension between the nuclear weapon states (NWS) of India and Pakistan.
India’s growing economic–industrial, military, relative and absolute power has given
it a geostrategic role as a counter-weight to the rising China, which is perceived by
the United States as its peer–competitor. Pakistan, in view of India’s economic and
strategic rise, has been motivated to craft a balancing policy by tilting toward China
to correct the imbalance of power and to enhance security. The power relies on the
country’s aggregate capabilities. The security denotes the country’s potential to sustain
its survival. It is important to understand that “different amounts of absolute power
may produce the same level of security” and, on the contrary, “the same amount of
absolute power may produce different levels of security” writes Davide Fiammenghi. He
further elaborates that in “an ideal–typical relationship between power and security, one
must therefore consider relative, not absolute, power.”3 Both countries’ “relative” and
“absolute” powers are highly asymmetrical. The transformed geostrategic environment
and strategic convergence between India and the United States has accorded the
former a considerable relative and absolute power. In contrast, Pakistan’s relative and
absolute power in comparison to India is less. As India has more economic and military
power, it is in a better position to attract more allies and to muster relative power to
deter rivals—Pakistan and China. India’s asymmetrical rise in military and economic
terms has considerably reduced Pakistan’s security, which the latter perceives is for the
accumulation of more power to dominate the region and to maintain its relative position
against China and Pakistan. Every state struggles to maximize its power.4 Pakistan’s
internal and external problems have led to the decline of its relative power and enhanced
its vulnerability to dissuade the rival from conceptualizing a punitive military plan.
This has pushed Pakistan to balance the power equation and to deal with the threat by
harnessing existing relative and absolute conventional and nuclear power. Pakistan’s
relative decline has led to fostering of India’s strategic convergence with the United
States ostensibly to assist New Delhi to accumulate more power to counter its rivals
and to establish its regional hegemony. Power accumulation encouraged India to craft
a highly destabilizing military plan to launch a limited war against a nuclear Pakistan
without crossing the latter’s redlines. Pakistan being a “status quo” state is to maximize
its security, in contrast to the “power maximizing”5 state (India), whose primary purpose
is to preserve its security and to tackle the security challenges. In essence, it is the states’
interests, rather than power or threats, which provide insight into understanding their
 India–Pakistan, Limited War and Lopsided Deterrence 137

behavior.6 At this juncture, both India and Pakistan’s interests are convergent with the
United States and China, respectively.
It is the strategic context that compels states to conceptualize new strategies for
the conventional, battlefield and strategic nuclear forces.7 After the nuclear tests of
1998, Pakistan was able to sustain a strategic parity with Indian nuclear forces. Nuclear
weapons had qualitatively created a strategic impasse between the rivals. Both countries
integrated nuclear weapons into their strategic doctrines and military posturing. But, it
could not prevent the frequent eruption of crises, including the 1999 Kargil War over
Kashmir. Despite Pakistan’s disadvantageous position in comparison to the Indian
power—it still continues to pursue an assertive foreign and security policy. India’s
disproportionate economic–industrial, military and diplomatic advantage is expected to
impel Islamabad to recalibrate appropriate conventional, strategic, and command and
control architectures to bolster its nuclear posturing vis-à-vis India.8 “Poor strategy is
expensive,” writes Colin Gray, but “bad strategy can be lethal, while when the stakes
include survival, very bad strategy is almost always fatal.” The strategy is to employ
the “theory and practice of the use, and threat of use, of organized force for political
purposes.” Presently, there is a “growing complexity of modern war and a general
theory of war and strategy” that has to be “properly formulated” for a viable deterrence.9
Therefore, one, it is imperative for India and Pakistan to properly utilize strategy to
avoid stumbling into unexpected pitfalls, or to foster misconceptions to achieve an
escalation dominance, or to initiate a limited war under the illusion that it is possible
between the nuclear rivals. Two, the threat of the use of force needs to be rationally and
realistically analyzed before making any critical decision, which could prove fatal for
their national security interests, stability, and peace. Three, technological revolution has
increased the complexity of modern warfare, and made deterrence difficult to sustain;
therefore, judicious cost and benefit analysis needs to be factored in with a view to
prevent the inadvertent escalation of crisis or war. To tackle the existential challenges,
Pakistan requires a determined and comprehensive national security plan to deal with
the emerging internal/external security challenges. The regional deterrence matrix is
becoming more complex, which has put Pakistan’s credible minimum nuclear deterrent
posture under considerable pressure. Pakistan has to effectively strategize its robust
deterrence plan to prevent India’s perceived “coercive strategy”10 and to neutralize the
threat of the use of force. India’s asymmetrical rise vis-à-vis Pakistan, is considered
by the latter’s policymakers to be dangerous and offensive due to the existence of the
former’s plan to deliberately initiate a limited war under its “Cold Start Doctrine”
(CSD), which is inherently escalatory. The Indian Army’s Chief General Bipin Rawat
revealed that the doctrine (CSD) crafted after a terrorist attack on the Indian Parliament
in December 2001, still exists (in 2017). Rawat elaborated that: “The Cold Start doctrine
exists for conventional military operations. Whether we have to conduct conventional
operations for such strikes is a decision well thought through, involving the government
and the Cabinet Committee on Security.”11 He further explained that:
138 Zulfqar Khan

In our case, we prepare for short, intense conflicts, and at the same time have to be
prepared for wars becoming long-drawn. Based on that, we have a well–defined
strategy. What the PM said is right; wars will be intense and short because there’ll
always be international pressure in wars between two nations. We have to be aware
of that; whatever action we take, therefore, has to be quick; forces have to be ready
and have to achieve success.12

For Pakistan, it is India’s coercive strategy to put it under perpetual pressure. George and
Simmons observe that “a threat of punishment for noncompliance” has to be “credible
and potent enough to persuade” the other party to comply.13 As indicated by Rawat, India
has a plan of military offensive to establish its primacy. India’s deliberate escalation plan
would exert tremendous strain on the viability of deterrence and would push Islamabad
to conceptualize a robust strategy to neutralize New Delhi’s planned military blitzkrieg.
The CSD envisages a short–duration military operation to achieve its politico–military
goals. Its central pillar is structured around the concept of availability of space for a
limited war despite Pakistan’s nuclear arsenal. The CSD is expected to be executed by
positioning the Indian Army’s Integrated Battle Groups (IBGs) near the border with
Pakistan. Such posturing indicates a first-attack strategy by minimizing any prospects of
mediation through diplomatic channels to defuse the crisis. It would surely increase the
probability of misperceptions and strategic miscalculations, thereby gradually leading
them toward an accidental or inadvertent conventional, or even a nuclear war.

Lopsided Deterrence

Effective deterrence requires stringent doctrinal restructuring, planning, multiple/

assured delivery systems, and determined leadership. As deterrence is “not automatic”;
in fact, it is harder to achieve.14 Albert Wohlstetter observes that: “Deterrence is a matter
of comparative risks” that demands immense “ingenuity and realism at any given
level of nuclear technology to devise a stable equilibrium”15 vis-à-vis the rival. Robust
deterrence requires resources, consistent efforts, ingenuity, and realism in unison with
emerging nuclear/technological developments to upgrade/stabilize it. It is a reflection of
the countries’ “resolve.”16 Murray and Grimsley observe that: “Strategy is a process, a
constant adaptation to shifting conditions and circumstances in a world where chance,
uncertainty, and ambiguity dominate,” which could go a long way in determining the
future outcome and military/political objectives.17 According to some scholars, the
threat of all-out nuclear war has receded in the 21st century, but the prospects of the
use of nuclear weapons are expected to increase in “limited ways” that fundamentally
requires revisiting the concept of a limited nuclear war.18 Since time immemorial, the
concept of a limited war had existed, which, during the Cold War passed through various
conceptual phases. Fundamentally, it relied on deterrence by punishment to strengthen
military capabilities,19 and triad–based deterrence reinforced by different measures to
deny and prevent the rival from achieving its strategic aims without risking its own vital
national interests, including survival. Under a “limited” war scenario, the adversaries are
 India–Pakistan, Limited War and Lopsided Deterrence 139

not expected to employ their entire military capabilities to achieve policy aims, but, to
use it as an instrument of escalation to influence the battlefield, or to impact cost–benefit
analysis as a coercive escalation signal to increase it to a higher rung. This creates shared
risks that may persuade rivals to avoid direct war, rather using deterrent strategy of
limited nuclear employment so as to create space/pause to commence the negotiations
process.20 Robert Osgood observes that the limited war strategy “is not only a matter of
degree but also a matter of national perspective.”21
India–Pakistan’s security dynamics, national security perspectives, and strategic
cultures are antagonistic, which can easily magnify and spiral toward a perilous
escalation particularly at a juncture when Pakistan is already facing asymmetrical
military and “two-frontal” security dilemmas both from India and Afghanistan.
Therefore, the jus ad bello (war for just goals) and jus in bellum (employment of just
force/means in war) could swiftly become ineffective to restrain the belligerents. Ian
Clark remarks how one defines the notion of a limited war, which is influenced by the
“nature of war and the form that it takes, is dependent upon our social conception of
what is its point.”22 In the case of India and Pakistan, the notion of social conception
and strategic cultures are distinctly hostile. This creates mistrust that would magnify
the prospects of frequent eruptions of crises. The war “could not be simply to apply
maximum force toward the military defeat of the adversary”; instead, “it must be to
employ force skillfully along a continuous spectrum,” remarked Osgood, ranging
“from diplomacy, to crises short of war, to an overt clash of arms, in order to exert the
desired effect upon the adversary’s will.”23 In India–Pakistan’s adversarial matrix, there
are no rules or norms that could define the relationship—both military and political.
Therefore, it can be assumed that the aggressive formulation of military doctrines
against each other, like India’s CSD and Pakistan’s “full spectrum” nuclear deterrence
strategy,24 can quite quickly spiral out of control. Henry Kissinger writes that the nature
of a limited war is dependent upon “the existence of ground rules which define the
relationship of military to political objectives.”25 Unfortunately, no such rules exist
between India and Pakistan; therefore, it can impact the future direction of the strategic
performance of both countries. Strategy has diverse dimensions: ranging from people–
to–politics; socio–cultural mooring of society; economic, industrial/technological and
logistical capabilities; superior societal/military command and organizational structure
to competently undertake different assignments; capabilities–information–intelligence
to strategic theory and doctrine; and of course, geography of the country and proper
conceptualization and execution of strategy with appropriate defense planning. Sun Tzu
observed that war “is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or the ruin”;26
therefore, every aspect and resource of the nation has to be harnessed toward its strategy/
tactics to achieve the desired goals.
140 Zulfqar Khan

Conflicting Doctrines

Nuclear deterrence strategy has to be credible and compatible in order to achieve

the set aims.27 In a nuclear environment, it is not possible to achieve a victory at an
acceptable cost. Despite the United States and the then Soviet Union’s irreconcilable
differences, they consistently exercised restraint toward each other’s military aims in
order to preserve peace.28 The strategy of deterrence by denial during the Cold War
had convinced the adversaries not to vie for advantage by initiating a conventional
or nuclear conflict. The United States and Soviet Union avoided escalating military
adventurism or armed clash that could escalate to all-out nuclear war. The rivals could
not possibly win without putting their own national survival in jeopardy. Therefore, it
is imperative for India–Pakistan to exercise maximum restraint while crafting military
doctrines and piling conventional and strategic forces. It is vital to establish arms
control, and confidence–security building regimes to stabilize the strategic environment
so as to prevent accidental catastrophe. India–Pakistan’s formulation of perilous military
doctrines of CSD and “full-spectrum” nuclear deterrence strategy, respectively, are for
divergent goals. Pakistan’s is to prevent the Indian strategy of launching limited military
strikes into its territories. India’s seems to be preparing to coerce and compel Pakistan
to accept the former’s military superiority despite possession of equalizing strategic
nuclear forces. In a mistrustful and hostile security milieu, Pakistan has to conceptualize
a strategy to increase the efficacy of deterrence. Pakistan perceives the Indian CSD as
a cavalier strategy, which can quite easily lead to an accidental or inadvertent conflict.
Both countries’ strategic aims are based on ninety-degree opposite trajectories that could
trigger crises and conflicts, or may lead to a limited employment of nuclear forces with a
high probability of cascading into a catastrophic nuclear war.
Pakistan seems to be pursuing an ambiguous military strategy juxtaposed with
multiple contingency options, including using a “Samson Solution”29 at a time of its
choosing against India. This impels Pakistan to strap up all elements of national power,
including integration of conventional, battlefield nuclear and strategic forces, to dissuade
India from operationalizing its CSD to escalate a limited conventional war, or to carry
out a preemptive strike. The Indian schema of military blitzkrieg to capture Pakistani
territories with the intent to subdue the latter, is a certain recipe to destabilize bilateral
deterrence and to escalate a conflict. To execute this doctrine, the Indian army has
reportedly divided its offensive corps into eight mechanized division-sized IBGs to
capture Pakistani territory in the shortest possible time.30 The IBGs would enable it to
carry out multiple strikes into Pakistan at multiple levels. The IBGs are integrated with
close air and naval aviation assets to provide a highly mobile firepower.31 According to
Walter C. Ladwig III and Vipin Narang:

In its more aggressive formulations, it was believed the aim was to create division-
sized formations that could rapidly mobilize and carry out short-notice, retaliatory
offensive of limited duration to quickly seize and hold Pakistani territory, while
simultaneously pursuing narrow enough objectives to deny Islamabad a justification
 India–Pakistan, Limited War and Lopsided Deterrence 141

to escalate the conflict by opening additional conventional fronts or to employ

nuclear weapons.32

In November 2017, some published sources indicated that the Indian Air Force was
planning to establish a forward air base at Deesa in Gujarat State near Pakistan’s
border,33 including the forward deployment of Su-35 aircraft squadrons. Deployment and
execution of operations would quintessentially depend on the aforementioned schema.
Sun Tzu writes that all wars are based on “deception,”34 therefore, mobility and strikes
at unpredictable locations can delay an adversary’s counter-moves. Pakistan is in a
dangerous dilemma: either to counter the CSD blitzkrieg with its comparatively weaker
conventional military might, or to use battlefield nuclear forces as a counter-force
strategy to hold the conventionally much superior Indian forces. The action–reaction
type strategies would be tantamount to committing “suicide from fear of death,” as once
Prussian Chancellor Otto von Bismarck stated.35
Historically, both countries’ strategic cultural mooring was fostered on divergent
“strategic preferences.” Such preferences are nurtured “in the early or formative
experiences” of the states after independence that are “influenced to some degree by the
philosophical, political, cultural and cognitive characteristics of the state and its elites.”36
Besides, there were a number of other historical and psychological factors that had set
the future trajectories of their decision-making and bilateral relations on opposite poles.37
Their historical narratives and perceptions about each other’s ambitions profoundly
impacted strategic dispositions and policymaking processes. Indian policymakers’
perceptions toward Pakistan were influenced by its geographical and population sizes,
and ancient civilizational factors. The nurturing of Indian hegemonic aspirations
persistently kept bilateral relations on sharp edge that led to various crises,38 and created
a cultural egocentrism that prevented them from broadly understanding multicultural
perspectives, or crafting appropriate deterrence and escalation control strategies. This
further widened the gulf of cultural alienation and motivated them to reinforce and
restructure their strategic positions to guarantee survival.39 Instability compelled Pakistan
to conceptualize offensive–defense strategy to guard against the perceived threats from
India. All these factors created dangerous power asymmetry that motivated Islamabad
to fill power imbalance by achieving a NWS capability and to formalize a strategic
equation with China. To deter, defuse or defeat the threat, the states would invariably
balance with other state(s). The security situation, material and ideational factors had
traditionally pushed Pakistan to follow a policy of “self-help,” which is the predominant
feature of prevalent “anarchy.” Alexander Wendt writes that “anarchy is what states
make of it.”40 Since 1947, both countries had moved on divergent strategic trajectories.
Both countries’ historical legacies were full of mutual suspicion, violence, and “imbalance
in material resources, geography that consequently matured into a conflicting strategic
outlook.”41 India’s geo–economic, military and strategic rise and, on the other hand,
Pakistan’s internal difficulties and external geopolitical challenges further undermined
the balance of power. Moreover, India’s fear of Chinese or Pakistani military collusion
ostensibly does not fully explain the dynamics behind India’s nuclear weapons plan.42
142 Zulfqar Khan

Actually, Indian “domestic factors, including individual personalities, have been at

least as important as the external security environment in determining Indian nuclear
policy.”43 In the case of Pakistan, its nuclear program, right from its inception was
motivated due to its perpetual rivalry with India.44 Pakistan never harbored any plan to
indulge in arms racing. Rather it intended to counter the perceived security threats from
India, and to ensure its survival by mustering capability to deter and defeat it. It was after
the Indian nuclear test of 1974 that compelled Pakistan to launch an indigenous nuclear
weapons program. It was with the intent to balance the aggravating power equation.

Fragility of Deterrence

During the Cold War, nuclear weapons and strategic balance between the U.S.–Soviet
(now Russia) blocs preserved peace and prevented war. The wars fought since 1945
were primarily conventional with limited political and military goals, and with a policy
of escalation avoidance.45 Since the 1980s, in the case of India–Pakistan, the pessimists
point out a number of anomalies particularly during clashes and crises. After India’s
nuclear test of 1974, and from the 1980s until the overt nuclearization of South Asia in
1998, India planned to launch preventive strikes against Pakistan’s nuclear facilities.
Such plans were reportedly rejected by the then Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi.
Interestingly, the Indian military leadership had insisted on preventive strikes.46 Now,
when both countries are declared NWS, the Indian policymakers reportedly are
contemplating preemptive strikes against Pakistan. In April 2017, the Indian Ministry of
Defense indicated the existence of the concept of an integrated strategy to synchronize
its armed forces with its strategic forces under a joint doctrine perhaps with the aim
of launching preemptive nuclear strikes on Pakistan, claimed MIT professor Vipin
Narang.47 The Indian Defense Minister also claimed that nuclear weapons “did not make
war obsolete.” Its former Army Chief General V. P. Malik stated that future limited
war with Pakistan could not be ruled out.48 Rhetorical posturing surely destabilizes
nuclear deterrence. Thomas Schelling writes that instability will “leave something to
chance” and would increase the prospects of action–reaction type behavior that would
multiply the shared risks of escalation to a war.49 Under such an environment, the
deliberate escalation of a chain of events would be difficult to control and could lead to
unintended and potentially uncontrollable escalation. It is the shared risk and nuclear
retaliatory factors that can assist in sustaining deterrence under the fear of conflagration
to a full-blown war. The nuclear forces can be strategized to avoid war, defeat, or use
as a defensive shield for power projection—both militarily and relative to ensure their
survival.
The Indian leadership has delusions that it can employ its conventional military
superiority to deliberately escalate a limited war without crossing Pakistan’s redlines.
The Indian civil–military establishment is endeavoring to coerce and compel Pakistan
to comply with its diktats. “The general intent of coercive diplomacy,” writes Alexander
George and William Simons, “is to back a demand on an adversary with a threat of
 India–Pakistan, Limited War and Lopsided Deterrence 143

punishment for noncompliance that will be credible and potent enough to persuade
him that it is in his interest to comply with demand.”50 Compellence relates to the
employment of “brute force and intimidation, between conquest and blackmail, between
action and threats.” Coercive diplomacy is “based on the power to hurt.”51 Planning a
military offensive against a NWS would prove detrimental to their national security
interests. Therefore, the prospect of achieving credible dividends from such an impasse
would be remote. On the contrary, the chances of escalation to an inadvertent conflict
would remain quite high. India’s plan to initiate a limited war to achieve escalation
dominance or to impose its primacy over Pakistan would surely have horrendous
consequences.
The Indian military leadership revealed its intent to launch military strikes against
Pakistan. The Indian Army Chief General Rawat threatened Pakistan with a surgical
strike. On September 25, 2017, Rawat claimed successful launching of surgical strikes
into Pakistani territories52 (it was rejected by Pakistan). While on October 5, 2017,
the Indian Air Force (IAF) Chief B. S. Dhanoa also maintained that IAF can target
Pakistani nuclear sites, or undertake surgical operations. Dhanoa further revealed
that IAF will achieve a required strength of 42 squadrons by 2032 as compared to
its existing 33 squadrons.53 In Vipin Narang’s perspective, Pakistan is pursuing a
strategy of “asymmetrical escalation,” which in his viewpoint is “geared for the rapid
(and asymmetric) first-use of nuclear weapons against conventional attacks to deter
their outbreak, operationalizing nuclear weapons as usable warfighting instruments.”
He further elaborated that a “state with this posture must therefore have sufficient
tactical and potentially survivable second–strike strategic weapons to absorb potential
retaliation.” That Pakistan’s “ability to disperse and deploy assets extremely quickly
and to enable their release on the battlefield through pre–delegative procedures to
military end users in the event of a crisis,” Narang writes was “the most aggressive
option available to nuclear states.”54 Pakistan’s alleged asymmetric strategy would
require an elaborate system that could achieve positive “deterrent effect at all levels of
conflict intensity, given the costly signal of credibly threatening early first use of nuclear
weapons against even conventional attacks.” This can generate numerous anomalies,
complexities relating to credibility, and “severe command and control pressures that
increase the risk of inadvertent use of nuclear weapons.”55 Therefore, Pakistan will
require nuclear–powered submarines/submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)—
(in addition to its existing 450 kilometer-range Babur-3 submarine-launched cruise
missile from underwater mobile platform) to ensure assured second–strike capability
to operationalizing its “full-spectrum” strategy vis-à-vis India’s alleged asymmetric
preemptive policy.
India is already working on a K-Series of SLBMs. K-15 SLBM has a 750–1,000
kilometer range. The first missile from the K-Series, which was developed, was K-4
SLBM which has a 3,500–5,000 kilometer range. It is developing the K-5 equipped with
MIRVs (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) warheads reportedly with a
range of 6,000 kilometers. India is also constructing three Arihant class nuclear ballistic
missile submarines. The Indian Navy Ship (INS) Arihant submarine was commissioned
144 Zulfqar Khan

in 2016, and work on its second submarine is nearing completion. Work on the third
submarine is in a full swing.56 It completes India’s “nuclear triad.” Moreover, its ballistic
missile defense comprising of radars, sensors, interceptor missiles with appropriate
command and control systems give it interception capability.
India–Pakistan’s military asymmetry is clearly in favor of the former that leaves
Islamabad at a clear military, diplomatic and strategic disadvantage due to the growing
geostrategic role of New Delhi in geo–economics, industrial development, and
burgeoning strategic partnership with the United States primarily to restrict the rise
of China. This accords India a relative security and absolute power vis-à-vis Pakistan.
Moreover, India is moving on a trajectory to play a “global power” role. Presently,
India has the fifth largest defense budget ($53.5 billion versus Pakistan’s $8.78 billion),
the third–largest armed forces, is the fifth–largest military spender and world’s top
importer of military weaponry (it spent $15 billion in the last five years). Its GDP is
$2 trillion (Pakistan’s GDP in 2016 was $283.66 billion) with the potential to become
the world’s third–largest economy by 2029, which is giving it a transformative role in
global politics.57 In addition to India’s deepening strategic partnership with the United
States and its allies, it still attaches great strategic significance to its relationship with
Russia, which makes the latter its major defense supplier along with France and Israel.
U.S. policymakers have regularly asserted that India would ensure security in the Indian
Ocean Region (IOR)/Asia–Pacific regions in the wake of China’s assertive (anti-access/
area-denial: A2/AD) strategy and presence in the South China Sea, IOR, Sri Lanka,
Maldives, Pakistan, and Djibouti. In the maritime realm, in 2012 the Indian Navy
possessed 138 ships that has now risen to 198, and plans to construct two more aircraft
carriers (presently it has one), and three more nuclear–powered submarines to its present
maritime strength (Pakistan does not possess a nuclear–powered submarine or aircraft
carrier). To fill the role of a security provider of the IOR, India reportedly has signed an
agreement to secure a military base in Seychelles.58 The United States, India, and Japan
regularly participate in the tri-nation Malabar naval exercises to showcase their strategic
partnership and maritime presence as a part of “offshore balancing” and a “realist grand
strategy”59 to influence geopolitics and preserve U.S. primacy in the Asia–Pacific.60
This is a part of the U.S. “active denial” strategy.61 In global politics, India is vying for
membership in international institutions/forums, including the United Nations Security
Council (UNSC), Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), Nuclear Suppliers
Group (NSG), Australia Group, G-7, and proportionate representation at the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF).
India is operationalizing the CSD, including deployment of nuclear–capable infantry
divisions along Pakistan’s border. Some published sources suggest that India has revived
its old combat–10th Infantry Division comprising of tanks and armored vehicles near the
Akhnoor sector in Jammu and Kashmir. This plan is envisaged to counter any prospect
of Pakistani forces’ intrusion into the Chamb–Jaurian sector of the Indian-occupied
territory of Kashmir. There are also indications that its 10th Infantry Division is being
mechanized into RAPID (Reorganized Army Plains Infantry Division) equipped with
approximately 100 T-72 tanks and a similar number of Russian-made mechanized
 India–Pakistan, Limited War and Lopsided Deterrence 145

armored vehicles. The RAPID formations would be able to conduct offensive operations
with adaptability to nuclear, biological and chemical warfare as well.62 In addition,
India is deploying Pinaka-guided rockets equipped with nuclear weapons against
Pakistan’s battlefield nuclear weapons. Pinaka mark-I possesses a maximum range of
40 kilometers, and 70 kilometers for the Pinaka mark-II which is capable of firing 12
rockets in 44 seconds with the capability to destroy about four square kilometers of the
target zone.63 In January 2017, a report indicated that the Indian Army is additionally
deploying more than 460 new T-90SM main battle tanks (MBTs) along its border
with Pakistan.64 In operationalizing the CSD, MBTs can play a pivotal part as they are
offensive assets to launch limited/rapid armored thrust into Pakistani territory supported
by mechanized infantry formations and air power within 48–72 hours. Reportedly,
the CSD has been interfaced with three strike-corps equipped with two armored, one
infantry division with around 450 MBTs (per corps). Additionally, India is undertaking
structural and organizational changes. First, to prop up its defensive corps (so-called
Pivot Corps) stationed along the border with Pakistan with new offensive elements:
division–sized IBGs consisting of artillery, armor, and aviation assets to launch a limited
offensive.
This indicates India’s plan of operationalizing a highly destabilizing strategy, which
per se compels Pakistan to appropriately deal with its existing conventional, battlefield
and strategic nuclear forces. This is a defining feature of the South Asian security
environment that would further accelerate the pace of power imbalance. This is a serious,
if not existential, threat to Pakistan’s security. Therefore, to offset the Indian forces’
size and strength, Pakistan’s reliance on nuclear weapons will increase. In fact, Indian
conventional superiority coupled with its nuclear triad capability is the primary driver
behind Pakistan’s crafting of a “full-spectrum” strategy. Pakistan’s nuclear capability
is enhancing its military capacity and the credibility of its threat, thereby giving it the
leeway to manipulate nuclear power as a defensive strategy to sustain the status quo and
achieve its politico–military objectives, and to increase its military resilience to reinforce
deterrence. Thomas Schelling observes that the fear of mutual surprise attack would
“cancel each other” along with the “power to hurt” potential which “is most successful
when” it is held in “reserve.”65 Pakistan’s robust nuclear weapons capability is a highly
effective deterrent that can check the conventional military might of India that is being
further replenished through different strategic partnership agreements with regional/
extra-regional countries.

Escalation Matrix

The tense security environment and the fragility of India–Pakistan’s nuclear deterrent
matrix are making the geostrategic landscape much more complex in contrast to the
Cold War era bipolar order. Complex strategic dynamics, divergent political and
military motivations of new NWS and their distinct threat perceptions, and the preferred
counter-strategies give them a diverse range of tactical and strategic tools to manipulate
146 Zulfqar Khan

the security situation. Pakistan is no exception. It is trying to manipulate the threat

perceptions with the available options to control the escalating tension, to neutralize, or
to manage any effort by India to impose escalation control or dominance. The former
Indian Army Chief General V. P. Malik in November 2004 optimistically claimed that
India would be able to maintain “escalation control,” after operationalizing the CSD,
and prevent war from spiraling out of control.66 In fact, the reality is the opposite and the
“fog of war” would surely intensify and consequently result in a catastrophe. Particularly,
the presence of nuclear forces clearly negates any chance of escalation control or dominance.
Quite the opposite, it would only open up a “Pandora’s box” of miscalculations and magnify
mutual threat perceptions, and increase the chances of accidental or inadvertent war.67 For
instance, on October 5, 2017, Pakistan Army’s spokesman stated that threats posed by India
are perpetual.68 Earlier, in September 2017, Pakistan’s Prime Minister, Shahid Khaqan
Abbasi, in talks at the Council on Foreign Relations in Washington categorically stated
that Pakistan had developed short–range nuclear weapons to counter the CSD.69
Pakistan’s policy and perceived threat from India compel it to develop and integrate
its battlefield nuclear weapons into its “full-spectrum” strategy to abridge the military
imbalance. In contrast, Indian nuclear policy is quite vague, and states that “the
objective of India’s nuclear doctrine is to deter the use and the threat of using nuclear
weapons by any state or entity against India and its forces.”70 It further complicates the
fabric of nuclear deterrence. This is a great challenge for both the countries. However,
the stabilization of the security environment, resumption of proactive diplomacy
and activation of other channels of communication can reduce misperceptions and
prevent brinkmanship. Pakistan reiterated its willingness to settle all bilateral issues
through dialogue to defuse tension. In November 2017, Pakistan offered to delineate
the Strategic Restraint Regime to stabilize the security situation that has intensified in
the wake of the CSD’s aggressive designs.71 In the absence of a stabilizing restraint
mechanism, uncertainty and brinkmanship would increase and it may overwhelm all
other stabilizing measures. Pakistan is clearly not prepared to reconcile with Indian
hegemonic aspirations despite New Delhi’s marked economic, strategic, and military
advantages. India is conceptualizing and rationalizing limited war theories to impose its
will over a nuclear Pakistan. This has created a dangerous security impasse between the
two. It increases the prospect of a limited employment of battlefield nuclear weapons
either by design, accidentally or inadvertently in a crisis situation. A fragile security
situation can spiral to an “all-out war” writes Kerry Kartchner and Michael Gerson, as
the chances of “nuclear war” that had “decreased with the end of the Cold War,” but “the
possibility of more limited nuclear use may be on the rise.” They further elaborate that:

As the opportunities for nuclear use multiply, so too do the challenges of being
prepared to control, manage, or dominate the process of escalation. Revisiting the
theory of escalation—while not necessarily revising it—in the context of the new
and emerging conditions of the post–Cold War world is essential to improving our
capacity for preventing and deterring crises, or any other circumstances that risk
crossing the nuclear threshold.”72
 India–Pakistan, Limited War and Lopsided Deterrence 147

In the prevalent security milieu, an offensive/unilateral move by the stronger nuclear

state does not make any sense as it would deplete the volatile threshold of the weaker
nuclear state. Rather, a successful security policy should endeavor to balance reassurance
and deterrence.73 It makes little logic in instituting a limited war plan against a declared
NWS. Richard Smoke observes that escalation either with intent or unwittingly crossing
“the current limits of the war” is highly unpredictable,74 and it may take escalation
toward a dangerous direction. Kartchner and Gerson elaborate that escalation can take
place in the case of ongoing conflict; the crossing of threshold is significant from the
standpoint of the adversary’s perceptions; and moreover, the consequences of escalation
cannot be accurately predicted that would obviously generate more misperceptions,
thereby further multiplying the chances of crises and war. In their opinion, escalation
is critical to sustain deterrence “against limited nuclear attacks and conventional
aggression.”75 This is the biggest “disincentive” for not initiating “aggression.”76 Per
se uncertainty and brinkmanship is the underlying base of deterrence. Schelling opines
that it can enable the belligerents to manipulate their mutual risks. “Without uncertainty,
deterrent threats of war would take the form of trip-wires,” which can accidentally lead
both countries to the “brink” that is “connected up to the machinery of war.”77 Limited
wars inherently possess seeds that may result in a major war.78
The security situation on Pakistan’s Western front with Afghanistan has deteriorated
since the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in the wake of the 9/11 terrorist attacks of
2001. Since then Pakistan has consistently supported the U.S./North Atlantic Treaty
Organization forces in Afghanistan by providing assistance ranging from facilitation of
the transportation of supplies, and use of its airspace and airbases to launch air strikes
against the terrorist targets in Afghanistan. In this context, the United States is still
insisting upon Pakistan to do more despite its tremendous human/material sacrifices
and repeated military operations against the non-state actors (NSAs) that resulted in the
dispersal and infiltration of NSAs into its tribal and some urban areas. Washington’s
strategic community, including the present administration of President Donald Trump,
is not “ruling out U.S. operations” even inside Pakistan.79 The NSAs are already
bleeding Pakistan in the tribal area, Balochistan, including in its urban centers of Quetta,
Peshawar and Karachi, which is being portrayed by the United States as terrorists’ safe
havens that warrant “focused offensive operations” even “inside Pakistan.”80
From January to August 2017, according to the Pakistani foreign office there were
over 600 Indian ceasefire violations (India too accuses Pakistan of 600 violations)
along the Line of Control (LOC) and the Working Boundary in which the lives of 28
civilians were lost and resulted in the wounding of 113 others as compared to 382
violations in 2016. It was in clear contravention to the 2003 Ceasefire Agreement
regarding the maintenance of peace along the LOC.81 An atypical security situation
has dragged Pakistan into a classical “two-frontal” security dilemma. The escalating
tensions and animosities among the new power blocs (the United States and China)
and their divergent interests have severely jeopardized Pakistan’s internal security and
stability. The deteriorating security situation at its Western borders will considerably
deplete Pakistan’s capacity to effectively deter any Indian military intrusion, which
148 Zulfqar Khan

will resultantly further lower its threshold and increase reliance on nuclear weapons. A
limited military operation by India could lead to a chain reaction from Pakistan. In such
a scenario, the first casualty would be pragmatism, which is the hallmark of strategy.

Concluding Remarks

India’s geo–economic, military and geostrategic significance as a counter-weight to

the rising China has led to the formalization of its strategic partnership with the United
States. Pakistan is determined to craft a balancing policy by siding with China, and to
establish the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor to correct the power equation and to
enhance security. A lopsided nuclear deterrence matrix indicates that India–Pakistan’s
offensive military strategies are destabilizing. India’s rhetorical exchange of statements
concerning the claimed existence of a deliberate limited war plan or preemptive
strikes under the nuclear overhang and, on the other hand, Pakistan’s determined “full-
spectrum” response strategy to deploy, or employ the battlefield and strategic nuclear
weapons could subtly lead them to dangerous brinkmanship. This will undermine
the security environment; increase the prospects of miscalculations; misperceptions;
accidental or inadvertent war. Based on their asymmetrical power equation, divergent
strategic interests aside—they cannot overlook the positive role of diplomacy to foster
a peaceful co-existence, or to institutionalize arms control and confidence–security
building mechanisms. Conflicting strategic cultures, strategies, fluctuating deterrence,
and frequent rhetorical statements need to be avoided for their collective interests.
Pakistan is engulfed in a classical “two-frontal” security dilemma emanating from India
and the U.S.-controlled Afghanistan, which would further deplete Pakistan’s deterrence
capability vis-à-vis India and to tackle the menace of terrorism from Northwest Asia.
To eradicate the scourge of terrorism, Pakistan essentially requires peace on its Eastern
border, and extension of wholehearted cooperation from regional/extra-regional
stakeholders, particularly India.

Notes

1. See Zulfqar Khan, “The Changing Dynamics of India–Pakistan Deterrence,” Pakistan Horizon
66, no. 4 (October 2013): 19.
2. Robert Jervis, The Illogic of American Nuclear Strategy (New York, NY: Columbia University
Press, 1984), 31; and Robert Jervis, “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma,” World Politics
30, no. 2 (January 1978): 186–214.
3. Davide Fiammenghi, “The Security Curve and the Structure of International Politics,”
International Security 35, no. 4 (spring 2011): 132.
4. See John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York, NY: W. W. Norton,
2001).
5. See Randall L. Schweller, Deadly Imbalances: Tripolarity and Hitler’s Strategy of World
Conquest (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1998), 24.
6. Ibid.
 India–Pakistan, Limited War and Lopsided Deterrence 149

7. Alastair Iain Johnston, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese
History (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), 36.
8. For further details see Zulfqar Khan, “Countering the Hegemon: Pakistan’s Strategic
Response,” IPRI Journal 15, no. 1 (Winter 2015): 21–50.
9. Colin S. Gray, National Security Dilemmas: Challenges & Opportunities (Dulles, VA: Potomac
Books, Inc., 2009), 1.
10. Lawrence Freedman, Deterrence (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), 26.
11. “Has India’s Army Revived its ‘Cold Start Doctrine?” Dawn, January 13, 2017, https://www.
dawn.com/news/1308168 (accessed October 25, 2017).
12. Ibid.
13. Alexander L. George and William E. Simmons, eds., The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy
(Boulder, CO: Westview, 1994), 2.
14. Albert Wohlstetter, “The Delicate Balance of Terror,” in Problems of National Strategy: A Book
of Readings, ed. Henry A. Kissinger (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger Publishers, 1965),
36.
15. Ibid., 46.
16. Ibid., 32, 45–46.
17. Williamson Murray and Mark Grimsley, “Introduction: On Strategy,” in The Making of
Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, eds. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin H.
Bernstein (New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 1.
18. See Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner, eds., On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st
Century (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014).
19. Jeffrey A. Larsen, “Limited War and the Advent of Nuclear Weapons,” in On Limited Nuclear
War in the 21st Century, eds. Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M. Kartchner (Stanford, CA: Stanford
University Press, 2014), 3–4.
20. Kerry M. Kartchner and Michael S. Gerson, “Escalation to Limited Nuclear War in the 21st
Century,” in On Limited Nuclear War in the 21st Century, eds. Jeffrey A. Larsen and Kerry M.
Kartchner (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2014), 158–61.
21. Robert E. Osgood, Limited War Revisited (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979), 3.
22. Ian Clark, Limited Nuclear War (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1982), 9–10.
23. Osgood, Limited War Revisited, 10.
24. Inter Services Public Relations, Pakistan, Press Release, April 19, 2011, https://www.ispr.gov.
pk/front/main.asp?id=1721&o=t-press_release (accessed November 13, 2017).
25. See Henry Kissinger, Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York, NY: W.W. Norton,
1969), 120–21.
26. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, ed. James Cavell (London: Hodder & Stoughton, 1990), 15.
27. Robert Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago, IL: University of
Chicago Press, 1957), 26, 242.
28. See William Kaufmann, Military Policy and National Security (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1956), 103.
29. Marco Rimanelli, “Origins of Arab-Israeli Conflicts in the ‘Greater Middle-East,’” in The
Ashgate Research Companion to War: Origins and Prevention, eds. Hall Gardner and Oleg
Kobtzeff (Farnham: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2012), 224–25.
30. Walter C. Ladwig III, “A Cold Start for Hot Wars? The Indian Army’s New Limited War
Doctrine,” International Security 32, no. 3 (winter 2007/08): 164–65.
31. Ibid., 160.
32. Walter C. Ladwig III and Vipin Narang, “Taking ‘Cold Start’ Out of the Freezer?” The
Hindu, January 11, 2017, http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/Taking-
%E2%80%98Cold-Start%E2%80%99-out-of-the-freezer/article17020804.ece (accessed
November 6, 2017).
33. Irfan Ghauri, “Counter Aggressive Doctrines: Strategic Restraint Pact Offered to India,” The
Express Tribune, November 10, 2017.
34. Tzu, The Art of War, 17.
150 Zulfqar Khan

35. Otto von Bismarck quoted in Richard K. Betts, “Suicide from Fear of Death,” Foreign Affairs
82, no. 1 (January/February 2003): 34–43.
36. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking about Strategic Culture,” International Security 19, no. 4
(Spring 1995): 34.
37. Hassan Askari Rizvi, “Pakistan Strategic Culture,” in South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic
Balance and Alliances, ed. Michael R. Chambers (Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute, 2002),
326.
38. For details see Barry Eichengreen, “Hegemonic Stability Theories of the International Monetary
System,” in International Economy: Perspectives on Global Power and Wealth, eds. Jeffry
A. Frieden, and David A. Lake (Boston, MA: St. Martin’s Press, 1995), 230–54; and Stephen
Krasner, “State and the Structure of International Trade,” World Politics 28, no. 3 (1976): 317–
47.
39. For details see Edward L. Luttwak, Strategy and History: Collected Essays (New York, NY:
Transaction Books, 1985).
40. Alexander Wendt, “Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power
Politics,” International Organization 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391–425.
41. Zulfqar Khan, “Pakistan’s Evolving Strategic Outlook: Strategy and Nuclear Deterrence,” The
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 28, no. 1 (March 2016): 106.
42. See George Perkovich, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation (Berkeley,
CA: University of California Press, 1999), 12.
43. Ibid., 445.
44. P. L. Bhola, Pakistan’s Nuclear Policy (New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1993), 20.
45. Gurmeet Kanwal, Indian Army Vision 2020 (New Delhi: HarperCollins, 2008), 63–64.
46. Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed
(New York, NY: W. W. Norton & Co., 1995), 92–95.
47. Max Fisher, “India, Long at Odds with Pakistan, May be Rethinking Nuclear First Strikes, The
New York Times, March 31, 2017, https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/31/world/asia/india-long-
at-odds-with-pakistan-may-be-rethinking-nuclear-first-strikes.html (accessed November 12,
2017).
48. See Swaran Singh, “Indian Debate on Limited War Doctrine,” Strategic Analysis 23, no.
12 (2000): 2179–185, http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09700160008455190
(accessed November 7, 2017).
49. Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1968),
186–203.
50. Alexander George and William E. Simons, eds., The Limit of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder,
CO: Westview, 1994), 2.
51. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2008), 2–3.
52. “Army Chief Bipin Rawat Warns Pakistan: Second Surgical Strike If It is Required,” Indian
Express, September 26, 2017, http://indianexpress.com/article/india/army-chief-bipin-rawat-
warns-pakistan-second-surgical-strike-if-that-is-required-4861237/ (accessed November 8,
2017).
53. “IAF Chief BS Dhanoa Asserts India’s Capability to Fight Two-front War, Acknowledges
Chinese Presence in Chumbi Valley,” First Post, October 6, 2017, http://www.firstpost.com/
india/indian-air-force-capable-of-targeting-pakistan-nuclear-sites-fighting-two-front-war-says-
air-chief-bs-dhanoa-4112203.html (accessed November 11, 2017).
54. Vipin Narang, “Posturing for Peace? Pakistan’s Nuclear Postures and South Asian Stability,”
International Security 34, no. 3 (Winter 2009/10): 44.
55. Ibid.
56. Vishal Karpe, “K-5 SLBM: India’s Next Big thing?” Indian Defense Research Wing, January
30, 2017, http://idrw.org/k-5-slbm-indias-next-big-thing/ (accessed November 18, 2017).
57. See Alyssa Ayres, “Will India Start Acting Like a Global Power?” Foreign Affairs 96, no 6
(November/December 2017): 83, 85, 86.
58. Ibid., 87.
 India–Pakistan, Limited War and Lopsided Deterrence 151

59. John J. Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, “The Case for Off-Shore Balancing: A Superior
U.S. Grand Strategy,” Foreign Affairs (July/August 2016): 73, 70–83.
60. Ayres, “Will India Start Acting Like,” 88.
61. Eric Heginbotham and Jacob L. Heim, “Deterring without Dominance: Discouraging Chinese
Adventurism under Austerity,” The Washington Quarterly 38, no. 1 (Spring 2015): 185–99.
62. Cited in Malik Qasim Mustafa, “India’s Offensive Military Preparedness Against Pakistan:
A Threat to Peace and Stability,” Issue Brief, October 16, 2017, (Islamabad: Islamabad
Instititue of Strategic Studies, 2017), http://issi.org.pk/wp-content/uploads/2017/10/IB_Qasim_
October_16_2017.pdf (accessed October 25, 2017).
63. “Indian Army Plans to Arm Pinaka Rockets with Nuclear Weapons to Counter Pakistan,” India,
September 27, 2017, http://www.india.com/news/india/indian-army-plans-to-arm-pinaka-
rockets-with-nuclear-weapons-to-counter-pakistan-pms-threat-2500366/ (accessed October 10,
2017).
64. Franz-Stefan Gady, “Cold Start: India to Deploy Massive Tank Army Along Border with
Pakistan,” Diplomat, January 20, 2017, https://thediplomat.com/2017/01/india-to-deploy-
massive-tank-army-along-border-with-pakistan/ (accessed November 15, 2017).
65. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 3.
66. General V. P. Malik, “Limited War and Escalation Control-I,” IPCS, November 30, 2004,
http://www.ipcs.org/article/nuclear/limited-war-and-escalation-control-i-1570.html (accessed
November 11, 2017).
67. For details see Ryan French, “Deterrence Adrift? Mapping Conflict and Escalation in South
Asia,” Strategic Studies Quarterly (Spring 2016): 108; and Robert Jervis, Perception and
Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
68. “Pakistan Army Says India Poses ‘Perpetual Threat’ to Pakistan,” The Economic Times, October
5, 2011, https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/defence/pakistan-army-says-india-poses-
perpetual-threat-to-pakistan/articleshow/60959864.cms (accessed October 30, 2017).
69. “Short-Range Nuclear Weapons to Counter India’s ‘Cold Start Doctrine:’ Pakistan PM Shahid
Khaqan Abbasi,” Hindustan Times, September 21, 2017, http://www.hindustantimes.com/india-
news/pakistan-pm-says-have-developed-short-range-nuclear-weapons-to-counter-india-s-cold-
start-doctrine/story-LAZUtNffLIT33Q02WEaKJL.html (accessed October 20, 2017).
70. Cited in Mohd Aminul Karim, “Is Nuclear Deterrence Workable at the Brink Time in South
Asia and Beyond?” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis 26, no. 1 (March 2014): 39.
71. Ghauri, “Counter Aggressive Doctrines.”
72. Kartchner and. Gerson, “Escalation to Limited Nuclear War,” 145.
73. See Thomas J. Christensen, The China Challenge: Shaping the Choices of a Rising Power
(New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2015).
74. Richard Smoke, War: Controlling Escalation (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977), 35.
75. Kartchner and Gerson, “Escalation to Limited Nuclear War,” 146, 147, 164.
76. Ibid., 147.
77. Schelling, Arms and Influence, 99.
78. Ibid., 33, 105
79. See Kosh Sadat and Stan McChrystal, “Staying the Course in Afghanistan,” Foreign Affairs 96,
no. 6 (November/December 2017): 7.
80. Ibid.
81. Naveed Siddiqui, “Pakistan Lodges Protest with India over Ceasefire Violations in AJK,”
Dawn, August 28, 2017, https://www.dawn.com/news/1354510 (accessed November 11, 2017).
152 Zulfqar Khan

Notes on Contributor

Zulfqar Khan  (Ph.D., University of Bradford) is a professor and head of the Department of
Strategic Studies at the National Defence University, Islamabad, Pakistan. He has extensive
experience in the field of nuclear, defense, strategy, security, and foreign policy. He has been a visiting
fellow at the Islamabad Policy Research Institute and a visiting faculty at the Department of Defense
and Strategic Studies, Quaid-i-Azam University, Islamabad. He is a former Senior Analyst, Ministry
of Defense, Pakistan. He has authored over forty research publications, including monographs, book,
and articles for national and international journals.