Copyright C5l IFAC Conflict Management and Resolution

in Regions of Long Confronted Nations (SWIIS 2000),

Ohrid, Republic of Macedonia, 2000

THE ROAD TO ACTIVE PEACE

Frederick O. Kile
Microtrend, 420 E. Sheffield Lane, Appleton WI54913-7181
Wisconsin, the USA; E-mail: 102610.2345@compuserve.com

Abstract: From the point of departure grounded on three axioms of international stability, issues are discussed with
respect to the prospect of achieving and maintaining stability in the contemporary multi-polar world. The discussion
is focused on the concept of 'active peace'. Possible approaches to international stability are examined, and then our
methodological approach to moving towards a paradigm of active peace is presented. Copyright © 2000 IFA C.

Keywords: international stability; human societies; global society; active peace; IFAC role.

1. INTRODUCTION commercial forces, etc.

1.1. Some Axioms o/Intemational Stability
Three axioms define a foundation for international
stability of Mankind societies:
1. Stability depends on a common desire for stability.
2. Presuppositions and attitudes are more important
than methods
3. Stability is dynamic, and not static.
1.2. Further Observations on Stability
Rapid global change challenges even robust
methodologies which emerge from non-repeatable
historical backdrops.
11lere are no generally accepted methods for
improving international stability, but cultural and
social ties are essential to implementing strategies for
long-term stability.
1.3. What is "Active Peace?"
Active peace is a significant marker of international
stability. Active peace is present when nations and
peoples:
1. Operate far from potential instability.
2. Adjust to our natural environment, resources, food
supplies, etc.
3. Adjust to religious activities, social attitudes,
4. Act in a sustainable way.
S. Periodically re-examine theories and presup-
positions of social stability.
We have avoided large-scale wars for over fifty years
but we have not achieved active peace. Occasionally
the loosely-couple international system seems to
approach active peace, but international society has
also frequently approached the edge of massive
instability during those fifty years.
1.4. Historical Memory
History is a seemingly endless series of tensions, and
wars. Thougll all combatants may be exhausted at the
end of a war, most wars end with one party victorious
and the otller party defeated.
Victory for one party often results in an unhappy
"peace" for tlle defeated party, with heavy terms
imposed on the loser by the winner. It is the
subjugated loser who feels that unfair terms have
been imposed by the winner, seeds for possible future
conflict are sown.
As times passes, many defeated nations and peoples
vanish from the pages of history. Thougll less
frequent, even victorious nations and peoples may
disappear, perhaps as casualties of a Pyrrhic victory.

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When defeated nations and peoples do survive, their
historical memory includes the cmotions of defeat
and subjugation. Eventually thesc memories surface
as actions. The likely targets of buried emotions are
the former conquerors, particularly if they are
remembered as mljust.
As the tides of history fall and rise, subject peoples
may become dominant and the rol~s of winner and
looser are sometimes reversed. Predictably, the
formerly dominant people now suffer. When tills
happens, new historical memories are fonned, and
new resentments arise. As pattems of emotional
memories recur witllln a matrix of nations and
peoples and shifting allianccs, a gcncral distrust may
develop and endure within a group of neighboring
peoples.
In an environment of general distrust, international
stability is weak, if tllere is cmy stability at all. During
periods of weak stability, pressures can easily arise
for some peoples to profit at the expense of others.
These circumstances are a fertile field for new
tensions and new wars. "
Every IFAC/SWIIS event is convened to develop and
enhance methods for improving intemationaI
stability. Improving inlernational stability is
especially important in areas Wilh long histories of
conflict. Tills special theme is thc focus for our
present SWIIS 2000 Workshop in Ohrid, Maccdonia.
2. UNDERSTANDING THE CURRENT
INTERNATIONAL INSTABILITY
2.1. Identifying and Describing our Focus
Identification
To treat or cure a disease, the illness must first be
identified. We will briefly review the recent past and
the current situation.
IFAC/SWIIS was formed during a period of uneasy
stability in a world dominated by two military powers
with huge stores of nuclear warheads and delivery
vehicles. In tile new millelonium, the world is even
less stable tlum it was when IFAC creatcd the
Technical Commit tee on Supplcmental Ways for
Improving International Stability (SWIIS). SWIIS
was born during tile Cold War. Wc can describe tllat
era as a time of nervous, temporary stability set in a
bi-polar world. We also remember the Cold War for
its massive buildup of nuclear weapons.
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Most of tile large Cold-War stockpiles of weapons
and delivery vehicles are still available to the same
two powers, but our present situation is a multi-polar
world. TIlere is no easy way to describe our current
level of international stability or instability. At some
times, the mood of international observers (one such
observer is "The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists") may
be more pessimistic tllaIl during the period of bi-
polarity. At other times, the mood of observers is
more optimistic.
Description
During the Cold War, most nations with nuclear arms
or nuclear capability ere at least passively aligned
Witll one of the two dominant powers. In that
situation, it was unlikely that any tIllrd party would
(or even could) begin a major conflict. An uneasy
"discipline" prevailed among tile two blocs and
among a more or less neutral group of other nations.
This quasi-stable situation no longer prevails.
A new world order has arisen, but tills "new order" is
quite different from the "New World Order"
proposed some years ago by a few idealists. The new
reality is that today's "new world order" can be
described as "tile brink of chaos." Many pairs of
nations Witll varying levels of hostility could choose
to use nuclear weapons in "local" conflicts apart from
the influence of the two major nuclear powers.
2.2. Catalytic War
Donald Kobe, currently Professor of Physics at
University of North Texas, Denton, Texas, D.S.A.,
[Kobe, 1962] set forth a hypothesis that as nations
acquire nuclear weapons, each nation will develop its
own "retaliatory matrix." Each nation's matrix
indicates which nation(s) will receive retaliatory
strikes if the subject nation is attacked with nuclear
weapons.
As the number of nuclear powers rises, it is possible
tllat a nation nlight create a rapidly escalating nuclear
conflict by attacking a nation whose retaliatory
matrix was known to include many target nations. In
turn, those nations would strike targets in their own
retaliatory matrices. Kobe's conclusion is that the
likelihood of catastrophic war rises rapidly as the
number of nuclear powers grows.
The nmnber of nations with nuclear weapons at the
begilming of the tlllrd millennium may already have
reached tile point where a single weapon in the hands
of a "rogue nation" could trigger a major "catalytic
war." Weapons of mass destmction are available to
nations, which were fonnerly mi!itarily weak. Thus,
as measured in destructive capability, lnany nations
are militarily strong.
This raises the task of "managing peace" to a level
that does not fit prior management or diplomatic
patterns. We will return to this topic shortly.
3. THE BASES FOR BU1LDING STABILITY
3.1. Our Challenge: Moving Beyond
the Cycle ofRetribution
Instability is a major disease which unlocks latent
historical memories of past sufferings. These
memories linger in the folk consciousness or national
consciousness of many peoples and nations. Given
that peoples and nations may seek retribution for past
sufferings and given that the cycle of retribution and
counter-retribution (or reprisal) is seemingly endless,
the present multi-polar, poorly- managed setting of
international instabiliiy poses a serious threat to the
entire world.
The cycle of retribution is a major international social
illness. We do not need to recite a list of specific
injustices, defeats and periods of subjugation. Every
serious observer knows thal the list of perceived
injustices is nearly without limit.
This SWIIS 2000 Workshop will contribute to a
better future if we foclls on positive actions and assist
international society in understanding the negative-
sum effects of the cycle of retribution.
We are challenged to use discretion in referring to
present tensions. E>.-perts realize that there are many
tension points. Thus, we continue to focus on
improving stability, not on apportioning blame or
guilt.
IFAC and IFAC/SWIIS are received in a friendly
manner almost everywhere because people tmst us to
be objective and to control our personal or national
political viewpoints. The practical result of this is that
though we move slowly, wc continue to "keep the
peace," where some peace already exists and that we
build goodwill where there has been hostility.
In regions with long histories of conflict, such as the
region where we arc today, almost every nation or
people of the region has been victor at one time and
defeated and subjugated at another time. With tlus
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backdrop, our present efforts focus on how we can
help to end the cycle of suffering.
3.2. Examining Possible Approaches to Stability
Collective historical memory can perpetuate the ills
of history by assigning blame for the offenses of past
generations to descendants of the offenders and by
seeking retribution against those descendants. In
regions where several population groups are close
neighbors, a climate of distrust among neighbors
from different groups can linger for centuries.
Many observers note that we live in a global
economy. Some of them would have us live in a
"global culture." They may believe that a single
culture, shared by all, would "repair" the ills of
lustory.
Several problems accompany the idea of a "global
culture:"
1. Most pointedly, a global culture is probably not
achievable.
2. However, for purposes of discussion, let's assume a
"global culture" could arise. Unless enforced,
homogeneity in large social groups tends to break
down as new subgroups form and attract adherents.
There are numerous historical precedents for the
splintering of seemingly homogeneous nations,
ethnic groups, religious groups and political
alliances. Thus, a "global culture," if it could be
achieved, would be temporary at most. Long-term
cultural homogeneity might possibly be maintained
through coercion, but this coercion would involve
global social control, a social evil of unimaginable
proportions.
3. Could ethnocentric distortions of history be
"corrected" by reducing all history to GLOBAL
lustory? Homogenizing history to a single global
perspective is unrealistic. It would be impossible to
reduce hwnan memory to a single undifferentiated
view of the past unless it were first possible to induce
a "mass forgetting." Creating a uniform global view
of history also seems undesirable because a second
(or third or fourth) process of "mass forgetting" could
be repeated by a demagogue, leading to a scenario
similar to that of OrwelI's novel "1984."
Is there a middle road between folk isolationism and
"global mass culture?" If so, this middle road could
prove to be an appropriate path to active peace.
 4. MOVING TOWARD A PARADIGM
FOR ACTIVE PEACE
4.1. Paradigm S'hift
The destructive cycle of retribution has bccn going
on for so long that it is not possible to decide when
one group has "evened the score" with another group.
Moreover, national perceptions are shapcd by the
biases of the perceiving group. Human
characteristics are such that each group of people
perceives its own misfortunes more sharply than it
perceives misfortunes suffered by others. As a result
of this human characteristic, it is impossible to end
the cycle of retribution by declaring that everyone
has "now paid an equal price." It would never be
possible to achieve multi-party agreement on any
such "settlement."
Clearly, stability and pcace will only be possible
within a new paradigm which transccnds thc notion
of "evening the score."
4.2. New Thinking abollt Inrernalional.':,'fability
Perhaps new methods of managing stability can be
developed based on a model of the global system as a
living body.
The global system may be thought of in terms of an
analog to the human body. Global society is, on the
one hand, more complex than the human body (if for
no other reason tlk'Ul that all humans are cncompassed
within global society, and clearly "all humans taken
together" are more complex than onc human), but
global society is, on the olher hand, much more
loosely-coupled than a human body. Each pcrson is
"governed" by a single brain which maps its
internally-determined control pammeters to various
functions of the body. In contrast. the global system
is "governed" by a vast overlapping array of
individuals, of groups, of ideologies, of religions, of
ethnic ties, of national governmcnts, of organizations,
of commitments, etc. Tltis results in a many-to-many
mapping of control onto the functions of the
international system. [ The term "governed" as used
here is directly drawn from the Greek word
"kubernetes," which means "helmsman" and wltich
entered Western languages through the Latin term
"gubernator.")
It is theoretically possible for a single controller
(brain) to integrate many inputs and transform them
into a control signal (or a set of cohcrent signals)
which effectively controls a complex entity.
However, there is no reasonable model for a many-
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to-many mapping of inputs to provide coherent
control to a complex system of entities such as the
international system of individuals, of groups, of
ideologies, of religions, of ethnic ties, of national
governments, of organizations, of commitments, etc.
A "many-to-many" mapping virtually ensures that the
system will - absent special forms of control,
whether explicit or implicit - function chaotically - or
"spastically. "
Two areas for possible study or improvement can be
suggested:
I. Development of a theory of stability for systems
with "many-to-many" mapping of control signals
onto system functions.
2. Development of a theory of a "social brain" which
will map its control signals onto the international
system without seeming to override the autonomous
ambitions of individuals, governments, religious
groups, cultural groups, etc.
This "social brain" could appear to many observers to
be a "world government" which overrides the goals
of governments, religious groups, cultural groups,
etc. Winning acceptance for tltis type of control
mechanism seems impossible.
To win needed acceptance, a workable theory of a
"social brain" which exerts enough "control" to avoid
social spasticity must also provide sufficient
"autonomy" for a wide range of special groups.
Accommodation
One promising approach to increasing international
stability is for nations and peoples to learn the
pmctice of accollunodation. Adopting tltis new
behavioral mode may seem impossible, but given
environmental decline and the nearly constant threat
of war (in addition to almost ceaseless armed conflict
in some areas), it is reasonable to ask, "Can anyone
suggest a better alternative?"
What is accommodation and how might it function?
Accommodation is behavior which leaves room for
other nations and peoples to live adequately and
according to sustainability requirement. To be
effective, accommodation must operate in at least
four domains: economic; political; military;
environmental.
A study of history suggests broad outlines of how
nations and peoples can achiev~ accommodation in
three of these domains: economic. political and
military. There have been periods of trade and
commerce in which economic progress has been
achieved in many regions at the same time. There
have been eras of relative political stability marked
by reduced military activity.
However, the entire modem era (beginning with the
birth of the Industrial Age and perhaps even earlier)
has been marked by steady encroachment of hwnan
activity on the natural systems which support life on
this planet. Several recent periods of accommodation
and relative international stability have been achieved
at the expense of "conquering'" more of the natural
environment rather than conquering neighbors.
Francis . Bacon stated that "Nature can only be
conquered by being obeyed." International society
has forgotten the injunction to obey nature, and the
costs to our life support systems are mounting
rapidly.
4.3. The Environmental Imperative
The carrying capacity of the environment has been
undermined sufficiently that perhaps within a single
lifetime, nature will compel modification of human
behavior in the economic and military spheres.
Modifying these behaviors will present an
unprecedented challenge, but there is no clear
altemative, since people CaIUlOt accommodate each
other indefinitely at the expense of the envirolUnent,
which may be at tlle tltreshold of irreversible decline.
Some observers believe this threshold has already
been breached.
Successful accommodation will require new
leadership. Prior leadership paradigms have been
based on one of two assumptions:
(a) ntat one nation or people will either dominate all
other groups, or
(b) That the larger community of nations and peoples
will subdue nature and overcome physical limitations
so that all economies will grow rapidly enough to
meet hwnan needs without the challenge of
prospering by subduing neighbors.
History books are a catalog of nations and people
which followed the motif "grow and conquer."
If the presuppositions stated above arc correct, new
leadership paradigms must be learned - paradigms
which accommodate other nations and peoples as
well as tlle natural envirolUllellt. This suggests tltat
nations and peoples must control competitive
rivalries to avoid open hostility.
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Accommodation has two defining characteristics:
(a) Each nation or people accommodates to the need
for other nations and peoples to exist.
(b) Each nation or people recognizes that we all
depend on shared bio-systems to support life. If these
bio-systems weaken, social collapse could follow.
Nations and peoples need to understand our shared
predicament in order to map effective strategies for
the future.
Facing a common predicament does not mean that all
people must adopt a single philosophy. It does imply
that there is no room for wasteful clashes of
philosophies or religions. Human social systems must
redesign themselves for survival.
We sketch a prospective paradigm shift, hoping that
concerned people will work to move beyond this
rudimentary model. This paradigm shift will only be
successful when various dogmas (political, religious,
economic, and military) recognize that life as a whole
will not long survive the clash of dogmas aimed at
conquest in any of the four domains mentioned
earlier: economic, military, political, environmental.
The environmental imperative will eventually limit
the growth of population, perhaps the most serious
challenge to international stability.
5. SHAPING THE FUTURE
5.1. The Most Difficult Barrier- The Problem
of the Commons
The problem of the commons is that as each unit of
society -- individual, nation, or cultural group -
seeks to enhance its own standing among the whole,
at some point the whole suffers to create a slight, and
almost certainly temporary advantage for the group
which sought to outdo tlle others.
The phenomenon is best described by a story from
tlle early 19th century. There was a common grazing
ground shared by ten shepherds. Each shepherd had
ten sheep. The grazing ground had been ecologically
stable for generations. Then one shepherd decided to
keep eleven sheep. Temporarily, he gained an
economic advantage over the other nine shepherds
and became more prosperous tl1an the rest As they
understood what had happened, gradually all of the
group raised eleven sheep. Then someone raised a
twelfth sheep, etc. Eventually, the common grazing
grOlUld eroded and poverty ensued for all the
shepherds. In brief, tltis is the problem of the
commons.
If all behave responsibly, the "commons" can be
sustained. If some groups advance at the expense of
the commons, the commons will eventually die, and
all will suffer.
The "commons" for humanity is much more than a
grazing ground. It is all of the earth, and not simply
the natural environment, but also the cultural and
social environment in which all people live.
The most daunting challenge is for nations (and their
leaders) to internalize the need for accommodation
vis-a-vis all nations and peoples as well as the nanlfal
environment.
This reality will require many groups to scale back
aspirations in at least two domains: economic and
military. To the extent that political aspirations
include expansion versus other peoples or against
fixed environmental limits, these aspirations must
also be scaled back.
Many political theories and religions beliefs have
structured their goals and aspirations into profoundly
dogmatic fonnulations. Unless we can restructure
these dogmatic systems, we will surely create chaos
in human affairs along with great loss of life in an
injured environment.
Our road to active peace is fairly clear - leam to live
with others or be choked out by an "angry"
environment.
5.2. The path: (1) Set an Example; (2) Educate;
(3) Persuade; (4) Assist
Namely, we should try to follow:
(1) Set an appropriate e.'\nmple by prac\Jclllg the
needed discipline in the political and economic
behavior of our OWIi nations.
(2) Educate all regarding the environmental
necessity for behaviornl change.
(3) Persuade ourselves and IJIC others to change
behaviors.
(4) Assist others with technology and knowledge to
accomplish a behaviornl transition.
6. CONCLUSIONS: A MAJOR ROLE FOR IFAC
/SWIIS IN ADDRESSING THE PROBLEM OF
THE COMMONS
We have inherited the well-known problem of the
commons. The problem was defined for us, both in
the early 19th century and, in a more scientific way in
the 20th century. Though we did not define tIns
16
problem, we have the technical insight to recognize
the problem and its implications for the international
stability.
The problem of the commons presents a control
challenge with no equal. Fortunately, the control
profession also has unprecedented experience in
addressing difficult issues. Can the issue of human
group behavior be meaningfully addressed by our
profession?
Personally, I do believe the IFAC community is the
most competent group available to work toward a
resolution of human group behavior within a bounded
space. TIns suggests that our community is an
irreplaceable resource in the quest to improve
international stability.
Certainly we will find tImt initially there are no
simple parameters to describe and model hUlllall and
group belmvior. If this challenge seems
insunllountable, consider the situation when IFAC
was founded.
Who would have believed that the engineering
profession would play major roles in:
1) Developing artificial vision?
2) Helping to ameliorate human paralysis following
injuries to tIle central nervous system?
Early attempts to address the issue of international
stability will surely be crude, and some approaches
will prove misdirected in retrospect, but I am quite
convinced that no other group has the courage as well
as sufficient freedom from dogma to undertake tIlis
important step toward future stability.
A final pair of questions:
1) If not IFAClSWIIS and tIle broader IFAC
community, tIlen who?
2) If it is not time to begin now, then when will the
time come?
REFERENCES
Chestnut, H. (1984). Uses of Systems Techniques to
Improve International Stability. In Proceedings
ofIFA C Symposium on SWllS, Pergamon,
Oxford (UK), pp. 87-92.
Kile, F.O. (1999). Guiding Rapid Change - A
Leadership Paradighm for Global Society. In
Preprints of 14th IFAC World Congress, Elsevier
Science, Oxford (UK), Vol. M. pp. 165-170.
Kobe, D. (1962), A Theory of Catalytic War. J. of
Conflict Resolution, VOl. 6, No. 2, pp. 125-142.
Scheffran, 1. (1996). Peace and Sustainable
Development. Janus. 4, pp. 22-32.