Arrow Transportation v.

BOT- Ripeness for judicial determination

Doctrine: There is, to repeat, a great public interest in a definitive outcome of the crucial
issue involved. One of the most noted authorities on Administrative Law, Professor
Kenneth Culp Davis, discussing the ripeness concept, is of the view that the resolution of
what could be a debilitating uncertainty with the conceded ability of the judiciary to work
out a solution of the problem posed is a potent argument for minimizing the emphasis laid
on its technical aspect.

Facts:
Arrow Domestic Corporation and private respondent Sultan Rent-a-Car are domestic
corporations, both operate a public utility bus air-conditioned-auto-truck service, but
Sultan only had a provisional permit which was granted without publication. This led to
the filing of motion for reconsideration and for the cancellation of such provisional permit
but without awaiting final action thereon, a petition for certiorari was filed. According to
the petitioner his direct filing of the petition before the court without waiting for the decision
in the pending motion for reconsideration was due to the fact that the question involved
herein is purely a legal one, and that the issuance of the Order without the Board having
acquired jurisdiction of the case yet, is patently illegal or was performed without
jurisdiction.

Issue:
Whether or not the case is ripe for judicial determination

Held:
The court ruled in the negative. One of the most noted authorities on Administrative Law,
professor Kenneth Culp Davis, discussing the ripeness concept, is of the view that the
resolution of what could be a debilitating uncertainty with the conceded ability of the
judiciary to work out a solution of the problem posed is a potent argument for minimizing
the emphasis laid on its technical aspect. It is undeniable that at the time the petition was
filed there was pending with the respondent Board a motion for reconsideration.
Ordinarily, its resolution should be awaited. Prior thereto, an objection grounded on
prematurity can be raised. Nonetheless, counsel for petitioner would stress that certiorari
lies as the failure to observe procedural due process ousted respondent Board of
whatever jurisdiction it could have had in the premises. This Court was impelled to go into
the merits of the controversy at this stage, not only because of the importance of the issue
raised but also because of the strong public interest in having the matter settled.

Kbmpbm v. Dominguez- Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies; Acts of Alter Ego of

the President
Doctrine: As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well - settled that
this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose
acts, as an alter ego of the President bear the implied approval of the latter, unless
actually disproved by him.

Facts:
The Municipal Government of Muntinlupa entered into a contract with the Kilusang Bayan
sa Paglilingkod ng mga Nagtitinda sa Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng Muntinlupa (kilusan)
for the latter's management and operation of the Muntinlupa Public Market. When Ignacio
Bunye (petitioner in GR 91927) became Mayor of Muntinlupa, he directed a review of
such contract, claiming that the virtual, 50-year term agreement was contrary to Sec. 143
(3) of BP 337. He sought opinions from the COA and the Metro Manila Commission after
which the latter granted the Municipality the authority to take the necessary legal steps
for the cancellation of the above contract. Consequently, upon the presentation made by
Bunye with the Municipal Council, the latter approved Resolution No. 45 abrogating the
contract. Mayor Bunye accompanied by heavily armed men, allegedly thru force , violence
and intimidation forcibly broke open the doors of the offices of petitioners located at the
second floor of the KBS Building, purportedly to serve upon petitioners the Order of the
respondent Secretary of Agriculture and to implement the same, by taking over and
assuming the management of KBMBPM, disbanding the then incumbent Board of
directors for that purpose and excluding and prohibiting the General Manager and the
other officers from exercising their lawfulfunctions as such. As claimed by the petitioners,
the Order served on them was not written on the stationary of the Department, does not
bear its seal and is a mere xerox copy. The so-called petition upon which the Order is
based appears to be an unverified petition signed, according to Mayor Bunye, by 371
members of the KBMBPM. Respondents challenged the personality of the petitioners,
set-up the defense of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, and assert that the
Order was lawfully and validly issued under the above decree and Executive Order. G.R.
No. 91927

Issue:
Whether or not the order of the Secretary was valid

Held:
The court ruled in the negative. the rule is well settled that this requirement does not
apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the
President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him.
This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most
needed. There was no need then to appeal the decision to the office of the President;
recourse to the courts could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of
administrative remedies also yields to other exceptions, such as when the
question involved is purely legal, as in the instant case, or where the questioned act is
patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. Such is the claim of petitioners which, as
hereinafter shown, is correct. A substantially identical provision, found in Section 17,
Article III of the KBMBPM's by-laws. (Sec. 17. Removal of Directors and Committee
Members . — Any elected director or committee member may be removed from office
for cause by a majority vote of the members in good standing present at the annual or
special general assembly called for the purpose after having been given the opportunity
to be heard at the assembly.) The same article provides for the requirements for the
holding of both the annual general assembly and a special general assembly. Indubitably
then, there is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of
cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the right to due process is respected by the
express provision on the opportunity to be heard. But even without said provision,
petitioners cannot be deprived of that right. The procedure was not followed in this case.
Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto himself the power of the members of
the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning directors and officers.
He cannot take refuge under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 which grants him authority to
supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This section does not give him that right. An
administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those
necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by
implication beyond what may to necessary for their just and reasonable execution.