1

Stay Deep! - Submersible Boats

to True Submarines

The book will cover the tremendous post-WWII technological surge from 1946 to

the1960s/1970s or perhaps a little later. Bringing in a continuation of, and the impact of, the German

U-boat technological and operational developments towards the true submarine. Perhaps stopping

the book’s scope at ‘viable’ nuclear power. The focus would be on the British, European, Soviet and

American vessels, within the context of the Cold War. The difference of the actual operating

limitations of the previous submersible submarine to the true submarine would be highlighted. For

example, most WWII submarine films show under-surface engagements, something that was not

possible, nor did happen, with submersibles in WWII. Clearly illustrated hypothetical and real

examples of submarine engagements, and deployments during the covered time period, will

enlighten the lay-reader.

Note: Cover –Painting

Note: Map and illustrations to be done by Maria [my wife]

Note: I can get lesser photos and cutaways

Note: British Spelling/English Document

Questions for Jay

1. What format and what font do you want manuscript in?
 2

Introduction.
Note: This would be fleshed out.

Although the first military submarine operated as early as 1775 and development continued

throughout the 1800s, the submarine was really a creature of the twentieth century; it was the

submarine and the aircraft carrier that defined naval warfare in that century.

Glossary
Note: This would be fleshed out.

Admiralty: Shorthand terminology for the Royal Navy’s Board of Admiralty, which heads its

central administration. Unlike most such boards, it includes both the civilian political appointees and

the professional heads of the fleet.

Air Lock: A watertight compartment through which a diver may pass between a submarine and

the sea, pausing within it while the air pressure is equalized with the external environment.

Ballast Tank: A tank that may be filled or emptied of water to increase or decrease a boat’s

displacement.

Ballast Tank, Saddle: Ballast tank mounted outside the main structure of the hull, named by

analogy with saddlebags.

Bridge: The ship’s navigating and control station.

Bulge: Structures built onto a ship’s side beyond the primary hull structure. Initially these were

used to enhance protection against damage from a torpedo hit but they came to be employed more

to enhance stability by increasing a hull’s internal volume.

 3

Casing: A light non-pressure-resistant structure designed to improve submarine performance

and/or enhance personnel access on the surface.

Catapult: A device for launching aircraft into the air.

Conseil Superieur: The French Navy’s professional leadership.

Conning Tower: Navigation station outside the main hull.

Convoy: A group of merchant vessels traveling together under escort.

Depth Charge: An explosive charge detonated at a pre-set depth.

Diving Planes: Horizontal control surfaces used to move a submarine in a vertical plane.

Drop-Collar: A mechanical arrangement suspending a torpedo that may be release remotely.

Dynamite Gun: A gun using compressed air as propellant for its missile, which had a dynamite

explosive charge.

General Board: The professional leadership of the United States Navy until 1948.

Horsepower:

Brake Horsepower (bhp): The measure of the power output of internal combustion engines.

Indicated horsepower (ihp): The measure of the power output of reciprocating steam

engines.

Shaft Horsepower (shp): The measure of the power output of turbine engines.

Machinery Types:

Diesel: Internal combustion engines using oil fuel and compression ignition.
 4

Triple Expansion: Reciprocating steam engines using multiple cylinders to maximize steam usage.

Turbine: Engines that use the passage of steam or hot gases to rotate encased fan blade

assemblies to generate power.

Magazine: Stowage space for munitions.

Mine: An underwater explosive charge.

Monitor: A small shallow draft vessel carrying heavy guns, primarily intended for shore

bombardment.

Pressure Hull: The main body of a submarine that is reinforced to withstand water pressure.

Radar: Electronic location equipment, initially for search only but rapidly developed to provide

gunnery control and missile guidance.

Radome: A protective enclosure for a radar antenna.

Sail: Streamlined superstructure containing conning stations.

Sheer: The shape of the top of a ship’s hull as viewed from the side.

Sonar: Acoustic detection equipment for locating submarines.

Spar Torpedo: A warhead attached to a pole or spar, allowing it to project ahead of the attacking

vessel.

Submarine: A vessel that normally operates submerged. Usually also used to describe any vessel

that may operate underwater, even for a limited period.

 5

Submersible: A vessel that normally operates on the surface but may be submerged controllably

at will.

Superstructure: All a ship’s structure above the hull’s sheer.

Topweight: The component of the ship’s weight that is above its centre of gravity.

Torpedo: Self-propelled underwater weapon.

Torpedo, Acoustic: A torpedo that that is self-guided toward the sound of a target’s propellers.

Torpedo, Homing: A torpedo that is self-guided to its target by emissions (usually sonic).

Torpedo, Wire-guided: A torpedo guided to its target by an operator on the launching vessel

using signals transmitted through a trailing wire.

Torpedo Pistol, Contact: Torpedo detonator that uses contact with its target for initiation.

Torpedo Pistol, Magnetic: Torpedo detonator that used its target’s magnetic field for initiation.

Torpedo Tube: Tube for launching torpedoes, usually by the pressure of introduced compressed

air, a ram, or by allowing the torpedo to exit under its own power (swim-out tube).

Trim Tank: Small tank used for fine adjust of a submarine’s depth and inclination.

Variable Pitch Propeller: A propeller whose blades may be twisted to vary their angle according

to power needs.

Warship Types:

Battlecruiser: A battleship type that trades armour protection for higher speed.

Corvette: A small low-speed escort vessel.

 6

Cruiser, Armoured: A cruising warship type used until the first quarter of the 20th century that

depended on an armoured belt for its main protection.

Cruiser, Heavy: A cruiser armed with 8-inch guns.

Cruiser, Light: A cruiser armed with 6-inch or smaller guns.

Cruiser, Protected: A cruising warship type used until the first quarter of the 20th century that

depended on an armoured deck for its main protection.

Destroyer: A relatively small, fast, multi-role warship, originally designed to defend against

torpedo boats but later also used for surface torpedo attack and antiaircraft and antisubmarine

defence.

Dreadnought: A battleship armed primarily with eight or more very large calibre guns.

Escort Carrier: A small aircraft carrier primarily operating antisubmarine aircraft.

Frigate: A more sophisticated development of a corvette.

Pre-Dreadnought: A battleship usually armed with four large calibre guns and a substantial

secondary armament.

Q-ship: A commissioned warship disguised as a merchant vessel carrying concealed weapons

used to attack submarines induced to surface.

Sloop: A sophisticated antisubmarine and antiaircraft escort vessel.

Torpedo Boat: A small fast vessel, originally for attack with torpedoes but later often used as a

fast antisubmarine vessel.

 7

Basic Technology.
Note: This would be fleshed out.

The basic technology of the submarine is quite simple and has remained constant since its

inception. The boat submerges by taking on water through vents to decrease its buoyancy and

surfaces by expelling the water with compressed air. The outward appearance of the military

submarine has remained remarkably constant throughout its modern development—a cigar-shaped

hull topped by the immediately recognizable conning tower with a periscope for viewing the surface.

We can break submarine technology into five categories:

• Propulsion

• Hull design

• Weaponry

• Stealthiness

• Ancillary technologies

The method of propulsion for the first half of the century was the diesel-electric system.

Standard diesel engines were used for general operation on the surface but could not be used while

submerged because of the enormous amount of air required for combustion. The submarine would

only dive to attack or avoid detection, at which time the boat switched to power provided by electric

batteries, charged from the diesels while on the surface. Most submarines were double hulled, with

water filling the space between the two hulls while submerged. The weapon that made the

submarine useful was the self-propelled torpedo, powered by compressed air, which provided the

sub with a deadly and stealthy attack. These technologies have been supported by countless others,

each complex in its own right: atmosphere regeneration, escape and rescue techniques, underwater
 8

communications, weapons guidance, electronic countermeasure, and countless others, but all

technologies unique to the military submarine revolved around one concept: avoiding detection by

stealth.

WWII Experience – just enough material to create the base line on submersible versus true

submarine.

In World War II, the critical Battle of the North Atlantic was a struggle defined by the

technological accomplishments on each side as Germany’s U-boat force sought to avoid detection

from the eyes and ears of Great Britain’s anti-submarine warfare (ASW) force. In the efforts at stealth

and avoidance of detection, the most significant developments were the deployment of ASDIC (for

Anti- Submarine Detection Investigation Committee), or sonar, followed closely by airborne radar.

The most deadly enemy of the submarine turned out to be aircraft, which could detect surfaced

submarines by means of radar allowing an attack with bombs or, as the submarine dived, depth

charges. The U-boats countered British radar with a radar detector called Metox that warned of

attack, but the British eventually deployed a new radar using a centimetric wavelength undetectable

by Metox. The Germans did not discover the use of the new radar and were slow to develop an

effective counter.

U-boat losses continued to rise. As a stopgap measure the Germans deployed the schnorkel,

developed before the war by the Dutch but captured by the Germans upon the surrender of the

Netherlands. The schnorkel, or snorkel to the Americans and snort to the British, was a simple device

—a breathing tube that could be raised similar to a periscope that allowed the submarine to run its
 9

diesel engines while submerged. While technologically interesting, its practical deployment was a

failure; Allied radar could soon detect even the schnorkel protruding from the water.

A submarine is only as effective as its weaponry is reliable, and World War II saw examples of

massive weapons systems failures. In the Norwegian campaign of 1940, the earth’s magnetic field

interfered with the operation of the U-boats’ magnetically armed torpedoes. German U-boats

operating off the Norwegian coast aimed torpedoes at unsuspecting British capital ships only to hear

their duds clank off the sides of the targets.

In the Pacific, American submarines were armed with hopelessly defective torpedoes that

rendered the American submarine fleet useless for many months until the flawed torpedo design

was corrected. When effective torpedoes reached the American subs, their effect was devastating.

The Japanese never developed an effective ASW force or doctrine, and U.S. subs ran wild, destroying

over 60 per cent of Japanese merchant shipping and paralyzing the import-constrained Japanese

economy. While less well known than the great carrier battles and island invasions, the U.S.

submarine force contributed at least as much to the defeat of Japan.

WWII submersible limitations. Sub to sub warfare before the TRUE

submarine.

Many subs sank subs during the WWII.

In fact, subs were among the most effective sub killers in WWII.
 10

But, WWII torpedo technology was relatively primitive - in general they ran at a fixed depth and

along a fixed, straight line. Hitting a fully, deeply submerged submarine (one NOT on the surface, or

just below it at periscope depth) would be a million in one shot both because of the added third

dimension and because technology of the day (sonar) was not accurate enough to get an exact fix on

a deeply submerged sub for a torpedo shot.

In both World wars, subs sank each other either when both were on the surface, or when one

was at periscope depth and the other on the surface. In other words, subs sank subs the same way

they sank surface ships; on the surface. ONE time, a submerged sub sank a submerged sub. A British

sub, the Venturer, at periscope depth, sighted and sank a German U-boat (the Type IXD2 U-864),

traveling on schnorkel (at periscope depth) off the coast of Bergen (on the way to the Far East).

Again, this was not a truly submerged versus submerged attack, as it used standard sub vs. ship

attack methods (though with a deep depth setting on his torpedoes). (Source: "Hitler's U-boat War"

Vol II, Clay Blair, pg 692).

Details: As Venturer continued her patrol of the waters around Fedje, her hydrophone operator

noticed a strange sound which they could not identify. The hydrophone operator thought that the

noise sounded as though some local fisherman had started up a boat's diesel engine. Launders

decided to track the strange noise. Then, due to poor adherence to proper periscope usage protocol

on the part of U-864's crew, the officer of the watch on Venturer's periscope noticed another

periscope above the surface of the water. Combined with the hydrophone reports of the strange

noise, which he determined to be coming from a submerged vessel, Launders surmised that they had

found U-864.
 11

Launders tracked U-864 by hydrophone, hoping it would surface and allow a clear shot. But U-

864 had detected the presence of an enemy submarine, and remained submerged, starting to zigzag.

This made U-864 quite safe according to the assumptions of the time.

Launders continued to track the U-Boat. After several hours it became obvious that she was not

going to surface, but he needed to attack it anyway. It was theoretically possible to compute a firing

solution in three dimensions, but this had never been attempted in practice because it was assumed

that performing the complex calculations would be impossible. Nevertheless, Launders and his crew

made the necessary calculations, made assumptions about U-864's defensive manoeuvres, and

ordered the firing of all torpedoes in the four bow tubes (as a small, fast-attack boat, Venturer was

equipped with only four tubes in the bow, none in the stern, and carried a full complement of only

eight torpedoes), with a 17.5 second delay between each shot, and at variable depths. U-864

performed a crash dive, straight into the path of the fourth torpedo. U-864 instantaneously imploded

with the loss of all hands.

1. Illustration: The above attack clearly shown, perhaps in a split sequence picture. The

centrepiece-located centre of Book with say two more leafs of photo pages.

This is a windy way of saying that the sub vs. sub battle in U-571, is totally unrealistic. Like the

rest of the plot in the movie. (Hey, it's Hollywood. Want to talk about the great realism of 'Mission to

Mars?')

This site lists 20/21 U-Boats sunken by allied subs.

 12

Other sources lists up to 25.

The Type XXI-the game changer.

At end of WWII the German Type XXI was theoretically able to work up a firing solution by sound

without visual help.

Note: This would be fleshed out considerably, with exact combat processes and the German

tests/trials

Note: To be fleshed out with example cruises/missions

The war ended before the Germans could deploy their own next wave of technology embodied

by the Type XXI ‘‘Electric’’ boat, with much larger battery capacity that gave it a fast underwater

speed. Until late 1944 Allied bombing had a disruptive rather than disastrous impact on the Type XXI

program. The situation changed radically in 1945 when massive raids resulted in the destruction not

only of U-boats still on the ways but also of completed U-boats fitting out, or, in some cases, after

commissioning and while undergoing training. Thus, quite apart from the damage to construction

facilities, 17 completed Type XXIs were sunk in harbour between December 31, 1944 and May 8,

1945: Hamburg – seven; Kiel – six; and Bremen – four.

In essence the Type XXI simply introduced too much that was new simultaneously and

demanded too much of those involved in the program. The reasons for this were diverse. In part it

was due to the impending defeat on the high seas and the desire to do something – anything – to

prevent it. There was also a fascination in Germany for anything that was new and militarily
 13

impressive. With hindsight, there also appears to have been an air of unreality about many activities

and decisions, some of which may have been due to the pressure of work and others plain ‘woolly

thinking’. Unfortunately for the Kriegsmarine, the outcome of all the pressure and cutting of corners

was that the boats that were actually completed were constantly having to return to the yards for

repair and modification, resulting in delays in attaining full service stratus.

2. Illustration: cutaway of Type XXI – we can get one of those without much fiscal pain.

The Advent of True Submarines

During World War II the submarine’s principal roles were commerce destruction and hunting enemy

surface warships. The antisubmarine forces of the United States and the British Commonwealth

comprehensively defeated the submarine campaigns of both Germany and Japan against both

merchant shipping and naval forces with a combination of superior tactics and technologies.

Nevertheless, it was clear that new submarine technologies could potentially negate this superiority.

In particular, the advent of the German Type XXI submarines, the elektroboote, was especially

worrying. They combined high underwater speed, rapid manoeuvrability, substantial submerged

endurance, deep diving, and long range without needing to surface. These attributes resulted from

the installation of greatly enlarged batteries and more powerful electric motors in a shorter, deeper,

stronger, streamlined hull, and the use of snorkels to operate the main diesel engines underwater.

While the Type XXI did not represent a mature technology, its potential was clear, and its design

features powerfully influenced submarine development after World War II, especially in the United

States and the Soviet Union.

 14

The advent of the Cold War forced a thorough reappraisal of the role of submarines in the fleets of

the United States and its allies. Maintenance of maritime commerce, the movement of troops,

munitions, and equipment across the oceans to Europe and the Far East, and the forward

deployment of powerful naval surface forces, centred mainly on aircraft carriers, all were vital

components of the West’s strategy for containing the Soviet Union and for conducting operations

should a war break out. The deployment of mature submarines with the capabilities of the

elektroboote potentially could jeopardize the West’s ability to undertake all three. One part of the

solution to countering fast, true submarines was the deployment of fast, effective surface and aerial

antisubmarine assets, but that addressed only containing and defeating submarines once they had

reached the open ocean. The other, and potentially more efficient, option was to deploy the West’s

own submarines to hunt and kill enemy submarines before they could reach the oceans, and that

therefore became one of the submarine’s primary missions.

The Soviet Union also had to re-evaluate the purpose of its submarine force. One primary role

quickly emerged: defending the nation’s coast and ports against attack through offensive operations

against the West’s surface maritime assets—especially carrier forces and oceanic lines of

communications—and defensive operations against submarines attempting to prevent the egress of

Soviet boats. Both sides in the Cold War quickly came to view enemy submarines as the primary

target of their own boats, especially as both began deploying submarines as platforms for strategic

missile attack against the other’s homeland; in addition, the Soviet Union also placed great emphasis

on offensive missions against the West’s carrier groups.

 15

At the beginning of the Cold War, all operational submarines used diesel-electric drive. This required

submarines either to surface frequently to recharge their batteries, or that they be equipped with a

snorkel breathing device. The initial primary focus of submarine development, especially in the

United States and the Soviet Union, was the integration of experience from analysing and operating

the German elektroboote into their fleets.

The U.S. Navy took a three-track approach to this task. The first, longer-term approach was to

explore new propulsion technologies that would free submarines from the limitations of diesel-

electric drive; this led to the introduction of nuclear-powered boats. The second was to develop new

designs that embodied the principles of the Type XXI boats within the framework of U.S.

requirements. New long-range submarines of the Tang class and short-range hunter-killer types

emerged, but their numbers fell far short of the fleet’s requirements. To a great extent, however,

budgetary constraints forced the U.S. Navy to pursue most vigorously the least attractive option:

modifying, through the GUPPY program, as much as possible of the large existing fleet of new but

obsolete submarines built during World War II for greater speed and underwater endurance. Large

numbers of almost new Gato, Balao, and Tench class fleet submarines received more streamlined

casings and sails, enlarged batteries, snorkels, and improved sensors to suit them for submerged

operation for more extended periods.

The United States also undertook research on improved hull forms for extended high-speed

submerged operation, leading to the construction of the experimental Albacore by the Portsmouth

Naval Shipyard in 1952–1953.

 16

The Albacore was revolutionary: the hull was a teardrop shape, optimized for underwater operation;

there was a single propeller; and the installation of a massive battery permitted very high submerged

speed, albeit for only short periods. The new hull form demonstrated great manoeuvrability, and

exploiting it led to substantial improvements in subsequent submarine control systems, making them

more akin to flying an aircraft than operating a boat. The Albacore also was subject to many

modifications, especially to the stern, which eventually received an X-tail that increased overall

length to 210’ 60”; several different types of propeller and rudder arrangements were tried, and the

boat also tested new configurations for sonar installations.

The new shape demonstrated by the Albacore quickly found its way into operational submarine

service, both for diesel boats and for nuclear-powered submarines, in the United States and

elsewhere. Its wide adoption marked the completion of the process of transformation from

submersible surface craft to full submarines. In the United States it found its principal application in

the development of nuclear-powered boats; only the three diesel-electric submarines of the Barbel

class took advantage of its characteristics.

The Soviet Union followed a somewhat different course in developing its new submarine fleet. In

many ways it was far more conservative, from a design standpoint. Essentially, it chose to integrate

the principles of the elektroboote into the design of updated iterations of the existing three basic

types: coastal, medium-range, and long-range boats. Unlike the United States, the Soviet Union put

these new designs into mass production, building 32 coastal Project 615 ( NATO-designated Quebec)

boats, more than 200 Project 613 ( NATO-designated Whiskey) medium submarines, and 22 of the

long-range Project 611 (NATO-designated Zulu) type.

 17

The Soviet Union also explored new submarine propulsion technologies and adopted nuclear power

some four years after the United States. Unlike the United States, however, the Soviet Union did not

end production of conventionally powered submarines. Large numbers of new diesel-electric Project

633 (NATO-designated Romeo) and Project 641 (NATO-designated Foxtrot) boats, again of relatively

conservative design, were built to supplement the earlier Project 613 and Project 611 types. Both

types nevertheless were successfully exported to countries within the Soviet sphere of influence and

laid the basis for conventional submarine production in both China and North Korea.

The Soviets in addition saw a role for conventionally powered submarines in the anti-carrier mission,

manifested in the production of the Project 651 (NATO-designated Juliett) and Project 641BUKI

( NATO-designated Tango) boats in the 1960s and 1970s, whose principal weapons were anti-ship

cruise missiles. The earlier type saw operational characteristics on the surface take pride of place,

inasmuch as it had to surface to launch its missiles and needed stability for that purpose. The

missiles of the later boats were launched while it was submerged, and consequently a modified form

of the earlier Project 641 attack submarine hull was found satisfactory.

The Royal Navy took a somewhat different approach to new submarine production immediately after

World War II. Alone among Allied navies, it had direct experience in creating submarines with high

underwater speed during the war, having converted several S class boats into high-speed targets for

antisubmarine forces. It used that experience, plus additional information derived from study of the

German elektroboote, to generate its own conversion program to build up a force of fast boats from

recently completed T and A class submarines, while working to make more radical propulsion

technologies reach production maturity.

 18

The Admiralty looked into nuclear propulsion but decided to exploit the German Walther close-cycle

turbine system for its non–air breathing submarines, because it seemed less expensive and closer to

being ready for service. Unfortunately, British experts were under the impression that German

technicians who had tested this system in a small number of experimental platforms were much

closer to solving all of its problems than was really the case. The Royal Navy built two special

experimental boats, the Explorer and the Excalibur, as platforms to bring the Walther system to

production status; in the meantime, they built new conventional submarines that, while very reliable

and generally quite effective, did not represent much of an advance on the conversions of wartime

boats or the German elektroboote. The failure of the work in developing a mature Walther system

left the Royal Navy no alternative but to turn to the United States for nuclear power technology

when the time came for it to build its own submarines that would be free from the limitations of

diesel-electric propulsion.

In the early 1980s the Soviet Fleet introduced a new conventionally powered attack submarine, in

large part because it was easier to create a quiet diesel-electric boat. The Project 877 (NATO-

designated Kilo) type was specifically designed for antisubmarine warfare and combined a teardrop

hull form with a powerful sensor suite and stringent measures to reduce acoustic and magnetic

signatures. These relatively large, conventionally powered boats proved very successful. They were

among the quietest boats of their era and also became a considerable export success, both in their

original form and as the upgraded Project 636 (also designated Kilo by NATO).

For most other nations the leap to nuclear power for submarines was out of the question, because of

the absence of the necessary industrial and scientific infrastructure, its great expense, and, in some
 19

instances, political obstacles. Instead, they exploited the elektroboote technologies to produce a new

first generation of Western, conventionally powered fast submarines.

The second generation of post-war diesel-electric boats represented a substantial advance on the

earlier types. Three elements combined to create these new boats: great strides in battery

technology, new hull forms inspired by the Albacore design, and advances in reducing acoustic and

magnetic signatures. New battery designs not only generated more power for the same space and

weight but also recharged much faster, enabling submarines to operate fully submerged for longer

periods and use their snorkel on a much more limited scale. New hull forms, and advances in

metallurgy, endowed these boats with higher speed, greater manoeuvrability, and deeper diving

capabilities. Reduced magnetism came from using nonmagnetic, high-tensile steel or active

demagnetizing. The biggest asset, however, that these later-generation diesel-electric boats

possessed was quietness and, therefore, stealth. Rafted machinery, slow-speed motors, advanced

propeller designs, sophisticated streamlining, and anechoic hull coatings all dramatically reduced

their acoustic signatures. When combined with their small size, especially relative to nuclear-

powered submarines, and thus an ability to operate in confined waters, this stealth made later

diesel-electric boats very difficult targets for aerial, surface, and subsurface antisubmarine forces.

Several producers of advanced conventional boats were able to turn these assets into lucrative

export production. Beginning in the 1970s, France, Sweden, and above all Germany began to

dominate the market for advanced conventionally powered submarines worldwide. The most

successful by far is the family of German Type 209 submarines, of which almost 60 have been

delivered or are on order for 15 nations. Moreover, since many of these export boats were ordered

by fleets without solid experience of modern submarine operations, lucrative training and support
 20

contracts often accompany the orders for the hardware, and contribute to the spread of a

remarkably uniform ethos of operation.

Soviet Developments.

Ambitious German plans to build Walter-designed ocean-going submarines, such as the 1,600-

ton Type XVIII, were thwarted by the unsuccessful course of the war, The Type XVIII was modified

into the highly successful Type XXI "Elektroboots" ["electro-boat"] in which larger batteries provided

a submerged speed of 17 knots, which could be maintained for 90 minutes. That innovation, and the

adoption of the snorkel, yielded a potent combination that strongly influenced the post-war design

of conventionally-powered submarines on both sides of the Iron Curtain. Type XXI U-boats were the

first submarines designed to operate entirely submerged, rather than as surface ships that could

submerge as a temporary, awkward mode of operation.

Following the Second World War the German U-Boat technology provided the Soviet Navy with

technological improvements. The German Type XXI submarine was capable of 18 kts submerged,

could dive to nearly 1,000 feet and included a schnorchel (snorkel) mast to allow for diesel

operations and battery charging while submerged.

During the five years following the end of World War II, Soviet exploitation of the Type XXI lagged

significantly behind American fears. US intelligence initially foresaw in 1946 a force of 300 Soviet

Type XXI equivalents by 1950. But it was not until 1949 that the first post-war Soviet submarine

designs -- the Whiskey and the Zulu -- put to sea. The Zulu was a true Type XXI, equipped with a
 21

snorkel, capable of 16 knots submerged, and possessing the size, habitability, and range necessary

for long range, blue water interdiction operations. But only 21 Zulus were commissioned between

1949 and 1958.

During the 1950s, including efforts to convert Zulus into ballistic missile submarines (SSBs). The

world's first SLBM submarines were the Soviet Zulu-class, diesel-electric-propelled vessels armed

with two SS-N-4 missiles. These undersea craft, converted to the SLBM role in 1958-1959, were

followed by the new-construction Hotel (nuclear) and Golf (diesel) classes, each of which carried

three missiles.

The Soviet Navy never lost faith in the SSK, and continued to build them in parallel with SSNs.

When the huge Project 613 ‘Whiskey’ programme came to an end in 1958 no fewer than 215 had

been built, and 21 more were assembled in Chinese yards. The improved Project 633 ‘Romeo’ type

never achieved the same popularity - 20 being built in 1956-64 for the Soviet Navy and others built

for export. The Project 611 ‘Zulu’ type, a 1930.5-tonne (1900-ton) ocean-going boat, ran to 30 units,

but large-scale production returned with the 62 Project 641 ‘Foxtrots’ built from the early 1960s to

1971. The 19 Project 641 BUKI ‘Som’ class (’Tango’) were specialised antisubmarine boats built from

‘Foxtrot’ components.

Very much like the battery capability given to the Tang class by the Americans to achieve the kind

of speed displayed by the German Type XXI’s at the end of World War II, this boat had an increased

number of batteries that provided the capability of remaining submerged for 300 hours at very slow

speed. The Romeo also had hovering capability. In many ways, it was the ideal pre-nuclear
 22

surveillance boat. These vessels came off the ways in the late 1950s, roughly the same time as the

advent of the first Soviet Nuclear boats, the November class.

Cold War ASW

Note: To be fleshed out with example cruises/missions

Each phase in the evolution of Soviet submarine capabilities created a new challenge for

American ASW forces, and the next four sections briefly assess how well each such challenge was

met, focusing on identifying innovations in technology and doctrine for ASW when they occurred.

The Second Battle ended as the Germans were deploying a new type of submarine designed to

counter the ASW techniques used by the Allies to defeat their wolf packs operating on the surface.

Known as the Type XXI, it combined three design changes to enable a radically new operational

approach focused on submerged operations. These changes were greater battery capacity, a hull

form more hydrodynamically suited to high underwater speed, and a snorkel allowing the main

diesel engine to breathe from periscope depth.

The Type XXI undermined each element of the Allied ASW posture that won the Second Battle.

The snorkel, which had a much lower radar cross section than a surfaced submarine, gave the

submarine back its tactical mobility. That is, it could once again move at speed on its main engine for

great distances without molestation by air ASW forces. A more hydrodynamic hull and greater

battery power allowed a completely submerged submarine to go faster for longer than before,

allowing it to escape prosecution by sonar-equipped convoy escorts once it had revealed its position

by attacking. At the operational level, Type XXIs deployed in sufficient numbers to blanket the North
 23

Atlantic shipping lanes would minimize the need for shore-based command and control, and, to the

extent that two-way communications between deployed submarines and headquarters remained

necessary, they could be executed using the new "kurier" burst transmission technology introduced

by the Germans at the end of World War II. Burst transmissions compress HF signals enough to make

it difficult to DF them. Combined with the likely absence of a code-breaking triumph, such as Ultra, a

future battle of the Atlantic would therefore be prosecuted without much of the operational

intelligence of opposing submarine operations that the Allies enjoyed in the Second Battle.

Type XXIs had fallen into American, British, and Soviet hands after World War II, and the U.S.

Navy rapidly discovered that it would face a major ASW challenge were the Soviet Navy to build large

numbers of ocean-going Type XXIs. In anticipation of this threat, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral

Chester W. Nimitz identified ASW as equal in importance to dealing with the threat of atomic attack.

The resulting ASW response to the fast snorkel threat initially unfolded in two basic directions: an

evolutionary path that sought to repair the ASW team that won the Second Battle and a more

revolutionary path that aspired to replace it.

The evolutionary response to the fast snorkel boat emphasized at the technical level better

radars for air ASW assets, better active sonars for surface escorts, and better weapons for both, along

with a tightly integrated tactical approach that sought to exploit the strengths and compensate for

the weaknesses of each ASW platform. This approach took advantage of the fact that a snorkel boat

still was not a true submarine in that it remained at least partially wedded to the surface, albeit in a

fashion that greatly reduced its vulnerability.

 24

The more revolutionary response introduced both a new sensor and a new platform into the

ASW equation. The new sensor was the passive acoustic array, and the new platform was the ASW

submarine, or SSK. American passive acoustic array development grew out of earlier German

developments, in this case the GHG array first used on a limited basis as a torpedo-self-defence

sensor on German surface ships, and later adapted for use by Type XXIs as a means of tracking and

targeting surface ships for torpedo attack while submerged. Fortuitously, the U.S. Navy discovered in

early post-war exercises that submarines were quite loud when snorkelling. Compared to a surface

ship, a snorkelling sub put all of its machinery noise into the water because it was submerged, and if

it was to make best progress during transits to and from its operating areas or keep up with a fast

convoy, it needed to operate at speeds well past the onset of propeller cavitation at such shallow

depths. For both reasons, it was an excellent target for a quiet platform deploying a large, low-

frequency passive array.

Submarine as Submarine Killer.

Note: To be fleshed out with example cruises/missions

The submarine, in turn, was ideal as such a platform for two reasons, one technical and one

strategic. On battery, essentially hovering in place, a submarine introduced the least possible self-

noise into the passive array, thereby maximizing the signal-to-noise ratio and therefore the detection

range. Direct path detection ranges against snorkelers of 10-15 miles were achieved in this manner in

exercises by essentially unmodified World War II fleet boats in the late 1940s. Equally important, the

submarine's inherent stealth, combined with the maritime geography of the emerging Cold War,

made it particularly suited for forward operations in the somewhat constricted waters through which

Soviet submarines had to proceed with some dispatch in order both to gain access to the North

Atlantic and to do so with transit times short enough to give reasonable endurance in the patrol

area.
 25

Both the evolutionary and revolutionary responses to the Type XXI threat began soon after World

War II, when little was known about the nature of the Soviet submarine threat. It was simply

expected that the Soviets, a continental power like Germany with both limited access to and

dependence upon the sea, would focus their maritime efforts on interdicting Allied sea lines of

communication by deploying a large force of modern submarines. Combined with this relative

vacuum of intelligence was a period in the five years between World War II and Korea of very low

defence spending in the United States. Despite the lack of intelligence and the extreme scarcity of

resources, the Navy placed substantial emphasis on ASW and made significant progress.

Airborne ASW.
Note: To be fleshed out with example cruises/missions

The evolutionary response focused on two technical challenges: the need to improve snorkel

detection by airborne radar and the need to improve the performance of surface ship sonars against

faster, deeper diving targets. Snorkels presented a much smaller radar cross section to a searching

radar and were also harder to detect amongst sea clutter, while the fixed "searchlight" sonars of

World War II could not be trained fast enough to keep up with a submarine moving at ten or fifteen

knots. By 1950, the APS-20 radar had recovered much of the detection range lost when snorkels first

arrived, and the QHB scanning sonar had improved the ability of a surface ship to hold a submerged

contact, but the ASW situation remained troublesome, according to several contemporary analyses

of the problem.

For example, the Hartwell report noted that despite its success, the performance of the APS-20

needed continued improvement because "we have no assurance that the ranges we are now

obtaining against our own snorkels and copies of the German snorkel can be duplicated against the
 26

Soviet snorkel. Evidence regarding the efficacy of snorkel camouflage is still fragmentary, but we feel

that a moderately vigorous Russian effort to exploit geometrical camouflage could probably reduce

our range seriously. In the long run, then, we see the radar-vs.-submarine contest as an unequal one,

with the submarine eventually the winner." Similar pessimism attached to the active sonar-versus

submarine contest as well as to the equally important area of ASW weapons, where the capabilities

of the Soviet systems produced by the imaginations of American engineers always exceeded the

American systems actually available to counter them.

This pessimism helped leave the door ajar for other approaches to the ASW problem. Thus, one

of the major conclusions of the Hartwell report was that small, tactical nuclear weapons should be

developed so that carrier aircraft could strike Soviet submarines in port at the source, a strategy

which had failed in World War II because of the fortifications produced by the Germans at their U-

boat ports, which survived repeated and massive attacks by even the largest conventional bombs. It

also discussed the possibility of ASW submarines and fixed surveillance systems utilizing passive

acoustics to detect snorkelling submarines at long ranges of as much as 100 miles.

NUCLEAR PROPULSION

At the beginning of the Cold War, all operational submarines used diesel-electric drive. This

required submarines either to surface frequently to recharge their batteries or that they be equipped

with a snorkel breathing device to operate their diesel engines while under water. New approaches

to the design of conventional submarines— such as the German Type XXI elektroboote, which greatly

increased submerged range and speed mainly by tripling the size of the battery— were clearly only

temporary substitutes for finding power plants that were not dependent on an external air supply for
 27

continuous operation. The Walter turbine, powered through the breakdown of hydrogen peroxide,

had potential, but it too suffered from limitations. Its operation was hazardous, the technology was

immature, and it had a voracious appetite for fuel, severely limiting the duration of a submarine

deploying the plant.

The physicist George Pegram, at a specially convened meeting on 17 March 1939, suggested to

the U.S. Navy that a suitable nuclear fission chamber could be used to generate steam for a

submarine power plant; three days later, the Naval Research Laboratory was granted $1,500 to begin

research into its feasibility. The outbreak of war and the concentration of the nation’s nuclear

physicists on the creation of an atomic bomb side-lined further work until late in 1944, when it

resumed. Serious research into nuclear power for submarines, which promised essentially unlimited

high-speed submerged operation, began immediately after World War II, leading to the

establishment of the Nuclear Power Branch, headed by Captain Hyman G. Rickover, within the

Bureau of Ships in August of 1948. A Division of Reactor Development, also headed by Rickover, in

the Atomic Energy Commission, was inaugurated the following February.

The Rickover Effect!

Strong, sustained leadership

The success of such varied innovators as the US Navy’s Admiral William J. Moffett (Chief of the

Bureau of Aeronautics 1921–33) and Admiral Hyman G. Rickover (responsible for the US Navy’s

nuclear propulsion throughout the Cold War), Japan’s reforming Admiral Yamamoto Gombei, and,

perhaps most outstandingly, the Soviet Navy’s Commander-in-Chief from 1956 to 1985, Admiral
 28

Sergei Gorshkov, all attest to the value of a long-term vision of the navy’s technological future, and

the administrative authority to push it through. The more a navy’s technological programme is

chopped around by regime changes, the less successful it is likely to be. To cope, navies need a long-

term institutional and cultural predisposition to adopt, adapt and exploit technological change pro-

actively.

Nautilus, the world’s first nuclear-powered submarine, was put in commission in September

1954, six months before the Killian report and nearly a year before Burke became chief of naval

operations. The vessel had been developed by a dedicated staff of zealots headed by one of the most

complex, abrasive, forceful figures in modern American naval history, Hyman G. Rickover. Rickover

eventually came to play Percy Scott, the dedicated early-twentieth-century Royal Navy technocrat, to

Burke’s Jacky Fisher, though by all accounts the Briton’s career was a model of easy ascent to flag

rank compared to the American’s tortured path. One might say of Rickover, as the entertainer Oscar

Levant said of himself, that he was a very controversial figure whom people either disliked or hated,

or, as Winston Churchill famously remarked of Charles de Gaulle, that he was a bull who carried his

own china shop around with him. Many respected Rickover, few liked him, and even those who did

admitted the man “exert[ed] an iron hold” on everything he touched or influenced. He drove his

people to the breaking point, and occasionally beyond, in his relentless insistence on top-quality

work and operations. Most found being around him “uncomfortable” and “very embarrassing,” as he

“browbeat” colleagues and subordinates alike. “I found he was just impossible,” Vice Admiral Kent

Lee recalled of a weekend cruise submerged with Rickover. “Insulting, never a decent word, ‘those

idiots from the shipyard and people like you’ he’d say to the man.” Future chief of naval operations

Elmo Zumwalt found Rickover “distasteful to listen to, egotistical, critical, spoke down. I got nothing

from the lecture that I recall.” Many senior sailors were incensed by Rickover’s unwillingness to wear

the uniform once he reached the relative shelter of the admiral’s star. Alfred Ward thought him
 29

“mean,” “rough,” “ruthless,” claiming that his sour personality permanently alienated him from the

secretaries of defense and of the navy as well as several chiefs of naval operations.

Rickover’s biting contempt for and patent distrust of people, their competence and their

motives, was readily understandable. His background was that of the poverty-stricken, frequently

despised Jewish immigrant child. Born in a small village north of Warsaw, he had come to America as

a young boy, settling with his family on Maxwell Street in Chicago. He saw his driven father, a tailor,

rise in the world by sheer grit and competence. Little wonder that as an adult, Hyman Rickover

“preached and practiced the gospel of work.” Winning one of the few Jewish appointments to

Annapolis, the youngster watched as a Jewish classmate was isolated without a word spoken to him

for every day of his four years because he dared to display a dash of academic excellence. The fleet

Rickover entered, like the society it served, was implicitly, often more than occasionally explicitly,

anti-Semitic. Brilliant as well as hardworking, Rickover never commanded a vessel larger than “an

ancient minesweeper,” the Finch, “pressed into use to move Marines to China” in the late thirties. At

the outbreak of war, he was back in Washington at the navy’s Bureau of Ships (BuShips), “one of the

unsung engineers who planned and built the ships that others would sail to battle and glory.” Stifled,

ignored, marginalized, his career something of a humiliation, it is little wonder Rickover seethed with

suppressed resentments and contempt that burst out irrepressibly when he at last found himself

better positioned than anyone else in 1946 to design and build revolutionary new vessels.

After World War II it was inevitable that the navy would go nuclear; the questions were how and

in what ways. Some sailors believed that “primary efforts in atomic energy should go into weapons.”

Others, like Deputy Chief of Naval Operations Mick Carney wanted a global ban on nuclear warships,

“fearing that if the United States had them at a future time so would its enemies.” But one
 30

community was avid for nuclear power from the beginning. Submariners realized that harnessing this

unique energy source would transform their weapon system from a surface ship with limited

submergence capabilities into a virtually undetectable stealth system that spent the vast majority of

its time far beneath the waves. The undersea community enjoyed the enthusiastic support of

Chester Nimitz, hero of the Pacific war and himself a former submariner. Rickover swiftly aligned

himself with these people, speaking out boldly for a nuclear-powered submarine and never letting

obstacles or frustrations deter or defeat him. In 1946 he got himself assigned to the nuclear facilities

at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, where he formed a small team of dedicated enthusiasts, and with the kind

of ruthless cunning for playing bureaucratic politics he had first displayed during the war in BuShips,

he eventually got to the right people (Edward Teller) and the right superiors (Nimitz and Navy

Secretary John L. Sullivan) for concept support and eventual project approval. In July 1948, following

months of manoeuvre and sweat, Rickover was at last given both the title and the practical authority

over the navy’s nuclear-power program. Six months later he was effectively “double hatted” as

nuclear-propulsion czar by both the navy and the Atomic Energy Commission. He immediately

proved to be as much an administrative genius as an able bureaucrat, blending the frequent

administrative chaos of the New Deal with the costly crash research program of the Manhattan

Project to build a shipboard atomic-power plant as rapidly as possible. “By the end of the year his

organization involved two federal agencies (the Navy Department and the Atomic Energy

Commission), two relatively autonomous groups within those agencies (the Bureau of Ships and the

commission’s division of reactor development), and three research organizations (Argonne National

Laboratory, the Westinghouse Electric Corporation, and the General Electric Company).” Five years

later facilities for building Nautilus and its later sisters stretched from Idaho (the National Reactor

Testing Station) to Connecticut (the Electric Boat Company).

 31

Even those who came to dislike Rickover vigorously were forced to admire him. Unlike other

chiefs of naval operations, Arleigh Burke exhibited “absolute warmest respect” for Rickover. The CNO

was no fool. For the good of the navy he would channel and control Rickover’s insatiable thrusts for

power and responsibility over the entire nuclear-submarine program. But within these limits Burke

treated Rickover decently, insisting that the apostle of nuclear power and his wife be invited to all

flag parties and urging those present “to make sure that people talked with Admiral Rickover because

he didn’t want him to have any feeling of being an outsider.” Ward and others might wilfully ignore

some understandable sources of Rickover’s conduct, but they did understand that the admiral’s drive

for perfection stemmed in part from a determination that the American taxpayer obtain the most

from very complex and costly programs. They also appreciated his ability to handle Congress. Ward

claimed in a 1972 interview that Rickover’s skill derived from being Jewish “and therefore a minority

race. . . . [A]nd the Congress was very careful not to alienate minorities.” The slur reflected more on

Ward’s attitude, which was regrettably widespread in the service and the country even at that late

date, than on Rickover’s presentational capabilities. “More importantly,” Ward added correctly,

Rickover treated congressmen and senators with extraordinary deftness, not only agreeing with what

they said but amplifying it in ways that suggested that Congressman X or Senator Y was a genius. In

short, Rickover was a more than able partisan for his cause and an adept political lobbyist in the

bargain.

Rickover harboured a surprisingly sensitive side that few ever saw. One who did was Captain Tom

Weschler. For some while in the late fifties, Rickover begged his CNO to come up to the Bettis factory

in West Mifflin, Pennsylvania, to familiarize himself with nuclear-power plants, their dimensions,

what kind of ships they could be used in, and so on. At last Burke made the journey, and at the end

of a long day he abruptly got in his limousine and was driven off to an affair in Pittsburgh, leaving just

Weschler and Rickover alone. When Rickover discovered that Weschler had to get to the distant
 32

Pittsburgh airport he said, “I’ll drive you.” Speeding along, Weschler hesitantly began to query the

admiral about his work and methods and got some surprisingly candid replies. Rickover explained his

mania for safety: “I have a son. I love my son. I want everything that I do to be so safe that I would be

happy to have my son operating it. That’s my fundamental rule.” Weschler soon discovered that

Rickover’s mania had a corollary: too many cooks spoiled any broth. “The second you get a new

project here in Washington, you’re going to find out you have a million helpers,” Rickover told him.

“Every one of them wants to help get your program through because it’s going to be a platform for

their gadgets. I was building a nuclear submarine, and that’s what it was going to be, and I didn’t

need all those other people who would have sunk my ship, or the project.”

Nautilus quickly demonstrated the astounding capabilities of the nuclear-powered submarine.

On its shakedown cruise in 1955 (the same year the navy deployed its first conventionally powered

supercarrier, Forrestal ) the submarine travelled thirteen hundred miles totally submerged at an

average speed of sixteen knots, remaining beneath the surface for eighty-four hours. Eventually, the

vessel sailed more than sixty thousand miles (including under the North Pole), almost always

submerged, on little more than eight pounds of uranium before its reactor core was pulled for

replacement.21 Carrier admirals were forced to take grudging notice of the possibility that such a

vessel could sweep surface ships off the seas, especially after the fast, teardrop-shaped nuclear sub

Skipjack later theoretically sank every aircraft carrier in the Sixth Fleet during manoeuvres in the

Mediterranean.

Burke took note of nuclear-powered submarines for another reason. These comparatively large,

roomy craft could be lengthened and widened even further to provide the prime launching pad for

an effective sea-based ballistic-missile system. Burke went first to the air force, then to the army,
 33

saying that he wanted “about a foot in your missile to put in the equipment that’s going to be

needed for a Navy missile.” He would pay a reasonable cost. The air force said no; its Thor and Atlas

programs were too complex and too far along in development to make room for navy needs and

requirements. The Army said yes, and the navy piggybacked its research and development on Jupiter

for as long as necessary before splitting off to finish development of its own unique missile.

Burke’s first task was “get the concepts” of a sea-based ballistic-missile system “moving. So I

wanted to find somebody to run it.” He wanted a man who “could get other people to do a hell of a

lot of work and had an idea of organizing his work and who could get things done without creating a

fight and without going around and demanding things. We’ve had enough of—like Rickover, for

example,” who was fine for research and development work but not for the critical follow-on where

“willing participation” was essential. After an exhaustive search Burke settled on Captain William F.

“Red” Raborn, called him in, and told him two things: First, he could have the pick of any top forty

people in the service and no more, because forty was the optimum number that “one man can

handle by himself.” Second, “If this thing works, you’re going to be one of the greatest people that

ever walked down the pike. . . . If it fails, I’ll have your throat.”

Burke first made sure that Rickover was “cut out” of the fleet ballistic-missile decision and the

initial research work. Putting a complex missile system aboard a submarine was adding the kind of

elaborate bells and whistles to an already successful program that sent Rickover into a rage. It was a

wise decision, but even so, “Rick” would all too soon prove to be a major impediment to effective

advanced submarine design. Simply put, his obsession with nuclear propulsion was not matched by a

mastery of its problems. Some in the defence community harboured a suspicion that loss of the fast,

deep-diving nuclear sub Thresher in the spring of 1963 was due to fatal flaws in Rickover’s nuclear
 34

reactor, though others dismissed the idea out of hand. Nonetheless, the doomed vessel and her

sisters were already deemed too large and noisy for their hunter-killer role against Soviet U-boats. In

January 1968 Enterprise tried to outrun a trailing Soviet submarine between the West Coast and

Pearl Harbor only to discover that the Russian sub could easily match the nuclear carrier’s top speed

of thirty-one knots. Rickover’s only solution to this startling advance in Soviet underwater capabilities

was a reactor so big as to make the boats that carried it at once overlarge, too slow, and incapable of

operation at sufficient depth to be effective against Russian counterparts. Rickover was still able to

ram his solution through the Pentagon brass. According to one U.S. submarine admiral, American

hunter-killer boats suffered from crippling disabilities in speed and operating depth right down to the

end of the cold war. It was fortunate, I. J. Galantin maintained, that even the numerous boats of the

advanced Los Angeles class never had to test their effectiveness in combat against Soviet

counterparts. Rickover nonetheless continued to dominate the navy’s nuclear-power program into

the early seventies, with often disruptive effects on the navy’s personnel system. Powerful

congressional supporters frustrated every White House and Pentagon effort to get rid of him.

Having nonetheless managed to brush Rickover aside from the ballistic-missile program, Burke

then overrode those who had absorbed too well the lesson derived from the battle over the

supercarrier United States: that naval power must never be designed for use against prime strategic

targets like Soviet urban-industrial centres and complexes. The CNO established a Special Projects

Office under now rear admiral Raborn’s direction, then left the man and his team alone. Raborn and

his men worked with physicist Edward Teller to develop both the solid-fuel propellant and the six

hundred–pound nuclear warhead needed to create an effective subsurface-launched strategic missile

that would ultimately come close to matching the air force’s ICBMs in range, payload, and

sophistication. Rickover was then given the specifications for the kind of submarine necessary to

carry such weapons, and the sixteen-tube George Washington class was born by cutting open a
 35

nuclear-powered attack submarine already on the builder’s ways and inserting a missile

compartment amidships. Sixteen George Washingtons were eventually built (the last fifteen from the

keel up), followed by the Ethan Allen class and several subsequent generations of ever more

advanced and elaborate boats. One of Burke’s biographers has rightly emphasized that the admiral’s

bold decision to develop a fleet ballistic missile on a priority basis reflected not only his commitment

to enhancing the navy’s capabilities but also “his desire to integrate the service into the broader

context of national defense.”The CNO of 1955–1961 displayed the same strong team player spirit he

had exhibited during the unification fight of the late forties.

NUCLEAR PROPULSION

Creating a submarine-based long-range ballistic-missile system posed a series of brutally difficult

interlocking challenges in advanced technology. Raborn later emphasized that the program involved

not just another rocket but “a wholly new concept of weaponry, the dispatching of this ‘bird’ from

beneath the surface of the sea.” Though Polaris could carry a thermonuclear warhead and possessed

the same fifteen hundred–mile range as army (Jupiter) and air force (Thor) strategic missiles, it had

to be built substantially smaller to fit into a sufficient number of launch tubes (sixteen in all) in the

narrow confines of a submarine. Of even greater importance was the decision to use solid- rather

than liquid-fuel propellants. “There was just no practical way,” Raborn said, “to store or handle liquid

fuels effectively or safely on board a submerged submarine.” The Soviets would never develop an

effective solid fuel, and their liquid-fuelled ballistic missiles— and torpedoes—were always an

immediate danger to crew health and safety. Another challenge confronting Raborn and his

engineers involved “the wholly naval problem” of designing ships to carry a long-range missile and

the equipment to launch it “from below the surface . . . in fact, from quite deep below the surface.”

Raborn’s job was to “design stowage, handling, launching, and fire control equipment which would
 36

allow submarines to be used as the launching platforms for the missile.” A host of problems had to

be overcome, and Raborn identified three particularly difficult challenges. “One was to develop

equipment which would fire such a missile from below the surface and get it up into the air where its

rocket engines could ignite and take over the job.” A second problem involved navigation. Physicists

and engineers had to develop “new and far more exact methods of determining a ship’s position

than anything needed for normal navigation,” and they had to do so long before satellite-based

global positioning systems were available. “Quite a few people” had no idea that “one of the

absolute ‘musts’ in firing a missile at a target fifteen hundred miles away is to know where you are,

and very exactly, at the instant of firing. Otherwise, you can make an awfully costly error in your

aim.” A final and interrelated problem involved the creation of a guidance system sufficiently

accurate so that the missiles “would actually go where they were directed to go.” Every problem was

solved, and by 1958 Raborn could—and did—boast that the United States had developed either the

ultimate deterrent to war or its most fearsome expression: a combination of “the almost limitless

cruising range of the nuclear powered submarine and the vast potential for concealment offered by

the ocean depths with the longest range, highest speed and most lethal weapon system ever

developed, the H-bomb Armed Ballistic Missile.” Raborn, his people, and his superiors had no

illusions about what they had achieved. Both sides of the world in 1958 were on hair-trigger alert.

They remained so in late 1960 when George Washington first went to sea and on into the sixties,

seventies, and early eighties when follow-on programs to Polaris—Poseidon and Trident—came into

the fleet. Such weapons were not part of any space race or “scientific competition to solve the

secrets” of the universe, the admiral said. They represented “a grimly realistic race to meet and

cancel out weapons development beyond the Iron Curtain,” to assure Soviet “potential aggressors”

that no surprise attack, no matter how “thoroughly developed,” could wipe out at a stroke all sources

of nuclear retaliation.
 37

The strategic-ballistic-missile submarines (SSBNs), soon known as “boomers,” were designed—

along with the Strategic Air Command’s B-52 bombers and a cluster of army and air force land-based

intercontinental ballistic missiles—to constitute a “triad” of weapon systems designed for “massive

retaliation” in response to any nuclear first strike against the United States. Such power would, at

least theoretically, make the United States invulnerable to either thermonuclear blackmail or

thermonuclear ambush. Some analysts have emphasized that Eisenhower’s acceptance of the SSBN

program reflected his desire to rein in the air force, which by 1957 had gone completely overboard,

“indulging in” a policy of “gross overkill,” to the extent that planned wartime nuclear attacks around

the Soviet periphery would kill as many allied civilians as Russians. In fact, if Admiral Robert L.

Dennison is to be believed, the question of who would control the boomers remained a hot question

up to the moment when the George Washington went to sea.

Dennison was commander of the Atlantic Fleet in mid-1960 when he encountered Thomas

Gates, now Eisenhower’s defense secretary, at a General Motors picnic in Quantico, Virginia. The

affair was meant to bring defence contractors and key military people together for “consultations and

briefings,” food, and a few drinks. That evening Dennison and Gates found themselves closing the

party down. The two men had known each other since Gates’s tenure as secretary of the navy, and

Gates unburdened himself of a problem. The ballistic-missile subs were certainly strategic weapons.

The air force’s Strategic Air Command “claimed to have exclusive rights over these weapons,” though

Gates, as an old navy partisan, instinctively thought sailors should have control of their own ships.

Still, Gates had been out to SAC Headquarters at Omaha and had seen its superb command-and-

control arrangements. Moreover, Tommy Powers, the air force chief of staff, had assured Gates that

there were no command layers between the White House, SAC Headquarters, and the B-52 squadron

commanders. Surely, the navy couldn’t match that!

 38

Dennison assured Gates that as Atlantic Fleet commander he certainly could. “If you assign these

Polaris submarines in the Atlantic to me as a unified commander, I will guarantee you that I’ll put in a

better command and control system than SAC has over his bombers. I will command them

personally, not through a whole echelon of division commanders and squadron commanders and so

on.” That wasn’t what the navy had told him, Gates replied. “I’m told the Navy has such a great

command organization that they’ll control Polaris through the normal chain of command.” “Well, I

don’t know who’d tell you that,” Dennison said, “but that isn’t what you’re going to hear. I just told

you what I will do and I’ll guarantee it. I’d like to do it.” A decision had to be made soon “because

time was pressing.” Gates “couldn’t leave this issue hanging.” The secretary pondered Dennison’s

offer, then made his decision. Within days the word was out. The navy would command and control

the ballistic-missile subs.

The ships, aircraft, and missiles of the U.S. fleet were now at the apex of the nation’s retaliatory

power. Brand-new or substantially upgraded aircraft carriers with atomic weapons in their bellies, a

new generation of advanced aircraft on their flight decks, and guided-missile cruisers riding escort

stocked the Sixth and Seventh Fleets that patrolled the Mediterranean and western Pacific flanks of

what was widely assumed (erroneously) to be a united Sino-Soviet Communist bloc. Soon the first

“boomers” would set out for their own undetected patrol areas in the vast seas ringing Russia and

China.
 39

The U.S. Navy followed two tracks simultaneously in developing reactors for use in submarines,

developing units using either pressurized water or liquid sodium to transfer heat to the steam

generators. Its first submarine with a nuclear power plant was the Nautilus, commissioned on 30

September 1954, although it was not underway under nuclear power until 17 January 1955. The

Nautilus used a pressurized water reactor, identical to a unit tested on land prior to the installation of

its power plant. It was a resounding technical success, although it suffered from extraordinarily high

noise levels that made its deployment as an operational boat in wartime problematic. The Nautilus

was followed by the Seawolf, powered by a liquid sodium reactor, which commissioned on 30 March

1957. The navy found that the liquid sodium reactor required detailed attention to maintaining

precise and limited operational parameters, and it decided against further investment in its

development. Instead, all resources went into production and improvement of pressurized water

units.

The Soviet Union began research work on nuclear power plants for submarines in 1946, but very

little progress was made because of the need to concentrate resources in the field of nuclear energy

on the production of bombs, to break the U.S. monopoly on such weapons. Consequently, it was not

until 1952 that significant effort was devoted to the project, leading to the testing of a land-based

prototype beginning in March 1956. Construction of the Soviet Union’s first nuclear-powered

submarine began with the laying of the keel for the K-3 at the Molotovsk yard in September 1955.

The boat was launched on 9 August 1957 and commissioned on 7 January 1958. Unlike the American

Nautilus, the K-3 was the first of a class of 13 boats of the Project 627 (NATO-designated November)

type, which also differed from U.S. practice in using two reactors for its power plant. Their greater

power output endowed them with higher performance than their U.S. counterparts, but, like

American nuclear boats, they were very noisy.

 40

The Soviet Union also explored the use of other media for transferring heat to the steam

generators, in this instance, liquid lead-bismuth. Its first submarine powered by such a plant was the

K- 27, built to Project 645, using the same hull design as the Project 627 boats lengthened to

accommodate the bulkier reactors. The liquid metal, although less dangerous in the event of an

accident than the sodium of the Seawolf’s plant, was somewhat less efficient as a heat exchanger

and also required constant heat to keep it from solidifying, leading to a requirement to either run the

reactor continuously or provide en external heat supply while the boat was in port. Although initial

trials were satisfactory, the K- 27 subsequently suffered a series of mechanical problems that led to

its early decommissioning; the experience, however, was not sufficient to induce the Soviets to

abandon lead-bismuth reactors immediately.

With the advent of ballistic missile submarines, both the United States and the Soviet Union

sought to protect themselves from a first strike at the hands of the other by developing fast, stealthy

submarines to intercept the ballistic missile boats, while simultaneously endeavouring to preserve

their own strike capability through defeating the interceptors. Very quickly the principal target of

attack submarines became enemy submarines, and the demand for high speed, manoeuvrability, and

quiet operation led to the rapid adoption of the hull form pioneered by the Albacore: the teardrop,

or body-of-revolution, shape. The Soviet Fleet introduced the remarkable titanium- hulled, highly

automated Project 705 (NATO-designated Alfa) type into limited service. Powered by a single, very

powerful lead-bismuth reactor, these boats could safely dive as deep as 2,000 feet and attain

submerged speeds well in excess of 40 knots. The complexity of their reactors, however, caused

problems in service and rendered them anomalies among the second-generation of attack boats: the

Soviet Fleet’s Project 671 (NATO-designated Victor) and the U.S. Navy’s Thresher and Sturgeon

classes became the most numerous and characteristic nuclear-powered attack submarines of the

Cold War.
 41

The Soviet Fleet also established a second requirement for its nuclear submarines, leading to the

production of a series of specialized boats equipped with cruise missiles with the dedicated mission

of tracking and, in the event of war, destroying the fast carriers of the U.S. Navy. Initially these cruise

missiles had to be launched from the surface, so their platforms, the Project 675 (NATO- designated

Echo-II) type, were optimized for stability on the surface. It was not until the Project 670 class (NATO-

designated Charlie-I) nuclear-powered cruise-missile submarines that the Soviets developed the

capability to launch cruise missiles while submerged.

The third generation of attack and cruise-missile submarines were the U.S. Los Angeles class and

the Soviet Type 971 boats (NATO-designated Akula). Both embody considerable advances in reducing

acoustic, magnetic, and infrared signatures, as well as greater operational flexibility compared with

their precursors. The end of the Cold War, however, has curtailed their construction or operational

deployment substantially.

Britain, France, and China all have deployed nuclear-powered attack submarines, while India is

working toward deploying such boats in the not-too-distant future. Britain launched its first nuclear-

powered submarine, the attack-type Dreadnought on 21 October 1960. It used a U.S. nuclear power

plant, enabling the British to save both considerable time and money. Later British boats were fitted

with British-built power plants, though these derived substantially from U.S. prototypes. Under

President Charles de Gaulle, the French also built up a nuclear submarine force during the Cold War.

The French took a different path than the Americans, British, and Soviets, however, in that they first

built nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines rather than nuclear-powered attack submarines.

The country’s first attack boats used power plants similar to those of its ballistic missile submarines.
 42

The low ebb of relations between France and the United States at the time meant that French

designers could not draw on U.S. assistance or expertise in developing their nuclear reactors or

submarine propulsion systems. Consequently, French submarine reactors were heavier than their

U.S. and British counterparts. Their propulsion system also was very different, since French designers

elected to use turbo-electric drive rather than steam turbines, and that preference has continued

with the design for the next generation of attack submarines for the fleet, the Barracuda class,

scheduled to begin deploying in 2010.

Nuclear-Powered.

The most significant single development in submarine technology has undoubtedly been the use

of nuclear propulsion. The first nuclear-powered boat was the USS Nautilus, launched in 1955.

Nuclear power freed submarines from the need to surface or schnorkel. Subs could stay at sea for

months longer than before and stay submerged indefinitely.

Nuclear power had the biggest impact on submarine construction, beginning with the first

nuclear submarine, USS Nautilus, in 1954. Nuclear power plants permitted the construction of the

first true submarines. Non-nuclear submarines are properly submersibles—vessels capable of

submerging that actually spend most of their time on the surface, recharging their electrical

batteries. Nuclear-powered submarines, however, can stay submerged indefinitely, limited only by

crew fatigue, because water and oxygen are two of the by-products of their nuclear reactors. The

post-war development of guided weapons led to two classifications of nuclear submarines.

 43

1. Attack submarines perform the traditional submarine missions: attacking surface ships and

hunting other attack submarines. The threat of fast attack submarines became so acute, post-war

surface vessels incorporated helicopter facilities into their design, as only aircraft could hope to

counter the faster submarines.

2. Ballistic-missile submarines, carrying long-range guided ballistic missiles armed with nuclear

warheads, act as a last line of nuclear deterrence. The first ballistic-missile submarine, the USS

George Washington, was commissioned in 1959. The first launch of a ballistic missile from a

submarine came from the USS George Washington in 1960.The Soviet, British, French, and Chinese

navies followed suit with their own ballistic-missile submarines. One type of these submarines, the

Russian Typhoon, is, at 26,000 tons displacement, the largest submarine in the world.

3. Illustration: cutaway of nuclear submarine – also without much fiscal pain.

Soviet Response.

Only recently has reliable information become public on the Soviet Navy’s efforts to match the

US Navy’s achievement in nuclear-powered submarines. Work on the first Soviet design began in

September 1952, roughly four years behind the Americans. The team was headed by V M Peregudov

and N A Dollezhal, with Academician A P Alexandrov as chief scientific adviser. Special Design Bureau

143 was assigned the task of turning the Project 627 design into reality in the spring of 1953.

Detailed design work took only 18 months, and in the summer of 1958, K.3 sailed on her sea trials.

When the reactor plant ‘went critical’ on 4 July the Soviet Navy’s nuclear fleet came into existence.
 44

Known to NATO as the ‘November’ type, the new nuclear attack submarine (SSN) entered service

as K.3, but was later named Leninskii Komsomol (Lenin’s Young Communist League). She was

followed by 12 more Project 627A boats, known to the Soviets as the ‘Kit’ class, and the same power

plant was used in the Project 658 (’Hotel’) and Project 659 (’Echo’), hence the Western nickname for

the reactor plant, the HEN. Both ‘Hotel’ and ‘Echo’ were armed with long-range anti-ship missiles -

SSGNs in US Navy standard nomenclature.

There was great alarm in the US Navy and NATO when the Soviet nuclear programme got under

way so quickly, and even more when the performance of the ‘Novembers’ was monitored. But the

Soviets were having trouble with the pressurised water reactor (PWR) HEN plant, and turned to

liquid metal cooling. The Project 645 boat K.27 was a ‘November’ with the prototype reactor cooled

by lead-bismuth. It was successful, but had the serious operational drawback of making the SSN

more dependent on shore support. For similar reasons the US Navy developed a liquid sodium-

cooled plant for the Seawolf (SSN-575), but discovered that its disadvantages outweighed the

benefits. Improvements in the design of PWRs provided the same results for less money.

Although taken by surprise at the speed with which the Polaris missile system was tested and

introduced into service, the Soviet Navy did not wait long to provide a response. In 1963, the first

Project 651 (NATO’s ‘ Julie”‘) appeared: the K.I56. Sixteen of these diesel-electric submarines (SSGNs)

were built, armed with four launch tubes for P-6 Progress (SS-N-3A ‘Shaddock’) missiles in the casing.

These were raised to the firing position, a system repeated in the nuclear-powered Project 675

(’Echo’) class. The 28 boats of this class had double the armament of the ‘Juliett’ design, together

with the benefit of nuclear propulsion, but the 555-km (300-mile) ‘Shaddock’ bore no comparison

with Polaris.
 45

The first SLBM in service was the R-13 (SS-N-4 ‘Sark’) - developed for the Project 629 (’Golf’) class

and the Project 658 (’Hotel’) class (three carried in the fin or sail). These boats were soon rearmed

with the 650-mile R-21 ‘Serb’ missile, but the Russian designers eventually produced an SSBN clearly

influenced by the American boats. This was the Project 667A (’Yankee’), which appeared in 1967.

They resembled the ‘George Washington’ class in layout, with 16 R-27 (SS-N-6 ‘Sawfly’) missiles,

credited with a range of 1500 miles.

Admiral Gorshkov‘s Tenure

Note: This would be fleshed out.

Given the damage done to the Soviet Union by Germany, and the immense amount of resources

that had been poured into the war, it was impossible to provide the i11dustrial resources necessary

for the creation of such a gargantuan fleet. Instead, the Soviet Navy leadership tried to complete the

twenty-four big cruisers of the Sverdlov class. The main concern of the top admirals was not so much

to have dominating firepower at sea as to create vessels in which crews would learn the trade of

being sailors before being trained to fight.

Much of the momentum to acquire a large surface fleet died with Stalin in 1953. His death was

followed by the usual Kremlin infighting, and when First Secretary Nikita Khrushchev denounced

Stalin. and the “cult of the person of Stalin” in his February 1956 speech to the 20th Congress of the

Soviet Union, it was evident that there was a new power source, one to which Admiral Gorshkov

immediately gravitated. (It would not be until 1958 that Khrushchev assumed the post of premier,

and became head of both state and party.)

 46

Thus it was in 1956, eleven years after the Great Patriotic War ended, that Gorshkov was given

command of the Red Navy. He immediately paid lip service to Khrushchev’s policy that large surface

ships were obsolete and that missiles and submarines were the weapons of the future. He also

supported Khrushchev’s view that the Red Navy was an important element of foreign policy and

supervised the provision of surface ships, submarines, personnel, and materials for mine warfare to

countries the Soviet Union wished to influence.

Gorshkov sanctioned the huge Soviet submarine construction program that was bringing new

boats into service at the rate of eighty per year. Their purpose was to defeat the enemy by disrupting

naval and sea communications. The United States and the North Atlantic Treaty

Organization (NATO) nations were seen as the principal enemy, and if a conventional war were

fought, the Soviet Union believed that between eighty and one hundred large transports would be

arriving at European ports daily, with as many as 2,000 vessels en route simultaneously. Such a

massive effort could only be defeated by a massive submarine force.

Yet both the United States and the Soviet Union had moved forward with nuclear weapons and

missiles. If the war turned out not to be conventional, but rather nuclear, submarines would be

needed to launch nuclear missiles against enemy carrier groups, and against the enemy coast.
 47

Gorshkov was thus faced with enormous opportunities and challenges. On the one hand, under

his guidance, the Soviet Navy had to be swiftly elevated in quality and capability to undertake the

missions that Khrushchev envisioned. On the other, he did not have a large share of the military

budget nor, more importantly, a broad base of personnel upon whom to draw to command and man

his ships.

It would be his most important task to see that the best possible candidates were selected to

command submarines and be responsible for nuclear weapons. (Nuclear-powered submarines were

just visible on the horizon.) To achieve this Gorshkov had to create the doctrine and supervise the

training of the Soviet Navy, which lacked all the components of naval experience and confidence that

are so vital in wartime. At the same time, he had to elevate the stature of the navy within the

military complex of the USSR, so that it would receive a fair and adequate share of the military

budget. Finally, he had to attend to the myriad other details of building and running a huge navy,

while still nourishing his private dream of creating a large and balanced surface fleet.

There are many ways to evaluate Gorshkov’s relative success or failure.

Cold War Submarine Operations by the West

Note: To be fleshed out with example cruises/missions

Three circumstances radically changed the paradigm of Western submarine operators

immediately after World War II: the Allies’ overwhelming victory in that conflict, the transformation

of the Soviet Union from an ally into the West’s preeminent opponent, and the advent of true

submarines—epitomized by the German Type XXI boats, whose technology was readily accessible to
 48

all the erstwhile allies. Countering the potential major threat fast submarines could present to

transatlantic and transpacific lines of communications and to the free operation of Western surface

task forces permeated naval planning. Consequently, antisubmarine warfare, both defensive and

offensive, became the central focus of Western submarine operations.

The limitations of existing boats, even after major modifications such as the GUPPY program in

the U.S. Navy, and the constraints of current propulsion technologies at first entailed concentration

on interception. Submarines were deployed forward, ideally in close proximity to Soviet naval bases

or, if that was impractical, at “choke points,” relatively tightly defined passages through which Soviet

boats would have to travel to reach their targets. Early hunter-killer tactics relied on slow, stealthy

boats using passive sonar and fire-control equipment, but actual operations quickly demonstrated

the limited effectiveness of both the boats and their electronics.

The advent of nuclear-powered boats quickly changed the antisubmarine warfare situation for

Western submarines forces from the 1960s. Their greater size provided space for very powerful

sonar o u t fits whose capabilities finally came close to fulfilling the needs of stealthy hunter-killer

operations. Their vastly enhanced submerged endurance made prolonged ambush deployments off

Soviet bases or at choke points a realistic option. Powerful sonar, speed, and endurance also opened

up the possibility of maintaining continuous submerged surveillance of Soviet submarines; an urgent

requirement in the Cold War situation once the Soviet Union began deploying strategic missiles

aboard dedicated submarine platforms. Furthermore, the submerged speed and endurance of

nuclear boats at last made feasible the long-running concept of fleet submarines. They, however, did

not take on the role of ambushers of enemy surface forces (the original fleet submarine concept) but

rather operated as effective wide-ranging, stealthy escorts for important fast surface task forces,
 49

especially those centred on carriers which had become the principal targets of Soviet submarines.

The operations of British nuclear boats as distant escorts for the task force operating against the

Falklands/Malvinas in 1982 vividly illustrated this role; the sinking of the Argentinian cruiser General

Belgrano on 2 May by HMS Conqueror and the subsequent self-blockade of Argentina’s carrier

Veinticinco de Mayo in port thereafter clearly demonstrated how effectively submarines could

perform task force escort missions.

Two developments further expanded the mission portfolio of Western submarines: the use of

submarine-launched cruise missiles and the growth of the Soviet surface fleet. The addition of

cruise-missile launch capability to attack submarines enabled them to perform land attack missions

with great precision against narrowly defined targets. During the 1990s submarine-launched punitive

Tomahawk cruise missile strikes against facilities of specific importance became the means of choice

whereby the United States attempted to reinforce its foreign policy decisions and retaliate against

regimes and organizations for attacks on U.S. citizens and assets. For example, on 20 August 1998 the

United States launched Tomahawk missiles against six terrorist bases in Afghanistan and a factory in

Sudan suspected of producing nerve gas in retaliation for the bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya

and Tanzania on 7 August. The commissioning of aircraft carriers into the Soviet Fleet also promptly

revitalized the submarine mission of surface warship attack, so that Western nuclear boats took on

the role of shadowing Soviet carrier forces that long had been an important function of Soviet

submarines.

Cold War Submarine Operations by the Soviet Bloc

Note: To be fleshed out with example cruises/missions
 50

At the end of World War II the Soviet Union had the largest submarine force in the world,

although it was far from being the most effective either in the quality of its equipment or its

operators. The onset of tensions with its erstwhile allies in Western Europe and North America that

led to the Cold War made containing the threat of the West’s overwhelming naval preponderance,

and especially its carrier forces, a major Soviet military goal. Consequently, using as a basis the

captured German elektroboote technology, the Soviet Union rapidly built up a very large force of

modern submarines whose primary missions were intercepting and shadowing Western carrier

forces and, should a conflict occur, attacking the transatlantic shipping bridge that carried

reinforcements and supplies from North America to Europe.

A second mission quickly developed: countering Western submarines that had adopted

antisubmarine warfare as their primary task. A dangerous cat-and-mouse game ensued that

persisted throughout the Cold War between Soviet and Western submariners, primarily in the waters

of the Arctic, North Atlantic, and North-western Pacific oceans, and the Mediterranean Sea. The

boats, their equipment, their weapons, and their operators became ever more sophisticated but the

objective remained the same: to secretly intercept an opponent and maintain stealthy contact

thereafter.

The deployment of Western ballistic missile submarines quickly led the Soviet Navy to react in

the same way as Western forces by deploying its attack submarines for operations to locate and

shadow the missile boats from their departure from port throughout their missions. Stealth,

endurance, and sophisticated sonar and fire control were crucial to the success of such operations,

which persisted throughout the Cold War and beyond to the present.
 51

Anti-carrier operations received a substantial boost in effectiveness with the advent of fast

nuclear boats armed with long-range anti-shipping missiles. This development closely coincided with

the deployment of Soviet strategic missile submarines, whose survival in the open waters of the

Atlantic and Pacific depended heavily on the ability of Soviet attack boats to neutralize Western

carriers and submarines. This became even more important with the advent of long-range ballistic

missiles capable of targeting North America without their launch platforms having to leave the

relative safety of the Arctic Ocean. The Soviet Navy developed the concept of “bastion defence” in

which its attack submarines and strong surface antisubmarine forces would neutralize Western

efforts to penetrate this zone of safety with their boats while the Soviet anti-carrier force prevented

U.S. carrier task forces from supporting penetration operations or initiating their own attacks on the

strategic missile submarines.

Throughout the Cold War attack submarines operated by all the protagonists played a vital role.

They were in the forefront of both defensive and offensive operations, operating right off their

opponent’s bases, trailing both surface and submerged opposition assets, and protecting their own

forces from interception and possible attack.

Strategic Missile Submarines

The advent of atomic and nuclear weapons, the physical distance between the two principal

protagonists in the Cold War, the range limitations of existing and imminent missile technologies, and

concerns about the vulnerability of bomber aircraft led to the investigation of the potential of

submarines as launch platforms for missiles. As the United States and the Soviet Union explored the

possibilities of this new submarine mission, the craft’s added attractions—stealth, mobility, and
 52

relative invulnerability—became more apparent, and it eventually came to occupy a position of at

least parity with land-based strategic missiles and clear superiority over conventional bombers.

Because Germany was the first nation to deploy strategic missiles, its experience and concepts

played a noticeable role in the development of U.S. and Soviet concepts. When Allied forces landed

in Normandy and advanced into northern France and Belgium, they o v e r-ran the launching sites for

Germany’s V-2 ballistic missiles. The range limitations of the V-2 missile (approximately 185 miles)

had placed most targets in the United Kingdom beyond its strike capabilities, and attacks against the

United States had clearly been far beyond the bounds of possibility. Such considerations had led the

missile development staff at Peenemünde to study options for launching ballistic missiles at sea. The

solution they chose was a self-contained canister, incorporating a launching platform, control space,

and propellant stowage, that could be towed by a submarine to its firing position and water-ballasted

upright for launch. Successful shore side testing of this system was completed in late 1944, and

construction of operational units had commenced; none, however, were completed before the war

ended.

The United States and the Soviet Union each took possession of both the technology and the

engineers from the V-2 missile at the end of World War II. This knowledge laid the foundations for

both nations’ subsequent development of strategic ballistic missiles for the delivery of atomic and

nuclear warheads. Similarly, they used the knowledge acquired from the German V-1 program as the

basis for developing their own land-attack cruise missiles that, initially, were more attractive than

ballistic missiles because it was easier to endow them with longer reach. Both navies quickly

appreciated the advantage of deploying land-attack missiles aboard submarines, since it offered the

potential for launching weapons against their opponent’s homeland from a stealthy platform.
 53

The U.S. Navy initially concentrated its efforts in exploiting cruise missile technology for land-

attack missions. It conducted test firings of Loon missiles (the U.S. production version of the V-1)

from the submarines Cusk and Carbonero in early 1947, using radio-command guidance to improve

their accuracy. Both boats served as guidance ships for later trials of the Regulus near- supersonic

nuclear-armed cruise missile, fired from surface ships. Two other fleet submarines, the Tunny and

the Barbero, received full conversions for front-line operation of Regulus missiles, entering service in

1953 and 1955, respectively. They soon were joined by the two purposes- built boats of the Grayback

class and, in 1959, by the nuclear-powered Halibut. A large force of more elaborate nuclear- powered

cruise missile submarines was proposed to supplement the Halibut. All boats were to carry the

supersonic Regulus II, but, after limited testing, that missile was cancelled in December 1958 as

redundant to requirements (and to concentrate funding and effort on the Polaris ballistic missile);

thus the submarines were reordered as nuclear-powered torpedo-attack craft.

The Soviet Navy exploited the concepts of the German V-2 missile launch canisters to develop a

design for a very large submarine capable of firing both ballistic and cruise missiles against land

targets. In the 1949 preliminary design the 5,400-ton (surfaced) Project P-2 boat could carry twelve

R-1 ballistic missiles (the Soviet production version of the V-2) and additional cruise missiles, but its

engineers were unable to solve a host of development problems, leading to the project’s

termination. The same design bureau began work the following year on Project 624, a 2,650-ton

(submerged) cruise missile submarine powered by a closed-cycle Walter steam turbine based on the

plant designed for the German Type XXVI boat. When that, too, was halted, work began on Project

628, a cruise missile–armed development of the wartime Series XIV design, but the Soviet Navy’s

rejection of its missile terminated efforts in 1953.

 54

Thereafter, the Soviet Navy simultaneously pursued the development and deployment of both

cruise and ballistic missile submarines. The diesel-electric Project 611A class (NATO- designated Zulu-

IV) submarine B- 62, with a single launch tube, was the first to fire an R-11 ballistic missile (NATO-

designated Scud) on 16 September 1955. The succeeding Project 611AB class (NATO-designated

Zulu-V) were the first operational ballistic missile submarines, the first boat (the B-67) commissioning

on 30 June 1956. These six boats could launch their two R-11FM missiles from vertical tubes in the

sail and retained the torpedo capabilities of their conventionally armed sisters. They were followed

by 22 Project 629 class (NATO-designated Golf) boats armed with three improved R-13 missiles and 9

similarly armed nuclear-powered boats of the Project 658 class (NATO-designated Hotel).

Meanwhile, after trials with two boats between 1955 and 1959— a Project 611 (NATO-

designated Zulu) and a Project 613 (NATO-designated Whiskey)—two series of operational

conversions based on the Whiskey design entered service from 1960, as the six Project 644 class

(NATO-designated Whiskey Twin Cylinder) and the six Project 665 class (NATO-designated Whiskey

Long Bin). Soviet designers also pursued development of nuclear-powered cruise missile submarines,

initially exploring a modified version of the fleet ’s first nuclear-powered attack boat as Project 627A

and then a much larger 7,140-ton (submerged) type as Project 653, both optimized for submerged

operation. But problems with the P-20 missiles for those vessels halted development. Instead, a new

nuclear- powered design, Project 659 (NATO-designated Echo I), which featured a conventional hull

form to maximize stability while launching missiles on the surface, entered service from 1961. On 14

December 1959, however, the new Strategic Rocket Forces were established. That arm of service

took control of all land-based strategic missiles, downgrading the importance of the navy’s cruise

missile boats and leading to the decision to concentrate efforts on sea-based ballistic missiles and

focus cruise missile efforts on anti-ship warfare.

 55

Soviet ballistic missile submarines were initially very vulnerable during launch, because they had

to surface to fire their missiles. On 10 September 1960, the B-62 of the Project 611AB class

successfully fired a ballistic missile while submerged. The new D-4 launch system it tested replaced

the earlier D-2 system originally fitted in the Project 629 and Project 658 classes of ballistic missile

submarines that began entering service in 1960. The upgraded Project 629A and Project 658M boats

carried three liquid-fuelled R-21 ( NATO-designated Sark) missiles with a range of 870 miles (twice

that of the earlier R-13 weapons) in vertical tubes and recommissioned beginning in February 1962.

In 1955, the United States began work on a submarine-launched ballistic missile that would

ultimately become the Polaris. Designers also began working on options for launching ballistic

missiles from submarines. Initially their designs were conceived to accommodate modified versions

of the U.S. Army’s liquid-fuelled Jupiter missile and emerged as similar to the Skipjack class attack

boats, with much enlarged sails incorporating the necessary launch tubes. The urgent development

of the solid-fuelled Polaris, however, made a more efficient arrangement possible. The first U.S.

ballistic missile submarines used a modification of the Skipjack class attack boat design, lengthening

the hull by 130 feet to accommodate 16 launch tubes in two rows of eight, additional auxiliary

machinery, and special navigation and missile-control equipment. The navy was able to accelerate

production by reordering a nuclear attack boat, the Scorpion, as a ballistic missile submarine and

incorporating its machinery and structural material into its construction. The first U.S. Navy ballistic

missile submarine, the George Washington, commissioned on 30 December 1959. The George

Washington test fired two Polaris missiles while submerged on 20 July 1960 in the Atlantic and

departed on its first operational patrol on 15 November 1960.

 56

The Polaris missile was upgraded over time, its range increasing with each iteration. The fourth

upgrade produced a new missile, the Poseidon, which featured Multiple Independently Targeted Re-

entry Vehicles (MIRVs). Each missile could carry 10–14 independently targeted nuclear warheads. It

was relatively straightforward to upgrade existing ballistic missile submarines to launch successive

versions of Polaris/ Poseidon missiles, since it was not necessary to enlarge their launch tubes to

accommodate them. The first boat to take Poseidon missiles to sea, the James Madison, departed on

patrol on 30 March 1971, while the final war patrol by any of the 41 submarines armed with these

missiles was not completed until 1994.

The Soviet Union was slower than the United States in developing ballistic missile submarines

capable of carrying heavy loads of these weapons. In part this was attributable to an attraction

toward deploying cruise missile boats, since cruise missiles seemed to offer greater and less complex

development potential than ballistic weapons and the submarines would be capable of undertaking

a broader range of missions. The emergence of a politically powerful rival for funding in the form of

the Strategic Rocket Forces also inhibited development of boats matching the weapons capabilities

of U.S. strategic submarines. The disappointing results of efforts to field long-range, heavily armed

cruise missiles and the success in overcoming difficulties in developing solid-fuelled ballistic weapons

led the Soviet Fleet to develop and deploy a large force of powerfully armed strategic missile

submarines: 34 of the Project 667A class (NATO-designated Yankee) followed by 43 of the various

versions of the Project 667B type (NATO-designated Delta), which entered service between late 1967

and early 1986.

Both the United States and the Soviet Union continued to develop longer-range, more powerful

ballistic missiles, which therefore were larger, and the bigger submarines required to accommodate
 57

them. For the United States the new missile was the Trident—substantially larger than the Poseidon

—which led to the design of the Ohio-class submarines, the largest in the world at that time. They

embarked 24 of the new weapons, an arrangement regarded as a considerably more efficient use of

submarine platforms. The first of 18 boats, the Ohio, commissioned on 11 November 1981. All

remain in service, although four are being converted to launch up to 154 cruise missiles via 22

vertical tubes, rather than ballistic missiles, with more possibly converting in the future. The Soviet

Union countered with its Project 941 class ballistic missile submarines (NATO-designated Typhoon),

the first, the TK- 208, commissioning on 12 December 1981. They use an unusual double pressure

hull form, are even larger than the Ohio class, and thus are the world’s largest submarines, although

they carried only 20 R-39 ballistic missiles (NATO-designated Sturgeon) in vertical tubes. The six boats

of the class remain in service.

Britain, France, and China also operate strategic missile submarines. The British turned to the

United States for their missiles, purchasing Polaris A-3 missiles, launch tubes, and control systems but

developing their own warheads. The design process for the four boats of the Resolution class took a

path similar to that of the first U.S. ballistic missile submarines. The British essentially used the

design for their own Valiant class attack submarines and inserted the missile launching section from

contemporary U.S. vessels abaft the sail to create the final design for their own boats. The first of the

class, the Resolution, departed on its first operational patrol on 15 June 1968. When the United

States developed the more powerful Trident missile, Britain negotiated an amendment to the original

Polaris agreement in 1982 to acquire the new weapon and the necessary systems for its operation.

The four boats of the Vanguard class used a greatly enlarged version of the Resolution class design.

Unlike their U.S. equivalents, the British boats carry only 16 missiles. They began operational patrols

in December 1994.
 58

Largely at the instigation of President Charles de Gaulle, the French also created a submarine

nuclear deterrent force. The French took a wholly independent route, developing their own

indigenous M1 strategic ballistic missile system. The six submarines of the Rédoutable class also were

the first French nuclear- powered boats, and they began operational patrols in 1971. After 1985

these boats were upgraded to launch the M4 missile with MIRV capability. As in the United States,

the Soviet Union, and Britain, advances in missile design necessitated the development of larger

submarines to accommodate the more powerful weapons. The four French boats of the Triomphant

class carry 16 M45 ballistic missiles capable of launching up to 6 MIRV warheads to a distance of

3,750 miles. These large boats are unusual in using a nuclear-powered turboelectric propulsion

system. They are scheduled to receive upgrades to launch new M51 weapons, with a range of 5,000

miles, beginning in 2010.

After China joined the “nuclear club,” it too inclined toward developing submarines to launch

strategic missiles. In the absence of indigenous capability to realize that ambition, it turned to its

then ally for assistance. The Soviet Union fabricated hull sections for two Project 629 class (NATO-

designated Golf) ballistic missile submarines at Komsomolsk and transferred them, together with

machinery and launch systems, to China in the early 1960s. The Chinese assembled one boat at

Darien in the mid-1960s and commissioned it as its Type 035. The other boat, however, was never

assembled. The completed submarine was deployed for testing: first of Soviet R-11F weapons and

later of indigenously derived missiles. In 1981, China launched a single example of its Type 092

ballistic missile submarine (NATO-designated Xia). This was an enlarged version of China’s first

nuclear-powered attack submarine design, the Type 091 class (NATO-designated Han), lengthened to

accommodate launch tubes for twelve JL-1 solid-propellant ballistic missiles with a range of 1,100

miles carrying a 200- to 300-kiloton warhead. That single boat became operational in 1983, although

it was not until 1988 that the Chinese satisfactorily resolved launch control problems. Between 1995
 59

and 1998 it was upgraded to deploy improved JL-2 weapons equipped with up to four MIRV

warheads and with a maximum range of 5,000 miles. China is reported to be developing a new class

of four nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (Type 094), but little reliable information on

their characteristics is available.

STRATEGIC MISSILE SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

Note: To be fleshed out with example cruises/missions

The U.S. Navy began operating its Regulus-armed submarines on strategic deterrent patrols in

September 1958. Exactly one year later, these boats initiated the continuous deployment of one or

more cruise missile submarines in the North Pacific, targeting sites in the Soviet Far East for attack in

the event of war. These patrols continued until July 1964, when the boats terminated their deterrent

mission. Conventional Soviet cruise missile boats, on the other hand, undertook only relatively short-

range missions in the Baltic Sea and Arctic Ocean until they were withdrawn from front-line service in

the late 1960s, although they no longer operated land attack missiles after 1965. Their nuclear-

powered cohorts of the Project 659 class (NATO-designated Echo I), however, were very active in the

North Atlantic and the Pacific. One boat, the K- 122, was seriously damaged internally by a battery

fire on 21 August 1980 while operating off Okinawa; the fire killed nine crewmen and left the ship

without power. Soviet ships had to tow the submarine to its base at Vladivostok.

U.S. ballistic missile submarines began deterrent patrols in the Atlantic in November 1960 and in

the Pacific in December 1964. To maximize sea time, the U.S. Navy introduced a new system for

operating its strategic missile submarines. Each boat was assigned two complete crews

(differentiated as the Blue and Gold crews, the navy colors). While one crew took the boat on a 60-

day deterrent patrol, the other was training, resting, or on leave. Upon the boat’s return to port, the
 60

active crew oversaw replenishment and repairs, then exchanged with the alternate crew, which took

the boat on patrol again. This crewing system has been maintained continuously to date; it allows the

navy to maintain up to two-thirds of its active ballistic missile submarine fleet at sea at any moment.

The early Soviet conventional Project 611AB class (NATO-designated Zulu-V) operated exclusively

in European waters as theatre threat weapons. The later conventional Project 629 class ( NATO-

designated Golf) and nuclear-powered boats of the Project 658 class (NATO-designated Hotel)

operated extensively with the Northern, Baltic, and Pacific fleets from 1962 until 1989. During those

operations the K-129 of the Project 629 class was lost on patrol in the North Pacific after an internal

explosion on 8 March 1968. The Central Intelligence Agency undertook a clandestine salvage

operation in 1974 using the purpose-built salvage vessel Glomar Explorer to recover the Soviet

submarine. During the lifting of the wreck the hull broke apart, and only the forward section was

recovered for examination and subsequent disposal. The Project 658 class was plagued with

problems, largely a consequence of poor workmanship and inadequate quality control. A coolant

pipe burst aboard the lead member of the class, the K-19, while it was operating submerged near

Greenland on 4 July 1961, exposing the entire crew of 139 officers and men, of whom 14 died, to

excessive radiation. After repairs the K-19 returned to operations but collided with the U.S. nuclear-

powered attack submarine Gato on 15 November 1969, damaging both boats. Then, on 24 February

1972, while on patrol 800 miles northeast of Newfoundland, the K- 19 suffered a catastrophic failure

in its cooling system, resulting in the deaths of 28 of its crew. The powerless submarine was towed

back to its base on the Kola Peninsula, repaired, returned to service on 5 November 1972, and not

decommissioned until 1990. Other members of the class also suffered major power plant problems,

often requiring tows back to port, and leading to a major reappraisal of inspection procedures during

construction and repair.

 61

The Soviet Union began deploying the large strategic missile submarines of the Project 667A

class (NATO-designated Yankee) on deterrent patrols off the Atlantic coast of the United States from

June 1969 and off the Pacific coast from October 1970. Thereafter, the Soviet Navy maintained two

to four of the class off the Atlantic coast and at least one off the Pacific coast. After these submarines

had been supplemented by the larger boats of the Project 667B type (NATO-designated Delta), the

Soviets kept 10 to 14 vessels at sea on deterrent patrols, with about three-quarters of all its ballistic

missile submarines ready for almost immediate service. It also developed systems enabling

submarines to launch missiles while alongside in their homeports to maximize their ability to

intervene in a conflict at short notice. This disposition of forces exploited the range advantage of the

Soviet liquid-fuelled missiles, which enabled their submarines to operate within “bastions,” oceanic

areas protected by the Soviet Fleet’s own antisubmarine and anti-ship forces from attack by NATO

antisubmarine and strike operations. That capability became even more effective when the huge

Project 941 class ballistic missile submarines (NATO-designated Typhoon) became operational in late

1981; the range of their weapons was sufficient for them to operate in the Arctic Ocean, where they

were virtually immune from attack.

Both the British and French ballistic missile submarine forces adopted a crewing system similar to

that devised by the U.S. Navy, using two crews to maximize operational deployments. The two forces

have consistently maintained about three-quarters of their submarines in operational status, with

the other quarter undergoing major refits. However, the smaller number of submarines each navy

possessed meant that few boats were at sea. During the Cold War up to half of the total forces were

deployed on deterrent patrols at any one time, but both navies now operate at a reduced tempo.

Each fleet is currently reduced to four submarines, usually with only one on patrol at any given time.

China, with a single boat, does not maintain standing patrols. Its single Type 092 submarine has

rarely ventured outside Chinese territorial waters.

 62

Postscript: Film Sub Warfare

Note: This would be fleshed out.

A humorous look at submarine films!