1. Lazaro v.
Agustin, April 15, 2010 ● The Heirs of Basilisa Agustin, as a defense, argued that they exclusively
DOCTRINE:
Settled is the rule that generally, a notarized document carries the evidentiary weight
conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents acknowledged
before a notary public have in their favor the presumption of regularity. However, this
presumption is not absolute and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to
the contrary. Moreover, not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on
authentication. Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become a public document
just because it contains a notarial jurat. The presumptions that attach to notarized
documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that the notarization
was regular.
FACTS:
● Simeon Santos begot 4 legitimate children, namely Basilisa Santos-Agustin,
Alberto Santos, Leoncio Santos and Alejandra Santos-Lazaro.
● Simeon died intestate, leaving a parcel of land (Lot No. 10675) in Laoag.
● The children of Simeon consented that the parcel of land be titled in the
name of Basilisa, as the eldest child.
● An OCT was issued in the name of Basilisa, but it was agreed that it did not
and does not necessarily mean that Basilia is the sole and exclusive owner of
the land.
● Without the knowledge and consent of the Lazaros, the title of the lot was
transferred to the children of the late Basilisa Santos-Agustin.
● During the lifetime of Basilisa, Alejandra informed Basilisa that the transfer of
the title into the names of her children would erroneously imply that the lot is
solely and exclusively owned by Basilisa’s children, but Basilisa replied to
Alejandra not to worry because an affidavit was already executed by her
recognizing and specifying that her brothers Alberto and Leoncio, and her
sister Alejandra would each get ¼ share of the lot.
● Alejandra initiated a partition in the barangay court, but that the children of
Basilisa and her grandchildren refused and opposed the partition claiming
that they are the sole and exclusive owners of the lot being that the lot is now
titled in their names.
● Because of this, Alejandra filed a partition of the lot in accordance with the
law in intestate succession and to partition the property.
owned the lot and that there was no agreement that Alejandra has a share
over the lot.
● The MTCC dismissed the complaint and denied the prayer for partition.
● The MTCC ruled that among others, that no evidentiary value could be given
to the affidavit allegedly executed by Basilisa, wherein she purportedly
acknowledged her co-ownership with her siblings, because the affiant was
not presented on the witness stand, such that all the statements made in her
affidavit were hearsay.
● In addition, the MTCC gave credence to the testimony of the Nurse and
Physician of Basilisa that she was already bedridden. The MTCC also gave
credence to the testimony of the notary public that he affidavit was already
complete and thumbmarked when presented to him.
● The RTC and CA affirmed the findings of the MTCC regarding the evidentiary
value of the affidavit.
● PETITIONERS contend that Basilisa's sworn statement which recognizes her
siblings' share in the disputed property is a declaration against interest which
is one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule. Petitioners argue that
since the sworn statement was duly notarized, it should be admitted in court
without further proof of its due execution and authenticity.
ISSUE(S):
Whether the sworn statement of Basilisa is a declaration against interest – NO
RULING:
● At the outset, it bears to point out that it is wrong for petitioners to argue
that Basilisa's alleged sworn statement is a declaration against interest. It is
not a declaration against interest. Instead, it is an admission against interest.
● Admissions against interest are those made by a party to a litigation or by one
in privity with or identified in legal interest with such party, and are
admissible whether or not the declarant is available as a witness.
● Declarations against interest are those made by a person who is neither a
party nor in privity with a party to the suit, are secondary evidence, and
constitute an exception to the hearsay rule. They are admissible only when
the declarant is unavailable as a witness.
● In the present case, since Basilisa is respondents' predecessor-in-interest and
is, thus, in privity with the latter's legal interest, the former's sworn
statement, if proven genuine and duly executed, should be considered as an
admission against interest.
 ● Settled is the rule that generally, a notarized document carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and
documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the
presumption of regularity. However, this presumption is not absolute and
may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.
● Not all notarized documents are exempted from the rule on authentication.
Thus, an affidavit does not automatically become a public document just
because it contains a notarial jurat. The presumptions that attach to
notarized documents can be affirmed only so long as it is beyond dispute that
the notarization was regular.
● The presumption cannot be made to apply to the present case because the
regularity in the execution of the sworn statement was challenged in the
proceedings below where its prima facie validity was overthrown by the
highly questionable circumstances under which it was supposedly executed,
as well as the testimonies of witnesses who testified on the improbability of
execution of the sworn statement, as well as on the physical condition of the
signatory, at the time the questioned document was supposedly executed.
● A notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who
signed the same are the very same persons who executed and personally
appeared before him to attest to the contents and truth of what are stated
therein.
● In the instant case, the notary public should have exercised utmost diligence
in ascertaining the true identity of the person executing the said sworn
statement. However, the notary public did not comply with this requirement
2. Patula v. People, G.R. No. 164457, April 11, 2012
DOCTRINE:
FACTS:
ISSUE(S):
RULING:
3. Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, et.al., G.R. No. 171701, February 8, 2012
FACTS:
● After the EDSA People Power Revolution in 1986, the first executive act of
then President Corazon Aquino was to create the Presidential Commission on
Good Governance (PCGG) for recovery, investigation and sequestration of ill-
gotten wealth accumulated by former President Marcos.
● Thus, numerous civil and criminal cases were subsequently filed. One of the
civil cases filed before the Sandiganbayan to recover the Marcoses’ alleged ill-
gotten wealth was Civil Case No. 0002, now subject of this petition.
● PCGG filed a complaint for Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting
and Damages against Ferdinand Marcos, who was later substituted by his
estate upon his death; Imelda Marcos; herein respondents Imee Marcos-
Manotoc; Irene Marcos-Araneta, Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Manotoc, and
Gregorio Araneta III. PCGG also filed several amended complaint to add
several more defendants to the case.
● Thereafter, petitioner presented and formally offered its evidence against
herein respondents. However, the latter objected to the offer primarily on
the ground that the documents violated the best evidence rule of the Rules of
Court, as these documents were unauthenticated; moreover, petitioner had
not provided any reason for its failure to present the originals.
● Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution admitting the pieces of evidence while
expressing that their evidentiary value shall be left to the determination of
the Court.
● Imelda R. Marcos; Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr.; Irene
Marcos-Araneta and Gregorio Ma. Araneta III; Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun
Ho and Yeung Chun Fan; and the PEA-PTGWO subsequently filed their
respective Demurrers to Evidence.
● Sandiganbayan issued the assailed Resolution, which granted all the
Demurrers to Evidence except the one filed by Imelda R. Marcos. Stating that
with regard to:
○ Imelda Marcos, she had categorically admitted that she and her
husband owned properties enumerated in the Complaint, while
stating that these properties had been lawfully acquired. The court
held that the evidence presented by petitioner constituted a prima
facie case against her, considering that the value of the properties
involved was grossly disproportionate to the Marcos spouses’
lawful income. Also, Rolando Gafud referred to her as one directly
involved in amassing ill-gotten wealth.
○ Siblings Imee Marcos-Manotoc & Bongbong Marcos, the court
noted that their involvement in the alleged illegal activities was
never established. As they were never mentioned by any of the
witnesses presented. Neither did the documentary evidence
pinpoint any specific involvement of the Marcos children.
Moreover, the court held that exhibits P-T were considered hearsay
as their originals were not presented in court, nor were they
 authenticated by the person who executed them. Also, petitioner
failed to provide any valid reason why it did not present the
originals in court.
○ Spouses Irene Marcos and Gregorio Araneta, the court similarly
held that there was no testimonial or documentary evidence that
supported petitioner’s allegations against the couple. Again,
petitioner failed to present the original documents but instead
merely presented photocopies of documents that sought to prove
how the Marcoses used the Potencianos as dummies in acquiring
and operating the bus company Pantranco.
○ The Yuengs, the court also held the allegations against them were
baseless because the documentary evidence relevant to their
allegations against them was inadmissible for being mere
photocopies, and that he affiants had not been presented as
witnesses.
○ PEA-PTGWO, the court held that there was no evidence to show
that Pantranco was illegally acquired, the former nevertheless held
that there was a need to first determine the ownership of the
disputed funds before they could be ordered released to the
rightful owner.
● Petitioner filed its Motion for Partial Reconsideration questioning, among
others, the court’s ruling that the evidence established previously admitted
was later held to be inadmissible against respondents, thus, depriving the
former of due process. However, the court denied the motion pointing out
its reservation in the Resolution wherein it said that it would still assess and
weigh the evidentiary value of the admitted evidence.
● To prove the petitioner’s allegations they submitted several evidences:
○ Sworn statement, depositions, affidavits, transcript of stenographic
notes (TSN), articles of incorporation, memorandum of agreement,
purchase agreement between Pantranco & Batangas, confidential
memorandum of Pantranco’s assets
ISSUE(S): W/N the documentary evidence presented can be admitted as evidence?
RULING:
● It is petitioner’s burden to prove the allegations in its Complaint. For relief to
be granted, the operative act on how and in what manner the Marcos siblings
participated in and/or benefitted from the acts of the Marcos couple must be
clearly shown through a preponderance of evidence. Should petitioner fail to
discharge this burden, the Court is constrained and is left with no choice but
to uphold the Demurrer to Evidence filed by respondents.
● Petitioner does not deny that what should be proved are the contents of the
documents themselves. It is imperative, therefore, to submit the original
documents that could prove petitioners allegations. Thus, the photocopied
documents are in violation Rule 130, Sec. 31 of the Rules of Court, otherwise
known as the best evidence rule, which mandates that the evidence must be
the original document itself.
● Petitioner did not even attempt to provide a plausible reason why the
originals were not presented, or any compelling ground why the court should
admit these documents as secondary evidence absent the testimony of the
witnesses who had executed them. It may not insist that the photocopies of
the documents fall under Sec. 7 of Rule 1302 because the fact that these
documents were collected by PCGG in the course of its investigation does not
make them per se public records referred to in Sec. 193 & 204 of Rule 132.
1
Original document must be produced; exceptions. - When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document
itself, except in the following cases:
a. When the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court,
without bad faith on the part of the offeror;
b. When the original is in the custody or under the control of the party against
whom the evidence is offered, and the latter fails to produce it after reasonable
notice;
c. When the original consists of numerous accounts or other documents which
cannot be examined in court without great loss of time and the fact sought to be
established from them is only the general result of the whole; and
d. When the original is a public record in the custody of a public officer or is
recorded in a public office.
2
Evidence admissible when original document is a public record. - When the original of a
document is in the custody of a public officer or is recorded in a public office, its contents
may be proved by a certified copy issued by the public officer in custody thereof.
3
Classes of Documents. - For the purpose of their presentation evidence, documents are
either public or private.
Public documents are:
a. The written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines, or of
a foreign country;
b. Documents acknowledge before a notary public except last wills and
testaments; and
c. Public records, kept in the Philippines, of private documents required by law to
the entered therein.
All other writings are private.
4
Proof of private document. - Before any private document offered as authentic is
received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must be proved either:
a. By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
 ● Petitioner presented as witness its records officer, Maria Lourdes Magno,
who testified that these public and private documents had been gathered by
and taken into the custody of the PCGG in the course of the investigation of
the alleged ill-gotten wealth of the Marcoses. However, given the purposes
for which these documents were submitted, Magno was not a credible
witness who could testify as to their contents. To reiterate, [i]f the writings
have subscribing witnesses to them, they must be proved by those witnesses.
Witnesses can testify only to those facts which are of their personal
knowledge; that is, those derived from their own perception. Thus, Magno
could only testify as to how she obtained custody of these documents, but
not as to the contents of the documents themselves.
● Neither did petitioner present as witnesses the affiants of these Affidavits or
Memoranda submitted to the court. Basic is the rule that, while affidavits
may be considered as public documents if they are acknowledged before a
notary public, these Affidavits are still classified as hearsay evidence. The
reason for this rule is that they are not generally prepared by the affiant, but
by another one who uses his or her own language in writing the affiant's
statements, parts of which may thus be either omitted or misunderstood by
the one writing them. Moreover, the adverse party is deprived of the
opportunity to cross-examine the affiants. For this reason, affidavits are
generally rejected for being hearsay, unless the affiants themselves are
placed on the witness stand to testify thereon.
● As to the copy of the TSN of the proceedings before the PCGG, while it may
be considered as a public document since it was taken in the course of the
PCGG’s exercise of its mandate, it was not attested to by the legal custodian
to be a correct copy of the original. The omission falls short of the
requirement of R132, Sec 24 & 25 of the Rules of Court
● Thus, absent any convincing evidence to hold otherwise, it follows that
petitioner failed to prove that the Marcos siblings and Gregorio Araneta III
collaborated with former President Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos and
participated in the first couples alleged accumulation of ill-gotten wealth
insofar as the specific allegations herein were concerned.
4. Republic v. Gimenez, G.R. No. 174673, January 11, 2016
FACTS:
b. By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the maker.
Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is claimed to be.
● This case involves 2 assailed resolution issued by the Sandiganbayan. Hence,
this petition for certiorari under Rule 45.
● Republic, through the Presidential Commission on Good Governance (PCGG),
instituted a Complaint for Reconveyance, Reversion, Accounting, Restitution
and Damages against the Gimenez Spouse before the Sandiganbayan. The
complaint seeks to recover ill-gotten wealth acquired by the Gimenez
Spouses.
● The Republic presented the testimonies of Atty. Tereso Javier, Head of the
Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and of Danilo R.V. Daniel, Director
of the Research and Development Department of PCGG. These witnesses
testified on the bank accounts and business owned or controlled by the
Gimenez Spouses
● During the trial, the Republic presented documentary evidence attesting to
the positions held, business interest, income, and pertinent transactions of
the Gimenez Spouses.
● Sandiganbayan gave the republic 30 days to file its formal offer of evidence.
● Republic moved for an extension of 30 days to file a formal offer of evidence
granted Republic moved for an additional 15 days granted.
● First assailed resolution: Sandiganbayan noted that the Republic failed to file
its Formal Offer of Evidence despite the extensions (around 75). Hence,
Republic waived the filing of its Formal offer of evidence
● Both spouses individually filed a motion to dismiss. One of which is on
Demurrer of Evidence and the other is on the ground of failure to prosecute
● 2 days after the motion to dismiss, Republic filed an MR and to admit
attached formal offer of evidences
● The formal offer of evidence consists of income tax returns, certificate of
income tax, checking statements summary issued by the Bankers Trust
Company, several checks drawn under the account of Fe Roa Gimenez,
Certification proving that Fe Roa worked with the office of the president
under different positions, Certificate of Articles of Incorporation, Affirmation
of a case filed in the CA against Marcos where certain acts of Fe Roa Gimenez
were mentioned. (Note: there are many more it extends until Exhibit TT)
● Second assailed resolution: Sandiganbayan denied the Republic’s MR and
granted the Motion to dismiss. The court reasoned that the reasons by
Republic to justify to timely file the formal offer of evidence fail to persuade
this court. The missing exhibits mentioned by Republic counsel appear to be
the same missing documents for almost 2 years ago. Hence, they had more
than ample time to locate them. There was also a failure to prosecute this
case for unreasonable length of time and to comply with the court’s rules.
 ● In the Same Resolution: The court also noted that the documentary evidence
presented by the Republic consisted mostly of certified true copies. However,
the persons who certified the documents as copies of the original were not
presented. Hence, the evidence lacked probative value.
● Hence this case
ISSUE: W/N the Sandiganbayan erred in holding that petitioner Republic of the
Philippines waived the filing of its Formal Offer of Evidence and in granting respondents
Ignacio Gimenez and Fe Roa Gimenez’s Motion to Dismiss on demurrer to evidence? -
YES.
RULING:
● Petitioner alleged that Sandiganbayan erred when it granted the demurrer to
evidence and dismissed the case despite a prima facie foundation that the
spouses Gimenezes amassed enormous wealth grossly disproportionate to
their lawful income or declared lawful assets. On the other hand respondent
allege that it was correct and that the petitioner cannot be excused from
filing its formal offer of its evidence considering the numerous extensions
given by the Sandiganbayan.
● To determine the propriety of the motion to dismiss, the nature of demurrer
to evidence shall be reviewed. The Rules of Court provide that the demurrer
to evidence may be filed after the plaintiff has presented his evidence if upon
the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief.
● In this case, the both documentary and testimonial evidence were submitted.
As to the documentary evidence, it submitted mostly certified true copies of
the original. The court, in the 2nd resolution, refuse to give credence to it
because it was not testified by the persons who certified them. Hence, there
was no significant substantial probative value.
Documentary Evidence presented by the petitioner
● Now, petitioner argues that its due process was violated when
Sandiganbayan rejected petitioner’s documentary evidence. Petitioner argues
that: a) respondents unqualifiedly admitted the identity and authenticity of
the documentary evidence presented by petitioner; and b) the documents it
presented were public documents, and there was no need for the
identification and authentication of the original documentary exhibits. It is a
public document because the exhibits were acquired in relation to the PCGG’s
functions prescribed in EO no. 1.
● On the other hand respondent, assail that the it is not an official issuance of
the Philippines government because they are mostly notarized public
documents, hence, no probative value.
Best Evidence Rule
The court ruled that the evidence presented by the petitioner before the
Sandiganbayan deserves better treatment.
● The court explained the best evidence rule provided under Rule 130, Section
3 of the Rules of Court. Under the rule, when the subject of the inquiry is the
content of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the
original document itself except for 4 mentioned in the same provisions. In
case of unavailability of the original document, secondary evidence may be
presented as provided under Section5 -7 of the same rule.
● The best evidence rule applies only when the subject of the inquiry is the
contents of the document.
● But even with respect to documentary evidence, the best evidence rule
applies only when the content of such document is the subject of the inquiry.
Where the issue is only as to whether such document was actually executed,
or exists, or on the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution,
the best evidence rule does not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible.
Any other substitutionary evidence is likewise admissible without need for
accounting for the original.
● Thus, when a document is presented to prove its existence or condition it is
offered not as documentary, but as real, evidence. Parol evidence of the fact
of execution of the documents is allowed
Public and Private Document
● For purposes of presenting these as evidence before courts, documents are
classified as either public or private. Rule 132, Section 19 of the Rules of Court
provides what are public documents. The same Rule provides for the effect of
public documents as evidence and the manner of proof for public documents
particularly section 23 – 25, 27 and 30.
● The nature of documents as either public or private determines how the
documents may be presented as evidence in court.
(1) A public document,
(a) by virtue of its official or sovereign character, or because
it has been acknowledged before a notary public (except
a notarial will) or a competent public official with the
 formalities required by law, or because it is a public
record of a private writing authorized by law,
(b) is self-authenticating and requires no further
authentication in order to be presented as evidence in
court.
(2) A private document
(a) is any other writing, deed, or instrument executed by a
private person without the intervention of a notary or
other person legally authorized by which some disposition
or agreement is proved or set forth.
(b) Lacking the official or sovereign character of a public
document, or the solemnities prescribed by law,
(c) A private document requires authentication in the
manner allowed by law or the Rules of Court before its
acceptance as evidence in court
● The distinction as to the kind of public document under Rule 132, Section 19
of the Rules of Court is material with regard to the fact the evidence proves
because not all types of public documents are prima facie evidence of the
facts stated.
● However, not all types of public documents are prima facie evidence of the
facts. "Public records made in the performance of a duty by a public officer"
include those specified as public documents under Section 19(a), Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court and the acknowledgement, affirmation or oath, or jurat
portion of public documents under Section 19(c). Hence, under Section 23,
notarized documents are merely proof of the fact which gave rise to their
execution and the date of the latter, but is not prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein.
● Additionally, under Section 30 of the same Rule, the acknowledgement in
notarized documents is prima facie evidence of the execution of the
instrument or document involved (e.g., the notarized Answer to
Interrogatories is prima facie proof that petitioner executed the same)
● The reason for the distinction lies with the respective official duties attending
the execution of the different kinds of public instruments. Official duties are
disputably presumed to have been regularly performed. As regards affidavits,
including Answers to Interrogatories which are required to be sworn to by the
person making them, the only portion thereof executed by the person
authorized to take oaths is the jurat. The presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed therefore applies only to the latter portion,
wherein the notary public merely attests that the affidavit was subscribed
and sworn to before him or her, on the date mentioned thereon.
● Whether a document is public or private is relevant in determining its
admissibility as evidence. Public documents are admissible in evidence even
without further proof of their due execution and genuineness. On the other
hand, private documents are inadmissible in evidence unless they are
properly authenticated. This based on Section 20, 132 of the Rules of Court.
During authentication in court, a witness positively testifies that a document
presented as evidence is genuine and has been duly executed or that the
document is neither spurious nor counterfeit nor executed by mistake or
under duress
● Indeed, in Republic v. Marcos-Manotoc, this court held that mere collection
of documents by the PCGG does not make such documents public documents
per se under Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. However, Sandiganbayan’s
evaluation of the evidence presented by petitioner was cursory. Its main
reason for granting the Motion to Dismiss on Demurrer to Evidence was that
there was no evidence to consider due to petitioner’s failure to file its Formal
Offer of Evidence. It brushed off the totality of evidence on which petitioner
built its case.
● Even assuming that no documentary evidence was properly offered, this
court finds it clear from the second assailed Resolution that the
Sandiganbayan did not even consider other evidence presented by petitioner
during the 19 years of trial. The Sandiganbayan erred in ignoring petitioner’s
testimonial evidence without any basis or justification. Numerous exhibits
were offered as part of the testimonies of petitioner’s witnesses.
● Petitioner presented both testimonial and documentary evidence that tended
to establish a presumption that respondents acquired ill-gotten wealth during
respondent Fe Roa Gimenez’s incumbency as public officer and which total
amount or value was manifestly out of proportion to her and her husband’s
salaries and to their other lawful income or properties. Petitioner presented 5
witnesses, 2 from PCGG.
● Petitioner presented as witnesses Atty. Tereso Javier, then Head of the
Sequestered Assets Department of PCGG, and Danilo R.V. Daniel, then
Director of the Research and Development Department of PCGG, who
testified on the bank accounts and businesses owned and/ or under the
control of spouses Gimenezes
● The court cannot arbitrarily disregard evidence especially when resolving a
demurrer to evidence which tests the sufficiency of the plaintiff’s evidence.
 ● Admissibility of evidence is different from probabtive value. Admissibility of
evidence refers to the question of whether or not the circumstance (or
evidence) is to considered at all. On the other hand, the probative value of
evidence refers to the question of whether or not it proves an issue.Thus, a
letter may be offered in evidence and admitted as such but its evidentiary
weight depends upon the observance of the rules on evidence. Accordingly,
the author of the letter should be presented as witness to provide the other
party to the litigation the opportunity to question him on the contents of the
letter. Being mere hearsay evidence, failure to present the author of the
letter renders its contents suspect. As earlier stated, hearsay evidence,
whether objected to or not, has no probative value
● Hence, there was an erroneous dismissal. The case is remanded to
Sandiganbayan for further proceedings.
5. Makati Shangri-La Hotel v. Harper, G.R. No. 189998, August 29, 2012
*This is a slightly long case. I really tried to shorten the facts and discussion. But we’ll
never know what Judge will ask.
FACTS:
● Christian Harper came to Manila on a business trip as the Business
Development Manager for Asia of ALSTOM Power Norway AS, an engineering
firm with worldwide operations. He checked in at the Shangri-La Hotel
(Shang) in Room 1428. In the early morning of 6 November 1996 (date of
check out), however, he was murdered inside his hotel room by still
unidentified malefactors.
● Around 11am, a Caucasian male entered the Alexis Jewelry Store in Glorietta
and expressed interest in purchasing a Cartier lady’s watch (P320k) with the
use of 2 Mastercard (MC) credit cards and an American Express (Amex) credit
card issued in the name of Harper. But the customer’s difficulty in answering
the queries phoned in by a credit card representative sufficiently aroused the
suspicion of saleslady Anna Liza Lumba, who asked for the customer’s
passport upon suggestion of the credit card representative to put the credit
cards on hold. Customer hurriedly left the store and left the 3 credit cards
and the passport behind.
● Harper’s family in Norway must have called him at his hotel room to inform
him about the attempt to use his Amex card. Not getting any response, his
family requested Raymond Alarcon, Duty Manager of Shang, to check on
Harper’s room. Alarcon and a security personnel went to Room 1428 at
11:27am and were shocked to discover Harper’s lifeless body on the bed
(eyes and mouth bound with electrical and packaging tapes and his hands and
feet tied with white rope).
● PO3 Carmelito Mendoza subsequently viewed the CCTV tapes, from which he
found that Harper had entered his room at 12:14am, and had been followed
into the room at 12:17am by a woman; that another person, a Caucasian
male, had entered Harper’s room at 2:48am; that the woman had left the
room at 5:33AM; and that the Caucasian male had come out at 5:46am.
● SPO1 Ramoncito Ocampo, Jr. interviewed Lumba about the incident in the
jewelry shop. During the interview, Lumba confirmed that the person who
had attempted to purchase the watch had been the same person whose
picture was on the passport issued under the name of Harper and the
Caucasian male seen on the CCTV tapes entering Harper’s hotel room.
● Respondents commenced this suit in the RTC to recover various damages
from Shang and offered documentary evidence relative to their heirship.
● RTC found hotel to be remiss in its duties and found liable for the death of
Harper. Shang pay respondents: P43.9M actual and compensatory damages;
P739k expenses of transporting the remains of Harper to Oslo, Norway;
P250k attorney’s fees; and cost of suit.
● CA affirmed RTC, but with modification. Pay P52M actual and compensatory
damages; P25k temperate damages; P250k attorney’s fees; and costs of suit.
● Shang points out that respondents committed several mistakes as regards the
documentary exhibits, resultantly making them incompetent evidence:
○ None of the respondents or any of the witnesses who testified for
them gave evidence that Ellen and Jonathan are the widow and son
of deceased Harper
○ Exhibit Q was labeled as Certificate of Marriage in Formal Offer of
Evidence, when it appears to be the Birth Certificate of Harper
○ Exhibit Q-1 is a translation of the Marriage Certificate of Ellen and
Christian, the original of which was not produced in court, much
less, offered in evidence. Mere translation --> cannot be a
competent evidence of the alleged fact that Ellen is the widow of
Harper, pursuant to Best Evidence Rule. Even assuming that it is an
original, it is not a public document that is admissible without the
need of being identified or authenticated on the witness stand by a
witness, as it appears to be a document issued by the Vicar of the
Parish of Ullern, and hence, a private document.
○ Exhibit R was labeled as Probate Court Certificate in Formal Offer of
Evidence, when it appears to be the Birth Certificate of Christian
Harper;
 ○ Exhibit R-1 is a translation of the supposed Probate Court
Certificate, original of which was not produced in court, much less,
offered in evidence. Mere translation --> it is an incompetent
evidence of the alleged fact that respondents are the heirs of
Christian Harper, pursuant to Best Evidence Rule.
○ Exhibits Q-1 and R-1 were not duly attested by the legal custodians
(by the Vicar of the Parish of Ullern and by the Judge or Clerk of the
Probate Court) as required under §24 and 25, R132, ROC. Likewise,
said documents are not accompanied by a certificate that such
officer has the custody as also required under §24, R132.
○ Exhibits Q-1 and R-1 as private documents, which were not duly
authenticated on the witness stand by a competent witness, are
essentially hearsay in nature that have no probative value à Failed
to prove that they are the widow and son of Harper.
ISSUES:
(1) W/N respondents were able to prove with competent evidence the
affirmative allegations in the complaint that they are the widow and son of
Harper. – YES.
(2) W/N respondents were able to prove with competent evidence the
affirmative allegations in the complaint that there was negligence on the part
of Shang and its said negligence was the proximate cause of the death of
Harper. – YES.
RULING:
(1)
● Shang assails that CA’s ruling on the authentication of the proofs of marriage
and filiation set by §24 and §25, R132 because the legal custodian did not
duly attest that the Marriage Certificate and Probate Court Certificate were
the correct copies of the originals on file, and because no certification
accompanied the documents stating that “no such officer has custody of the
originals.” Shang contends that respondents did not competently prove their
being Harper’s surviving heirs by reason of such documents being hearsay and
incompetent.
● Although Exhibits Q, Q-1, R, and R-1 were not attested by the officer having
the legal custody of the record or by his deputy in the manner required in
§25, R132, and said documents did not comply with the requirement under
§24, R132 to the effect that if the record was not kept in the PH a certificate
of the person having custody must accompany the copy of the document that
was duly attested stating that such person had custody of the documents, the
deviation was not enough reason to reject the utility of the documents for
the purposes they were intended to serve.
● Exhibits Q and R were extracts from the registry of births of Oslo, Norway
issued on 23 March 2004 and signed by Y. Ayse B. Nordal, Registrar, and
corresponded to respondent Jonathan and victim Christian, respectively.
Exhibit Q explicitly stated that Jonathan was the son of Christian and Ellen,
while Exhibit R attested to the birth of Christian on 4 December 1968. Exhibits
Q and R were authenticated on 29 March 2004 by the signatures of Tanja
Sorlie of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway as well as by the
official seal of that office. In turn, Consul Marian Jocelyn R. Tirol of the PH
Consulate in Stockholm, Sweden authenticated the signatures of Tanja Sorlie
and the official seal of the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway on
Exhibits Q and R, explicitly certifying to the authority of Tanja Sorlie to legalize
official documents for the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway.
● Exhibit Q-1, Marriage Certificate of Ellen and Christian was similarly
authenticated by the signature of Tanja Sorlie, with the official seal of that
office. PH Consul Tirol again expressly certified to the capacity of Sorlie, and
further certified that the document was a true translation into English of a
transcript of a Marriage Certificate issued to Christian and Ellen by the Vicar
of the Parish of Ullern on 29 June 1996.
● Exhibit R-1, Probate Court Certificate issued by the Oslo Probate Court on 18
February 2000, through Morten Bolstad, its Senior Executive Officer, was also
authenticated by the signature of Sorlie and with the official seal of the Royal
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Norway. As with the other documents, PH
Consul Tirol explicitly certified to the capacity of Sorlie, and further certified
that the document was a true translation into English of the Oslo Probate
Court certificate to the effect that Christian had reportedly died on 6
November 1999. Oslo Probate Court certificate recited that both Ellen and
Christopher were Harpers’ heirs.
● The official participation in the authentication process of Sorlie and the
attachment of the official seal of that office on each authentication
indicated that the documents were of public nature in Norway, not merely
private documents. It cannot be denied that based on PH Consul Tirol’s
official authentication, Sorlie “was on the date of signing, duly authorized to
legalize official documents for the Royal Ministry of Foreign Affairs of
Norway.” Without a showing to the contrary by Shang, documents should
be presumed to be themselves official documents under Norwegian law,
 and admissible as prima facie evidence of the truth of their contents under
the PH law.
● At minimum, documents substantially met the requirements of §24 and §25,
R132 as a condition for their admission as evidence in default of a showing by
Shang that the authentication process was tainted with bad faith.
Consequently, the objective of ensuring the authenticity of the documents
prior to their admission as evidence was substantially achieved.
● Constantino-David v. Pangandaman-Gania said that the focus in every inquiry
on whether or not to accept substantial compliance is always on the presence
of equitable conditions to administer justice effectively and efficiently
without damage or injury to the spirit of the legal obligation. There are,
indeed, such equitable conditions attendant here, the foremost of which is
that respondents had gone to great lengths to submit the documents. As the
CA observed, respondents’ compliance with the requirements on attestation
and authentication of the documents had not been easy; they had to contend
with many difficulties. Their submission of the documents should be
presumed to be in good faith because they did so in due course. It would be
inequitable if the sincerity of respondents in obtaining and submitting the
documents despite the difficulties was ignored.
(2)
● Shang is liable due to its own negligence. Shang failed to provide the basic
and adequate security measures expected of a five-star hotel; and that its
omission was the proximate cause of Harper’s death.
● The hotel business is imbued with public interest. Catering to the public,
hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for their guests but also
security to the persons and belongings of their guests. The twin duty
constitutes the essence of the business. There is much greater reason to
apply the same if not greater degree of care and responsibility when the lives
and personal safety of their guests are involved. Otherwise, the hotelkeepers
would simply stand idly by as strangers have unrestricted access to all the
hotel rooms on the pretense of being visitors of the guests, without being
held liable should anything untoward befall the unwary guests. That would be
absurd, something that no good law would ever envision.
PETITION DENIED.
6. Salas v. Sta. Mesa Market Corp., G.R. No. 157766, July 12, 2007
Facts:
● Primitivo Domingo and Ernesto Salas (petitioner) entered into a management
contract
● Under such contract, Domingo handed the management of his estate and the
(respondent) corp. SMMC to Salas. Salas was tasked to ensure SMMCs
continued profitability by redeveloping the Sta. Mesa market and
restructuring the corporation’s finances.
● On the other hand, Domingo bound himself to transfer 30% of SMMC’s
subscribed and paid-up capital stock to Salas as his compensation. But if Salas
fails to achieve a monthly market revenue of at least P350,000, he would be
obliged to return the shares of stock to Domingo
● Under the petitioner’s management contract, SMMC leased the Sta. Mesa
market to Malaca. However, Malaca was financially incapable of improving
the existing facilities of SMMC. In fact, it was unable to pay monthly rent.
SMMC terminated the lease contract and ended its management contract
with the petitioner.
● Petitioner filed an action for specific performance with the RTC. He alleged
that SMMC ‘s monthly market revenue surpassed P350,000 yet Domingo
failed to deliver the shares of stock
● Domingo argued that petitioner was not entitled to the shares of stock and
that the corporation suffered new losses amounting to P1,935,995.06
● RTC ruled in favor of Salas
● CA reversed the RTC and held that the trial court erred in admitting in
evidence petitioner’s documentary evidence. Petitioner failed to prove the
authenticity of the audited financial statements it presented. Thus, such is
hearsay.
Issue: W/N the audited financial statements were properly authenticated – NO
Held:
● Financial statements show the fiscal condition of a particular entity within a
specified period. The financial statements prepared by external auditors who
are certified public accountants are audited financial statements.
● Financial statements, audited or not, are private documents.
Section 20. Proof of private document. — Before any private
document offered as authentic is received in evidence, its due execution
and authenticity must be proved either:
(a) By anyone who saw the document executed or written; or
(b) By evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of
the maker.
 Any other private document need only be identified as that which it is
claimed to be.
● Neither party claimed that the copies were certified true copies.
● Thus, the statements presented were private documents and needed to be
authenticated in order to be admitted as evidence
● In this case, petitioner merely presented a memorandum attesting to the
increase in the corporation’s monthly market revenue, prepared by his
management team
● The best proof available would have been the testimony of a representative
of SMMC’s external auditor who prepared the audited financial statements.
● Since there was none, the audited financial statements were never
authenticated.
7. Heirs of Ochoa v. G&S Transport Corp., G.R. No. 170071, July 16, 2012
DOCTRINE: In the presentation of public documents as evidence, due execution and
authenticity thereof are already presumed.
FACTS:
● The petitioners are heirs of the late Jose Marcial K. Ochoa who died while
onboard a taxicab owned and operated by G & S Transport Corporation
(respondent).
● The RTC found G & S guilty of breaching the contract of carriage and ordered
it to pay the said heirs civil indemnity, moral damages, exemplary damages,
attorney’s fees, and [this is the important part] P6,537,244.96 for loss of
earning capacity of the deceased.
● The CA affirmed the RTC, but deleted the awards for loss of income in the
amount of P6,537,244.96 and that moral damages be reduced.
● The deletion was ordered on the ground that the income certificate issued
by Jose Marcial’s employer, the United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), is self-serving, unreliable and biased, and that the
same was not supported by competent evidence such as income tax returns
or receipts.
● Both parties appealed to the SC. On 9 March 2011 the Court affirmed the
assailed CA Decision with the modifications that G & S is ordered to pay the
heirs P6,611,634.59 for loss of earning capacity of the deceased.
● G & S filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that the USAID Certification
used as basis in computing the award for loss of income is inadmissible in
evidence because it was not properly authenticated and identified in court
by the signatory (Jonas Cruz) thereof.
ISSUE: W/N the USAID certification is admissible in evidence? – YES.
RULING:
● The requirement of authentication only pertains to private documents and
does not apply to public documents, these being admissible without further
proof of their due execution or genuineness.
● The latter documents have been executed in the proper registry and are
presumed to be valid and genuine until the contrary is shown by clear and
convincing proof and public documents are authenticated by the official
signature and seals which they bear and of which seals, courts may take
judicial notice.
● [Refer to doctrine]
● Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court classifies public documents as the
written official acts, or records of the official acts of the sovereign authority,
official bodies and tribunals, and public officers, whether of the Philippines,
or of a foreign country.
● USAID is the principal United States agency that extends assistance to
countries recovering from disaster, trying to escape poverty, and engaging in
democratic reforms and that it is an independent federal government agency
that receives over-all foreign policy guidance from the Secretary of State of
the United States.
● Hence, Jonas Cruz, as USAID’s Chief of the Human Resources Division in the
Philippines, is actually a public officer. Apparently, Cruz’s issuance of the
subject USAID Certification was made in the performance of his official
functions, he having charge of all employee files and information as such
officer.
● In view of these, it is clear that the USAID Certification is a public document
pursuant to paragraph (a), Sec. 19, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. Hence, the
authenticity and due execution of said Certification are already presumed.
● Moreover, as a public document issued in the performance of a duty by a
public officer, the subject USAID Certification is prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein. The USAID Certification could very well be used as basis
for the award for loss of income to the heirs.
 8. Heirs of Pedro Cabais v. Court of Appeals, October 8, 1999
Doctrine: A baptismal certificate, a private document, which is hearsay, is not
conclusive proof of filiation. It is only evidence to prove the administration of the
sacrament on the dates therein specified but not to the veracity of the declarations
therein stated with respect to his kinsfolk.
Facts:
1. Petitioners are the legal heirs of Pedro Cabais, who died and left a parcel of
land in Albay in his name.
2. The property was inherited by Cabais from his grandmother Eustaquia
Caneta, by right of representation. His mother Felipa Buesa, was the only
daughter of Caneta, who predeceased the latter, and left Cabais as the only
legal heir of Caneta. Cabais executed a Deed of Self-Adjudication, adjudicating
in his favor subject property, and the title was transferred to his name.
3. Shorty after Cabais had adjudicated the subject property, a complaint for
partition and accounting was brought by Simon Bonaobra, Heirs of Victoria
Caneta and Heirs of Anastacio Caneta against Cabais. This case was eventually
dismissed for being nonsuited.
4. However, during the pendency of such case, Cabais died. Respondents
(consisting of Heirs of Victoria Canete and several others) entered the
property and constructed houses thereon, depriving petitioners of
possession.
5. Petitioners Heirs of Cabais then filed for quieting of title, recovery of
possession and ownership with preliminary injunction.
6. Respondents answered that the Heirs of Cabais have no COA and the issuance
of the certificate of title was fraudulent and in derogation of their
successional rights. Subsequently, they instituted a case for annulment of title
and damages, claiming to be co-owners of the property. Sps Nicolas and
Goyal, one of the respondents, alleged that they had bought a portion of one
of the lot; while the Heirs of Victoria Canete alleged that they had bought the
remaining portion of the lot from their deceased grandmother who was the
first wife of Antonio Buesa.
7. RTC: Tried both cases jointly. GRANTED the quieting of title filed by the Heirs
of Cabais and ordered respondents to vacate the same and pay rents until
leaving the place. They also ruled that res judicata barred the institution of
the second case due to dismissal of the first case.
8. However, respondents filed an MR, alleging that res judicata did not apply
and the baptismal certificate of Felipe Buesa does not show her to be the
daughter of Eustaquia Caneta.
9. RTC on MR: GRANTED. CA: AFFIRMED.
10. Heirs of Cabais filed with this Court, alleging that RTC erred in relying on the
Baptismal Certificate of Felipe Buesa to establish parentage and filiation of
Pedro Cabais.
Issue: W/N RTC’s Decision on the MR disregarded the limited evidentiary value of a
baptismal certificate v. a birth certificate. (YES)
Held:
1. A birth certificate, being a public document, offers prima facie evidence of
filiation and a high degree of proof is needed to overthrow the presumption
of truth contained in such public document.
a. Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty by a
PO are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
b. Evidentiary nature must be sustained in the absence of strong proof
of its falsity/nullity
2. On the contrary, a baptismal certificate, a private document, being hearsay, is
not conclusive proof of filiation. It does not have the same probative value as
a birth certificate.
a. Only evidence to prove the administration of the sacrament on the
dates therein specified but NOT the veracity of the declarations
therein stated with respect to kinsfolk or relationship of the person
baptized.
b. Conclusive only of the baptism administered according to the rites
of the Catholic Church by the priest.
3. The unjustified failure to present the birth certificate instead of the baptismal
certificate now under consideration or to otherwise prove filiation by any of
the means recognized by law weight heavily against respondents.
- RTC erred in giving too much credence on the baptismal certificate
of Felipe Buesa to prove that she was the daughter of one Gregoria
Caneta and not Eustaquia Caneta, the original registered owner of
the subject property. Hence, the grant of the MR was unwarranted.
4. Moreover, the baptismal certificate of Felipa Buesa herein is inherently
inconsistent and unbelievable as it appears therein that she was born on
Sept. 13, 1899, while the baptismal certificate of Gregoria Caneta, her
 supposed mother, indicates that Gregoria was born on May 9, 1898—just
more than a year ahead of her alleged daughter.
Fallo: REVERSED and REINSTATED the original RTC decision.
9. Heirs of Ignacio Conti v. Court of Appeals, December 21, 1998
DOCTRINE: The entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as entries made
in the course of the business under Section 43 of Rule 130, which is an exception to the
hearsay rule. The baptisms administered by the church are one of its transactions in the
exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in the book of the church during the
course of its business.
FACTS:
● Lourdes and Conti were the co-owners of the property in litigation consisting
of a 539-square meter lot with house in Lucena City. Lourdes died intestate
without issue.
● Private respondents Reyes et al. claiming to be collateral relatives of Lourdes
Sampayo, filed an action for partition and damages before RTC-Lucena.
● The spouses Conti refused the partition on the ground that private
respondents failed to produce any document to prove that they were the
rightful heirs of Lourdes. Ignacio Conti died and was substituted by his
children.
● Private respondents presented Lydia Sampayo Reyes to prove that they were
the collateral heirs of the deceased Lourdes and therefore entitled to her
rights as co-owner of the subject lot.
● Lydia presented her original copy of her certificate of live birth showing that
her mother was Josefina, Lourdes’ sister. To prove that her mother was one
of the siblings of Lourdes, the baptismal certificates of the four siblings, and a
photocopy of the certificate of live birth of Manuel Sampayo, the fifth sibling,
were offered in evidence.
● The baptismal certificates were presented in lieu of the birth certificates
because the Office of the Civil Registrar of Lucena City, had been razed by fire
on two separate occasions, in 1974 and 1983, thus all civil registration
records were totally burned.
● Adelaida Sampayo, widow of Manuel, testified that her husband was a
brother of the deceased Lourdes, and with the death of Manuel, Luis and
Remedios, the only living sibling of Lourdes was Josefina.
● The Contis offered testimonial evidence to prove that Lourdes was adopted,
and that she wanted to leave her share as co-owner to Ignacio Conti upon her
death, who she considered a brother during her lifetime as they were both
allegedly adopted by the same foster parents.
● RTC declared private respondents as the rightful heirs of Lourdes. CA
affirmed. It upheld the probative value of the documentary and testimonial
evidence of private respondents and faulted petitioners for not having
subpoenaed Josefina if they believed that she was a vital witness in the case.
ISSUE: W/N the baptismal certificates are admissible as public records? – YES.
RULING:
● Public documents are the written official acts, or records of official acts, of
the sovereign authority, official bodies and tribunals, and public officers. The
baptismal certificates presented in evidence by private respondents are
public documents. Parish priests continue to be the legal custodians of the
parish records and are authorized to issue true copies, in the form of
certificates, of the entries contained therein.
● The admissibility of baptismal certificates offered by Lydia, absent the
testimony of the officiating priest or the official recorder, was settled in
People v. Ritter:
x x x the entries made in the Registry Book may be considered as
entries made in the course of the business under Section 43 of
Rule 130, which is an exception to the hearsay rule. The baptisms
administered by the church are one of its transactions in the
exercise of ecclesiastical duties and recorded in the book of the
church during the course of its business.
● It may be argued that baptismal certificates are evidence only of the
administration of the sacrament, but in this case, there were four certificates
which, when taken together, uniformly show that Lourdes, Josefina,
Remedios and Luis had the same set of parents. Corroborated by the
undisputed testimony of Adelaida Sampayo that with the demise of Lourdes
and her brothers Manuel, Luis and sister Remedios, the only sibling left was
Josefina, such baptismal certificates have acquired evidentiary weight to
prove filiation.
● Petitioners' objection to the photocopy of the birth certificate of Manuel was
properly discarded by the court a quo and respondent Court of Appeals.
When the subject of inquiry is the contents of a document, no evidence shall
be admissible other than the original document itself except when the
original has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court, without
bad faith on the part of the offeror. The loss or destruction of the original
certificate of birth of Manuel J. Sampayo was duly established by the
certification issued by the Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Lucena City to
the effect that its office was completely destroyed by fire on 27 November
1974 and 30 August 1983, respectively, and as a consequence thereof, all civil
registration records were totally burned.
● There is some merit in the argument that the Adelaida’s testimony cannot
prove filiation for being hearsay considering that there was no declaration
ante litem motam (spoken before a lawsuit is brought) as required by the
rules - no declaration relating to pedigree was made before the controversy
occurred. However, petitioners made no move to dispute her testimony in
open court when she was mentioning who the brothers and sisters of Lourdes
were. As observed by the trial court, "the documentary and testimonial
evidence were not disputed.”
● Ignacio’s widow even admitted on the witness stand that she did not know
the identities of the parents of the deceased. Clearly, this runs counter to the
relationship akin to filial bonding which she professed she had enjoyed with
the decedent. As wife of Ignacio Conti, she was supposedly a "sister-in-law" of
the deceased Lourdes who regarded Ignacio as a brother.
● All the pieces of evidence adduced, taken together, clearly preponderate to
the right of private respondents to maintain the action for partition.
● Petition DENIED. CA AFFIRMED.