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Monterey Bay, I am not taking the traditional college path. CSUMB's online computer science
campus classes. Throughout my schooling career, I have attended private all-girls elementary
and high school. Upon graduating from high school, I attend college abroad, where I received a
degree in elementary education. Upon returning to Los Angeles, I was offered a position as an
elementary school teacher. Within a couple of months I transitioned to the EdTech department,
working with teachers and technology specialists to seamlessly integrate technology into the
classroom environments. Although I enjoyed my job, I knew elementary education was not for
me, and that I would further pursue a degree. I researched programs that would allow me to
obtain a Bachelor’s while working full time, and CSUMB CSIT degree seemed an appropriate fit.
I had a deep interest in computer science and the CSUMB program structure appeared give a
decipher and appreciate the minute ethical considerations involved in all aspects of software
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) found that Volkswagen had been using a defeat device
to fabricate results during emissions testing. Many Volkswagen models were releasing nitrous
oxide in quantities that far surpassed the legal amount in the United States. However, each of
these models successfully passed emissions testing due to software installed by Volkswagen.
The software detected when the car was being tested, and it switched the mode of the car to
is responsible and should serve the consequences is a difficult issue. This case study will explore
the motivation for Volkswagen’s actions, the wide-ranging consequences, and the ethical
impact on the automobile industry and the software industry. Volkswagen used software to
play the system and cheat their customers and the government. As the world becomes
increasingly technology oriented, and software becomes prevalent in every area, it is important
that software developers and users know how to properly exploit software’s power. Its impact
is not limited to the automotive industry; it is an example for software developers and users
first became public in September 2015 through the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA)
notification to the German automaker Volkswagen Group that it had violated the Clean Air Act,
which was designed to cut pollution on a national level. In the 1970’s due to increasing
Congress enacted the Clean Air Act (CAA), along with forming the EPA. Under the Clean Air Act,
the EPA sets limits on certain air pollutants including nitrous oxide (Environmental). Nitrous
oxide is one of the reactants of particle pollution, which can affect the lungs, causing
oxides are some of the main ingredients in ground-level ozone, a critical component of smog.
Motor vehicles are some of the largest contributors to air pollution, and are responsible for
more than half of nitrous oxide emissions. Due to growing concerns from scientists and
environments, regarding the effects nitrous oxide and remaining criteria pollutants have on
humans and the environment,the Clean Air Act which set federal standards for those
pollutants, was enacted (Environmental) . Thus, motor vehicle manufacturers had to ensure
Although United States standards focus on nitrous oxide emissions, the European
standards target carbon dioxide emissions instead. Diesel cars have a lower carbon dioxide
emissions output than ordinary cars, leading to diesel models easily exceeding Europe’s
standards for carbon dioxide emissions. Before Volkswagen developed the turbocharged direct
injection (TDI) in the 1980’s, diesel cars were obsolete due to poor performance and exhaust
release(Fisher). Volkswagen’s TDI model allowed for greater engine efficiency and decreased
emissions output, changing the current of obsolete diesel engines. With the creation of the TDI
models, European standards for emissions were kinder to Volkswagen than American standards
because they focused on carbon dioxide instead of nitrous oxide. According to Eugenio J.
Miravete, political science professor at the University of Texas, Europe was perhaps less
focused on NOx emissions than CO2 emissions because Eastern European countries, including
Russia, had few regulations on NOx, and any improvements to the environment would be
Due to the United State’s tighter regulations of NOx, few European diesel engines,
managed to enter into the US market. Yet in 2001, Volkswagen claimed their company’s cars
met emissions standards for NOx in the United States, and began selling them there. However,
they had merely inserted a defeat device that sensed when the car was under testing
conditions, and regulated the emissions at that time only. According to the EPA, a defeat device
refers to
“an auxiliary emission control device that reduces the effectiveness of the emission
“Under regulations provided in this part, [it is illegal] for any person to manufacture or
sell, or offer to sell, or install, any part or component intended for use with, or as part
of, any motor vehicle or motor vehicle engine, where a principal effect of the part or
under this subchapter, and where the person knows or should know that such part or
component is being offered for sale or installed for such use or put to such use.”
ultimately they were not the first company to utilize such technology. In 1970s some cars were
found to be rigged with "defeat devices" that turned off the emission systems when the air
conditioning was turned on. Others had sensors that activated pollution controls only at the
temperature regulators used during the tests. In 1974 the EPA accused VW of installing defeat
devices in some of its models, and VW was fined $120,000 for it. Additionally companies such
as Ford, Toyota and General Motors have been accused with similar charges. In 1995 General
Motors agreed to pay $45 million after being indicted of circumventing pollution controls on
470,000 Cadillac luxury sedans. The cars' 4.9-liter V8 engines were tuned to turn off pollution
controls when the air conditioning ran (Jeff Plungis). Although other companies have had
similar scandals, the scandal now engulfing VW, is unique both for its size and digital
complexity.
Clarence Ditlow, executive director of the Washington-based Center for Auto Safety
explains “The concept of a defeat device has always been there, because there's such an
incentive for the manufacturers to cheat on the emissions tests."(Plungis). Analysts have
attributed Volkswagen’s wrongdoing to their desire to grow in size and to become one of the
leading automobile manufacturers worldwide. Under Ferdinand Piëch and his successors, “the
Volkswagen was run like an empire, with overwhelming control vested in a few hands, marked
volatile backdrop of epic family power plays, liaisons, and blood feuds. It’s a culture that
mandated success at all costs.”(“Inside Volkswagen’s Diesel Fraud”). Volkswagen’s goals were
audacious: it aspired to be the biggest seller of cars in the world under Piëch protégé Martin
Winterkorn. Sales of U.S. diesels were crucial to the mission, yet automobile sellers and
consumers were scornful of the environmental effects of diesel cars. With Volkswagen’s new
“clean diesel” approach, which promised fair prices, efficiency, performance and environmental
It is still unclear which executives were aware of the defeat device and who was
responsible for creating it. In a statement to the press ,Volkswagen chairman Hans Dieter
Pötsch, blamed the scandal on a “chain of errors,” and suggests that executives were not
responsible or aware of the deception (Boston). Much of the blame has been placed on a small
group of employees, likely engineers, deflecting the blame from the leadership. Still, many
executives, including Winterkorn, either resigned or were ousted from the company. In
September 2016, James Liang, an engineer at Volkswagen for over 30 years, was indicted on
criminal charges. There are both ongoing internal and federal investigations, and Volkswagen
has agreed to pay billions to both dealers, customers and the government as compensation for
their crimes.
Initial media coverage of the Volkswagen scandal merely presented a list of facts as to
what occurred, in addition to sound bites from both the government and Volkswagen. Despite
the seemingly consistent and fact oriented coverage, customers, environmentalists, and federal
organizations condemned the company. Many customers chose the VW cars due to the
environmental benefits of the car, so these customers were understandably upset that the
company had lied to them. One customer describes his feelings of betrayal: “They lied to me,
both directly and indirectly. They’ve dumped pollutants into the atmosphere that my family, my
friends and I breathe. They’ve also made me an unwitting and unwilling accomplice in their
environmental crime.” Another customer said that the scandal “kind of makes [him] sick, and
certain [he] won’t go back to Volkswagen after this.” Others called the scandal a “disheartening
atrocity” and many said they would never again be a customer of Volkswagen (Bartlett, 2015).
Volkswagen had claimed that their cars met the standards of the EPA, but in fact it exceeded
the EPA standards by up to forty times the allowed emissions. The government also responded
harshly; they fined Volkswagen severely and opened an investigation into the company.
Volkswagen dealerships were also angry, because their trustworthiness and sales declined.
Aside from the consumers and environmentally, software engineers were also adversely
affected by the scandal. While VW consumers were viewed as the victims of the scandal,
software engineers were casted in a negative role; that of a perpetrator. In attempts to deflect
blame from the managements, VW laid the blame solely within the engineering department
(Boston, 2015). This phenomenon can be concerning for engineers across the board.
The determination as to who is responsible for this emission scandals and consequently
who should pay reparations, and what the consequences should be is a complex dilemma. Even
if Volkswagen blames the scandal on the engineers, and even if amongst the engineers a
Additionally, even if executives were unaware of the software device, they should also receive
some form of retribution. It was not for no reason that the engineers created the software
device. While he was not CEO at the time of the scandal, Ferdinand Piech created a culture at
Volkswagen that bred the deviance. Piech proudly spoke about how he created a demanding,
uptight culture in Volkswagen. When engineering a car, he told his employees, “you have six
weeks to achieve world-class body fits. I have all your names. If we do not have it in six weeks, I
will replace all of you” (Smith, 2016). While the cheating may have occurred at the bottom of
the company, the culture came from the top and bled down to the bottom. Both the utilitarian
and ethical egoism frameworks would therefore implicate the managers as well as the
engineers. While they may not have explicitly done or partaken in anything illegal, the
managers created a culture that led to such harm and self-destruction, and that in it of itself is
unethical.
According to the Utilitarian framework, good, ethical choices are those that produce the
least harm and the greatest happiness. Thus assuming that the EPA’s regulations were in the
best interests of humanity and the environment and were not politically motivated, the
Utilitarian approach would place sole blame on Volkswagen. Environmental protection provides
the most utility for humans; it keeps the environment clean and healthy. Polluting the
environment is an unethical action because it produces greater harm. According to a joint study
by Harvard and MIT, Volkswagen’s emission will have caused up to 60 premature deaths.
However, if Volkswagen recalls all affected vehicles by 2016, more than 130 premature deaths
can be prevented (Chu). While Volkswagen has agreed to compensate their customers
monetarily and to fix the software, it has been more reluctant to recall the vehicles. The
Utilitarian approach would dictate that the correct ethical choice would be to recall every
affected vehicle. The fine itself is hard to determine according to this approach, as it does not
Egoism, or the Self-Interest perspective, dictates moral agents should act in their own
self-interest and have an obligation to guide their conduct by a rational calculation as to what is
best for them. Initially VW followed the Egoism perspective and acted in their own self interest
by creating a defeat system, however ultimately those actions only benefited the company in
the short terr. Volkswagen had been trying to expand their company and to become the leading
manufacturer of automobiles, and it was only possible to do that with the expansion of their
diesel sales in the United States. Thus, such software would seem to be necessary to their
pursue their goal, which would make such an action ethically sound according to the Egoism
framework. However, the company did not act in its long-term self interest. Volkswagen
damaged its reputation with its customers and now must invest in rebuilding trust and polishing
the company’s reputation. Volkswagen should have evaluated their actions in terms of
long-range consequences, and assumed the possibility that such a device could get caught. It is
in the best interest of every company to have a reputation as a reliable, honest, legal and moral
business. Cheating customers and false advertising may have benefited the company for five
years, but it was a myopic solution that only served to drag the company further away from the
top spot.
The Cultural Relativism framework can also be adapted for this scenario. Cultural
Relativism is the view that moral or ethical systems, which vary from culture to culture, are all
equally valid and no one system is “better” than any other. This is based on the idea that there
is no ultimate standard of good or evil, so every judgment about right and wrong is a product of
society. Therefore, any opinion on morality or ethics is subject to the cultural perspective of
each person. Ultimately, this means that no moral or ethical system can be considered the
“best,” or “worst,” and no particular moral or ethical position can actually be considered “right”
norms, or the law, “ If an action is not illegal, it is permitted.” Here social culture is equated
with law because laws are an expression of national cultural values. They need not be fixed or
constant values. Under this framework, Volkswagens actions can be deemed unethical, as
Although an exact scenario may never occur again, there will certainly be ethical issues
that continue to plague automobile companies. Firstly, companies are now manufacturing
electric and driverless cars. Volkswagen forecasts that between 20 to 25 percent of their sales
will be electric cars by 2025. Electric cars also have a “green” image, and Volkswagen needs to
ensure that they are fully transparent with both their customers and the EPA. Driverless cars
There are implications for the software industry as well. After ostensibly being
pressured by executives, software developers created unethical and illegal software. There
needs to be a two-fold solution for this. Firstly, software engineers, and anyone working in
technology, should be well versed in the ethics of technology and business. Engineers hold
tremendous power; software that one person wrote can be distributed and used worldwide.
Engineering isn’t just solving technical problems. It is a field that forces one to make serious
ethical choices with repercussions of a large magnitude. Every engineer should be required to
take an ethics course in college, and companies should regularly hold professional development
for engineers and discuss ethical problems that may arise in the workplace. Secondly, upper
management has to work in tandem with engineering instead of demanding a plan. Much of
this problem surfaced because engineers were instructed to create a car that was impossible
under the constraints they had. In many companies, including Volkswagen, the pressure
oftentimes concentrates around the engineers, and non-technical management expects them
to be able to fix or create anything. The culture in a company should be demanding, but it
should also be reasonable. Executives need to work with the engineering team, not intimidate
With our increasingly wired world, software will only become more prevalent in our
lives. Nearly every few feet has something that is backed by software. If the ethical issues are
not sorted out in software’s youth, it will be abused and ethically misused and created.
Software is now taking on a human-like quality and is being entrusted with decisions. Walter
Vannini, a digital consultant and researcher, writes that “in just a few years, understanding
Prior to researching this scandal, I felt no personal involvement. However, now that I
understand the implications not just for automobile engineers, but for software engineers as
well, I have refined my approach to the scandal. While I had previously seen the issue as
black-and-white - that Volkswagen should recall all of their cars and all of their upper
management should leave- it is more nuanced than I initially perceived it. Both engineers and
My ethical framework is shaped by the Jewish set of laws and ethics, called Halacha.
Halacha dictates that the person ultimately responsible for such a scenario is the one who
actually did the cheating. While executives are by no means halachically absolved, the
consequences for them would be less severe. Judaism values the power of the individual and
holds him/her responsible for his/her choices. Thus, even if the person may suffer a loss, s/he is
still accountable for the choices s/he made. The Volkswagen engineers may have had their jobs
in jeopardy, but ultimately, they still made the wrong choice. While the circumstances that led
to the cheating was not their fault, the choice was ultimately theirs, and they are accountable.
Analyzing the Volkswagen scandal through frameworks other than my own showed me how
each party, both the engineers and the executives, can be held accountable.
While it is unfortunate that such a scandal occurred, I believe that such an event was
necessary at the dawn of the technological revolution. The magnitude of the media coverage it
received was proportionate to the severity of the story’s implications. This is not just a story of
one company’s transgression. To only see this scandal as a Volkswagen story would be
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/volkswagen-blames-chain-of-mistakes-for-scandal-2015-1
Chu, Jennifer. “Study: Volkswagen’s Emissions Cheat to Cause 60 Premature Deaths in U.S.” MIT
News,
http://news.mit.edu/2015/volkswagen-emissions-cheat-cause-60-premature-deaths-1029.
Environmental, Protection Agency. “The Plain English Guide to the Clean Air Act.”
https://www.epa.gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/peg.pdf.
Fisher, Daniel. “VW’s Diesel Was A Creation Of EU Regulators.” Forbes, 2 Oct. 2015,
https://www.forbes.com/sites/danielfisher/2015/10/02/eu-emissions-regulations-made-t
he-vw-diesel-u-s-regs-brought-it-down/.
Jeff Plungis, Bloomberg News. “Carmaker Cheating on Emissions Almost as Old as Pollution
ry.html.
Plungis, Jeff. “Forty Years of Greenwashing: The Well-Travelled Road Taken by VW.” The
http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/volkswagen-emissio
ns-scandal-forty-years-of-greenwashing-the-well-travelled-road-taken-by-vw-10516209.ht
ml.
https://aeon.co/ideas/coding-is-not-fun-it-s-technically-and-ethically-complex. Accessed
12 Dec. 2017.