RULINGS, DOCTRINES, PRINCIPLES (SECTIONS 39-47)

Section Topic Case

39 (a) RA 8171 Altajeros vs COMELEC, GR
No. 163256, 10 November
Section 2. Repatriation shall be 2004
effected by taking the necessary
oath of allegiance to the Republic of
the Philippines and registration in the
proper civil registry and in the Bureau
of Immigration. The Bureau of
Immigration shall thereupon cancel
the pertinent alien certificate of
identification as Filipino citizen to the
repatriated citizen.

The citizenship qualification must be

construed as applying to the time of
proclamation of the elected official
and at the start of his term. (Frivaldovs
COMELEC)

“Residence” is to be understood not Pundaodaya vs COMELEC,

in its common acceptation as GR No. 179313, 17
referring to “dwelling” or “habitation,” SEPTEMBER 2009
but rather to “domicile” or the legal
residence, that is, “the place a party
actually or constructively has his
permanent home, where he, no
matter where he may be found at
any given time, eventually intends to
return and remain (animus manendi)
[Japzonvs COMELEC]

Domicile denotes a fixed permanent

residence which, whenever absent for
business, pleasure, or some other
reasons, one intends to return. It is a
question of intention and
circumstances, three rules must be
borne in mind, namely :

1. that a man must have a

domicile somewhere;

2. when once established,

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it remains until a new one is acquired;

3. a man can have but

one residence or domicile at a time

If one wishes to successfully effect a

change of domicile, he must
demonstrate an actual removal or an
actual change of domicile, a bona
fide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and
establishing a new one, and definite
acts which correspond with the
purpose. (Domino vs COMELEC)

Without clear and positive proof of

the concurrence of these three
requirements, the domicile of origin
continues. (In the Matter of the
Petition for Disqualification of Tess
Dumpit-Michelena, GR Nos. 163619-
20), 475 SCRA 290, 17 November
2005)

While we have ruled in the past that

voting gives rise to a strong
presumption of residence, it is not
conclusive evidence thereof.
(Domino vs COMELEC)

A person’s registration as a voter in

one district is not proof that he is not
domiciled in another district. The
registration of a voter in a place other
than his residence of origin is not
sufficient to consider him to have
abandoned or lost his residence.
(Perez vs COMELEC citing Faypon vs
Quirino)

To establish a new domicile of choice,

personal presence in the place must
be coupled with conduct indicative
of that intention. It requires not only
such bodily presence in that place
but also a declared and probable
intent to make it one’s fixed and
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permanent place of abode. (Domino

vs COMELEC)

The one-year residency requirement is

aimed at excluding outsiders “from
taking advantage of favorable
circumstances existing in that
community for electoral gain”.
Establishing residence in a community
merely to meet an election law
requirement defeats the purpose of
representation : to elect through the
assent of voters those most cognizant
and sensitive to the needs of the
community. (Torayno, Sr. vs COMELEC
citing Aquino vs COMELEC)

No loss of residence due to transfer for Abella vs Commission on

professional, business, or educational Elections, 201 SCRA 253,
reasons 1991 (citing Faypon vs
Quirino, 96 Phil 1954)

It is not required that a candidate Jalover vs Osmena, GR No.

should have his own house in order to 209286, 23 September 2104
establish his residence or domicile in
that place. It is enough that he
should live in the locality even in a
rented house or that of a friend or
relative (Sabilivs COMELEC, GR No.
193261, 24 April 2012)

40 An order placing defendant on Moreno vs COMELEC (2006)

probation is not a sentence but is
rather, in effect, a suspension of the
imposition of sentence. We held that
the grant of probation to petitioner
suspended the imposition of the
principal penalty of imprisonment, as
well as the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office and
from the right to follow a profession or
calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of
suffrage. (Baclayon v. Mutia)
4 | Cases (39-47)

Applying this doctrine to the instant

case, the accessory penalties of
suspension from public office, from
the right to follow a profession or
calling, and that of perpetual special
disqualification from the right of
suffrage, attendant to the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum
period to prisioncorreccional in its
minimum period (Article 43, Revised
Penal Code) imposed upon Moreno
were similarly suspended upon the
grant of probation.

It appears then that during the period

of probation, the probationer is not
even disqualified from running for a
public office because the accessory
penalty of suspension from public
office is put on hold for the duration of
the probation.

Clearly, the period within which a

person is under probation cannot be
equated with service of the sentence
adjudged. Sec. 4 of the Probation
Law specifically provides that the
grant of probation suspends the
execution of the sentence. During the
period of probation, (Section 14,
Probation Law od 1976, as
amended) the probationer does not
serve the penalty imposed upon him
by the court but is merely required to
comply with all the conditions
prescribed in the probation order.
(Section 10, Probation Law of 1976, as
amended)

xxx those who have not served their

sentence by reason of the grant of
probation which, we reiterate, should
not be equated with service of
sentence, should not likewise be
disqualified from running for a local
elective office because the two (2)-
year period of ineligibility under Sec.
5 | Cases (39-47)

40(a) of the Local Government Code

does not even begin to run.
The Court has consistently adopted Magno vs COMELEC (2002)
the definition in Black’s Law Dictionary
of ‘moral turpitude’ as:

"x xx an act of baseness, vileness, or

depravity in the private duties which
a man owes his fellow men, or to
society in general, contrary to the
accepted and customary rule of right
and duty between man and woman
or conduct contrary to justice,
honesty, modesty, or good morals."1

In this case, we need not review the

facts and circumstances relating to
the commission of the crime
considering that petitioner did not
assail his conviction. By applying for
probation, petitioner in effect
admitted all the elements of the
crime of direct bribery

1. the offender is a public

officer;

2. the offender accepts an

offer or promise or receives a
gift or present by himself or
through another;

3. such offer or promise be

accepted or gift or present be
received by the public officer
with a view to committing
some crime, or in consideration
of the execution of an act
which does not constitute a
crime but the act must be
unjust, or to refrain from doing
something which it is his official
duty to do; and [Italics
supplied]

4. the act which the offender

agrees to perform or which he
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executes is connected with the

performance of his official
duties.3

Moral turpitude can be inferred from

the third element. The fact that the
offender agrees to accept a promise
or gift and deliberately commits an
unjust act or refrains from performing
an official duty in exchange for some
favors, denotes a malicious intent on
the part of the offender to renege on
the duties which he owes his
fellowmen and society in general.
Also, the fact that the offender takes
advantage of his office and position is
a betrayal of the trust reposed on him
by the public. It is a conduct clearly
contrary to the accepted rules of
right and duty, justice, honesty and
good morals. In all respects, direct
bribery is a crime involving moral
turpitude.

It should be noted that the Omnibus

Election Code (BP 881) was approved
on December 3, 1985 while the Local
Government Code (RA 7160) took
effect on January 1, 1992. It is basic in
statutory construction that in case of
irreconcilable conflict between two
laws, the later enactment must
prevail, being the more recent
expression of legislative will.4 Legis
posterior es priores contrarias
abrogant. In enacting the later law,
the legislature is presumed to have
knowledge of the older law and
intended to change it. Furthermore,
the repealing clause of Section 534 of
RA 7160 or the Local Government
Code states that:

In accordance therewith, Section 40

of RA 7160 is deemed to have
repealed Section 12 of BP 881.
Furthermore, Article 7 of the Civil
7 | Cases (39-47)

Code provides that laws are repealed

only by subsequent ones, and not the
other way around. When a
subsequent law entirely encompasses
the subject matter of the former
enactment, the latter is deemed
repealed.

RA 7160 is a codified set of laws that

specifically applies to local
government units. Section 40 thereof
specially and definitively provides for
disqualifications of candidates for
elective local positions. It is applicable
to them only. On the other hand,
Section 12 of BP 881 speaks of
disqualifications of candidates for any
public office. It deals with the election
of all public officers. Thus, Section 40
of RA 7160, insofar as it governs the
disqualifications of candidates for
local positions, assumes the nature of
a special law which ought to prevail.
(David vs. COMELEC)

Therefore, although his crime of direct

bribery involved moral turpitude,
petitioner nonetheless could not be
disqualified from running in the 2001
elections. Article 12 of the Omnibus
Election Code (BP 881) must yield to
Article 40 of the Local Government
Code (RA 7160). Petitioner’s
disqualification ceased as of March 5,
2000 and he was therefore under no
such disqualification anymore when
he ran for mayor of San Isidro, Nueva
Ecija in the May 14, 2001 elections.
40 (d) Dual citizenship as disqualification Mercado vs Manzano
(1999)
Dual citizenship is different from dual
allegiance. The former arises when, as
a result of the concurrent application
of the different laws of two or more
states, a person is simultaneously
considered a national by the said
states.9 For instance, such a situation
8 | Cases (39-47)

may arise when a person whose

parents are citizens of a state which
adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which
follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a
person, ipso facto and without any
voluntary act on his part, is
concurrently considered a citizen of
both states.

Dual allegiance, on the other hand,

refers to the situation in which a
person simultaneously owes, by some
positive act, loyalty to two or more
states. While dual citizenship is
involuntary, dual allegiance is the
result of an individual's volition.

Clearly, in including §5 in Article IV on

citizenship, the concern of the
Constitutional Commission was not
with dual citizens per se but with
naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin
even after their naturalization. Hence,
the phrase "dual citizenship" in R.A.
No. 7160, §40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854,
§20 must be understood as referring
to "dual allegiance." Consequently,
persons with mere dual citizenship do
not fall under this disqualification.
Unlike those with dual allegiance,
who must, therefore, be subject to
strict process with respect to the
termination of their status, for
candidates with dual citizenship, it
should suffice if, upon the filing of their
certificates of candidacy, they elect
Philippine citizenship to terminate their
status as persons with dual citizenship
considering that their condition is the
unavoidable consequence of
conflicting laws of different states.

By the laws of the United States,

petitioner Frivaldo lost his American
citizenship when he took his oath of
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allegiance to the Philippine

Government when he ran for
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995.
Every certificate of candidacy
contains an oath of allegiance to the
Philippine Government.

By declaring in his certificate of

candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen;
that he is not a permanent resident or
immigrant of another country; that he
will defend and support the
Constitution of the Philippines and
bear true faith and allegiance thereto
and that he does so without mental
reservation, private respondent has,
as far as the laws of this country are
concerned, effectively repudiated his
American citizenship and anything
which he may have said before as a
dual citizen.

On the other hand, private

respondent's oath of allegiance to
the Philippines, when considered with
the fact that he has spent his youth
and adulthood, received his
education, practiced his profession as
an artist, and taken part in past
elections in this country, leaves no
doubt of his election of Philippine
citizenship.

40 (e) "fugitive from justice" as a ground for Rodriguez vs Commission

the disqualification or ineligibility of a on Elections (1996)
person seeking to run for any elective
local petition under Section 40(e) of
the Local Government Code, should
be understood according to the
definition given in the MARQUEZ
Decision, to wit:

A "fugitive from justice" includes

not only those who flee after
conviction to avoid
punishment but likewise those
who, after being charged, flee
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to avoid prosecution.

Intent to evade on the part of a

candidate must therefore be
established by proof that there has
already been a conviction or at least,
a charge has already been filed, at
the time of flight. Not being a "fugitive
from justice"under this definition,
Rodriguez cannot be denied the
Quezon Province gubernatorial post.

40 (f) Green card as disqualification Caasi vs CA, 191 SCRA 229,

1990
To be "qualified to run for elective
office" in the Philippines, the law
requires that the candidate who is a
green card holder must have "waived
his status as a permanent resident or
immigrant of a foreign country."
Therefore, his act of filing a certificate
of candidacy for elective office in the
Philippines, did not of itself constitute
a waiver of his status as a permanent
resident or immigrant of the United
States. The waiver of his green card
should be manifested by some act or
acts independent of and done prior
to filing his candidacy for elective
office in this country. Without such
prior waiver, he was "disqualified to
run for any elective office" (Sec. 68,
Omnibus Election Code).
43 (b) Petitioner did not fill in or succeed to Bolos, Jr. vs. COMELEC, G.R.
a vacancy by operation of law. He No. 184082 March
instead relinquished his office 17, 2009
as Punong Barangay during his third
term when he won and assumed
office as Sangguniang
Bayan member of Dauis, Bohol, which
is deemed a voluntary renunciation of
the Office of Punong Barangay.

Francis’s proclamation by the OngvsAlegre, 479 SCRA

Municipal Board of Canvassers of San 473, 481, 2006
Vicente as the duly elected mayor in
the 1998 mayoralty election coupled
11 | Cases (39-47)

by his assumption of office and his

continuous exercise of the functions
thereof from start to finish of the term,
should legally be taken as service for
a full term in contemplation of the
three-term rule, despite the order of
his suspension which came after he
had already served his term for which
he was suspended

Morales cannot be deemed to have Dizon vs COMELEC and

served the full term of 2004-2007 Morales, GR No. 182088,
because he was ordered to vacate January 30, 2009
his post before the expiration of the
term. Morales’ occupancy of the
position of mayor of Mabalacat from
1 July 2004 to 16 May 2007 cannot be
counted as a term for purposes of
computing the three-term limit.
Indeed, the period from 17 May 2007
to 30 June 2007 served as a gap for
purposes of the three-term limit rule.
Thus, the present 1 July 2007 to 30
June 2010 term is effectively Morales’
first term for purposes of the three-
term limit rule.
12 | Cases (39-47)

One who wins and serves a recall Socrates vs COMELEC, GR

term does not serve the full term of his No. 145512, November 12,
predecessor but only the unexpired 2002
term. The period of time prior to the
recall term, when another elective
official holds office, constitutes an
interruption in continuity of service.

Loss in an electionsis considered as an Adormeo v. COMELEC

interruption in the continuity of (2002)
service.

Petitioner therein cannot be Lonzanidavs COMELEC, GR

considered as having been duly No. 135150, July 28, 1999
elected to the post in the May 1995
elections, and that said petitioner did
not fully serve the 1995-1998 mayoral
term by reason of involuntary
relinquishment of office. Lonzanida
"cannot be deemed to have served
the May 1995 to 1998 term because
he was ordered to vacate [and in
fact vacated] his post before the
expiration of the term."

Two conditions for the application of

the disqualification must concur:

a) that the official concerned has

been elected for three consecutive

terms in the same local government
post and

2) that he has fully served three

consecutive terms.

Voluntary renunciation of a term does

not cancel the renounced term in the
computation of the three term limit;
conversely, involuntary severance
from office for any length of time short
of the full term provided by law
amounts to an interruption of
continuity of service.
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Potencioso’s assumption of office as Montebon v. COMELEC

Vice-Mayor was considered an
involuntary severance from his office
as Municipal Councilor, resulting in an
interruption in his second term of
service.

It could not be deemed to have

been by reason of voluntary
renunciation because it was by
operation of law.

The term limit for elective local Borjavs COMELEC, GR No.

officials must be taken to refer to the 133495, September 3, 1998
right to be elected as well as the right
to serve the same elective position.
Consequently, it is not enough that an
individual has served three
consecutive terms in an elective local
office, he must also have
been elected to the same position for
the same number of times before the
disqualification can apply.

To allow petitioner Latasa to vie for Latasa vs COMELEC, GR

the position of city mayor after having No. 154829, December 10,
served for three consecutive terms as 2003
a municipal mayor would obviously
defeat the very intent of the framers
when they wrote this exception.
Should he be allowed another three
consecutive terms as mayor of the
City of Digos, petitioner would then
be possibly holding office as chief
executive over the same territorial
jurisdiction and inhabitants for a total
of eighteen consecutive years. This is
the very scenario sought to be
avoided by the Constitution, if not
abhorred by it.

45 (b) The reason behind the right given to a Damasen vs Tumamao,

political party to nominate a G.R. No. 173165, February
replacement where a permanent 17, 2010
vacancy occurs in the Sanggunian is
to maintain the party representation
14 | Cases (39-47)

as willed by the people in the

election.

With the elevation of petitioner

Tamayo, who belonged to REFORMA-
LM, to the position of Vice-Mayor, a
vacancy occurred in the Sanggunian
that should be filled up with someone
belonging to the political party of
petitioner Tamayo. Otherwise,
REFORMA-LM’s representation in the
Sanggunian would be diminished.
Xxx. As earlier pointed out, the reason
behind Par. (b), Sec. 45 of the Local
Government Code is the
maintenance of party representation
in the Sanggunian in accordance
with the will of the
electorate.(Navarro v. Court of
Appeals, 2001)

Since the permanent vacancy in the

Sanggunian occurred because of the
elevation of LDP member Alonzo to
vice-mayor, it follows that the person
to succeed her should also belong to
the LDP so as to preserve party
representation. Thus, this Court
cannot countenance Damasen’s
insistence in clinging to an
appointment when he is in fact not a
bona fide member of the LDP. While
the revocation of the nomination
given to Damasen came after the
fact of his appointment, this Court
cannot rule in his favor, because the
very first requirement of Sec. 45 (b) is
that the appointee must come from
the political party as that of the
Sanggunian member who caused the
vacancy. To stress, Damasen is not a
bona fide member of the LDP.

In addition, appointing Damasen

would not serve the will of the
electorate. He himself admitts that he
was previously a member of the
15 | Cases (39-47)

Lakas-CMD, and that he ran for the

position of Mayor under the said party
on the May 2004 Elections. Likewise,
he did not resign from the said party
when he joined the LDP, and even
admitted that his joining the LDP was
not because of party ideals, but
because he just wanted to.46 How
can the will of the electorate be best
served, given the foregoing
admissions of Damasen? If this Court
were to grant herein petition, it would
effectively diminish the party
representation of the LDP in the
Sanggunian, as Damasen would still
be considered a member of the
Lakas-CMD, not having resigned
therefrom, a scenario that defeats the
purpose of the law, and that
ultimately runs contrary the ratio of
Navarro.

Lastly, the records of the case reveal

that Tumamao has the
nomination47 of Senator Edgardo J.
Angara, the Party Chairman and,
therefore, the highest official of the
LDP. In addition, he is a member in
good standing of the LDP.48 Thus,
given the foregoing, it is this Court’s
view that Tumamao has complied
with the requirements of law.
44 The language of the law is clear, ToralKarevs COMELEC
explicit and unequivocal. Thus, it
admits no room for interpretation, but
merely for application. Accordingly,
when Moll was adjudged to be
disqualified, a permanent vacancy
was created for failure of the elected
mayor to qualify for the office.In such
eventuality, the duly elected vice
mayor shall succeed as provided by
law . (Sunga v. Comelec, 1998)