POLICE POWER

G.R. No. 122846 January 20, 2009

WHITE LIGHT CORPORATION vs. CITY OF MANILA

FACTS: On December 3, 1992, City Mayor Alfredo S. Lim (Mayor Lim) signed into law the Ordinance. The Ordinance is reproduced in
full, hereunder:
SECTION 1. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby the declared policy of the City Government to protect the best interest, health
and welfare, and the morality of its constituents in general and the youth in particular.
SEC. 2. Title. This ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance" prohibiting short time admission in hotels, motels, lodging
houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 3. Pursuant to the above policy, short-time admission and rate [sic], wash-up rate or other similarly concocted terms,
are hereby prohibited in hotels, motels, inns, lodging houses, pension houses and similar establishments in the City of Manila.
SEC. 4. Definition of Term[s]. Short-time admission shall mean admittance and charging of room rate for less than twelve
(12) hours at any given time or the renting out of rooms more than twice a day or any other term that may be concocted by owners
or managers of said establishments but would mean the same or would bear the same meaning.
SEC. 5. Penalty Clause. Any person or corporation who shall violate any provision of this ordinance shall upon conviction
thereof be punished by a fine of Five Thousand (₱5,000.00) Pesos or imprisonment for a period of not exceeding one (1) year or both
such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court; Provided, That in case of [a] juridical person, the president, the manager,
or the persons in charge of the operation thereof shall be liable: Provided, further, That in case of subsequent conviction for the
same offense, the business license of the guilty party shall
On December 15, 1992, the Malate Tourist and Development Corporation (MTDC) filed a complaint for declaratory relief
with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order ( TRO) with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Manila, Branch 9 impleading as defendant, herein respondent City of Manila (the City) represented by Mayor Lim. MTDC prayed that
the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited establishments, be declared invalid and
unconstitutional. MTDC claimed that as owner and operator of the Victoria Court in Malate, Manila it was authorized by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 259 to admit customers on a short time basis as well as to charge customers wash up rates for stays of only three
hours.
On December 21, 1992, petitioners White Light Corporation (WLC), Titanium Corporation (TC) and Sta. Mesa Tourist and
Development Corporation (STDC) filed a motion to intervene and to admit attached complaint-in-intervention on the ground that
the Ordinance directly affects their business interests as operators of drive-in-hotels and motels in Manila. The three companies are
components of the Anito Group of Companies which owns and operates several hotels and motels in Metro Manila.
On December 23, 1992, the RTC granted the motion to intervene. The RTC also notified the Solicitor General of the
proceedings pursuant to then Rule 64, Section 4 of the Rules of Court. On the same date, MTDC moved to withdraw as plaintiff.
On December 28, 1992, the RTC granted MTDC's motion to withdraw. The RTC issued a TRO on January 14, 1993, directing
the City to cease and desist from enforcing the Ordinance. The City filed an Answer dated January 22, 1993 alleging that the
Ordinance is a legitimate exercise of police power.
On February 8, 1993, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the city to desist from the enforcement of the
Ordinance. A month later, on March 8, 1993, the Solicitor General filed his Comment arguing that the Ordinance is constitutional.

ISSUE: Whether or not Ordinance 7774 is constitutional.

HELD: NO, The SC ruled that the said ordinance is null and void as it indeed infringes upon individual liberty. It also violates the due
process clause which serves as a guaranty for protection against arbitrary regulation or seizure. The said ordinance invades private
rights. Note that not all who goes into motels and hotels for wash up rate are really there for obscene purposes only. Some are
tourists who needed rest or to “wash up” or to freshen up. Hence, the infidelity sought to be avoided by the said ordinance is more
or less subjected only to a limited group of people. The SC reiterates that individual rights may be adversely affected only to the
extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare.
G.R. No. 179554 December 16, 2009
METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY vs. TRACKWORKS RAIL TRANSIT
ADVERTISING, VENDING AND PROMOTIONS, INC.,

FACTS: In 1997, the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications, entered into a build-lease-
transfer agreement (BLT agreement) with Metro Rail Transit Corporation, Limited (MRTC) pursuant to Republic Act No. 6957 (Build,
Operate and Transfer Law), under which MRTC undertook to build MRT3 subject to the condition that MRTC would own MRT3 for 25
years, upon the expiration of which the ownership would transfer to the Government.
The BLT agreement stipulated, among others, that MRTC could build and develop commercial premises in the MRT3 structures, or
obtain advertising income therefrom, viz:
Details of Development Rights. DOTC hereby confirms and awards to Metro Rail the rights to (a) develop commercial
premises in the Depot and the air space above the Stations, which shall be allowed to such height as is legally and technically
feasible, (b) lease or sub-lease interests or assign such interests in the Depot and such air space and (c) obtain any advertising
income from the Depot and such air space and LRTS Phase I.
LRTS Phase I means the rail transport system comprising about 16.9 line kilometers extending from Taft Avenue, Pasay City, to North
Avenue, Quezon City, occupying a strip in the center of EDSA approximately 10.5 meters wide (approximately 12 meters wide at or
around the Boni Avenue, Santolan and Buendia Stations), plus about 0.1 to 0.2 line kilometers extending from the North Avenue
Station to the Depot, together with the Stations, 73 Light Rail Vehicles and all ancillary plant, equipment and facilities, as more
particularly detailed in the Specifications.
Assignment of Rights. During the Development Rights Period, Metro Rail shall be entitled to assign all or any of its rights,
titles and interests in the Development Rights to bona fide real estate developers. In this connection, Metro Rail may enter into such
development, lease, sub-lease or other agreements or contracts relating to the Depot and the air space above the Stations (the
space not needed for all or any portion of the operation of the LRTS) for all or any portion of the Development Rights Period.
In 1998, respondent Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc. (Trackworks) entered into a contract
for advertising services with MRTC. Trackworks thereafter installed commercial billboards, signages and other advertizing media in
the different parts of the MRT3. In 2001, however, MMDA requested Trackworks to dismantle the billboards, signages and other
advertizing media pursuant to MMDA Regulation No. 96-009, whereby MMDA prohibited the posting, installation and display of any
kind or form of billboards, signs, posters, streamers, in any part of the road, sidewalk, center island, posts, trees, parks and open
space. After Trackworks refused the request of MMDA, MMDA proceeded to dismantle the formers billboards and similar forms of
advertisement.
On March 1, 2002, Trackworks filed against MMDA in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Pasig City an injunction suit (with prayer for
the issuance of a temporary restraining order [TRO] and preliminary injunction), docketed as Civil Case No. 68864.
On March 6, 2002, the RTC (Branch 155) issued a TRO, enjoining MMDA from dismantling or destroying Trackworks
billboards, signages and other advertizing media. On March 25, 2002, the RTC issued a writ of preliminary injunction for the same
purpose.

ISSUE: Whether or not MMDA has the power to dismantle, remove or destroy the billboards, signages and other advertising media
installed by Trackworks on the interior and exterior structures of the MRT3.

HELD: NO. That Trackworks derived its right to install its billboards, signages and other advertising media in the MRT3 from MRTC’s
authority under the BLT agreement to develop commercial premises in the MRT3 structure or to obtain advertising income
therefrom is no longer debatable. Under the BLT agreement, indeed, MRTC owned the MRT3 for 25 years, upon the expiration of
which MRTC would transfer ownership of the MRT3 to the Government.
Considering that MRTC remained to be the owner of the MRT3 during the time material to this case, and until this date, MRTC’s
entering into the contract for advertising services with Trackworks was a valid exercise of ownership by the former. In fact,
in Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Trackworks Rail Transit Advertising, Vending & Promotions, Inc., this Court
expressly recognized Trackworks’ right to install the billboards, signages and other advertising media pursuant to said contract. The
latter’s right should, therefore, be respected.
It is futile for MMDA to simply invoke its legal mandate to justify the dismantling of Trackworks’ billboards, signages and
other advertising media. MMDA simply had no power on its own to dismantle, remove, or destroy the billboards, signages and other
advertising media installed on the MRT3 structure by Trackworks. In Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Bel-Air Village
Association, Inc., Metropolitan Manila Development Authority v. Viron Transportation Co., Inc., and Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Garin, the Court had the occasion to rule that MMDA’s powers were limited to the formulation,
coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installing a system, and
administration. Nothing in Republic Act No. 7924 granted MMDA police power, let alone legislative power.
G.R. No. 100152 March 31, 2000
ACEBEDO OPTICAL COMPANY, INC. vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner applied with the Office of the City Mayor of Iligan for a business permit. After consideration of petitioners
application and the opposition interposed thereto by local optometrists, respondent City Mayor issued Business Permit No. 5342
subject to the following conditions:
1. Since it is a corporation, Acebedo cannot put up an optical clinic but only a commercial store;
2. Acebedo cannot examine and/or prescribe reading and similar optical glasses for patients, because these are functions of
optical clinics;
3. Acebedo cannot sell reading and similar eyeglasses without a prescription having first been made by an independent
optometrist (not its employee) or independent optical clinic. Acebedo can only sell directly to the public, without need of a
prescription, Ray-Ban and similar eyeglasses;
4. Acebedo cannot advertise optical lenses and eyeglasses, but can advertise Ray-Ban and similar glasses and frames;
5. Acebedo is allowed to grind lenses but only upon the prescription of an independent optometrist.[1]
On December 5, 1988, private respondent Samahan ng Optometrist Sa Pilipinas (SOPI), Iligan Chapter, through its Acting
President, Dr. Frances B. Apostol, lodged a complaint against the petitioner before the Office of the City Mayor, alleging that
Acebedo had violated the conditions set forth in its business permit and requesting the cancellation and/or revocation of such
permit.
Acting on such complaint, then City Mayor Camilo P. Cabili designated City Legal Officer Leo T. Cahanap to conduct an
investigation on the matter. On July 12, 1989, respondent City Legal Officer submitted a report to the City Mayor finding the herein
petitioner guilty of violating all the conditions of its business permit and recommending the disqualification of petitioner from
operating its business in Iligan City. The report further advised that no new permit shall be granted to petitioner for the year 1989
and should only be given time to wind up its affairs.
On July 19, 1989, the City Mayor sent petitioner a Notice of Resolution and Cancellation of Business Permit effective as of said date
and giving petitioner three (3) months to wind up its affairs.
On October 17, 1989, petitioner brought a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with prayer for restraining
order/preliminary injunction against the respondents, City Mayor, City Legal Officer and Samahan ng Optometrists sa Pilipinas-Iligan
City Chapter (SOPI), docketed as Civil Case No. 1497 before the Regional Trial Court of Iligan City, Branch I. Petitioner alleged that (1)
it was denied due process because it was not given an opportunity to present its evidence during the investigation conducted by the
City Legal Officer; (2) it was denied equal protection of the laws as the limitations imposed on its business permit were not imposed
on similar businesses in Iligan City; (3) the City Mayor had no authority to impose the special conditions on its business permit; and
(4) the City Legal Officer had no authority to conduct the investigation as the matter falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Professional Regulation Commission and the Board of Optometry.
Respondent SOPI interposed a Motion to Dismiss the Petition on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies
but on November 24, 1989, Presiding Judge Mamindiara P. Mangotara deferred resolution of such Motion to Dismiss until after trial
of the case on the merits. However, the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction was granted. Thereafter, respondent SOPI filed its
answer.
On May 30, 1990, the trial court dismissed the petition for failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and dissolved the writ of
preliminary injunction it earlier issued. Petitioners motion for reconsideration met the same fate. It was denied by an Order dated
June 28, 1990.

ISSUE: Whether or not the special conditions attached by the mayor is a valid exercise of police power.

HELD: NO. Acebedo was applying for a business permit to operate its business and not to practice optometry (the latter being within
the jurisdiction PRC Board of Optometry). The conditions attached by the mayor is ultra vires hence cannot be given any legal
application therefore estoppel does not apply. It is neither a valid exercise of police power. Though the mayor can definitely impose
conditions in the granting of permits, he must base such conditions on law or ordinances otherwise the conditions are ultra vires.
Lastly, the granting of the license is not a contract, it is a special privilege – estoppel does not apply.
EMINENT DOMAIN

G.R. No. 78742 July 14, 1989

ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS IN THE PHILIPPINES, INC vs. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM

FACTS: The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by P.D. No. 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not
exceeding seven hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the
statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands.
According to P.D. No. 316, which was promulgated in implementation of P.D. No. 27:
No tenant-farmer in agricultural lands primarily devoted to rice and corn shall be ejected or removed from his farmholding
until such time as the respective rights of the tenant- farmers and the landowner shall have been determined in accordance with the
rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27.
The petitioners claim they cannot eject their tenants and so are unable to enjoy their right of retention because the
Department of Agrarian Reform has so far not issued the implementing rules required under the above-quoted decree. They
therefore ask the Court for a writ of mandamus to compel the respondent to issue the said rules.
In his Comment, the public respondent argues that P.D. No. 27 has been amended by LOI 474 removing any right of retention from
persons who own other agricultural lands of more than 7 hectares in aggregate area or lands used for residential, commercial,
industrial or other purposes from which they derive adequate income for their family. And even assuming that the petitioners do not
fall under its terms, the regulations implementing P.D. No. 27 have already been issued, to wit, the Memorandum dated July 10,
1975 (Interim Guidelines on Retention by Small Landowners, with an accompanying Retention Guide Table), Memorandum Circular
No. 11 dated April 21, 1978, (Implementation Guidelines of LOI No. 474), Memorandum Circular No. 18-81 dated December 29,1981
(Clarificatory Guidelines on Coverage of P.D. No. 27 and Retention by Small Landowners), and DAR Administrative Order No. 1, series
of 1985 (Providing for a Cut-off Date for Landowners to Apply for Retention and/or to Protest the Coverage of their Landholdings
under Operation Land Transfer pursuant to P.D. No. 27). For failure to file the corresponding applications for retention under these
measures, the petitioners are now barred from invoking this right.
The public respondent also stresses that the petitioners have prematurely initiated this case notwithstanding the pendency
of their appeal to the President of the Philippines. Moreover, the issuance of the implementing rules, assuming this has not yet been
done, involves the exercise of discretion which cannot be controlled through the writ of mandamus. This is especially true if this
function is entrusted, as in this case, to a separate department of the government.
In their Reply, the petitioners insist that the above-cited measures are not applicable to them because they do not own more than
seven hectares of agricultural land. Moreover, assuming arguendo that the rules were intended to cover them also, the said
measures are nevertheless not in force because they have not been published as required by law and the ruling of this Court in
Tanada v. Tuvera.10 As for LOI 474, the same is ineffective for the additional reason that a mere letter of instruction could not have
repealed the presidential decree.

ISSUE: Whether or not all rights acquired by the tenant-farmer under P.D. No. 27, as recognized under E.O. No. 228, are retained
even under R.A. No. 6657.

HELD: YES. P.D. No. 27 expressly ordered the emancipation of tenant-farmer as October 21, 1972 and declared that he shall "be
deemed the owner" of a portion of land consisting of a family-sized farm except that "no title to the land owned by him was to be
actually issued to him unless and until he had become a full-fledged member of a duly recognized farmers' cooperative." It was
understood, however, that full payment of the just compensation also had to be made first, conformably to the constitutional
requirement.
When E.O. No. 228, categorically stated in its Section 1 that:
All qualified farmer-beneficiaries are now deemed full owners as of October 21, 1972 of the land they acquired by virtue of
Presidential Decree No. 27.
The CARP Law, for its part, conditions the transfer of possession and ownership of the land to the government on receipt by
the landowner of the corresponding payment or the deposit by the DAR of the compensation in cash or LBP bonds with an
accessible bank. Until then, title also remains with the landowner. No outright change of ownership is contemplated either.
This should counter-balance the express provision in Section 6 of the said law that "the landowners whose lands have been
covered by Presidential Decree No. 27 shall be allowed to keep the area originally retained by them thereunder, further, that original
homestead grantees or direct compulsory heirs who still own the original homestead at the time of the approval of this Act shall
retain the same areas as long as they continue to cultivate said homestead."
G.R. No. L-119694 May 22, 1995
PHILIPPINE PRESS INSTITUTE, INC., vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS: On 2 March 1995, Comelec promulgated Resolution No. 2772, which reads in part:
Sec. 2. Comelec Space. — The Commission shall procure free print space of not less than one half (1/2) page in at least one
newspaper of general circulation in every province or city for use as "Comelec Space" from March 6, 1995 in the case of candidates
for senator and from March 21, 1995 until May 12, 1995. In the absence of said newspaper, "Comelec Space" shall be obtained from
any magazine or periodical of said province or city.
Sec. 3. Uses of Comelec Space. — "Comelec Space" shall be allocated by the Commission, free of charge, among all
candidates within the area in which the newspaper, magazine or periodical is circulated to enable the candidates to make known
their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of government.
"Comelec Space" shall also be used by the Commission for dissemination of vital election information.
Apparently in implementation of this Resolution, Comelec through Commissioner Regalado E. Maambong sent identical letters,
dated 22 March 1995, to various publishers of newspapers like the Business World, the Philippine Star, the Malaya and the
Philippine Times Journal, all members of PPI. These letters read as follows:
“This is to advise you that pursuant to Resolution No. 2772 of the Commission on Elections, you are directed to provide free
print space of not less than one half (1/2) page for use as "Comelec Space" or similar to the print support which you have extended
during the May 11, 1992 synchronized elections which was 2 full pages for each political party fielding senatorial candidates, from
March 6, 1995 to May 6, 1995, to make known their qualifications, their stand on public issues and their platforms and programs of
government.”
In this Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order, PPI asks us to
declare Comelec Resolution No. 2772 unconstitutional and void on the ground that it violates the prohibition imposed by the
Constitution upon the government, and any of its agencies, against the taking of private property for public use without just
compensation. Petitioner also contends that the 22 March 1995 letter directives of Comelec requiring publishers to give free
"Comelec Space" and at the same time process raw data to make it camera-ready, constitute impositions of involuntary servitude,
contrary to the provisions of Section 18 (2), Article III of the 1987 Constitution. Finally, PPI argues that Section 8 of Comelec
Resolution No. 2772 is violative of the constitutionally guaranteed freedom of speech, of the press and of expression.
The Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment on behalf of respondent Comelec alleging that Comelec Resolution No.
2772 does not impose upon the publishers any obligation to provide free print space in the newspapers as it does not provide any
criminal or administrative sanction for non-compliance with that Resolution. According to the Solicitor General, the questioned
Resolution merely established guidelines to be followed in connection with the procurement of "Comelec space," the procedure for
and mode of allocation of such space to candidates and the conditions or requirements for the candidate's utilization of the
"Comelec space" procured. At the same time, however, the Solicitor General argues that even if the questioned Resolution and its
implementing letter directives are viewed as mandatory, the same would nevertheless be valid as an exercise of the police power of
the State. The Solicitor General also maintains that Section 8 of Resolution No. 2772 is a permissible exercise of the power of
supervision or regulation of the Comelec over the communication and information operations of print media enterprises during the
election period to safeguard and ensure a fair, impartial and credible election.

ISSUE: Whether or not COMELEC Resolution No. 2772 is constitutional.

HELD: NO. To compel print media companies to donate “Comelec-space” amounts to “taking” of private personal property for public
use. The extent of the taking or deprivation is not insubstantial measured by the advertising rates ordinarily charged by newspaper
publishers whether in cities or in non-urban areas.
The taking of print space here sought to be effected may first be appraised under the rubric of expropriation of private
personal property for public use. The threshold requisites for a lawful taking of private property for public use need to be examined
here: one is the necessity for the taking; another is the legal authority to effect the taking. The element of necessity for the taking
has not been shown by respondent Comelec. It has not been suggested that the members of PPI are unwilling to sell print space at
their normal rates to Comelec for election purposes. It has not been suggested that Comelec has been granted the power of eminent
domain either by the Constitution or by the legislative authority. A reasonable relationship between that power and the
enforcement and administration of election laws by Comelec must be shown.
The taking of private property for public use is, of course, authorized by the Constitution, but not without payment of “just
compensation.
G.R. No. 124795 December 10, 2008
FORFOM DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS

FACTS: Forfom is the registered owner of several parcels of land in San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna under Transfer Certificates of
Title (TCT) Nos. T-34384, T-34386 and 34387, all of the Registry of Deeds of Laguna. Said parcels of land were originally registered in
the name of Felix Limcaoco, predecessor-in-interest of Forfom, under Original Certificates of Title (OCT) Nos. (0-326) 0-384 and (0-
328) 0-386.
In a cabinet meeting held on 1 November 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos approved the Presidential Commuter
Service Project, more commonly known as the Carmona Project of the President. Per Resolution No. 751 dated 2 November 1972 of
the PNR Board of Directors, its General Manager was authorized to implement the project. The San Pedro-Carmona Commuter Line
Project was implemented with the installation of railroad facilities and appurtenances.
During the construction of said commuter line, several properties owned by private individuals/corporations were
traversed as right-of-way. Among the properties through which the commuter line passed was a 100,128 square-meter portion
owned by Forfom covered by TCT Nos. T-34384, T-34386 and T-34387.
On 24 August 1990, Forfom filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Binan, Laguna a complaint for Recovery of
Posssession of Real Property and/or Damages. It alleged that PNR, with the aid of military men, and without its consent and against
its will, occupied 100,128 square meters of its property located in San Pedro, Laguna and installed thereon railroad and railway
facilities and appurtenances. It further alleged that PNR rented out portions of the property to squatters along the railroad tracks.
Despite repeated verbal and written demands for the return of the property or for the payment of its price, PNR failed to comply. It
prayed that PNR be ordered to vacate the property and to cause the eviction of all shanties and squatters that PNR had taken in as
lessees, and that it be restored to the peaceful occupation and enjoyment thereof
PNR explained that former President Ferdinand E. Marcos approved what was known to be the Carmona Project -- a 5.1
kilometer railroad extension line from San Pedro, Laguna to San Jose, Carmona, Cavite to serve the squatters resettlement area in
said localities. It claimed that it negotiated with the respective owners of the affected properties and that they were paid just
compensation. Dr. Felix Limcaoco, it said, was not paid because he failed to present the corresponding titles to his properties. It
claimed that the right to and just compensation for the subject property was the declared fair market value at the time of the taking
which was P0.60 per square meter. It disclosed that in a meeting with the representatives of Dr. Limcaoco, the price agreed upon
was P1.25 per square meter, the amount the adjoining owners was paid. It prayed that the instant complaint be dismissed, and that
the owner of the properties involved be compelled to accept the amount of P1.25 per square meter as price for the properties.

ISSUE: Whether or not Forform can recover possession of the property because PNR failed to file a expropriation case and pay just
compensation.

HELD: NO. The power of eminent domain is an inherent and indispensable power of the State. Being inherent, the power need not
be specifically conferred on the government by the Constitution. Section 9, Article III states that private property shall not be taken
for public use without just compensation. The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation.
A number of circumstances must be present in the taking of property for purposes of eminent domain: (1) the expropriator
must enter a private property; (2) the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period; (3) the entry into
the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority; (4) the property must be devoted to a public purpose or otherwise
informally, appropriately or injuriously affected; and (5) the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust
the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
In the case at bar, the expropriator (PNR) entered the property of Forfom, a private land. The entrance into Forfom's property was
permanent, not for a fleeting or brief period. PNR has been in control, possession and enjoyment of the subject land since December
1972 or January 1973. PNR's entry into the property of Forfom was with the approval of then President Marcos and with the
authorization of the PNR's Board of Directors. The property of Forfom measuring around eleven hectares was devoted to public use -
railroad tracks, facilities and appurtenances for use of the Carmona Commuter Service. With the entrance of PNR into the property,
Forfom was deprived of material and beneficial use and enjoyment of the property. It is clear from the foregoing that there was a
taking of property within the constitutional sense.
It is clear that recovery of possession of the property by the landowner can no longer be allowed on the grounds of
estoppel and, more importantly, of public policy which imposes upon the public utility the obligation to continue its services to the
public. The non-filing of the case for expropriation will not necessarily lead to the return of the property to the landowner. What is
left to the landowner is the right of compensation.
G.R. No. 170147 January 30, 2009
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. SPOUSES AGUSTIN and IMELDA CANCIO

FACTS: Petitioner Philippine Economic Zone Authority is a government-owned and controlled corporation created and existing under
and by virtue of RA 7916, as amended. It is vested with governmental functions, including the power of eminent domain, thus
enabling it to acquire private land within or adjacent to the ecozone for consolidation with land for zone development purposes.
On January 15, 1979, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1811 which reserved certain parcels of
land of the public domain in Lapu Lapu City in favor of petitioner (then Export Processing Zone Authority or EPZA) for the
establishment of the Mactan Export Processing Zone. However, some of the parcels covered by the proclamation, including that of
respondent spouses Agustin and Imelda Cancio, were private land.
Petitioner eventually laid out the development of the economic zone and subsequently leased out respondents’ 47,540 sq. m. lot to
an investor in the economic zone, Maitland Smith Inc. (Maitland).
On May 19, 2001, petitioner offered to purchase respondents’ lot at ₱1,100 per sq. m. or ₱52,294,000 for the whole
property. The letter containing the offer further instructed respondents "to consider and accept, otherwise we will initiate
expropriation proceedings in the proper court."
Instead of accepting the offer, respondents filed an unlawful detainer case against Maitland in the Municipal Trial Court of Lapu Lapu
City.
Thereafter, petitioner commenced expropriation proceedings for respondents’ property with the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Lapu Lapu City, Branch 54 on August 27, 2001. Accordingly, it sought a writ of possession for the property for which it was willing
to deposit 10% of the offered amount or a total of ₱5,229,400 with the Land Bank of the Philippines in accordance with
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 50. Respondents, however, filed a motion to require petitioner to comply with RA 8974, specifically
Section 4(a) thereof, which requires that, upon the filing of the complaint for expropriation, the implementing agency shall
immediately pay the owner of the property an amount equivalent to 100% of the current zonal valuation thereof for purposes of the
issuance of a writ of possession.
In its January 14, 2002 order (first order), the trial court granted respondents’ motion.
Petitioner moved for its reconsideration. It argued that RA 8974 was inapplicable as the payment required under the law
applied only to instances where the property was still in the owner’s possession and had yet to be transferred to the government. It
could not be validly invoked when the property was already in the government’s possession, as in this case. It also averred that it
should be made to pay only the price of the land at the time of its taking. Corollarily, if it was ordered to pay the amount required
under RA 8974, it would be unjustly penalized for its own improvements to the property.
This time, the RTC agreed with petitioner’s position. On February 26, 2002 (second order), the court a quo granted
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that petitioner should make the required payment under the
law because RA 8974, which took effect before the commencement of the expropriation case, applied to all actions of such nature
regardless of whether the government agency was already in possession or not. The court a quo issued its September 5, 2002 order
(third order) which reversed its second order and reinstated the first one.

ISSUE: Whether or not RA 8974 is applicable to this case for purposes of the issuance of the writ of possession.

HELD:YES. A perusal of RA 8974 readily reveals that it applies to instances when the national government expropriates property for
national government infrastructure projects. Undeniably, the economic zone is a national government project – a matter undisputed
by both parties. Also, the complaint for expropriation was filed only on August 27, 2001 or almost one year after the law was
approved on November 7, 2000. Thus, there is no doubt about its applicability to this case.
We note that this expropriation case is still in its initial stages. The trial court had yet to approve a writ of possession in
petitioner’s favor when the issue of payment of just compensation cropped up. Both parties seemed to have confused the
requirement of paying 100% of the current zonal valuation of the property (as a prerequisite to the issuance of a writ of possession)
with the payment of just compensation itself.
G.R. No. 169008 July 31, 2008
LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ

FACTS: After compulsory acquisition by the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), on November 16, 1993, of respondent Martinez’s
62.5369-hectare land in Barangay Agpudlos, San Andres, Romblon, pursuant to Republic Act No. 6657 or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 (CARL), petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) offered ₱1,955,485.60 as just compensation.
Convinced that the proffered amount was unjust and confiscatory, respondent rejected it. Thus, the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB), through its Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) conducted summary administrative
proceedings for the preliminary determination of just compensation in accordance with Section 16 (d) of the CARL.
On September 4, 2002, PARAD Virgilio M. Sorita, finding some marked inconsistencies in the figures and factors made as
bases by LBP in its computation, rendered judgment as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:
Ordering the Land Bank of the Philippines to pay landowner-protestant RAYMUNDA MARTINEZ for her property covered and
embraced by TCT No. T-712 with an area of 62.5369 hectares, more or less, which the Department of Agrarian Reform intends to
acquire, the total amount of TWELVE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY NINE THOUSAND FOUR HUNDRED NINETY TWO and 50/100
Pesos (Php12,179,492.50), in the manner provided for by law.
SO ORDERED.
A petition for the fixing of just compensation docketed as Agrarian Case No. 696 was then filed by LBP’s counsel before the
Special Agrarian Court (SAC), the Regional Trial Court of Odiongan, Romblon, Branch 82. After filing her answer to the said petition,
respondent, contending that the orders, rulings and decisions of the DARAB become final after the lapse of 15 days from their
receipt, moved for the dismissal of the petition for being filed out of time. Petitioner opposed the motion.
Meanwhile, respondent, still asserting the finality of PARAD Sorita’s decision, filed before the Office of the PARAD a motion
for the issuance of a writ of execution, which was eventually granted on November 11, 2003. Ascertaining that the petition before
the SAC was filed by LBP 26 days after it received a copy of PARAD Sorita’s decision, the Office of the PARAD denied LBP’s motion for
reconsideration and ordered the issuance of a writ of execution on February 23, 2004. Aggrieved of these developments, LBP, on
March 12, 2004, moved to quash the said February 23, 2004 PARAD resolution.
On April 6, 2004, even as the motion to quash was yet unresolved, LBP instituted a petition for certiorari before the CA,
which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 83276, assailing both the November 11, 2003 and the February 23, 2004 PARAD resolutions.
LBP primarily contended that the Office of the PARAD gravely abused its discretion when it issued the writ of execution despite the
pendency with the SAC of a petition for the fixing of just compensation.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (PARAD) gravely abused his discretion when he issued a writ of
execution despite the pendency of LBP’s petition for fixing of just compensation with the Special Agrarian Court (SAC).

HELD: YES. To resolve the conflict in the rulings of the Court, we now declare herein, for the guidance of the bench and the bar, that
the better rule is that stated in Philippine Veterans Bank, reiterated in Lubrica and in the August 14, 2007 Decision in this case. Thus,
while a petition for the fixing of just compensation with the SAC is not an appeal from the agrarian reform adjudicator’s decision but
an original action, the same has to be filed within the 15-day period stated in the DARAB Rules; otherwise, the adjudicator’s decision
will attain finality. This rule is not only in accord with law and settled jurisprudence but also with the principles of justice and equity.
Verily, a belated petition before the SAC, e.g., one filed a month, or a year, or even a decade after the land valuation of the DAR
adjudicator, must not leave the dispossessed landowner in a state of uncertainty as to the true value of his property.
G.R. NO. 162474 October 13, 2009
HON. VICENTE P. EUSEBIO vs. JOVITO M. LUIS et, el.

FACTS: Respondents are the registered owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 53591 and 53589 with
an area of 1,586 square meters. Said parcel of land was taken by the City of Pasig sometime in 1980 and used as a municipal road
now known as A. Sandoval Avenue, Barangay Palatiw, Pasig City. On February 1, 1993, the Sanggunian of Pasig City passed
Resolution No. 15 authorizing payments to respondents for said parcel of land. However, the Appraisal Committee of the City of
Pasig, in Resolution No. 93-13 dated October 19, 1993, assessed the value of the land only at ₱150.00 per square meter. In a letter
dated June 26, 1995, respondents requested the Appraisal Committee to consider ₱2,000.00 per square meter as the value of their
land.
One of the respondents also wrote a letter dated November 25, 1994 to Mayor Vicente P. Eusebio calling the latter’s
attention to the fact that a property in the same area, as the land subject of this case, had been paid for by petitioners at the price of
₱2,000.00 per square meter when said property was expropriated in the year 1994 also for conversion into a public road.
Subsequently, respondents’ counsel sent a demand letter dated August 26, 1996 to Mayor Eusebio, demanding the amount of
₱5,000.00 per square meter, or a total of ₱7,930,000.00, as just compensation for respondents’ property. In response, Mayor
Eusebio wrote a letter dated September 9, 1996 informing respondents that the City of Pasig cannot pay them more than the
amount set by the Appraisal Committee.
Thus, on October 8, 1996, respondents filed a Complaint for Reconveyance and/or Damages (Civil Case No. 65937) against
herein petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City, Branch 155. Respondents prayed that the property be returned
to them with payment of reasonable rental for sixteen years of use at ₱500.00 per square meter, or ₱793,000.00, with legal interest
of 12% per annum from date of filing of the complaint until full payment, or in the event that said property can no longer be
returned, that petitioners be ordered to pay just compensation in the amount of ₱7,930,000.00 and rental for sixteen years of use at
₱500.00 per square meter, or ₱793,000.00, both with legal interest of 12% per annum from the date of filing of the complaint until
full payment. In addition, respondents prayed for payment of moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
After trial, the RTC rendered a Decision in favor of plaintiff.

ISSUE: Whether or not respondents are entitled to regain possession of their property taken by the city government in the 1980’s
and, in the event that said property can no longer be returned, how should just compensation to respondents be determined

HELD: NO. Just like in the Forfom case, herein respondents also failed to question the taking of their property for a long period of
time (from 1980 until the early 1990’s) and, when asked during trial what action they took after their property was taken, witness
Jovito Luis, one of the respondents, testified that "when we have an occasion to talk to Mayor Caruncho we always asked for
compensation."9 It is likewise undisputed that what was constructed by the city government on respondents’ property was a road
for public use, namely, A. Sandoval Avenue in Pasig City. Clearly, as in Forfom, herein respondents are also estopped from recovering
possession of their land, but are entitled to just compensation.
The prevailing doctrine on judicial determination of just compensation is that set forth in Forfom. Therein, the Court ruled
that even if there are no expropriation proceedings instituted to determine just compensation, the trial court is still mandated to act
in accordance with the procedure provided for in Section 5, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the appointment
of not more than three competent and disinterested commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for
the subject property. The Court reiterated its ruling in “National Power Corporation v. Dela Cruz” that "trial with the aid of
commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously or for no reason at all." It was also emphasized
therein that although ascertainment of just compensation is a judicial prerogative, the commissioners’ findings may only be
disregarded or substituted with the trial court’s own estimation of the property’s value only if the commissioners have applied illegal
principles to the evidence submitted to them, where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or where the
amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive. Thus, the Court concluded in Forfom that:
The judge should not have made a determination of just compensation without first having appointed the required
commissioners who would initially ascertain and report the just compensation for the property involved. This being the case, we find
the valuation made by the trial court to be ineffectual, not having been made in accordance with the procedure provided for by the
rules.
G.R. No. 165828 August 24, 2011
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. HEIRS OF MACABANGKIT SANGKAY

FACTS: Pursuant to its legal mandate under Republic Act No. 6395 (An Act Revising the Charter of the National Power Corporation),
NPC undertook the Agus River Hydroelectric Power Plant Project in the 1970s to generate electricity for Mindanao. The project
included the construction of several underground tunnels to be used in diverting the water flow from the Agus River to the
hydroelectric plants.
On November 21, 1997, the respondents, namely: Cebu, Bangowa-an, Sayana, Nasser, Manta, Edgar, Putri, Mongkoy and
Amir, all surnamed Macabangkit (Heirs of Macabangkit), as the owners of land with an area of 221,573 square meters situated in
Ditucalan, Iligan City, sued NPC in the RTC for the recovery of damages and of the property, with the alternative prayer for the
payment of just compensation. They alleged that they had belatedly discovered that one of the underground tunnels of NPC that
diverted the water flow of the Agus River for the operation of the Hydroelectric Project in Agus V, Agus VI and Agus VII traversed
their land; that their discovery had occurred in 1995 after Atty. Saidali C. Gandamra, President of the Federation of Arabic Madaris
School, had rejected their offer to sell the land because of the danger the underground tunnel might pose to the proposed Arabic
Language Training Center and Muslims Skills Development Center; that such rejection had been followed by the withdrawal by
Global Asia Management and Resource Corporation from developing the land into a housing project for the same reason; that Al-
Amanah Islamic Investment Bank of the Philippines had also refused to accept their land as collateral because of the presence of the
underground tunnel; that the underground tunnel had been constructed without their knowledge and consent; that the presence of
the tunnel deprived them of the agricultural, commercial, industrial and residential value of their land; and that their land had also
become an unsafe place for habitation because of the loud sound of the water rushing through the tunnel and the constant shaking
of the ground, forcing them and their workers to relocate to safer grounds.
In its answer with counterclaim, NPC countered that the Heirs of Macabangkit had no right to compensation under section
3(f) of Republic Act No. 6395, under which a mere legal easement on their land was established; that their cause of action, should
they be entitled to compensation, already prescribed due to the tunnel having been constructed in 1979; and that by reason of the
tunnel being an apparent and continuous easement, any action arising from such easement prescribed in five years.

ISSUE: Whether the Heirs of Macabangkit's right to claim just compensation had prescribed under section 3(i) of Republic Act No.
6395, or, alternatively, under Article 620 and Article 646 of the Civil Code.

HELD: NO. We rule that the prescriptive period provided under Section 3(i) of Republic Act No. 6395 is applicable only to an action
for damages, and does not extend to an action to recover just compensation like this case. Consequently, NPC cannot thereby bar
the right of the Heirs of Macabangkit to recover just compensation for their land.
The action to recover just compensation from the State or its expropriating agency differs from the action for damages. The
former, also known as inverse condemnation, has the objective to recover the value of property taken in fact by the governmental
defendant, even though no formal exercise of the power of eminent domain has been attempted by the taking agency. Just
compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the taker's
gain, but the owner's loss. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation in order to convey the idea that
the equivalent to be rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample. On the other hand, the latter
action seeks to vindicate a legal wrong through damages, which may be actual, moral, nominal, temperate, liquidated, or exemplary.
When a right is exercised in a manner not conformable with the norms enshrined in Article 19 and like provisions on human
relations in the Civil Code, and the exercise results to the damage of another, a legal wrong is committed and the wrongdoer is held
responsible.
The two actions are radically different in nature and purpose. The action to recover just compensation is based on the
Constitution[30] while the action for damages is predicated on statutory enactments. Indeed, the former arises from the exercise by
the State of its power of eminent domain against private property for public use, but the latter emanates from the transgression of a
right. The fact that the owner rather than the expropriator brings the former does not change the essential nature of the suit as an
inverse condemnation, for the suit is not based on tort, but on the constitutional prohibition against the taking of property without
just compensation. It would very well be contrary to the clear language of the Constitution to bar the recovery of just compensation
for private property taken for a public use solely on the basis of statutory prescription.
G.R. No. 168770 February 9, 2011
ANUNCIACION VDA. DE OUANO et al. vs. THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES

FACTS: In 1949, the National Airport Corporation (NAC), MCIAAs predecessor agency, pursued a program to expand the Lahug
Airport in Cebu City. Through its team of negotiators, NAC met and negotiated with the owners of the properties situated around
the airport, which included Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A, 942, and 947 of the Banilad Estate. As the
landowners would later claim, the government negotiating team, as a sweetener, assured them that they could repurchase their
respective lands should the Lahug Airport expansion project do not push through or once the Lahug Airport closes or its operations
transferred to Mactan-Cebu Airport. Some of the landowners accepted the assurance and executed deeds of sale with a right of
repurchase. Others, however, including the owners of the aforementioned lots, refused to sell because the purchase price offered
was viewed as way below market, forcing the hand of the Republic, represented by the then Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA),
as successor agency of the NAC, to file a complaint for the expropriation of Lot Nos. 744-A, 745-A, 746, 747, 761-A, 762-A, 763-A,
942, and 947, among others, docketed as Civil Case No. R-1881 entitled Republic v. Damian Ouano, et al.
On December 29, 1961, the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Cebu rendered judgment for the Republic.
At the end of 1991, or soon after the transfer of the aforesaid lots to MCIAA, Lahug Airport completely ceased operations,
Mactan Airport having opened to accommodate incoming and outgoing commercial flights. On the ground, the expropriated lots
were never utilized for the purpose they were taken as no expansion of Lahug Airport was undertaken. This development prompted
the former lot owners to formally demand from the government that they be allowed to exercise their promised right to repurchase.
The demands went unheeded. Civil suits followed.
Soon after the MCIAA jettisoned the Lahug Airport expansion project, informal settlers entered and occupied Lot No. 763-A
which, before its expropriation, belonged to the Ouanos. The Ouanos then formally asked to be allowed to exercise their right to
repurchase the aforementioned lot, but the MCIAA ignored the demand. On August 18, 1997, the Ouanos instituted a complaint
before the Cebu City RTC against the Republic and the MCIAA for reconveyance, docketed as Civil Case No. CEB-20743.

ISSUE: Whether or not under the ruling of this Honorable Court in the heirs of Moreno Case, and pursuant to the principles
enunciated therein, petitioners herein are entitled to recover their litigated property.

HELD:YES. In esse, expropriation is forced private property taking, the landowner being really without a ghost of a chance to defeat
the case of the expropriating agency. In other words, in expropriation, the private owner is deprived of property against his will.
Withal, the mandatory requirement of due process ought to be strictly followed, such that the state must show, at the minimum, a
genuine need, an exacting public purpose to take private property, the purpose to be specifically alleged or least reasonably
deducible from the complaint.
Public use, as an eminent domain concept, has now acquired an expansive meaning to include any use that is of usefulness,
utility, or advantage, or what is productive of general benefit [of the public]. If the genuine public necessitythe very reason or
condition as it wereallowing, at the first instance, the expropriation of a private land ceases or disappears, then there is no more
cogent point for the governments retention of the expropriated land. The same legal situation should hold if the government
devotes the property to another public use very much different from the original or deviates from the declared purpose to benefit
another private person. It has been said that the direct use by the state of its power to oblige landowners to renounce their
productive possession to another citizen, who will use it predominantly for that citizens own private gain, is offensive to our laws.
A condemnor should commit to use the property pursuant to the purpose stated in the petition for expropriation, failing
which it should file another petition for the new purpose. If not, then it behooves the condemnor to return the said property to its
private owner, if the latter so desires. The government cannot plausibly keep the property it expropriated in any manner it pleases
and, in the process, dishonor the judgment of expropriation. This is not in keeping with the idea of fair play,
The notion, therefore, that the government, via expropriation proceedings, acquires unrestricted ownership over or a fee
simple title to the covered land, is no longer tenable. We suggested as much in Heirs of Moreno and in Tudtud and more recently in
Lozada, Sr. Expropriated lands should be differentiated from a piece of land, ownership of which was absolutely transferred by way
of an unconditional purchase and sale contract freely entered by two parties, one without obligation to buy and the other without
the duty to sell. In that case, the fee simple concept really comes into play. There is really no occasion to apply the fee simple
concept if the transfer is conditional. The taking of a private land in expropriation proceedings is always conditioned on its continued
devotion to its public purpose. As a necessary corollary, once the purpose is terminated or peremptorily abandoned, then the
former owner, if he so desires, may seek its reversion, subject of course to the return, at the very least, of the just compensation
received.
DUE PROCESS
G.R. No. 117565
November 18, 1997
ARSENIO P. LUMIQUED et, al. vs. Honorable APOLINIO G. EXEVEA et, al.

FACTS: Arsenio P. Lumiqued was the Regional Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform Cordillera Autonomous
Region (DAR-CAR) until President Fidel V. Ramos dismissed.
The dismissal was the aftermath of three complaints filed by DAR-CAR Regional Cashier and private respondent
Jeannette Obar-Zamudio with the Board of Discipline of the DAR.
The three affidavit-complaints were referred in due course to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for appropriate
action. On May 20, 1992, Acting Justice Secretary Eduardo G. Montenegro issued Department Order No. 145 creating a
committee to investigate the complaints against Lumiqued. The order appointed Regional State Prosecutor Apolinario
Exevea as committee chairman with City Prosecutor Erdolfo Balajadia and Provincial Prosecutor Felix Cabading as
members. They were mandated to conduct an investigation within thirty days from receipt of the order, and to submit
their report and recommendation within fifteen days from its conclusion.
The investigating committee accordingly issued a subpoena directing Lumiqued to submit his counter-affidavit
on or before June 17, 1992. Lumiqued, however, filed instead an urgent motion to defer submission of his counter-
affidavit pending actual receipt of two of private respondents complaints. The committee granted the motion and gave
him a five-day extension.
Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3 and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted
by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for its resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the
services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he
himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution.
On August 12, 1992, Lumiqued filed an urgent motion for additional hearing, alleging that he suffered a stroke
on July 10, 1992. The motion was forwarded to the Office of the State Prosecutor apparently because the investigation
had already been terminated. In an order dated September 7, 1992, State Prosecutor Zoila C. Montero denied the
motion.The OP, however, found that the charges of oppression and harassment, as well as that of incurring unliquidated
cash advances, were not satisfactorily established.
In a petition( by the heirs) for appeal addressed to President Ramos, Lumiqued prayed that A.O. No. 52 be
reconsidered and that he be reinstated to his former position with all the benefits accorded to him by law and existing
rules and regulations. This petition was basically premised on the affidavit dated May 27, 1993, of a certain Dwight L.
Lumiqued, a former driver of the DAR-CAR, who confessed to having authored the falsification of gasoline receipts and
attested to petitioner Lumiqueds being an honest man who had no premonition that the receipts he (Dwight) turned
over to him were altered.
Treating the petition for appeal as a motion for the reconsideration of A.O. No. 52, the OP, through Senior
Deputy Executive Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing, denied the same on August 31, 1993.
Undaunted, Lumiqued filed a second motion for reconsideration, alleging, among other things, that he was
denied the constitutional right to counsel during the hearing. On May 19, 1994, however, before his motion could be
resolved, Lumiqued died. On September 28, 1994, Secretary Quisumbing denied the second motion for reconsideration
for lack of merit.

ISSUE: Whether or not due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative
inquiry.

HELD: NO. While investigations conducted by an administrative body may at times be akin to a criminal proceeding, the
fact remains that under existing laws, a party in an administrative inquiry may or may not be assisted by counsel,
irrespective of the nature of the charges and of the respondent’s capacity to represent himself. In an administrative
proceeding such as the one that transpired, a respondent (such as Lumiqued) has the option of engaging the services of
counsel or not. Thus, the right to counsel is not imperative in administrative investigations because such inquiries are
conducted merely to determine whether there are facts that merit disciplinary measures against erring public officers
and employees, with the purpose of maintaining the dignity of government service.
G.R. No. 139465 January 18, 2000
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION

FACTS: On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree No. 1069 "Prescribing the
Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on:
the doctrine of incorporation under the Constitution.
On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the Government of the
Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines and the Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US Extradition
Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also
expressed its concurrence in the Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility of
the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the principal diplomatic or consular officer of
the requested state resident in the Requesting State).
On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign Affairs U. S. Note Verbale
No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to
the Note Verbale were the Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court, Southern
District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition. Based on the papers submitted, private
respondent appears to be charged in the United States with violation of SOME provisions of the United States Code
(USC.
On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and authorizing a panel of attorneys
to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel
began with the "technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents in support thereof.
The panel found that the "official English translation of some documents in Spanish were not attached to the request
and that there are some other matters that needed to be addressed"
Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent, through counsel, wrote a
letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting copies of the official extradition request from the U. S.
Government, as well as all documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to comment on
the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers. Private respondent also requested that the
proceedings on the matter be held in abeyance in the meantime.
Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of
the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the
Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private
respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an opportunity to comment on, or
oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to
set aside herein petitioners letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from considering the
extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the
Director of the NBI from performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United States), with
an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction.

ISSUE: Whether or not private respondent entitled to the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing.

HELD: YES. In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An application of the basic
twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty
nor the Extradition Law precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American jurisprudence and
procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate extradition proceedings as explained above, the
prospective extraditee may even request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state,
and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right (35 C.J.S. 410).
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of loss of property or
employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his forcible banishment to a foreign land. The
convergence of petitioners favorable action on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondents
liberty is easily comprehensible.
G.R. No. 148571. September 24, 2002
GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA vs. Hon. GUILLERMO G. PURGANAN

FACTS: Pursuant to the existing RP-US Extradition Treaty,[6] the United States Government, through diplomatic
channels, sent to the Philippine Government Note Verbale No. 0522 dated June 16, 1999, supplemented by Note Nos.
0597, 0720 and 0809 and accompanied by duly authenticated documents requesting the extradition of Mark B. Jimenez,
also known as Mario Batacan Crespo. Upon receipt of the Notes and documents, the secretary of foreign affairs (SFA)
transmitted them to the secretary of justice (SOJ) for appropriate action, pursuant to Section 5 of Presidential Decree
(PD) No. 1069, also known as the Extradition Law.
Upon learning of the request for his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granted a Temporary Restraining Order
(TRO) by the RTC of Manila, Branch 25. The TRO prohibited the Department of Justice (DOJ) from filing with the RTC a
petition for his extradition. The validity of the TRO was, however, assailed by the SOJ in a Petition before this Court in
the said GR No. 139465. Initially, the Court -- by a vote of 9-6 -- dismissed the Petition. The SOJ was ordered to furnish
private respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable
period within which to file a comment and supporting evidence.
Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the SOJ, this Court issued its October 17, 2000 Resolution. By
an identical vote of 9-6 -- after three justices changed their votes -- it reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It
held that private respondent was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process. This Resolution has become final and executory.
Finding no more legal obstacle, the Government of the United States of America, represented by the Philippine
DOJ, filed with the RTC on May 18, 2001, the appropriate Petition for Extradition which was docketed as Extradition Case
No. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia, that Jimenez was the subject of an arrest warrant issued by the United
States District Court for the Southern District of Florida on April 15, 1999. The warrant had been issued in connection
with the following charges in Indictment No. 99-00281 CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraud the United States and to
commit certain offenses in violation of Title 18 US Code Section 371; (2) tax evasion, in violation of Title 26 US Code
Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, in violation of Title 18 US Code Sections 1343 and 2; (4) false statements, in violation of
Title 18 US Code Sections 1001 and 2; and (5) illegal campaign contributions, in violation of Title 2 US Code Sections
441b, 441f and 437g(d) and Title 18 US Code Section 2. In order to prevent the flight of Jimenez, the Petition prayed for
the issuance of an order for his immediate arrest pursuant to Section 6 of PD No. 1069.
Before the RTC could act on the Petition, Respondent Jimenez filed before it an Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte
Motion,[10] which prayed that petitioners application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001 Order, the RTC granted the Motion of Jimenez and set the case for hearing on June 5, 2001.
In that hearing, petitioner manifested its reservations on the procedure adopted by the trial court allowing the accused
in an extradition case to be heard prior to the issuance of a warrant of arrest.

ISSUE: Whether Jimenez is entitled to notice and hearing before a warrant for his arrest can be issued.

HELD: NO. Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.
To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the Constitution itself requires only the
examination -- under oath or affirmation -- of complainants and the witnesses they may produce. There is no
requirement to notify and hear the accused before the issuance of warrants of arrest.
In Ho v. People[54] and in all the cases cited therein, never was a judge required to go to the extent of conducting a
hearing just for the purpose of personally determining probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. All we
required was that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents upon which to make his independent judgment,
or at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause.
G.R. No. 190529 April 29, 2010
PHILIPPINE GUARDIANS BROTHERHOOD, INC. vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

FACTS: For the upcoming May 2010 elections, the COMELEC en banc issued on October 13, 2009 Resolution No. 8679
deleting several party-list groups or organizations from the list of registered national, regional or sectoral parties,
organizations or coalitions. Among the party-list organizations affected was PGBI; it was delisted because it failed to get
2% of the votes cast in 2004 and it did not participate in the 2007 elections. Nevertheless, the COMELEC stated in this
Resolution that any national, regional sectoral party or organizations or coalitions adversely affected can personally or
through its authorized representative file a verified opposition on October 26, 2009.
PGBI filed its Opposition to Resolution No. 8679, but likewise sought, through its pleading, the admission ad
cautelam of its petition for accreditation as a party-list organization under the Party-List System Act.
First, the COMELEC observed that PGBI clearly misunderstood the import of Section 4 of R.A. 7941.3 The
provision simply means that without the required manifestation or if a party or organization does not participate, the
exemption from registration does not arise and the party, organization or coalition must go through the process again
and apply for requalification; a request for deferment would not exempt PGBI from registering anew.
Second, the MINERO ruling is squarely in point, as MINERO failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not
participate at all in the 2004 elections.
Third, PGBI was given an opportunity to be heard or to seek the reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of – the essence of due process; this is clear from Resolution No. 8679 which expressly gave the adversely
affected parties the opportunity to file their opposition.
As regards the alternative relief of application for accreditation, the COMELEC found the motion to have been filed out
of time, as August 17, 2009 was the deadline for accreditation provided in Resolution 8646. The motion was obviously
filed months after the deadline.
Since petitioner by its own admission failed to get 2% of the votes in 2001 and did not participate at all in the
2004 elections, it necessarily failed to get at least two per centum (2%) of the votes cast in the two preceding elections.
COMELEC, therefore, is not duty bound to certify it.
PGBI subsequently moved to reconsider the dismissal of its petition. Among other arguments, PGBI claimed that
the dismissal of the petition was contrary to law, the evidence and existing jurisprudence. Essentially, PGBI asserts that
Section 6(8) of RA 7941 does not apply if one is to follow the tenor and import of the deliberations inclusive of the
interpellations in Senate Bill No. 1913 on October 19, 1994.

ISSUE: Whether PGBI’s right to due process was violated.

HELD:NO. On the due process issue, we agree with the COMELEC that PGBI’s right to due process was not violated for
PGBI was given an opportunity to seek, as it did seek, a reconsideration of Resolution No. 8679. The essence of due
process, we have consistently held, is simply the opportunity to be heard; as applied to administrative proceedings, due
process is the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of. A formal or trial-type hearing is not at all times and in all instances essential. The requirement is satisfied
where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. What is
frowned upon is absolute lack of notice and hearing. We find it obvious under the attendant circumstances that PGBI
was not denied due process. In any case, given the result of this Resolution, PGBI has no longer any cause for complaint
on due process grounds.
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW
G.R. No. 132922 April 21, 1998
TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND BROADCAST ATTORNEYS OF THE PHILIPPINES and GMA NETWORK, INC vs. COMELEC

FACTS: In Osmea v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 132231, decided March 31, 1998,we upheld the validity of 11(b) of R.A. No. 6646
which prohibits the sale or donation of print space or air time for political ads, except to the Commission on Elections
under 90, of B.P. No. 881, the Omnibus Election Code, with respect to print media, and 92, with respect to broadcast
media. In the present case, we consider the validity of 92 of B.P. Blg. No. 881 against claims that the requirement that
radio and television time be given free takes property without due process of law; that it violates the eminent domain
clause of the Constitution which provides for the payment of just compensation; that it denies broadcast media the
equal protection of the laws; and that, in any event, it violates the terms of the franchise of petitioner GMA Network,
Inc.
Petitioner Telecommunications and Broadcast Attorneys of the Philippines, Inc. is an organization of lawyers of
radio and television broadcasting companies. They are suing as citizens, taxpayers, and registered voters. The other
petitioner, GMA Network, Inc., operates radio and television broadcasting stations throughout the Philippines under a
franchise granted by Congress.
Petitioners challenge the validity of 92 on the ground (1) that it takes property without due process of law and
without just compensation; (2) that it denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws;
and (3) that it is in excess of the power given to the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the operation of media of
communication or information during the period of election.

ISSUE: Whether or not B.P. Blg 881 denies radio and television broadcast companies the equal protection of the laws

HELD: NO. With the prohibition on media advertising by candidates themselves, the COMELEC Time and COMELEC Space
are about the only means through which candidates can advertise their qualifications and programs of government.
More than merely depriving candidates of time for their ads, the failure of broadcast stations to provide air time unless
paid by the government would clearly deprive the people of their right to know. Art. III, 7 of the Constitution provides
that the right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized, while Art. XII, 6 states that
the use of property bears a social function [and] the right to own, establish, and operate economic enterprises [is]
subject to the duty of the State to promote distributive justice and to intervene when the common good so demands.
To affirm the validity of 92 of B.P. Blg. 881 is to hold public broadcasters to their obligation to see to it that the variety
and vigor of public debate on issues in an election is maintained. For while broadcast media are not mere common
carriers but entities with free speech rights, they are also public trustees charged with the duty of ensuring that the
people have access to the diversity of views on political issues. This right of the people is paramount to the autonomy of
broadcast media. To affirm the validity of 92, therefore, is likewise to uphold the peoples right to information on matters
of public concern. The use of property bears a social function and is subject to the states duty to intervene for the
common good. Broadcast media can find their just and highest reward in the fact that whatever altruistic service they
may render in connection with the holding of elections is for that common good.
G.R. Nos. 132875-76 November 16, 2001
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs ROMEO G. JALOSJOS

FACTS: The accused-appellant, Romeo G. Jalosjos is a full-fledged member of Congress who is now confined at the
national penitentiary while his conviction for statutory rape on two counts and acts of lasciviousness on six counts[1] is
pending appeal. The accused-appellant filed this motion asking that he be allowed to fully discharge the duties of a
Congressman, including attendance at legislative sessions and committee meetings despite his having been convicted in
the first instance of a non-bailable offense.

ISSUE: Whether or not the accused was deprived of his right to equal protection of the law.

HELD: NO. The performance of legitimate and even essential duties by public officers has never been an excuse to free a
person validly in prison. The duties imposed by the "mandate of the people" are multifarious. The accused-appellant
asserts that the duty to legislate ranks highest in the hierarchy of government. The accused-appellant is only one of 250
members of the House of Representatives, not to mention the 24 members of the Senate, charged with the duties of
legislation. Congress continues to function well in the physical absence of one or a few of its members. Depending on
the exigency of Government that has to be addressed, the President or the Supreme Court can also be deemed the
highest for that particular duty. The importance of a function depends on the need for its exercise. The duty of a mother
to nurse her infant is most compelling under the law of nature. A doctor with unique skills has the duty to save the lives
of those with a particular affliction. An elective governor has to serve provincial constituents. A police officer must
maintain peace and order. Never has the call of a particular duty lifted a prisoner into a different classification from
those others who are validly restrained by law.
A strict scrutiny of classifications is essential lest wittingly or otherwise, insidious discriminations are made in
favor of or against groups or types of individuals.
The Court cannot validate badges of inequality. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify exercise of
government authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert that their interests are
disregarded.
We, therefore, find that election to the position of Congressman is not a reasonable classification in criminal law
enforcement. The functions and duties of the office are not substantial distinctions which lift him from the class of
prisoners interrupted in their freedom and restricted in liberty of movement. Lawful arrest and confinement are
germane to the purposes of the law and apply to all those belonging to the same class
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010
LOUIS BAROK C. BIRAOGO vs. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010

FACTS: The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections, when
then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III declared his staunch condemnation of graft and corruption with his slogan,
Kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap. The Filipino people, convinced of his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this
noble objective, catapulted the good senator to the presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality, President Aquino found a need for a special body to investigate
reported cases of graft and corruption allegedly committed during the previous administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order No. 1
establishing the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (Truth Commission).
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from performing its functions. A perusal of the arguments of the petitioners in
both cases shows that they are essentially the same. The petitioners-legislators summarized them in the following
manner:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create a public
office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot legitimize E.O.
No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally reorganize the Office of the President to achieve
economy, simplicity and efficiency does not include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto
inexistent like the Truth Commission
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and pertinent statutes when it vested the Truth Commission
with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of the Ombudsman created under the 1987
Constitution and the Department of Justice created under the Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and prosecution
officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their peculiar species even as it excludes those
of the other administrations, past and present, who may be indictable.
(e) The creation of the Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 violates the consistent and general international
practice of four decades wherein States constitute truth commissions to exclusively investigate human rights violations,
which customary practice forms part of the generally accepted principles of international law which the Philippines is
mandated to adhere to pursuant to the Declaration of Principles enshrined in the Constitution.
(f) The creation of the Truth Commission is an exercise in futility, an adventure in partisan hostility, a launching
pad for trial/conviction by publicity and a mere populist propaganda to mistakenly impress the people that widespread
poverty will altogether vanish if corruption is eliminated without even addressing the other major causes of poverty.
(g) The mere fact that previous commissions were not constitutionally challenged is of no moment because
neither laches nor estoppel can bar an eventual question on the constitutionality and validity of an executive issuance or
even a statute.

ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. of 2010 is in violations of the Equal protection Clause.

HELD: YES. Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The
clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the reported cases of graft and corruption
during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest. The equal protection
clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature Its inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the
political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or
whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires is
equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such
classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of
the same class.[81] Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification
In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past
administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes arbitrariness which the equal
protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness
and selective retribution.
G.R. No. 186616 November 20, 2009
Commission on Elections vs. Conrado Cruz et, al.

FACTS: Before the October 29, 2007 Synchronized Barangay and Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) Elections, some of the then
incumbent officials of several barangays of Caloocan City[2] filed with the RTC a petition for declaratory relief to
challenge the constitutionality of the above-highlighted proviso, based on the following arguments:
I. The term limit of Barangay officials should be applied prospectively and not retroactively.
II. Implementation of paragraph 2 Section 2 of RA No. 9164 would be a violation of the equal protection of the law.
III. Barangay officials have always been apolitical.
The RTC agreed with the respondents contention that the challenged proviso retroactively applied the three-
term limit for barangay officials under the following reasoning:
When the Local Government Code of 1991 took effect abrogating all other laws inconsistent therewith, a
different term was ordained. Here, this Court agrees with the position of the petitioners that Section 43 of the Code
specifically exempted barangay elective officials from the coverage of the three (3) consecutive term limit rule
considering that the provision applicable to these (sic) class of elective officials was significantly separated from the
provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b) thereof. Paragraph (b) is indeed intended to qualify paragraph (a) of Section 43 as
regards to (sic) all local elective officials except barangay officials. Had the intention of the framers of the Code is (sic) to
include barangay elective officials, then no excepting proviso should have been expressly made in paragraph (a) thereof
or, by implication, the contents of paragraph (c) should have been stated ahead of the contents of paragraph (b).
The COMELEC takes the position that the assailed law is valid and constitutional. RA No. 9164 is an amendatory
law to RA No. 7160 (the Local Government Code of 1991 or LGC) and is not a penal law; hence, it cannot be considered
an ex post facto law. The three-term limit, according to the COMELEC, has been specifically provided in RA No. 7160, and
RA No. 9164 merely restated the three-term limitation. It further asserts that laws which are not penal in character may
be applied retroactively when expressly so provided and when it does not impair vested rights. As there is no vested
right to public office, much less to an elective post, there can be no valid objection to the alleged retroactive application
of RA No. 9164.

ISSUE: Whether or not Section 2 of Republic Act (RA) No. 9164 is violative of the equal Protection Clause.

HELD: NO. The equal protection guarantee under the Constitution is found under its Section 2, Article III, which
provides: Nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. Essentially, the equality guaranteed under
this clause is equality under the same conditions and among persons similarly situated. It is equality among equals, not
similarity of treatment of persons who are different from one another on the basis of substantial distinctions related to
the objective of the law; when things or persons are different in facts or circumstances, they may be treated differently
in law.
Appreciation of how the constitutional equality provision applies inevitably leads to the conclusion that no basis
exists in the present case for an equal protection challenge. The law can treat barangay officials differently from other
local elective officials because the Constitution itself provides a significant distinction between these elective officials
with respect to length of term and term limitation. The clear distinction, expressed in the Constitution itself, is that while
the Constitution provides for a three-year term and three-term limit for local elective officials, it left the length of term
and the application of the three-term limit or any form of term limitation for determination by Congress through
legislation. Not only does this disparate treatment recognize substantial distinctions, it recognizes as well that the
Constitution itself allows a non-uniform treatment. No equal protection violation can exist under these conditions.
From another perspective, we see no reason to apply the equal protection clause as a standard because the
challenged proviso did not result in any differential treatment between barangay officials and all other elective officials.
This conclusion proceeds from our ruling on the retroactivity issue that the challenged proviso does not involve any
retroactive application.
G.R. No. 199082 September 18, 2012
JOSE MIGUEL T. ARROYO vs. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

FACTS: Acting on the discovery of alleged new evidence and the surfacing of new witnesses indicating the occurrence of
massive electoral fraud and manipulation of election results in the 2004 and 2007 National Elections, on August 2, 2011,
the Comelec issued Resolution No. 9266 approving the creation of a committee jointly with the Department of Justice
(DOJ), which shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies committed during
the 2004 and 2007 elections.5
On August 4, 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 6406 naming three (3) of its
prosecutors to the Joint Committee.
On August 15, 2011, the Comelec and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011 creating and constituting a Joint
Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007 National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases. The
Joint Committee and the Fact-Finding Team are composed of officials from the DOJ and the Comelec. Section 2 of the
Joint Order lays down the mandate of the Joint Committee, to wit:
Section 2. Mandate. – The Committee shall conduct the necessary preliminary investigation on the basis of the
evidence gathered and the charges recommended by the Fact-Finding Team created and referred to in Section 4 hereof.
Resolutions finding probable cause for election offenses, defined and penalized under the Omnibus Election Code and
other election laws shall be approved by the Comelec in accordance with the Comelec Rules of Procedure. For other
offenses, or those not covered by the Omnibus Election Code and other election laws, the corresponding criminal
information may be filed directly with the appropriate courts.
The Fact-Finding Team,8 on the other hand, was created for the purpose of gathering real, documentary, and
testimonial evidence which can be utilized in the preliminary investigation to be conducted by the Joint Committee.
The members of the Fact-Finding Team unanimously agreed that the subject of the Initial Report would be the
electoral fraud and manipulation of election results allegedly committed during the May 14, 2007 elections. Thus, in its
Initial Report11 dated October 20, 2011, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the results in the May
14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato and Maguindanao were indeed
perpetrated.12 The Fact-Finding Team recommended that petitioner Abalos and ten (10) others13 be subjected to
preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for conspiring to manipulate the election results in North and South
Cotabato. Twenty-six (26)14 persons, including petitioners GMA and Abalos, were likewise recommended for
preliminary investigation for electoral sabotage for manipulating the election results in Maguindanao. Several persons
were also recommended to be charged administratively, while others, including petitioner Mike Arroyo, were
recommended to be subjected to further investigation. The case resulting from the investigation of the Fact-Finding
Team was docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 001-2011.
Meanwhile, on October 17, 2011, Senator Aquilino Pimentel III (Senator Pimentel) filed a Complaint-Affidavit18
for Electoral Sabotage against petitioners and twelve others and several John Does and Jane Does. The case was
docketed as DOJ-Comelec Case No. 002-2011.
On October 24, 2011, the Joint Committee issued two subpoenas against petitioners in DOJ-Comelec Case Nos.
001-2011 and 002-2011. On November 3, 2011, petitioners, through counsel, appeared before the Joint Committee. On
that preliminary hearing, the Joint Committee consolidated the two DOJ-Comelec cases. Respondents therein were
likewise ordered to submit their Counter-Affidavits by November 14, 2011.
Thereafter, petitioners filed before the Court separate Petitions for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the
Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction assailing the creation of the Joint
Panel. The petitions were eventually consolidated.
On November 14, 2011, petitioner Mike Arroyo filed a Motion to Defer Proceedings before the Joint Committee,
in view of the pendency of his petition before the Court. On the same day, petitioner GMA filed before the Joint
Committee an Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam to require Senator Pimentel to furnish her with documents referred to in
his complaint-affidavit and for the production of election documents as basis for the charge of electoral sabotage. GMA
contended that for the crime of electoral sabotage to be established, there is a need to present election documents
allegedly tampered which resulted in the increase or decrease in the number of votes of local and national candidates.
GMA prayed that she be allowed to file her counter-affidavit within ten (10) days from receipt of the requested
documents. Petitioner Abalos, for his part, filed a Motion to Suspend Proceedings (Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam), in view
of the pendency of his petition brought before the Court.
 On even date, pursuant to the above Resolution, the Comelec’s Law Department filed with the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Pasay City, an Information against petitioner GMA, Governor Andal Ampatuan, Sr., and Atty. Lintang H.
Bedol, for violation of Section 42 (b)(3) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9369, amending Section 27 (b) of R.A. No. 6646,
docketed as Criminal Case No. RPSY-11-04432-CR. The case was raffled to Branch 112 and the corresponding Warrant of
Arrest was issued which was served on GMA on the same day.
On November 18, 2011, petitioner GMA filed with the RTC an Urgent Omnibus Motion Ad Cautelam with leave
to allow the Joint Committee to resolve the motion for reconsideration filed by GMA, to defer issuance of a warrant of
arrest and a Hold Departure Order, and to proceed to judicial determination of probable cause. She, likewise, filed with
the Comelec a Motion to Vacate Ad Cautelam37 praying that its Resolution be vacated for being null and void. The RTC
nonetheless issued a warrant for her arrest which was duly served. GMA thereafter filed a Motion for Bail which was
granted.

ISSUE: Whether or not Joint Order No. 001-2011 violates the equal protection clause.

HELD: NO. Petitioners claim that the creation of the Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team is in violation of the equal
protection clause of the Constitution because its sole purpose is the investigation and prosecution of certain persons
and incidents. They insist that the Joint Panel was created to target only the Arroyo Administration as well as public
officials linked to the Arroyo Administration.
The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate
discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, it does not
demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons under like circumstances and conditions shall be treated
alike both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
We once held that the Office of the Ombudsman is granted virtually plenary investigatory powers by the
Constitution and by law and thus may, for every particular investigation, whether commenced by complaint or on its
own initiative, decide how best to pursue each investigation. Since the Office of the Ombudsman is granted such
latitude, its varying treatment of similarly situated investigations cannot by itself be considered a violation of any of the
parties’ rights to the equal protection of the laws. This same doctrine should likewise apply in the present case.
Thus, as the constitutional body granted with the broad power of enforcing and administering all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall, and tasked to ensure free,
orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections, the Comelec has the authority to determine how best to perform such
constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the Comelec issues various resolutions prior to every local or national
elections setting forth the guidelines to be observed in the conduct of the elections. This shows that every election is
distinct and requires different guidelines in order to ensure that the rules are updated to respond to existing
circumstances.
Moreover, as has been practiced in the past, complaints for violations of election laws may be filed either with
the Comelec or with the DOJ. The Comelec may even initiate, motu proprio, complaints for election offenses.
Pursuant to law and the Comelec’s own Rules, investigations may be conducted either by the Comelec itself
through its law department or through the prosecutors of the DOJ. These varying procedures and treatment do not,
however, mean that respondents are not treated alike. Thus, petitioners’ insistence of infringement of their
constitutional right to equal protection of the law is misplaced.
 SEARCH AND SEIZURE

G.R. Nos. 94054-57 February 19, 1991

VICENTE LIM, SR. and MAYOR SUSANA LIM vs. HON. NEMESIO S. FELIX

FACTS: On March 17, 1989, at about 7:30 o'clock in the morning, at the vicinity of the airport road of the Masbate
Domestic Airport, located at the municipality of Masbate province of Masbate, Congressman Moises Espinosa, Sr. and
his security escorts, namely Provincial Guards Antonio Cortes, Gaspar Amaro, and Artemio Fuentes were attacked and
killed by a lone assassin. Dante Siblante another security escort of Congressman Espinosa, Sr. survived the assassination
plot, although, he himself suffered a gunshot wound.
Thereafter, and for the purpose of preliminary investigation, the designated investigator, Harry O. Tantiado, TSg,
of the PC Criminal Investigation Service at Camp Bagong Ibalon Legazpi City filed an amended complaint with the
Municipal Trial Court of Masbate accusing, among others, Vicente Lim, Sr., Mayor Susana Lim of Masbate (petitioners in
G.R. Nos. 9405457), Jolly T. Fernandez, Florencio T. Fernandez, Jr., Nonilon A. Bagalihog, Mayor Nestor C. Lim and Mayor
Antonio Kho (petitioners in G.R. Nos. 94266-69) of the crime of multiple murder and frustrated murder in connection
with the airport incident. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 9211.
On November 21, 1989, petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with us a verified petition for change of
venue. (Case No. A.M. No. 89-11-1270-MTC, formerly, G.R. Nos. 90587-90)
On December 14, 1989, we issued an en banc Resolution authorizing the change of venue from the Regional
Trial Court of Masbate to the Regional Trial Court of Makati to avoid a miscarriage of justice.
Petitioners Vicente Lim, Sr. and Susana Lim filed with the respondent court several motions and manifestations
which in substance prayed for the following:
1. An order be issued requiring the transmittal of the initial records of the preliminary inquiry or investigation
conducted by the Municipal Judge Barsaga of Masbate for the best enlightenment of this Honorable Court in its personal
determination of the existence of a probable cause or prima facie evidence as well as its determination of the existence
of guilt, pursuant to the mandatory mandate of the constitution that no warrant shall issue unless the issuing magistrate
shall have himself been personally convinced of such probable cause.
2. Movants be given ample opportunity to file their motion for preliminary investigation as a matter of right; and
3. In the event that this court may later be convinced of the existence of a probable cause, to be allowed to file a
motion for reduction of bail or for admission of bail.

ISSUE: Whether or not a judge may issue a warrant of arrest without bail by simply relying on the prosecution's
certification and recommendation that a probable cause exists.

HELD: NO. 1973 Constitution which provides:

. . . no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such
other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant
and the witnesses he may produce . . .
It is obvious from the present petition that notwithstanding the above decisions, some Judges are still bound by
the inertia of decisions and practice under the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions and are sadly confused or hesitant.
Prosecutors are also interested in a clear cut ruling. We will, therefore, restate the rule in greater detail and hopefully
clearer terms.
There is no problem with search warrants which are relatively fewer and far between and where there is no
duplication of work between the Judge and the Prosecutor. The problem lies with warrants of arrest especially in
metropolitan or highly urban areas. If a Judge has to personally question each complainant and witness or go over the
records of the Prosecutor's investigation page by page and word for word before he acts on each of a big pile of
applications for arrest warrants on his desk, he or she may have no more time for his or her more important judicial
functions.At the same time, the Judge cannot ignore the clear words of the 1987 Constitution which requires ". . .
probable cause to be personally determined by the judge . . .", not by any other officer or person.
If a Judge relies solely on the certification of the Prosecutor as in this case where all the records of the investigation are
in Masbate, he or she has not personally determined probable cause. The determination is made by the Provincial
Prosecutor. The constitutional requirement has not been satisfied. The Judge commits a grave abuse of discretion.
G.R. No. 113447 October 9, 1997
ALAIN MANALILI vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Upon reaching the Kalookan City Cemetery, the policemen alighted from their vehicle. They then chanced upon a
male person in front of the cemetery who appeared high on drugs. The male person was observed to have reddish eyes
and to be walking in a swaying manner. When this male person tried to avoid the policemen, the latter approached him
and introduced themselves as police officers. The policemen then asked the male person what he was holding in his
hands. The male person tried to resist. Pat. Romeo Espiritu asked the male person if he could see what said male person
had in his hands. The latter showed the wallet and allowed Pat. Romeo Espiritu to examine the same. Pat. Espiritu took
the wallet and examined it. He found suspected crushed marijuana residue inside. He kept the wallet and its marijuana
contents.
The male person was then brought to the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police Headquarters and was
turned over to Cpl. Wilfredo Tamondong for investigation. Pat. Espiritu also turned over to Cpl. Tamondong the
confiscated wallet and its suspected marijuana contents. The man turned out to be the accused ALAIN MANALILI y
DIZON.
Upon receipt of the confiscated suspected marijuana residue from Pat. Espiritu, Cpl. Tamondong wrapped the
same with a white sheet of paper on which he wrote Evidence A 4/11/88 Alain Manalili. The white sheet of paper was
marked as Exhibit E-3. The residue was originally wrapped in a smaller sheet of folded paper. (Exhibit E-4).
Cpl. Tamondong next prepared a referral slip addressed to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section requesting a chemical
analysis of the subject marijuana residue (Exhibit D). Cpl. Tamondong thereafter prepared a Joint Affidavit of the
apprehending policemen (Exhibit A). Pat. Angel Lumabas handcarried the referral slip (Exhibit D) to the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI), including the subject marijuana residue for chemical analysis. The signature of Pat. Lumabas
appears on the left bottom corner of Exhibit D.
The NBI received the aforesaid referral slip and the subject marijuana residue at 7:40 oclock in the evening of
April 11, 1988 as shown on the stamped portion of Exhibit D.
It was NBI Aida Pascual, referred to the subject specimen as crushed marijuana leaves in her Certification dated April 11,
1988 (Exhibit F). These crushed marijuana leaves gave positive results for marijuana, according to the Certificate.
Mrs. Pascual also conducted a chromatographic examination of the specimen. In this examination, she also
found that the crushed marijuana leaves gave positive results for marijuana. After conducting the examinations, Ms.
Pascual placed the specimen in a white letter-envelope and sealed it. (Exhibit E). She then wrote identification notes on
this letter-envelope. (Exhibit E-1).
Pat. Lumabas carried the Certification marked as Exhibit F from the NBI Forensic Chemistry Section to Cpl.
Tamondong. Upon receipt thereof, Cpl. Tamondong prepared a referral slip addressed to the City Fiscal of Kalookan City.
(Exhibit C)
On rebuttal, Pat. Espiritu testified that appellant was not riding a tricycle but was walking in front of the
cemetery when he was apprehended.
Version of Defense
At about 2:00 oclock in the afternoon of April 11, 1988, the accused ALAIN MANALILI was aboard a tricycle at A.
Mabini street near the Kalookan City Cemetery on the way to his boarding house. Three policemen ordered the driver of
the tricycle to stop because the tricycle driver and his lone passenger were under the influence of marijuana. The
policemen brought the accused and the tricycle driver inside the Ford Fiera which the policemen were riding in. The
policemen then bodily searched the accused and the tricycle driver. At this point, the accused asked the policemen why
he was being searched and the policemen replied that he (accused) was carrying marijuana. However, nothing was
found on the persons of the accused and the driver. The policemen allowed the tricycle driver to go while they brought
the accused to the police headquarters at Kalookan City where they said they would again search the accused.
On the way to the police headquarters, the accused saw a neighbor and signaled the latter to follow him. The
neighbor thus followed the accused to the Kalookan City Police Headquarters. Upon arrival thereat, the accused was
asked to remove his pants in the presence of said neighbor and another companion. The policemen turned over the
pants of the accused over a piece of bond paper trying to look for marijuana. However, nothing was found, except for
some dirt and dust. This prompted the companion of the neighbor of the accused to tell the policemen to release the
accused. The accused was led to a cell. The policemen later told the accused that they found marijuana inside the
pockets of his pants.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marijuana found is admissible as evidence.

HELD: YES. In Philippine jurisprudence, the general rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a previously
secured judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional and subject to challenge.[20] Section 2,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution, gives this guarantee:
SEC. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation
of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Any evidence obtained in violation of the mentioned provision is legally inadmissible in evidence as a fruit of the
poisonous tree, falling under the exclusionary rule:
SEC. 3. x x x
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of x x x the preceding section shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
This right, however, is not absolute. The recent case of People vs. Lacerna enumerated five recognized
exceptions to the rule against warrantless search and seizure, viz.: (1) search incidental to a lawful arrest, (2) search of
moving vehicles, (3) seizure in plain view, (4) customs search, and (5) waiver by the accused themselves of their right
against unreasonable search and seizure. In People vs. Encinada, the Court further explained that [i]n these cases, the
search and seizure may be made only with probable cause as the essential requirement. Although the term eludes exact
definition, probable cause for a search is, at best, defined as a reasonable ground of suspicion, supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to warrant a cautious man in the belief that the person accused is guilty
of the offense with which he is charged; or the existence of such facts and circumstances which could lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and that the item(s), article(s) or object(s)
sought in connection with said offense or subject to seizure and destruction by law is in the place to be searched.
Stop-and-frisk has already been adopted as another exception to the general rule against a search without a warrant. In
Posadas vs. Court of Appeals , the Court held that there are many instances where a search and seizure can be effected
without necessarily being preceded by an arrest, one of which is stop-and-frisk. In said case, members of the Integrated
National Police of Davao stopped petitioner, who was carrying a buri bag and acting suspiciously. They found inside
petitioners bag one .38-cal. revolver with two rounds of live ammunition, two live ammunitions for a .22-cal. gun and a
tear gas grenade. In upholding the legality of the search, the Court said that to require the police officers to search the
bag only after they had obtained a search warrant might prove to be useless, futile and much too late under the
circumstances. In such a situation, it was reasonable for a police officer to stop a suspicious individual briefly in order to
determine his identity or to maintain the status quo while obtaining more information, rather than to simply shrug his
shoulders and allow a crime to occur.
In the case at hand, Patrolman Espiritu and his companions observed during their surveillance that appellant had
red eyes and was wobbling like a drunk along the Caloocan City Cemetery, which according to police information was a
popular hangout of drug addicts. From his experience as a member of the Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Caloocan City
Police, such suspicious behavior was characteristic of drug addicts who were high. The policemen therefore had
sufficient reason to stop petitioner to investigate if he was actually high on drugs. During such investigation, they found
marijuana in petitioners possession.
Furthermore, we concur with the Solicitor Generals contention that petitioner effectively waived the
inadmissibility of any evidence illegally obtained when he failed to raise this issue or to object thereto during the trial. A
valid waiver of a right, more particularly of the constitutional right against unreasonable search, requires the
concurrence of the following requirements: (1) the right to be waived existed; (2) the person waiving it had knowledge,
actual or constructive, thereof; and (3) he or she had an actual intention to relinquish the right.[26] Otherwise, the
Courts will indulge every reasonable presumption against waiver of fundamental safeguards and will not deduce
acquiescence from the failure to exercise this elementary right. In the present case, however, petitioner is deemed to
have waived such right for his failure to raise its violation before the trial court. In petitions under Rule 45, as
distinguished from an ordinary appeal of criminal cases where the whole case is opened for review, the appeal is
generally limited to the errors assigned by petitioner. Issues not raised below cannot be pleaded for the first time on
appeal.
G.R. No. 93239 March 18, 1991
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EDISON SUCRO

FACTS: On March 21, 1989, Pat. Roy Fulgencio, a member of the INP, Kalibo, Aklan, was instructed by P/Lt. Vicente
Seraspi, Jr. (Station Commander of the INP Kalibo, Aklan) to monitor the activities of appellant Edison Sucro, because of
information gathered by Seraspi that Sucro was selling marijuana. (p. 6, TSN, May 2,1989).
As planned, at about 5:00 P.M. on said date, Pat. Fulgencio Positioned himself under the house of a certain Arlie
Regalado at C. Quimpo Street. Adjacent to the house of Regalado, about 2 meters away, was a chapel. Thereafter, Pat.
Fulgencio saw appellant enter the chapel, taking something which turned out later to be marijuana from the
compartment of a cart found inside the chapel, and then return to the street where he handed the same to a buyer,
Aldie Borromeo. After a while appellant went back to the chapel and again came out with marijuana which he gave to a
group of persons. (pp. 6-8, 15-18, Ibid). It was at this instance that Pat. Fulgencio radioed P/Lt. Seraspi and reported the
activity going on. P/Lt. Seraspi instructed Pat. Fulgencio to continue monitoring developments. At about 6:30 P.M., Pat.
Fulgencio again called up Seraspi to report that a third buyer later Identified as Ronnie Macabante, was transacting with
appellant. (pp. 18-19, Ibid)
At that point, the team of P/Lt. Seraspi proceeded to the area and while the police officers were at the Youth
Hostel at Maagma St., Pat. Fulgencio told P/Lt. Seraspi to intercept Macabante and appellant. P/Lt. Seraspi and his team
caught up with Macabante at the crossing of Mabini and Maagma Sts. in front of the Aklan Medical Center. Upon seeing
the police, Macabante threw something to the ground which turned out to be a tea bag of marijuana. (pp. 6-8, TSN, June
19, 1989) When confronted, Macabante readily admitted that he bought the same from appellant (Edison Sucro) in front
of the chapel. (p. 6, TSN, May 24, 1989) The police team was able to overtake and arrest appellant at the corner of C.
Quimpo and Veterans Sts. The police recovered 19 sticks and 4 teabags of marijuana from the cart inside the chapel and
another teabag from Macabante, The teabags of marijuana were sent to the PC-INP Crime Laboratory Service, at Camp
Delgado, Iloilo City for analysis. The specimens (Exhibits "G" to "G-18", Exhibits "E" to "E-4") were all found positive of
marijuana.

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence resulting from such arrest is admissible.

HELD: YES. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides for the instances where arrest without
warrant is considered lawful. The rule states:
Arrest without warrant, when lawful. — A peace officer or private person may, without warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it.
That searches and seizures must be supported by a valid warrant is not an absolute rule (Manipon, Jr. v.
Sandiganbayan, 143 SCRA 267 [1986]). Among the exceptions granted by law is a search incidental to a lawful arrest
under Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure, which provides that a person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a
search warrant. (People v. Castiller, G.R. No. 87783, August 6, 1990)
The accused-appellant claims that the arrest having been done without warrant, it follows that the evidence
obtained therefrom is inadmissible.
As earlier discussed, there is nothing unlawful about the arrest considering its compliance with the requirements
of a warrantless arrest. Ergo, the fruits obtained from such lawful arrest are admissible in evidence.
Edison Sucro assails the trial court's reliance on the statement of Macabante whose reason for testifying could
be merely to escape prosecution.
G.R. No. 129296 September 25, 2000
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ABE VALDEZ

FACTS: On November 15, 1996, appellant was arraigned and, with assistance of counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
charge. Trial on the merits then ensued.
The first witness for the prosecution was SPO3 Marcelo Tipay, a member of the police force of Villaverde, Nueva
Vizcaya. He testified that at around 10:15 a.m. of September 24, 1996, he received a tip from an unnamed informer
about the presence of a marijuana plantation, allegedly owned by appellant at Sitio Bulan, Ibung, Villaverde, Nueva
Vizcaya. The prohibited plants were allegedly planted close to appellant's hut. Police Inspector Alejandro R. Parungao,
Chief of Police of Villaverde, Nueva Vizcaya then formed a reaction team from his operatives to verify the report. The
team was composed of SPO3 Marcelo M. Tipay, SPO2 Noel V. Libunao, SPO2 Pedro S. Morales, SPO1 Romulo G. Tobias
and PO2 Alfelmer I. Balut. Inspector Parungao gave them specific instructions to "uproot said marijuana plants and
arrest the cultivator of same.
At approximately 5:00 o'clock A.M. the following day, said police team, accompanied by their informer, left for
the site where the marijuana plants were allegedly being grown. After a three-hour, uphill trek from the nearest
barangay road, the police operatives arrived at the place pinpointed by their informant. The police found appellant
alone in his nipa hut. They, then, proceeded to look around the area where appellant had his kaingin and saw seven (7)
five-foot high, flowering marijuana plants in two rows, approximately 25 meters from appellant's hut. PO2 Balut asked
appellant who owned the prohibited plants and, according to Balut, the latter admitted that they were his.The police
uprooted the seven marijuana plants, which weighed 2.194 kilograms.The police took photos of appellant standing
beside the cannabis plants. Appellant was then arrested. One of the plants, weighing 1.090 kilograms, was sent to the
Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya for analysis. Inspector Prevy Fabros Luwis, the
Crime Laboratory forensic analyst, testified that upon microscopic examination of said plant, she found cystolitic hairs
containing calcium carbonate, a positive indication for marijuana. She next conducted a chemical examination, the
results of which confirmed her initial impressions. She found as follows:

ISSUE: Whether or not the search and seizure of Marijuana plants is lawful and admissible as evidence.

HELD:NO. The Constitution lays down the general rule that a search and seizure must be carried on the strength of a
judicial warrant. Otherwise, the search and seizure is deemed "unreasonable." Evidence procured on the occasion of an
unreasonable search and seizure is deemed tainted for being the proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree and should be
excluded. Such evidence shall be inadmissible in evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
In the instant case, there was no search warrant issued by a judge after personal determination of the existence
of probable cause. From the declarations of the police officers themselves, it is clear that they had at least one (1) day to
obtain a warrant to search appellant's farm. Their informant had revealed his name to them. The place where the
cannabis plants were planted was pinpointed. From the information in their possession, they could have convinced a
judge that there was probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant.
In the instant case, recall that PO2 Balut testified that they first located the marijuana plants before appellant
was arrested without a warrant.[36] Hence, there was no valid warrantless arrest which preceded the search of
appellant's premises. Note further that the police team was dispatched to appellant's kaingin precisely to search for and
uproot the prohibited flora. The seizure of evidence in "plain view" applies only where the police officer is not searching
for evidence against the accused, but inadvertently comes across an incriminating object.[37] Clearly, their discovery of
the cannabis plants was not inadvertent. We also note the testimony of SPO2 Tipay that upon arriving at the area, they
first had to "look around the area" before they could spot the illegal plants.[38] Patently, the seized marijuana plants
were not "immediately apparent" and a "further search" was needed. In sum, the marijuana plants in question were not
in "plain view" or "open to eye and hand." The "plain view" doctrine, thus, cannot be made to apply.
With respect to the first issue, that the confiscated plants were evidently obtained during an illegal search and
seizure. As to the second issue, which involves the admissibility of the marijuana plants as evidence for the prosecution,
we find that said plants cannot, as products of an unlawful search and seizure, be used as evidence against appellant.
They are fruits of the proverbial poisoned tree. It was, therefore, a reversible error on the part of the court a quo to
have admitted and relied upon the seized marijuana plants as evidence to convict appellant.
G.R. No. 128222 June 17, 1999
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CHUA HO SAN

FACTS: In response to reports of rampant smuggling of firearms and other contraband, Jim Lagasca Cid (hereafter CID),
as Chief of Police of the Bacnotan Police Station, of La Union began patrolling the Bacnotan coastline with his officers.
While monitoring the coastal area of Barangay Bulala on 29 March 1995, he intercepted a radio call at around 12:45 p.m.
from Barangay Captain Juan Almoite (hereafter ALMOITE) of Barangay Tammocalao requesting police assistance
regarding an unfamiliar speedboat the latter had spotted. According to ALMOITE, the vessel looked different from the
boats ordinarily used by fisherfolk of the area and was poised to dock at Tammocalao shores. CID and six of his men led
by his Chief Investigator, SPO1 Reynoso Badua (hereafter BADUA), proceeded forthwith to Tammocalao beach and there
conferred with ALMOITE. CID then observed that the speedboat ferried a lone male passenger. As it was routine for CID
to deploy his men in strategic places when dealing with similar situations, he ordered his men to take up positions thirty
meters from the coastline. When the speedboat landed, the male passenger alighted, and using both hands, carried
what appeared a multicolored strawbag. He then walked towards the road. By this time, ALMOITE, CID and BADUA, the
latter two conspicuous in their uniform and issued side-arms, became suspicious of the man as he suddenly changed
direction and broke into a run upon seeing the approaching officers. BADUA, however, prevented the man from fleeing
by holding on to his right arm. Although CID introduced themselves as police officers, the man appeared impassive.
Speaking in English, CID then requested the man to open his bag, but he seemed not to understand. CID thus tried
speaking Tagalog, then Ilocano, but still to no avail. CID then resorted to what he termed sign language; he motioned
with his hands for the man to open the bag. This time, the man apparently understood and acceded to the request. A
search of the bag yielded several transparent plastic packets containing yellowish crystalline substances. CID then
gestured to the man to close the bag, which he did. As CID wished to proceed to the police station, he signaled the man
to follow, but the latter did not to comprehend. Hence, CID placed his arm around the shoulders of the man and
escorted the latter to the police headquarters.
At the police station, CID surmised, after having observed the facial features of the man, that he was probably
Taiwanese. CID then "recited and informed the man of his constitutional rights" to remain silent, to have the assistance
of a counsel, etc. Eliciting no response from the man, CID ordered his men to find a resident of the area who spoke
Chinese to act as an interpreter. In the meantime, BADUA opened the bag and counted twenty-nine (29) plastic packets
containing yellowish crystalline substances which he and CID suspected was shabu. The interpreter, Mr. Go Ping Guan,
finally arrived, through whom the man was "apprised of his constitutional rights." The police authorities were satisfied
that the man and the interpreter perfectly understood each other despite their uncertainty as to what language was
spoken. But when the policemen asked the man several questions, he retreated to his obstinate reticence and merely
showed his I.D. with the name Chua Ho San printed thereon. CHUA's bag and its contents were sent to the PNP Crime
Laboratory at Camp Diego Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union for laboratory examination. In the meantime, CHUA
was detained at the Bacnotan Police Station.
Later that same day, Police Chief Inspector and Forensic Chemist Theresa Ann Bugayong Cid of the Philippine
National Police, Region I, received a letter request from CID incidentally her husband to conduct a laboratory
examination of twenty-nine (29) plastic packets placed inside a multicolored strawbag. In her Chemistry Report No. D-
025-95,[4] she stated that her qualitative examination established the contents of the plastic packets, weighing 28.7
kilos, to be positive of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu, a regulated drug.
For the defense, CHUA testified in his own behalf through interpreter Steven Yu. He disclosed that he hails from
Taiwan and was employed in a shipbuilding and repairing company. On 21 March 1995, he was instructed by his
employer Cho Chu Rong (hereafter RONG) to board the latters 35-tonner ship which would embark for Nan Au Port,
Mainland China where they would buy fish. Upon arrival at their destination, RONG left the ship, came back without the
fish, but with two bags, the contents of which he never divulged to CHUA. RONG then showed to CHUA a document
purportedly granting them authority to fish on Philippine waters. So they sailed towards the Philippines and reached
Dagupan, Pangasinan on 29 March 1995. At around 10:30 a.m., they disembarked on a small speedboat with the two
bags RONG brought with him from China. While sailing, RONG made several phone calls using his mobile phone. CHUA
heard RONG asked the person on the other side of the line if he could see the speedboat they were riding. Apparently,
the person on shore could not see them so they cruised over the waters for about five hours more when finally, low on
fuel and telephone battery, they decided to dock. CHUA anchored the boat while RONG carried the bags to shore. The
tasks completed, RONG left to look for a telephone while CHUA rested and sat one and half (1 1/2) meters away from
one bag. A child thereafter pointed out to him that one bag was missing much to RONGs dismay when he learned of it.
When a crowd started to mill around them, the police arrived. CHUA then realized that RONG was nowhere to be found.
The police immediately approached CHUA, and with nary any spoken word, only gestures and hand movements, they
escorted him to the precinct where he was handcuffed and tied to a chair. Later, the police, led by an officer who CHUA
guessed as the Chief of Police arrived with the motor engine of the speedboat and a bag. They presented the bag to him,
opened it, inspected and weighed the contents, then proclaimed them as methamphetamine hydrochloride.
CHUA denounced the prosecutions story as a distortion of the truth. He denied he was ever favored with an
interpreter or informed of his "constitutional rights," particularly of his right to counsel. Consequently, his arrest was
tainted with illegality and the methamphetamine hydrochloride found in the bag should have been regarded
inadmissible as evidence. He also maintained that CID never graced the occasion of his setting foot for the first time at
Tammocalao beach. BADUA certainly never prevented him from running away, as such thought failed to make an
impression in his mind. Most significantly, he denied ownership and knowledge of the contents of the bag, emphasizing
that RONG alone exercised dominion over the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was an effective and valid waiver of CHUA's right against unreasonable searches and
seizures since he consented to the search.

HELD: The State then attempted to persuade this Court that there was a consented search, a legitimate waiver of the
constitutional guarantee against obtrusive searches. It is fundamental, however, that to constitute a waiver, it must first
appear that the right exists; secondly, that the person involved had knowledge, actual or constructive, of the existence
of such a right; and lastly, that said person had an actual intention to relinquish the right. CHUA never exhibited that he
knew, actually or constructively of his right against unreasonable searches or that he intentionally conceded the same.
This can be inferred from the manner by which the search was performed.
CHUA obviously failed to understand the events that overran and overwhelmed him. The police officers already
introduced themselves to CHUA in three languages, but he remained completely deadpan. The police hence concluded
that CHUA failed to comprehend the three languages. When CHUA failed to respond again to the polices request to
open the bag, they resorted to what they called sign language. They claimed that CHUA finally understood their hand
motions and gestures. This Court disagrees. If CHUA could not understand what was orally articulated to him, how could
he understand the polices sign language. More importantly, it cannot logically be inferred from his alleged cognizance of
the sign language that he deliberately, intelligently, and consciously waived his right against such an intrusive search.
This Court is not unmindful of cases upholding the validity of consented warrantless searches and seizure. But in these
cases, the police officers' request to search personnel effects was orally articulated to the accused and in such language
that left no room for doubt that the latter fully understood what was requested. In some instances, the accused even
verbally replied to the request demonstrating that he also understood the nature and consequences of such request.
It was eventually discovered that the bag contained the regulated substance. But this is a trifling matter. If
evidence obtained during an illegal search even if tending to confirm or actually confirming initial information or
suspicion of felonious activity is absolutely considered inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding, the same being
the fruit of a poisonous tree how much more of "forbidden fruits" which did not confirm any initial suspicion of criminal
enterprise as in this case - because the police admitted that they never harbored any initial suspicion. Casting aside the
regulated substance as evidence, the remaining evidence on record are insufficient, feeble and ineffectual to sustain
CHUAs conviction.
G.R. No. L-63630 April 6, 1990
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MEDEL TANGLIBEN

FACTS: It appears from the evidence presented by the prosecution that in the late evening of March 2, 1982, Patrolmen
Silverio Quevedo and Romeo L. Punzalan of the San Fernando Police Station, together with Barangay Tanod Macario
Sacdalan, were conducting surveillance mission at the Victory Liner Terminal compound located at Barangay San Nicolas,
San Fernando, Pampanga; that the surveillance was aimed not only against persons who may commit misdemeanors at
the said place but also on persons who may be engaging in the traffic of dangerous drugs based on informations
supplied by informers; that it was around 9:30 in the evening that said Patrolmen noticed a person caring a traveling bag
(Exhibit G) who was acting suspiciously and they confronted him; that the person was requested by Patrolmen Quevedo
and Punzalan to open the red traveling bag but the person refused, only to accede later on when the patrolmen
identified themselves; that found inside the bag were marijuana leaves (Exhibit B) wrapped in a plastic wrapper and
weighing one kilo, more or less; that the person was asked of his name and the reason why he was at the said place and
he gave his name as Medel Tangliben and explained that he was waiting for a ride to Olongapo City to deliver the
marijuana leaves; that the accused was taken to the police headquarters at San Fernando, Pampanga, for further
investigation; and that Pat. Silverio Quevedo submitted to his Station Commander his Investigator's Report (Exhibit F).
It appears also from the prosecution's evidence that in the following morning or on March 3, 1982, Pat. Silverio
Quevedo asked his co-policeman Pat. Roberto Quevedo, who happens to be his brother and who has had special
training on narcotics, to conduct a field test on a little portion of the marijuana leaves and to have the remaining portion
examined by the PCCL at Camp Olivas, San Fernando, Pampanga; that Pat. Roberto Quevedo conducted a field test
(Exhibit H) on the marijuana leaves and found positive result for marijuana (Exhibit E); that the remaining bigger quantity
of the marijuana leaves were taken to the PCCL at Camp Olivas by Pat. Roberto Quevedo that same day of March 3, 1982
(Exhibit A and A-1) and when examined, the same were also found to be marijuana.

ISSUE: Whether or not marijuana allegedly seized from the accused was a product of an unlawful search without a
warrant and is therefore admissible in evidence.

HELD:YES. One of the exceptions to the general rule requiring a search warrant is a search incident to a lawful arrest.
Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Section 12. Search incident to a lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the commission of an offense, without a search warrant.
Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a) provides:
. . . A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense.
Accused was caught in flagrante, since he was carrying marijuana at the time of his arrest. This case therefore falls
squarely within the exception. The warrantless search was incident to a lawful arrest and is consequently valid.
Accused-appellant likewise asserts that the package of marijuana leaves supposedly seized from him was never
authenticated and therefore should not have been admitted as evidence. He capitalizes on the fact that the marijuana
package brought by patrolman Roberto Quevedo to the PC Crime Laboratory for examination did not contain a tag
bearing the name of the accused. We rule, however, that since Patrolman Quevedo testified that he gave the marijuana
package together with a letter-request for examination, and the forensic chemist Marilene Salangad likewise testified
that she received the marijuana together with the letter-request and said letter-request bore the name of the accused,
then the requirements of proper authentication of evidence were sufficiently complied with. The marijuana package
examined by the forensic checklist was satisfactorily identified as the one seized from accused.
G.R. No. 138881 December 18, 2000
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. LEILA JOHNSON

FACTS: Accused-appellant Leila Reyes Johnson was, at the time of the incident, 58 years old, a widow, and a resident of
Ocean Side, California, U.S.A. She is a former Filipino citizen who was naturalized as an American on June 16, 1968 and
had since been working as a registered nurse, taking care of geriatric patients and those with Alzheimers disease, in
convalescent homes in the United States.
On June 16, 1998, she arrived in the Philippines to visit her sons family in Calamba, Laguna. She was due to fly
back to the United States on July 26. On July 25, she checked in at the Philippine Village Hotel to avoid the traffic on the
way to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport (NAIA) and checked out at 5:30 p.m. the next day, June 26, 1998.
At around 7:30 p.m. of that day, Olivia Ramirez was on duty as a lady frisker at Gate 16 of the NAIA departure
area. Her duty was to frisk departing passengers, employees, and crew and check for weapons, bombs, prohibited drugs,
contraband goods, and explosives.
When she frisked accused-appellant Leila Johnson, a departing passenger bound for the United States via
Continental Airlines CS-912, she felt something hard on the latters abdominal area. Upon inquiry, Mrs. Johnson
explained she needed to wear two panty girdles as she had just undergone an operation as a result of an ectopic
pregnancy.
Not satisfied with the explanation, Ramirez reported the matter to her superior, SPO4 Reynaldo Embile, saying
Sir, hindi po ako naniniwalang panty lang po iyon. (Sir, I do not believe that it is just a panty.) She was directed to take
accused-appellant to the nearest womens room for inspection. Ramirez took accused-appellant to the rest room,
accompanied by SPO1 Rizalina Bernal. Embile stayed outside.
Inside the womens room, accused-appellant was asked again by Ramirez what the hard object on her stomach
was and accused-appellant gave the same answer she had previously given. Ramirez then asked her to bring out the
thing under her girdle. Accused-appellant brought out three plastic packs, which Ramirez then turned over to Embile,
outside the womens room.
The confiscated packs, marked as Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3, contained a total of 580.2 grams of a substance
which was found by NBI Chemist George de Lara to be methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
Embile took accused-appellant and the plastic packs to the 1st Regional Aviation and Security Office (1st RASO)
at the arrival area of the NAIA, where accused-appellants passport and ticket were taken and her luggage opened.
Pictures were taken and her personal belongings were itemized.
In her defense, accused-appellant alleged that she was standing in line at the last boarding gate when she was
approached by Embile and two female officers. She claimed she was handcuffed and taken to the womens room. There,
she was asked to undress and was then subjected to a body search. She insisted that nothing was found on her person.
She was later taken to a room filled with boxes, garbage, and a chair. Her passport and her purse containing $850.00 and
some change were taken from her, for which no receipt was issued to her. After two hours, she said, she was transferred
to the office of a certain Col. Castillo.
After another two hours, Col. Castillo and about eight security guards came in and threw two white packages on
the table. They told her to admit that the packages were hers. But she denied knowledge and ownership of the
packages. She was detained at the 1st RASO office until noon of June 28, 1999 when she was taken before a fiscal for
inquest. She claimed that throughout the period of her detention, from the night of June 26 until June 28, she was never
allowed to talk to counsel nor was she allowed to call the U.S. Embassy or any of her relatives in the Philippines.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused was deprived of her constitutional rights.

HELD:NO. Accused-appellant claims that she was arrested and detained in gross violation of her constitutional rights.
She argues that the shabu confiscated from her is inadmissible against her because she was forced to affix her signature
on the plastic bags while she was detained at the 1st RASO office, without the assistance of counsel and without having
been informed of her constitutional rights. Hence, she argues, the methamphetamine hydrochloride, or shabu, should
have been excluded from the evidence.
The contention has no merit. No statement, if any, was taken from accused-appellant during her detention and
used in evidence against her. There is, therefore, no basis for accused-appellants invocation of Art. III, 12(1) and (3). On
the other hand, what is involved in this case is an arrest in flagrante delicto pursuant to a valid search made on her
person.
The trial court held:
The constitutional right of the accused was not violated as she was never placed under custodial investigation
but was validly arrested without warrant pursuant to the provisions of Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure which provides:
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) when in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense;
(b) when an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the
person to be arrested has committed it; and
A custodial investigation has been defined in People. v. Ayson 175 SCRA 230 as the questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been taken [in] custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom in any significant
way. This presupposes that he is suspected of having committed an offense and that the investigator is trying to elicit
information or [a] confession from him."
The circumstances surrounding the arrest of the accused above falls in either paragraph (a) or (b) of the Rule above
cited, hence the allegation that she has been subjected to custodial investigation is far from being accurate.[18]
The methamphetamine hydrochloride seized from her during the routine frisk at the airport was acquired legitimately
pursuant to airport security procedures.
Persons may lose the protection of the search and seizure clause by exposure of their persons or property to the
public in a manner reflecting a lack of subjective expectation of privacy, which expectation society is prepared to
recognize as reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in airport security procedures. With increased concern over airplane
hijacking and terrorism has come increased security at the nations airports. Passengers attempting to board an aircraft
routinely pass through metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as well as checked luggage are routinely subjected to x-
ray scans. Should these procedures suggest the presence of suspicious objects, physical searches are conducted to
determine what the objects are. There is little question that such searches are reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety interests involved, and the reduced privacy expectations associated with airline
travel. Indeed, travelers are often notified through airport public address systems, signs, and notices in their airline
tickets that they are subject to search and, if any prohibited materials or substances are found, such would be subject to
seizure. These announcements place passengers on notice that ordinary constitutional protections against warrantless
searches and seizures do not apply to routine airport procedures.
The packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride having thus been obtained through a valid warrantless search,
they are admissible in evidence against the accused-appellant herein. Corollarily, her subsequent arrest, although
likewise without warrant, was justified since it was effected upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in her person in
flagrante delicto.
Anent her allegation that her signature on the said packs (Exhibits C-1, C-2 and C-3 herein) had been obtained
while she was in the custody of the airport authorities without the assistance of counsel, the Solicitor General correctly
points out that nowhere in the records is it indicated that accused-appellant was required to affix her signature to the
packs. In fact, only the signatures of Embile and Ramirez thereon, along with their testimony to that effect, were
presented by the prosecution in proving its case.
G.R. No. 91107 June 19, 1991
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MIKAEL MALMSTEDT

FACTS: At around 7:00 o'clock in the morning of 11 May 1989, accused went to the Nangonogan bus stop in Sagada to
catch the first available trip to Baguio City. From Baguio City, accused planned to take a late afternoon trip to Angeles
City, then proceed to Manila to catch his flight out of the country, scheduled on 13 May 1989. From Sagada, accused
took a Skyline bus with body number 8005 and Plate number AVC 902.
At about 8: 00 o'clock in the morning of that same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen Vasco, the Commanding Officer of
the First Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up a temporary checkpoint
at Kilometer 14, Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the purpose of checking all vehicles coming from the Cordillera
Region. The order to establish a checkpoint in the said area was prompted by persistent reports that vehicles coming
from Sagada were transporting marijuana and other prohibited drugs. Moreover, information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that same morning, that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had in his possession
prohibited drugs.The group composed of seven (7) NARCOM officers, in coordination with Tublay Police Station, set up a
checkpoint at the designated area at about 10:00 o'clock in the morning and inspected all vehicles coming from the
Cordillera Region.At about 1:30 o'clock in the afternoon, the bus where accused was riding was stopped. Sgt. Fider and
CIC Galutan boarded the bus and announced that they were members of the NARCOM and that they would conduct an
inspection. The two (2) NARCOM officers started their inspection from the front going towards the rear of the bus.
Accused who was the sole foreigner riding the bus was seated at the rear thereof.
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the bulge on accused's waist
to be a gun, the officer asked for accused's passport and other identification papers. When accused failed to comply, the
officer required him to bring out whatever it was that was bulging on his waist. The bulging object turned out to be a
pouch bag and when accused opened the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed four (4) suspicious-looking objects
wrapped in brown packing tape, prompting the officer to open one of the wrapped objects. The wrapped objects turned
out to contain hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the bus for questioning. But before he alighted from the bus, accused
stopped to get two (2) travelling bags from the luggage carrier.Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers got the bags
and opened them. A teddy bear was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy bears, the officer noticed that there were
bulges inside the same which did not feel like foam stuffing. It was only after the officers had opened the bags that
accused finally presented his passport.Accused was then brought to the headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp Dangwa,
La Trinidad, Benguet for further investigation. At the investigation room, the officers opened the teddy bears and they
were found to also contain hashish. Representative samples were taken from the hashish found a prohibited drug which
is a derivative of marijuana.

ISSUE: Whether in the absence of a search warrant the prohibited drugs are admissible in evidence.

HELD: YES. The Constitution guarantees the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures.5 However, where the search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest, there is
no need to obtain a search warrant. A lawful arrest without a warrant may be made by a peace officer or a private
person under the following circumstances.
Sec. 5 Arrest without warrant; when lawful. –– A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has
committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or
temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) hereof, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station
or jail, and he shall be proceeded against in accordance with Rule 112, Section 7.
Accused was searched and arrested while transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A crime was actually being committed
by the accused and he was caught in flagrante delicto. Thus, the search made upon his personal effects falls squarely
under paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of law, which allow a warrantless search incident to a lawful arrest.7
While it is true that the NARCOM officers were not armed with a search warrant when the search was made over the
personal effects of accused, however, under the circumstances of the case, there was sufficient probable cause for said
officers to believe that accused was then and there committing a crime.
G.R. No. 83988 September 29, 1989
RICARDO C. VALMONTE vs. GEN. RENATO DE VILLA

FACTS: On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to Letter of
Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting security operations within
its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing an effective territorial defense,
maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to the social, economic and political development
of the National Capital Region. As part of its duty to maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in
various parts of Valenzuela, Metro Manila.
Petitioners aver that, because of the installation of said checkpoints, the residents of Valenzuela are worried of
being harassed and of their safety being placed at the arbitrary, capricious and whimsical disposition of the military
manning the checkpoints, considering that their cars and vehicles are being subjected to regular searches and check-ups,
especially at night or at dawn, without the benefit of a search warrant and/or court order. Their alleged fear for their
safety increased when, at dawn of 9 July 1988, Benjamin Parpon, a supply officer of the Municipality of Valenzuela,
Bulacan, was gunned down allegedly in cold blood by the members of the NCRDC manning the checkpoint along
McArthur Highway at Malinta, Valenzuela, for ignoring and/or refusing to submit himself to the checkpoint and for
continuing to speed off inspire of warning shots fired in the air. Petitioner Valmonte also claims that, on several
occasions, he had gone thru these checkpoints where he was stopped and his car subjected to search/check-up without
a court order or search warrant.
Petitioners further contend that the said checkpoints give the respondents a blanket authority to make searches
and/or seizures without search warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution; and, instances have occurred
where a citizen, while not killed, had been harassed.
Petitioners' concern for their safety and apprehension at being harassed by the military manning the
checkpoints are not sufficient grounds to declare the checkpoints as per se illegal. No proof has been presented before
the Court to show that, in the course of their routine checks, the military indeed committed specific violations of
petitioners' right against unlawful search and seizure or other rights.

ISSUE: Whether or not the installation of checkpoints constitute unlawful search and seizure.

HELD: NO. The constitutional right against unreasonable searches and seizures is a personal right invocable only by
those whose rights have been infringed, or threatened to be infringed. What constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable
search and seizure in any particular case is purely a judicial question, determinable from a consideration of the
circumstances involved.
Petitioner Valmonte's general allegation to the effect that he had been stopped and searched without a search
warrant by the military manning the checkpoints, without more, i.e., without stating the details of the incidents which
amount to a violation of his right against unlawful search and seizure, is not sufficient to enable the Court to determine
whether there was a violation of Valmonte's right against unlawful search and seizure. Not all searches and seizures are
prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable search is not to be determined by any fixed
formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the public
fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, 8 or flashes a light therein, 9 these do not constitute unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered as a
security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial defense and maintaining
peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded as measures to thwart plots to
destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the
shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in
cities of police and military men by NPA "sparrow units," not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the
alarming rise in lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely
brought about by deteriorating economic conditions — which all sum up to what one can rightly consider, at the very
least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and promote public welfare
and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
G. R. Nos. 102009 10 July 6, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. ROLANDO DE GRACIA et, al.

FACTS: The records show that in the early morning of December 1, 1989, Maj. Efren Soria of the Intelligence Division,
National Capital Region Defense Command, was on board a brown Toyota car conducting a surveillance of the Eurocar
Sales Office located at Epifanio de los Santos Avenue in Quezon City, together with his team composed of Sgt. Crispin
Sagario, M/Sgt. Ramon Briones, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino, one S/Sgt. Simon and a Sgt. Ramos. The surveillance, which
actually started on the night of November 30, 1989 at around 10:00 P.M., was conducted pursuant to an intelligence
report received by the division that said establishment was being occupied by elements of the RAM-SFP as a
communication command post.Sgt. Crispin Sagario, the driver of the car, parked the vehicle around ten to fifteen meters
away from the Eurocar building near P. Tuazon Street, S/Sgt. Henry Aquino had earlier alighted from the car to conduct
his surveillance on foot. A crowd was then gathered near the Eurocar office watching the on-going bombardment near
Camp Aguinaldo. After a while, a group of five men disengaged themselves from the crowd and walked towards the car
of the surveillance team. At that moment, Maj. Soria, who was then seated in front, saw the approaching group and
immediately ordered Sgt. Sagario to start the car and leave the area. As they passed by the group, then only six meters
away, the latter pointed to them, drew their guns and fired at the team, which attack resulted in the wounding of Sgt.
Sagario on the right thigh. Nobody in the surveillance team was able to retaliate because they sought cover inside the
car and they were afraid that civilians or bystanders might be caught in the cross-fire.
As a consequence, at around 6:30 A.M. of December 5, 1989, a searching team composed of F/Lt. Virgilio Babao
as team leader, M/Sgt. Lacdao, Sgt. Magallion, Sgt. Patricio Pacatang, and elements of the 16th Infantry Battalion under
one Col. delos Santos raided the Eurocar Sales Office. They were able to find and confiscate six cartons of M-16
ammunition, five bundles of C-4 dynamites, M-shells of different calibers, and "molotov" bombs inside one of the rooms
belonging to a certain Col. Matillano which is located at the right portion of the building. Sgt. Oscar Obenia, the first one
to enter the Eurocar building, saw appellant De Gracia inside the office of Col. Matillano, holding a C-4 and suspiciously
peeping through a door. De Gracia was the only person then present inside the room. A uniform with the nametag of
Col. Matillano was also found. As a result of the raid, the team arrested appellant, as well as Soprieso Verbo and Roberto
Jimena who were janitors at the Eurocar building. They were then made to sign an inventory, written in Tagalog, of the
explosives and ammunition confiscated by the raiding team. No search warrant was secured by the raiding team
because, according to them, at that time there was so much disorder considering that the nearby Camp Aguinaldo was
being mopped up by the rebel forces and there was simultaneous firing within the vicinity of the Eurocar office, aside
from the fact that the courts were consequently closed.

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search and seizure.

HELD:YES. It is admitted that the military operatives who raided the Eurocar Sales Office were not armed with a search
warrant at that time. The raid was actually precipitated by intelligence reports that said office was being used as
headquarters by the RAM. Prior to the raid, there was a surveillance conducted on the premises wherein the
surveillance team was fired at by a group of men coming from the Eurocar building. When the military operatives raided
the place, the occupants thereof refused to open the door despite requests for them to do so, thereby compelling the
former to break into the office. The Eurocar Sales Office is obviously not a gun store and it is definitely not an armory or
arsenal which are the usual depositories for explosives and ammunition. It is primarily and solely engaged in the sale of
automobiles. The presence of an unusual quantity of high-powered firearms and explosives could not be justifiably or
even colorably explained. In addition, there was general chaos and disorder at that time because of simultaneous and
intense firing within the vicinity of the office and in the nearby Camp Aguinaldo which was under attack by rebel forces.
The courts in the surrounding areas were obviously closed and, for that matter, the building and houses therein were
deserted.Under the foregoing circumstances, it is our considered opinion that the instant case falls under one of the
exceptions to the prohibition against a warrantless search. In the first place, the military operatives, taking into account
the facts obtaining in this case, had reasonable ground to believe that a crime was being committed. There was
consequently more than sufficient probable cause to warrant their action. Furthermore, under the situation then
prevailing, the raiding team had no opportunity to apply for and secure a search warrant from the courts. The trial judge
himself manifested that on December 5, 1989 when the raid was conducted, his court was closed. Under such urgency
and exigency of the moment, a search warrant could lawfully be dispensed with.
G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008
SOCIAL JUSTICE SOCIETY vs. DANGEROUS DRUGS BOARD and PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA)

FACTS: SEC. 36. Authorized Drug Testing.Authorized drug testing shall be done by any government forensic laboratories
or by any of the drug testing laboratories accredited and monitored by the DOH to safeguard the quality of the test
results. The drug testing shall employ, among others, two (2) testing methods, the screening test which will determine
the positive result as well as the type of drug used and the confirmatory test which will confirm a positive screening test.
The following shall be subjected to undergo drug testing:
(c) Students of secondary and tertiary schools.Students of secondary and tertiary schools shall, pursuant to the
related rules and regulations as contained in the schools student handbook and with notice to the parents, undergo a
random drug testing
(d) Officers and employees of public and private offices.Officers and employees of public and private offices,
whether domestic or overseas, shall be subjected to undergo a random drug test as contained in the companys work
rules and regulations, x x x for purposes of reducing the risk in the workplace. Any officer or employee found positive for
use of dangerous drugs shall be dealt with administratively which shall be a ground for suspension or termination,
subject to the provisions of Article 282 of the Labor Code and pertinent provisions of the Civil Service Law;
(f) All persons charged before the prosecutors office with a criminal offense having an imposable penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1) day shall undergo a mandatory drug test;
(g) All candidates for public office whether appointed or elected both in the national or local government shall
undergo a mandatory drug test.
In addition to the above stated penalties in this Section, those found to be positive for dangerous drugs use shall
be subject to the provisions of Section 15 of this Act.
G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections)
On December 23, 2003, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued Resolution No. 6486, prescribing the
rules and regulations on the mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office in connection with the May 10, 2004
synchronized national and local elections.
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re-election in the May 10, 2004
elections,[1] filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it, he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165
and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a
qualification for candidates for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to
enjoin the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486.
According to Pimentel, the Constitution only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a
candidate for, elected to, and be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring,
via RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a mandatory drug test,
create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first be certified as drug free. He adds that there is
no provision in the Constitution authorizing the Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of
candidates for senator.
G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
In its Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65, petitioner Social Justice Society (SJS), a registered political party,
seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing
paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the
provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion to schools and
employers to determine the manner of drug testing. For another, the provisions trench in the equal protection clause
inasmuch as they can be used to harass a student or an employee deemed undesirable. And for a third, a persons
constitutional right against unreasonable searches is also breached by said provisions.
G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous
Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also seeks in his Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 that Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g) of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on
the constitutional right to privacy, the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-
incrimination, and for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
ISSUE: Whether or not paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional.

HELD: 1. G.R. No. 161658 (Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. v. Commission on Elections) Sec. 36[g] of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486(Unconstitutional) It may of course be argued, in defense of the validity of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165,
that the provision does not expressly state that non-compliance with the drug test imposition is a disqualifying factor or
would work to nullify a certificate of candidacy. This argument may be accorded plausibility if the drug test requirement
is optional. But the particular section of the law, without exception, made drug-testing on those covered mandatory,
necessarily suggesting that the obstinate ones shall have to suffer the adverse consequences for not adhering to the
statutory command. And since the provision deals with candidates for public office, it stands to reason that the adverse
consequence adverted to can only refer to and revolve around the election and the assumption of public office of the
candidates. Any other construal would reduce the mandatory nature of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 into a pure jargon without
meaning and effect whatsoever.
While it is anti-climactic to state it at this juncture, COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 is no longer enforceable, for
by its terms, it was intended to cover only the May 10, 2004 synchronized elections and the candidates running in that
electoral event. Nonetheless, to obviate repetition, the Court deems it appropriate to review and rule, as it hereby rules,
on its validity as an implementing issuance. It ought to be made abundantly clear, however, that the unconstitutionality
of Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 is rooted on its having infringed the constitutional provision defining the qualification or
eligibility requirements for one aspiring to run for and serve as senator.

2. G.R. No. 157870 (Social Justice Society v. DangerousDrugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency) Sec.
36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165([c] and [d] Constitutional) To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp
out illegal drug in the country and thus protect the well-being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious
effects of dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of promoting and
resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a mandatory random drug test. To the Court, the
need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal drug use is substantial enough to override the individuals privacy
interest under the premises. The Court can consider that the illegal drug menace cuts across gender, age group, and
social- economic lines. And it may not be amiss to state that the sale, manufacture, or trafficking of illegal drugs, with
their ready market, would be an investors dream were it not for the illegal and immoral components of any of such
activities. The drug problem has hardly abated since the martial law public execution of a notorious drug trafficker. The
state can no longer assume a laid back stance with respect to this modern-day scourge. Drug enforcement agencies
perceive a mandatory random drug test to be an effective way of preventing and deterring drug use among employees
in private offices, the threat of detection by random testing being higher than other modes. The Court holds that the
chosen method is a reasonable and enough means to lick the problem.
Taking into account the foregoing factors, i.e., the reduced expectation of privacy on the part of the employees,
the compelling state concern likely to be met by the search, and the well-defined limits set forth in the law to properly
guide authorities in the conduct of the random testing, we hold that the challenged drug test requirement is, under the
limited context of the case, reasonable and, ergo, constitutional.
3.G.R. No. 158633 (Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr. v. Dangerous Sec. 36[c], [d], [f], and [g] of RA 9165([c] and [d]
Constitutional. Drugs Board and Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency)Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d)
of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of
students, the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students emanates
primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry to the school, and from their
voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of school authorities. In the case of private and public
employees, the constitutional soundness of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the
reasonableness of the drug test policy and requirement.
“The Court resolves to GRANT the petition in G.R. No. 161658 and declares Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC
Resolution No. 6486 as UNCONSTITUTIONAL; and to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition in G.R. Nos. 157870 and 158633 by
declaring Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165 CONSTITUTIONAL, but declaring its Sec. 36(f) UNCONSTITUTIONAL. All concerned
agencies are, accordingly, permanently enjoined from implementing Sec. 36(f) and (g) of RA 9165.”
G.R. No. 181881 October 18, 2011
BRICCIO Ricky A. POLLO vs. KARINA CONSTANTINO-DAVID et,al. (Not good digest)

FACTS: Petitioner is a former Supervising Personnel Specialist of the CSC Regional Office No. IV and also the Officer-in-
Charge of the Public Assistance and Liaison Division (PALD) under the Mamamayan Muna Hindi Mamaya Na program of
the CSC.
On January 3, 2007 at around 2:30 p.m., an unsigned letter-complaint addressed to respondent CSC Chairperson
Karina Constantino-David which was marked Confidential and sent through a courier service (LBC) from a certain Alan
San Pascual of Bagong Silang, Caloocan City, was received by the Integrated Records Management Office (IRMO) at the
CSC Central Office. Following office practice in which documents marked Confidential are left unopened and instead
sent to the addressee, the aforesaid letter was given directly to Chairperson David.
The letter-complaint reads:
The Chairwoman
Civil Service Commission
Batasan Hills, Quezon City

Dear Madam Chairwoman,

Belated Merry Christmas and Advance Happy New Year!

As a concerned citizen of my beloved country, I would like to ask from you personally if it is just alright for an employee of your agency to be a lawyer of an accused
govt employee having a pending case in the csc. I honestly think this is a violation of law and unfair to others and your office.
I have known that a person have been lawyered by one of your attorny in the region 4 office. He is the chief of the Mamamayan muna hindi mamaya na division. He
have been helping many who have pending cases in the Csc. The justice in our govt system will not be served if this will continue. Please investigate this anomaly
because our perception of your clean and good office is being tainted.

Concerned Govt employee

Chairperson David immediately formed a team of four personnel with background in information technology
(IT), and issued a memo directing them to conduct an investigation and specifically to back up all the files in the
computers found in the Mamamayan Muna (PALD) and Legal divisions.[4] After some briefing, the team proceeded at
once to the CSC-ROIV office at Panay Avenue, Quezon City. Upon their arrival thereat around 5:30 p.m., the team
informed the officials of the CSC-ROIV, respondents Director IV Lydia Castillo (Director Castillo) and Director III Engelbert
Unite (Director Unite) of Chairperson Davids directive.
The backing-up of all files in the hard disk of computers at the PALD and Legal Services Division (LSD) was witnessed by
several employees, together with Directors Castillo and Unite who closely monitored said activity. At around 6:00 p.m.,
Director Unite sent text messages to petitioner and the head of LSD, who were both out of the office at the time,
informing them of the ongoing copying of computer files in their divisions upon orders of the CSC Chair.
Petitioner replied also thru text message that he was leaving the matter to Director Unite and that he will just
get a lawyer. Another text message received by petitioner from PALD staff also reported the presence of the team from
CSC main office: Sir may mga taga C.O. daw sa kuarto natin.[6] At around 10:00 p.m. of the same day, the investigating
team finished their task. The next day, all the computers in the PALD were sealed and secured for the purpose of
preserving all the files stored therein. Several diskettes containing the back-up files sourced from the hard disk of PALD
and LSD computers were turned over to Chairperson David. The contents of the diskettes were examined by the CSCs
Office for Legal Affairs (OLA). It was found that most of the files in the 17 diskettes containing files copied from the
computer assigned to and being used by the petitioner, numbering about 40 to 42 documents, were draft pleadings or
letters[7] in connection with administrative cases in the CSC and other tribunals. On the basis of this finding, Chairperson
David issued the Show-Cause Order[8] dated January 11, 2007, requiring the petitioner, who had gone on extended
leave, to submit his explanation or counter-affidavit within five days from notice.
Petitioner filed his Comment, denying that he is the person referred to in the anonymous letter-complaint which
had no attachments to it, because he is not a lawyer and neither is he lawyering for people with cases in the CSC. He
accused CSC officials of conducting a fishing expedition when they unlawfully copied and printed personal files in his
computer, and subsequently asking him to submit his comment which violated his right against self-incrimination. He
asserted that he had protested the unlawful taking of his computer done while he was on leave, citing the letter dated
January 8, 2007 in which he informed Director Castillo that the files in his computer were his personal files and those of
his sister, relatives, friends and some associates and that he is not authorizing their sealing, copying, duplicating and
printing as these would violate his constitutional right to privacy and protection against self-incrimination and
warrantless search and seizure. He pointed out that though government property, the temporary use and ownership of
the computer issued under a Memorandum of Receipt (MR) is ceded to the employee who may exercise all attributes of
ownership, including its use for personal purposes. As to the anonymous letter, petitioner argued that it is not
actionable as it failed to comply with the requirements of a formal complaint under the Uniform Rules on Administrative
Cases in the Civil Service (URACC). In view of the illegal search, the files/documents copied from his computer without
his consent is thus inadmissible as evidence, being fruits of a poisonous tree.

ISSUE: Whether or not the search was lawful.

HELD:YES. A search by a government employer of an employees office is justified at inception when there are
reasonable grounds for suspecting that it will turn up evidence that the employee is guilty of work-related
misconduct.[51] Thus, in the 2004 case decided by the US Court of Appeals Eighth Circuit, it was held that where a
government agencys computer use policy prohibited electronic messages with pornographic content and in addition
expressly provided that employees do not have any personal privacy rights regarding their use of the agency information
systems and technology, the government employee had no legitimate expectation of privacy as to the use and contents
of his office computer, and therefore evidence found during warrantless search of the computer was admissible in
prosecution for child pornography. In that case, the defendant employees computer hard drive was first remotely
examined by a computer information technician after his supervisor received complaints that he was inaccessible and
had copied and distributed non-work-related e-mail messages throughout the office. When the supervisor confirmed
that defendant had used his computer to access the prohibited websites, in contravention of the express policy of the
agency, his computer tower and floppy disks were taken and examined. A formal administrative investigation ensued
and later search warrants were secured by the police department. The initial remote search of the hard drive of
petitioners computer, as well as the subsequent warrantless searches was held as valid under the OConnor ruling that a
public employer can investigate work-related misconduct so long as any search is justified at inception and is reasonably
related in scope to the circumstances that justified it in the first place.
We need not belabor this point raised by petitioner. The administrative complaint is deemed to have been
initiated by the CSC itself when Chairperson David, after a spot inspection and search of the files stored in the hard drive
of computers in the two divisions adverted to in the anonymous letter -- as part of the disciplining authoritys own fact-
finding investigation and information-gathering -- found a prima facie case against the petitioner who was then directed
to file his comment. As this Court held in Civil Service Commission v. Court of Appeals
Under Sections 46 and 48 (1), Chapter 6, Subtitle A, Book V of E.O. No. 292 and Section 8, Rule II of Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, a complaint may be initiated against a civil service officer or employee
by the appropriate disciplining authority, even without being subscribed and sworn to. Considering that the CSC, as the
disciplining authority for Dumlao, filed the complaint, jurisdiction over Dumlao was validly acquired. (Emphasis
supplied.)
As to petitioners challenge on the validity of CSC OM 10, S. 2002 (CUP), the same deserves scant consideration.
The alleged infirmity due to the said memorandum order having been issued solely by the CSC Chair and not the
Commission as a collegial body, upon which the dissent of Commissioner Buenaflor is partly anchored, was already
explained by Chairperson David in her Reply to the Addendum to Commissioner Buenaflors previous memo expressing
his dissent to the actions and disposition of the Commission in this case. According to Chairperson David, said
memorandum order was in fact exhaustively discussed, provision by provision in the January 23, 2002 Commission
Meeting, attended by her and former Commissioners Erestain, Jr. and Valmores. Hence, the Commission En Banc at the
time saw no need to issue a Resolution for the purpose and further because the CUP being for internal use of the
Commission, the practice had been to issue a memorandum order. Moreover, being an administrative rule that is merely
internal in nature, or which regulates only the personnel of the CSC and not the public, the CUP need not be published
prior to its effectivity.
WRIT OF AMPARO
G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008
THE SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE vs. RAYMOND MANALO and REYNALDO MANALO

FACTS: On October 25, 2007, the Court resolved to treat the August 23, 2007 Petition as a petition under the Amparo
Rule and further resolved, viz:
WHEREFORE, let a WRIT OF AMPARO be issued to respondents requiring them to file with the CA (Court of
Appeals) a verified written return within five (5) working days from service of the writ. We REMAND the petition to the
CA and designate the Division of Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin to conduct the summary hearing on the petition on
November 8, 2007 at 2:00 p.m. and decide the petition in accordance with the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision in favor of therein petitioners (herein
respondents), the dispositive portion of which reads, viz:
ACCORDINGLY, the PRIVILEGE OF THE WRIT OF AMPARO is GRANTED.
The respondents SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE and AFP CHIEF OF STAFF are hereby REQUIRED:
1. To furnish to the petitioners and to this Court within five days from notice of this decision all official and unofficial
reports of the investigation undertaken in connection with their case, except those already on file herein;
2. To confirm in writing the present places of official assignment of M/Sgt Hilario aka Rollie Castillo and Donald Caigas
within five days from notice of this decision.
3. To cause to be produced to this Court all medical reports, records and charts, reports of any treatment given or
recommended and medicines prescribed, if any, to the petitioners, to include a list of medical and (sic) personnel
(military and civilian) who attended to them from February 14, 2006 until August 12, 2007 within five days from notice
of this decision.
The compliance with this decision shall be made under the signature and oath of respondent AFP Chief of Staff
or his duly authorized deputy, the latters authority to be express and made apparent on the face of the sworn
compliance with this directive.
SO ORDERED.
Hence, this appeal. In resolving this appeal, we first unfurl the facts as alleged by herein respondents:
Respondent Raymond Manalo recounted that about one or two weeks before February 14, 2006, several uniformed and
armed soldiers and members of the CAFGU summoned to a meeting all the residents of their barangay in San Idelfonso,
Bulacan. Respondents were not able to attend as they were not informed of the gathering, but Raymond saw some of
the soldiers when he passed by the barangay hall.
On February 14, 2006, Raymond was sleeping in their house in Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. At past
noon, several armed soldiers wearing white shirts, fatigue pants and army boots, entered their house and roused him.
They asked him if he was Bestre, but his mother, Ester Manalo, replied that he was Raymond, not Bestre. The armed
soldier slapped him on both cheeks and nudged him in the stomach. He was then handcuffed, brought to the rear of his
house, and forced to the ground face down. He was kicked on the hip, ordered to stand and face up to the light, then
forcibly brought near the road. He told his mother to follow him, but three soldiers stopped her and told her to stay.
Among the men who came to take him, Raymond recognized brothers Michael de la Cruz, Madning de la Cruz, Puti de la
Cruz, and Pula de la Cruz, who all acted as lookout. They were all members of the CAFGU and residing in Manuzon, San
Ildefonso, Bulacan. He also recognized brothers Randy Mendoza and Rudy Mendoza, also members of the CAFGU. While
he was being forcibly taken, he also saw outside of his house two barangay councilors, Pablo Cunanan and Bernardo
Lingasa, with some soldiers and armed men.
The men forced Raymond into a white L300 van. Once inside, he was blindfolded. Before being blindfolded, he
saw the faces of the soldiers who took him. Later, in his 18 months of captivity, he learned their names. The one who
drove the van was Rizal Hilario alias Rollie Castillo, whom he estimated was about 40 years of age or older. The leader of
the team who entered his house and abducted him was Ganata. He was tall, thin, curly-haired and a bit old. Another one
of his abductors was George who was tall, thin, white-skinned and about 30 years old.
The van drove off, then came to a stop. A person was brought inside the van and made to sit beside Raymond. Both of
them were beaten up. On the road, he recognized the voice of the person beside him as his brother Reynaldos. The van
stopped several times until they finally arrived at a house. Raymond and Reynaldo were each brought to a different
room. With the doors of their rooms left open, Raymond saw several soldiers continuously hitting his brother Reynaldo
on the head and other parts of his body with the butt of their guns for about 15 minutes. After which, Reynaldo was
brought to his (Raymonds) room and it was his (Raymonds) turn to be beaten up in the other room. The soldiers asked
him if he was a member of the New Peoples Army. Each time he said he was not, he was hit with the butt of their guns.
He was questioned where his comrades were, how many soldiers he had killed, and how many NPA members he had
helped. Each time he answered none, they hit him.
In the next days, Raymonds interrogators appeared to be high officials as the soldiers who beat him up would
salute them, call them sir, and treat them with respect. He was in blindfolds when interrogated by the high officials, but
he saw their faces when they arrived and before the blindfold was put on. He noticed that the uniform of the high
officials was different from those of the other soldiers. One of those officials was tall and thin, wore white pants, tie, and
leather shoes, instead of combat boots. He spoke in Tagalog and knew much about his parents and family, and a habeas
corpus case filed in connection with the respondents abduction. While these officials interrogated him, Raymond was
not manhandled. But once they had left, the soldier guards beat him up. When the guards got drunk, they also
manhandled respondents. During this time, Raymond was fed only at night, usually with left-over and rotten food.
On the third week of respondents detention, two men arrived while Raymond was sleeping and beat him up. They
doused him with urine and hot water, hit his stomach with a piece of wood, slapped his forehead twice with a .45 pistol,
punched him on the mouth, and burnt some parts of his body with a burning wood. When he could no longer endure
the torture and could hardly breathe, they stopped. They then subjected Reynaldo to the same ordeal in another room.
Before their torturers left, they warned Raymond that they would come back the next day and kill him.
The following night, Raymond attempted to escape. He waited for the guards to get drunk, then made noise
with the chains put on him to see if they were still awake. When none of them came to check on him, he managed to
free his hand from the chains and jumped through the window. He passed through a helipad and firing range and
stopped near a fishpond where he used stones to break his chains. After walking through a forested area, he came near
a river and an Iglesia ni Kristo church. He talked to some women who were doing the laundry, asked where he was and
the road to Gapan. He was told that he was in Fort Magsaysay. He reached the highway, but some soldiers spotted him,
forcing him to run away. The soldiers chased him and caught up with him. They brought him to another place near the
entrance of what he saw was Fort Magsaysay. He was boxed repeatedly, kicked, and hit with chains until his back bled.
They poured gasoline on him. Then a so-called Mam or Madam suddenly called, saying that she wanted to see Raymond
before he was killed. The soldiers ceased the torture and he was returned inside Fort Magsaysay where Reynaldo was
detained.
For some weeks, the respondents had a respite from all the torture. Their wounds were treated. When the
wounds were almost healed, the torture resumed, particularly when respondents guards got drunk.
Raymond recalled that sometime in April until May 2006, he was detained in a room enclosed by steel bars. He stayed
all the time in that small room measuring 1 x 2 meters, and did everything there, including urinating, removing his
bowels, bathing, eating and sleeping. He counted that eighteen people had been detained in that bartolina, including his
brother Reynaldo and himself.
For about three and a half months, the respondents were detained in Fort Magsaysay. They were kept in a small house
with two rooms and a kitchen. One room was made into the bartolina. The house was near the firing range, helipad and
mango trees. At dawn, soldiers marched by their house. They were also sometimes detained in what he only knew as
the DTU.
At the DTU, a male doctor came to examine respondents. He checked their body and eyes, took their urine
samples and marked them. When asked how they were feeling, they replied that they had a hard time urinating, their
stomachs were aching, and they felt other pains in their body. The next day, two ladies in white arrived. They also
examined respondents and gave them medicines, including orasol, amoxicillin and mefenamic acid. They brought with
them the results of respondents urine test and advised them to drink plenty of water and take their medicine. The two
ladies returned a few more times. Thereafter, medicines were sent through the master of the DTU, Master Del Rosario
alias Carinyoso at Puti. Respondents were kept in the DTU for about two weeks. While there, he met a soldier named
Efren who said that Gen. Palparan ordered him to monitor and take care of them.
One day, Rizal Hilario fetched respondents in a Revo vehicle. They, along with Efren and several other armed
men wearing fatigue suits, went to a detachment in Pinaud, San Ildefonso, Bulacan. Respondents were detained for one
or two weeks in a big two-storey house. Hilario and Efren stayed with them. While there, Raymond was beaten up by
Hilarios men.
 From Pinaud, Hilario and Efren brought respondents to Sapang, San Miguel, Bulacan on board the Revo. They
were detained in a big unfinished house inside the compound of Kapitan for about three months. When they arrived in
Sapang, Gen. Palparan talked to them. They were brought out of the house to a basketball court in the center of the
compound and made to sit. Gen. Palparan was already waiting, seated. He was about two arms length away from
respondents. He began by asking if respondents felt well already, to which Raymond replied in the affirmative. He asked
Raymond if he knew him. Raymond lied that he did not. He then asked Raymond if he would be scared if he were made
to face Gen. Palparan. Raymond responded that he would not be because he did not believe that Gen. Palparan was an
evil man.
Raymond narrated his conversation with Gen. Palparan in his affidavit, viz:
Tinanong ako ni Gen. Palparan, Ngayon na kaharap mo na ako, di ka ba natatakot sa akin?
Sumagot akong, Siyempre po, natatakot din
Sabi ni Gen. Palparan: Sige, bibigyan ko kayo ng isang pagkakataon na mabuhay, bastat sundin nyo ang lahat ng sasabihin
ko sabihin mo sa magulang mo huwag pumunta sa mga rali, sa hearing, sa Karapatan at sa Human Right dahil niloloko lang kayo.
Sabihin sa magulang at lahat sa bahay na huwag paloko doon. Tulungan kami na kausapin si Bestre na sumuko na sa gobyerno.
Respondents agreed to do as Gen. Palparan told them as they felt they could not do otherwise. At about 3:00 in
the morning, Hilario, Efren and the formers men - the same group that abducted them - brought them to their parents
house. Raymond was shown to his parents while Reynaldo stayed in the Revo because he still could not walk. In the
presence of Hilario and other soldiers, Raymond relayed to his parents what Gen. Palparan told him. As they were afraid,
Raymonds parents acceded. Hilario threatened Raymonds parents that if they continued to join human rights rallies,
they would never see their children again. The respondents were then brought back to Sapang.
When respondents arrived back in Sapang, Gen. Palparan was about to leave. He was talking with the four
masters who were there: Arman, Ganata, Hilario and Cabalse. When Gen. Palparan saw Raymond, he called for him. He
was in a big white vehicle. Raymond stood outside the vehicle as Gen. Palparan told him to gain back his strength and be
healthy and to take the medicine he left for him and Reynaldo. He said the medicine was expensive at Php35.00 each,
and would make them strong. He also said that they should prove that they are on the side of the military and warned
that they would not be given another chance. During his testimony, Raymond identified Gen. Palparan by his picture.
One of the soldiers named Arman made Raymond take the medicine left by Gen. Palparan. The medicine, named
Alive, was green and yellow. Raymond and Reynaldo were each given a box of this medicine and instructed to take one
capsule a day. Arman checked if they were getting their dose of the medicine. The Alive made them sleep each time they
took it, and they felt heavy upon waking up.
After a few days, Hilario arrived again. He took Reynaldo and left Raymond at Sapang. Arman instructed
Raymond that while in Sapang, he should introduce himself as Oscar, a military trainee from Sariaya, Quezon, assigned
in Bulacan. While there, he saw again Ganata, one of the men who abducted him from his house, and got acquainted
with other military men and civilians.[
After about three months in Sapang, Raymond was brought to Camp Tecson under the 24th Infantry Battalion.
He was fetched by three unidentified men in a big white vehicle. Efren went with them. Raymond was then blindfolded.
After a 30-minute ride, his blindfold was removed. Chains were put on him and he was kept in the barracks.
The next day, Raymonds chains were removed and he was ordered to clean outside the barracks. It was then he learned
that he was in a detachment of the Rangers. There were many soldiers, hundreds of them were training. He was also
ordered to clean inside the barracks. In one of the rooms therein, he met Sherlyn Cadapan from Laguna. She told him
that she was a student of the University of the Philippines and was abducted in Hagonoy, Bulacan. She confided that she
had been subjected to severe torture and raped. She was crying and longing to go home and be with her parents. During
the day, her chains were removed and she was made to do the laundry.
After a week, Reynaldo was also brought to Camp Tecson. Two days from his arrival, two other captives, Karen
Empeo and Manuel Merino, arrived. Karen and Manuel were put in the room with Allan whose name they later came to
know as Donald Caigas, called master or commander by his men in the 24th Infantry Battalion. Raymond and Reynaldo
were put in the adjoining room. At times, Raymond and Reynaldo were threatened, and Reynaldo was beaten up. In the
daytime, their chains were removed, but were put back on at night. They were threatened that if they escaped, their
families would all be killed.
On or about October 6, 2006, Hilario arrived in Camp Tecson. He told the detainees that they should be thankful
they were still alive and should continue along their renewed life. Before the hearing of November 6 or 8, 2006,
respondents were brought to their parents to instruct them not to attend the hearing. However, their parents had
already left for Manila. Respondents were brought back to Camp Tecson. They stayed in that camp from September
2006 to November 2006, and Raymond was instructed to continue using the name Oscar and holding himself out as a
military trainee. He got acquainted with soldiers of the 24th Infantry Battalion whose names and descriptions he stated
in his affidavit.
On November 22, 2006, respondents, along with Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel, were transferred to a camp of the 24th
Infantry Battalion in Limay, Bataan. There were many huts in the camp. They stayed in that camp until May 8, 2007.
Some soldiers of the battalion stayed with them. While there, battalion soldiers whom Raymond knew as Mar and Billy
beat him up and hit him in the stomach with their guns. Sherlyn and Karen also suffered enormous torture in the camp.
They were all made to clean, cook, and help in raising livestock.
Raymond recalled that when Operation Lubog was launched, Caigas and some other soldiers brought him and
Manuel with them to take and kill all sympathizers of the NPA. They were brought to Barangay Bayan-bayanan, Bataan
where he witnessed the killing of an old man doing kaingin. The soldiers said he was killed because he had a son who
was a member of the NPA and he coddled NPA members in his house.Another time, in another Operation Lubog,
Raymond was brought to Barangay Orion in a house where NPA men stayed. When they arrived, only the old man of the
house who was sick was there. They spared him and killed only his son right before Raymonds eyes.
From Limay, Raymond, Reynaldo, Sherlyn, Karen, and Manuel were transferred to Zambales, in a safehouse near the
sea. Caigas and some of his men stayed with them. A retired army soldier was in charge of the house. Like in Limay, the
five detainees were made to do errands and chores. They stayed in Zambales from May 8 or 9, 2007 until June 2007.
In June 2007, Caigas brought the five back to the camp in Limay. Raymond, Reynaldo, and Manuel were tasked to bring
food to detainees brought to the camp. Raymond narrated what he witnessed and experienced in the camp, viz:
Isang gabi, sinabihan kami ni Donald (Caigas) na matulog na kami. Nakita ko si Donald na inaayos ang kanyang baril, at
nilagyan ng silenser. Sabi ni Donald na kung mayroon man kaming makita o marinig, walang nangyari. Kinaumagahan, nakita
naming ang bangkay ng isa sa mga bihag na dinala sa kampo. Mayroong binuhos sa kanyang katawan at itoy sinunog. Masansang
ang amoy.
Makaraan ang isang lingo, dalawang bangkay and ibinaba ng mga unipormadong sundalo mula sa 6 x 6 na trak at dinala sa
loob ng kampo. May naiwang mga bakas ng dugo habang hinihila nila ang mga bangkay. Naamoy ko iyon nang nililinis ang bakas.
Makalipas ang isa o dalawang lingo, may dinukot sila na dalawang Ita. Itinali sila sa labas ng kubo, piniringan, ikinadena at
labis na binugbog. Nakita kong nakatakas ang isa sa kanila at binaril siya ng sundalo ngunit hindi siya tinamaan. Iyong gabi nakita
kong pinatay nila iyong isang Ita malapit sa Post 3; sinilaban ang bangkay at ibinaon ito.
Pagkalipas ng halos 1 buwan, 2 pang bangkay ang dinala sa kampo. Ibinaba ang mga bangkay mula sa pick up trak, dinala
ang mga bangkay sa labas ng bakod. Kinaumagahan nakita kong mayroong sinilaban, at napakamasangsang ang amoy.
May nakilala rin akong 1 retiradong koronel at 1 kasama niya. Pinakain ko sila. Sabi nila sa akin na dinukot sila sa Bataan.
Iyong gabi, inilabas sila at hindi ko na sila nakita.
xxx xxx xxx
Ikinadena kami ng 3 araw. Sa ikatlong araw, nilabas ni Lat si Manuel dahil kakausapin daw siya ni Gen. Palparan.
Nakapiring si Manuel, wala siyang suot pang-itaas, pinosasan. Nilakasan ng mga sundalo ang tunog na galing sa istiryo ng sasakyan.
Di nagtagal, narinig ko ang hiyaw o ungol ni Manuel. Sumilip ako sa isang haligi ng kamalig at nakita kong sinisilaban si Manuel.
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya
kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.
Tinanggal ang aming kadena. Kinausap kami ni Donald. Tinanong kami kung ano ang sabi ni Manuel sa amin. Sabi ni
Donald huwag na raw naming hanapin ang dalawang babae at si Manuel, dahil magkakasama na yung tatlo. Sabi pa ni Donald na
kami ni Reynaldo ay magbagong buhay at ituloy namin ni Reynaldo ang trabaho. Sa gabi, hindi na kami kinakadena.
On or about June 13, 2007, Raymond and Reynaldo were brought to Pangasinan, ostensibly to raise poultry for
Donald (Caigas). Caigas told respondents to also farm his land, in exchange for which, he would take care of the food of
their family. They were also told that they could farm a small plot adjoining his land and sell their produce. They were no
longer put in chains and were instructed to use the names Rommel (for Raymond) and Rod (for Reynaldo) and represent
themselves as cousins from Rizal, Laguna.
Respondents started to plan their escape. They could see the highway from where they stayed. They helped
farm adjoining lands for which they were paid Php200.00 or Php400.00 and they saved their earnings. When they had
saved Php1,000.00 each, Raymond asked a neighbor how he could get a cellular phone as he wanted to exchange text
messages with a girl who lived nearby. A phone was pawned to him, but he kept it first and did not use it. They earned
some more until they had saved Php1,400.00 between them.
There were four houses in the compound. Raymond and Reynaldo were housed in one of them while their
guards lived in the other three. Caigas entrusted respondents to Nonong, the head of the guards. Respondents house
did not have electricity. They used a lamp. There was no television, but they had a radio. In the evening of August 13,
2007, Nonong and his cohorts had a drinking session. At about 1:00 a.m., Raymond turned up the volume of the radio.
When none of the guards awoke and took notice, Raymond and Reynaldo proceeded towards the highway, leaving
behind their sleeping guards and barking dogs. They boarded a bus bound for Manila and were thus freed from captivity.
Reynaldo also executed an affidavit affirming the contents of Raymonds affidavit insofar as they related to
matters they witnessed together. Reynaldo added that when they were taken from their house on February 14, 2006, he
saw the faces of his abductors before he was blindfolded with his shirt. He also named the soldiers he got acquainted
with in the 18 months he was detained. When Raymond attempted to escape from Fort Magsaysay, Reynaldo was
severely beaten up and told that they were indeed members of the NPA because Raymond escaped. With a .45 caliber
pistol, Reynaldo was hit on the back and punched in the face until he could no longer bear the pain.
At one point during their detention, when Raymond and Reynaldo were in Sapang, Reynaldo was separated
from Raymond and brought to Pinaud by Rizal Hilario. He was kept in the house of Kapitan, a friend of Hilario, in a
mountainous area. He was instructed to use the name Rodel and to represent himself as a military trainee from
Meycauayan, Bulacan. Sometimes, Hilario brought along Reynaldo in his trips. One time, he was brought to a market in
San Jose, del Monte, Bulacan and made to wait in the vehicle while Hilario was buying. He was also brought to Tondo,
Manila where Hilario delivered boxes of Alive in different houses. In these trips, Hilario drove a black and red vehicle.
Reynaldo was blindfolded while still in Bulacan, but allowed to remove the blindfold once outside the province. In one of
their trips, they passed by Fort Magsaysay and Camp Tecson where Reynaldo saw the sign board, Welcome to Camp
Tecson.
Dr. Benito Molino, M.D., corroborated the accounts of respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo. Dr. Molino
specialized in forensic medicine and was connected with the Medical Action Group, an organization handling cases of
human rights violations, particularly cases where torture was involved. He was requested by an NGO to conduct medical
examinations on the respondents after their escape. He first asked them about their ordeal, then proceeded with the
physical examination. His findings showed that the scars borne by respondents were consistent with their account of
physical injuries inflicted upon them. The examination was conducted on August 15, 2007, two days after respondents
escape, and the results thereof were reduced into writing. Dr. Molino took photographs of the scars. He testified that he
followed the Istanbul Protocol in conducting the examination.

ISSUE: Whether or not Writ of Amparo applies.

HELD:YES. First, the violation of the right to security as freedom from threat to respondents life, liberty and security.
While respondents were detained, they were threatened that if they escaped, their families, including them, would be
killed. In Raymonds narration, he was tortured and poured with gasoline after he was caught the first time he attempted
to escape from Fort Magsaysay. A call from a certain Mam, who wanted to see him before he was killed, spared him.
This time, respondents have finally escaped. The condition of the threat to be killed has come to pass. It should be
stressed that they are now free from captivity not because they were released by virtue of a lawful order or voluntarily
freed by their abductors. It ought to be recalled that towards the end of their ordeal, sometime in June 2007 when
respondents were detained in a camp in Limay, Bataan, respondents captors even told them that they were still deciding
whether they should be executed. Respondent Raymond Manalo attested in his affidavit, viz:
Kinaumagahan, naka-kadena pa kami. Tinanggal ang mga kadena mga 3 o 4 na araw pagkalipas. Sinabi sa amin na kaya
kami nakakadena ay dahil pinagdedesisyunan pa ng mga sundalo kung papatayin kami o hindi.

The possibility of respondents being executed stared them in the eye while they were in detention. With their
escape, this continuing threat to their life is apparent, moreso now that they have surfaced and implicated specific
officers in the military not only in their own abduction and torture, but also in those of other persons known to have
disappeared such as Sherlyn Cadapan, Karen Empeo, and Manuel Merino, among others.
Understandably, since their escape, respondents have been under concealment and protection by private citizens
because of the threat to their life, liberty and security. The threat vitiates their free will as they are forced to limit their
movements or activities. Precisely because respondents are being shielded from the perpetrators of their abduction,
they cannot be expected to show evidence of overt acts of threat such as face-to-face intimidation or written threats to
their life, liberty and security. Nonetheless, the circumstances of respondents abduction, detention, torture and escape
reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this
time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ
of amparo.
Next, the violation of the right to security as protection by the government. Apart from the failure of military
elements to provide protection to respondents by themselves perpetrating the abduction, detention, and torture, they
also miserably failed in conducting an effective investigation of respondents abduction as revealed by the testimony and
investigation report of petitioners own witness, Lt. Col. Ruben Jimenez, Provost Marshall of the 7th Infantry Division.
The one-day investigation conducted by Jimenez was very limited, superficial, and one-sided. He merely relied on the
Sworn Statements of the six implicated members of the CAFGU and civilians whom he met in the investigation for the
first time. He was present at the investigation when his subordinate Lingad was taking the sworn statements, but he did
not propound a single question to ascertain the veracity of their statements or their credibility. He did not call for other
witnesses to test the alibis given by the six implicated persons nor for the family or neighbors of the respondents.
In his affidavit, petitioner Secretary of National Defense attested that in a Memorandum Directive dated October 31,
2007, he issued a policy directive addressed to the AFP Chief of Staff, that the AFP should adopt rules of action in the
event the writ of amparo is issued by a competent court against any members of the AFP, which should essentially
include verification of the identity of the aggrieved party; recovery and preservation of relevant evidence; identification
of witnesses and securing statements from them; determination of the cause, manner, location and time of death or
disappearance; identification and apprehension of the person or persons involved in the death or disappearance; and
bringing of the suspected offenders before a competent court. Petitioner AFP Chief of Staff also submitted his own
affidavit attesting that he received the above directive of respondent Secretary of National Defense and that acting on
this directive, he immediately caused to be issued a directive to the units of the AFP for the purpose of establishing the
circumstances of the alleged disappearance and the recent reappearance of the respondents, and undertook to provide
results of the investigations to respondents. To this day, however, almost a year after the policy directive was issued by
petitioner Secretary of National Defense on October 31, 2007, respondents have not been furnished the results of the
investigation which they now seek through the instant petition for a writ of amparo.
Under these circumstances, there is substantial evidence to warrant the conclusion that there is a violation of
respondents right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government.
In sum, we conclude that respondents right to security as freedom from threat is violated by the apparent threat
to their life, liberty and security of person. Their right to security as a guarantee of protection by the government is
likewise violated by the ineffective investigation and protection on the part of the military.
Finally, we come to the reliefs granted by the Court of Appeals, which petitioners question.
G.R. No. 182161 December 3, 2009
Reverend Father ROBERT P. REYES vs. RAUL M. GONZALEZ et, al.

FACTS: Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007. In the morning
of November 30, 2007, petitioner together with fifty (50) others, were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest
proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors, composed of
Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz and Aristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or
not there was probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to
Rebellion.
On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG),
respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner
of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of
petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of national security and public safety.
On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for the crime of Rebellion under
Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information docketed as I.S. No. 2007-1045
before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City.
On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Release of the
Accused Fr. Reyes Upon Recognizance asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce any evidence indicating his specific
participation in the crime charged; and that under the Constitution, the determination of probable cause must be made
personally by a judge.
On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17
others for lack of probable cause. The trial court ratiocinated that the evidence submitted by the DOJ Panel of
Investigating Prosecutors failed to show that petitioner and the other accused-civilians conspired and confederated with
the accused-soldiers in taking arms against the government; that petitioner and other accused-civilians were arrested
because they ignored the call of the police despite the deadline given to them to come out from the 2nd Floor of the
Hotel and submit themselves to the police authorities; that mere presence at the scene of the crime and expressing
one’s sentiments on electoral and political reforms did not make them conspirators absent concrete evidence that the
accused-civilians knew beforehand the intent of the accused-soldiers to commit rebellion; and that the cooperation
which the law penalizes must be one that is knowingly and intentionally rendered.
On December 18, 2007, petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco L. Chavez wrote the DOJ Secretary requesting the
lifting of HDO No. 45 in view of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 07-3126.
On even date, Secretary Gonzales replied to petitioner’s letter stating that the DOJ could not act on petitioner’s request
until Atty. Chavez’s right to represent petitioner is settled in view of the fact that a certain Atty. J. V. Bautista
representing himself as counsel of petitioner had also written a letter to the DOJ.
On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal of the rebellion case
against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists; that on December 19, 2007, petitioner was held by BID officials at the NAIA
as his name is included in the Hold Departure List; that had it not been for the timely intervention of petitioner’s
counsel, petitioner would not have been able to take his scheduled flight to Hong Kong; that on December 26, 2007,
petitioner was able to fly back to the Philippines from Hong Kong but every time petitioner would present himself at the
NAIA for his flights abroad, he stands to be detained and interrogated by BID officers because of the continued inclusion
of his name in the Hold Departure List; and that the Secretary of Justice has not acted on his request for the lifting of
HDO No. 45. Petitioner further maintained that immediate recourse to the Supreme Court for the availment of the writ
is exigent as the continued restraint on petitioner’s right to travel is illegal.
On January 24, 2008, respondents represented by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed the Return of
the Writ raising the following affirmative defenses: 1) that the Secretary of Justice is authorized to issue Hold Departure
Orders under the DOJ Circulars No. 17, Series of 19982 and No. 18 Series of 20073 pursuant to his mandate under the
Administrative Code of 1987 as ahead of the principal law agency of the government; 2) that HDO No. 45 dated
December 1, 2007 was issued by the Sec. Gonzales in the course of the preliminary investigation of the case against
herein petitioner upon the request of the DILG; 3) that the lifting of HDO No. 45 is premature in view of public
respondent’s pending Motion for Reconsideration dated January 3, 2008 filed by the respondents of the Order dated
December 13, 2007 of the RTC dismissing Criminal Case No. 07-3126 for Rebellion for lack of probable cause; 4) that
petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies by filing a motion to lift HDO No. 45 before the DOJ; and 5) that the
constitutionality of Circulars No. 17 and 18 can not be attacked collaterally in an amparo proceeding.
During the hearing on January 25, 2008 at 10:00 a.m. at the Paras Hall of the Court of Appeals, counsels for both parties
appeared. Petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco Chavez manifested that petitioner is currently in Hong Kong; that every
time petitioner would leave and return to the country, the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and interrogate him
for several minutes because of the existing HDO; that the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO has no legal basis;
and that petitioner did not file a motion to lift the HDO before the RTC nor the DOJ because to do so would be
tantamount to recognizing the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue HDO.
For respondents’ part, the Office of the Solicitor-General (OSG) maintained that the Secretary of the DOJ’s
power to issue HDO springs from its mandate under the Administrative Code to investigate and prosecute offenders as
the principal law agency of the government; that in its ten-year existence, the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17
has not been challenged except now; and that on January 3, 2008, the DOJ Panel of Investigating Prosecutors had filed a
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of Dismissal of the trial court.
On February 1, 2008, petitioner filed a Manifestation attaching thereto a copy of the Order dated January 31,
2008 of the trial court denying respondent DOJ’s Motion for Reconsideration for utter lack of merit. The trial court also
observed that the said Motion should be dismissed outright for being filed out of time.
The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents violated petitioner’s constitutional
right to travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary has no power to issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and the
subject HDO No. 45 has no legal basis since Criminal Case No. 07-3126 has already been dismissed.
On February 4, 2008, the CA rendered the assailed Decision dismissing the petition and denying the privilege of
the writ of amparo.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated or threatened with violation by the issuance of the
subject HDO, which would entitle him to the privilege of the writ of amparo.

HELD: NO. Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

Section 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a
private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
The Court, in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,11 made a categorical pronouncement that the
Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of "extralegal killings" and "enforced
disappearances," or to threats thereof, thus:
x x x As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of "extralegal killings" and "enforced
disappearances," its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats thereof. "Extralegal
killings" are "killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings." On
the other hand, "enforced disappearances" are "attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or
abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or
indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person
concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of
law."
In Tapuz v. Del Rosario, the Court laid down the basic principle regarding the rule on the writ of amparo as
follows:
To start off with the basics, the writ of amparo was originally conceived as a response to the extraordinary rise
in the number of killings and enforced disappearances, and to the perceived lack of available and effective remedies to
address these extraordinary concerns. It is intended to address violations of or threats to the rights to life, liberty or
security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy
supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither
is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds. Consequently, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo – in
line with the extraordinary character of the writ and the reasonable certainty that its issuance demands – requires that
every petition for the issuance of the writ must be supported by justifying allegations of fact, to wit:
"(a) The personal circumstances of the petitioner;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of the respondent responsible for the threat, act or omission, or, if the name
is unknown or uncertain, the respondent may be described by an assumed appellation;
(c) The right to life, liberty and security of the aggrieved party violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or
omission of the respondent, and how such threat or violation is committed with the attendant circumstances detailed in
supporting affidavits;
(d) The investigation conducted, if any, specifying the names, personal circumstances, and addresses of the investigating
authority or individuals, as well as the manner and conduct of the investigation, together with any report;
(e) The actions and recourses taken by the petitioner to determine the fate or whereabouts of the aggrieved party and
the identity of the person responsible for the threat, act or omission; and
(f) The relief prayed for.
Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the DOJ may
deny his motion to lift the HDO.Petitioner’s apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any
clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The absence of an actual
controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on this occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17,
Series of 1998 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders); and Circular No. 18,
Series of 2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance and Implementation of Watchlist Orders and
for Other Purposes
G.R. No. 191805 November 15, 2011
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE WRIT OF AMPARO AND HABEAS DATA IN FAVOR OF NORIEL H. RODRIGUEZ
vs. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO et, al.

FACTS: Rodriguez claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its
members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances.
On 6 September 2009, at 5:00 p.m., Rodriguez had just reached Barangay Tapel, Cagayan onboard a tricycle
driven by Hermie Antonio Carlos (Carlos), when four men forcibly took him and forced him into a car. Inside the vehicle
were several men in civilian clothes, one of whom was holding a .45 caliber pistol. Subsequently, three more persons
arrived, and one of them carried a gun at his side. Two men boarded the car, while the others rode on the tricycle.
The men tied the hands of Rodriguez, ordered him to lie on his stomach, sat on his back and started punching him. The
car travelled towards the direction of Sta. Teresita-Mission and moved around the area until about 2:00 a.m. During the
drive, the men forced Rodriguez to confess to being a member of the New Peoples Army (NPA), but he remained silent.
The car then entered a place that appeared to be a military camp. There were soldiers all over the area, and there was a
banner with the word Bravo written on it. Rodriguez later on learned that the camp belonged to the 17th Infantry
Battalion of the Philippine Army.
Rodriguez was brought to a canteen, where six men confronted him, ordering him to confess to his membership
in the NPA. Due to his exhaustion, he unintentionally fell asleep. As a result, the men hit him on the head to wake him
up. After the interrogation, two of the men guarded him, but did not allow him to sleep.
In the morning of 7 September 2009, the men tied the hands of Rodriguez, blindfolded him and made him board
a vehicle. While they were in transit, the soldiers repeatedly hit him in the head and threatened to kill him. When the car
stopped after about ten minutes, the soldiers brought him to a room, removed his blindfold, and forced him to confess
to being a member of the NPA. During the interrogation, the soldiers repeatedly hit him on the head. Thereafter, he was
detained inside the room for the entire day. The soldiers tied his stomach to a papag, and gave him rice and viand.
Fearing that the food might be poisoned, he refused to eat anything. He slept on the papag while being tied to it at the
waist.
On 8 September 2009, the men forced Rodriguez into a vehicle, which brought them to Bugey and Mission.
While passing houses along the way, the men asked him if his contacts lived in those houses. When he failed to answer,
a soldier pointed a gun to his head and threatened to kill him and his family. Because he remained silent, the soldiers
beat him and tied him up. The vehicle returned to the military camp at past 1:00 p.m., where he was again subjected to
tactical interrogation about the location of an NPA camp and his alleged NPA comrades. He suffered incessant mauling
every time he failed to answer.
At dawn on 9 September 2009, soldiers armed with rifles took Rodriguez and made him their guide on their way
to an NPA camp in Birao. Accompanying them was a man named Harry, who, according to the soldiers, was an NPA
member who had surrendered to the military. Harry pointed to Rodriguez and called him a member of the NPA. He also
heard Harry tell the soldiers that the latter knew the area well and was acquainted with a man named Elvis. The soldiers
loaded Rodriguez into a military truck and drove to Tabbak, Bugey. While he was walking with the soldiers, he noticed a
soldier with the name tag Matutina, who appeared to be an official because the other soldiers addressed him as sir.[8]
Upon reaching Birao on foot, the soldiers looked for and was able to locate a certain Elvis and told him that Rodriguez
had identified his whereabouts location. The soldiers forced Rodriguez to convince Elvis to disclose the location of the
NPA camp. They brought the two to the mountains, where both were threatened with death. When the soldiers
punched Elvis, Rodriguez told them that he would reveal the location of the NPA camp if they let Elvis go home. They
finally released Elvis around 3:00 p.m. that day. The soldiers and Rodriguez spent the next three nights in the mountains.
On 12 September 2009, the soldiers again hit Rodriguez and forced him to identify the location of the NPA camp.
He was blindfolded and warned to get ready because they would beat him up again in the military camp. Upon arrival
therein, they brought him to the same room where he had first been detained, and two soldiers mauled him again. They
repeatedly punched and kicked him. In the afternoon, they let him rest and gave him an Alaxan tablet. Thereafter, he fell
asleep due to over-fatigue and extreme body pain. The soldiers, however, hit him again. After giving him a pen and a
piece of paper, they ordered him to write down his request for rice from the people. When he refused, the soldiers
maltreated him once more.
On 13 September 2009, the soldiers forced Rodriguez to sign documents declaring that he had surrendered in an
encounter in Cumao, and that the soldiers did not shoot him because he became a military asset in May. When he
refused to sign the document, he received another beating. Thus, he was compelled to sign, but did so using a different
signature to show that he was merely coerced.
The soldiers showed Rodriguez photographs of different persons and asked him if he knew the men appearing
therein. When he told them that he did not recognize the individuals on the photos, the soldiers instructed him to write
down the name of his school and organization, but he declined. The soldiers then wrote something on the paper, making
it appear that he was the one who had written it, and forced him to sign the document. The soldiers took photographs
of him while he was signing. Afterwards, the soldiers forced him down, held his hands, and sat on his feet. He did not
only receive another beating, but was also electrocuted. The torture lasted for about an hour.
At 11:00 p.m. on 15 September 2009, the soldiers brought Rodriguez to a military operation in the mountains, where he
saw Matutina again. They all spent the night there.
In the morning of 16 September 2009, the soldiers and Rodriguez started their descent. When they stopped, the
soldiers took his photograph and asked him to name the location of the NPA camp. Thereafter, they all returned to the
military camp. The soldiers asked him to take a bath and wear a white polo shirt handed to him. He was then brought to
the Enrile Medical Center, where Dr. Juliet Ramil (Dr. Ramil) examined him.[14] When the doctor asked him why he had
bruises and contusions, he lied and told her that he sustained them when he slipped, as he noticed a soldier observing
him. Dr. Ramils medical certificate indicated that he suffered from four hematomas in the epigastric area, chest and
sternum.
Back at the camp, the soldiers let Rodriguez eat with several military officials and took pictures of him while he
was eating with them. They also asked him to point to a map in front of him and again took his photograph. Later, they
told him that he would finally see his mother.
Rodriguez was brought to another military camp, where he was ordered to sign a piece of paper stating that he was a
surrenderee and was never beaten up. Scared and desperate to end his ordeal, he signed the paper and was warned not
to report anything to the media.
Around 6:00 a.m. on 17 September 2009, the soldiers instructed petitioner to take a bath. They gave him a pair
of jeans and perfume. While he was having breakfast, the two soldiers guarding him repeatedly reminded him not to
disclose to the media his experience in the camp and to say instead that he had surrendered to the military.
At 9:00 a.m. on the same day, the mother and the brother of Rodriguez arrived surrounded by several men. His mother,
Wilma Rodriguez (Wilma), talked to Lt. Col. Mina. Rodriguez heard one of the soldiers tell Wilma that he had
surrendered to the military and had long been its asset. His brother, Rodel Rodriguez (Rodel), informed him that the
men accompanying them were from the CHR, namely, Pasicolan, Cruz and Callagan. Upon seeing Rodriguez, Cruz
instructed him to lift up his shirt, and one of the CHR employees took photographs of his bruises.
A soldier tried to convince Wilma to let Rodriguez stay in the camp for another two weeks to supposedly
prevent the NPA from taking revenge on him. Respondent Calog also approached Rodriguez and Rodel and asked them
to become military assets. Rodel refused and insisted that they take Rodriguez home to Manila. Again, the soldiers
reminded them to refrain from facing the media. The soldiers also told them that the latter will be taken to the
Tuguegarao Airport and guarded until they reached home.
Rodriguez and his family missed their flight. Subsequently, the soldiers accompanied them to the CHR office, where
Rodriguez was made to sign an affidavit stating that he was neither abducted nor tortured. Afraid and desperate to
return home, he was forced to sign the document. Cruz advised him not to file a case against his abductors because they
had already freed him. The CHR personnel then led him and his family to the CHR Toyota Tamaraw FX service vehicle. He
noticed that a vehicle with soldiers on board followed them.
The Tamaraw FX pulled over and respondent 1st Lt. Matutina boarded the vehicle. Upon reaching a mall in
Isabela, Rodriguez, his family, Callagan, 1st Lt. Matutina and two other soldiers transferred to an orange Toyota Revo
with plate number WTG 579. Upon reaching the boundary of Nueva Ecija and Nueva Viscaya, 1st Lt. Matutina alighted
and called Rodriguez to a diner. A certain Alan approached Rodriguez and handed him a cellphone with a SIM card. The
latter and his family then left and resumed their journey back home.
Rodriguez reached his house in Sta. Ana, Manila at 3:00 a.m. on 18 September 2010. Callagan and two soldiers
went inside the house, and took photographs and a video footage thereof. The soldiers explained that the photos and
videos would serve as evidence of the fact that Rodriguez and his family were able to arrive home safely. Despite
Rodriguezs efforts to confront the soldiers about their acts, they still continued and only left thirty minutes later.
 On 19 September 2009, Dr. Reginaldo Pamugas, a physician trained by the International Committee on Torture
and Rehabilitation, examined Rodriguez and issued a Medical Certificate stating that the latter had been a victim of
torture.
Around 7:00 a.m. on 3 November 2010, Rodriguez and his girlfriend, Aileen Hazel Robles, noticed that several
suspicious-looking men followed them at the Metro Rail Transit (MRT), in the streets and on a jeepney.
On 7 December 2009, Rodriguez filed before this Court a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the
Writ of Habeas Data with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal
Properties dated 2 December 2009. The petition was filed against former President Arroyo, Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Versoza,
Lt. Gen. Bangit, Major General (Maj. Gen.) Nestor Z. Ochoa, P/CSupt. Tolentino, P/SSupt. Santos, Col. De Vera, 1st Lt.
Matutina, Calog, George Palacpac (Palacpac), Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan. The petition prayed for the following reliefs:
a. The issuance of the writ of amparo ordering respondents to desist from violating Rodriguezs right to
life, liberty and security.
b. The issuance of an order to enjoin respondents from doing harm to or approaching Rodriguez, his
family and his witnesses.
c. Allowing the inspection of the detention areas of the Headquarters of Bravo Co., 5th Infantry
Division, Maguing, Gonzaga, Cagayan and another place near where Rodriguez was brought.
d. Ordering respondents to produce documents submitted to them regarding any report on Rodriguez,
including operation reports and provost marshall reports of the 5th Infantry Division, the Special Operations Group of
the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), prior to, on and subsequent to 6 September 2009.
e. Ordering records pertinent or in any way connected to Rodriguez, which are in the custody of
respondents, to be expunged, disabused, and forever barred from being used.

On 15 December 2009, we granted the respective writs after finding that the petition sufficiently alleged that
Rodriguez had been abducted, tortured and later released by members of the 17th Infantry Battalion of the Philippine
Army. We likewise ordered respondents therein to file a verified return on the writs on or before 22 December 2009 and
to comment on the petition on or before 4 January 2010.[29] Finally, we directed the Court of Appeals to hear the
petition on 4 January 2010 and decide on the case within 10 days after its submission for decision.
During the initial hearing on 4 January 2010, the Court of Appeals required the parties to submit affidavits and other
pieces of evidence at the next scheduled hearing on 27 January 2010.
On 8 January 2010, respondents therein, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed their Return of
the Writ, which was likewise considered as their comment on the petition.[32] In their Return, respondents therein
alleged that Rodriguez had surrendered to the military on 28 May 2009 after he had been put under surveillance and
identified as Ka Pepito by former rebels.[33] According to his military handlers, Corporal (Cpl.) Rodel
B. Cabaccan and Cpl. Julius P. Navarro, Rodriguez was a former member of the NPA operating in Cagayan
Valley.[34] Wanting to bolt from the NPA, he told Cpl. Cabaccan and Cpl. Navarro that he would help the military in
exchange for his protection.
Upon his voluntary surrender on 28 May 2009, Rodriguez was made to sign an Oath of Loyalty and an Agents
Agreement/Contract, showing his willingness to return to society and become a military asset.[36] Since then, he acted
as a double agent, returning to the NPA to gather information.[37] However, he feared that his NPA comrades were
beginning to suspect him of being an infiltrator.[38] Thus, with his knowledge and consent, the soldiers planned to stage
a sham abduction to erase any suspicion about him being a double agent.[39] Hence, the abduction subject of the
instant petition was conducted.
Meanwhile, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan filed a Consolidated Return of the Writ dated 15 January 2010,alleging
that they had exercised extraordinary diligence in locating Rodriguez, facilitating his safe turnover to his family and
securing their journey back home to Manila. More specifically, they alleged that, on 16 September 2009, after Wilma
sought their assistance in ascertaining the whereabouts of her son, Cruz made phone calls to the military and law
enforcement agencies to determine his location.[42] Cruz was able to speak with Lt. Col. Mina, who confirmed that
Rodriguez was in their custody.[43] This information was transmitted to CHR Regional Director Atty. Jimmy P. Baliga. He,
in turn, ordered Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan to accompany Wilma to the 17th Infantry Division.
When the CHR officers, along with Wilma and Rodel, arrived at the 17th Infantry Battalion at Masin, Alcala,
Cagayan, Brigade Commander Col. de Vera and Battalion Commander Lt. Col. Mina alleged that Rodriguez had become
one of their assets, as evidenced by the Summary on the Surrender of Noriel Rodriguez and the latters Contract as
Agent. The CHR officers observed his casual and cordial demeanor with the soldiers.[46] In any case, Cruz asked him to
raise his shirt to see if he had been subjected to any maltreatment. Cruz and Pasicolan did not see any traces of torture.
Thereafter, Rodriguez was released to his family, and they were made to sign a certification to this effect. During the
signing of the document, herein CHR officers did not witness any threat, intimidation or force employed against
Rodriguez or his family.
During their journey back to the home of Rodriguez, the CHR officers observed that he was very much at ease
with his military escorts, especially with 1st Lt. Matutina.[48] Neither was there any force or intimidation when the
soldiers took pictures of his house, as the taking of photographs was performed with Wilmas consent.
During the hearing on 27 January 2010, the parties agreed to file additional affidavits and position papers and to have
the case considered submitted for decision after the filing of these pleadings.

ISSUES: 1. Whether the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases.
2. Whether the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or threatened by respondents.

HELD: 1. YES. To attribute responsibility or accountability to former President Arroyo, Rodriguez contends that the
doctrine of command responsibility may be applied. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo, command responsibility
pertains to the responsibility of commanders for crimes committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or
other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic conflict. Although originally used for ascertaining
criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has also found application in civil cases for human rights
abuses. the United States, for example, command responsibility was used in Ford v. Garcia and Romagoza v. Garcia civil
actions filed under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act. This development in the use of
command responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has been liberally extended even
to cases not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may likewise find application in
proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo. As we held in Rubrico:
It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders
liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the
theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary
international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution.
If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be only to
determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the disappearance and
harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that may be appropriate under the
premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier, however, the determination should not
be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative
disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative issuances, if there be any.
Precisely in the case at bar, the doctrine of command responsibility may be used to determine whether
respondents are accountable for and have the duty to address the abduction of Rodriguez in order to enable the courts
to devise remedial measures to protect his rights. Clearly, nothing precludes this Court from applying the doctrine of
command responsibility in amparo proceedings to ascertain responsibility and accountability in extrajudicial killings and
enforced disappearances.
As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors have been
established by substantial evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced
disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited
involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of responsibility
defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance. Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative
liabilities, the doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and
accountability within these foregoing definitions.

2. YES. The failure to conduct a fair and effect investigation amounted to a violation of or threat to Rodriguezs
rights to life, liberty and security.
 The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty and
security may be caused by either an act or an omission of a public official. Moreover, in the context of amparo
proceedings, responsibility may refer to the participation of the respondents, by action or omission, in enforced
disappearance. Accountability, on the other hand, may attach to respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating
to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge,
the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the enforced disappearance
In this regard, we emphasize our ruling in Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo that the right to security of a
person includes the positive obligation of the government to ensure the observance of the duty to investigate, viz:
“Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one's rights by the government. In the
context of the writ of Amparo, this right is built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III,
Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily
and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third sense is a corollary of
the policy that the State guarantees full respect for human rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As
the government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and
security of person is rendered ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they
are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to
extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their families,
and bringing offenders to the bar of justice. The Inter-American Court of Human Rights stressed the importance of
investigation in the Velasquez Rodriguez Case, viz:
"(The duty to investigate) must be undertaken in a serious manner and not as a mere formality preordained to
be ineffective. An investigation must have an objective and be assumed by the State as its own legal duty, not as a step
taken by private interests that depends upon the initiative of the victim or his family or upon their offer of proof,
without an effective search for the truth by the government.”
RIGHT TO PRIVACY
G.R. No. 193636 JULY 24, 2012
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA vs. P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN

FACTS: On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275),
“Creating an Independent Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Country.”7 The body,
which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa Commission,8 was formed to investigate the existence of private army
groups (PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 elections and dismantling them
permanently in the future.9 Upon the conclusion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission released and submitted
to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled “A Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission
Against Private Armies’ Report to the President”
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos Norte) conducted a series of
surveillance operations against her and her aides,11 and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG. Purportedly
without the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information gathered on her to the Zeñarosa
Commission, thereby causing her inclusion in the Report’s enumeration of individuals maintaining PAGs.14 More
specifically, she pointed out the following items reflected therein:
(a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding the status of PAGs in the Philippines.
(b) The Report stated that “x x x the PNP organized one dedicated Special Task Group (STG) for each private armed
group (PAG) to monitor and counteract their activities.”
(c) Attached as Appendix “F” of the Report is a tabulation generated by the PNP and captioned as “Status of PAGs
Monitoring by STGs as of April 19, 2010,” which classifies PAGs in the country according to region, indicates their
identity, and lists the prominent personalities with whom these groups are associated. The first entry in the table names
a PAG, known as the Gamboa Group, linked to herein petitioner Gamboa.
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the portion of the Report naming
Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be maintaining a PAG.21 Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG
also appeared on print media.22 Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who maintains a PAG on the basis of the
unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zeñarosa Commission.23 As a result,
she claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of personalities maintaining a PAG as published
in the Report also made her, as well as her supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to harassment
and police surveillance operations.

ISSUE: Whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of habeas data.

HELD:NO. Clearly, the right to privacy is considered a fundamental right that must be protected from intrusion or
constraint. However, in Standard Chartered Bank v. Senate Committee on Banks,47 this Court underscored that the right
to privacy is not absolute, viz:
“With respect to the right of privacy which petitioners claim respondent has violated, suffice it to state that
privacy is not an absolute right. While it is true that Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution, guarantees respect for the
rights of persons affected by the legislative investigation, not every invocation of the right to privacy should be allowed
to thwart a legitimate congressional inquiry. In Sabio v. Gordon, we have held that the right of the people to access
information on matters of public concern generally prevails over the right to privacy of ordinary financial transactions. In
that case, we declared that the right to privacy isnot absolute where there is an overriding compelling state interest.
Employing the rational basis relationship test, as laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, there is no infringement of the
individual’s right to privacy as the requirement to disclosure information is for a valid purpose, in this case, to ensure
that the government agencies involved in regulating banking transactions adequately protect the public who invest in
foreign securities. Suffice it to state that this purpose constitutes a reason compelling enough to proceed with the
assailed legislative investigation.”
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state objective, the courts are required to
weigh both notions. In these cases, although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may nevertheless
succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed legitimate and compelling.
PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATIONS
G.R. No. 121087 August 26, 1999
FELIPE NAVARRO vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: That on or about the 4th day of February, 1990, in the nighttime, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a member of the Lucena
Integrated National Police, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault one Ike
Lingan inside the Lucena police headquarters, where authorities are supposed to be engaged in the discharge of their
duties, by boxing the said Ike Lingan in the head with the butt of a gun and thereafter when the said victim fell, by
banging his head against the concrete pavement, as a consequence of which said Ike Lingan suffered cerebral
concussion and shock which directly caused his death.
The evidence shows that, at around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique Ike
Lingan, who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the
Entertainment City following reports that it was showing nude dancers. After the three had seated themselves at a table
and ordered beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act. As she removed her
brassieres, Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture.
At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and
demanded to know why he took a picture.Jalbuena replied: Wala kang pakialam, because this is my job.[4] Sioco pushed
Jalbuena towards the table as he warned the latter that he would kill him.When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to
pull out his gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his companions.
Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter. Three of the policemen on duty, including
petitioner Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police station, and they asked Jalbuena and his companions to join
them. Jalbuena declined and went to the desk officer, Sgt. Aonuevo, to report the incident. In a while, Liquin and Sioco
arrived on a motorcycle.Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner for around
fifteen minutes.Afterwards, petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, said to him: Putang ina,
kinakalaban mo si Kabo Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba kilala?[9] Petitioner Navarro then pulled out his
firearm and cocked it, and, pressing it on the face of Jalbuena, said, Ano, uutasin na kita?
At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner Navarro: Huwag namang ganyan, pumarito kami para magpa-
blotter, I am here to mediate. Petitioner Navarro replied: Walang press, press, mag-sampu pa kayo. He then turned to
Sgt. Aonuevo and told him to make of record the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan. This angered Lingan, who said: O, di
ilagay mo diyan. Petitioner Navarro retorted: Talagang ilalagay ko. The two then had a heated exchange.Finally, Lingan
said: Masyado kang abusado, alisin mo yang baril mo at magsuntukan na lang tayo. Petitioner Navarro replied: Ah,
ganoon? As Lingan was about to turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of his pistol above the left
eyebrow. Lingan fell on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist
blow on the forehead which floored him.
Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: Kita mo yan ha, buhay kang testigo, si Ike Lingan ang naghamon.
He said to Sgt. Aonuevo: Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter, sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin, na si Ike Lingan ang
naghamon. He then poked his gun at the right temple of Jalbuena and made him sign his name on the blotter. Jalbuena
could not affix his signature. His right hand was trembling and he simply wrote his name in print.
Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro to his office, while a policeman took Lingan to the
Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station manager of DWTI, Boy Casaada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had been
taken to the hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died from his injuries.
Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the
deceased.[25] The following is an excerpt from the tape recording:
Lingan: Pare, you are abusing yourself.
Navarro: Who is that abusing?
Lingan: Im here to mediate. Do not include me in the problem. Im out of the problem.
Navarro: Wala sa akin yan. Ang kaso lang . . . .
Lingan: Kalaban mo ang media, pare. Ako at si Stanley, dalawa kami. Okay. Do not fight with me. I just came here to
ayusin things. Do not say bad things against me. Im the number one loko sa media. Im the best media man. . . .
Navarro: Huwag tayong mag-lokohan sa ganyan! Huwag na tayong mag-takotan! Huwag mong sabihing loko ka!
Lingan: Im brave also.
Navarro: Ay lalo na ako. Tahimik lang naman ako. Wala ka namang masasabi sa akin dahil nag-tatrabaho lang ako ng
ayon sa serbisyo ko.
Lingan: You are challenging me and him. . . .
Navarro: Ay walastik ka naman Ike! Pag may problema ka dito sinasabihan kita na may balita tayong maganda.
Pambihira ka Ike. Huwag mong sabihin na . . . Parang minomonopoly mo eh.
Lingan: Pati ako kalaban ninyo.
Navarro: Talagang kalaban namin ang press. Lahat, hindi lang ikaw!
Lingan: You are wrong. Bakit kalaban nyo ang press?
Navarro: Pulis ito! Aba!
Lingan: Alisin mo ang baril mo! Alisin mo ang baril mo! Suntukan tayo, sige.
Navarro: Mayabang ka ah!
(Sounds of a scuffle)
Navarro: Hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan, testigo kayo. Alisin ko daw ang baril ko.
Hinamon ako nyan. Pare, ilagay mo diyan, hinamon ako sa harap ni Stanley. Testigo kayo, hinamon ako. Pulis tayo eh.
Puta, buti nga, suntok lang ang inabot nyan. Sa harap ni Alex, ni Joe, ni Stanley, hinamon ako. Pare, hinamon ako, kinig
nyo ha. Hinamon ako nyan. Sige, dalhin nyo sa hospital yan.
Petitioner Felipe Navarro claims that it was the deceased who tried to hit him twice, but he (petitioner) was able
to duck both times, and that Lingan was so drunk he fell on the floor twice, each time hitting his head on the concrete.

ISSUE: Whether or not the tape is admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200.

HELD: YES. SECTION 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly
overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone
or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:
It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next
preceding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies
thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the
manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the contents
thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other
person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial
of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.

SEC. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of the
same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation of the
preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.

Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. Since the
exchange between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.
Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a
witness (1) that he personally recorded the conversation; (2) that the tape played in court was the one he recorded; and
(3) that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong.In the instant case, Jalbuena testified
that he personally made the voice recording; that the tape played in court was the one he recorded;[32] and that the
speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of
the tape presented by the prosecution.
Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated exchange between
petitioner Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that
some form of violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995
SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging
that the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and
humiliated her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality,"
contrary to morals, good customs and public policy."In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of
the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in
addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil
case was based was culled from a tape recording of the confrontation made by petitioner.
The transcript reads as follows:
Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am.
Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang
gagawin ko sa 'yo.
CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon.
ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)
CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon —
ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang 10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo,
nag-aaply ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo, kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.
CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.
ESG — Bastos ka, nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel. Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok
dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).
CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.
ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.
ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam
kong hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon.
ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.
CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo
ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.
CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —
ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.
CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.
ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang
mga magulang ko.
ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.
CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.
ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.
CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.
ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan mo ako.
CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?
ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na. Magsumbong ka.
As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was
illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act 4200,
entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and other purposes."
An information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988. Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner
filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of
R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged
do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that 2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a
communication by a person other than a participant to the communication

ISSUE: Whether provision of Republic Act 4200 does not apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the
parties to the conversation.

HELD: NO(It Applies) The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized
by all the parties to any private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The
law makes no distinction as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or
different from those involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to
make such recording is underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals
correctly concluded, "even a (person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another
without the knowledge of the latter (will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.
G.R. No. 107383 February 20, 1996
CECILIA ZULUETA vs. COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner
entered the clinic of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private
respondents secretary, forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husbands clinic and took 157 documents
consisting of private correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks,
diaries, Dr. Martins passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for
legal separation and for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.
Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against
petitioner. The case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for
private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in
paragraph 3 of plaintiffs Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress and ordering Cecilia
Zulueta and any person acting in her behalf to immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him
P5,000.00, as nominal damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorneys fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The
writ of preliminary injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and
representatives were enjoined from using or submitting/admitting as evidence the documents and papers in question.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not the 157 documents are admissible as evidence.

HELD:NO. Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction
declaring the privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable3 is no less applicable simply because it is
the wife (who thinks herself aggrieved by her husbands infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional
provision is to be enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a lawful order [from a]
court or when public safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law.4 Any violation of this provision renders
the evidence obtained inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding.5
The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the
other and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not
shed his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or
to her.
The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor
wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists.6
Neither may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from
the other during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another
is a compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity
that each owes to the other.
G.R. No. 113271 October 16, 1997
WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION

FACTS: Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation (hereafter WATEROUS) on 15 August
1988.On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum from WATEROUS Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co
warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latters accounts because the same was a
prohibited practice. On the same date, Co issued another memorandum to Catolico warning her not to negotiate with
suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department, as this would impair the companys control of
purchases and, besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers.As regards the first memorandum,
Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act was due to negligence, since fellow employee Irene
Soliven obtained the medicines in bad faith and through misrepresentation when she claimed that she was given a
charge slip by the Admitting Dept. Catolico then asked the company to look into the fraudulent activities of Soliven.In a
memorandum dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro warned Catolico against the rush
delivery of medicines without the proper documents.
On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity
involving Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (hereafter YSP), which he described as follows:
“A case in point is medicine purchased under our Purchase Order (P.O.) No. 19045 with YSP Sales Invoice No. 266
representing purchase of ten (10) bottles of Voren tablets at P384.00 per unit. Previous P.O.s issued to YSP, Inc. showed that the
price per bottle is P320.00 while P.O. No. 19045 is priced at P384.00 or an over price of P64.00 per bottle (or total of P640.00).
WDRC paid the amount of P3,840.00 thru MBTC Check No. 222832 dated December 15, 1988. Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to
determine the discrepancy and it was found that the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms.
Estelita Reyes) confirmed that the difference represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice no.
266 as per their check voucher no. 629552 (shown to the undersigned), which was paid to Ms. Catolico through China Bank check
no. 892068 dated November 9, 1989.”
The undersigned talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check but she denied having received it and that she is
unaware of the over price. However, upon conversation with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk, she confirmed
that the check amounting to P640.00 was actually received by Ms. Catolico. As a matter of fact, Ms. Catolico even asked
Ms. Saldana if she opened the envelope containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered her talagang ganyan,
bukasCatolico asked for additional time to give her explanation, and she was granted a 48-hour extension from 1 to 3
February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7 March 1990, she
would be placed on preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company. A case was then filed in a Labor
arbiter her supencion, who ruled on respondents favor.
In a decision of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that
petitioners were not able to prove a just cause for Catolicos dismissal from her employment. It found that petitioners
evidence consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw
when the latter opened the envelope. But, it declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections
2 and 3(1 and 2) of Article III of the Constitution

ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence is admissible for violation of respondent’s rights against unreasonable search and
seizure.

HELD:NO In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed from the
service in the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel.
No hearing was ever conducted after the issues were joined through said letters. The Supervisors memorandum spoke
of evidences [sic] in [WATEROUS] possession, which were not, however, submitted. What the evidences [sic] other than
the sales invoice and the check were, only the Supervisor knew.
Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just and valid
cause for dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is
unjustified. Here, WATEROUS proved unequal to the task. As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC
anchored its decision, we find no reason to revise the doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti that the Bill of Rights does
not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel
for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits,
such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil liabilities.
FACTS: Sometime in May 1998, petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto dated
April 29, 1998, to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts
maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager. The accounts
to be inspected are Account Nos. 011-37270, 240-020718, 245-30317-3 and 245-30318-1, involved in a case pending
with the Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et. al.
Clearly, the specific provision of R.A. 6770, a later legislation, modifies the law on the Secrecy of Bank Deposits
(R.A. 1405) and places the office of the Ombudsman in the same footing as the courts of law in this regard.
The basis of the Ombudsman in ordering an in camera inspection of the accounts is a trail of managers checks purchased
by one George Trivinio, a respondent in OMB-0-97-0411, pending with the office of the Ombudsman.
It would appear that Mr. George Trivinio, purchased fifty one (51) Managers Checks (MCs) for a total amount of P272.1
Million at Traders Royal Bank, United Nations Avenue branch, on May 2 and 3, 1995. Out of the 51 MCs, eleven (11) MCs
in the amount of P70.6 million, were deposited and credited to an account maintained at the Union Bank, Julia Vargas
Branch.
On May 26, 1998, the FFIB panel met in conference with petitioner Lourdes T. Marquez and Atty. Fe B. Macalino
at the banks main office, Ayala Avenue, Makati City. The meeting was for the purpose of allowing petitioner and Atty.
Macalino to view the checks furnished by Traders Royal Bank. After convincing themselves of the veracity of the checks,
Atty. Macalino advised Ms. Marquez to comply with the order of the Ombudsman. Petitioner agreed to an in camera
inspection set on June 3, 1998. However, on June 4, 1998, petitioner wrote the Ombudsman explaining to him that the
accounts in question cannot readily be identified and asked for time to respond to the order. The reason forwarded by
petitioner was that despite diligent efforts and from the account numbers presented, we can not identify these accounts
since the checks are issued in cash or bearer. We surmised that these accounts have long been dormant, hence are not
covered by the new account number generated by the Union Bank system. We therefore have to verify from the
Interbank records archives for the whereabouts of these accounts.[
Thus, on June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued an order directing petitioner to produce the bank documents
relative to the accounts in issue. The order states:
“Viewed from the foregoing, your persistent refusal to comply with Ombudsmans order is unjustified, and is
merely intended to delay the investigation of the case. Your act constitutes disobedience of or resistance to a lawful
order issued by this office and is punishable as Indirect Contempt under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6770. The same may also
constitute obstruction in the lawful exercise of the functions of the Ombudsman which is punishable under Section 36 of
R.A. 6770”

ISSUE: Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as
an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R. A. No. 1405).

HELD: NO. In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we held that Section 2 of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, as amended,
declares bank deposits to be absolutely confidential except:
(1) In an examination made in the course of a special or general examination of a bank that is specifically authorized by the Monetary Board after
being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is
necessary to look into the deposit to establish such fraud or irregularity,(2) In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to
conduct its regular audit provided that the examination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the
bank,(3) Upon written permission of the depositor,(4) In cases of impeachment,(5) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or
dereliction of duty of public officials, or(6) In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation
In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is existing is
an investigation by the office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the Office of the Ombudsman would wish to do is to
fish for additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no
pending case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.
Zones of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "[e]very person shall
respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as
actionable torts several acts for meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or
employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and
recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime of the
violation of secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of
privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual
Property Code.
G.R. No. 127685 July 23, 1998
BLAS F. OPLE vs. RUBEN D. TORRES et, al.

FACTS: The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the
right to privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right
most valued by civilized men."[1] Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled
"Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz:
one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's
protected zone of privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger
barriers against further erosion. A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22,
1997 and January 23, 1997. On January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then
Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency
Coordinating Committee, are charged with the implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary
restraining order enjoining its implementation.
Petitioner contends:
"A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF
A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE
POWERS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.
B. THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL
USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.
C. THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS
ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION."
Respondents counter-argue:
A. THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW;
B. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE
LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;
C. THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY BE SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE
CONCERNED AGENCIES;
D. A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY

ISSUE: Whether or not A.O No. 308 violates the constitutional right to privacy,thus unconstitutional.

HELD:YES. In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The
right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good. It merely
requires that the law be narrowly focused[85] and a compelling interest justify such intrusions. Intrusions into the right must be
accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or
order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court to strict scrutiny. The reason for this stance was laid down in
Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:
"The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into the personal life
of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the
individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector,
which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector--
protection, in other words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual-- has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All
the forces of a technological age-- industrialization, urbanization, and organization-- operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate intrusion
into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference between a democratic and a
totalitarian society”
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threats emanate
from various sources-- governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc.[88] In the case at bar, the threat
comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their
privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the
record-keeping power of the computer, only the indifferent will fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the
government the power to compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the
well-worded warning of Kalvin, Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable
record of his past and his limitations. In a way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost
its benign capacity to forget." Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in labelling the
right to privacy as a fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right to privacy was not engraved in our
Constitution for flattery.