PPT 8: LIMITATIONS/ RESTRICTIONS OF GOVERNMENT LAWYERS IN THE PRACTICE OF

LAW

 RESTRICTIONS:

1. A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

INTERVENE - an act of a person who has the power to influence the proceedings.

The respondent must have accepted engagement or employment in a matter which, by

virtue of his public office, he had previously exercised power to influence the outcome of
the proceedings

2. General Rule: Lawyers in government service cannot handle private cases for they are
expected to devote themselves full-time to the work of their respective offices.

Exception: Code of Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713 Rule X)
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that such practice will not conflict or tend
to conflict with their official functions;

These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation,
retirement, or separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b) (2)
above, but the professional concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any
matter before the office he used to be with, in which case the one-year prohibition shall
likewise apply.

Section 5, Canon 3 of the Code of Conduct for Court Personnel

Outside employment may be allowed by the head of office provided it complies with all of
the following requirements:

(a) The outside employment is not with a person or entity that practices law before the
courts or conducts business with the Judiciary;
(b) The outside employment can be performed outside of normal working hours and is not
incompatible with the performance of the court personnel’s duties and responsibilities;
(c) That outside employment does not require the practice of law; Provided, however, that
court personnel may render services as professor, lecturer, or resource person in law
schools, review or continuing education centers or similar institutions;
(d) The outside employment does not require or induce the court personnel to disclose
confidential information acquired while performing officials duties;
(e) The outside employment shall not be with the legislative or executive branch of
government, unless specifically authorized by the Supreme Court.

3. A lawyer shall not promote private interests; advance private interests; or allow private
interest to interfere with his or her public duties.

4. “Revolving door” law practice - The process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter
government service from private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice,
where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered in government service.
These concerns were classified as adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest
conflicts.

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 5. Disqualification of former government attorney -“substantial responsibility”

With these competing policies in mind, the Court turns to the requirements of Canon 9
which prohibit a former government attorney from accepting private employment in a
matter in which he had "substantial responsibility" while working for the government.
According to the American Bar Association, a "substantial responsibility" is "a responsibility
requiring the official to become personally involved to an important, material degree, in the
investigative or deliberative processes regarding the transactions or facts in question

 APPLICATION OF C.P.R. ON A GOVERNMENT LAWYER

General rule: that a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of
the bar for infractions he committed as a government official,

Exception: A lawyer may be disciplined as a lawyer if his misconduct constitutes a violation of his
oath a member of the legal profession.

The Code of Professional Responsibility does not cease to apply to a lawyer simply because
he has joined the government service. In fact, by the express provision of Canon 6 thereof,
the rules governing the conduct of lawyers“shall apply to lawyers in government service in
the discharge of their official tasks.” Thus, where a lawyer’s misconduct as a government
official is of such nature as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or to show moral
delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such grounds.

 VARIOUS WAYS A GOVERNMENT LAWYER LEAVES GOVERNMENT SERVICE

1. Retirement
2. Resignation
3. Expiration of the term of office
4. Dismissal
5. Abandonment

 TWO THEORIES ON THE DISQUALIFICATION OF FORMER GOVERNMENT LAWYERS IN

REPRESENTING A CLIENT
1. ADVERSE-INTEREST CONFLICT - exist where the matter in which the former government
lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the
lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and
former are adverse.”

In the “adverse-interest conflict” a former government lawyer is enjoined from representing

a client in private practice when the matter is substantially related to a matter that the
lawyer dealt with while employed by the government and if the interests of the current and
former clients are adverse.

It must be observed that the “adverse-interest conflict” applies to all lawyers in that they are
generally disqualified from accepting employment in a subsequent representation if the
interests of the former client and the present client are adverse and the matters involved
are the same or substantially related.

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2. CONGRUENT-INTEREST REPRESENTATION CONFLICTS - the disqualification does not really
involve a conflict at all, because it prohibits the lawyer from representing a private practice
client even if the interests of the former government client and the new client are entirely
parallel. The “congruent-interest representation conflict”, unlike the “adverse-interest
conflict”, is unique to former government lawyers.

 GROUNDS FOR DISQUALIFICATION ARISING FROM COI

The fatal taint which would require disqualification arises in two types of cases:

(1) where an attorney's conflict of interests in violation of [Canons] undermines the court's
confidence in the vigor of the attorney's representation of his client, or more commonly

(2) where the attorney is at least potentially in a position to use privileged information concerning
the other side through prior representation xxx thus giving his present client an unfair advantage.

PPT 9: NOTARIAL LAW

 ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS TO BECOME A NOTARY PUBLIC

To be eligible for commissioning as notary public, the petitioner:

(1) must be a citizen of the Philippines;

(2) must be over twenty-one (21) years of age;
(3) must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one (1) year and maintains a regular place
of work or business in the city or province where the commission is to be issued;

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 (4) must be a member of the Philippine Bar in good standing with clearances from the Office of
the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and
(5) must not have been convicted in the first instance of any crime involving moral turpitude.

Regular Place of Work or Business - The term "regular place of work or business" refers to a
stationary office in the city or province wherein the notary public renders legal and notarial services.

NOTE: Stationary office is required

 SEAL OF NOTARIAL OFFICE

(a) Every person commissioned as notary public shall have a seal of office, to be procured at his
own expense, which shall not be possessed or owned by any other person. It shall be of metal,
circular in shape, two inches in diameter, and shall have the name of the city or province and
the word "Philippines" and his own name on the margin and the roll of attorney's number on
the face thereof, with the words "notary public" across the center. A mark, image or impression
of such seal shall be made directly on the paper or parchment on which the writing appears.
(b) The official seal shall be affixed only at the time the notarial act is performed and shall be clearly
impressed by the notary public on every page of the instrument or document notarized.
(c) When not in use, the official seal shall be kept safe and secure and shall be accessible only to the
notary public or the person duly authorized by him.
(d) Within five (5) days after the official seal of a notary public is stolen, lost, damaged or other
otherwise rendered unserviceable in affixing a legible image, the notary public, after informing
the appropriate law enforcement agency, shall notify the Executive Judge in writing, providing
proper receipt or acknowledgment, including registered mail, and in the event of a crime
committed, provide a copy or entry number of the appropriate police record. Upon receipt of
such notice, if found in order by the Executive Judge, the latter shall order the notary public to
cause notice of such loss or damage to be published, once a week for three (3) consecutive
weeks, in a newspaper of general circulation in the city or province where the notary public is
commissioned. Thereafter, the Executive Judge shall issue to the notary public a new Certificate
of Authorization to Purchase a Notarial Seal.
(e) Within five (5) days after the death or resignation of the notary public, or the revocation or
expiration of a notarial commission, the official seal shall be surrendered to the Executive Judge
and shall be destroyed or defaced in public during office hours. In the event that the missing,
lost or damaged seal is later found or surrendered, it shall be delivered by the notary public to
the Executive Judge to be disposed of in accordance with this section. Failure to effect such
surrender shall constitute contempt of court. In the event of death of the notary public, the
person in possession of the official seal shall have the duty to surrender it to the Executive
Judge.

 NOTICE OF SUMMARY HEARING

The notice of summary hearing shall be published in a newspaper of general circulation in the city or
province where the hearing shall be conducted and posted in a conspicuous place in the offices of
the Executive Judge and of the Clerk of Court. The cost of the publication shall be borne by the
petitioner. The notice may include more than one petitioner.

 WHAT IS AN OATH?

Rule II SEC. 2. Affirmation or Oath. - The term "Affirmation" or "Oath" refers to an act in which an
individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public;

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(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through competent
evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) avows under penalty of law to the whole truth of the contents of the instrument or document.

 JURAT - refers to an act in which an individual on a single occasion:

(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules;
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary; and
(d) takes an oath or affirmation before the notary public as to such instrument or document.

A jurat is, among others, an attestation that the person who presented the instrument or
document to be notarized is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary
public through competent evidence of identity.

 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT - Acknowledgment refers to an act in which an individual on a single

occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an integrally complete instrument or
document;
(b) is attested to be personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) represents to the notary public that the signature on the instrument or document was
voluntarily affixed by him for the purposes stated in the instrument or document, declares that
he has executed the instrument or document as his free and voluntary act and deed, and, if he
acts in a particular representative capacity, that he has the authority to sign in that capacity.
(See Section 1, Rule II of 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice) - Testate Estate of the late Alipio
Abada v. Abaja, G.R. No. 147145. January 31, 2005

Duplicate Original copy to be submitted to the COC - A certified copy of each month's entries and a
duplicate original copy of any instrument acknowledged before the notary public shall, within the
first ten (10) days of the month following, be forwarded to the Clerk of Court and shall be under the
responsibility of such officer. If there is no entry to certify for the month, the notary shall forward a
statement to this effect in lieu of certified copies herein required. (Only documents with
acknowledge)

PURPOSE OF ACKNOWLEDGEMENT IN A NOTARIAL WILL

An acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a deed in going before some competent
officer or court and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an extra step undertaken whereby
the signatory actually declares to the notary public that the same is his or her own free act and deed.
The acknowledgment in a notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the testator’s wishes
long after his demise and (2) to assure that his estate is administered in the manner that he intends
it to be done.

 NOTARIZED DOCUMENT - includes one that is subscribed and sworn under oath or one that
contains a jurat.

 LIMITATION OF NOTARIES PUBLIC EX-OFFICIO

Notaries public ex-officio only in the notarization of documents connected with the exercise of their
official functions. They may not undertake the preparation and acknowledgment of documents
which bear no relation to the performance of their functions as judges.

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  CHANGES OF STATUS OF NOTARY

Change of Name and Address

Within ten (10) days after the change of name of the notary public by court order or by marriage, or
after ceasing to maintain the regular place of work or business, the notary public shall submit a
signed and dated notice of such fact to the Executive Judge.

The notary public shall not notarize until:

(a) he receives from the Executive Judge a confirmation of the new name of the notary public and/or
change of regular place of work or business; and

(b) a new seal bearing the new name has been obtained.

The foregoing notwithstanding, until the aforementioned steps have been completed, the notary
public may continue to use the former name or regular place of work or business in performing
notarial acts for three (3) months from the date of the change, which may be extended once for
valid and just cause by the Executive Judge for another period not exceeding three (3) months.

 RESIGNATION AS NOTARY PUBLIC

Rule 10 SEC. 2. Resignation. - A notary public may resign his commission by personally submitting a
written, dated and signed formal notice to the Executive Judge together with his notarial seal,
notarial register and records. Effective from the date indicated in the notice, he shall immediately
cease to perform notarial acts. In the event of his incapacity to personally appear, the submission of
the notice may be performed by his duly authorized representative.

 PUBLICATION OF RESIGNATION

SEC. 3. Publication of Resignation. - The Executive Judge shall immediately order the Clerk of Court
to post in a conspicuous place in the offices of the Executive Judge and of the Clerk of Court the
names of notaries public who have resigned their notarial commissions and the effective dates of
their resignation.

 NOTARIAL CERTIFICATE

Rule II SEC. 8. Notarial Certificate. - "Notarial Certificate" refers to the part of, or attachment to, a
notarized instrument or document that is completed by the notary public, bears the notary's
signature and seal, and states the facts attested to by the notary public in a particular notarization as
provided for by these Rules.

INFORMATION REQUIRED TO BE INDICATED AS PART OF A COUNSEL’S SIGNATURE

Apart from the signature itself, additional information is required to be indicated as part of a
counsel’s signature:

(1) Per Rule 7, Section 3 of the Rules of Court, a counsel’s address must be stated;
(2) In Bar Matter No. 1132, 40 this court required all lawyers to indicate their Roll of
Attorneys number;
(3) In Bar Matter No. 287, 41 this court required the inclusion of the “number and date
of their official receipt indicating payment of their annual membership dues to the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the current year”; in lieu of this, a lawyer may
indicate his or her lifetime membership number;

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 (4) In accordance with Section 139 of the Local Government Code,42 a lawyer must
indicate his professional tax receipt number;
(5) Bar Matter No. 192243 required the inclusion of a counsel’s Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education Certificate of Compliance or Certificate of Exemption; and
(6) This court’s Resolution in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC44 required the inclusion of a counsel’s
contact details.

The inclusion of a counsels Roll of Attorneys number, professional tax receipt number, and
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) receipt (or lifetime membership) number is intended to
preserve and protect the integrity of legal practice. They seek to ensure that only those who have
satisfied the requisites for legal practice are able to engage in it.

With the Roll of Attorneys number, parties can readily verify if a person purporting to be a lawyer
has, in fact, been admitted to the Philippine bar.

With the professional tax receipt number, they can verify if the same person is qualified to engage in
a profession in the place where he or she principally discharges his or her functions.

With the IBP receipt number, they can ascertain if the same person remains in good standing as a
lawyer. These pieces of information“protect the public from bogus lawyers.”

Paying professional taxes (and the receipt that proves this payment) is likewise compliance with a
revenue mechanism that has been statutorily devolved to local government units.

The inclusion of information regarding compliance with (or exemption from) Mandatory Continuing
Legal Education (MCLE) seeks to ensure that legal practice is reserve only for those who have
complied with the recognized mechanism for “keeping abreast with law and jurisprudence,
maintain[ing] the ethics of the profession, and enhancing the standards of the practice of law.”

 COPY CERTIFICATION - refers to a notarial act in which a notary public:

(a) is presented with an instrument or document that is neither a vital record, a public record,
nor publicly recordable;
(b) copies or supervises the copying of the instrument or document;
(c) compares the instrument or document with the copy; and
(d) determines that the copy is accurate and complete.

COMPETENT EVIDENCE OF IDENTITY

The phrase "competent evidence of identity" refers to the identification of an individual based on:

(a) at least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the
photograph and signature of the individual; or
(b) the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the
individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary
public documentary identification.

NO current identification document issued by an official agency

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1. the oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or
transaction who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual,
or

2. the oath or affirmation of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument,
document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public
documentary identification.

The individual has no current identification document issued by an official agency

A third party can attest in behalf of the individual under the following:

1. The credible witness is not privy to the instrument, document or transaction.

2. The notary public personally knows the credible witness.
3. The credible witness personally knows the individual.

The notary public personally knows the third party.

The notary public does not personally knows the third party [two witnesses]

1. The 2 credible witnesses are not privy to the instrument, document or transaction.
2. The 2 credible witnesses each personally knows the individual and
3. Shows to the notary public documentary identification [of their real by showing current
identification document issued by an official agency].

 SIGNATURE WITNESSING - refers to a notarial act in which an individual on a single

occasion:
(a) appears in person before the notary public and presents an instrument or document;
(b) is personally known to the notary public or identified by the notary public through
competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules; and
(c) signs the instrument or document in the presence of the notary public.

 TERM - A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place
within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years
commencing the first day of January of the year in which the commissioning is made, unless
earlier revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court.
 PROHIBITED ACTS OF A NOTARY

(a) A notary public shall not perform a notarial act outside his regular place of work or business;
provided, however, that on certain exceptional occasions or situations, a notarial act may be
performed at the request of the parties in the following sites located within his territorial
jurisdiction:

(1) public offices, convention halls, and similar places where oaths of office may be
administered;
(2) public function areas in hotels and similar places for the signing of instruments or
documents requiring notarization;
(3) hospitals and other medical institutions where a party to an instrument or document is
confined for treatment; and
(4) any place where a party to an instrument or document requiring notarization is under
detention.

(b) A person shall not perform a notarial act if the person involved as signatory to the instrument or
document -

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 (1) is not in the notary's presence personally at the time of the notarization; and
(2) is not personally known to the notary public or otherwise identified by the notary public
through competent evidence of identity as defined by these Rules.

 WHEN A NOTARY PUBLIC CAN SIGN ON BEHALF OF A PERSON

A notary public is authorized to sign on behalf of a person who is physically unable to sign or make a
mark on an instrument or document if:

(1) the notary public is directed by the person unable to sign or make a mark to sign on his
behalf;
(2) the signature of the notary public is affixed in the presence of two disinterested and
unaffected witnesses to the instrument or document;
(3) both witnesses sign their own names ;
(4) the notary public writes below his signature: "Signature affixed by notary in presence of
(names and addresses of person and two [2] witnesses)"; and
(5) the notary public notarizes his signature by acknowledgment or jurat.

 DISQUALIFIED TO PERFORM NOTARIAL ACT

A notary public is disqualified from performing a notarial act if he:

(a) is a party to the instrument or document that is to be notarized;

(b) will receive, as a direct or indirect result, any commission, fee, advantage, right, title,
interest, cash, property, or other consideration, except as provided by these Rules and by
law; or
(c) is a spouse, common-law partner, ancestor, descendant, or relative by affinity or
consanguinity of the principal within the fourth civil degree.

 REFUSAL TO NOTARIZE - A notary public shall not perform any notarial act described in
these Rules for any person requesting such an act even if he tenders the appropriate fee
specified by these Rules if:
(a) the notary knows or has good reason to believe that the notarial act or transaction is
unlawful or immoral;
(b) the signatory shows a demeanor which engenders in the mind of the notary public
reasonable doubt as to the former's knowledge of the consequences of the transaction
requiring a notarial act; and
(c) in the notary's judgment, the signatory is not acting of his or her own free will.

 PROHIBITION TO DO A NOTARIAL ACT

False or Incomplete Certificate. - A notary public shall not:

(a) execute a certificate containing information known or believed by the notary to be false.

(b) affix an official signature or seal on a notarial certificate that is incomplete.

(c) Notary public should not notarize Improper Instruments or Documents

Improper Instruments or Documents. - A notary public shall not notarize:

(a) a blank or incomplete instrument or document; or

(b) an instrument or document without appropriate notarial certification.
 PURPOSE OF PHYSICAL PRESENCE

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The physical presence of the affiants enables the notary public to verify the genuineness of the
signatures of the acknowledging parties and to ascertain that the document is the parties’ free act
and deed. – Angeles, et. al. v. Atty. Ibañez, A.C. No. 7860 January 15, 2009

Interviewing the contracting parties does not make the parties personally known to the notary
public

That the parties appeared before [notary ex-officio] and that he interviewed them do not make the
parties personally known to him. The parties are supposed to appear in person to subscribe to their
affidavits. To personally know the parties, the notary public must at least be acquainted with them.
Interviewing the contracting parties does not make the parties personally known to the notary
public.

 Acknowledgement and personal appearance

As it were, the Notarial Law is silent as to whether or not the parties to a conveying instrument must
be present before the notary public at the same time when they acknowledge its due execution. -
Tan Tiong Bio v. Atty. Renato L. Gonzalez, A.C. no. 6634, August 23, 2007

 Personal knowledge of a false statement or information

Where admittedly the notary public has personal knowledge of a false statement or information
contained in the instrument to be notarized, yet proceeds to affix his or her notarial seal on it, the
Court must not hesitate to discipline the notary public accordingly as the circumstances of the case
may dictate. Otherwise, the integrity and sanctity of the notarization process may be undermined
and public confidence on notarial documents diminished. Heirs of the late Sps. Lucas and Francisca
Villanueva v. Atty. Salud P. Beradio, A.C. No. 6270, January 22, 2007)

 Personal appearance is required

Hence, a notary public should not notarize a document unless the persons who signed the same are
the very same persons who executed and personally appeared before him to attest to the contents
and truth of what are stated therein.

 A notary public is duty-bound to require the person executing a document:

1. to be personally present,
2. to swear before him that he is that person and ask the latter if he has voluntarily and freely
executed the same. (Pantoja-Mumar v. Atty. Flores, A.C. No. 5426, April 3, 2007)

 Notarization is not a ministerial duty

In this case, Atty. Gasmen claimed that before the SPA and loan application were notarized, the
proceeds were already released to NGC by AMWSLAI, thus, dispensing with the need for
notarization. Moreover, he insisted that the notarization of said documents was merely done on a
ministerial basis, with proper safeguards, and that it cannot be expected of him to require the
personal appearance of every loan applicant considering the hundreds of loan applications brought
to him for signing.

 Notarization after the fact prohibited

In this case, Atty. Gasmen claimed that before the SPA and loan application were notarized, the
proceeds were already released to NGC by AMWSLAI, thus, dispensing with the need for
notarization. Moreover, he insisted that the notarization of said documents was merely done on a

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ministerial basis, with proper safeguards, and that it cannot be expected of him to require the
personal appearance of every loan applicant considering the hundreds of loan applications brought
to him for signing. – Sappayani v. Atty. Gasmen, A.C. no. 7073, September 01, 2015

 No need for notary to retain a copy of the will

On the issue of whether respondent was under the legal obligation to furnish a copy of the notarized
will to the archives division, Article 806 provides:

Art. 806. Every will must be acknowledged before a notary public by the testator and the witness.
The notary public shall not be required to retain a copy of the will, or file another with the office of
the Clerk of Court. (emphasis supplied)

Respondent’s failure, inadvertent or not, to file in the archives division a copy of the notarized will
was therefore not a cause for disciplinary action. (Lee v. Atty. Tambago, A.C. No. 5281, February 12,
2008)

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PPT 10: THE LAWYER AND THE MONEYS OR PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENTS

CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT
MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

 Business transaction between lawyer and client is discourage

 No services rendered, money must be returned
 Issuance of receipts is part of ethical practice
 Lawyer should not deposit the funds in his personal account
 When to deliver funds of clients

Thus, having obtained the funds from the [client] in the course of his professional employment, [a
lawyer] had the obligation to deliver such funds to his clients

(a) when they became due, or

(b) upon demand.

 Lending money to client

Moreover, by engaging in a money-lending venture with his clients as borrowers, respondent

violated Rule 16.04:

Rule 16.04 – A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the client’s interests
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a lawyer lend
money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses in a
legal matter he is handling for the client.

The rule is that a lawyer shall not lend money to his client. The only exception is, when in the
interest of justice, he has to advance necessary expenses (such as filing fees, stenographer’s fees for
transcript of stenographic notes, cash bond or premium for surety bond, etc.) for a matter that he is
handling for the client.

The rule is intended to safeguard the lawyer’s independence of mind so that the free exercise of his
judgment may not be adversely affected. It seeks to ensure his undivided attention to the case he is
handling as well as his entire devotion and fidelity to the client’s cause.

If the lawyer lends money to the client in connection with the client’s case, the lawyer in effect
acquires an interest in the subject matter of the case or an additional stake in its outcome.

 Lawyer and client must agree with the amount before retaining lien is validly applied

In both cases, however, it is to be assumed that the client agrees with the lawyer in the amount of
attorney's fees. In case of a disagreement, or when the client disputes the amount claimed by the
lawyer for being unconscionable, the lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession
to the payment of his fees; instead, it should behoove the lawyer to file, if he still deems it desirable,
the necessary action or the proper motion with the proper court to fix the amount of his attorney's
fees. If a lawyer were allowed to unilaterally apply the funds in his hands in payment of his claimed
compensation even when there is a disagreement between him and his client would not only be
violative of the trust relationship between them but can also open the door to possible abuse by
those who are less than mindful of their fiduciary duty.

 Obligation of lawyer once the money or property intended for his client is received

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 (a) should be reported and accounted for promptly and
(b) should not under any circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him.

 Misappropriation is not required

The records do not clearly show whether Attorney Uy had in fact appropriated the said amount; in
fact, Mrs. Del Rosario acknowledged that she had received it on February 12, 1999. They do show,
however, that respondent failed to promptly report that amount to her. This is clearly a violation of
his professional responsibility.

Verily, the question is not necessarily whether the rights of the clients have been prejudiced, but
whether the lawyer has adhered to the ethical standards of the bar. - Judge Angeles v. Atty. Uy, Jr.,
A.C. No. 5019. April 6, 2000

 Avoid keeping the money of client

Keeping the money in his possession without his client's knowledge only provided Atty. Uy the
tempting opportunity to appropriate for himself the money belonging to his client. This situation
should, at all times, be avoided by members of the bar. Like judges, lawyers must not only be clean;
they must also appear clean. This way, the people's faith in the justice system would remain
undisturbed.

 Severe punishment warranted

The conversion of funds entrusted to an attorney is a gross violation of general morality as well as
professional ethics. It impairs public confidence in the legal profession, "It deserves severe
punishment." - Daroy, et. al. v. Atty, Legaspi, A.M. No. 936 July 25, 1975

Unjust retention of client’s money punishable by contempt

Section 25, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that when an attorney unjustly retains in his
hands money of his client after it has been demanded, he may be punished for contempt as an
officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions and he is liable to a criminal
prosecution. - Daroy, et. al. v. Atty. Legaspi, A.M. No. 936 July 25, 1975

 Duty to account

In any event, even assuming that respondent was authorized to receive payments, the same does
not exempt him from his duty of promptly informing his client of the amounts he received in the
course of his professional employment. "The fiduciary nature of the relationship between counsel
and client imposes on a lawyer the duty to account for the money or property collected or received
for or from the client....

He is obliged to render a prompt accounting of all the property and money he has collected for his
client." "The fact that a lawyer has a lien for his attorney's fees on the money in his hands collected
for his client does not relieve him from the obligation to make a prompt accounting. "Moreover, a
lawyer has no right "to unilaterally appropriate his client's money for himself by the mere fact alone
that the client owes him attorney's fees

 Duty to return immediately

When a lawyer receives money from a client for a particular purpose involving the client-attorney
relationship, he is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that the money was spent for
that particular purpose. If the lawyer does not use the money for the intended purpose, he must

13
immediately return the money to his client. -Navarro v. Atty. Solidum, Jr., A.C. No. 9872
January 28, 2014

14
PPT 11: ACQUISITION OF PROPERTIES SUBJECT LITIGATION

• ART. 1491. The following persons cannot acquire any purchase, even at a public auction,
either in person of through the mediation of another:

Justices, judges, prosecuting attorneys, clerks of superior and inferior courts, and other
officers and employees connected with the administration of justice, the property and
rights of in litigation or levied upon an execution before the court within whose jurisdiction
or territory they exercise their respective functions; this prohibition includes the act of
acquiring an assignment and shall apply to lawyers, with respect to the property and rights
which may be the object of any litigation in which they may take part by virtue of their
profession.

 There is no written prohibition in CPR from acquiring interest

However, respondent notes that Canon 10 of the old Canons of Professional Ethics, which states that
" the lawyer should not purchase any interests in the subject matter of the litigation which he is
conducting," does not appear anymore in the new Code of Professional Responsibility. He therefore
concludes that while a purchase by a lawyer of property in litigation is void under Art. 1491 of the
Civil Code, such purchase is no longer a ground for disciplinary action under the new Code of
Professional Responsibility.

This contention is without merit. The very first Canon of the new Code states that "a lawyer shall
uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal process"
(Emphasis supplied), Moreover, Rule 138, Sec. 3 of the Revised Rules of Court requires every lawyer
to take an oath to obey the laws [of the Republic of the Philippines] as well as the legal orders of the
duly constituted authorities therein.“ xxx And for any violation of this oath, a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred by the Supreme Court [Rule 138, Sec. 27, Revised Rules of Court]. – Bautista
v. Atty. R. Gonzales, A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990

Parenthetically, it should be noted that the persons mentioned in Art. 1491 of the Civil Code are
prohibited from purchasing the property mentioned therein because of their existing trust
relationship with the latter. A lawyer is disqualified from acquiring by purchase the property and
rights in litigation because of his fiduciary relationship with such property and rights, as well as with
the client. And it cannot be claimed that the new Code of Professional Responsibility has failed to
emphasize the nature and consequences of such relationship.

Canon 17 states that "a lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the
trust and confidence reposed in him." On the other hand, Canon 16 provides that "a lawyer shall
hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession." Hence,
notwithstanding the absence of a specific provision on the matter in the new Code, the Court,
considering the above quoted provisions of the new Code in relation to Art. 1491 of the Civil Code,

15
as well as the prevailing jurisprudence, holds that the purchase by a lawyer of his client's property in
litigation constitutes a breach of professional ethics for which a disciplinary action may be brought
against him. - Bautista v. Atty. R. Gonzales, A.M. No. 1625 February 12, 1990

Contingent fee arrangement does not violate Article 1491 (5) of the Civil Code

Hence, a contract between a lawyer and his client stipulating a contingent fee is not covered by
said prohibition under because the payment of said fee is not made during the pendency of the
litigation but only after judgment has been rendered in the case handled by the lawyer. In fact,
under the 1988 Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer may have a lien over funds and
property of his client and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees
and disbursements. - Fabillo and Tana v. IAC G.R. No. L-68838 [1991]

 Limitations of contingent fee

As long as the lawyer does not exert undue influence on his client, that no fraud is committed or
imposition applied, or that the compensation is clearly not excessive as to amount to extortion, a
contract for contingent fee is valid and enforceable.

 What is “a property [is] in litigation”?

A property is in litigation if there is a contest or litigation over it in court or when it is subject of a

judicial action. A thing is said to be in litigation not only if there is some contest or litigation over it in
court, but also from the moment that it becomes subject to the judicial action of the judge.

 Mortgage also falls under Article 1491

 Appearance of impropriety if judge purchase property after litigation
 Levied property in satisfaction of damages can be properly acquired by lawyer

In the case at bar, the lot in which respondent acquired rights by assignment was not the subject of
Civil Case No. 2171 in which he approved as counsel for Bernabe Flores and others. The said case
was purely one for damages and did not involve the lot in question. The lot was simply levied upon
on execution after judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiffs. Therefore Article 1491 of the
New Civil Code did not apply. Consequently, respondent had not violated the said provision of law.

It was not professional misconduct or unethical practice for the respondent to acquire the rights and
interests of his client to the 439 square meter parcel of land subject of the administrative charges
because the land was not involved in the litigation he was handling. The land was acquired by
Bernabe Flores in an execution sale conducted to satisfy the judgment secured in the course of Civil
Case No. 2171. The case handled by the respondent was for damages. - Guevara v. Calalang, A.M.
No. 681 [1982]

 Withdrawal of the amount deposited in order to pay attorney’s fees violates Article 1491
of the NCC
 Even if litigant voluntarily assigned the amount

That petitioner knowingly and voluntarily assigned the subject amount to his counsel did not remove
their agreement within the ambit of the prohibitory provisions.

 Assignment of property violates Article 1491

 Prohibition still applies even if lessee is a separate juridical person
 Mere demand for delivery of the litigated property does not violate the rule
 Certiorari proceeding still bars purchase of property under Article 1491

16
PPT 12: CRITICISMS AGAINST THE COURTS AND JUDGES

CANON 11 - A LAWYER SHALL OBSERVE AND MAINTAIN THE RESPECT DUE TO THE COURTS AND
TO JUDICIAL OFFICERS AND SHOULD INSIST ON SIMILAR CONDUCT BY OTHERS.

CANON 13 - A LAWYER SHALL RELY UPON THE MERITS OF HIS CAUSE AND REFRAIN FROM ANY
IMPROPRIETY WHICH TENDS TO INFLUENCE, OR GIVES THE APPEARANCE OF INFLUENCING THE
COURT.

 A scurrilous attack
We recall his use of the following words and phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal monstrosity,
horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary and an anachronism in the
judicial process. – Judge Lacurom v. Atty. Jacoba, A.C. No. 5921, March 10, 2006
 Offensive language
They unfairly called the Court of Appeals a “court of technicalities” for validly dismissing their
defectively prepared petition.They also accused the Court of Appeals of protecting, in their view, “an
incompetent judge.”
 Intemperate language
His characterization of the decision of the respondent Judge as having been "crafted in order to fool
the winning party"; as a "hypocritical judgment in plaintiffs' favor"; one "you could have sworn it was
the Devil who dictated it"; or one with "perfidious character”
 Foul language
"Crooks in Robe," "Swindlers in Robe," "corrupt justices who were only sowing ‘judicial terrorism,’"
as well as his vilification of the Chief Justice whom he called "Chief-Swindler-in-Robe,"
 Proscribed language
Proscribed then are, inter alia:
1. the use of unnecessary language which jeopardizes high esteem in courts, creates or
promotes distrust in judicial administration or
2. tends necessarily to undermine the confidence of the people in the integrity of the members
of this Court and to degrade the administration of justice by this Court of offensive and
abusive language or
3. abrasive and offensive language or
4. of disrespectful, offensive, manifestly baseless, and malicious statements in pleadings or in a
letter addressed to the judge or
5. of disparaging, intemperate, and uncalled-for remarks.

 Not disrespectful, abusive or slanderous - use of the adjective "insufficiently-informed" is

disrespectful, abusive or slanderous.

17
  Constitutional provision on parliamentary immunity

“A Senator or Member of the House of Representative shall, in all offenses punishable by not more
than six years imprisonment, be privileged from arrest while the Congress is in session. No
member shall be questioned nor be held liable in any other place for any speech or debate in the
Congress or in any committee thereof.”- Article VI, Section 11 of the Constitution

Purpose of parliamentary immunity

Our Constitution enshrines parliamentary immunity which is a fundamental privilege cherished in

every legislative assembly of the democratic world. As old as the English Parliament, its purpose “is
to enable and encourage a representative of the public to discharge his public trust with firmness
and success” for “it is indispensably necessary that he should enjoy the fullest liberty of speech and
that he should be protected from resentment of every one, however, powerful, to whom the
exercise of that liberty may occasion offense.”

 Defensor-Santiago case
 Senator Miriam Defensor-Santiago’s speech delivered on the Senate floor:

x x x I am not angry. I am irate. I am foaming in the mouth. I am homicidal. I am suicidal. I am

humiliated, debased, degraded. And I am not only that, I feel like throwing up to be living my middle
years in a country of this nature. I am nauseated. I spit on the face of Chief Justice Artemio
Panganiban and his cohorts in the Supreme Court, I am no longer interested in the position [of Chief
Justice] if I was to be surrounded by idiots. I would rather be in another environment but not in the
Supreme Court of idiots x x x. - Pobre v. Sen. Defensor-Santiago A.C. No. 7399 [2009]

The purpose of her speech, according to her, was to bring out in the open controversial anomalies in
governance with a view to future remedial legislation. She averred that she wanted to expose what
she believed “to be an unjust act of the Judicial Bar Council [JBC],” which, after sending out public
invitations for nomination to the soon to-be vacated position of Chief Justice, would eventually
inform applicants that only incumbent justices of the Supreme Court would qualify for
nomination. She felt that the JBC should have at least given an advanced advisory that non-sitting
members of the Court, like her, would not be considered for the position of Chief Justice.

No lawyer who has taken an oath to maintain the respect due to the courts should be allowed to
erode the people’s faith in the judiciary. In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule
8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which respectively provide:

Canon 8, Rule 8.01.––A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive,
offensive or otherwise improper.

Canon 11.––A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial
officers and should insist on similar conduct by others.

Case against Sen. Defensor-Santiago dismissed

Indeed, her privilege speech is not actionable criminally or in a disciplinary proceeding under the
Rules of Court.

18
In this case, the lady senator clearly violated Canon 8, Rule 8.01 and Canon 11 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, the letter-complaint of Antero J. Pobre against Senator/Atty. Miriam Defensor-

Santiago is, conformably to Art. VI, Sec. 11 of the Constitution, DISMISSED.

 Statements in form of questions still proscribed

 Direct contempt if submitted in the same court

In Ang vs. Castro, this Court held that if a pleading containing derogatory, offensive and malicious
statements is submitted in the same court or judge in which the proceedings are pending, it is direct
contempt, equivalent as it is to a misbehavior committed in the presence of or so near a court or
judge as to interrupt the administration of justice. Direct contempt is punishable summarily.

 Post litigation criticisms

The Philippine rule, therefore, is that in case of a post-litigation newspaper publication, fair criticism
of the court, its proceedings and its members, are allowed. However, there may be a contempt of
court, even though the case has been terminated, if the publication is attended by either of these
two circumstances: (1) where it tends to bring the court into disrespect or, in other words, to
scandalize the court; or (2) where there is a clear and present danger that the administration of
justice would be impeded. – PP v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09 March 29, 1995

 Contempt and Disciplinary proceeding are not the same

A contempt proceeding for misbehavior in court is designed to vindicate the authority of the
court; on the other hand, the object of a disciplinary proceeding is to deal with the fitness of the
court's officer to continue in that office, to preserve and protect the court and the public from the
official ministrations of persons unfit or unworthy to hold such office. The principal purpose of the
exercise of the power to cite for contempt is to safeguard the functions of the court and should thus
be used sparingly on a preservative and not, on the vindictive principle. The principal purpose of the
exercise of disciplinary authority by the Supreme Court is to assure respect for orders of such court
by attorneys who, as much as judges, are responsible for the orderly administration of justice.

Moreover, it has been held that the imposition a fine as a penalty in a contempt proceeding is not
considered res judicata to a subsequent charge for unprofessional conduct. In the same manner an
attorney's conviction for contempt was not collaterally estopped by reason of a subsequent
disbarment proceeding in which the court found in his favor on essentially the same facts leading to
conviction. It has likewise been the rule that a notice to a lawyer to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt cannot be considered as a notice to show cause why he should not be
suspended from the practice of law, considering that they have distinct objects and for each of them
a different procedure is established. Contempt of court is governed by the procedures laid down
under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary actions in the Practice of law are governed
by file 138 and 139 thereof. - PP v. Godoy, G.R. Nos. 115908-09 March 29, 1995

19
PPT 13: TERMINATING AND ESTABLISHING ATTY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP

Nature of attorney-client relationship

An attorney-client relationship is said to exist when a lawyer acquiesces or voluntarily permits the
consultation of a person, who in respect to a business or trouble of any kind, consults a lawyer with
a view of obtaining professional advice or assistance.

It is not essential that the client should have employed the lawyer on any previous occasion or that
any retainer should have been paid, promised or charged for; neither is it material that the attorney
consulted did not afterward undertake the case about which the consultation was had, for as long as
the advice and assistance of the attorney is sought and received in matters pertinent to his
profession.

 Can trigger a lawyer-client relationship

A lawyer-client relationship was established from the very first moment complainant asked
respondent for legal advise regarding the former's business. To constitute professional employment,
it is not essential that the client employed the attorney professionally on any previous occasion.

It is not necessary that any retainer be paid, promised, or charged; neither is it material that the
attorney consulted did not afterward handle the case for which his service had been sought.

 Verbal agreement
There is no gainsaying that a verbal engagement is sufficient to create an attorney-client
relationship.

 Presumption

The presumption in favor of the counsels authority to appear in behalf of a client is a strong one. A
lawyer is not even required to present a written authorization from the client. In fact, the absence of
a formal notice of entry of appearance will not invalidate the acts performed by the counsel in his
clients name.

 Section 21, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court

20
SEC. 21. Authority of attorney to appear.

An attorney is presumed to be properly authorized to represent any cause in which he appears, and
no written power of attorney is required to authorize him to appear in court for his client, but the
presiding judge may, on motion of either party and on reasonable grounds therefor being shown,
require any attorney who assumes the right to appear in a case to produce or prove the authority
under which he appears, and to disclose, whenever pertinent to any issue, the name of the person
who employed him, and may thereupon make such order as justice requires. An attorney wilfully
appearing in court for a person without being employed, unless by leave of the court, may be
punished for contempt as an officer of the court who has misbehaved in his official transactions.

 Court finds that no attorney-client relationship exists – stemmed from personal transaction
only

 Non-payment of fees does not diminish a lawyer’s duty

Assuming the non-payment to be true, such failure should not be a reason not to inform the client of
an important development, or worse, to withhold vital information from her.

 Remedy for deliberate refusal to pay

It is but just and proper that if refusal to pay just compensation ensues in any transaction, the
proper remedy is to institute an action before the proper court and such actuation of the
respondent herein did not constitute deceit, malpractice or gross misconduct. - Urban Bank Inc. vs.
Atty. Pena, A.C. No. 4863 [2001]

Rule 20.04 - A lawyer shall avoid controversies with clients concerning his compensation and shall
resort to judicial action only to prevent imposition, injustice or fraud.

 Terminating the attorney-client relation

CLIENT: The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the absolute right to terminate the attorney-
client relation at anytime with or without cause.

ATTORNEY: The right of an attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other than for sufficient
cause is, however, considerably restricted. Xxx He is not at liberty to abandon it without reasonable
cause. A lawyer’s right to withdraw from a case before its final adjudication arises only from the
client’s written consent or from a good cause. - Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155, March 14,
2006

CANON 22 - A LAWYER SHALL WITHDRAW HIS SERVICES ONLY FOR GOOD CAUSE AND UPON NOTICE
APPROPRIATE IN THE CIRCUMSTANCES.

Rule 22.01 - A lawyer may withdraw his services in any of the following case:

(a) When the client pursues an illegal or immoral course of conduct in connection with
the matter he is handling; [see Rule 19.02]
(b) When the client insists that the lawyer pursue conduct violative of these canons and
rules;
(c) When his inability to work with co-counsel will not promote the best interest of the
client;
(d) When the mental or physical condition of the lawyer renders it difficult for him to
carry out the employment effectively;

21
 (e) When the client deliberately fails to pay the fees for the services or fails to comply
with the retainer agreement;
(f) When the lawyer is elected or appointed to public office [see Rule 3.03]; and
(g) Other similar cases.

Rule 3.03 - Where a partner accepts public office, he shall withdraw from the firm and his name shall
be dropped from the firm name unless the law allows him to practice law concurrently.

Rule 15.06. - A lawyer shall not state or imply that he is able to influence any public official, tribunal
or legislative body.

Rule 19.02 - A lawyer who has received information that his client has, in the course of the
representation, perpetrated a fraud upon a person or tribunal, shall promptly call upon the client to
rectify the same, and failing which he shall terminate the relationship with such client in accordance
with the Rules of Court.

 Changing lawyer does not need the approval of the court

 Termination of services without the written consent of client

A lawyer who desires to retire from an action without the written consent of his client must file a
petition for withdrawal in court. He must serve a copy of his petition upon his client and the adverse
party

A lawyer must see to it that a new lawyer is recorded before terminating his services

An attorney may only retire from a case either by written consent of his client or by permission of
the court after due notice and hearing, in which event the attorney should see to it that the name of
the new lawyer is recorded in the case.

 Cessation of law practice is not a “good cause” to withdraw

 Duty of lawyer once he is discharged as counsel
1. immediately turn over all papers and property to which the client is entitled
2. shall cooperative with his successor in the orderly transfer of the matter, including all
information necessary for the proper handling of the matter.
3. see to it that the name of the new counsel is properly recorded and the records properly
handed over.

 Client refusal to give his consent is still subject to Court’s discretion

 Consent to withdraw must be given by the litigant
 Pendency of petition for withdrawal does not relieve lawyer of his duty
 A valid cause to withdraw must still be subject to formalities of withdrawing as counsel
 Verbal substitution of counsel not allowed
 Death of a partner did not extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between said firm and
petitioner. Upon receipt of the notice to file Brief, the law firm should have re-assigned the
case to another associate or, it could have withdrawn as counsel in the manner provided by
the Rules of Court so that the petitioner could contract the services of a new lawyer.

 Written contract is not essential in establishing lawyer-client relationship

A written contract is not an essential element in the employment of an attorney; the contract may
be express or implied. - Francisco v. Atty. Portugal, A.C. No. 6155 [2006]

22
  Perceived insufficiency of remuneration not a ground to diminish professional zeal
 Close personal relationship will not bar a lawyer-client relationship
 Heavy workload is not sufficient reason for the withdrawal of her services
 “Hurt feelings” is not a valid ground to automatically withdraw
 Client should not file the Notice to Withdraw
 Having an additional lawyer did not necessarily mean conformity

PPT 14: GROUNDS AGAINST DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST LAWYERS

 Contempt v. Disciplinary Proceeding

While the two proceedings can proceed simultaneously with each other, a contempt proceeding
cannot substitute for a disciplinary proceeding for erring lawyers, and vice versa.

There can be no substitution between the two proceedings, as contempt proceedings against
lawyers, as officers of the Court, are different in nature and purpose from the discipline of lawyers as
legal professionals.

The two proceedings spring from two different powers of the Court. The Court, in exercising its
power of contempt, exercises an implied and inherent power granted to courts in general.

Its existence is essential to the preservation of order in judicial proceedings; to the enforcement of
judgments, orders and mandates of courts; and, consequently, in the administration of justice; thus,
it may be instituted against any person guilty of acts that constitute contempt of court.

Further, jurisprudence describes a contempt proceeding as penal and summary in nature; hence,
legal principles applicable to criminal proceedings also apply to contempt proceedings.

A judgment dismissing the charge of contempt, for instance, may no longer be appealed in the same
manner that the prohibition against double jeopardy bars the appeal of an accused’s acquittal.

In contrast, a disciplinary proceeding against an erring lawyer is sui generis in nature; it is neither
purely civil nor purely criminal.

Unlike a criminal prosecution, a disciplinary proceeding is not intended to inflict punishment, but to
determine whether a lawyer is still fit to be allowed the privilege of practicing law.

It involves an investigation by the Court of the conduct of its officers, and has, for its primary
objective, public interest.

23
Thus, unlike a contempt proceeding, the acquittal of the lawyer from a disciplinary proceeding
cannot bar an interested party from seeking reconsideration of the ruling.

Neither does the imposition of a penalty for contempt operate as res judicata to a subsequent
charge for unprofessional conduct.

Contempt proceedings and disciplinary actions are also governed by different procedures. Contempt
of court is governed by the procedures under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, whereas disciplinary
actions in the practice of law are governed by Rules 138 and 139 thereof.

 Supreme Court is neither bound by the findings of the IBP

 Continuous display and use of the title “Attorney-at-law” after disbarment

On this matter, the Court is of the view that the title "Atty." preceding respondent's name in his
son's wedding invitation, and the signboard outside his office bearing his name and the words
"Attorney-at-Law" are not evidence sufficient to convince this Court that respondent continues in
the practice of law, in violation Court's Decision dated April 30, 1999 that ordered his disbarment.
Nonetheless, respondent is ORDERED to remove the signboard outside his office showing his name
and the words "Attorney-at-Law

 Guidelines to be observed in the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from
the practice of law

1) After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court
shall render a decision imposing the penalty;
2) Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof,
respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said
motion shall render the decision final and executory;
3) Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with
the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from
the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;
4) Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the
Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or
where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5) The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondent’s compliance with the order of
suspension;
6) Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a ground
for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.

Lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not automatic

The lifting of a lawyer’s suspension is not automatic upon the end of the period stated in the Court’s
decision, and an order from the Court lifting the suspension at the end of the period is necessary in
order to enable [him] to resume the practice of his profession

Supreme Court can choose not to refer complaint to IBP

In administrative cases against lawyers, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant.
Administrative complaints that are prima facie groundless as shown by the pleadings filed by the
parties need not be referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for further investigation. They
may be summarily dismissed for utter lack of merit.

24
The Court normally refers administrative cases to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. Considering, however, that the question being raised is
simple and that no further factual determination is necessary, the Court resolves to dispense with
such referral and to decide the case on the basis of the extensive pleadings already on record, which
all show the lack of merit of the Complaint.

Confidentiality

Rules of Court Rule 139-B Sec. 18. Confidentiality. - Proceedings against attorneys shall be private
and confidential. However, the final order of the Supreme Court shall be published like its decisions
in other cases.

Suspension of attorney by CA and RTC

Rule 139-B Sec. 16. Suspension of attorney by the Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court. - The
Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court may suspend an attorney from practice for any of the causes
named in Rule 138, Section 27, until further action of the Supreme Court in the case.

Rule 139-B Sec. 17. Upon suspension by Court of Appeals or Regional Trial Court, further proceedings
in Supreme Court. - Upon such suspension, the Court of Appeals or a Regional Trial Court shall
forthwith transmit to the Supreme Court a certified copy of the order of suspension and a full
statement of the facts upon which the same was based. Upon receipt of such certified copy and
statement, the Supreme Court shall make a full investigation of the case and may revoke, shorten or
extend the suspension, or disbar the attorney as the facts may warrant.

Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by Supreme Court Resolution
dated February 13, 1992

Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor.—A member
of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for:

1. any deceit,
2. malpractice,
3. other gross misconduct in such office,
4. grossly immoral conduct,
5. by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude,
6. for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice,
7. for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney for a party to a case without authority to do so.

The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.

 Disbarment or suspension in a foreign jurisdiction - ground for his disbarment or

suspension if the basis of such action includes any of the acts hereinabove enumerated

Judgment of a foreign court is only prima facie evidence

The basis of the foreign court's action must include any of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension in this jurisdiction

Defenses - repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,

collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

25
  Ex parte investigation valid - It is only after reasonable notice and failure on the part of the
respondent lawyer to appear during the scheduled investigation that an investigation may
be conducted ex parte.
 Misconduct pertaining to another profession - The rule is settled that a lawyer may be
suspended or disbarred for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private activities, as
long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. -
Nakpil v. Valdes, A.C. No. 2040 [1998]
 Respondent lawyer cannot hide behind the corporate veil
 Judgment from the RTC not needed in IBP investigation

The Court need not delve into the question of whether or not respondent did contract a bigamous
marriage, a matter which apparently is still pending with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City. It is
enough that the records of this administrative case sufficiently substantiate the findings of the
Investigating Commissioner, as well as the IBP Board of Governors, i.e., that indeed respondent has
been carrying on an illicit affair with a married woman, grossly immoral conduct and only indicative
of an extremely low regard for the fundamental ethics of his profession. This detestable behavior
renders him regrettably unfit and undeserving of the treasured honor and privileges which his
license confers upon him.

 Violation of BP 22 not subject to sanction yet - His liability has yet to be determined by the
trial court where his case is pending
 Anonymous complaints - should not be dismissed outright, however, where their averments
may be easily verified and may, without much difficulty, be substantiated and established by
other competent evidence.
 Forum shopping

Forum shopping applies only to judicial cases or proceedings, not to disbarment proceedings.

A finding of grave misconduct in the ADMINISTRATIVE CASE would not be determinative of the guilt
or innocence of the respondent in a criminal proceeding

The issue in the FALSIFICATION CASE is whether or not the SHERIFFS had unlawfully and feloniously
made an alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning in violation of
Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code.

 Acquittal of respondent of the criminal charge is not a bar to administrative proceedings.

 Administrative complaint against a member of the bar does not prescribe
 Indefinite suspension - the indefiniteness of respondent’s suspension puts in his hands the
key for the restoration of his rights and privileges as a lawyer.
 Censure or reprimand is usually meted out for an isolated act of misconduct of a lesser
nature. It is also imposed for some minor infraction of the lawyer’s duty to the court or the
client. Kissing complainant on the lips not grossly immoral
 Non-injured party can file a complaint

The right to institute a disbarment proceeding is not confined to clients nor is it necessary that the
person complaining suffered injury from the alleged wrongdoing. Disbarment proceedings are
matters of public interest and the only basis for judgment is the proof or failure of proof of the
charge. The evidence submitted by complainant before the Commission on Bar Discipline sufficed to
sustain its resolution and recommended sanctions. - Atty. Navarro v. Atty. Meneses III, CBD A.C. No.
313. January 30, 1998

 Misconduct as a government official

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As a general rule, a lawyer who holds a government office may not be disciplined as a member of
the bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a government official. However, if that
misconduct as a government official is of such a character as to affect his qualification as a lawyer or
to show moral delinquency, then he may be disciplined as a member of the bar on such ground.

 Res judicata does not apply in administrative proceeding

“The doctrine of res adjudicata applies only to judicial or quasi-judicial proceedings and not to the
exercise of the [Court’s] administrative powers.”- Dinsay v. Atty. Cioco, A.C. No. 2995. November 27,
1996

While respondent is in effect being indicted twice for the same misconduct, it does not amount to
double jeopardy as both proceedings are admittedly administrative in nature. -

 Definition of Unprofessional conduct - is that which violates the rules on ethical code of his
profession or which is unbecoming a member of that profession.
 Indirect contempt does not involve moral turpitude
 Sexual relations between two unmmaried and consenting adults

Mere sexual relations between two unmmaried and consenting adults are not enough to warrant
administrative sanction for illicit behavior.

 Estrada v. Escritor case

Respondent, court interpreter in said court, was investigated for living with a man not her husband,
and having borne a child within this live-in arrangement. Complainant believes that [the court
interpreter] is committing an immoral act that tarnishes the image of the court, thus she should not
be allowed to remain employed therein as it might appear that the court condones her act.
Consequently, respondent was charged with committing "disgraceful and immoral conduct“. -
Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

She admitted that she started living with Luciano Quilapio, Jr. without the benefit of marriage more
than twenty years ago when her husband was still alive but living with another woman. She also
admitted that she and Quilapio have a son. But as a member of the religious sect known as the
Jehovah’s Witnesses and the Watch Tower and Bible Tract Society, respondent asserted that their
conjugal arrangement is in conformity with their religious beliefs and has the approval of her
congregation.

Invoking the religious beliefs, practices and moral standards of her congregation, she asserts that her
conjugal arrangement does not constitute disgraceful and immoral conduct for which she should be
held administratively liable. - Estrada v. Escritor, A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

Thus, we find that in this particular case and under these distinct circumstances, respondent’s
conjugal arrangement cannot be penalized as she has made out a case for exemption from the law
based on her fundamental right to freedom of religion. The Court recognizes that state interests
must be upheld in order that freedoms - including religious freedom - may be enjoyed. In the area of
religious exercise as a preferred freedom, however, man stands accountable to an authority higher
than the state, and so the state interest sought to be upheld must be so compelling that its violation
will erode the very fabric of the state that will also protect the freedom. In the absence of a showing
that such state interest exists, man must be allowed to subscribe to the Infinite.- Estrada v. Escritor,
A.M. No. P-02-1651 August 4, 2003

27
  Penalties imposed in administrative cases [judiciary] are immediately executory

We stressed that when suspension is "to take effect immediately", this Court means that the period
of suspension should commence on the day respondent judge receives notice of the decision
suspending him from office.

While this does not preclude the filing by respondent judge of a motion for reconsideration, the
filing and pendency of such a motion does not have the effect of staying the suspension order.

 Penalties imposed in administrative cases [of lawyers] are

NOT immediately executory - Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is
immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a
motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final
and executory.
 Unlimited grounds for suspension or disbarment

“A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral character, honesty, probity or good
demeanor. Possession of good moral character is not only a good condition precedent to the
practice of law but also a good qualification for all members of the bar.

 Desistance cannot stop a disciplinary investigation

The aforesaid letter hardly deserves consideration as proceedings of this nature cannot be
"interrupted by reason of desistance, settlement, compromise, restitution, withdrawal of the
charges, or failure of the complainant to prosecute the same. - Section 5, Rule 139-B, Rules of Court

 Reconciliation of parties or amicable settlement

Therefore, in the instant case, the Court cannot just set aside the finding of culpability against the
respondents merely because the complainants have decided to forgive them or settle matters
amicably after the case was completely evaluated and reviewed by the IBP.

The complainants’ forgiveness or even withdrawal from the case does not ipso facto obliterate the
misconduct committed by Francisco. To begin with, it is already too late in the day for the
complainants to withdraw the disbarment case considering that they had already presented and
supported their claims with convincing and credible evidence, and the IBP has promulgated a
resolution on the basis thereof. – Sps. Amatorio v. Atty. F. Yap & Atty. W. Yap, A.C. No. 5914, March
11, 2015

 Affidavit stands in lieu complainant’s testimony

 Disciplinary authority v. Judicial action

It is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the disciplinary authority of the
Court or whether the matter is a proper subject of judicial action against lawyers. If the matter
involves violations of the lawyer’s oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the Court’s
disciplinary authority. However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal liability,
and which do not directly require an inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter
would be a proper subject of a judicial action which is understandably outside the purview of the
Court’s disciplinary authority. – Felipe, et. al. v. Atty. Macapagal, A.C. No. 4549, December 02, 2013

28
WON the money should be returned to complainant

It is imperative to first determine whether the matter falls within the disciplinary authority of the
Court OR whether the matter is a proper subject of judicial action against lawyers. - Annacta v. Atty.
Resurreccion, A.C. No. 9074 August 14, 2012

If the matter involves violations of the lawyer’s oath and code of conduct, then it falls within the
Court’s disciplinary authority.

However, if the matter arose from acts which carry civil or criminal liability, and which do not
directly require an inquiry into the moral fitness of the lawyer, then the matter would be a proper
subject of a judicial action which is understandably outside the purview of the Court’s disciplinary
authority.

Thus, we hold that when the matter subject of the inquiry pertains to the mental and moral fitness
of the respondent to remain as member of the legal fraternity, the issue of whether the respondent
be directed to return the amount received from his client shall be deemed within the Court’s
disciplinary authority. Annacta v. Atty. Resurreccion, A.C. No. 9074 August 14, 2012

 Return of money or fees

It is well to note that "[w]hile the Court has previously held that disciplinary proceedings should only
revolve around the determination of the respondent-lawyer's administrative and not his: civil
liability, it must be clarified that this rule remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are
purely civil in nature - for instance, when the claim involves moneys received by the lawyer from his
client in a transaction separate and distinct and not intrinsically linked to his professional
engagement."

Since respondent received the aforesaid amount as part of her legal fees, the Court, thus, finds the
return thereof to be in order, with legal interest as recommended by the IBP Investigating
Commissioner.

 Quantum of evidence [judges] - The ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be
established beyond reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the
removal is sought is misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The
general rules in regard to admissibility of evidence in criminal trials apply
 Quantum of evidence [judges] As a rule, proof beyond reasonable doubt is not necessary in
deciding administrative cases. Only substantial evidence is required
 Quantum of evidence [lawyers] - The burden of proof for these types of cases differ. In a
criminal case, proof beyond reasonable doubt is necessary; in an administrative case for
disbarment or suspension, “clearly preponderant evidence” is all that is required.
 Absolute pardon
 Preventive suspension for erring lawyer

Rule 139-B Sec. 15. Suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court. - After receipt of respondent's
answer or lapse of the period therefor, the Supreme Court, motu proprio, or at the instance of the
IBP Board of Governors upon the recommendation of the Investigator, may suspend an attorney
from the practice of his profession for any of the causes specified in Rule 138, Section 27, during the
pendency of the investigation until such suspension is lifted by the Supreme Court.

 Preventive suspension not applicable to judges

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Based on the foregoing disquisition, the Court is of the resolve that, while it is true that preventive
suspension pendente lite does not violate the right of the accused to be presumed innocent as the
same is not a penalty, the rules on preventive suspension of judges, not having been expressly
included in the Rules of Court, are amorphous at best. – Re: Conviction of Judge Angeles A.M. No. 06-
9-545-RTC January 31, 2008

PPT 15: JUDICIAL CLEMENCY AND REINSTATEMENT IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW

 Forms of clemency

1. Reinstatement
2. Commutation
3. Lifting of disqualification

 "Pier factors"

(1) the petitioner's present moral fitness;

(2) the petitioner's acceptance of wrongdoing with sincerity and honesty;
(3) the extent of the petitioner's rehabilitation;
(4) the nature and seriousness of the original misconduct;
(5) the petitioner's conduct following discipline;
(6) the time elapsed since the original discipline;
(7) the petitioner's character, maturity, and experience at the time of discipline and at present;
(8) the petitioner's current competency and qualifications to practice law;
(9) restitution; and

30
(10) the proof that the petitioner's return to the practice of law will not be detrimental to the
integrity and standing of the bar or the administration of justice, or subversive of the public interest.
- In re Pier, 561 N.W.2d 297, 300 (S.D.1997)

 Rehabilitation is demonstrated by a course of conduct that enables the court to conclude

there is little likelihood that after such rehabilitation is completed and the applicant is
readmitted to the practice of law he will engage in unprofessional conduct. - In Re Arrotta,
96 P.3d 213 (Ariz. 2004)

 Reinstatements to the legal profession were allowed under the following criteria

1. the person appreciates the significance of his dereliction and he has assured the Court that he
now possesses the requisite probity and integrity necessary to guarantee that he is worthy to be
restored to the practice of law

2. the time that has elapsed between disbarment and the application for reinstatement,

3. his good conduct and honorable dealing subsequent to his disbarment,

4. his active involvement in civic, educational, and religious organizations

5. the favorable indorsement of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, as well as the local
government officials and citizens of his community.

6. the pleas of his mother and wife for the sake and the future of his family.

 Court lays down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency

1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to
certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,
judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and
probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct
will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation.

2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty1 to ensure a period of
reformation.

3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of
him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself.

4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or
contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and
other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service.

5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency. – Re: Letter of
Judge Diaz, A.M. No. 07-7-17-SC September 19, 2007

 Effects of pardon -“A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and
the guilt of the offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots
out of existence the guilt, so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as if he
had never committed the offense.

 Effect of conditional pardon

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 The fact that the respondent was extended conditional pardon by the Chief Executive is of
no moment. Such conditional pardon merely partially relieved him of the penal
consequences of his act, but did not operate as a bar to his disbarment, especially so when
he is being disbarred on the ground of professional misconduct for which he had been
convicted by final judgment. In re: Atty. Jose Avanceña, A.C. No. 407 August 15, 1967

 Conditional pardon merely remitted the unexecuted portion of his term. It does not reach
the offense itself.

 Pardon granted before conviction

“A pardon reaches both the punishment prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the punishment and blots out of existence
the guilt, so that in the eyes of the law the offender is as innocent as if he had never
committed the offense.

 If granted before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties and disabilities, consequent
upon conviction, from attaching;

 If granted after conviction, it removes the penalties and disabilities, and restores him to all
his civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and gives him a new credit and
capacity.”- In re: Disbarment proceedings against Atty. Gutierrez, A.C. No. L-363. July 31,
1962

PPT 16: AFFINITY AND CONSANGUINITY AS A BASIS FOR DISQUALIFICATION UNDER CANON 3
SECTION 5(F)

DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his
wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when
his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just
or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

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Sec. 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. - If it be claimed that an official is
disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing,
file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon
proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question
of his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers
in the case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his
own competency, until after final judgment in the case.

RULE 3.12 - A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might
reasonably be questioned. These cases include among others, proceedings where:

(a) the judge has personal knowledge of disputed evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding;
(b) the judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or
matter in controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their
association, or the judge or lawyer was a material witness therein;
(c) the judge's ruling in a lower court is the subject of review;
(d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or
to counsel within the fourth degree;
(e) the judge knows the judge's spouse or child has a financial interest, as heir, legatee, creditor,
fiduciary, or otherwise, in the subject matter in controversy or in a party to the proceeding,
or any other interest that could be substantially affected by the outcome of the proceeding.

In every instance, the judge shall indicate the legal reason for inhibition.

Definition of affinity

Affinity is defined as "the relation which one spouse because of marriage has to blood relatives of
the other. The connection existing, in consequence of marriage between each of the married
persons and the kindred of the other. The doctrine of affinity grows out of the canonical maxim that
marriage makes husband and wife one. The husband has the same relation by affinity to his wife's
blood relatives as she has by consanguinity and vice versa. – PP v. Raul Berana, G.R. No. 123544
July 29, 1999

Relationship by affinity refers to a relation by virtue of a legal bond such as marriage. Relatives by
affinity therefore are those commonly referred to as "in-laws," or stepfather, stepmother, stepchild
and the like. - PP v. Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05 February 10, 1998

Case 1

Judge is respondent’s second cousin by affinity, the former’s [judge] aunt is married to an uncle of
respondent. The relationship notwithstanding, Judge did not inhibit himself from hearing said
electoral case.

Judge, as alleged, are related within the sixth degree by affinity in that the aunt of the judge is
married to the uncle of respondent.

WON the judge is related by affinity to respondent.

Judge not disqualified

In the instant case, considering that Judge Wacas is related to his aunt by consanguinity in the third
degree, it follows by virtue of the marriage of his aunt to the uncle of Dagadag that Judge Wacas is
the nephew-in-law of the uncle of Dagadag, i.e., a relationship by affinity in the third degree.

33
But Judge Wacas is not related by affinity to the blood relatives of the uncle of Dagadag as they are
not his in-laws and, thus, are not related in any way to Dagadag.

In like manner, Dagadag is the nephew-in-law of the aunt of Judge Wacas but is not related by
affinity to the blood relatives of Judge Wacas’ aunt, like Judge Wacas.

In short, there is no relationship by affinity between Judge Wacas and Dagadag as they are not in-
laws of each other. Thus, Judge Wacas is not disqualified under Sec. 1 of Rule 137 to hear Election
Case. - Tiggangay v. Judge Wacas A.M. OCA IPI No. 09-3243-RTJ [2013]

Being“magbalaes” is not a ground for automatic disqualification

Complainant contends that respondent judge is guilty of impropriety by refusing to inhibit himself
from the case despite the fact that one of the accused, Lope Panti, Sr., is the father-in-law of
respondent judge’s daughter.

To be sure, respondent judge and accused Lope Panti, Sr. are not, strictly speaking, relatives within
the meaning of Rule 137, §1 of the Rules of Court.

Nevertheless, the close personal relations between them as parents of their respective children,
being in our culture known as “magbalaes,” should have cautioned respondent judge to inhibit
himself from the case, lest his impartiality be placed in doubt. – Agunday v. Judge Tresvalles, A.M.
No. MTJ-99-1236. November 25, 1999

Complainant is the judge’s wife

Respondent issued a warrant for the arrest of complainant, knowing that the private complainant
therein was his wife, Atty. Ester Flor. – Tenenan v. Judge Flor, Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-06-1995 September
25, 2007

Judge’s nephew is the husband of the daughter of the counsel for the accused

It is alleged that respondent should have inhibited himself from Criminal Case No. 207096, entitled
“People v. Crisostomo Yalung, Roy Manuel M. Villasor, SG Fernando Tagle, and SG Ronan Guerrero”
because respondent’s nephew, Atty. Cris Pascua Zafra, is married to the daughter of Atty. P. M.
Castillo, complainants’ defense counsel in that case. Complainants’ claim that although
respondent’s relationship is to the husband of the daughter of their counsel, they did not want
respondent to try their case because they wanted “to [avoid] any stigma and/or cloud of doubt on
any order/decision” which respondent may render on the case.

In this case, respondent judge failed to take into account the loss of trust on the part of the
complainant as to his impartiality.

When a judge exhibits actions that give rise, fairly or unfairly, to perceptions of bias, such faith and
confidence are eroded, and he has no choice but to inhibit himself voluntarily. A judge may not be
legally prohibited from sitting in a litigation, but when circumstances appear that will induce doubt
on his honest actuation and probity in favor of either party, or incite such state of mind, he should
conduct a careful self-examination. He should exercise his discretion in a way that the people’s

34
faith in the courts of justice is not impaired. The better course for the judge is to disqualify himself. -
Latorre v. Judge Ansaldo, A.M. No. RTJ-00-1563 [2001]

In any event, the grounds relied upon by complainants to support their motion, i.e., that
respondent’s nephew is the husband of the daughter of the counsel for the accused; that they
lacked confidence in respondent’s impartiality xxx have no merit.

The first is not a ground for mandatory disqualification of judges under Rule 137, par. 1 since
respondent is not even related to counsel for the accused. - Yalung v. Judge Pascua, A.M. No. MTJ-
01-1342 [2001]

Father-in-law of the judge present in the proceeding

The meat of this motion for inhibition is that the father-in-law of the Presiding Judge, herein
respondent, was conspicuously present in the proceedings during which time he gave consultation
to the complainant who was reportedly his political leader and protégée.

In this case, however, respondent did not simply fail to recuse himself from cases in which his
relatives were either involved or interested, the record shows he did so to favor or protect the
parties. – Siawan v. Judge Inopiquez, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-95-1056. May 21, 2001

Discussing the pending case with a brother

By allowing his brother to discuss with him the merits of one party’s position, Justice Sabio gave his
brother the opportunity to influence him. Any reasonable person would tend to doubt Justice
Sabio’s independence and objectivity after such a conversation with a close family member who
also happens to hold a high government position. As a magistrate, Justice Sabio has the duty to
prevent any circumstance that would cast doubt on his ability to decide a case without interference
or pressure from litigants, counsels or their surrogates. (Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Vasquez, Jr.,
A.M. No. 08-8-11-CA, October 15, 2008)

Clearly, respondent judge's participation in the preliminary investigation, involving his nephew is a
violation of the aforequoted rules laid down to guide members of the judiciary. The rationale for the
rule on disqualification of a judge stems from the principle that no judge should preside in a case in
which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge should not handle a
case in which he might be perceived to be susceptible to bias and partiality. 7 The rule is intended to
preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice. Perez v. Judge Suller, A.M. No.
MTJ-94-936 November 6, 1995

A stepdaughter has no common ancestry by her stepmother.

PPT 17: Grounds for voluntary inhibition and disqualification of judges

“Judge’s family”

Includes a judge’s:

35
1. spouse,
2. son,
3. daughter,
4. son-in-law,
5. daughter-in-law, and
6. any other relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth civil degree, or
7. person who is a companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge’s household.
Disqualification of judges under Rule 137 section 1

Sec. 1. Disqualification of judges. - No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his
wife or child, is pecuniarily interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, or in which he is
related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the
fourth degree, computed according to the rules of the civil law, or in which he has been executor,
administrator, guardian, trustee or counsel, or in which he has presided in any inferior court when
his ruling or decision is the subject of review, without the written consent of all parties in interest,
signed by them and entered upon the record.

A judge may, in the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just
or valid reasons other than those mentioned above.

Sec. 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. - If it be claimed that an official is
disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing,
file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon
proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question
of his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers
in the case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his
own competency, until after final judgment in the case.

Rules contemplate two kinds of inhibition

1. compulsory - it is conclusively presumed that judges cannot actively and impartially sit in the
instances mentioned.

2. voluntary - leaves to the sound discretion of the judges concerned whether to sit in a case for
other just and valid reasons, with only their conscience as guide.

- Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]

Proof that a specific act of bias or partiality was committed

What can reasonably be gleaned from jurisprudence on this point of law is the necessity of proving
bias and partiality under the second paragraph of the rule in question. The proof required needs to
point to some act or conduct on the part of the judge being sought for inhibition. In the instant
Motions, there is not even a single act or conduct attributed to Justice Hernandez from where a
suspicion of bias or partiality can be derived or appreciated. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez
G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]

Evidence required

We find the above explanation well-taken and thus uphold the assailed Resolution upon the grounds
so stated. We have ruled in Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Dy Hong Pi, that the mere
imputation of bias or partiality is not enough ground for inhibition, especially when the charge is
without basis. Extrinsic evidence must further be presented to establish bias, bad faith, malice, or
corrupt purpose, in addition to palpable error which may be inferred from the decision or order

36
itself. This Court has to be shown acts or conduct of the judge clearly indicative of arbitrariness or
prejudice before the latter can be branded the stigma of being biased or partial. - Ramiscal, Jr. v.
Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]

Proof of clear and convincing evidence

The bare allegations of the judge’s partiality, as in this case, will not suffice in the absence of clear
and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role
of dispensing justice in accordance with law and evidence, and without fear or favor. - Ramiscal, Jr.
v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]

"No judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, or his wife or child, is pecuniarily
interested as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise...."

The relationship mentioned therein becomes relevant only when such spouse or child of the judge is
"pecuniarily interested" as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise. Petitioner, however, miserably failed
to show that Professor Carolina G. Hernandez is financially or pecuniarily interested in these cases
before the Sandiganbayan. - Ramiscal, Jr. v. Justice Hernandez G.R. Nos. 173057-74 [2010]

A summary of judicial obligations

3.1 A judge’s conduct should be above reproach and in the discharge of his judicial duties he should
be conscientious, studious, thorough, courteous, patient, punctual, just, impartial, fearless of
public clamour, and regardless of private influence should administer justice according to law and
should deal with the patronage of the position as a public trust; and he should not allow outside
matters or his private interests to interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his
office.”- Administrative Order No. 162, of the Department of Justice, dated August 1, 1946.Sandoval
v. Justice Tan, Jr. G.R. No. 106657 [1996]

Meaning of
“ruling in a lower court is the subject of review” or
“in which he has presided in any inferior court when his ruling or decision is the subject of
review.”

Granted that Justice Victor presided partly over the case in the court a quo, his was not the pen
that finally rendered the decision therein. Hence, he cannot be said to have been placed in a
position where he had to review his own decision as judge in the trial court. Accordingly, he was
not legally bound to inhibit himself from the case. - Sandoval v. Justice Tan, Jr. G.R. No. 106657
[1996]

Nevertheless, Justice Victor should have been more prudent and circumspect and declined to take
on the case, owing to his earlier involvement in the case. The Court has held that a judge should
not handle a case in which he might be perceived, rightly or wrongly, to be susceptible to bias and
partiality, which axiom is intended to preserve and promote public confidence in the integrity and
respect for the judiciary. While he is not legally required to decline from taking part in the case, it is
our considered view that his active participation in the case below constitutes a “just or valid
reason,” under Section 1 of Rule 137 for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from the case. - Sandoval
v. Justice Tan, Jr. G.R. No. 106657 [1996]

Automatic granting of a motion for voluntary inhibition improper

37
Indeed, the automatic granting of a motion for voluntary inhibition would open the floodgates to a
form of forum-shopping, in which litigants would be allowed to shop for a judge more sympathetic
to their cause, and would prove antithetical to the speedy and fair administration of justice. -
Kilosbayan Foundation v. Judge Janolo, Jr. G.R. No. 180543 [2010]

“Utang na loob” per se not a ground for inhibition

Inhibition is not allowed at every instance that a friend, classmate, associate or patron of a presiding
judge appears before him as counsel for one of the parties to a case. "Utang na loob", per se, should
not be a hindrance to the administration of justice. Nor should recognition of such value in
Philippine society prevent the performance of one's duties as judge. – Query of Executive Judge
Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October 26, 1987

Intimacy or friendship between a judge and an attorney of record is no ground for disqualification

It is clear from a reading of the law that intimacy or friendship between a judge and an attorney of
record of one of the parties to a suit is no ground for disqualification. xxx We held that the fact
"that one of the counsels in a case was a classmate of the trial judge is not a legal ground for the
disqualification of said judge.” To allow it would unnecessarily burden other trial judges to whom
the case would be transferred.

Ultimately, confusion would result, for under a different rule, a judge would be barred from sitting in
a case whenever one of his former classmates (and he could have many) appeared." - Query of
Executive Judge Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October 26, 1987

Personally approaching the judge to disqualify himself not contempt

We do not consider it as an act of contempt of court when petitioner asked his counsel to see
respondent Judge in his chamber and request him to disqualify himself upon a ground which
respondent Judge might consider just or valid. It is one thing to act not in accordance with the rules,
and another thing to act in a manner which would amount to a disrespect or an affront to the dignity
of the court or judge. - Austria v. Hon. Judge Masaquel, G.R. No. L-22536 August 31, 1967

Former associate in practice of law

We are in accord with the statement of respondent Judge in his memorandum that the circumstance
invoked by petitioner in asking him to inhibit himself from further trying the case — that Atty. Sicat
was his former associate in his practice of law — is not one of the grounds enumerated in the first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the new Rules of Court for disqualifying a judge. While it is true
that respondent Judge may not be compelled to disqualify himself, the fact that Atty. Sicat,
admittedly his former associate, was counsel for a party in the case being tried by him, may
constitute a just or valid reason for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case on a
retrial, if he so decides, pursuant to the provision of the second paragraph of Section 1 of the said
Rule 137. – Austria v. Hon. Judge Masaquel, G.R. No. L-22536 August 31, 1967

Judge was the former public prosecutor who handled the same case

The above-mentioned criminal case was inherited by the undersigned upon assumption to office as
Presiding Judge of this sala last November 12, 1996. It was only after 4 months herein undersigned
discovered and remembered that he handled the aforecited criminal case as public prosecutor years
back. Hence, for all intents and purposes, from the time he discovered his previous participation in
the above-cited criminal case, up to the present, the undersigned never heard nor tried nor

38
conducted any full-blown trial in the same. Besides the private prosecutor did not interpose any
objection.

WON respondent judge should be administratively sanctioned.

The prohibition is thus not limited to cases in which a judge hears the evidence of the parties but
includes as well cases where he acts by resolving motions, issuing orders and the like as Judge Rojas
has done in the criminal case. xxx The purpose of the rule is to prevent not only a conflict of interest
but also the appearance of impropriety on the part of the judge. A judge should take no part in a
proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned.

In violation of these rules, Judge Rojas sat as a judge in Criminal Case No. 09-5668 from November
12, 1996 to April 13, 1998 without securing the written consent of both the prosecution and the
defense and entering the same upon the record of the case. For almost one and a half years, he
issued various orders resetting the dates of the hearing and of the reception of additional evidence
for the prosecution and for the defense. Undoubtedly, by these acts, he sat in and acted on the
case. - In Re: Inhibition of Judge Rojas A.M. No. 98-6-185-RTC [1998]

Justice of CA had acted as counsel for respondent but no sanction

Considering that Justice Montenegro had so represented the National Power Corporation in CA G.R.
CV No. 34524 in his then capacity as the Acting Solicitor General, he should have really begged off
from any participation in the decision process by, indeed from being the ponente for, the
appellate court.

In all fairness to Justice Montenegro, however, he explained such failure to promptly inhibit himself
as one of mere inadvertence and oversight on his part, and when reminded that he, in fact, had
acted as counsel for respondent NPC as the then Acting Solicitor General, he then forthwith
disengaged himself from further involvement in the disposition of the case. - Urbanes, R. v. CA, G.R.
No. 112884 August 30, 1994

Should a judge whose decision was reversed by the appellate court voluntarily inhibit herself
when the case is remanded to her sala

The fact that Judge Quijano-Padilla ruled adversely against petitioner in the resolution of the motion
to dismiss, which this Court later reversed in G.R. No. 160753, is not enough reason, absent any
extrinsic evidence of malice or bad faith, to conclude that the judge was biased and partial against
petitioner. As this Court has emphasized in Webb v. People, the remedy of erroneous interlocutory
rulings in the course of a trial is not the outright disqualification of a judge, for there is yet to come
a judge with the omniscience to issue rulings that are always infallible. The courts will close shop if
we disqualify judges who err, for we all err. - Barnes v. reyes, et. al., G.R. No. 179583 [2009]

Is a former assistant or associate of the judge in the practice of law a ground for automatic
disqualification

We are in accord with the statement of respondent Judge in his memorandum that the circumstance
invoked by petitioner in asking him to inhibit himself from further trying the case — that Atty. Sicat
was his former associate in his practice of law — is not one of the grounds enumerated in the first
paragraph of Section 1, Rule 137 of the new Rules of Court for disqualifying a judge. While it is true
that respondent Judge may not be compelled to disqualify himself, the fact that Atty. Sicat,
admittedly his former associate, was counsel for a party in the case being tried by him, may
constitute a just or valid reason for him to voluntarily inhibit himself from hearing the case on a

39
retrial, if he so decides, pursuant to the provision of the second paragraph of Section 1 of the said
Rule 137. – Austria v. Hon. Judge Masaquel, G.R. No. L-22536 August 31, 1967

Is being a former classmate of the judge a ground for inhibition or disqualification?

Appellants stress that the trial court should be held disqualified because the counsel for plaintiffs-
appellees had been a classmate of the trial judge. Admittedly, this is not a legal ground for
disqualification. To allow it would unnecessarily burden other trial judges to whom the case would
be transferred. Ultimately, confusion would result, for under the rule advocated, a judge would be
barred from sitting in a case whenever one of his former classmates (and he could have many)
appeared. – Vda. De Bonifacio v. BLTB, et. al., G.R. No. L-26810. August 31, 1970

It is clear from a reading of the law that intimacy or friendship between a judge and an attorney of
record of one of the parties to a suit is no ground for disqualification. - Query of Executive Judge
Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October 26, 1987

Who shall resolve a motion for reconsideration filed against the decision of a judge, after he had
voluntarily inhibited himself from further sitting in the case?

The administrative matter before us differs from most petitions involving a judge's disqualification
here, a judge voluntarily inhibits himself and, instead of a party or both parties filing a motion on the
matter, it is another judge who insists that he continue with the case.

However, as much as possible, the judge to whom a case is transferred should not resist too much
the order of recusation unless the motives for inhibition are suspect. - Query of Executive Judge
Estrada, A.M. No. 87-9-3918-RTC October 26, 1987

Judge attempted to make complainant and the accused settle their dispute amicably considering
that they are brothers and the wife of the accused is his first cousin

Respondent's efforts, praiseworthy though they may be, cannot justify the disregard of the law. At
the first sign that complainant was not willing to listen to respondent's counsel, the latter should
have recused himself from the case without further delay. He cannot sacrifice the integrity of the
judicial office on the chance that complainant might relent and agree at last to settle the matter with
his brother. A period of two (2) months is more than enough for respondent to make use of his
good office. After a reasonable time trying his ability to bring the parties to an amicable settlement
and using his moral influence on them without success, he should have inhibited himself from the
case and continued his peace efforts in a private capacity.

Judge is reprimanded. – Lazo v. Judge Tiong, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1173. December 15, 1998

Would mandamus lie to compel respondent Judge to proceed with hearing the case

On July 26, 1995, respondent Judge de la Cruz, Jr. issued an order denying the motion for inhibition
but voluntarily inhibited himself and subsequently denied the motion for reconsideration of the
order of inhibition.

As such, mandamus would not lie to compel respondent Judge Marino M. dela Cruz, Jr. to proceed
with hearing the case since the grant or denial of the motion to inhibit involves the exercise of
discretion. The right or duty to exercise this discretion has been imposed on him by the Rules of
Court with regard to any matter brought before him. Furthermore, petitioners have no vested right
to the issuance of the motion to inhibit given its discretionary nature. – Gutang, et. al. v. CA, G.R.
No. 124760 July 8, 1998

40
Verbal motion for voluntary inhibition is not proper

Acting thereupon, respondent judge ordered the lawyer to file the corresponding motion within five
(5) days from receipt of the Order; and in the meantime, he suspended the arraignment of the
accused. However, the private prosecutor did not file the required motion for inhibition, an
omission which was interpreted as abandonment of the stance of the complainant to inhibit the
respondent Judge from hearing subject cases. – Villanueva v. Judge Almazan, A.M. No. MTJ-99-
1221. March 16, 2000

DISQUALIFICATION OF JUDICIAL OFFICERS Rule 137

Sec. 2. Objection that judge disqualified, how made and effect. - If it be claimed that an official is
disqualified from sitting as above provided, the party objecting to his competency may, in writing,
file with the official his objection, stating the grounds therefor, and the official shall thereupon
proceed with the trial, or withdraw therefrom, in accordance with his determination of the question
of his disqualification. His decision shall be forthwith made in writing and filed with the other papers
in the case, but no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his decision in favor of his
own competency, until after final judgment in the case.

No appeal or stay shall be allowed until after final judgment in the case is not an absolute rule

Second, while the restriction in the Rule against appeal or stay of the proceedings where the trial
judge rules in favor of her competency to sit in a case is not an absolute rule in civil cases, and has
not precluded a resort in appropriate cases to the special civil action of certiorari before the higher
courts for determination.

This will apply only in cases where the denial of the motion for inhibition or disqualification was
made ahead of the trial court’s judgment on the merits and there is a clear showing that the case
is an exceptional one. This is not true in the case of the present petitioner. Ong v. Basco, G.R. No.
167899 August 6, 2008

Interpretation of Section 2 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court against appeal or stay of the
proceedings when the trial judge denies a motion to disqualify himself and rules in favor of his
own competency

Rule 137 in criminal cases might give a contrary impression, that such restriction against appeal or
stay of the proceedings when the trial judge denies a motion to disqualify himself and rules in favor
of his own competency does not apply in criminal cases where such disqualification is sought by the
prosecution or offended party. - Paredes v. Judge Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710 September 30, 1969

When the accused seeks inhibition or disqualification

Where, however, it is the accused in a criminal case who seeks the disqualification of the trial
judge, the general restriction provided in the rule against appeal or stay of the proceedings when
the judge denies the motion and rules in favor of his own competency would apply, as it does in
civil cases.

In such case, the accused, in the event of his conviction, could raise the correctness of the judge's
ruling on his non-disqualification with his appeal from the decision on the merits; and were he to be
acquitted, he would have no cause for complaint against the judge's acquittal verdict and ruling of
non-disqualification of himself from trying the case and rendering such verdict. - Paredes v. Judge
Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710 September 30, 1969

41
Rule on restriction against appeal or stay of the proceedings when the trial judge denies a motion
to disqualify himself and rules in favor of his own competency

When it is the accused in a criminal case who seeks the disqualification of the trial judge, the
general restriction would apply – meaning no appeal until final judgment.

When it is the prosecution or offended party in a criminal case who seeks the disqualification of the
trial judge such restriction against appeal or stay of the proceedings does not apply. – otherwise the
rule on double jeopardy will apply against the prosecution or offended party.

In civil and [administrative] cases, no appeal or stay shall be allowed from, or by reason of, his
decision in favor of his own competency, until after final judgment in the case.

Disqualification of a judge is not a matter that affects his jurisdiction

This Court's jurisprudence, likewise contrary to petitioners' contention, holds that the
disqualification of a judge is not a matter that affects his jurisdiction and power to act such as to
render his decision null and void, so much so that failure on the part of a party, to timely interpose
such an objection of disqualification prior to the decision has been held to be a fatal obstacle to
raising such objection on appeal. - Paredes v. Judge Gopengco, G.R. No. L-23710 September 30,
1969

When to file a motion for disqualification?

The question of a judge's disqualification, therefore, is one that should be timely raised in the first
instance, so that it may properly be raised and considered on appeal.

At the same time, as we pointed out in the Abella case, supra, if this Court were of the opinion upon
a review of the case that the litigant had not had a fair trial, it would grant a new trial, although
the judge may not have been disqualified under Rule 137, not on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
but in the best interests of justice.

This we did in Dais vs. Torres, where we ruled that: "Although a judge may not have been
disqualified under said section, nevertheless if it appears to this court that the appellant was not
given a fair and impartial trial because of the trial judge's bias or prejudice, this court will order a
new trial, if it deems it necessary, in the interest of justice." Paredes v. Judge Gopengco, G.R. No.
L-23710 September 30, 1969

“Remittal of Disqualification”

SEC. 6. A judge disqualified as stated above may, instead of withdrawing from the proceeding,
disclose on the records the basis of disqualification. If, based on such disclosure, the parties and
lawyers independently of the judge’s participation, all agree in writing that the reason for the
inhibition is immaterial or unsubstantial, the judge may then participate in the proceeding. The
agreement, signed by all parties and lawyers, shall be incorporated in the record of the proceedings.
- CANON 3 IMPARTIALITY New Code of Judicial Conduct

Written consent of all the parties is required in “Remittal of Disqualification”

From the foregoing provision of the rules, a judge cannot sit in any case in which he was a counsel
without the written consent of all the parties in interest, signed by them and entered upon the

42
record. The respondent alleged that since there was no objection from any of the parties, he
proceeded to preside over the case and to decide it. This is a clear violation of the law. The rule is
explicit that he must secure the written consent of all the parties, not a mere verbal consent much
less a tacit acquiescence. More than this, said written consent must be signed by them and entered
upon the record. - Lorenzo v. Judge Marquez, A.M. No. MTJ-87-123 June 27, 1988

“Common law” relationship not a relationship by affinity

The law cannot be stretched to include persons attached by common-law relations. Here, there is no
blood relationship or legal bond that links the appellant to his victim. Thus, the modifying
circumstance of relationship cannot be considered against him. – PP v. Atop, G.R. Nos. 124303-05
February 10, 1998

Presumption of regularity

Mere allegations, conjectures, suppositions, speculations or hearsay cannot overcome the

presumption that the respondent [judge] has regularly performed his or her duties. - Bautista v. Ass.
Justice Abdulwahid, A.M. OCA IPI No. 06-97-CA-J, May 2, 2006

"Bare allegations of partiality x x x [is not sufficient] in the absence of clear and convincing evidence
to overcome the presumption that the judge will undertake his noble role to dispense justice
according to law and evidence and without fear or favor." - Crisostomo v. People of the Philippines,
G.R. No. 171526, September 1, 2010

Duty not to recuse

Judges should not recuse themselves merely because an unfounded claim of bias or prejudice has
been lodged against them. xxx . [A] judge has an equally strong duty not to recuse when the
circumstances do not require recusal. - Annotated Model Code of Judicial Conduct, American Bar
Association, page 187, 2004

Improper purpose for filing motion to inhibit/disqualify

The rule [on inhibition or disqualification] should “not be used cavalierly to suit a litigant’s personal
designs or to defeat the ends of justice.”

It deemed as intolerable acts of litigants who, for any conceivable reason, would seek to disqualify a
judge for their own purposes under a plea of bias, hostility, or prejudgment.

It further held that it did not approve of some litigants’ tactic of filing baseless motions for
disqualification as a means of delaying the case or of forum-shopping for a more friendly judge. -
People v. Serrano, 203 SCRA 171, 186-87, October 28, 1991, cited by Justice Panganiban in his
Extended Explanation for Inhibition in the case of Estrada vs. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March
2, 2001

43
PPT 18: Extrajudicial activities of judges /justices

The previous “Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct is a supplement to the
new Code

“Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct”, promulgated on 5 September 1989,
shall take effect on 20 October 1989

This “New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary” shall take effect on the first day of
June 2004

This Code, which shall hereafter be referred to as the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the
Philippine Judiciary, supersedes the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct
heretofore applied in the Philippines to the extent that the provisions or concepts therein are
embodied in this Code: Provided, however, that in case of deficiency or absence of specific
provisions in this New Code, the Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct shall be
applicable in a suppletory character.

CANON 4 PROPRIETY

New Code of Judicial Conduct [2004]

Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a
judge.

SECTION 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.

SEC. 2. As a subject of constant public scrutiny, judges must accept personal restrictions that might
be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen and should do so freely and willingly. In particular,
judges shall conduct themselves in a way that is consistent with the dignity of the judicial office.

SEC. 3. Judges shall, in their personal relations with individual members of the legal profession who
practice regularly in their court, avoid situations which might reasonably give rise to the suspicion or
appearance of favoritism or partiality.

SEC. 4. Judges shall not participate in the determination of a case in which any member of their
family represents a litigant or is associated in any manner with the case.

SEC. 5. Judges shall not allow the use of their residence by a member of the legal profession to
receive clients of the latter or of other members of the legal profession.

44
SEC. 6. Judges, like any other citizen, are entitled to freedom of expression, belief, association and
assembly, but in exercising such rights, they shall always conduct themselves in such a manner as to
preserve the dignity of the judicial office and the impartiality and independence of the judiciary.

SEC. 7. Judges shall inform themselves about their personal fiduciary financial interests and shall
make reasonable efforts to be informed about the financial interests of members of their family.

SEC. 8. Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their private
interests, or those of a member of their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit
others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to influence them in
the performance of judicial duties.

SEC. 9. Confidential information acquired by judges in their judicial capacity shall not be used or
disclosed by for any other purpose related to their judicial duties.

SEC. 10. Subject to the proper performance of judicial duties, judges may

(a) Write, lecture, teach and participate in activities concerning the law, the legal system, the
administration of justice or related matters;

(b) Appear at a public hearing before an official body concerned with matters relating to the law, the
legal system, the administration of justice or related matters;

(c) Engage in other activities if such activities do not detract from the dignity of the judicial office or
otherwise interfere with the performance of judicial duties.

SEC. 12. Judges may form or join associations of judges or participate in other organizations
representing the interests of judges.

SEC. 13. Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift, bequest,
loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in
connection with the performance of judicial duties.

SEC. 14. Judges shall not knowingly permit court staff or others subject to their influence, direction
or authority, to ask for, or accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to
be done or omitted to be done in connection with their duties or functions.

SEC. 15. Subject to law and to any legal requirements of public disclosure, judges may receive a
token gift, award or benefit as appropriate to the occasion on which it is made provided that such
gift, award or benefit might not reasonably be perceived as intended to influence the judge in the
performance of judicial duties or otherwise give rise to an appearance of partiality.

Private practice of law prohibited

Rule 138 RRC Sec. 35. Certain attorneys not to practice. - No judge or other official or employee of
the superior courts or of the Office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as a
member of the bar or give professional advice to clients.

Canon 5, Rule 5.07 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states that: A judge shall not engage in the
private practice of law. Unless prohibited by the Constitution or law, a judge may engage in the
practice of any other profession provided that such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with
judicial functions.

Why a judge cannot practice law

45
These provisions are based on public policy for there is no question that the rights, duties, privileges
and functions of the office of an attorney-at-law are inherently incompatible with the high official
functions, duties, powers, discretion and privileges of a judge.

It also aims to ensure that judges give their full time and attention to their judicial duties, prevent
them from extending special favors to their own private interests and assure the public of their
impartiality in the performance of their functions.

These objectives are dictated by a sense of moral decency and desire to promote the public
interest. - Ziga v. Judge Arejola, A.M. No. MTJ-99-1203. June 10, 2003

Drafting complainant’s affidavit is practice of law

Respondent acted as a lawyer for complainant and her father-in-law when he drafted complainant’s
affidavit which became the basis of a complaint for estafa filed against Heidi Navarra.

By acting as counsel for complainant and the latter’s father-in-law in a case filed in his court,
respondent compromised his neutrality and independence. How could he then be expected to
decide with objectivity and fairness the cases in which he has acted as a lawyer for the plaintiff or
complainant?

Respondent’s misconduct in this case is further compounded by the fact that he rendered the legal
services in question using government facilities during office hours. - Biboso v. Judge Villanueva,
A.M. No. MTJ-01-1356. April 16, 2001

Instances when a judge canserving as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or other fiduciary

As a general rule, a judge is prohibited from serving as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or
other fiduciary. The only exception is when the estate or trust belongs to, or the ward is a member
of his immediate family, and only if his service as executor, administrator, trustee, guardian or
fiduciary will not interfere with the proper performance of his judicial duties.

The Code has defined who may be considered as members of his immediate family and they are the
spouse and relatives within the second degree of consanguinity. – Carual v. Brusola A.M. No. RTJ-
99-1500. October 20, 1999

“Judge’s family”

Includes a judge’s:

1. spouse,
2. son,
3. daughter,
4. son-in-law,
5. daughter-in-law, and
6. any other relative by consanguinity or affinity within the sixth civil degree, or
7. person who is a companion or employee of the judge and who lives in the judge’s household.
Rendering legal opinion proscribed

To escape our disciplining wrath, respondent judge argues that the "resolution" he issued was a
mere expression of his legal opinion and not a judgment or order "which adjudicates and settles

46
rights and obligations of the parties." He said that the petition for declaratory relief, earlier quoted,
is not a pleading, but a mere letter-request for a legal opinion. Hence, complainant Gozun was not
entitled to notice and hearing.

Besides, even assuming arguendo that the resolution was a mere legal opinion, still respondent must
know that rendering of "legal opinions" is not the function of a judge. The function of the court is
limited to adjudication of actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable or
enforceable. Unlike lawyers, judges cannot render legal advice. Judges are expressly prohibited from
engaging in the private practice of law or from giving professional advice to clients. – Gozun v. Judge
Liangco A.M. No. MTJ-97-1136. August 30, 2000

A judge who violates the judicial code of conduct also violates the lawyer’s oath

We ruled that because membership in the bar is an integral qualification for membership in the
bench, the moral fitness of a judge also reflects the latter’s moral fitness as a lawyer. A judge who
disobeys the basic rules of judicial conduct also violates the lawyer’s oath. - OCA v. Atty. Liangco, A.
C. No. 5355 [2011]

As attorney-in-fact in actual litigations

Except for the initiatory pleading, respondent Judge signed the pleadings relative to the civil case
and participated in some of the hearings held relative thereto.

The proscription against the private practice of law, or just giving professional advice to clients, by
Judges is based on public policy.

The prohibition applies equally well to the appointment of and acceptance by judges to the post of
attorney-in-fact in actual litigations, a fact which is also, by and large, incompatible with the high
office, functions, prestige and privileges of a judge. It is of no moment, albeit worse, that the case
where he accepts such designation as attorney-in-fact is one that pends before his own court. - Sps.
Gragera v. Judge Francisco, A. M. No. RTJ-02-1670. June 26, 2003

A.M. NO. 13-05-05-SC

RE: REVISION OF
RESTRICTIONS ON TEACHING HOURS OF
JUSTICES, JUDGES AND PERSONNEL OF THE JUDICIARY
EN BANC RESOLUTION DATED 01 APRIL 2014

1. Teaching shall be allowed for not more than ten (10) hours a week. On regular working days
(Monday through Friday), teaching shall not be conducted earlier than 5:30 p.m.

2. An application for permission to teach if filed by a judge shall be accompanied by a certification of

the Clerk of Court concerned regarding the condition of the court docket showing:

(a) the number of pending cases; and

(b) the number of cases disposed of within a three-month period prior to the start of the semester
in his or her respective sala.

An application for permission to teach filed by a

judge or justice shall require approval as follows:

47
 a. If filed by a judge from a lower level court, it shall be subject to the approval of the executive
judge concerned;

b. If filed by an executive judge, it shall be subject to the approval of the Court Administrator;

c. If filed by an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or the Court of Tax
Appeals, it shall be subject to the approval of the presiding justice concerned;

d. If filed by the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or the Court of Tax
Appeals, it shall be subject to the approval of the Chief Justice.

An application for permission to teach filed by

court personnel shall require approval as follows

a. If filed by court personnel from a lower level court, it shall be subject to the approval of the
executive judge concerned;

b. If filed by court personnel from the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, or the Court of Tax
Appeals, it shall be subject to the approval of the presiding justice or the executive justice
concerned, as the case may be;

c. If filed by Supreme Court personnel belonging to a chamber of an Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court, it shall be subject to the approval of the Associate Justice concerned, who will notify the Chief
Justice and the Office of Administrative Services, Supreme Court, of this approval;

d. If filed by other Supreme Court personnel, it shall be subject to the approval of the Chief Justice.

Disposition of applications

5. The approving authority may deny the application or allow less than ten (10) hours of teaching a
week, depending on the applicant’s performance record.

6. At the end of every year, an approving authority shall submit to the Chief Justice a report on the
applications submitted for the year and the respective status of, or action taken on, each
application.

Failure to secure permit to teach

To justify his failure to obtain a permit from the Supreme Court, he said that the University of the
East did not require him to submit one.

Respondent judge’s failure to accomplish the Request for Permission to Teach form prescribed in
Circular No. 50-97, dated July 18, 1997 is inexcusable. It is a clear violation of the judiciary rules and
regulations, indicating respondent judge’s disregard of the authority of the Supreme Court. For no
matter how insignificant or inconsequential the circular may seem to respondent judge, he should
have complied with it. - Jabon v. Judge Sibanah E. Usman, A.M. No. RTJ-02-1713 [2005]

Proper for judges to attend meetings of members of the bar

It is not necessary to the proper performance of judicial duty that judges should live in retirement or
seclusion; it is desirable that, so far as the reasonable attention to the completion of their work will
permit, they continue to mingle in social intercourse, and that they should not discontinue their
interests in or appearance at meetings of members at the bar.

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A judge should, however, in pending or prospective litigation before him be scrupulously careful to
avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations
or friendships constitute an element in determining his judicial course.’”- Abundo v. Judge Manio,
Jr., A.M. No. RTJ-98-1416. August 6, 1999

Judge eating lunch with counsel

For respondent judge to eat lunch with counsel is not wrong per se. The Canons, however, provides
that as much as possible he should be scrupulously careful to avoid any suspicion that his social or
business or friendly relationship is an element in “determining his judicial course.”

Knowing that Atty. Verano, Jr., is counsel of the petitioner in an annulment case pending before him,
the respondent judge should have thought twice about joining counsel for lunch, especially in the
courtroom at that. – Pertierra v. Judge Lerma, A.M. No. RTJ-03-1799. September 12, 2003

Political activities of judges

Allowed : A judge is entitled to entertain personal views on political questions.

Prohibited: But to avoid suspicion of political partisanship:

1. a judge shall not make political speeches, 2. a judge shall not contribute to party funds

3. a judge shall not publicly endorse candidates for political office or participate in other partisan
political activities. - Rule 5.10, Canon 5, of the Code of Judicial Conduct

Engaging in partisan political activity

improper under Civil Service Law

Pres. Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Law) clearly states:

Section 45. No officer or employee in the Civil Service including members of the Armed Forces, shall
engage directly or indirectly in any partisan political activity or take part in any election except to
vote nor shall be use his official authority or influence to coerce the political activity of any other
person or body. Nothing herein provided shall be understood to prevent any officer or employee
from expressing his views on current political problems or issues, or from mentioning the names of
candidates for public office whom he supports: ...

Engaging in political activity

Respondent started circulating handbills/letters addressed to electoral constituents in the second

district of Bulacan indicating his intention to run for a congressional seat.

For having held himself out as a congressional candidate while still a member of the Bench,
Respondent took advantage of his position to boost his candidacy, demeaned the stature of his
office, and must be pronounced guilty of gross misconduct. - Vistan v. Judge Nicolas A.M. No. MTJ-
87-79 [1991]

Filing of a certificate of candidacy

When he was appointed as a judge, he took an oath to uphold the law, yet in filing a certificate
of candidacy as a party-list representative in the May 1998 elections without giving up his judicial
post, Judge Limbona violated not only the law, but the constitutional mandate that “no officer or

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employee in the civil service shall engage directly or indirectly, in any electioneering or partisan
political campaign.”

The filing of a certificate of candidacy is a partisan political activity as the candidate thereby offers
himself to the electorate for an elective post. - Limbona v. Judge Limbona, A.M. No. SCC-98-4
March 22, 2011

Limit of judge’s journalistic writing

Complainant alleged that respondent used his newspaper column to ventilate his biases or personal
anger at people or institutions.

Complainant believes that respondent judge should not engage in active, sensational, and free-for-
all journalistic writing because such act degrades the judicial system and compromises his
impartiality as an administrator of justice.

Respondent’s writing of active and vicious editorials compromises his duties as judge in the
impartial administration of justice, for his views printed on newspapers reflect on his office as well
as on the public officers that he challenges.

Not only does he act as its contributor or columnist, he is also its publisher, editor and legal adviser.
Although the Code of Judicial Conduct allows a judge to engage in certain lawful activities, they
should not interfere with the performance of judicial duties nor detract from the dignity of the court.
- Galang v. Judge Santos G.R. No. MTJ-99-1197 [1999]

Judge cannot be appointed to executive position in any enterprise

Circular No. 6 dated April 10, 1987 strictly enjoins all Judges, Clerks of Court and Sheriffs not to
accept the position of director or any other position in any electric cooperative or other
enterprises, or to resign immediately from such position if they are already holding the same so as
not to prejudice the expeditious and proper administration of justice.

In violation of this circular, Judge Estrada, who was appointed to the judiciary on May 17, 1994, did
not resign from the Board of Directors of the Rural Bank of Labrador until May 31, 1997. - Re:
Inhibition of Judge Bienvenido R. Estrada A.M. No. 98-1-32-RTC July 29, 1998

Judge should not accept any position in any business enterprise

RULE 5.01 - A judge may engage in the following activities provided that they do not interfere with
the performance of judicial duties or detract from the dignity of the court:

(d) serve as an officer, director, trustee, or non-legal advisor of a non-profit or non-political

educational, religious, charitable, fraternal, or civic organization.

RULE 5.03 - Subject to the provisions of the proceeding rule, a judge may hold and manage
investments but should not serve as officer, director, manager or advisor, or employee of any
business except as director of a family business of the judge. - Canons of Judicial Ethics and the Code
of Judicial Conduct

Not good for judges to engage in business

Indeed, it is not good for judges to engage in business except only to the extent allowed by Rule
5.03 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which provides:

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Subject to the provisions of the preceding rule, a judge may hold and manage investments but
should not serve as an officer, director, manager, advisor, or employee of any business except as
director of a family business of the judge.

- Berin and Alorro v. Judge Barte A.M. No. MTJ-02-1443. July 31, 2002

Limits of financial and business dealings

Refrain from financial and business dealings that tend to:

1. reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality,

2. interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities, or
3. increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court.
- Berin and Alorro v. Judge Barte A.M. No. MTJ-02-1443. July 31, 2002 citing Rule 5.02 of the Canons
of Judicial Ethics and the Code of Judicial Conduct

Act of writing a letter to opposing counsel and defending a right amounts to private practice of
law

We also find merit in complainant's contention that respondent's act of writing to Atty. Cargullo and
defending the right of Andres Bo to possess the lot in dispute amounts to private practice of law.

The tenor of the letter shows that respondent, as representative of Andres Bo, was defending the
latter's rights over the disputed property. Respondent's act of representing and defending the
interest of a private individual in the disputed property constitutes private practice of law. It has
been ruled that "the practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court or participation in
court proceedings but also includes preparation of pleadings or papers in anticipation of a litigation,
giving advice to clients or persons needing the same, etc. - Carual v. Brusola A.M. No. RTJ-99-1500.
October 20, 1999

As agent in the sale of the subject property

By allowing himself to act as agent in the sale of the subject property, respondent judge has
increased the possibility of his disqualification to act as an impartial judge in the event that a
dispute involving the said contract of sale arises.

Also, the possibility that the parties to the sale might plead before his court is not remote and his
business dealings with them might not only create suspicion as to his fairness but also to his ability
to render it in a manner that is free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and also as
to the judge’s integrity. - Rosauro v. Judge Kallos A.M. No. RTJ-03-1796 February 10, 2006

Financial and business dealings

Judge can engage in financial and business dealings provide:

1. such will not reflect adversely on the court’s impartiality.

2. will not interfere with the proper performance of judicial activities.

3. will not increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the court.

A judge should so manage investments and other financial interests as to minimize the number of
cases giving grounds for disqualification. - Catbagan v. Judge Barte, A.M. No. MTJ-02-1452. April
06, 2005

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Sheer presence - as a member of the Judiciary - would be sufficient suggestion of persuasion and
influence

As a member of the bench, the respondent judge should realize that his presence, opinion and
participation in any proceeding could slant the evaluation and resolution of the case in favor of (the)
party he identifies himself with. A judge need not utter any word for his sheer presence - as a
member of the Judiciary - would be sufficient suggestion of persuasion and influence.

In this case, the respondent judge's presence and participation in the proceedings were to the
advantage of his relatives, the heirs of Dr. Cosme T. Valdez, Sr. That his efforts failed to influence
the DARAB, for the motion filed by the Valdez heirs in DARAB Case No. 282-T-93 for contempt was
dismissed, has no relevance. - Garcia, et. al. v. Judge Valdez, A.M. No. MTJ-98-1156 [1998]

Giving moral support to a family member by attending the hearing is improper

Judge Dojillo admitted that he was present during the mentioned hearings but explained that he did
not sit beside his brother’s lawyer but in the area reserved for the public; and that the main reason
why he was there was to observe how election protests are conducted as he has never conducted
one. His other reason was to give moral support to his brother. - Vidal v. Judge Dojillo, Jr. A.M. No.
MTJ-05-1591 [2005]

Objection from complainant or counsel is immaterial

Although concern for family members is deeply ingrained in the Filipino culture, respondent, being a
judge, should bear in mind that he is also called upon to serve the higher interest of preserving the
integrity of the entire judiciary.

The fact that neither complainant nor his counsel objected to the presence of respondent during
the hearing is immaterial. - Vidal v. Judge Dojillo, Jr. A.M. No. MTJ-05-1591 [2005]

Use of letterhead by a judge

In other words, the respondent Judge’s transgression was not per se in the use of the letterhead, but
in not being very careful and discerning in considering the circumstances surrounding the use of his
letterhead and his title. - Ladignon v. Judge Garong, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1712 [2008]

Hence, respondent judge’s use of the court heading outside of judicial business warrants
disciplinary action for violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct particularly Section 1, Canon 4.

Use of ordinary bond papers and placing his official station as return address

The Judge’s claim that he used an ordinary bond papers and placed thereon his official station as
return address is not totally without merit.

For, indeed, this is not an unusual practice and it would be hypocritical to deny its occurrence at all
levels of the Judiciary. For example, some members of the Judiciary may use a social card with the
letterhead of their office to indicate their address as well as their station within the judicial
hierarchy; some also use notepads bearing their names, designation and station. - Ladignon v.
Judge Garong, A.M. No. MTJ-08-1712 [2008]

Use of court’s stationery

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The Court also finds respondent Judge liable for violating Rule 2.03 of the Code in using official
stationery for his correspondence with complainant and the latter’s counsel regarding Lot No.
1470. A court’s stationery, with its official letterhead, should only be used for official
correspondence. By using his sala’s stationery other than for official purposes, respondent Judge
evidently used the prestige of his office to benefit Guererro (and himself) in violation of Rule 2.0322
of the Code. - Rosauro v. Judge Kallos A.M. No. RTJ-03-1796 February 10, 2006

Respondent Judge should know that a court’s letterhead should be used only for official
correspondence. - Oktubre v. Judge Velasco A.M. No. MTJ 02-1444. July 22, 2004

Judge required tenants to pay at MTC

Respondent Judge aggravates his liability when, in his letters to the tenants, he further required
them to pay their rent at the MTC Maasin, although he was then staying at the Paler building.

By these calculated steps, respondent Judge in the words of Rule 2.03, clearly intended to “use the
prestige of his judicial office” to advance the interest of his maternal co-heirs. – Oktubre v. Judge
Velasco A.M. No. MTJ 02-1444. July 22, 2004

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