Knowledge Part 3

Public Corporation
There are two kinds of public corporation, namely, municipal and non-municipal. A municipal
corporation in its strict sense is the body politic constituted by the inhabitants of a city or town for the
purpose of local government thereof. It is the body politic established by law particularly as an
agency of the State to assist in the civil government of the country chiefly to regulate the local and
internal affairs of the city or town that is incorporated. Non-municipal corporations, on the other hand,
are public corporations created as agencies of the State for limited purposes to take charge merely
of some public or state work other than community government. [National Waterworks & Sewerage
Authority v. NWSA Consolidated Unions (1964)] The mere fact that the Government happens to be
the majority stockholder does not make it a public corporation. [National Coal Co. v. Collector of
Internal Revenue, 46 Phil. 583 (1924); Bacani v. National Coconut Corporation (1956)] Note:
National Power Corporation (NPC or NAPOCOR) is a public corporation, by virtue of Commonwealth
Act No. 120, as amended, and Executive Order No. 399. [City of Iligan v Director of Lands (1988)]
NAWASA, though a public corporation [under Republic Act No. 1383.], is not a municipal
corporation, because it is not an agency of the State to regulate or administer the local affairs of the
town, city, or district which is incorporated. It performs proprietary functions, and hence, it is covered
by Commonwealth Act No. 444. [National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority v. NWSA Consolidated
Unions (1964)]
Related Reference(s)
 National Coal Co. vs. Collector Of Internal Revenue 046 Phil 583
G.R. No. L-22619 | 1924-12-02
 Leopoldo T. Bacani, et al. vs. National Coconut Corporation (NACOCO) 100 Phil 468
G.R. No. L-9657 | 1956-11-29
 City of Iligan vs. Director of Lands, et al.
G.R. No. L-30852 | 1988-02-26
 National Waterworks & Sewerage Authority vs. NWSA Consolidated Unions
G.R. No. L-18939 | 1964-08-31
Political Law; Local Governments; Municipal Corporations

Elements
1. Legal creation or incorporation

2. Corporate name by which the entity is known and in which all corporate acts are done
3. Inhabitants or population which is invested with the powers of the corporation through
duly constituted officers and agents
4. Place or territory within which the local government exercises civil and corporate
functions [Nachura, Outline Reviewer in Political law (2009)]
Nature and functions
Every LGU created under this Code is a body politic and corporate. It shall exercise powers
both as a political subdivision of the National Government, and as a corporate entity
representing the inhabitants of its territory. [Sec. 15, R.A. No. 7160]
Exercised for the special benefit and advantage of the community [Torio v.
Fontanilla, G.R. No. L-29993, October 23, 1978]
Powers are ministerial, private, and corporate. The Municipal Corporation can be held
liable ex contractu or ex delicto.
 Torio vs. Fontanilla 85 SCRA 99
G.R. No. L-29993/G.R. No. L-30183 | 1978-10-23
Municipality Liability, Suits Against Municipal Corporations

Statutory Basis
a) Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code)
Section 24. Liability for Damages. - Local government units and their officials are not
exempt from liability for death or injury to persons or damage to property.
b) Republic Act No. 386 (Civil Code)
Art. 2189. Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death
of, or injuries suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads,
streets, bridges, public buildings, and other public works under their control or
supervision.
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one's own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not
when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly
pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable.
Art. 34. When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid
or protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall
be primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall
be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein recognized shall be
independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice
to support such action.
A. Liability for Tort
Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to
sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them
in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable only if it can be
shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity. In permitting such entities to be
sued, the State merely gives the claimant the right to show that the defendant was not
acting in its governmental capacity when the injury was committed or that the case comes
under the exceptions recognized by law. Failing this, the claimant cannot
recover. [Municipality of San Fernando vs. Firme, G.R. No. 52179, April 8, 1991]
Sovereign or government functions - not liable
In Municipality of San Fernando vs. Firme [G.R. No. 52179, April 8, 1991], the
court ruled that the municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its
regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental functions. In
the said case, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality was then on his way to
get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of San Fernando's municipal streets, entered
into a collission with a jeepney which resulted in the death of several passengers. The
court ruled that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining
to his office. hence, the municipality cannot be made liable to pay monetary
compensation.
Also, in Palafox, et al., v. Province of Ilocos Norte, a truck driver employed by the
provincial government of Ilocos Norte ran over Proceto Palafox in the course of his work
at the construction of a road. The court held that the province could not be made liable
because its employee was in the performance of a governmental function — the
construction and maintenance of roads — and the death of Palafox imposed on the
province no duty to pay monetary consideration. [see Torio vs Fontanilla, G.R. No. L-
29993/G.R. No. L-30183, October 23, 1978]
Proprietary or commercial functions - liable
Holding of a town fiesta

In Torio vs Fontanilla [G.R. No. L-29993/G.R. No. L-30183, October 23,
1978], applying the principle of respondeat superior, the municipality was held liable for
the death of a member of the zarzuela group when the stage collapsed during the town
fiesta managed by the municipality.
Operation of a ferry service

In Mendoza vs. De Leon [G.R. No. 9596, February 11, 1916], the court held that
the leasing of a municipal ferry to the highest bidder for a specified period of time is not
a governmental but corporate function. Such a lease, when validly entered into,
constitutes a contract with the lessee which the municipality is bound to respect. Hence
the municipality was made liable for damages when the municipal officers awarded the
franchise to another operator notwithstanding the prior and existing lease granted to the
plaintiff.
Operation of a public cemetery

In City of Manila vs IAC [G.R. No. 71159, November 15, 1989], the court held that,
in the absence of a special law, the North Cemetery is within the class of property which
the City of Manila owns in its proprietary or private character. The operation of a cemetery
being a corporate function, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the City of Manila
is liable for the tortious act committed by its agents with respect to the contract of lease
over the burial lots.
B. Liability for Contracts
A municipal corporation is liable under the contracts it enters into provided the contract
is intra vires. If the contract is ultra vires, the municipality is not liable. [see City of
Manila vs IAC, G.R. No. 71159, November 15, 1989]
Doctrine of implied municipal liability
A municipality may become obligated upon an implied contract to pay the reasonable
value of the benefits accepted or appropriated by it as to which it has the general power
to contract. The doctrine of implied municipal liability has been said to apply to all cases
where money or other property of a party is received under such circumstances that the
general law, independent of express contract implies an obligation upon the municipality
to do justice with respect to the same.
The obligation of a municipal corporation upon the doctrine of an implied contract does
not connote an enforceable obligation. Some specific principle or situation of which equity
takes cognizance must be the foundation of the claim. The principle of liability rests upon
the theory that the obligation implied by law to pay does not originate in the unlawful
contract, but arises from considerations outside it. The measure of recovery is the benefit
received by the municipal corporation. The amount of the loan, the value of the property
or services, or the compensation specified in the contract, is not the measure. If the price
named in the invalid contract is shown to be entirely fair and reasonable not only in view
of the labor done, but also in reference to the benefits conferred, it may be taken as the
true measure of recovery. [see Provice of Cebu vs. IAC, G.R. No. 72841, Jnauary
29, 1987]
C. Liability for defective roads, bridges
Control and supervision, not ownership, is basis of liability
In City of Manila vs Teotico [G.R. No. L-23052, January 29, 1968], the City of
Manila was held liable for damages when a person fell into an open manhole in the streets
of the city.
The court therein further stated that under Article 2189 of the Civil Code, it is not
necessary for the liability therein established to attach that the defective roads or streets
belong to the province, city or municipality from which responsibility is exacted. What
said article requires is that the province, city or municipality have either "control or
supervision" over said street or road. Hence, even if P. Burgos avenue were, therefore, a
national highway, this circumstance would not necessarily detract from its "control or
supervision" by the City of Manila.
In Guilatco vs City of Dagupan [G.R. No. 61516, March 21, 1989], the court held
that the express provision in the charter holding the city not liable for damages or injuries
sustained by persons or property due to the failure of any city officer to enforce the
provisions of the charter, can not be used to exempt the city. The charter only lays down
general rules regulating the liability of the city. On the other hand article 2189 applies in
particular to the liability arising from "defective streets, public buildings and other public
works.
 Marcos Mendoza vs. Francisco De Leon 33 Phil 508

G.R. No. 9596 | 1916-02-11
 City of Manila vs. Genero M. Teotico 22 SCRA 267
G.R. No. L-23052 | 1968-01-29
 Torio vs. Fontanilla 85 SCRA 99
G.R. No. L-29993/G.R. No. L-30183 | 1978-10-23
 Province of Cebu vs. Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC) 147 SCRA 447
G.R. No. 72841 | 1987-01-29
 Florentina A. Guilatco vs. City of Dagupan 171 SCRA 382
G.R. No. 61516 | 1989-03-21
 City of Manila vs Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)
G.R. No. 71159 | 1989-11-15
 Municipality of San Fernando, La Union vs. Firme 195 SCRA 692
G.R. No. 52179 | 1991-04-08
Political Law; Local Governments; Public Corporations

A corporation is an artificial being created by operation of law, having the right of
succession and the powers, attributes and properties expressly authorized by law or
incident to its existence, they are classified as:
1. Public – organized for the government of a portion of a State.

2. Private – formed for some private purpose, benefit, aim or end.
3. Quasi-public – a private corporation that renders public service.
The BSP is a public corporation or a government agency or instrumentality with juridical

personality, which does not fall within the constitutional prohibition in Article XII, Section
16, notwithstanding the amendments to its charter. Not all corporations, which are not
government owned or controlled, are ipso facto to be considered private corporations as
there exists another distinct class of corporations or chartered institutions which are
otherwise known as "public corporations." These corporations are treated by law as
agencies or instrumentalities of the government which are not subject to the tests of
ownership or control and economic viability but to different criteria relating to their public
purposes/interests or constitutional policies and objectives and their administrative
relationship to the government or any of its Departments or Offices. [Boy Scout of the
Philippines v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 177131, June 7, 2011]
By "government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter," We mean

government owned or controlled corporation created by a special law and not under the
Corporation Code of the Philippines. [Davao City Water District v. Civil Service
Commission, G.R. No. 95237-38, 13 September 1991]
The Constitution recognizes two classes of corporations. The first refers to private
corporations created under a general law. The second refers to government-owned or
controlled corporations created by special charters. Section 16, Article XII of the
Constitution provides:
Sec. 16. The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation,
organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled
corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the
common good and subject to the test of economic viability.
The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except by a

general law applicable to all citizens. The purpose of this constitutional provision is to ban
private corporations created by special charters, which historically gave certain
individuals, families or groups special privileges denied to other citizens. [Feliciano v.
Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 147402, January 14, 2004]
Quasi-corporations
Created by the state for a narrow or limited purpose
Municipal corporations
Elements:
1. Legal Creation or Incorporation – the law creating or authorizing the creation or

incorporation of a municipal corporation.
2. Corporate name - the name by which the corporation shall be known.
3. Inhabitants – the people residing in the territory of the corporation.
4. Territory – the land mass where the inhabitants reside, together with the internal and
external waters, and the air space above the land and waters. [Nachura, Outline
Reviewer in Political law (2009)]
The character of Local Governments is two-fold, these are governmental or public, and
proprietary or private [City of Manila v. IAC, G.R. No. 71159, November 15, 1989]

G.R. No. 71159 | 1989-11-15
 Davao City Water District vs. Civil Service Commission
G.R. Nos. 95237-38 | 1991-09-13
 Davao City Water District vs. Civil Service Commission [DISSENTING OPINION, BIDIN, J.]
G.R. Nos. 95237-38 | 1991-09-13
 Engr Ranulfo Feliciano vs COA, et al
G.R. No. 147402 | 2004-01-14
 BOY SCOUTS OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 177131 | 2011-06-07
Political Law; Local Governments; Powers Of Local Governments;

Corporate Powers
Every local government unit, as a corporation, shall have the following powers:
1. To have continuous succession in its corporate name;

2. To sue and be sued;
3. To have and use a corporate seal;
4. To acquire and convey real or personal property;
5. To enter into contracts; and
6. To exercise such other powers as are granted to corporations, subject to the
limitations provided in this Code and other laws.
Local government units may continue using, modify, or change their existing corporate
seals. Newly established local government units or those without corporate seals may
create their own corporate seals which shall be registered with the Department of the
Interior and Local Government. Any change of corporate seal shall also be registered as
provided hereon.
Unless otherwise provided, no contract may be entered into by the local chief executive
in behalf of the local government unit without prior authorization by the sanggunian
concerned. A legible copy of such contract shall be posted at a conspicuous place in the
provincial capitol or the city, municipal or barangay hall.
Local government units shall enjoy full autonomy in the exercise of their proprietary
functions and in the limitations provided in this Code and other applicable laws. [Sec.
22, R.A. No. 7160]
To sue and be sued
Under such circumstances, in the same manner that a stockholder of a corporation is

permitted to institute derivative or representative suits as nominal party plaintiff for the
benefit of the corporation which is the real party in interest, more so may plaintiffs as
city councilors exclusively empowered by the city charter to "make all appropriations for
the expenses of the government of the city" and who were the very source of the
authority granted to the city mayor to enter into the questioned transactions which
authority was later revoked by them, as per the allegations of the complaint at bar, be
deemed to possess the necessary authority, and interest, if not duty, to file the present
suit on behalf of the City and to prevent the disbursement of city funds under contracts
impugned by them to have been entered into by the city mayor without lawful authority
and in violation of law. [City of Cebu v. Cuizon, G.R. No. L-28972, October 31, 1972]
The doctrine of separate personality of a corporation finds no application in the

Cooperative Development Authority which was created by virtue of Republic Act No. 6939
since it is not a private entity but a government agency. [Verzosa v. Carague, G.R. No.
157838, March 08, 2011]
To acquire and sell property
Since the lots in question are manifestly owned by the city in

its public and governmental capacity and are therefore public property over which
Congress had absolute control as distinguished from patrimonial property owned by it in
its private or proprietary capacity of which it could not be deprived without due process
and without just compensation. [Rabuco v. Villegas, G.R. No. L-24661, February 28,
1974]
Local government unit may acquire real or personal, tangible or intangible property, upon
proper authority. [City of Naga v. Court of Appeals,G.R. No. L-37289, April 12,
1989]
To enter into contracts
Requisites
1. The local government unit has express, implied or inherent power to enter into the
particular contract;
2. The contract is entered into by the proper department, board, committee, officer or
agent. Unless otherwise provided by the Code, no contract may be entered into by
the local chief executive on behalf of the local government unit without prior
authorization by the sanggunian concerned;
3. The contract must comply with certain substantive requirements;
4. The contract must comply with the formal requirements of written contracts.
Ultra vires contracts – When a contract is entered into without compliance with the first
and third requisites, the same us ultra vires and is null and void. Such contract cannot
be ratified or validated. Ratification of defective municipal contracts is possible only when
there is non-compliance with the second and/or the fourth requirements. Ratification may
either be express or implied.
Under the doctrine of respondent superior, petitioner City of Manila is liable for the
tortious act committed by its agents who failed to verify and check the duration of the
contract of lease. The contention of the petitioner-city that the lease is covered by
Administrative Order No. 5, series of 1975 dated March 6, 1975 of the City of Manila for
five (5) years only beginning from June 6, 1971 is not meritorious for the said
administrative order covers new leases. When subject lot was certified on January 25,
1978 as ready for exhumation, the lease contract for fifty (50) years was still in full force
and effect. [City of Manila v. IAC, G.R. No. 71159, November 15, 1989]
 CCCC, et al vs. Cuizon, et al

G.R. No. L-28972 | 1972-10-31
G.R. No. 71159 | 1989-11-15
 Candelario L. verzosa, Jr. vs. Guillermo N. Caraque, et al.
G.R. No. 157838 | 2011-03-08
Locus Standi, Taxpayer Suits To Question Government Contracts

The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer's suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts
entered into by the national government or government-owned or controlled corporations
allegedly in contravention of the law [Kilosbayan v. Guingona, G.R. No. 113375, May
5, 1994] and to disallow the same when only municipal contracts are involved [Bugnay
Construction and Development Corporation v. Laron, G.R. No. 79983, August 10,
1989]
[cited in Tatad vs Garcia, Jr., G.R. No. 114222, April 6, 1995]
 Bugnay Cons. & Dev't Corp. vs. Crispin C. Laron

G.R. No. 79983 | 1989-08-10
 Kilosbayan, Inc. vs. Teofisto Guingona, Jr. 232 SCRA 110
G.R. No. 113375 | 1994-05-05
 KilosBayan, Inc., et al. Vs. Teofisto Guingona, Jr., et al. [SEPARATE OPINION CRUZ]
G.R. No. 113375 | 1994-05-05
 KilosBayan, Inc., et al. Vs. Teofisto Guingona, Jr., et al. [SEPARATE OPINION FELICIANO]
G.R. No. 113375 | 1994-05-05
 KilosBayan, Inc., et al. Vs. Teofisto Guingona, Jr., et al. [SEPARATE OPINION PADILLA]
G.R. No. 113375 | 1994-05-05
 KilosBayan, Inc., et al. Vs. Teofisto Guingona, Jr., et al. [SEPARATE OPINION MELO]
G.R. No. 113375 | 1994-05-05
 KilosBayan, Inc., et al. Vs. Teofisto Guingona, Jr., et al. [SEPARATE OPINION QUIASON]
G.R. No. 113375 | 1994-05-05
 KilosBayan, Inc., et al. Vs. Teofisto Guingona, Jr., et al. [SEPARATE OPINION PUNO]
G.R. No. 113375 | 1994-05-05
 KilosBayan, Inc., et al. Vs. Teofisto Guingona, Jr., et al. [SEPARATE OPINION VITUG]
G.R. No. 113375 | 1994-05-05
 KilosBayan, Inc., et al. Vs. Teofisto Guingona, Jr., et al. [SEPARATE OPINION KAPUNAN]
G.R. No. 113375 | 1994-05-05
 Francisco S. Tatad vs. Jesus B. Garcia, Jr.
G.R. No. 114222 | 1995-04-06
 Francisco S. Tatad vs. Jesus B. Garcia, Jr. [SEPARATE OPINIONS]
G.R. No. 114222 | 1995-04-06
Ordinance Distinguished From Resolution

While ordinances are laws and possess a general and permanent character, resolutions
are merely declarations of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific
matter and are temporary in nature. [Land Bank of the Philippines vs Cacayuran,
G.R. No. 191667, April 17, 2013; See also Municipality of Parañaque v. V.M.
Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 127820, July 20, 1998]
As opposed to ordinances, “no rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a

resolution.” [Spouses Yusay v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 156684, April 6, 2011]
 Municipality Of Paranaque Vs. V.M. Realty Corporation

G.R. No. 127820 | 1998-07-20
 Spouses Antonio and Fe Yusay vs. Court of Appeals, et al.
G.R. No. 156684 | 2011-04-06
 Land Bank of the Philippines Vs. Eduardo M. Cacayurin
G.R. No. 191667 | 2013-04-17
 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER, VS. EDUARDO M. CACAYURAN,
RESPONDENT, MUNICIPALITY OF AGOO, LA UNION, INTERVENOR. A M E N D E D
G.R. No. 191667 | 2015-04-22
Political Law; Local Governments; Powers Of Local Governments;

Liability Of LGUs
Local government units and their officials are not exempt from liability for death or injury
to persons or damage to property. [Sec. 24, R.A. No. 7160]
When a member of a city or municipal police force refuses or fails to render aid or
protection to any person in case of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be
primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall be subsidiarily responsible
therefor. The civil action
herein recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings, and a preponderance
of evidence shall suffice to support such action. [Article 34, Civil Code of the
Philippines]
The State is responsible in like manner when it acts through a special agent; but not
when the damage has been caused by the official to whom the task done properly
pertains, in which case what is provided in Article 2176 shall be applicable. [Article
2180, Civil Code of the Philippines]
Provinces, cities and municipalities shall be liable for damages for the death of, or injuries
suffered by, any person by reason of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges,
public buildings, and other public works under their control or supervision. [Article 2189,
Civil Code of the Philippines]
Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as
regards the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409
establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or
injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the
provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city
"Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said
provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular
prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the
death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" — specifically — "of the defective
condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their
control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from
negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs
liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon
the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon. Hence,
the City is liable for the damages suffered by a person who fell into a man hole. [City of
Manila v. Teotico, G.R. No. L-23052, January 29, 1968]
The doctrine of estoppel cannot be applied as against a municipal corporation to validate
a contract which it has no power to make, or which it is authorized to make only under
prescribed conditions, within prescribed limitations, or in a prescribed mode or manner,
although the corporation has accepted the benefits thereof and the other party has fully
performed his part of the agreement, or has expanded large sums in preparation for
performance. A reason frequently assigned for this rule is that to apply the doctrine of
estoppel against a municipality in such case would be to enable it to do indirectly what it
cannot do directly. Also, where a contract is violative of public policy, the municipality
executing it cannot be estopped to assert the invalidity on this ground; nor can it be
estopped to assert the invalidity of a contract which has ceded away, controlled, or
embarrassed its legislative or government powers. [San Diego v. Municipality of
Naujan, G.R. No. L-9920, February 29, 1960]
The government is justified to decline payment of the purchase price of illegally cut
lumber delivered by a contractor who won a public bidding for the construction of the
Navotas Bridge. All contracts, including Government contracts, are subject to the police
power of the State. Being an inherent attribute of sovereignty, such power is deemed
incorporated into the laws of the land, which are part of all contracts, thereby qualifying
the obligations arising therefrom. Thus, it is an implied condition in the subject contract
for the procurement of materials needed in the repair and construction of the Navotas
Bridge that petitioner as private contractor would comply with pertinent forestry laws and
regulations on the cutting and gathering of the lumber she undertook to supply the
provincial government. [Guadines v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 164891, June 6,
2011]
A municipality may become obligated upon an implied contract to pay the reasonable
value of the benefits accepted or appropriated by it as to which it has the general power
to contract. The doctrine applies to all cases where money or other property of a party is
received under such circumstances that the general law, independent of an express
contract, implies an obligation to do justice with respect to the same. [Nachura, Outline
Reviewer in Political law (2009)]
 Bartolome E. San Diego vs. The Municipality of Naujan, Province of Oriental Mindoro
G.R. No. L-9920 | 1960-02-29
 City of Manila vs. Genero M. Teotico 22 SCRA 267
G.R. No. L-23052 | 1968-01-29
 VIRGINIA M. GUADINES, PETITIONER, VS. SANDIGANBAYAN AND PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 164891 | 2011-06-06
Local Expropriation; Essential Requisites

The following are the essential requisites that must concur before an LGU can exercise
the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for
the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought
to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
(Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, G.R.No. 127820, July 20,

1998; Heirs of Alberto Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, G.R. No. 135087, March
14, 2000)

G.R. No. 127820 | 1998-07-20
 Heirs of Alberto Suguitan vs City of Mandaluyong
G.R. No. 135087 | 2000-03-14
 Danilo Antonio, et al., vs. Hon. Isagani A. Geronimo, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. et al
G.R. No. 124779 | 2005-11-29
G.R. No. 156684 | 2011-04-06
Authority Of LGU To Enter Into Contracts

Requirement of sanggunian authorization in the execution of contracts which
bind the local government unit
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC),
provides:
Section 22. Corporate Powers. -
(a) Every local government unit, as a corporation, shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) To enter into contracts; and
xxx
(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into by the local
chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without prior authorization by the
sanggunian concerned. A legible copy of such contract shall be posted at a conspicuous
place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipal or barangay hall. (underscoring ours)
Authorization by the sanggunian may take the form of an appropriation

ordinance
Under Sec. 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160 , prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned is
required before the local chief executive may enter into contracts on behalf of the local
government unit. R.A. No. 7160, however, does not expressly state the form that the
authorization by the sanggunian has to take. Such authorization may be done by
resolution enacted in the same manner prescribed by ordinances, except that the
resolution need not go through a third reading for final consideration unless the majority
of all the members of the sanggunian decides otherwise.
In cases where the local government unit operates under an annual

budget, the appropriation passed by the sanggunian may validly serve as the
authorization required under Sec. 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160. After all, an appropriation is an
authorization made by ordinance, directing the payment of goods and services from local
government funds under specified conditions or for specific purposes. The appropriation
covers the expenditures which are to be made by the local government unit, such as
current operating expenditure and capital outlays.
The question of whether a sanggunian authorization separate from the appropriation

ordinance is required should be resolved depending on the particular circumstances of
the case. Resort to the appropriation ordinance is necessary in order to determine if there
is a provision therein which specifically covers the expense to be incurred or the contract
to be entered into. Should the appropriation ordinance, for instance, already contain in
sufficient detail the project and cost of a capital outlay such that all that the local chief
executive needs to do after undergoing the requisite public bidding is to execute the
contract, no further authorization is required, the appropriation ordinance already being
sufficient.
On the other hand, should the appropriation ordinance describe the projects in generic
terms such as infrastructure projects, inter-municipal waterworks, drainage and
sewerage, flood control, and irrigation systems projects, reclamation projects or roads
and bridges, there is an obvious need for a covering contract for every specific project
that in turn requires approval by the sanggunian.Specific sanggunian approval may also
be required for the purchase of goods and services which are neither specified in the
appropriation ordinance nor encompassed within the regular personal services and
maintenance operating expenses. [seeQuisumbing vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 175527,
December 8, 2008]
Procurement contracts (via public bidding)
Republic Act No. 9184 establishes the law and procedure for public procurement. Sec. 37
thereof explicitly makes the approval of the appropriate authority which, in the case of
local government units, is the sanggunian, the point of reference for the notice to proceed
to be issued to the winning bidder. This provision xxx acknowledges that in the exercise
of the local government unit's corporate powers, the chief executive acts merely as an
instrumentality of the local council. Read together, the cited provisions mandate the local
chief executive to secure the sanggunians approval before entering into procurement
contracts and to transmit the notice to proceed to the winning bidder not later than seven
(7) calendar days therefrom. [see Quisumbing vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 175527,
December 8, 2008]
Negotiated purchase contracts (no public bidding)
In case of failure of public bidding, the local chief executive may enter into contracts of
negotiated purchase. Section 369 of the LGC , while not requiring the local chief executive
to secure prior authorization from the sanggunian concerned, nevertheless provides that
the contract covering the negotiated purchase shall be approved by the sanggunian, viz:
Section 369. Negotiated Purchase. -
(a) In cases where public biddings have failed for two (2) consecutive times and no
suppliers have qualified to participate or win in the biddings, local government units may,
through the local chief executive concerned, undertake the procurement of supplies by
negotiated purchase, regardless of amount, without public bidding: Provided, however,
That the contract covering the negotiated purchase shall be approved by the sanggunian
concerned.
 Quisumbing vs. Garcia

G.R. No. 175527 | 2008-12-08
 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE MODERNIZATION, STANDARDIZATION AND
REGULATION OF THE PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES (Procurement Law)
R.A. No. 9184 | 2002-07-22
 Local Government Code of 1991
Republic Act No. 7160 | 1991-10-10
Rules On Barangay Elections

Under Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 or the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines :
Conduct of election of Barangay officials
ARTICLE I.
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Sec. 3. Election and campaign periods. - Unless otherwise fixed in special cases by
the Commission on Elections, which hereinafter shall be referred to as the Commission,
the election period shall commence ninety days before the day of the election and shall
end thirty days thereafter.
The period of campaign shall be as follows:

xxx
3. Barangay Election - 15 days.
The campaign periods shall not include the day before and the day of the election.
However, in case of special elections under Article VIII, Section 5, Subsection (2) of the
Constitution, the campaign period shall be forty-five days.
ARTICLE VI.
ELECTION OF BARANGAY OFFICIALS
Sec. 37. Regular election of barangay officials. - The election for barangay officials
shall be held throughout the Philippines in the manner prescribed on the second Monday
of May Nineteen hundred and eighty-eight and on the same day every six years
thereafter.
The officials elected shall assume office on the thirtieth day of June next following the
election and shall hold office for six years and until their successors shall have been
elected and qualified.
Sec. 38. Conduct of elections. - The barangay election shall be non-partisan and shall
be conducted in an expeditious and inexpensive manner.
No person who files a certificate of candidacy shall represent or allow himself to be

represented as a candidate of any political party or any other organization; and no
political party, political group, political committee, civic, religious, professional, or other
organization or organized group of whatever nature shall intervene in his nomination or
in the filing of his certificate of candidacy or give aid or support, directly or indirectly,
material or otherwise favorable to or against his campaign for election: Provided, That
this provision shall not apply to the members of the family of a candidate within the fourth
civil degree of consanguinity or affinity nor to the personal campaign staff of the candidate
which shall not be more than one for every one hundred registered voters in his barangay:
Provided, however, That without prejudice to any liability that may be incurred, no permit
to hold a public meeting shall be denied on the ground that the provisions of this
paragraph may or will be violated.
Nothing in this section, however, shall be construed as in any manner affecting or

constituting an impairment of the freedom of individuals to support or oppose any
candidate for any barangay office.
Sec. 39. Certificate of Candidacy. - No person shall be elected punong barangay or

kagawad ng sangguniang barangay unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy in
triplicate on any day from the commencement of the election period but not later than
the day before the beginning of the campaign period in a form to be prescribed by the
Commission. The candidate shall state the barangay office for which he is a candidate.
The certificate of candidacy shall be filed with the secretary of the sangguniang barangay
who shall have the ministerial duty to receive said certificate of candidacy and to
immediately acknowledge receipt thereof.
In case the secretary refuses to receive the same, or in the case of his absence or non-
availability, a candidate may file his certificate with the election registrar of the city or
municipality concerned.
The secretary of the sangguniang barangay or the election registrar, as the case may be,
shall prepare a consolidated list all the candidates and shall post said list in the barangay
hall and in other conspicuous places in the barangay at least ten days before the election.
Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official or employee, or

those in the civil or military service, including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, shall be considered automatically resigned upon the filing of certificate of
candidacy for a barangay office.
Sec. 40. Board of Election Tellers. - (1) The Commission shall constitute not later than
ten days before the election a board of election tellers in every barangay polling place,
to be composed of a public elementary school teacher as chairman, and two members
who are registered voters of the polling place concerned, but who are not incumbent
barangay officials nor related to any candidate for any position in that barangay within
the fourth civil degree of affinity or consanguinity.
In case no public elementary school teachers are available, the Commission shall
designate any registered voter in the polling place who is not an incumbent barangay
official nor related to any candidate for any position in that barangay within the fourth
civil degree of affinity or consanguinity.
(2) The board of election tellers shall supervise and conduct the election in their
respective polling places, count the votes and thereafter prepare a report in triplicate on
a form prescribed by the Commission. The original of this report shall be delivered
immediately to the barangay board of canvassers. The second copy shall be delivered to
the election registrar and the third copy shall be delivered to the secretary of the
sangguniang barangay who shall keep the same on file.
Sec. 41. Registration of voters and list of voters. - Not later than seven days before
the election, the board of election tellers shall meet in every barangay polling place to
conduct the registration of barangay voters and to prepare the list of voters. Any voter
may challenge the qualification of any person seeking to register and said challenge shall
be heard and decided on the same day by the board of election tellers.
The final list of voters shall be posted in the polling places at least two days before election
day. The registration of any voter shall not be transferred without written notice at least
two days before the date of election. Not later than the day following the barangay
election, the board of election tellers shall deliver the list of voters to the election registrar
for custody and safekeeping.
Sec. 42. Polling places. - (1) The chairman of the board of election tellers shall
designate the public school or any other public building within the barangay to be used
as polling place in case the barangay has one election precinct. (2) For barangays with
two or more election precincts the chairman of the board of canvassers shall designate
the public school or any other public building to be used as polling place.
In case there is no public school or other public building that can be used as polling
places, other appropriate private buildings may be designated: Provided, That such
buildings are not owned or occupied or possessed by any incumbent elective public official
or candidate, or his relative within the fourth civil degree of consanguinity or affinity. The
polling place shall be centrally located as possible, always taking into consideration the
convenience and safety of the voters.
Sec. 43. Official barangay ballots. - The official barangay ballots shall be provided by
the city or municipality concerned of a size and color to be prescribed by the Commission.
Such official ballots shall, before they are handed to the voter at the polling place, be
authenticated in the presence of the voter, by the authorized representatives of the
candidates and the chairman and members of the board of election tellers who shall affix
their signatures at the back thereof. Any ballot which is not authenticated shall be deemed
spurious.
Sec. 44. Ballot boxes. - The Commission shall provide the ballot boxes for each
barangay polling place, but each candidate may be permitted to provide a padlock for
said ballot box.
Sec. 45. Postponement or failure of election. - When for any serious cause such as
violence, terrorism, loss or destruction of election paraphernalia or records, force
majeure, and other analogous causes of such nature that the holding of a free, orderly
and honest election should become impossible in any barangay, the Commission, upon a
verified petition of an interested party and after due notice and hearing at which the
interested parties are given equal opportunity to be heard, shall postpone the election
therein for such time as it may deem necessary.
If, on account of force majeure, violence, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes, the
election in any barangay has not been held on the date herein fixed or has been
suspended before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting therein and such
failure or suspension of election would affect the result of the election, the Commission,
on the basis of a verified petition of an interested party, and after due notice and hearing,
at which the interested parties are given equal opportunity to be heard shall call for the
holding or continuation of the election within thirty days after it shall have verified and
found that the cause or causes for which the election has been postponed or suspended
have ceased to exist or upon petition of at least thirty percent of the registered voters in
the barangay concerned.
When the conditions in these areas warrant, upon verification by the Commission, or
upon petition of at least thirty percent of the registered voters in the barangay concerned,
it shall order the holding of the barangay election which was postponed or suspended.
Sec. 46. Barangay board of canvassers. - (1) The Commission shall constitute a board
of canvassers at least seven days before the election in each barangay, to be composed
of the senior public elementary school teacher in the barangay as chairman, and two
other public elementary school teachers, as members.
In case the number of public elementary school teachers is inadequate, the Commission
shall designate the chairman and members of the barangay board of canvassers from
among the board of election tellers.
(2) The barangay board of canvassers shall meet immediately in a building where a
polling place is found and which is most centrally located in the barangay and after
canvassing the results from the various polling places within the barangay, proclaim the
winners. The board of canvassers shall accomplish the certificate of proclamation in
triplicate on a form to be prescribed by the Commission. The original of the certificate
shall be sent to the election registrar concerned, the second copy shall be delivered to
the secretary of the sangguniang bayan or sangguniang panglunsod, as the case may be,
and the third copy shall be kept on file by the secretary of the sangguniang barangay.
(3) In a barangay where there is only one polling place, the barangay board of election
tellers shall also be the barangay board of canvassers.
Sec. 47. Activities during the campaign period. - During the campaign period, the
punong barangay if he is not a candidate, or any resident of the barangay designated by
the Commission, shall convene the barangay assembly at least once for the purpose of
allowing the candidates to appear at a joint meeting duly called, upon proper and with at
least two days notice, to explain to the barangay voters their respective program of
administration, their qualifications, and other information that may help enlighten voters
in casting their votes.
The members of the barangay assembly may take up and discuss other matters relative
to the election of barangay officials.
Sec. 48. Watchers. - Candidates may appoint two watchers each, to serve alternately,
in every polling place within the barangay, who shall be furnished with a signed copy of
the results of the election, in such form as the Commission may prescribe, immediately
after the completion of the canvass.
Sec. 49. Inclusion and exclusion cases. - Inclusion and exclusion cases which shall
be decided not later than seven before the date of the election shall be within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the municipal or metropolitan trial court. The notice of
such decision shall be served to all parties within twenty-four hours following its
promulgation and any party adversely affected may appeal therefrom within twenty-four
hours to the regional trial court which shall finally decide the same not later than two
days before the date of the election.
Sec. 50. Funding. - Local governments shall appropriate such funds to defray such
necessary and reasonable expenses of the members of the board of election tellers, board
of canvassers and the printing of election forms and procurement of other election
paraphernalia, and the installation of polling booths.
Sec. 51. Penalties. - Violations of any provisions of this Article shall constitute
prohibited acts and shall be prosecuted and penalized in accordance with the provisions
of this Code.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 108. Place for filing statements. - The statements of contributions and
expenditures shall be filed as follows:
xxx
(d) Those of candidates for city, municipal and barangay offices, with the election
registrar concerned.
If the statement is sent by mail, it shall be by registered mail, and the date on which it
was registered with the post office may be considered as the filing date thereof if
confirmed on the same date by telegram or radiogram addressed to the office or official
with whom the statement should be filed.
The provincial election supervisors and election registrars concerned shall, within fifteen
days after the last day for the filing of the statements, send to the Commission duplicate
copies of all statements filed with them.
Sec. 109. Form and contents of statement. - The statement shall be in writing,
subscribed and sworn to by the candidate or by the treasurer of the party, shall be
complete as of the date next preceding the date of filing and shall set forth in detail (a)
the amount of contribution, the date of receipt, and the full name and exact address of
the person from whom the contribution was received; (b) the amount of every
expenditure, the date thereof, the full name and exact address of the person to whom
payment was made, and the purpose of the expenditure; (c) any unpaid obligation, its
nature and amount, and to whom said obligation is owing; and (d) such other particulars
which the Commission may require.
If the candidate or treasurer of the party has received no contribution, made no
expenditure, or has no pending obligation, the statement shall reflect such fact.
Sec. 110. Preservation and inspection of statements. - All statements of

contributions and expenditures shall be kept and preserved at the office where they are
filed and shall constitute part of the public records thereof for three years after the
election to which they pertain. They shall not be removed therefrom except upon order
of the Commission or of a competent court and shall, during regular office hours, be
subject and open to inspection by the public. The officer in-charge thereof, shall, on
demand, furnish certified copies of any statement upon payment of the fee prescribed
under Section 270 hereof.
It shall be the duty of the Commission to examine all statements of contributions and
expenditures of candidates and political parties to determine compliance with the
provisions of this Article.
Sec. 111. Effect of failure to file statement. - In addition to other sanctions provided
in this Code, no person elected to any public office shall enter upon the duties of his office
until he has filed the statement of contributions and expenditures herein required.
The same prohibition shall apply if the political party which nominated the winning
candidate fails to file the statements required herein within the period prescribed by this
Code.
Sec. 112. Report of contractor and business firms. - Every person or firm to whom
any electoral expenditure is made shall, within thirty days after the day of the election,
file with the Commission a report setting forth the full names and exact addresses of the
candidates, treasurers of political parties, and other persons incurring such expenditures,
the nature or purpose of each expenditure, the date and costs thereof, and such other
particulars as the Commission may require. The report shall be signed and sworn to by
the supplier or contractor, or in case of a business firm or association, by its president or
general manager.
It shall be the duty of such person or firm to whom an electoral expenditure is made to
require every agent of a candidate or of the treasurer of a political party to present written
authority to incur electoral expenditures in behalf of such candidate or treasurer, and to
keep and preserve at its place of business, subject to inspection by the Commission or
its authorized representatives, copies of such written authority, contracts, vouchers,
invoices and other records and documents relative to said expenditures for a period of
three years after the date of the election to which they pertain.
It shall be unlawful for any supplier, contractor or business firm to enter into contract
involving election expenditures with representatives of candidates or political parties
without such written authority.
Election Contest
ARTICLE XXI.
ELECTION CONTESTS
Sec. 252. Election contest for barangay offices. - A sworn petition contesting the
election of a barangay officer shall be filed with the proper municipal or metropolitan trial
court by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and has been voted
for the same office, within ten days after the proclamation of the results of the election.
The trial court shall decide the election protest within fifteen days after the filing thereof.
The decision of the municipal or metropolitan trial court may be appealed within ten days
from receipt of a copy thereof by the aggrieved party to the regional trial court which
shall decide the case within thirty days from its submission, and whose decisions shall be
final.
Sec. 253. Petition for quo warranto. - xxx Any voter contesting the election of any
municipal or barangay officer on the ground of ineligibility or of disloyalty to the Republic
of the Philippines shall file a sworn petition for quo warranto with the regional trial court
or metropolitan or municipal trial court, respectively, within ten days after the
proclamation of the results of the election.
Sec. 254. Procedure in election contests. - xxx However, with respect to election
contests involving municipal and barangay offices the following rules of procedure shall
govern:
(a) Notice of the protest contesting the election of a candidate for a municipal or barangay
office shall be served upon the candidate by means of a summons at the postal address
stated in his certificate of candidacy except when the protestee, without waiting for the
summons, has made the court understand that he has been notified of the protest or has
filed his answer hereto;
(b) The protestee shall answer the protest within five days after receipt of the summons,
or, in case there has been no summons from the date of his appearance and in all cases
before the commencement of the hearing of the protest or contest. The answer shall deal
only with the election in the polling places which are covered by the allegations of the
contest;
(c) Should the protestee desire to impugn the votes received by the protestant in other
polling places, he shall file a counter-protest within the same period fixed for the answer
serving a copy thereof upon the protestant by registered mail or by personal delivery or
through the sheriff;
(d) The protestant shall answer the counter-protest within five days after notice;
(e) Within the period of five days counted from the filing of the protest any other
candidate for the same office may intervene in the case as other contestants and ask for
affirmative relief in his favor by a petition in intervention, which shall be considered as
another contest, except that it shall be substantiated within the same proceedings. The
protestant or protestee shall answer the protest in intervention within five days after
notice;
(f) If no answer shall be filed to the contest, counter-protest, or to the protest in

intervention, within the time limits respectively fixed, a general denial shall be deemed
to have been entered;
(g) In election contest proceedings, the permanent registry list of voters shall be
conclusive in regard to the question as to who had the right to vote in said election.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 260. Notice of decisions. - The clerk of court and the corresponding official in the
Commission before whom an election contest or a quo warranto proceeding has been
instituted or where the appeal of said case has been taken shall notify immediately the
President of the Philippines of the final disposition thereof. In election contests involving
provincial, city, municipal, or barangay offices, notice of such final disposition shall also
be sent to the secretary of the local sanggunian concerned. If the decision be that none
of the parties has been legally elected, said official shall certify such decision to the
President of the Philippines and, in appropriate cases, to the Commission.
(see also A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC, which took effect on May 15, 2007)
Election Offenses
ARTICLE XXII.
ELECTION OFFENSES
Sec. 261. Prohibited Acts. - The following shall be guilty of an election offense:
xxx
(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds.

- Any public official or employee including barangay officials and those of government-
owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, who, during forty-five days
before a regular election and thirty days before a special election, releases, disburses or
expends any public funds for: xxx
xxx
(x) Suspension of elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay officer. - The

provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding during the election period, any public
official who suspends, without prior approval of the Commission, any elective provincial,
city, municipal or barangay officer, unless said suspension will be for purposes of applying
the "Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act" in relation to the suspension and removal of
elective officials; in which case the provisions of this section shall be inapplicable.
Qualifications and Disqualifications of Elective Barangay Officials
Under Republic Act No. 7160 otherwise known as the Local Government Code of
1991 (LGC):
TITLE II
ELECTIVE OFFICIALS
CHAPTER I
Qualifications and Election
Section 39. Qualifications. -
(a) An elective local official must be a citizen of the Philippines; a registered voter in the
barangay, municipality, city, or province or, in the case of a member of the sangguniang
panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod, or sangguniang bayan, the district where he
intends to be elected; a resident therein for at least one (1) year immediately preceding
the day of the election; and able to read and write Filipino or any other local language or
dialect.
xxx
(e) Candidates for the position of punong barangay or member of the sangguniang
barangay must be at least eighteen (18) years of age on election day.
Section 40. Disqualifications. - The following persons are disqualified from running for
any elective local position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an
offense punishable by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after
serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to
reside abroad and continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code;
and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded.
Section 43. Term of Office. -
(a) The term of office of all local elective officials elected after the effectivity of this Code
shall be three (3) years, starting from noon of June 30, 1992 or such date as may be
provided for by law, except that of elective barangay officials: Provided, That all local
officials first elected during the local elections immediately following the ratification of
the 1987 Constitution shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992.
(b) No local elective official shall serve for more than three (3) consecutive terms in the
same position. Voluntary renunciation of the office for any length of time shall not be
considered as an interruption in the continuity of service for the full term for which the
elective official concerned was elected.
(c) The term of office of barangay officials and members of the sangguniang kabataan
shall be for three (3) years, which shall begin after the regular election of barangay
officials on the second Monday of May 1994.
Vacancies and Succession
Under the Local Government Code of 1991:
CHAPTER II
Vacancies and Succession
Section 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice-Governor, Mayor,
and Vice-Mayor. — xx
(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest
ranking sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second
highest ranking sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.
(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sanggunian members shall be resolved
by the drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their
predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official
fills a higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from
office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the
functions of his office.
For purposes of succession as provided in the Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall
be determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate
to the total number of registered voters in each district in the immediately preceding local
election.
Section 45. Permanent Vacancies in the Sanggunian. -
(a) Permanent vacancies in the sanggunian where automatic succession provided above
do not apply shall be filled by appointment in the following manner:
xxx
(3) The city or municipal mayor, in the case of sangguniang barangay, upon
recommendation of the sangguniang barangay concerned.
(b) Except for the sangguniang barangay, only the nominee of the political party under
which the sanggunian member concerned had been elected and whose elevation to the
position next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the sanggunian shall be appointed
in the manner hereinabove provided. The appointee shall come from the same political
party as that of the sanggunian member who caused the vacancy and shall serve the
unexpired term of the vacant office. In the appointment herein mentioned, a nomination
and a certificate of membership of the appointee from the highest official of the political
party concerned are conditions sine qua non, and any appointment without such
nomination and certification shall be null and void ab initio and shall be a ground for
administrative action against the official responsible therefore.
(c) In case or permanent vacancy is caused by a sanggunian member who does not
belong to any political party, the local chief executive shall, upon recommendation of the
sanggunian concerned, appoint a qualified person to fill the vacancy.
(d) In case of vacancy in the representation of the youth and the barangay in the
sanggunian, said vacancy shall be filled automatically by the official next in rank of the
organization concerned.
Section 46. Temporary Vacancy in the Office of the Local Chief Executive. -
(a) When the governor, city or municipal mayor, or punong barangay is temporarily
incapacitated to perform his duties for physical or legal reasons such as, but not limited
to, leave of absence, travel abroad, and suspension from office, the vice-governor, city
or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang barangay member shall
automatically exercise the powers and perform the duties and functions of the local chief
executive concerned, except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss employees which
can only be exercised if the period of temporary incapacity exceeds thirty (30) working
days.
(b) Said temporary incapacity shall terminate upon submission to the appropriate
sanggunian of a written declaration by the local chief executive concerned that he has
reported back to office. In cases where the temporary incapacity is due to legal causes,
the local chief executive concerned shall also submit necessary documents showing that
said legal causes no longer exist.
(c) When the incumbent local chief executive is traveling within the country but outside
his territorial jurisdiction for a period not exceeding three (3) consecutive days, he may
designate in writing the officer-in-charge of the said office. Such authorization shall
specify the powers and functions that the local official concerned shall exercise in the
absence of the local chief executive except the power to appoint, suspend, or dismiss
employees.
(d) In the event, however, that the local chief executive concerned fails or refuses to
issue such authorization, the vice-governor, the city or municipal vice-mayor, or the
highest ranking sangguniang barangay member, as the case may be, shall have the right
to assume the powers, duties, and functions of the said office on the fourth (4th) day of
absence of the said local chief executive, subject to the limitations provided in subsection
(c) hereof.
(e) Except as provided above, the local chief executive shall in no case authorize any
local official to assume the powers, duties, and functions of the office, other than the
vice-governor, the city or municipal vice-mayor, or the highest ranking sangguniang
barangay member, as the case may be.
 Rules Of Procedure In Election Contests Before The Courts Involving Elective Municipal
And Barangay Officials
A.M. No. 07-4-15-SC | 2007-05-15
Doctrine Of Operative Fact

As a general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it imposes no
duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not been
passed at all. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code. xxx
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a
matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by
recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality
is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The
past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration.
The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue

burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal
case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy
or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating
it. [Yap vs. Thenamaris Ship's Management and Intermare Maritime
Agencies, Inc., G.R. No. 179532, May 30, 2011 citing Planter Products
vs Fertiphil Corporation, G.R. No. 166006, March 14, 2008; see also De
Agbayani v. Philippine National Bank, G.R. No. L-23127, April 29, 1971]
Doctrine applies even to quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial acts
The doctrine of operative fact extends to a void or unconstitutional executive act. The
term executive act is broad enough to includeany and all acts of the Executive, including
those that are quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial in nature. xxx
The operative fact doctrine is not confined to statutes and rules and regulations issued
by the executive department that are accorded the same status as that of a statute or
those which are quasi-legislative in nature.
Even assuming that De Agbayani initially applied the operative fact doctrine only to
executive issuances like orders and rules and regulations, said principle can nonetheless
be applied, by analogy, to decisions made by the President or the agencies under the
executive department. This doctrine, in the interest of justice and equity, can be applied
liberally and in a broad sense to encompass said decisions of the executive branch. In
keeping with the demands of equity, the Court can apply the operative fact dctrine to
acts and consequences that resulted from the reliance not only on a law or executive act
which is quasi-legislative in nature but also on decisions or orders of the executive branch
which were later nullified. This Court is not unmindful that such acts and consequences
must be recognized in the higher interest of justice, equity and fairness. [Araullo vs
Aquino, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014 citing Hacienda Luisita, Inc. v.
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council, G.R. No. 171101, November 22, 2011]
Operative Fact applied to Question of Jurisdiction
In Tan v. Barrios [G.R. Nos. 85481-82, October 18, 1990], [the Supreme] Court, in
applying the operative fact doctrine, held that despite the invalidity of the jurisdiction of
the military courts over civilians, certain operative facts must be acknowledged to have
existed so as not to trample upon the rights of the accused there.
In
Tan v. Barrios
, this Court, in applying the operative fact doctrine,
held that despite the invalidity of th
e jurisdiction of the military courts
over civilians, certain operative f
acts must be acknowledged to have
existed so as not to trample upon th
e rights of the accused therei
 Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito 27 SCRA 533
G.R. No. L-28113 | 1969-03-28
 De Agbayani vs. Philippine National Bank (PNB) 38 SCRA 429
G.R. No. L-23127 | 1971-04-29
 William Tan vs. Hernani T. Barrios
G.R. Nos. 85481-82 | 1990-10-18
 Planters Products Inc., et al. vs. Fertiphil Corporation
G.R. No. 166006 | 2008-03-14
 Yap vs. Thenamaris Ship's Management and Intermare Maritime Agencies, Inc.
G.R. No. 179532 | 2011-05-30
 Hacienda Luisita, Inc. vs PARC [Resolution] 670 SCRA 392
G.R. No. 171101 | 2011-11-22
 Hacienda Luisita, Inc. vs. Presidential Agrarian Reform Council
G.R. No. 171101 | 2011-07-05
 Araullo vs. Aquino [SEPARATE OPINION]
G.R. No. 209287 | 2014-07-01
 Araullo v Aquino [DECISION]
G.R. No. 209287 | 2014-07-01
 Araullo vs. Aquino (Resolution)
G.R. No. 209287 | 2015-02-03
 Araullo vs. Aquino (Resolution) [SEPARATE OPINION CARPIO, J.]
G.R. No. 209287 | 2015-02-03
 Araullo vs. Aquino (Resolution) [SEPARATE OPINION BRION, J.]
G.R. No. 209287 | 2015-02-03
 Araullo vs. Aquino (Resolution) [CONCURRING AND DISSENTING OPINION DEL
CASTILLO, J.]
G.R. No. 209287 | 2015-02-03
 Araullo vs. Aquino (Resolution) [CONCURRING OPINION LEONEN, J.]
G.R. No. 209287 | 2015-02-03
Government-Owned Or Controlled Corporation (GOCC), Definition

The Administrative Code defines a GOCC (as reiterated in Republic Act No. 10149 or the
GOCC Governance Act of 2011):
(13) Government-owned or controlled corporation refers to any agency organized

as a stock or non-stock corporation, vested with functions relating to public needs
whether governmental or proprietary in nature, and owned by the Government directly
or through its instrumentalities either wholly, or, where applicable as in the case of stock
corporations, to the extent of at least fifty-one (51) per cent of its capital stock: x x x.
GOCCs, therefore, are “stock or non-stock” corporations “vested with functions relating
to public needs” that are “owned by the Government directly or through its
instrumentalities.” By definition, three attributes thus make an entity a GOCC:
(i) its organization as stock or non-stock corporation

(ii) the public character of its function;
(iii) government ownership over the same.
Possession of all three attributes is necessary to deem an entity a GOCC. [see Funa vs
MECO and COA, G.R. No. 193462, February 4, 2014]
Government ownership
As to the third attribute, the government owns a stock or non-stock corporation if it has
controlling interest in the corporation.
In a stock corporation, the controlling interest of the government is assured by

its ownership of at least fifty-one percent (51%) of the corporate capital stock.
In a non-stock corporation, the controlling interest of the government is affirmed when

“at least majority of the members are government officials holding such membership by
appointment or designation” or there is otherwise “substantial participation of the
government in the selection” of the corporation’s governing board.
[see Funa vs MECO and COA, G.R. No. 193462, February 4, 2014]
 Dennis A.B. Funa vs. Manila Economic and Cultural Office (MECO) and COA
G.R. No. 193462 | 2014-02-04
Political Law; Law On Public Officers; Disabilities And Inhibition Of

Public Officials
Disabilities for the President, Vice President, Members of the Cabinet, and their
deputies or assistants
The President, Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies or
assistants shall not, unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold any other office
or employment during their tenure. They shall not, during said tenure, directly or
indirectly, practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be financially
interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including
government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly
avoid conflict of interest in the conduct of their office.
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
President shall not, during his tenure, be appointed as Members of the Constitutional
Commissions, or the Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries,
chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled
corporations and their subsidiaries. [1987 Constitution, Article VII, Section 13]
Disabilities for Senators and Members of the House of Representatives
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any other office or
employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof,
including government-owned or controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his
term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may
have been created or the emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he
was elected. [1987 Constitution, Article VI, Section 13]
No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may personally appear as counsel

before any court of justice or before the Electoral Tribunals, or quasi-judicial and other
administrative bodies. Neither shall he, directly or indirectly, be interested financially in
any contract with, or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or
any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, or its subsidiary, during his term of office. He shall not intervene
in any matter before any office of the Government for his pecuniary benefit or where he
may be called upon to act on account of his office. [1987 Constitution, Article VI,
Section 14]
Senators and Members of the House of Representatives are disqualified to hold two
classes of office, namely:
1. Incompatible office – any other office or employment in the Government, or any

subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries
2. Forbidden office – any office which may have been created or the emoluments thereof
increased during the term for which he was elected
Disabilities for Members of Constitutional Commissions
No member of a Constitutional Commission shall, during his tenure, hold any other office
or employment. Neither shall he engage in the practice of any profession or in the active
management or control of any business which, in any way, may be affected by the
functions of his office, nor shall he be financially interested, directly or indirectly, in any
contract with, or in any franchise or privilege granted by the Government, any of its
subdivisions, agencies, or instrumentalities, including government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. [1987 Constitution, Article IX-A, Section 2]
Prohibition against Members of the Judiciary
The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative function. [1987
Constitution, Article VIII, Section 12]
Prohibition against Appointment of Elective Officials
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to any
public office or position during his tenure. [1987 Constitution, Article IX-B, Section
7]
Prohibition against Appointment of Appointive Officials
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no appointive
official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any subdivision,
agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries. [1987 Constitution, Article IX-B, Section 7]
Prohibition against Receipt of Additional, Double or Indirect Compensation
No elective or appointive public officer or employee shall receive additional, double, or

indirect compensation, unless specifically authorized by law, nor accept without the
consent of the Congress, any present, emolument, office, or title of any kind from any
foreign government.
Pensions or gratuities shall not be considered as additional, double, or indirect

compensation. [1987 Constitution, Article IX-B, Section 8]
Prohibition against Appointment of Members of the Armed Forces to Civilian

Positions
No member of the armed forces in the active service shall, at any time, be appointed or
designated in any capacity to a civilian position in the Government including government-
owned or controlled corporations or any of their subsidiaries. [1987 Constitution,
Article XVI, Section 5(4)]
Prohibition against grant of loan, guaranty or other form of financial

accommodation
No loan, guaranty, or other form of financial accommodation for any business purpose
may be granted, directly or indirectly, by any government-owned or controlled bank or
financial institution to the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the
Congress, the Supreme Court, and the Constitutional Commissions, the Ombudsman, or
to any firm or entity in which they have controlling interest, during their tenure. [1987
Constitution, Article XI, Section 16]
Political Law; Law On Public Officers; Modes Of Acquiring Title To Public

Office
Modes
There are two modes of acquiring title to a public office:
1. Election
2. Appointment
Definition of Appointment
Appointment signifies no more than selection for public office. The term "appoint" is
applied to the nomination or designation of an individual.[Borromeo v. Mariano, G.R.
No. 16808, January 3, 1921]
It is equivalent to filling a vacancy in an office. [Conde v. National Tobacco

Corporation, G.R. No. L-11985, January 28, 1961]
Where Appointing Power Resides
The power to appoint inherently belongs to the people. However, it may be entrusted to
elected or appointed public officials.
By some authorities the power of appointment to office is regarded as per se an executive

function, which, therefore, may not be exercised, vested, or controlled by the legislature
[or judiciary] except in so far as it is a necessary incident to the exercise of the legislative
[or judicial] power or is vested by the constitution in the legislature. By the great weight
of authority, however, the power of appointment is held not to be per se an executive
function, and unless the appointment of particular officers is, by the constitution,
expressly conferred on the executive department or forbidden to the legislature the latter
may, by statute, vest the power of appointment in its discretion. [Government v.
Spinger, G.R. No. L-26979, April 1, 1927]
A provision of the constitution precluding the legislature from electing or appointing

officers does not invalidate an act creating a board or commission of which certain state
officers shall be ex-officio members, nor prevent the legislature from imposing new
functions on existing officers. [Government v. Spinger, G.R. No. L-26979, April 1,
1927]
Appointing Power is Discretionary
The power to appoint is, in essence, discretionary. The appointing power has the right of
choice which he may exercise freely according to his judgment, deciding for himself who
is best qualified among those who have the necessary qualifications and eligibilities. It is
a prerogative of the appointing power that may be availed of without liability, provided
however, that it is exercised in good faith for the advancement of the employer's interest
and not for the purpose of defeating or circumventing the rights of the employees under
special laws or under valid agreements, and provided further, that such prerogatives are
not exercised in a malicious, harsh, oppressive, vindictive or wanton manner, or out of
malice or spite [Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila v. IAC, G.R. No. L-65439,
November 13, 1985]
The Civil Service Commission has no authority to revoke an appointment on the ground
that another person is more qualified for a particular position; neither does it have
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice or a successful protestant.
The Commission has the power to recall or revoke an appointment initially approved if
such appointment is void from the beginning due to fraud on the part of the appointee or
because it was issued in violation of law. [Debulgado v. CSC, G.R. No. 111471,
September 26, 1994]
Appointment subject to Confirmation

Appointment may or may not be subject to confirmation. An appointment is deemed not
subject to confirmation when the power of appointment is absolute, and the formal
evidence of appointment issues at once. However, where the confirmation of the
Commission on Appointments is required, the appointment will only be completed when
confirmation is obtained.
The appointing power is the exclusive prerogative of the President, upon which no
limitations may be imposed by Congress, except those resulting from the need of securing
the concurrence of the Commission on Appointments and from the exercise of the limited
legislative power to prescribe the qualifications to a given appointive office. [Manalang
v. Quitoriano, G.R. No. L-6898, April 30, 1954]
Acceptance of Appointment
Acceptance is not necessary to give validity to an appointment. However, acceptance is

necessary to enable the appointee to have full possession, enjoyment, and responsibility
of an office.
Once a government employee accepts a new position, he loses his right to the old office.
Moreover, an appointee cannot impose his own conditions for the acceptance of a public
office. He may accept or decline it. [Magana v. Auditor General, G.R. No. L-2180,
April 29, 1960]
Acceptance may be made expressly or impliedly.
While there is currently no authority holding that acceptance in writing is necessary in

order to validate an appointment, the better rule requires some kind of written memorial
that could render title to public office indubitable. [Valencia v. Peralta, G.R. No. L-
20864, August 23, 1963]
Steps in the Appointing Process
1. Nomination
2. Confirmation (by the Commission on Appointments)
3. Issuance of Commission
Issuance of Commission
“Commission” is the written authority from a competent source given to the officer as his
warrant for the exercise of the powers and duties of the office. It is the written evidence
of the appointment.
When a person is elected to office, his right as established as a result of the election and
does not depend upon the issuance of a commission. Issuance of a commission to an
elected officer is merely a ministerial act and not a part of the act of appointment.
Revocation of Appointment
The general rule is that once appointment to an office is made and complete, it is not
subject to reconsideration or revocation, except if the officer is removable at the will of
the appointing power.
The moment an appointee assumes a position in the civil service under a completed and
approved appointment, he acquires a legal, not merely an equitable right, which is
protected by statute and the Constitution and can only be revoked or removed for cause
and with previous notice and hearing.
As long as the appointee possesses the minimum required qualifications, he cannot be

removed even if the protestant is more qualified than the first appointee.
 Andres Borromeo vs. Fermin Mariano

G.R. No. 16808 | 1921-01-03
 In Re: Juan P. Pellicer & Co., Inc. Vs. Philippine Realty Corporation 087 Phil 302
G.R. No. L-2180 | 1950-09-01
 Luis Manalang Vs. Aurelio Quitoriano, Et Al. 094 Phil 903
G.R. No. L-6898 | 1954-04-30
 Mariano Conde Vs. National Tobacco Corporation, Et Al.110 Phil. 717
G.R. No. L-11985 | 1961-01-28
 Elpidio Valencia Vs. Macario Peralta, Jr. 118 Phil. 691
G.R. No. L-20864 | 1963-08-23
 Insurance Company of North America vs. Republic
G.R. No. L-26979 | 1969-05-29
 Pamantasan ng Lungsod ng Maynila vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, et al.
G.R. No. L-65439 | 1985-11-13
 Rogelio R. Debulgado Vs. Civil Service Commission
G.R. No. 111471 | 1994-09-26
Political Law; Law On Public Officers; Accountability Of Public Officers;

Sandiganbayan
Sandiganbayan Jurisdiction
1. Violations of R.A. 3019 (Anti-graft and Corrupt Practices Act)

2. Violations of R.A. 1379
3. Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more
of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government
whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of
the offense:
4. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and
higher, otherwise classified as Grade '27' and higher, of the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:
5. Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan and
provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers and other provincial department heads;
6. City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors engineers and other city department heads;
7. Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;
8. Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;
9. Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher;
10. City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;
11. Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or -controlled
corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;
12. Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade'27'and up under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989;
13. Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
14. Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the
provisions of the Constitution; and
15. All other national and local officials classified as Grade'27'and higher under the
Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.
16. Other offenses orfelonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed
by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in
relation to their office.
17. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos.
1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986. [RA 8429, Sec. 4]
“In relation to his office”

An offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is "intimately
connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the
performance of his official functions [Lacson v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
128096, January 20, 1999]
 Lacson vs. Executive Secretary, Sandiganbayan, DOJ, etc.

G.R. No. 128096 | 1999-01-20
Political Law; Law On Public Officers; Eligibility And Qualification

Requirements
Definitions
 Eligibility refers to state or quality of being legally fitted or qualified to be chosen.

Eligibility to a public office is of a continuing nature and must exist both at the
commencement and during the occupancy of an office [Aguila v. Genato, G.R. No.
L-55151, March 17, 1981]
 Qualification refers to either endowment or accomplishment that fits one for office,
or to the act which the person is legally required to do before entering upon the
performance of his duties.
Authority to Prescribe Qualifications
The authority to prescribe qualifications depends on whether the public office was
created by the Constitution or by Congress
1. If created by the Constitution – The criteria imposed by the Constitution

is exclusive and the Congress has no power to require different or additional
qualifications, unless granted to it by the Constitution
2. If created by Congress – The Congress has plenary power to specify the
qualifications and disqualifications, as long as these are (1) germane to the
objectives for which the office was created, and (2) the qualifications are not too
specific as to fit a particular identifiable person that would deprive the appointing
authority of discretion in the selection of the appointee
Authority to Prescribe Disqualifications
Congress may prescribe disqualifications in the same manner as it can prescribe

qualifications, as long as the Constitution is not violated. Congress cannot remove a
disqualification that the Constitution has attached to a position.
The Congress cannot also add to the list of disqualifications in the Constitution without
any Constitutional authority. [Vargas v. Rilloraza, G.R. No. L-1612, February 26,
1984]
The qualifications prescribed for elective office cannot be erased by the electorate
alone. The will of the people as expressed through the ballot cannot cure the vice of
ineligibility, especially if they mistakenly believed, as in this case, that the candidate
was qualified. [Frivaldo v. Comelec, G.R. No. 87193, June 23, 1989]
Presumption in Favour of Eligibility
There is a strong public policy that exists in favour of eligibility. Thus, the right to hold
public office is strictly construed against ineligibility.
When to Possess Qualifications
The qualifications must be possessed by the candidate or appointee at the time

specified by the Constitution or by the law. However, eligibility is of a continuing nature
and must exist during the occupancy of the office. [Aguila v. Genato, G.R. No. L-
55151, March 17, 1981]
General Disqualifications under the Constitution
No candidate who has lost in any election shall, within one year after such election, be
appointed to any office in the Government or any Government-owned or controlled
corporations or in any of their subsidiaries. [1987 Constitution, Art. IX-B, Sec. 6]
No elective official shall be eligible for appointment or designation in any capacity to

any public office or position during his tenure. [1987 Constitution, Art. IX-B, Sec. 7]
Unless otherwise allowed by law or by the primary functions of his position, no

appointive official shall hold any other office or employment in the Government or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including Government-owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries. [1987 Constitution, Art. IX-B, Sec. 7]
Specific Disqualifications under the Constitution
 President, Vice President, Cabinet Members and their deputies and assistants
o Shall not hold any other office or employment during their tenure, unless
otherwise provided in the Constitution.
 Senator or Member of the House of Representatives
o May not hold any other office or employment in the Government, including
GOCC, during his term without forfeiting his seat. Neither shall he be appointed
to any office which may have been created or the emoluments increased during
the term for which he was elected.
 Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law
o Shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions.
 Member of a Constitutional Commission
o May not, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment and must not
have been candidates for any elective position in the election immediately
preceding their appointments.
 Ombudsman and his deputies
o May not, during his tenure, hold any other office or employment. He shall
likewise not be qualified to run for office in the election immediately succeeding
their cessation, and must not have been candidates for any elective position in
the election immediately preceding their appointments.
 Spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the 4th civil degree of the
President shall not during his tenure be appointed as:
o members of the Constitutional Commission
o Office of Ombudsman
o Secretaries
o Undersecretaries
o Chairmen/heads
 Vargas vs. Rilloraza 80 Phil 297

G.R. No. L-1612 | 1948-02-26
 Vargas vs. Rilloraza 80 Phil 297 [CONCURRING OPINION]
G.R. No. L-1612 | 1948-02-26
 Vargas vs. Rilloraza 80 Phil 297 [DISSENTING OPINION, FERIA, J.]
G.R. No. L-1612 | 1948-02-26
 David Aguila, et al. vs. Melencio A. Genato
G.R. No. L-55151 | 1981-03-17
 Frivaldo vs. COMELEC 174 SCRA 245
G.R. No. 87193 | 1989-06-22
Patrimonial Property
A property is patrimonial when it is no longer earmarked for public use. Public domain lands
become only patrimonial property not only with a declaration that these are alienable and
disposable. There must also be an express government manifestationthat the property is
already patrimonial or no longer retained for public service or the development of national
wealth, under Article 422 of the Civil Code. And only when the property has become
patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion
begin to run. [Republic v. Rizalvo, Jr.,G.R. No. 172011, March 7, 2011].
An alienable and disposable land of the public domain is not necessarily patrimonial. For
while the property is no longer for public use, the intent to use it for public service or for the
development of national wealth is presumed unless the contrary is expressly manifested by
competent authority. [Republic vs Metro Index Realty and Development Corporation, G.R. No.
198585, July 2, 2012]
 Republic of the Philippines vs. Teodoro P. Rizalvo, Jr.

G.R. No. 172011 | 2011-03-07
 Republic of the Philippines Vs. Metro Index Realty and Development Corporation, 675
SCRA 439
G.R. No. 198585 | 2012-07-02
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Bill Of Rights; Eminent Domain
Concept
Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation. [Section 9,
Article III, 1987 Constitution]
The elements of eminent domain are the following: (1) There is taking of private property;
(2) The taking must be for needed public purpose; (3) There must be just compensation.
[Bernas, The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer (2011)]
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within the

jurisdiction of the regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject property.
[Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Francisco, G.R. No. 138896, June 20, 2000]
Taking
A number of circumstances must be present in the "taking" of property for purposes of

eminent domain. These are: First, the expropriator must enter a private property.
Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period.
Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority.
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated
or injuriously affected. Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such
a way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property.
[Republic v. Vda. De Castellvi, G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974]
Public Purpose
The requirement of public use means that the expropriator must use the property for the
purpose specified in the petition. If this is not done, the expropriator must return the
property, even if there was no agreement for reversal. But the owner must return to the
expropriator the compensation it had received with legal interest and must pay the
expropriator for benefits the lot may have obtained. [Mactan Cebu International
Airport v. Lozada, G.R. No. 176625, February 25, 2010]
The public use requirement for the valid exercise of the power of eminent domain is a
flexible and evolving concept influenced by changing conditions. It is accurate to state
that at present, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies
the requirement of public use. [Estate of Salud Jimenez v. Reyes, G.R. No. 137285,
January 16, 2001]
Public use is the general concept of meeting public need or public exigency It is not
confined to actual use by the public in its traditional sense. The idea that publice use is
strictly limited to clear cases of use by the public has been abandoned. The term public
use has now been held to synonymous with public interest, public benefit, public welfare,
and public convenience. [Reyes v. National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 147511,
January 20, 2003]
Just compensation
Just compensation has been described as the just and complete equivalent of the loss
which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation.
It means payment that matches the market value. [Bernas, supra]
Just compensation includes not only the correct determination of the amount to be paid
to owner of the land but also the payment for the land within a reasonable period of time
from its taking. [Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos. 89898-99,
October 1, 1990]
Two stages in every action for expropriation
The first stage is the determination of authority of the plaintiff to expropriate, which
includes the propriety of the expropriation, its necessity and public purpose. The second
stage is the determination of just compensation through the court-appointed
commissioners. [National Power Corporation v. Joson, G.R. No. 160652, February
13, 2006] The first phase ends with either an order of dismissal or a determination that
the property is to be acquired for a public purpose. [City of Manila v. Alegar
Corporation, G.R. No. 187604, June 25, 2012]
Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than
three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report
to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. [Rule 67, Sec.
5]
The payment of just compensation to be determined as of the date of the taking of the
property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first. [Rule 67, Sec. 4]
Upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than
three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report
to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. [Rule 67, Sec.
5]
Non-payment of just compensation does not entitle the private landowner to recover
possession of the expropriated lots. However, in cases where the government failed to
pay just compensation within 5 years from the finality of judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their
rights. [Yujuico v. Atienza, Jr., G.R. No. 164282, October 12, 2005]
In such a case, the owner is not restricted to payment of the market value of the portion
actually taken. In addition to the market value of the portion taken, he is also entitled to
payment of consequential damages, if any, to the remaining part of the property. At the
same time, from the total compensation must be deducted the value of consequential
benefits, if any, that the consequential benefits do not exceed the consequential
damages. [NPC v. Spouses Chiong, G.R. No. 152436, June 20, 2003]
Just Compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner of the
land but also payment within a reasonable time from its taking. [Eslaban v. De Onorio,
G.R. No. 146062, June 28, 2001]
 Republic vs Castellvi 58 SCRA 336

G.R. No. L-20620 | 1974-08-15
 Municipality of Makati vs. Court of Appeals, Et Al., 190 scra 206
G.R. Nos. 89898-99 | 1990-10-01
 Barangay San Roque, Talisay Cebu vs Heirs of Francisco Pastor
G.R. No. 138896 | 2000-06-20
 Eslaban vs De Onorio
G.R. No. 146062 | 2001-06-28
 Reyes vs National Housing Authority
G.R. No. 147511 | 2003-01-20
 National Power Corporation (NPC) vs Spouses Chiong
G.R. No. 152436 | 2003-06-20
 Teresita M. Yujuico vs. Hon. Jose L. Atienza, Jr., et al.
G.R. No. 164282 | 2005-10-12
 Hon. Tomas N. Joson III, et al. vs. Court Of Appeals, et al
G.R. No. 160652 | 2006-02-13
 Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority (MCIAA) and Air Transportation Office (ATO)
vs. Bernardo Lozada, et al.
G.R. No. 176625 | 2010-02-25
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Bill Of Rights; Fundamental Powers Of The State;
Eminent Domain; Concept, Application And Limits
It is the power of the State to take private property for public use upon payment of just
compensation. [Bernas, The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A Comprehensive
Reviewer (2011)].
It is well settled that eminent domain is an inherent power of the state that need not be
granted even by the fundamental law. Sec. 9, Art. III merely imposes a limit on the
government’s exercise of this power. [Republic v. Tagle, G.R. No. 129079, December
2, 1998].
In the exercise of police power, the State restricts the use of private property but none
of the property interest in the bundle of rights which constitutes ownership is
appropriated for use by or for the benefit of the public. Use of the property by the owners
is limited, but no aspect of the property is used by or for the benefit of the public. The
deprivation of use can, in fact, be total, and it will not constitute compensable taking if
nobody else acquires use of the property or any interest therein. [Didipio Eart-Savers
Multi-Purpose Association v. Gozun, G.R. No. 157882, March 30, 2006].
Elements:
1. There is taking of private property;

2. The taking must be for needed public use;
3. There must be just compensation. [Bernas, The 1987 Philippine Constitution: A
Comprehensive Reviewer (2011)].
To constitute taking for purposes of eminent domain, the following circumstances must
concur: (a) The expropriator must enter upon the private property; (b) The entrance
must not be for a momentary period; (c) The entry must be under warrant or color of
legal authority; (d) The property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally
appropriated or injuriously affected; (e) The utilization of the property must be in such a
way as to oust the owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the
property. [Republic v. Vda. De Castellvi, G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974].
All private property capable of ownership may be expropriated, except money and choses
in action. Even services may be subject to eminent domain. [Republic v. PLDT, G.R.
No. L-18841, January 27, 1969]. But note that, property already devoted to public
use cannot be expropriated by a delegate of legislature acting under a general grant of
authority. [City of Manila v. Chinese Community, G.R. No. L-14355, October 31,
1919].
The predominant precept is that upon abandonment of real property condemned for
public purpose, the party who originally condemned the property recovers control of the
land if the condemning party continues to use the property for public purpose; however,
if the condemning authority ceases to use the property for a public purpose, the property
reverts to the owner in fee simple. [Heirs of Moreno v. Mactan-Cebu International
Airport, G.R. No. 156273, August 9, 2005]. The foundation of the right to exercise
eminent domain is genuine necessity and that necessity must be of public character.
Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily choose which private property should be
expropriated. In one case, there was no showing at all why petitioner’s property was
singled out for expropriation by the city ordinance or what necessity impelled the
particular choice or selection. [Lagaco v. Labra, G.R. No. 155746, October 13,
2004].
As a requirement for eminent domain, “public use” is the general concept of meeting
public need or public exigency. It is not confined to actual use by the public in its
traditional sense. The idea that “public use” is strictly limited to clear cases of use by the
public has been abandoned. The rem “public use” has now been held to be synonymous
with public interest, public benefit, public welfare and public convenience. [Reyes v.
National Housing Authority, G.R. No. 147511, January 20, 2003]. The meaning
has been broadened to cover uses which, while not directly available to the public,
redound to their indirect advantage or benefits. [Heirs of Ardona v. Reyes, G.R. Nos.
L-60549, 60553-5, October 26, 1983].
Just compensation has been described as “the just and complete equivalent of the loss
which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation.
It means payment that matches market value. It also includes the payment of the land
within a reasonable period of time from its taking. [Eslaban v. De Onorio, G.R. No.
146062, June 28, 2001].
As a rule, the determination of whether there is genuine necessity for the exercise of
eminent domain is a justiciable question. However, when the power is exercised by
Congress, the question of necessity is essentially a political question. [Manapat v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 110478, October 15, 2007].
The general rule is that the value must be that as of the time of the filing of the complaint
for expropriation.[Sec. 4, Rule 67, Rules of Court]. The filing of the case generally
coincides with the taking. When, however, the filing of the case comes later than the time
of taking and meanwhile the value of the property has increased because of the use to
which the expropriator has put it, the value is that of the time of the earlier taking.
Otherwise the owner would gain undeserved profit. But if the value increased
independently of what the expropriator did, then the value is of the later filing of the
case. [National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, G.R. No. 168732, June 29,
2007]. Where the government occupied a piece of private land for the airport runway
but without expropriating it and after lapse of many years the owner seeks compensation
and rental for purposes of compensation the value of the land should be based on what
it was worth at the time of the entry and not its value many years after. Beyond the
payment for the value of the land, the owner is entitled to legal interest, not
rentals. [Manila International Airport Authority v. Rodriguez, G.R. No. 16183,
February 28, 2006].
Note however, that in CARP cases, the Court ruled in 2001 that, as explicitly provided by
Sec. 16 (e) of R.A. 6657, the deposit of compensation must be in cash or in Land Bank
bonds, not in any other form, and certainly not in a trust account. While the Association
of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform ruling allowed a deviation in the
traditional mode of payment other than cash, this did not dispense with the settled rule
that there must be payment of just compensation before the title to the expropriated
property is transferred. [Sta. Rosa Realty and Development Corp. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 112526, October 12, 2001]. Note further that the principal
criterion in determining just compensation is the character of the land at the time of the
taking.[National Power Corporation v. Henson, G.R. No. 129998, December 29,
1998]. Once the value of the property is fixed by the court, the amount shall earn
interest at the legal rate until full payment. Hence the interest due to the property owner
is at the rate of 6% per annum, prescribed in Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, and not 12%
per annum under the Central Bank Circular No. 416, because the latter applies to loans
or forbearance of money, goods or credits. [National Power Corporation v. Angas,
G.R. Nos. 60225-26, May 8, 1992].
Title to the property do not pass until after payment of the amount. [Visayan Refining
v. Camus, G.R. No. L-15870, December 3, 1919]. Save in cases of agrarian
reform. [Resolution on Motion for Reconsideration, Land Bank v. Court of
Appeals]. Thus, the owner of the land subject to expropriation my still dispose of the
same before payment of just compensation. [Republic v. Salem Investment
Corporation, G.R. No. 137569, June 23, 2000].
As a rule, non-payment of just compensation in an expropriation proceeding does not

entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the expropriated lots, but to
demand payment of the fair market value of the property. [Republic of the Philippines
v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 146587, July 2, 2003]. But such rule was not applied
when the government failed to pay just compensation for 57 years after the expropriation
case was terminated. The court construed the government’s failure to pay as a deliberate
refusal on its part.[Republic of the Philippines v. Lim, G.R. No. 161656, June 29,
2005].
 Jose D. Dacudao Vs. Agustin D. Duenas

G.R. No. L-14355 | 1960-05-20
 Republic vs PLDT 26 SCRA 620
G.R. No. L-18841 | 1969-01-27
G.R. No. L-20620 | 1974-08-15
 Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs Reyes 125 SCRA 220
G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555 | 1983-10-26
 National Power Corporation vs Angas 208 SCRA 542
G.R. Nos. 60225-26 | 1992-05-08
 Republic vs Tagle
G.R. No. 129079 | 1998-12-02
 National Power Corporation vs Henson
G.R. No. 129998 | 1998-12-29
 RP vs Salem Investment Corp, De Elizalde, Cabarrus vda de Santos
G.R. No. 137569 | 2000-06-23
G.R. No. 146062 | 2001-06-28
 SRRDC vs. Court of Appeals [DECISION]
G.R. No. 112526 | 2001-10-12
 Republic vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 146587 | 2002-07-02
G.R. No. 147511 | 2003-01-20
 Heirs of TImoteo Moreno, et al Vs. Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority.
G.R. No. 156273 | 2003-10-15
 Lagcao vs Judge Labra
G.R. No. 155746 | 2004-10-13
 Sta. Rosa Realty Development Corporation vs Juan B. Amante, et al.
G.R. No. 112526 | 2005-03-16
 RP, et al. vs Vicente G. Lim
G.R. No. 161656 | 2005-06-28
 Republic of the Philippines vs Vicente G. Lim (RESOLUTION)
G.R. No. 161656 | 2005-06-29
 National Power Corp vs. Lucman G. Ibrahim et al.
G.R. No. 168732 | 2007-06-29
 SRRDC vs. Court of Appeals [AMENDED DECISION, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.]
G.R. No. 112526 | 2005-03-16
GOCCS, Exemption From Payment Of Legal Fees

GENERAL RULE: GOCCS are not exempt from payment of legal fees
As a general rule, government owned and controlled corporations (GOCCs)-- with or
without independent charters -- are required to pay legal fees:
SEC. 21. Government Exempt. - The Republic of the Philippines, its agencies and
instrumentalities, are exemptfrom paying the legal fees provided in this rule. Local
governments and government-owned or controlled corporations with or without
independent charters are not exempt from paying such fees.
[see Section 21, Rule 141 of the 1997 Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No.
00-2-01-SC](emphasis and underscoring supplied)
EXCEPTION: GOCC exempt from paying docket fees when it sues or is sued in
relation to its government function
In Badillo vs Tayag [G.R. No. 143976 and G.R. No. 145846, April 3, 2003] , the
court declared that the National Housing Authority (NHA), a government-owned and
controlled corporation, is exempt from paying appellate docket fees when it sues or is
sued in relation to its governmental function of providing mass housing. It is likewise
exempt from filing a supersedeas bond that will stay the execution of a forcible entry
case.
In Public Estates Authority v. Yujuico [G.R. No. 140486, Febriary 6, 2001], it was
held that the Public Estates Authority (PEA), a government-owned and controlled
corporation, is exempt from paying docket fees whenever it files a suit in relation to its
governmental functions.
Exemption from posting appeal bonds
When a case involves provable rents or damages incurred by a government-owned or

controlled corporation, the real party in interest is the Republic of the Philippines. When
the State litigates, it is not required to put up a bond for damages or even an appeal
bond -- either directly or indirectly through its authorized officers -- because it is
presumed to be always solvent
[Badillo vs Tayag, G.R. No. 143976 and G.R. No. 145846, April 3, 2003 citing
Araneta v. Gatmaitan, G.R. No. L-8895, April 30, 1957]
 Salvador Araneta vs. Hon. Magno S. Gatmaitan 101 Phil 328

G.R. No. L-8895 | 1957-04-30
 Public Estates Authority vs. Yujuico 351 SCRA 280
G.R. No. 140486 | 2001-02-06
 Badillo vs Tayag
G.R. No. 143976 and G.R. No. 145846 | 2003-04-03
Power Of Eminent Domain (Expropriation)

Definition:
The power of eminent domain is the inherent right of the State to condemn private
property to public use upon payment of just compensation.
The right is inherent because it need not be granted by the Constitution in order for it to
exist. The provision in the Constitution on eminent domain is not a grant of right to the
State but actually serves as a limitation on the government's exercise of its inherent
power and provides a measure of protection to the citizens. [see Republic vs Tagle,
G.R. No. 129079 December 2, 1998]
Constitutional provisions:
Section 9, Article III; Section 18, Article XII; Section 4 and 9, Article XIII
Distinguished from police power
In the exercise of police power, (a) interest in private property is typically not
appropriated but merely restrained or restricted because the continued use thereof would
be inurious to the public welfare. (b) Hence, there is no need to pay just
compensation. (c) The purpose of the restraint is to secure the general comfort, safety,
health, and prosperity of the State.
In the exercise of eminent (a) interest in private property is appropriated by the State
(there is loss of ownership) and (b) hence, there is need for just compensation. (c) The
purpose of the exercise is to apply the property for some public purpose.
[see Didipio Earth-Savers Multi-Purpose Association vs Gozun, G.R. No. 157882,
March 30, 2006]
There is exercise of expropriation power even if only a burden is imposed on

the property owner and no loss of title occurred
Normally, of course, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation
of title to, and possession of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears
why the said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of
condemned property, without loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real
property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of
way. [Republic vs PLDT, G.R. No. L-18841. January 27, 1969; see also Camarines
Norte Electric Cooperative vs Court of Appeals G.R. No. 109338, November 20,
2000]
In Republic vs PLDT, it was held that PLDT can be compelled to enter into an inter-
connection agreement with the Bureau of Telecommunication for the use of the telephone
company's lines and services to allow inter-service connection between both telephone
systems. This was held to be an exercise of expropriation powers since private property
is subjected to a burden for public use and benefit. The State may require a public utility
to render services in the general interest, provided just compensation is paid therefor.
In National Power Corporation vs Manubay Agro-Industrial Development

Corporation, G.R. No. 150936, August 18, 2004, an action for a right of way filed by
an electric power company for the construction of transmission lines was deemed to be
within the scope of eminent domain power.
In National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay,

G.R. No. 165828, August 24, 2011, it was held that NAPOCOR's construction of the
tunnel constituted taking of the land and it was liable to pay not merely an easement fee
but rather the full compensation for land traversed by the underground tunnels. [see
also National Power Corporation v. Ibrahim, G.R. No. 168732, June 29, 2007]
Jurisdiction over complaint for eminent domain is with the RTC
Expropriation proceedings are actions "incapable of pecuniary estimation" and thus within
the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts regardless of the value of the propery to be
expropriated. Valuation of the property is required only to determine the amount of just
compensation and not to determine jurisdiction. [see Barangay San Roque, Talisay
Cebu vs Heirs of Francisco Pastor, G.R. No. 138896, June 20, 2000 and Bardillon
vs Barangay Masili of Calamba, Laguna G.R. No. 146886, April 30, 2003]
Who may exercise the expropriation power

Congress, as the legislative arm of the state, has the inherent power of eminent domain.
However, other entities may exercise this power by delegation:
i. the President
ii. local government (Sec 19, RA 7610, Local Government Code)
Local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain and can exercise it
only when expressly authorized by the legislature. By virtue of RA 7160, Congress
conferred upon local government units the power to expropriate. [Lagcao vs Judge
Labra G.R. No. 155746 October 3, 2004]
The expropriation power, when exercised by local government units, must be through a
valid ordinance. A mere resolutin by the sanggunian is not sufficient compliance with the
requirements of Secton 19 of RA 7610. [see Municipality of Paranaque vs V.M.
Realty Corporation, G.R. No. 127820 July 20, 1998]
iii. administrative bodies

iv. private enterprises performing public services (ex: Napocor)
Requisites for the exercise of Eminent Domain:
(a) Necessity
(b) Private property
(c) Taking must be valid
(d) Public use
(e) Just compensation
A. Necessity
The foundation of the right to exercise eminent domain is genuine necessity and that
necessity must be of public character. Government may not capriciously or arbitrarily
choose which private property should be expropriated. [Lagcao vs Judge Labra G.R.
No. 155746 October 3, 2004]
When exercised by the Legislature, the question of necessity is generally a political

question. [see Municipality of Meycauayan Bulacan vs IAC, G.R. No. 72126
January 29, 1988]. But when exercised by a delegate, the determination of genuine
necessity is a justiciable question. [Republic vs La Orden de PP.. Benedictinos de
Filipinas, G.R. No. L-12792 February 28, 1961]
The RTC has the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent
domain and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity for it. [Bardillon vs
Barangay Masili of Calamba, Laguna G.R. No. 146886 April 30, 2003]
B. Private Property
All private property capable of ownership may be expropriated, except money and choses
in action. Even services may be subject to eminent domain. [Republic vs PLDT G.R.
No. L-18841. January 27, 1969]
C. Valid Taking
The requisites for valid taking are:
(1) expropriator must enter into a private property

(2) entry must be for more than a momentary period
(3) entry must be under warrant or color of authority
(4) property must be devoted to public use or otherwise informally appropriated or
injuriously affected; and
(5) utilization of the property must be in such a way as to oust the owner and deprive
him of the beneficial enjoyment of the property.
[Republic vs Castellvi, G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974]
Taking contemplates not only deprivation of ownership, but also deprivation of

beneficial use
Taking may include trespass without actual eviction of the owner, material impairment of
the value of the property or prevention of the ordinary uses for which the property was
intended. [see Ayala de Roxas vs City of Manila G.R. No. L-3144, November 19,
1907; People vs Fajardo G.R. No. L-12172, August 29, 1958; National Power
Corporation vs Gutierrez , G.R. No. L-60077, January 18, 1991]
D. Concept of Public Use
Restrictive view not applied
It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional
purposes. Here, as elsewhere, the idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases
of "use by the public" has been abandoned. The term "public use" has now been held to
be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public
convenience." [Reyes vs National Housing Authority G.R. No. 147511, January 20,
2003]
Public use includes indirect advantage to the public
It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for
the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public use....The meaning of "public use"
has also been broadened to cover uses which, while not directly available to the public,
redound to their indirect advantage or benefit. [Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs Reyes,
G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555, October 26, 1983]
That only few would actually benefit from the expropriation of the property does not
necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use. [Manosca vs Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 106440, January 29, 1996]
E. Just Compensation
a) Fair Market Value
In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that the just
compensation to which the owner of condemned property is entitled to is the market
value. Market value is "that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to
buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given
and received therefor." [National Power Corporation vs Spouses Chiong G.R. No.
152436 June 20, 2003]
Just compensation means the value of the property at the time of the taking. It means a
fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts as to the condition of the
property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities, should be
considered. [EPZA vs Dulay, G.R. No. L-59603, April 29, 1987]
b) When only a portion of the propery is expropriated
The aforementioned rule, however, is modified where only a part of a certain property is
expropriated. In such a case the owner is not restricted to compensation for the portion
actually taken. In addition to the market value of the portion taken, he is also entitled to
recover for the consequential damage, if any, to the remaining part of the property. At
the same time, from the total compensation must be deducted the value of the
consequential benefits.[National Power Corporation vs Spouses Chiong G.R. No.
152436 June 20, 2003]
c) Payment within a reasonable time
Just compensation means not only the correct amount to be paid to the owner but also
payment within a reasonable time from its taking. [Eslaban vs De Onorio G.R. No.
146062 June 28, 2001]
d) Judicial prerogative
The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.

The executive department or the legislature may make the initial determinations but
when a party claims a violation of the guarantee in the Bill of Rights that private property
may not be taken for public use without just compensation, no statute, decree, or
executive order can mandate that its own determination shall prevail over the court's
findings. Much less can the courts be precluded from looking into the "just-ness" of the
decreed compensation. [EPZA vs Dulay, G.R. No. L-59603, April 29, 1987; see also
Panes vs Visayas State College of Agriculture, G.R. Nos. 56219 & 56220,
November 27, 1996]
In EPZA, P.D. No. 1533 was declared unconstitutional since it effectively limited te role
of the courts to simply stating the lower value of the property as declared either by the
owner or the assessor. It was held that the valuation in the decree may only serve as a
guiding principle or one of the factors in determining just compensation but it may not
substitute the court's own judgment as to what amount should be awarded and how to
arrive at such amount
e) Trial by commissioners
In an expropriation case where the principal issue is the determination of just

compensation, a trial before the Commissioners is indispensable to allow the parties to
present evidence on the issue of just compensation... the appointment of at least three
(3) competent persons as commissioners to ascertain just compensation for the property
sought to be taken is a mandatory requirement in expropriation cases...trial with the aid
of the commissioners is a substantial right that may not be done away with capriciously
or for no reason at all.
While it is true that the findings of commissioners may be disregarded and the court may
substitute its own estimate of the value, the latter may only do so for valid reasons, i.e.,
(i) where the Commissioners have applied illegal principles to the evidence submitted to
them or (ii) where they have disregarded a clear preponderance of evidence, or (iii) where
the amount allowed is either grossly inadequate or excessive...in such instances, where
the report of the commissioners may be disregarded, the trial court may make its own
estimate of value from competent evidence that may be gathered from the
record. [Manila Electric Company vs Pineda, G.R. No. L-59791, February 13,
1992]
f) Determination of value of just compensation
The value of the property must be determined either as of the date of the taking or the
date of the filing of the complaint, whichever comes first. [See Eslaban vs De Onorio
G.R. No. 146062 June 28, 2001]
Exception: when expropriation is exercised by a local government unit, the amount to be

paid shall be determined based on the fair market value of the property at the time of
the taking. [Sec 19, RA 7610] [see Nepomuceno vs City of Surigao, G.R. No.
146091 July 28, 2008; City of Cebu vs Spouses Dedamo G.R. No. 142971 May 7,
2002]
The principal criterion in determining just compensation is the character of the land at
the time of taking. [National Power Corporation vs Henson G.R. No. 129998
December 29, 1998]
The tax declaration is only one of the factors in determining the market value of the
property for purposes of arriving at the amount of just compensation. [Republic vs Ker
& Co. G.R. No. 136171 July 2, 2002]
g) Entitlement of owner to interest at the rate of 6%
Once the value of the property is fixed by the court, the amount shall earn legal
interest by way of damages at the rate of 6% per annum in accordance with Article
2209 of the Civil Code. The 12% under Central Bank Circular No. 416 applies only to
loans or forbearances of money, goods, or credit. [see National Power Corporation
vs Angas, G.R. Nos. 60225-26, May 8, 1992]
h) Remedy of landowner in case of non-payment
As a general rule, non-payment of just compensation in an expropriation proceeding does

not entitle the private landowners to recover possession of the exproproated lots, but
only to demand payment of the fair market value. [See Republic vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 146587 July 2, 2002 and Reyes vs National Housing Authority G.R. No.
147511, January 20, 2003] Note: in such case, immunity from suit cannot be invoked
by the State since such doctrine cannot be used to perpetrate an injustice
By way of exception, it has been held that when the government fails to pay the just
compensation within five years from the finality of judgment in the expropriation
proceedings, the owners concerned shall have the right to recover possession of their
property. [see Republic vs Vicente Lim, G.R. No. 161656, June 29, 2005]
 People vs Fajardo 104 Phil 443

G.R. No. L-12172 | 1958-08-29
G.R. No. L-18841 | 1969-01-27
G.R. No. L-20620 | 1974-08-15
 Heirs of Juancho Ardona vs Reyes 125 SCRA 220
G.R. Nos. L-60549, 60553 to 60555 | 1983-10-26
 Export Processing Zone Authority (EPZA) vs. Dulay 148 SCRA 305
G.R. No. L-59603 | 1987-04-29
 Manila Electric Company vs Pineda 206 SCRA 196
G.R. No. L-59791 | 1992-02-13
 National Power Corporation vs Angas 208 SCRA 542
G.R. Nos. 60225-26 | 1992-05-08
 Manosca vs Court of Appeals 252 SCRA 412
G.R. No. 106440 | 1996-01-29
 Panes vs Visayas State College of Agriculture 263 SCRA 708
G.R. Nos. 56219 & 56220 | 1996-11-27
 Republic vs Tagle
G.R. No. 129079 | 1998-12-02
 National Power Corporation vs Henson
G.R. No. 129998 | 1998-12-29
 Barangay San Roque, Talisay Cebu vs Heirs of Francisco Pastor
G.R. No. 138896 | 2000-06-20
 Camarines Norte Electric Cooperative (CANORECO) vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 109338 | 2000-11-20
G.R. No. 146062 | 2001-06-28
 City of Cebu vs Spouses Dedamo
G.R. No. 142971 | 2002-05-07
 Republic vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 146587 | 2002-07-02
 Republic vs Ker & Co.
G.R. No. 136171 | 2002-07-02
G.R. No. 147511 | 2003-01-20
 Bardillon vs Barangay Masili of Calamba, Laguna
G.R. No. 146886 | 2003-04-30
 National Power Corporation (NPC) vs Spouses Chiong
G.R. No. 152436 | 2003-06-20
 National Power Corporation vs Manubay Agro-Industrial Development Corporation 437
SCRA 60
G.R. No. 150936 | 2004-08-18
 RP, et al. vs Vicente G. Lim
G.R. No. 161656 | 2005-06-28
 Republic of the Philippines vs Vicente G. Lim (RESOLUTION)
G.R. No. 161656 | 2005-06-29
 National Power Corp vs. Lucman G. Ibrahim et al.
G.R. No. 168732 | 2007-06-29
 Nepomuceno vs City of Surigao
G.R. No. 146091 | 2008-07-28
 National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) vs. Heirs of Macabangkit Sangkay
G.R. No. 165828 | 2011-08-24
 Ayala de Roxas vs City of Manila
G.R. No. L-3144 | November 19, 1907
Local Expropriation; Essential Requisites

The following are the essential requisites that must concur before an LGU can exercise
the power of eminent domain:
1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council authorizing the local chief
executive, in behalf of the LGU, to exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue
expropriation proceedings over a particular private property.
2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use, purpose or welfare, or for
the benefit of the poor and the landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under Section 9, Article III of the
Constitution, and other pertinent laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner of the property sought
to be expropriated, but said offer was not accepted.
(Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, G.R.No. 127820, July 20,

1998; Heirs of Alberto Suguitan v. City of Mandaluyong, G.R. No. 135087, March
14, 2000)

G.R. No. 127820 | 1998-07-20
 Heirs of Alberto Suguitan vs City of Mandaluyong
G.R. No. 135087 | 2000-03-14
 Danilo Antonio, et al., vs. Hon. Isagani A. Geronimo, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of
the Municipal Trial Court of Antipolo, Rizal. et al
G.R. No. 124779 | 2005-11-29
G.R. No. 156684 | 2011-04-06
Eminent Domain, What Constitutes Taking

A number of circumstances must be present in the "taking" of property for purposes of
eminent domain.
First, the expropriator must enter a private property.
Second, the entrance into private property must be for more than a momentary period.
'Momentary' means, 'lasting but a moment; of but a moment's duration'; 'lasting a very
short time; transitory; having a very brief life; operative or recurring at every moment."
The word 'momentary' when applied to possession or occupancy of (real) property should
be construed to mean 'a limited period' not indefinite or permanent.
Third, the entry into the property should be under warrant or color of legal authority. This
circumstance in the "taking" may be considered as present in the instant case, because
the Republic entered the Castellvi property as lessee.
Fourth, the property must be devoted to a public use or otherwise informally appropriated
or injuriously affected.
Fifth, the utilization of the property for public use must be in such a way as to oust the
owner and deprive him of all beneficial enjoyment of the property. [Republic vs. Vda.
De Castellvi, G.R. No. L-20620, August 15, 1974]
In People vs Fajardo [G.R. No. L-12172, August 29, 1958], the court held that
an ordinance that operates to permanently deprive a party of the right to use their own
property oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of property
without just compensation. While property may be regulated in the interest of the general
welfare, and in its pursuit, the State may prohibit structures offensive to the sight (see
Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty, G.R. No. L-10572, December 21, 1915), the State may
not, under the guise of police power, permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of
their property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic
appearance of the community.
In Republic vs PLDT [G.R. No. L-18841, January 27, 1969], the court held that "the
Republic may, in the exercise of the sovereign power of eminent domain, require the
telephone company to permit interconnection of the government telephone system and
that of the PLDT, as the needs of the government service may require, subject to the
payment of just compensation to be determined by the court. Normally, of course, the
power of eminent domain results in the taking or appropriation of title to, and possession
of, the expropriated property; but no cogent reason appears why the said power may not
be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of condemned property, without
loss of title and possession. It is unquestionable that real property may, through
expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of way." [see also National Power
Corporation (NAPOCOR) vs. Aguirre Paderanga, G.R. No. 155065, July 28, 2005]
 People vs Fajardo 104 Phil 443

G.R. No. L-12172 | 1958-08-29
G.R. No. L-18841 | 1969-01-27
G.R. No. L-20620 | 1974-08-15
 National Power Corporation (NAPOCOR) vs. Aguirre Paderanga
G.R. No. 155065 | 2005-07-28
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Bill Of Rights; Fundamental Powers Of

The State; Police Power; Concept, Application, Limits
Police power has been characterized as “the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does to all great public needs.” Negatively, it has
been defined as “that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit
all that is hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. [Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. Mayor of Manila, G.R. No. L-24693, July
31, 1967].
Police power rests upon public necessity and upon the right of the State and of the public
to self-protection. For this reason, its scope expands and contracts with changing
needs. [Churchill v. Rafferty, G.R. No. L-10572, December 21, 1915]. The state, in
order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with personal liberty, with property,
and with business and occupations. Persons may be subjected to all kinds of restraints
and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort health and prosperity of the state
and to this fundamental aim of our Government, the rights of the individual are
subordinated. [Ortigas and Co. v. Feati Bank and Trust Co., G.R. No. L-24670,
December 14, 1979]. Police Power cannot be bargained away through treaty or
contract. [Ichong v. Hernandez, G.R. No. L-7995, May 31, 1957]. Moreover, the
non-impairment of contracts or vested rights clauses will have to yield to the superior
and legitimate exercise by the State of the police power. [Ortigas and Co. v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 126102, December 2000]. Even profession, like all rights and
freedoms, their exercise may be so regulated pursuant to the police power of the State
to safeguard health, morals, peace, education, order, safety and the general welfare of
the people. [Professional Regulation Commission v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 144681,
June 21, 2004]. Taxation may be used as an implement of police power [Lutz v.
Araneta, G.R. No. L-7859, December 22, 1955].
When condition so demand, as determined by the legislature, property rights must bow
to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by the due
process clause, must yield to the general welfare. Therefore an administrative order
implementing the 20% discount of R.A. 9257 otherwise known as the “Expanded Senior
Citizens Act of 2003”, is a legitimate exercise of police power. [Carlos Superdrug
Corporation v. DSWD, et al., G.R. No. 166494, June 29, 2007]. The national
government, through the legislative department, exercises police power. But police power
is also delegated, within limits, to local governments. [Bernas, The 1987 Philippine
Constitution: A Comprehensive Reviewer (2011)].
Test for valid exercise
1. Lawful Subject: Interest of the general public (as distinguished from a particular class
required exercise). This means that the activity or property sought to be regulated
affects the general welfare. [TaxicabOperators v. Board of Transportation, G.R.
No. L-59234, September 30, 1982].
2. Lawful Means: Means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of
the purpose, and are not unduly oppressive. [Tablarin v. Gutierrez, G.R. No.
78164, July 31, 1987]
3. Least Restrictions of Individual Rights: It must also be evident that no other
alternative for the accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can
work. [White Light Corporation, et al v. City of Manila, G.R. No. 122846,
January 20, 2009].
 Lutz vs. Araneta 98 Phil 148

G.R. No. L-7859 | 1955-12-22
 Ermita-Malate Hotel And Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor Of Manila
G.R. No. L-24693 | 1967-07-31
 Ermita-Malate Hotel And Motel Operators Association, Inc., Et Al. vs. City Mayor Of Manila
G.R. No. L-24693 | 1967-10-23
 Ortigas & Co. Limited Partnership vs. Feati Bank and Trust Co.
G.R. No. L-24670 | 1979-12-14
 Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc., et al. Vs. Board of Transportation, et al., 117
SCRA 597
G.R. No. L-59234 | 1982-09-30
 Tablarin vs. Gutierrez 152 SCRA 730
G.R. No. 78164 | 1987-07-31
 Ortigas & Co. vs Court of Appeals and Mathay
G.R. No. 126102 | 2000-12-04
 Professional Regulation Commission vs De Guzman
G.R. No. 144681 | 2004-06-21
 Carlos Superdrug Corporation vs DSWD
G.R. No. 166494 | 2007-06-29
 White Light Corporation, et al. Vs. City of Manila etc., 576 SCRA 416
G.R. No. 122846 | 2009-01-20
 Ichong vs Hernandez, 101 Phil. 115
G.R. No. L-7995 | 1957-05-31
 Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty 32 Phil 580
G.R. No. L-10572 | 1915-12-21
Political Law; Constitutional Law; Executive Department; Privileges,

Inhibitions, Disqualifications
Privileges
The President shall have an official residence. The salaries of the President and Vice-President
shall be determined by law and shall not be decreased during their tenure. No increase in said
compensation shall take effect until after the expiration of the term of the incumbent during which
such increase was approved. They shall not receive during their tenure any other emolument from
the Government or any other source. [Sec. 6, Art. VII, 1987 Constitution]
Case law uses the term presidential privilege to refer to either (1) immunity from suit (i.e. immunity
from judicial processes, or (2) executive privilege.
The privilege of immunity may be invoked only by the President. While the President is immune
from suit, she may not be prevented from instituting it [Soliven v. Makasiar, G.R. No. 82585,
November 14, 1988], but even if the DECS secretary is an alter ego of the President, he cannot
invoke the President’s immunity from suit in a case filed against him because the questioned acts
are not the act of the President but merely those of a department secretary. [Gloria v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 119903, August 15, 2000]. The immunity is co-extensive with tenure and
covers only official duties. After tenure, the Chief Executive cannot invoke immunity from suit
for civil damages arising out of acts done by him while he was President which were not performed
in the exercise of official duties. [Estrada v. Desierto, G.R. Nos. 146710-15, March 2, 2001] This
immunity cannot be invoked by a non-sitting president even for acts committed during his or her
tenure. Courts look with disfavor upon the presidential privilege of immunity, especially when it
impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right. [Saez vs. Macapagal-Arroyo,
G.R. No. 183533, September 25, 2012]
There are, on the other hand, two kinds of Executive Privilege, these are the Presidential
Communications Privilege (President) wherein communications are presumptively privileged; and
the Deliberative Process Privilege (Executive Officials), which refers to materials that comprise
part of a process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated. [Neri v. Senate,
G.R. No. 180843, March 25, 2008] Executive privilege is basically the power of the President to
withhold certain types of information from the courts, the congress, and ultimately the public.
The court had the chance to enumerate the matters covered by the privilege, these are: (1)
Conversations and correspondence between the President and the public official covered by an
executive order; (2) Military, diplomatic and other national security matters which in the interest
of national security should not be divulged; (3) Information between inter-government agencies
prior to the conclusion of treaties and executive agreements; (4) Discussion in close-door Cabinet
meetings; (5) Matters affecting national security and public order. [Senate v. Ermita, G.R. No.
169777, April 20, 2006]In a subsequent case, the Court handed out another decision regarding the
matter, it held, that Presidential communication is presumptively privileged; but the presumption
is subject to rebuttal. Thus, whoever challenges it, must show good cause and valid reasons related
to the public welfare. In that case, the court ruled against the senate for failing to overcome this
presumption. It reasoned that the communications between the president and operationally
proximate advisers are presumed to be privileged. [Neri v. Senate, supra]
Prohibitions/Inhibitions
Aside from those mentioned in Sec. 6 of Art. VII, “[T]he President, Vice-President, the Members
of the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not unless otherwise provided in this
Constitution, hold any other office or employment during said tenure. They shall not, during their
tenure, directly or indirectly practice any other profession, participate in any business, or be
financially interested in any contract with, or in any franchise, or special privilege granted by the
government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-
owned or controlled corporation or their subsidiaries. They shall strictly avoid conflict of interest
in the conduct of their office
The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the forth civil degree of the President
shall not during his tenure be appointed as members of the Constitutional Commission, or the
Office of the Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Under Secretaries, Chairmen or Heads of bureaus or
offices, including government-owned and controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. [Sec. 13,
Art. VII, 1987 Constitution]
Based on the preceding provision, the Supreme Court declared as unconstitutional E.O. No 284,
which allowed Cabinet members to hold two other offices in government. The prohibition on the
President and his official family is all-embracing and covers both public and private office
employment, not being qualified by the phrase “in the Government”. This is proof of the intent of
the Constitution to treat them as a class by itself and to impose upon said class stricter prohibitions.
[Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 83896, February 22, 1991] The said
prohibition does not, however, apply to posts occupied by Executive officials without additional
compensation. Precisely because, these do not comprise as “any other office” within the
contemplation of the prohibition. The ex-officio position being actually and in legal contemplation
part of the principal office, it follows that the official concerned has no right to receive additional
compensation for his services in said position. [National Amnesty Commission v. Commission on
Audit, G.R. No. 156982, September 8, 2004]
 Civil Liberties Union (CLU) vs. Executive Secretary 194 SCRA 317
G.R. No. 83896 | 1991-02-22
 Gloria vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 119903 | 2000-08-15
 Estrada vs. Desierto, et al.
G.R. Nos. 146710-15 | 2001-03-08
 Estrada vs. Desierto (Resolution on MR)
G.R. Nos. 146710-15 | 2001-04-03
 Brillantes, Jr vs COMELEC
G.R. No. 163193 | 2004-06-15
 Senate of the Philippines vs. Ermita 488 SCRA 1
G.R. No. 169777 | 2006-04-20
 [2/3] Senate of the Philippines, et al. vs. Eduardo R. Ermita etc.
G.R. No. 169777 | 2006-04-20
 In the Matter of the Petition for the Writ of Amparo and the Writ of Habeas Data in favor of
Francis Saez, Francis Saez, petitioner versus Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, et al., respondents
G.R. No. 183533 | 2012-09-25
 National Amnesty Commission vs. Commission on Audit (COA)
G.R. No. 156982 | 2004-09-08
 PIMENTEL vs. CONGRESS
G.R. No. 163783 | 2004-06-22
 Lopez vs. Senate of the Philippines et al. [Minute Resolution]
G.R. No. 163556 | 2004-06-08
 Lopez vs. Senate of the Philippines et al. [Resolution]
G.R. No. 163556 | 2004-06-08
 Lopez vs. Senate of the Philippines et al. [SEPARATE OPINION, DAVIDE, JR., C.J.]
G.R. No. 163556 | 2004-06-08
 Lopez vs. Senate of the Philippines et al. [SEPARATE OPINION, PUNO, J.]
G.R. No. 163556 | 2004-06-08
 Lopez vs. Senate of the Philippines et al. [SEPARATE OPINION, QUISUMBING, J.]
G.R. No. 163556 | 2004-06-08
 Lopez vs. Senate of the Philippines et al. [SEPARATE OPINION, CARPIO MORALES, J.]
G.R. No. 163556 | 2004-06-08
 Lopez vs. Senate of the Philippines et al. [SEPARATE OPINION, TINGA, J.]
G.R. No. 163556 | 2004-06-08
 Lopez vs. Senate of the Philippines et al. [CONCURRING OPINION, CALLEJO, J.]
G.R. No. 163556 | 2004-06-08
Authority Of LGU To Enter Into Contracts

Requirement of sanggunian authorization in the execution of contracts which
bind the local government unit
Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC),
provides:
Section 22. Corporate Powers. -
(a) Every local government unit, as a corporation, shall have the following powers:
xxx
(5) To enter into contracts; and
xxx
(c) Unless otherwise provided in this Code, no contract may be entered into by the local
chief executive in behalf of the local government unit without prior authorization by the
sanggunian concerned. A legible copy of such contract shall be posted at a conspicuous
place in the provincial capitol or the city, municipal or barangay hall.(underscoring ours)
Authorization by the sanggunian may take the form of an appropriation

ordinance
Under Sec. 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160 , prior authorization by the sanggunian concerned is
required before the local chief executive may enter into contracts on behalf of the local
government unit. R.A. No. 7160, however, does not expressly state the form that the
authorization by the sanggunian has to take. Such authorization may be done by
resolution enacted in the same manner prescribed by ordinances, except that the
resolution need not go through a third reading for final consideration unless the majority
of all the members of the sanggunian decides otherwise.
In cases where the local government unit operates under an annual

budget, the appropriation passed by thesanggunian may validly serve as the
authorization required under Sec. 22(c) of R.A. No. 7160. After all, an appropriation is an
authorization made by ordinance, directing the payment of goods and services from local
government funds under specified conditions or for specific purposes. The appropriation
covers the expenditures which are to be made by the local government unit, such as
current operating expenditure and capital outlays.
The question of whether a sanggunian authorization separate from the appropriation

ordinance is required should be resolved depending on the particular circumstances of
the case. Resort to the appropriation ordinance is necessary in order to determine if there
is a provision therein which specifically covers the expense to be incurred or the contract
to be entered into. Should the appropriation ordinance, for instance, already contain in
sufficient detail the project and cost of a capital outlay such that all that the local chief
executive needs to do after undergoing the requisite public bidding is to execute the
contract, no further authorization is required, the appropriation ordinance already being
sufficient.
On the other hand, should the appropriation ordinance describe the projects in generic
terms such as infrastructure projects, inter-municipal waterworks, drainage and
sewerage, flood control, and irrigation systems projects, reclamation projects or roads
and bridges, there is an obvious need for a covering contract for every specific project
that in turn requires approval by the sanggunian. Specific sanggunian approval may also
be required for the purchase of goods and services which are neither specified in the
appropriation ordinance nor encompassed within the regular personal services and
maintenance operating expenses. [see Quisumbing vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 175527,
December 8, 2008]
Procurement contracts (via public bidding)
Republic Act No. 9184 establishes the law and procedure for public procurement. Sec. 37
thereof explicitly makes the approval of the appropriate authority which, in the case of
local government units, is the sanggunian, the point of reference for the notice to proceed
to be issued to the winning bidder. This provision xxx acknowledges that in the exercise
of the local government unit's corporate powers, the chief executive acts merely as an
instrumentality of the local council. Read together, the cited provisions mandate the local
chief executive to secure the sanggunians approvalbefore entering into procurement
contracts and to transmit the notice to proceed to the winning bidder not later than seven
(7) calendar days therefrom. [see Quisumbing vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 175527,
December 8, 2008]
Negotiated purchase contracts (no public bidding)
In case of failure of public bidding, the local chief executive may enter into contracts of
negotiated purchase. Section 369 of the LGC , while not requiring the local chief executive
to secure prior authorization from the sanggunian concerned, nevertheless provides that
the contract covering the negotiated purchase shall be approved by the sanggunian, viz:
Section 369. Negotiated Purchase. -
(a) In cases where public biddings have failed for two (2) consecutive times and no
suppliers have qualified to participate or win in the biddings, local government units may,
through the local chief executive concerned, undertake the procurement of supplies by
negotiated purchase, regardless of amount, without public bidding: Provided, however,
That the contract covering the negotiated purchase shall be approved by the sanggunian
concerned.
 Quisumbing vs. Garcia

G.R. No. 175527 | 2008-12-08
 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE MODERNIZATION, STANDARDIZATION AND
REGULATION OF THE PROCUREMENT ACTIVITIES OF THE GOVERNMENT AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES (Procurement Law)
R.A. No. 9184 | 2002-07-22
 Local Government Code of 1991
Republic Act No. 7160 | 1991-10-10

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Public Corporation

Political Law; Local Governments; Municipal Corporations

1. Legal creation or incorporation

Nature and functions

Municipality Liability, Suits Against Municipal Corporations

a) Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government Code)

Sovereign or government functions - not liable

Proprietary or commercial functions - liable

Holding of a town fiesta

Operation of a ferry service

Operation of a public cemetery

B. Liability for Contracts

Doctrine of implied municipal liability

C. Liability for defective roads, bridges

Control and supervision, not ownership, is basis of liability

 Marcos Mendoza vs. Francisco De Leon 33 Phil 508

Political Law; Local Governments; Public Corporations

1. Public – organized for the government of a portion of a State.

The BSP is a public corporation or a government agency or instrumentality with juridical

By "government-owned or controlled corporation with original charter," We mean

The Constitution emphatically prohibits the creation of private corporations except by a

Created by the state for a narrow or limited purpose

1. Legal Creation or Incorporation – the law creating or authorizing the creation or

 City of Manila vs Intermediate Appellate Court (IAC)

Political Law; Local Governments; Powers Of Local Governments;

1. To have continuous succession in its corporate name;

To sue and be sued

Under such circumstances, in the same manner that a stockholder of a corporation is

The doctrine of separate personality of a corporation finds no application in the

To acquire and sell property

Since the lots in question are manifestly owned by the city in

To enter into contracts

 CCCC, et al vs. Cuizon, et al

Locus Standi, Taxpayer Suits To Question Government Contracts

 Bugnay Cons. & Dev't Corp. vs. Crispin C. Laron

Ordinance Distinguished From Resolution

As opposed to ordinances, “no rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a

 Municipality Of Paranaque Vs. V.M. Realty Corporation

Political Law; Local Governments; Powers Of Local Governments;

Local Expropriation; Essential Requisites

(Municipality of Paranaque v. V.M. Realty Corporation, G.R.No. 127820, July 20,

 Municipality Of Paranaque Vs. V.M. Realty Corporation

Authority Of LGU To Enter Into Contracts

Section 22. Corporate Powers. -

Authorization by the sanggunian may take the form of an appropriation

In cases where the local government unit operates under an annual

The question of whether a sanggunian authorization separate from the appropriation

Procurement contracts (via public bidding)

Negotiated purchase contracts (no public bidding)

Section 369. Negotiated Purchase. -

 Quisumbing vs. Garcia

Rules On Barangay Elections

Conduct of election of Barangay officials

The period of campaign shall be as follows:

No person who files a certificate of candidacy shall represent or allow himself to be

Nothing in this section, however, shall be construed as in any manner affecting or

Sec. 39. Certificate of Candidacy. - No person shall be elected punong barangay or

Any elective or appointive municipal, city, provincial or national official or employee, or

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Sec. 110. Preservation and inspection of statements. - All statements of

(f) If no answer shall be filed to the contest, counter-protest, or to the protest in

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(v) Prohibition against release, disbursement or expenditure of public funds.

(x) Suspension of elective provincial, city, municipal or barangay officer. - The