#47 MALIGAYA VS DORONILLA

FACTS: Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel for several military officers. During ahearing,
he said “…we had an agreement that if we withdraw the case against him(Maligaya)
he will also withdraw all the cases. Do with that understanding, he evenretired and he
is now receiving pension.” Atty. Doronilla was then charge of misleading the court
through misrepresentation of facts resulting in obstruction of justice.

ISSUE: WON Atty. Doronilla guilt of purposely stating a falsehood in violation of canon
10 of the code of professional responsibility.

RULING: by stating untruthfully in open court, Att. Doronilla breached

peremptorytenets of ethical conduct. Not only violated the lawyer’s oath to “do no
falsehood,nor consent to the doing of an in court,” but also his acts infringed on
everylawyer’s duty to “ never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by
anartifice or false statement of fact or law. He was suspended from practice of law
fortwo months.
EDGAR O. PEREA, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. RUBEN L. ALMADRO, Respondent.
RESOLUTION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
This refers to an offshoot incident in the disbarment case 1 filed by Edgar O. Perea
against Atty. Ruben L. Almadro.
Atty. Ruben L. Almadro engaged the services of the Sua & Alambra Law Offices to
represent him in this disbarment case. In their Entry of Appearance with
Motion/Manifestation dated November 20, 2000, signed by Atty. Alan Andres B.
Alambra, he stated that respondent has yet to receive a copy of the complaint and thus
prayed that a copy of the said complaint be furnished him so he can file an answer.
Complainant Edgar O. Perea filed a Manifestation dated November 29, 2000,
asseverating that he had furnished respondent copies of the complaint through
facsimile machine.
In the Resolution dated March 20, 2003, the Court sustained the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines’ order requiring Atty. Kenton Sua and Atty. Alambra to show cause for
their deliberate falsehood and misrepresentation in the preparation of the answer for
respondent, and accordingly remanded the case to the IBP for further action on the
contempt proceedings.
Before the Court now is the Resolution No. XVII-2005-162 dated December 17, 2005
of the Board of Governors of the IBP finding that Atty. Sua and Atty. Alambra were less
than honest and forthright in their representation before the Court and imposing a
fine of P2,000.00 each with warning that any further unprofessional conduct will be
dealt with more severely.
Let it be emphasized that the subject contumacious act was committed before the
Court; thus, the following disposition.
In their Explanation dated September 10, 2002,2 Atty. Sua and Atty. Alambra avered
that: Atty. Sua, a partner in the Sua & Alambra Law Offices, was not and is not, the
partner assigned to handle the case for Atty. Almadro and had no participation
whatsoever in the case other than to notarize the Affidavit of Service for Atty.
Almadro’s Answer; Atty. Alambra acted in good faith upon the express instructions
and advise of Atty. Almadro that he never received a copy of the complaint up to the
time that he referred the case to their Law Office. To bolster their claim of good faith,
they attached a photocopy of the letter of Atty. Almadro dated November 9,
20003 stating that he had not actually received a copy of the complaint of Mr. Perea.
The Court is not fully convinced.
A perusal of the aforesaid letter of Atty. Almadro reveals that indeed stated that he
had not received a copy of the complaint. However, in Atty. Almadro’s three Motions
for Extension of Time to Comment4 which he filed before the Court before engaging
the services of the law office, there was no mention that he had not received a copy of
the complaint. In fact, in the second paragraph of the second motion for extension,
Atty. Almadro stated that:
He is in the process of reviewing an initial draft of said comment and will need said
period of ten (10) days to complete and finalize the draft.
Said statement shows very clearly that Atty. Almadro has received a copy of the
complaint. For how can he prepare a draft of his comment if it were not so? This
should have alerted Atty. Alambra to verify the veracity of the claim of Atty. Almadro.
Atty. Alambra should not have relied on the statement given by Atty. Almadro. Their
being classmates in the law school is not a reason to be less cautious in his dealings
with the Court. He is an officer of the court, and as such, he owes candor, fairness and
good faith to the Court.5 As explicitly stated in Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, to wit:
A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall
he misled, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.1avvphil.net
Considering the admission made by Atty. Alambra regarding the non-participation of
Atty. Sua, the latter should be absolved of any liability.
WHEREFORE, finding Atty. Alan Andres B. Alambra guilty of contempt of Court and
neglect of his duties as a lawyer as embodied in Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, he is FINED in the amount of Two Thousand Pesos
(P2,000.00) with a WARNING that any similar act will be dealt with more severely.
Atty. Kenton Sua is absolved of any liability.

SO ORDERED.

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ

Associate Justice
ATTY. BONIFACIO T. BARANDON, JR., A.C. No. 5768 document when the document allegedly falsified was a notarized
Complainant, document executed on February 23, 1994, at a date when
Present: Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer nor was assigned
CARPIO, J., Chairperson, in Camarines Norte. The latter was not even a signatory to the
- versus - BRION, document.
DEL
CASTILLO, 3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal
ABAD, and Trial Court (MTC) Daet before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer,
PEREZ, JJ. evidently drunk, threatened
ATTY. EDWIN Z. FERRER, SR., Atty. Barandon saying, Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, ka
Respondent. Promulgated: sama ang lahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado s
a Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga taga-
March 26, 2010 Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-
x --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- x rito.

DECISION 4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of

ABAD, J.:
This administrative case concerns a lawyer who is claimed to have hurled
invectives upon another lawyer and filed a baseless suit against him.
The Facts and the Case
On January 11, 2001 complainant Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. filed a complaint-
affidavit[1] with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice of law, or imposition
of appropriate disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. for the
following offenses:
1. On November 22, 2000 Atty. Ferrer, as plaintiffs
counsel in Civil Case 7040, filed a reply with opposition to motion
to dismiss that contained abusive, offensive, and improper
language which insinuated that Atty. Barandon presented a
falsified document in court.
2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against
Atty. Barandon in Civil Case 7040 for alleged falsification of public
public document without bothering to check the copy with the
Office of the Clerk of Court and, with gross ignorance of the law,
failed to consider that a notarized document is presumed to be
genuine and authentic until proven otherwise.
5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first
disbarment case against repeating his unethical act; yet he faces a
disbarment charge for sexual harassment of an office secretary of
the IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts
of lasciviousness; and criminal cases for libel and grave threats that
Atty. Barandon filed against him. In October 2000,
Atty. Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily time record of
his son who worked with the Commission on Settlement of Land
Problems, Department of Justice. When Atty. Barandon declined,
Atty. Ferrer repeatedly harassed him with inflammatory language.
Atty. Ferrer raised the following defenses in his answer with motion to dismiss:
1. Instead of having the alleged forged document
submitted for examination, Atty. Barandon filed charges of libel
and grave threats against him. These charges came about because
Atty. Ferrers clients filed a case for falsification of public document
against Atty. Barandon.

2. The offended party in the falsification case,
Imelda Palatolon, vouchsafed that her thumbmark in the waiver
document had been falsified.
3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the
threatening remarks against Atty. Barandon, the MTC Daet was
already in session. It was improbable that the court did not take
steps to stop, admonish, or cite Atty. Ferrer in direct contempt for
his behavior.
4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his
allegations that Atty. Ferrer was drunk on December 19, 2000 and
that he degraded the law profession. The latter had received
various citations that speak well of his character.
5. The cases of libel and grave threats that
Atty. Barandon filed against Atty. Ferrer were still pending. Their
mere filing did not make the latter guilty of the
charges. Atty. Barandon was forum shopping when he filed this
disbarment case since it referred to the same libel and grave
threats subject of the criminal cases.
In his reply affidavit,[2] Atty. Barandon brought up a sixth ground for disbarment. He
alleged that on December 29, 2000 at about 1:30 p.m., while Atty. Ferrer was on board
his sons taxi, it figured in a collision with a tricycle, resulting in serious injuries to the
tricycles passengers.[3] But neither Atty. Ferrer nor any of his co-passengers helped
the victims and, during the police investigation, he denied knowing the taxi driver and
blamed the tricycle driver for being drunk. Atty. Ferrer also prevented an eyewitness
from reporting the accident to the authorities.[4]
Atty. Barandon claimed that the falsification case against him had already been
dismissed. He belittled the citations Atty. Ferrer allegedly received. On the contrary, in
its Resolution 00-1,[5] the IBP-Camarines Norte Chapter opposed his application to
serve as judge of the MTC of Mercedes, Camarines Sur, on the ground that he did not
have the qualifications, integrity, intelligence, industry and character of a trial judge
and that he was facing a criminal charge for acts of lasciviousness and a disbarment
case filed by an employee of the same IBP chapter.
On October 10, 2001 Investigating Commissioner Milagros V. San Juan of the IBP-CBD
submitted to this Court a Report, recommending the suspension for two years of
Atty. Ferrer. The Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on record to
prove Atty. Ferrers violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040, the
falsification of the plaintiffs affidavit despite the absence of evidence that the
document had in fact been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to it. The
Investigating Commissioner also found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening
remarks imputed to him in the presence of other counsels, court personnel, and
litigants before the start of hearing.
On June 29, 2002 the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution XV-2002-
225,[6] adopting and approving the Investigating Commissioners recommendation but
reduced the penalty of suspension to only one year.
Atty. Ferrer filed a motion for reconsideration but the Board denied it in its
Resolution[7] of October 19, 2002 on the ground that it had already endorsed the
matter to the Supreme Court. On February 5, 2003, however, the Court referred back
the case to the IBP for resolution of Atty. Ferrers motion for reconsideration.[8] On
May 22, 2008 the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and
Recommendation[9] of the Investigating Commissioner that denied
Atty. Ferrers motion for reconsideration.[10]
On February 17, 2009, Atty. Ferrer filed a Comment on Board of Governors IBP Notice
of Resolution No. XVIII-2008.[11] On August 12, 2009 the Court resolved to treat
Atty. Ferrers comment as a petition for review under Rule 139 of the Revised Rules of
Court. Atty. Barandon filed his comment,[12] reiterating his arguments before the
IBP. Further, he presented certified copies of orders issued by courts
in Camarines Norte that warned Atty. Ferrer against appearing in court drunk.[13]
The Issues Presented
The issues presented in this case are:
1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating
Commissioner erred in finding respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges against
him; and
 2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is
justified.
The Courts Ruling
We have examined the records of this case and find no reason to disagree with the
findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors and the Investigating
Commissioner.
The practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of
legal proficiency and morality. Any violation of these standards exposes the lawyer to
administrative liability.[14]
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct
themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid
harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the Code
provides:
Rule 8.01. A lawyer shall not, in his professional
dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or
otherwise improper.
Atty. Ferrers actions do not measure up to this Canon. The evidence shows that he
imputed to Atty. Barandon the falsification of the Salaysay Affidavit of the plaintiff in
Civil Case 7040. He made this imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that
the affidavit had been falsified and that Atty. Barandon authored the same.
Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper
forum and without using offensive and abusive language against a fellow lawyer. To
quote portions of what he said in his reply with motion to dismiss:
1. That the answer is fraught with grave and culpable
misrepresentation and FALSIFICATION of documents,
committed to mislead this Honorable Court, but with
concomitant grave responsibility of counsel for Defendants,
for distortion and serious misrepresentation to the court, for
presenting a grossly FALSIFIED document, in violation of his
oath of office as a government employee and as member of the
Bar, for the reason, that, Plaintiff, IMELDA PALATOLON, has
never executed the SALAYSAY AFFIDAVIT, wherein her
fingerprint has been falsified, in view whereof, hereby DENY
the same including the affirmative defenses, there being no
knowledge or information to form a belief as to the truth of
the same, from pars. (1) to par. (15) which are all lies and
mere fabrications, sufficient ground for DISBARMENT of the
one responsible for said falsification and distortions.[15]
The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in
their pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal system.[16]
Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all
times. Rule 7.03 of the Code provides:
Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely
reflect on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the
discredit of the legal profession.
Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrers drunken invectives at
Atty. Barandon shortly before the start of a court hearing. Atty. Ferrer did not present
convincing evidence to support his denial of this particular charge. He merely
presented a certification from the police that its blotter for the day did not report the
threat he supposedly made. Atty. Barandon presented, however, the police blotter on
a subsequent date that recorded his complaint against Atty. Ferrer.
Atty. Ferrer said, Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kasama ang lahat ng pamil
ya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado narito ay m
ga taga-Camarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo taga-
rito. Evidently, he uttered these with intent to annoy, humiliate, incriminate, and
discredit Atty. Barandon in the presence of lawyers, court personnel, and litigants
waiting for the start of hearing in court. These language is unbecoming a member of
the legal profession. The Court cannot countenance it.
Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always
be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of
intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial
forum.[17] Atty. Ferrer ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only
bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for
it. Whatever moral righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was negated by the way he chose to
express his indignation.
Contrary to Atty. Ferrers allegation, the Court finds that he has been accorded due
process. The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be
heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of ones defense.[18] So long as
the parties are given the opportunity to explain their side, the requirements of due
process are satisfactorily complied with.[19] Here, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
gave Atty. Ferrer all the opportunities to file countless pleadings and refute all the
allegations of Atty. Barandon.

All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are
mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence they must conduct
themselves honorably and fairly.[20] Atty. Ferrers display of improper attitude,
arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a
lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent
transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold.

ACCORDINGLY, the Court AFFIRMS the May 22, 2008 Resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors in CBD Case 01-809 and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer,
Sr. from the practice of law for one year effective upon his receipt of this Decision.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered in Atty. Ferrers personal record as an

attorney with the Office of the Bar Confidant and a copy of the same be served to the
IBP and to the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all the courts in the
land.
SO ORDERED.
ASEAN PACIFIC PLANNERS, APP G.R. No. 162525
CONSTRUCTION AND
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION*
AND CESAR GOCO,
Petitioners,
- versus -
CITY OF URDANETA, CEFERINO J. CAPALAD, WALDO C.
DEL CASTILLO, NORBERTO M. DEL PRADO, JESUS A. Promulgated:
ORDONO AND AQUILINO MAGUISA,**
Respondents.
x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
The instant petition seeks to set aside the Resolutions[1] dated April 15,
2003 and February 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76170.
This case stemmed from a Complaint[2] for annulment of contracts with prayer
for preliminary prohibitory injunction and temporary restraining order filed by
respondent Waldo C. Del Castillo, in his capacity as taxpayer, against respondents City of
Urdaneta and Ceferino J. Capalad doing business under the name JJEFWA Builders, and
petitioners Asean Pacific Planners (APP) represented by Ronilo G. Goco and Asean
Pacific Planners Construction and Development Corporation (APPCDC) represented by
Cesar D. Goco.
Del Castillo alleged that then Urdaneta City Mayor Rodolfo E. Parayno
entered into five contracts for the preliminary design, construction and management
of a four-storey twin cinema commercial center and hotel involving a massive
expenditure of public funds amounting to P250 million, funded by a loan from the
Philippine National Bank (PNB). For minimal work, the contractor was allegedly
paid P95 million. Del Castillo also claimed that all the contracts are void because the
object is outside the commerce of men. The object is a piece of land belonging to the
public domain and which remains devoted to a public purpose as a public elementary
Present: school.Additionally, he claimed that the contracts, from the feasibility study to
management and lease of the future building, are also void because they were all
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
awarded solely to the Goco family.
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, In their Answer,[3] APP and APPCDC claimed that the contracts are
VELASCO, JR., and valid. Urdaneta City Mayor Amadeo R. Perez, Jr., who filed the citys Answer,[4] joined
BRION, JJ. in the defense and asserted that the contracts were properly executed by then Mayor
Parayno with prior authority from the Sangguniang Panlungsod. Mayor Perez also
stated that Del Castillo has no legal capacity to sue and that the complaint states no
cause of action. For respondent Ceferino J. Capalad, Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun filed an
September 23, 2008 Answer[5]with compulsory counterclaim and motion to dismiss on the ground that Del
Castillo has no legal standing to sue.
Respondents Norberto M. Del Prado, Jesus A. Ordono and Aquilino Maguisa
became parties to the case when they jointly filed, also in their capacity as taxpayers, a
Complaint-in-Intervention[6] adopting the allegations of Del Castillo.
After pre-trial, the Lazaro Law Firm entered its appearance as counsel
for Urdaneta City and filed an Omnibus Motion[7] with prayer to (1)
withdraw Urdaneta Citys Answer; (2) drop Urdaneta City as defendant and be joined
as plaintiff; (3) admit Urdaneta Citys complaint; and (4) conduct a new pre-
trial. Urdaneta City allegedly wanted to rectify its position and claimed that
inadequate legal representation caused its inability to file the necessary pleadings in
representation of its interests.
In its Order[8] dated September 11, 2002, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Urdaneta City, Pangasinan, Branch 45, admitted the entry of appearance of the Lazaro
Law Firm and granted the withdrawal of appearance of the City Prosecutor. It also
granted the prayer to drop the city as defendant and admitted its complaint for
consolidation with Del Castillos complaint, and directed the defendants to answer the
citys complaint.
In its February 14, 2003 Order,[9] the RTC denied reconsideration of
the September 11, 2002 Order. It also granted Capalads motion to expunge all
pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in his behalf. Capalad was dropped as defendant, and
his complaint filed by Atty. Jorito C. Peralta was admitted and consolidated with the
complaints of Del Castillo and Urdaneta City. The RTC also directed APP and APPCDC
to answer Capalads complaint.
Aggrieved, APP and APPCDC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of
Appeals. In its April 15, 2003 Resolution, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition
on the following grounds: (1) defective verification and certification of non-forum
shopping, (2) failure of the petitioners to submit certified true copies of
the RTCsassailed orders as mere photocopies were submitted, and (3) lack of written
explanation why service of the petition to adverse parties was not personal. [10] The
Court of Appeals also denied APP and APPCDCs motion for reconsideration in
its February 4, 2004 Resolution.[11]
Hence, this petition, which we treat as one for review on certiorari under Rule
45, the proper remedy to assail the resolutions of the Court of Appeals.[12]
Petitioners argue that:
I.
THE APPELLATE COURT PALPABLY ERRED AND GRAVELY
ABUSED ITS JUDICIAL PREROGATIVES BY SUMMARILY
DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE BASIS OF PROCEDURAL
TECHNICALITIES DESPITE SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE
[THEREWITH]
II.
THE TRIAL COURT PALPABLY ERRED AND GRAVELY ABUSED ITS
JUDICIAL PREROGATIVES BY CAPRICIOUSLY
(a.) Entertaining the taxpayers suits of private respondents del
Castillo, del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa despite their
clear lack of legal standing to file the same.
(b.) Allowing the entry of appearance of a private law firm to
represent the City of Urdaneta despite the clear statutory
and jurisprudential prohibitions thereto.
(c.) Allowing Ceferino J. Capalad and the City of Urdaneta to switch
sides, by permitting the withdrawal of their respective
answers and admitting their complaints as well as
allowing the appearance of Atty. Jorito C. Peralta to
represent Capalad although Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun, his
counsel of record, had not withdrawn from the case, in
gross violation of well settled rules and case law on the
matter.[13]
We first resolve whether the Court of Appeals erred in denying
reconsideration of its April 15, 2003 Resolution despite APP and APPCDCs subsequent
compliance.
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals should not have dismissed the
petition on mere technicalities since they have attached the proper documents in their
motion for reconsideration and substantially complied with the rules.
Respondent Urdaneta City maintains that the Court of Appeals correctly
dismissed the petition because Cesar Goco had no proof he was authorized to sign the
certification of non-forum shopping in behalf of APPCDC.
Indeed, Cesar Goco had no proof of his authority to sign the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping of the petition for certiorari filed with the Court
of Appeals.[14] Thus, the Court of Appeals is allowed by the rules the discretion to
dismiss the petition since only individuals vested with authority by a valid board
resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of a
corporation. Proof of said authority must be attached; otherwise, the petition is
subject to dismissal.[15]
However, it must be pointed out that in several cases,[16] this Court had
considered as substantial compliance with the procedural requirements the
submission in the motion for reconsideration of the authority to sign the verification
and certification, as in this case. The Court notes that the attachments in the motion
for reconsideration show that on March 5, 2003, the Board of Directors of APPCDC
authorized Cesar Goco to institute the petition before the Court of
Appeals.[17] On March 22, 2003, Ronilo Goco doing business under the name APP, also
appointed his father, Cesar Goco, as his attorney-in-fact to file the petition.[18] When
the petition was filed on March 26, 2003[19] before the Court of Appeals, Cesar Goco
was duly authorized to sign the verification and certification except that the proof of
his authority was not submitted together with the petition.
Similarly, petitioners submitted in the motion for reconsideration certified
true copies of the assailed RTC orders and we may also consider the same as
substantial compliance.[20] Petitioners also included in the motion for reconsideration
their explanation[21] that copies of the petition were personally served on the Lazaro
Law Firm and mailed to the RTC and Atty. Peralta because of distance. The affidavit of
service[22] supported the explanation. Considering the substantial issues involved, it
was thus error for the appellate court to deny reinstatement of the petition.
Having discussed the procedural issues, we shall now proceed to address the substantive
issues raised by petitioners, rather than remand this case to the Court of Appeals. In our
view, the issue, simply put, is: Did the RTC err and commit grave abuse of discretion in (a)
entertaining the taxpayers suits; (b) allowing a private law firm to represent UrdanetaCity;
(c) allowing respondents Capalad and Urdaneta City to switch from being defendants to
becoming complainants; and (d) allowing Capalads change of attorneys?
On the first point at issue, petitioners argue that a taxpayer may only sue
where the act complained of directly involves illegal disbursement of public funds
derived from taxation. The allegation of respondents Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono
and Maguisa that the construction of the project is funded by the PNB loan contradicts
the claim regarding illegal disbursement since the funds are not directly derived from
taxation.
Respondents Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa counter that their
personality to sue was not raised by petitioners APP and APPCDC in their Answer and
that this issue was not even discussed in the RTCs assailed orders.
Petitioners contentions lack merit. The RTC properly allowed the taxpayers
suits. In Public Interest Center, Inc. v. Roxas,[23] we held:
In the case of taxpayers suits, the party suing as a taxpayer
must prove that he has sufficient interest in preventing the illegal
expenditure of money raised by taxation. Thus, taxpayers have been
allowed to sue where there is a claim that public funds are illegally
disbursed or that public money is being deflected to any improper
purpose, or that public funds are wasted through the enforcement of
an invalid or unconstitutional law.
xxxx
Petitioners allegations in their Amended Complaint that
the loan contracts entered into by the Republic and NPC are
serviced or paid through a disbursement of public funds are not
disputed by respondents, hence, they are invested with personality
to institute the same.[24]
Here, the allegation of taxpayers Del Castillo, Del Prado, Ordono and Maguisa
that P95 million of the P250 million PNB loan had already been paid for minimal work
is sufficient allegation of overpayment, of illegal disbursement, that invests them with
personality to sue. Petitioners do not dispute the allegation as they merely insist,
albeit erroneously, that public funds are not involved. Under Article 1953[25] of the
Civil Code, the city acquired ownership of the money loaned from PNB, making the
money public fund. The city will have to pay the loan by revenues raised from local
taxation or by its internal revenue allotment.
In addition, APP and APPCDCs lack of objection in their Answer on the
personality to sue of the four complainants constitutes waiver to raise the objection
under Section 1, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court.[26]
On the second point, petitioners contend that only the City Prosecutor can
represent Urdaneta City and that law and jurisprudence prohibit the appearance of
the Lazaro Law Firm as the citys counsel.
The Lazaro Law Firm, as the citys counsel, counters that the city was inutile
defending its cause before the RTC for lack of needed legal advice. The city has no legal
officer and both City Prosecutor and Provincial Legal Officer are busy. Practical
considerations also dictate that the city and Mayor Perez must have the same counsel
since he faces related criminal cases. Citing Mancenido v. Court of Appeals,[27] the law
firm states that hiring private counsel is proper where rigid adherence to the law on
representation would deprive a party of his right to redress a valid grievance.[28]
 We cannot agree with the Lazaro Law Firm. Its appearance as Urdaneta Citys
counsel is against the law as it provides expressly who should represent it. The City
Prosecutor should continue to represent the city.
Section 481(a)[29] of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991[30] mandates
the appointment of a city legal officer. Under Section 481(b)(3)(i)[31] of the LGC, the city
legal officer is supposed to represent the city in all civil actions, as in this case, and
special proceedings wherein the city or any of its officials is a party. In Ramos v. Court of
Appeals,[32] we cited that under Section 19[33] of Republic Act No. 5185,[34] city
governments may already create the position of city legal officer to whom the function
of the city fiscal (now prosecutor) as legal adviser and officer for civil cases of the city
shall be transferred.[35] In the case of Urdaneta City, however, the position of city legal
officer is still vacant, although its charter[36] was enacted way back in 1998.
Because of such vacancy, the City Prosecutors appearance as counsel
of Urdaneta City is proper. The City Prosecutor remains as the citys legal adviser and
officer for civil cases, a function that could not yet be transferred to the city legal
officer. Under the circumstances, the RTC should not have allowed the entry of
appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm vice the City Prosecutor. Notably, the citys Answer
was sworn to before the City Prosecutor by Mayor Perez. The City Prosecutor prepared
the citys pre-trial brief and represented the city in the pre-trial conference. No question
was raised against the City Prosecutors actions until the Lazaro Law Firm entered its
appearance and claimed that the city lacked adequate legal representation.
Moreover, the appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm as counsel for Urdaneta City is against
the law. Section 481(b)(3)(i) of the LGC provides when a special legal officer may be
employed, that is, in actions or proceedings where a component city or municipality is a
party adverse to the provincial government. But this case is not between Urdaneta Cityand
the Province of Pangasinan. And we have consistently held that a local government unit
cannot be represented by private counsel[37] as only public officers may act for and in
behalf of public entities and public funds should not be spent to hire private
lawyers.[38] Pro bono representation in collaboration with the municipal attorney and
prosecutor has not even been allowed.[39]
Neither is the law firms appearance justified under the instances listed
in Mancenido when local government officials can be represented by private counsel,
such as when a claim for damages could result in personal liability. No such claim
against said officials was made in this case. Note that before it joined the
complainants, the city was the one sued, not its officials. That the firm represents
Mayor Perez in criminal cases, suits in his personal capacity,[40] is of no moment.
On the third point, petitioners claim that Urdaneta City is estopped to
reverse admissions in its Answer that the contracts are valid and, in its pre-trial brief,
that the execution of the contracts was in good faith.
We disagree. The court may allow amendment of pleadings.
Section 5,[41] Rule 10 of the Rules of Court pertinently provides that if evidence
is objected to at the trial on the ground that it is not within the issues raised by the
pleadings, the court may allow the pleadings to be amended and shall do so with
liberality if the presentation of the merits of the action and the ends of substantial justice
will be subserved thereby. Objections need not even arise in this case since the Pre-trial
Order[42] dated April 1, 2002 already defined as an issue whether the contracts are
valid.Thus, what is needed is presentation of the parties evidence on the issue. Any
evidence of the city for or against the validity of the contracts will be relevant and
admissible.Note also that under Section 5, Rule 10, necessary amendments to pleadings
may be made to cause them to conform to the evidence.
In addition, despite Urdaneta Citys judicial admissions, the trial court is still
given leeway to consider other evidence to be presented for said admissions may not
necessarily prevail over documentary evidence,[43] e.g., the contracts assailed. A
partys testimony in open court may also override admissions in the Answer.[44]
As regards the RTCs order admitting Capalads complaint and dropping him
as defendant, we find the same in order. Capalad insists that Atty. Sahagun has no
authority to represent him. Atty. Sahagun claims otherwise. We note, however, that
Atty. Sahagun represents petitioners who claim that the contracts are valid. On the
other hand, Capalad filed a complaint for annulment of the contracts. Certainly, Atty.
Sahagun cannot represent totally conflicting interests. Thus, we should expunge all
pleadings filed by Atty. Sahagun in behalf of Capalad.
Relatedly, we affirm the order of the RTC in allowing Capalads change of
attorneys, if we can properly call it as such, considering Capalads claim that Atty.
Sahagun was never his attorney.
 Before we close, notice is taken of the offensive language used by Attys.
Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante in their pleadings before us and the Court
of Appeals. They unfairly called the Court of Appeals a court of technicalities[45] for
validly dismissing their defectively prepared petition. They also accused the Court of
Appeals of protecting, in their view, an incompetent judge.[46] In explaining the
concededly strong language, Atty. Sahagun further indicted himself. He said that the
Court of Appeals dismissal of the case shows its impatience and readiness to punish
petitioners for a perceived slight on its dignity and such dismissal smacks of
retaliation and does not augur for the cold neutrality and impartiality demanded of
the appellate court.[47]

Accordingly, we impose upon Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and Antonio B. Escalante a

fine of P2,000[48] each payable to this Court within ten days from notice and we remind
them that they should observe and maintain the respect due to the Court of Appeals and
judicial officers;[49] abstain from offensive language before the courts;[50] and not attribute
to a Judge motives not supported by the record.[51] Similar acts in the future will be dealt
with more severely.

WHEREFORE, we (1) GRANT the petition; (2) SET ASIDE the Resolutions
dated April 15, 2003 and February 4, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
76170; (3) DENY the entry of appearance of the Lazaro Law Firm in Civil Case No. U-
7388 and EXPUNGE all pleadings it filed as counsel of Urdaneta City; (4) ORDER the
City Prosecutor to represent Urdaneta City in Civil Case No. U-7388; (5) AFFIRM the
RTC in admitting the complaint of Capalad; and (6) PROHIBIT Atty. Oscar C. Sahagun
from representing Capalad and EXPUNGE all pleadings that he filed in behalf of
Capalad.

Let the records of Civil Case No. U-7388 be remanded to the trial court for
further proceedings.

Finally, we IMPOSE a fine of P2,000 each on Attys. Oscar C. Sahagun and

Antonio B. Escalante for their use of offensive language, payable to this Court within
ten (10) days from receipt of this Decision.

SO ORDERED.
JUDGE UBALDINO A. LACUROM, A.C. No. 5921 On 29 June 2001, Judge Lacurom issued a Resolution (Resolution) reversing
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, the earlier judgments rendered in favor of Veneracion.[5] The dispositive portion
Cabanatuan City, Branch 29 and Present: reads:
Pairing Judge, Branch 30,
Complainant, QUISUMBING, J., WHEREFORE, this Court hereby REVERSES its Decision
Chairperson, dated December 22, 2000, as well as REVERSES the Decision of the
CARPIO, court a quo dated July 22, 1997.
- versus - CARPIO MORALES, and TINGA, JJ.
Furthermore, the plaintiff-appellee
ATTY. ELLIS F. JACOBA and Promulgated: Alejandro Veneracion is ordered to CEASE and DESIST from
ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, ejecting the defendant-appellant Federico Barrientos from the
Respondents. March 10, 2006 1,000 square meter homelot covered by TCT No. T-75274, and the
x--------------------------------------------------x smaller area of one hundred forty-seven square meters, within the
1,000 sq.m. covered by TCT No. T-78613, and the house thereon
DECISION standing covered by Tax Declaration No. 02006-01137, issued by
the City Assessor of Cabanatuan City; and Barrientos is ordered to
pay Veneracion P10,000.00 for the house covered by Tax
CARPIO, J.: Declaration No. 02006-01137.

SO ORDERED.[6]
The Case

This administrative case arose from a complaint filed on 22 October 2001 by
Judge Ubaldino A. Lacurom (Judge Lacurom), Pairing
Judge, Regional Trial Court ofCabanatuan City, Branch 30, against respondent-spouses
Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba and Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba (respondents). Complainant
charged respondents with violation of Rules 11.03,[1] 11.04,[2] and 19.01[3] of the Code
of Professional Responsibility.
The Facts
The Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm is counsel for plaintiff Alejandro
R. Veneracion (Veneracion) in a civil case for unlawful detainer against defendant
Federico Barrientos (Barrientos).[4] The Municipal Trial Court of Cabanatuan City rend
ered judgment in favor of Veneracion but Barrientos appealed to the Regional Trial
Court. The case was raffled to Branch 30 where Judge Lacurom was sitting as pairing
judge.
Veneracions counsel filed a Motion for Reconsideration (with Request for
Inhibition)[7] dated 30 July 2001 (30 July 2001 motion), pertinent portions of which
read:
II. PREFATORY STATEMENT
This RESOLUTION of REVERSAL is an ABHORRENT
NULLITY as it is entirely DEVOID of factual and legal basis. It is
a Legal MONSTROSITY in the sense that the Honorable REGIONAL
TRIAL COURT acted as if it were the DARAB (Dept. of Agrarian
Reform ADJUDICATION BOARD)! x x x HOW HORRIBLE and
TERRIBLE! The mistakes are very patent and glaring! x x x
xxxx
III. GROUNDS FOR RECONSIDERATION
 1. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in
Peremptorily and Suddenly Reversing the Findings of the Lower
Court Judge and the Regular RTC Presiding Judge:
x x x The defendant filed a Motion for Reconsideration, and after a
very questionable SHORT period of time, came this STUNNING and
SUDDEN REVERSAL. Without any legal or factual basis, the Hon.
Pairing Judge simply and peremptorily REVERSED two (2)
decisions in favor of the plaintiff. This is highly questionable, if not
suspicious, hence, this Motion for Reconsideration.
xxxx
[The Resolution] assumes FACTS that have not been
established and presumes FACTS not part of the records of the
case, all loaded in favor of the alleged TENANT. Clearly, the
RESOLUTION is an INSULT to the Judiciary and an ANACHRONISM
in the Judicial Process. Need we say more?
xxxx
4. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED in
Holding That the Defendant is Entitled to a Homelot, and That the
Residential LOT in Question is That Homelot:
THIS ERROR IS STUPENDOUS and a real BONER. Where
did the Honorable PAIRING JUDGE base this conclusion?
x x x This HORRENDOUS MISTAKE must be corrected here and
now!
xxxx
6. The Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge ERRED
Grievously in Holding and Declaring that The [court] A QUO
Erroneously Took Cognizance of the Case and That It Had No
Jurisdiction over the Subject-Matter:
Another HORRIBLE ERROR! Even an average Law Student
knows that JURISDICTION is determined by the averments of the
COMPLAINT and not by the averments in the answer! This is
backed up by a Litany of Cases!
xxxx
7. FINALLY, the Honorable Pairing Court Presiding Judge
Ridiculously ERRED in Ordering the Defendant To Pay P10,000.00
to the Plaintiff As Payment for Plaintiffs HOUSE:
THIS IS the Last STRAW, but it is also the Best
ILLUSTRATION of the Manifold GLARING ERRORS committed by
the Hon. Pairing Court Judge.
xxxx
This Order of the Court for the plaintiff to sell his
RESIDENTIAL HOUSE to the defendant for the ridiculously LOW
price of P10,000.00 best illustrates the Long Line of
Faulty reasonings and ERRONEOUS conclusions of the Hon. Pairing
Court Presiding Judge. Like the proverbial MONSTER, the
Monstrous Resolution should be slain on sight![8]
The 30 July 2001 motion prayed that (1) Judge Lacurom inhibit himself in
order to give plaintiff a fighting chance and (2) the Resolution be reconsidered and set
aside.[9] Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba (Velasco-Jacoba) signed the motion on behalf of
the Jacoba-Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm.
On 6 August 2001, Judge Lacurom ordered Velasco-Jacoba to appear before
his sala and explain why she should not be held in contempt of court for the very
disrespectful, insulting and humiliating contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.[10] In her
Explanation, Comments and Answer,[11] Velasco-Jacoba claimed that His Honor knows
beforehand who actually prepared the subject Motion; records will show that the
undersigned counsel did not actually or actively participate in this case.[12]Velasco-
Jacoba disavowed any conscious or deliberate intent to degrade the honor and
integrity of the Honorable Court or to detract in any form from the respect that is
rightfully due all courts of justice.[13] She rationalized as follows:
x x x at first blush, [the motion] really appears to contain some
sardonic, strident and hard-striking adjectives. And, if we are to
pick such stringent words at random and bunch them together,
side-by-side x x x then collectively and certainly they present a
cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect. x x x
xxxx
We most respectfully submit that plaintiff & counsel did
not just fire a staccato of incisive and hard-hitting remarks,
machine-gun style as to be called contumacious and contemptuous.
They were just articulating their feelings of shock, bewilderment
and disbelief at the sudden reversal of their good fortune, not
driven by any desire to just cast aspersions at the Honorable
Pairing judge. They must believe that big monumental errors
deserve equally big adjectives, no more no less. x x x The matters
involved were [neither] peripheral nor marginalized, and they had
to call a spade a spade. x x x [14]
Nevertheless, Velasco-Jacoba expressed willingness to apologize for whatever
mistake [they] may have committed in a moment of unguarded discretion when [they]
may have stepped on the line and gone out of bounds. She also agreed to have the
allegedly contemptuous phrases stricken off the record.[15]
On 13 September 2001, Judge Lacurom found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt and
penalized her with imprisonment for five days and a fine of P1,000.[16]
Velasco-Jacoba moved for reconsideration of the 13 September 2001 order. She
recounted that on her way out of the house for an afternoon hearing, Atty.
Ellis Jacoba(Jacoba) stopped her and said O, pirmahan mo na ito kasi last day
na, baka mahuli. (Sign this as it is due today, or it might not be filed on time.) She
signed the pleading handed to her without reading it, in trusting blind faith on her
husband of 35 years with whom she entrusted her whole life and future.[17] This
pleading turned out to be the 30 July 2001 motion which Jacoba drafted but could not
sign because of his then suspension from the practice of law.[18]
Velasco-Jacoba lamented that Judge Lacurom had found her guilty of
contempt without conducting any hearing. She accused Judge Lacurom of harboring a
personal vendetta, ordering her imprisonment despite her status as senior lady
lawyer of the IBP Nueva Ecija Chapter, already a senior citizen, and a grandmother
many times over.[19] At any rate, she argued, Judge Lacurom should have inhibited
himself from the case out of delicadeza because [Veneracion] had already filed against
him criminal cases before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City and
before the Ombudsman.[20]
The records show that with the assistance of counsel Jacoba and the Jacoba-
Velasco-Jacoba Law Firm, Veneracion had executed an affidavit on 23 August 2001
accusing Judge Lacurom of knowingly rendering unjust
judgment through inexcusable negligence and ignorance[21] and violating
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 (RA 3019).[22] The first charge became the
subject of a preliminary investigation[23] by the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City.On
the second charge, Veneracion set forth his allegations in a Complaint-
Affidavit[24] filed on 28 August 2001 with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Luzon.
Judge Lacurom issued another order on 21 September 2001, this time
directing Jacoba to explain why he should not be held in contempt.[25] Jacoba complied
by filing an Answer with Second Motion for Inhibition, wherein he denied that he
typed or prepared the 30 July 2001 motion. Against Velasco-Jacobas statements
implicating him, Jacoba invoked the marital privilege rule in
evidence.[26] Judge Lacurom later rendered a decision[27] finding Jacoba guilty of
contempt of court and sentencing him to pay a fine of P500.
On 22 October 2001, Judge Lacurom filed the present complaint against
respondents before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP).
Report and Recommendation of the IBP
Respondents did not file an answer and neither did they appear at the hearing set by
IBP Commissioner Atty. Lydia A. Navarro (IBP Commissioner Navarro) despite
sufficient notice.[28]

IBP Commissioner Navarro, in her Report and Recommendation of 10 October 2002,
recommended the suspension of respondents from the practice of law for six
months.[29] IBP Commissioner Navarro found that respondents were prone to us[ing]
offensive and derogatory remarks and phrases which amounted to discourtesy and
disrespect for authority.[30] Although the remarks were not directed at
Judge Lacurom personally, they were aimed at his position as a judge, which is a
smack on the judiciary system as a whole.[31]
The IBP Board of Governors (IBP Board) adopted IBP Commissioner Navarros Report
and Recommendation, except for the length of suspension which the IBP Board
reduced to three months.[32] On 10 December 2002, the IBP Board transmitted its
recommendation to this Court, together with the documents pertaining to the case.
Several days later, Velasco-Jacoba sought reconsideration of the IBP Board decision,
thus:[33]
xxxx
3. For the information of the Honorable Commission, the
present complaint of Judge Lacurom is sub judice; the same
issues involved in this case are raised before the Honorable
Court of Appeals presently pending in CA-G.R. SP No. 66973 for
Certiorari and Mandatory Inhibition with TRO and
Preliminary Injunction x x x;
4. We filed an Administrative Case against
Judge Lacurom before the Supreme Court involving the same issues
we raised in the aforementioned Certiorari case, which was
dismissed by the Supreme Court for being premature, in view of
the pending Certiorari case before the Court of Appeals;
5. In like manner, out of respect and deference to the
Court of Appeals, the present complaint should likewise be
dismissed and/or suspended pending resolution of the certiorari
case by the Court of Appeals.[34] (Emphasis supplied)
The Courts Ruling
On a preliminary note, we reject Velasco-Jacobas contention that the present
complaint should be considered sub judice in view of the petition for certiorari and
mandatory inhibition with preliminary injunction (petition for certiorari)[35] filed
before the Court of Appeals.
The petition for certiorari, instituted by Veneracion and Velasco-Jacoba on 4 October
2001, seeks to nullify the following orders issued by Judge Lacurom in Civil Case No.
2836: (1) the Orders dated 26 September 2001 and 9 November 2001 denying
respondents respective motions for inhibition; and (2) the 13 September 2001 Order
which found Velasco-Jacoba guilty of contempt. The petitioners allege that
Judge Lacurom acted with grave abuse of discretion [amounting] to lack of
jurisdiction, in violation of express provisions of the law and applicable decisions of
the Supreme Court.[36]
Plainly, the issue before us is respondents liability under the Code of Professional
Responsibility. The outcome of this case has no bearing on the resolution of the
petition for certiorari, as there is neither identity of issues nor causes of action.
Neither should the Courts dismissal of the administrative complaint against
Judge Lacurom for being premature impel us to dismiss this complaint.
Judge Lacuroms orders in Civil Case No. 2836 could not be the subject of an
administrative complaint against him while a petition for certiorari assailing the same
orders is pending with an appellate court. Administrative remedies are neither
alternative nor cumulative to judicial review where such review is available to the
aggrieved parties and the same has not been resolved with finality. Until there is a
final declaration that the challenged order or judgment is manifestly erroneous, there
will be no basis to conclude whether the judge is administratively liable.[37]
The respondents are situated differently within the factual setting of this case. The
corresponding implications of their actions also give rise to different liabilities. We
first examine the charge against Velasco-Jacoba.
There is no dispute that the genuine signature of Velasco-Jacoba appears
on the 30 July 2001 motion. Velasco-Jacobas responsibility as counsel is governed
by Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 3. Signature and address.Every pleading must be signed by the
party or counsel representing him x x x.

The signature of counsel constitutes a certificate by
him that he has read the pleading, that to the best of his
knowledge, information, and belief there is good ground to
support it, and that it is not interposed for delay.
x x x Counsel who x x x signs a pleading in violation of
this Rule, or alleges scandalous or indecent matter
therein x x x shall be subject to appropriate disciplinary action.
(Emphasis supplied)
By signing the 30 July 2001 motion, Velasco-Jacoba in effect certified that she had
read it, she knew it to be meritorious, and it was not for the purpose of delaying the
case. Her signature supplied the motion with legal effect and elevated its status from a
mere scrap of paper to that of a court document.
Velasco-Jacoba insists, however, that she signed the 30 July 2001 motion only because
of her husbands request but she did not know its contents beforehand. Apparently,
this practice of signing each others pleadings is a long-standing arrangement between
the spouses. According to Velasco-Jacoba, [s]o implicit is [their] trust for each other
that this happens all the time. Through the years, [she] already lost count of the
number of pleadings prepared by one that is signed by the other.[38] By Velasco-
Jacobasown admission, therefore, she violated Section 3 of Rule 7. This violation is an
act of falsehood before the courts, which in itself is a ground
for subjecting her to disciplinary action, independent of any other ground arising from
the contents of the 30 July 2001 motion.[39]
We now consider the evidence as regards Jacoba. His name does not appear in the 30
July 2001 motion. He asserts the inadmissibility of Velasco-Jacobas statement
pointing to him as the author of the motion.
The Court cannot easily let Jacoba off the hook. Firstly, his Answer with Second
Motion for Inhibition did not contain a denial of his wifes account.
Instead, Jacobaimpliedly admitted authorship of the motion by stating that he trained
his guns and fired at the errors which he perceived and believed to be gigantic and
monumental.[40]
Secondly, we find Velasco-Jacobas version of the facts more plausible, for
two reasons: (1) her reaction to the events was immediate and spontaneous,
unlike Jacobasdefense which was raised only after a considerable time had elapsed
from the eruption of the controversy; and (2) Jacoba had been
counsel of record for Veneracion in Civil Case No. 2836, supporting Velasco-
Jacobas assertion that she had not actually participate[d] in the prosecution of the
case.
Moreover, Jacoba filed a Manifestation in Civil Case No. 2836, praying that
Judge Lacurom await the outcome of the petition for certiorari before deciding the
contempt charge against him.[41] This petition for certiorari anchors some of its
arguments on the premise that the motion was, in fact, Jacobas handiwork.[42]
The marital privilege rule, being a rule of evidence, may be waived by failure of the
claimant to object timely to its presentation or by any conduct that may be construed
as implied consent.[43] This waiver applies to Jacoba who impliedly admitted
authorship of the 30 July 2001 motion.
The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:
Rule 11.03.A lawyer shall abstain from scandalous, offensive or
menacing language or behavior before the Courts.
Rule 11.04.A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not
supported by the record or have no materiality to the case.
No doubt, the language contained in the 30 July 2001 motion greatly
exceeded the vigor required of Jacoba to defend ably his clients cause. We recall his
use of the following words and phrases: abhorrent nullity, legal
monstrosity, horrendous mistake, horrible error, boner, and an insult to the judiciary
and an anachronism in the judicial process. Even Velasco-Jacoba acknowledged that
the words created a cacophonic picture of total and utter disrespect.[44]
Respondents nonetheless try to exculpate themselves by saying that every remark in
the 30 July 2001 motion was warranted. We disagree.
Well-recognized is the right of a lawyer, both as an officer of the court and as a citizen,
to criticize in properly respectful terms and through legitimate channels the acts of
courts and judges.[45] However, even the most hardened judge would be scarred by the
scurrilous attack made by the 30 July 2001 motion on Judge Lacuroms Resolution.On
its face, the Resolution presented the facts correctly and decided the case according to
supporting law and jurisprudence. Though a lawyers language may be forceful and
emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal
profession.[46] The use of unnecessary language is proscribed if we are to promote
high esteem in the courts and trust in judicial administration.[47]
In maintaining the respect due to the courts, a lawyer is not merely enjoined to use
dignified language but also to pursue the clients cause through fair and honest means,
thus:
In these cases, the Court sternly warned respondents that a repetition of
similar acts would merit a stiffer penalty. Yet, here again we are faced with the
question of whether respondents have conducted themselves with the courtesy and
candor required of them as members of the bar and officers of the court. We find
respondents to have fallen short of the mark.
WHEREFORE, we SUSPEND Atty. Ellis F. Jacoba from the practice of law for
two (2) years effective upon finality of this Decision. We also SUSPEND Atty. Olivia
Velasco-Jacoba from the practice of law for two (2) months effective upon finality of
this Decision. We STERNLY WARN respondents that a repetition of the same or
similar infraction shall merit a more severe sanction.

Rule 19.01.A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to
attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not present,
participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded
criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage in any case or
proceeding.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondents personal records as attorneys; the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines; and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Shortly after the filing of the 30 July 2001 motion but before its Associate Justice
resolution, Jacoba assisted his client in instituting two administrative cases against
Judge Lacurom. As we have earlier noted, Civil Case No. 2836 was then pending before
Judge Lacuroms sala. The Courts attention is drawn to the fact that the timing of the
filing of these administrative cases could very well raise the suspicion that the cases
were intended as leverage against Judge Lacurom.

Respondent spouses have both been the subject of administrative cases

before this Court. In Administrative Case No. 2594, we suspended Jacoba from the
practice of law for a period of six months because of his failure to file an action for the
recovery of possession of property despite the lapse of two and a half years from
receipt by him of P550 which his client gave him as filing and sheriffs fees.[48] In
Administrative Case No. 5505, Jacoba was once again found remiss in his duties when
he failed to file the appellants brief, resulting in the dismissal of his clients appeal. We
imposed the penalty of one year suspension.[49]
As for Velasco-Jacoba, only recently this Court fined her P5,000 for
appearing in barangay conciliation proceedings on behalf of a party, knowing fully
well the prohibition contained in Section 415 of the Local Government Code.[50]
RE : SUSPENSION OF ATTY. ADM. CASE No. 7006 trial court declared him in contempt of court pursuant to the Rules of Court.
ROGELIO Z. BAGABUYO, FORMER
SENIOR STATE PROSECUTOR Present: ISSUE: WON Prosecutor Bagabuyo violated the canons and his oath as a
lawyer?

Held: YES
This administrative case stemmed from the events of the Criminal case
Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear,
proceeding originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C.
prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities
Buyser. Judge Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the
and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence. Membership in the
accused, declaring that the evidence thus presented by the prosecution
bar imposes upon them certain obligations. Canon 11 of the Code of
was sufficient to prove the crime of homicide and not the charge of
Professional Responsibility mandates a lawyer to observe and maintain
murder. The counsel of the defense filed a Motion to fix the amount of Bail
the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and [he] should insist
Bond. Respondent Atty Bagabuyo, then Senior state Prosecutor and the
on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that a lawyer
deputized prosecutor of the case, objected thereto mainly on the ground
shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only.
that the original charge of murder, punishable with reclusion perpetua, was
not subject of bail under the Rules of Court.
Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused
the holding of a press conference where he made statements against the
Judge Buser inhibited himself from further trying the case because of the
Order dated November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in Crim. Case No.
harsh insinuation of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo that he lacks the
5144 to be released on bail.
cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate, by allegedly suggesting the filing
of the motion to fix the amount of bail bond by counsel for the accused.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge
Tan was displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior
Respondent appealed to the CA. Instead of availing himself only of
prosecutor lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out,
judicial remedies, respondent caused the publication of an article
which appeared in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star
regarding the Order granting to the accused in the issue of the Mindanao
Daily. Respondents statements in the article, which were made while Crim.
Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled Senior prosecutor lambast Surigao
Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated Rule 13.02 of
judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out.
Canon 13, which states that a lawyer shall not make public statements in
the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or
The RTC of Surigao City directed respondent and the writer of the article
against a party.
to appear in court to explain why they should not be cited for indirect
contempt of court for the publication of the article which degrade the court
In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated
and its presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentation.
Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not
resorting to the proper authorities only for redress of his grievances
Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference,
against Judge Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect
but refused to answer whether he made the statement in the article until
of the court and its officer when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of
after he shall have filed a motion to dismiss. For his refusal to answer, the
the law, that as a mahjong aficionado, he was studying mahjong instead of
studying the law, and that he was a liar.
Respondent also violated the Lawyers Oath, as he has sworn to conduct
[himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.
As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should
have set the example of observing and maintaining the respect due to the
courts and to judicial officers. Montecillo v. Gica held:
It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful
attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to uphold the dignity and
authority of the court to which he owes fidelity, according to the oath he
has taken. Respect for the courts guarantees the stability of our
democratic institutions which, without such respect, would be resting on a
very shaky foundation.
AZCUNA, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from the events of the proceedings in
Crim. Case No. 5144, entitled People v. Luis Bucalon Plaza, heard before the sala of
Presiding Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Branch
29.
Crim. Case No. 5144 was originally raffled to the sala of Judge Floripinas C.
Buyser, RTC of Surigao City, Branch 30. In an Order dated March 14, 2002, Judge
Buyser denied the Demurrer to the Evidence of the accused, declaring that the
evidence thus presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove the crime of
homicide and not the charge of murder. Consequently, the counsel for the defense
filed a Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond. Respondent Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo,
then Senior State Prosecutor and the deputized prosecutor of the case, objected
thereto mainly on the ground that the original charge of murder, punishable
with reclusion perpetua,was not subject to bail under Sec. 4, Rule 114 of the Rules of
Court.[1]
In an Order dated August 30, 2002,[2] Judge Buyser inhibited himself from
further trying the case because of the harsh insinuation of Senior Prosecutor Rogelio
Z. Bagabuyo that he lacks the cold neutrality of an impartial magistrate, by allegedly
suggesting the filing of the motion to fix the amount of bail bond by counsel for the
accused.
The case was transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC of Surigao City, presided
by Judge Jose Manuel P. Tan. In an Order dated November 12, 2002, Judge Tan
favorably resolved the Motion to Fix the Amount of Bail Bond, and fixed the amount of
the bond at P40,000.
Respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order dated November
12, 2002, which motion was denied for lack of merit in an Order dated February 10,
2003. In October, 2003, respondent appealed from the Orders dated November 12,
2002 and February 10, 2003, to the Court of Appeals (CA).
Instead of availing himself only of judicial remedies, respondent caused the
publication of an article regarding the Order granting bail to the accused in the August
18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. The article, entitled Senior prosecutor
lambasts Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out, reads:
SENIOR state prosecutor has lashed at a judge
in Surigao City for allowing a murder suspect to go out on bail.
Senior state prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo lambasted
Judge Manuel Tan of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 29
based in Surigao City for ruling on a motion that sought a bailbond
for Luis Plaza who stands charged with murdering a policeman . . . .
Plaza reportedly posted a P40-thousand bail bond.
Bagabuyo argued that the crime of murder is a non-
bailable offense. But Bagabuyo admitted that a judge could still opt
to allow a murder suspect to bail out in cases when the evidence of
the prosecution is weak.
But in this murder case, Bagabuyo said the judge who
previously handled it, Judge F[lori]pinas B[uy]ser, described the
 evidence to be strong. B[uy]ser inhibited from the case for an
unclear reason.
xxx
Bagabuyo said he would contest Tans decision before the
Court of Appeals and would file criminal and administrative
charges of certiorari against the judge.
Bagabuyuo said he was not afraid of being cited in
contempt by Judge Tan.
This is the only way that the public would know that
there are judges there who are displaying judicial arrogance. he
said.[3]
In an Order dated August 21, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29,
directed respondent and the writer of the article, Mark Francisco of the Mindanao
Gold Star Daily, to appear in court on September 20, 2003 to explain why they should
not be cited for indirect contempt of court for the publication of the article which
degraded the court and its presiding judge with its lies and misrepresentation.
The said Order stated that contrary to the statements in the article, Judge
Buyser described the evidence for the prosecution as not strong, but sufficient to
prove the guilt of the accused only for homicide. Moreover, it was not true that Judge
Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an unclear reason. Judge Buyser, in an
Order dated August 30, 2002, declared in open court in the presence of respondent
that he was inhibiting himself from the case due to the harsh insinuation of
respondent that he lacked the cold neutrality of an impartial judge.
On the scheduled hearing of the contempt charge, Mark Francisco admitted
that the Mindanao Gold Star Daily caused the publication of the article. He disclosed
that respondent, in a press conference, stated that the crime of murder is non-
bailable. When asked by the trial court why he printed such lies, Mr. Francisco
answered that his only source was respondent.[4] Mr. Francisco clarified that in
the statement alleging that Judge Buyser inhibited himself from the case for an
unclear reason, the phrase for an unclear reason, was added by the newspapers
Executive Editor Herby S. Gomez.[5]
Respondent admitted that he caused the holding of the press conference, but
refused to answer whether he made the statements in the article until after he shall
have filed a motion to dismiss. For his refusal to answer, the trial court declared him
in contempt of court pursuant to Sec. 3, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court.[6] The Courts
Order dated September 30, 2003 reads:
ORDER
Mr. Mark Francisco for publishing this article which is a
lie clothed in half truth to give it a semblance of truth is hereby
ordered to pay a fine of P10,000. Prosecutor Bagabuyo, for
obstinately refusing to explain why he should not be cited for
contempt and admitting that the article published in the Mindanao
Gold Star Daily on August 18, 2003 and quoted in the Order of this
Court dated August 21, 2003 which is contemptuous was caused by
him to be published, is hereby adjudged to have committed indirect
contempt of Court pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court and he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of 30 days in
jail. The BJMP is hereby ordered to arrest Prosecutor Rogelio Z.
Bagabuyo if he does not put up a bond of P100,000.00.
SO ORDERD.[7]
Respondent posted the required bond and was released from the custody of
the law. He appealed the indirect contempt order to the CA.
Despite the citation of indirect contempt, respondent presented himself to
the media for interviews in Radio Station DXKS, and again attacked the integrity of
Judge Tan and the trial courts disposition in the proceedings of Crim. Case No. 5144.
In an Order dated October 20, 2003, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29,
required respondent to explain and to show cause within five days from receipt
thereof why he should not be held in contempt for his media interviews that degraded
the court and the presiding judge, and why he should not be suspended from the
practice of law for violating the Code of Professional Responsibility, specifically Rule
11.05 of Canon 11[8] and Rule 13.02 of Canon 13.[9]
In the Order, the trial court stated that respondent was interviewed by Jun
Clergio, and that the interview was repeatedly aired on September 30, 2003 and in his
news program between 6:00 and 8:00 a.m. on October 1, 2003. He was also
interviewed by Tony Consing on October 1 and 2, 2003, between 8:00 and 9:00 a.m. in
his radio program. In those radio interviews, respondent allegedly called Judge Tan a
judge who does not know the law, a liar, and a dictator who does not accord due
process to the people.
The hearing for the second contempt charge was set on December 4, 2003.
On November, 20, 2003, respondent filed an Urgent Motion for Extension of
Time to File Answer to Contempt alleging that he was saddled with work of equal
importance and needed ample time to answer the same. He also prayed for a bill of
particulars in order to properly prepare for his defense.
In an Order dated November 20, 2003, the trial court denied the motion. It
stated that a bill of particulars is not applicable in contempt proceedings, and that
respondents actions and statements are detailed in the Order of October 20, 2003.
On the scheduled hearing of December 4, 2003 respondent neither appeared
in court nor informed the court of his absence. The trial court issued an Order dated
December 4, 2003 cancelling the hearing to give Prosecutor Bagabuyo all the chances
he asks for, and ordered him to appear on January 12, 2004 to explain in writing or
orally why he should not be cited in contempt of court pursuant to the facts stated in
the Order dated October 20, 2003. However, respondent did not appear in the
scheduled hearing of January 12, 2004.
On January 15, 2004, the trial court received respondents Answer
dated January 8, 2004. Respondent denied the charge that he sought to be
interviewed by radio station DXKS. He, however, stated that right after the hearing
of September 30, 2003, he was approached by someone who asked him to comment
on the Order issued in open court, and that his comment does not fall within the
concept of indirect contempt of court. He also admitted that he was interviewed by his
friend, Tony Consing, at the latters instance. He justified his response during the
interview as a simple exercise of his constitutional right of freedom of speech and that
it was not meant to offend or malign, and was without malice.
On February 8, 2004, the trial court issued an Order, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, finding preponderant evidence that
Prosecutor Bagabuyo has grossly violated the Canons of the legal
profession and [is] guilty of grave professional misconduct,
rendering him unfit to continue to be entrusted with the duties and
responsibilities belonging to the office of an attorney, he is hereby
SUSPENDED from the practice of law.
Likewise, he is also found guilty of indirect contempt of
court, for which he is hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of
IMPRISONMENT for ninety (90) days to be served at the Surigao
City Jail and to pay the maximum fine of THIRTY THOUSAND
PESOS (P30,000.00). Future acts of contempt will be dealt with
more severely.
Let copies of the relevant records be immediately
forwarded to the Supreme Court for automatic review and for
further determination of grounds for [the] disbarment of
Prosecutor Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo.[10]
The trial court found respondents denials to be lame as the tape of his
interview on October 2, 2003, duly transcribed, showed disrespect of the court and its
officers, thus:
TONY CONSING: Fiscal, nanglabay ang mga oras, nanglabay
ang gamayng panahon ang samad
sa imong kasingkasing nagpabilin
pa ba ni. O ingnon nato duna na
bay pagbag-o sa imong huna-huna
karon?
(Fiscal, after the lapse of time, are you still hurt? Or have you not
changed your mind yet?)
BAGABUYO : Ang akong huna-huna kon aduna man ugaling pagbag-
o ang pagsiguro, ang mga Huwes
nga dili mahibalo sa balaod
tangtangon pagka abogado, mao
kana.
(If my mind has changed at all, it is that I ensure that all judges who
are ignorant of the law should be
disbarred. Thats it.)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Mao kana ang tinuod, Ton, ug kining akong guibatonan
karon nga hunahuna mahitungod
nianang mga Huwes nga dili
kahibalo sa balaod, magkadugay
magkalami.Kada adlao nagatoon
ako. Nagabasa ako sa mga bag-
ong jurisprudence ug sa atong
balaod aron sa pagsiguro gayod
nga inigsang-at unya nako sa kaso
nga disbarment niining di
mahibalo nga Huwes, sigurado
gayod ako nga katangtangan siya
sa lisensiya . . . . Ang kini nga
Huwes nga dili mahibalo sa balaod,
pagatangtangon na, dili lamang sa
pagka-Huwes kon dili sa pagka-
abogado. Tan-awa ra gyod kining
iyang gibuhat nga Order, Ton,
ang iyang pagkabakakon. . . .
(Thats true, Ton, and this conviction I have now about judges who
are ignorant of the law is made
firmer by time. I study everyday. I
read new jurisprudence and the
law to insure that when I file the
disbarment case against this Judge
who does not know his law, I am
certain that he loses his license. . .
. This judge who is ignorant of the
lawshould not only be removed as
a judge but should also be
disbarred. Just take a look at his
Order, Ton, and see what a liar he
is . . . .)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Yes, nag-ingon ang iyang Order. . . . Ngano nga
nakaingon ako nga bakakon kini,
nag-ingon nga kini konong order
given in open court, ang kalooy sa
dios, ang iyang order sa Korte
wala siya mag-ingon ug kantidad
nga P100,000.00 nga bail bond. . . .
(Yes, his Order said that . . . . Why did I say that he is a liar? It states
that this Order was given in open
court, and in Gods mercy, he did
not state the amount
of P100,000.00 as bailbond. . . .)
BAGABUYO : Kay dili man lagi mahibalo sa balaod, ako
siyang gui-ingnan, Your Honor, I have the right to appeal. Mibalik
dayon, ug miingon siya, BJMP
arrest Bagabuyo.
(Because he does not know the
law, I said, Your Honor, I have the
right to appeal. Then he came
back and said, BJMP, arrest
Bagabuyo.)
xxx
BAGABUYO : . . . P100,000.00 ang iyang guipapiyansa.
Naunsa na? Dinhi makita nimo ang
iyang pagka gross ignorance of
the law. . . .
(He imposed a bail of P100,000.00. How come? This is where you
will see his gross ignorance of the
law. . . . )
xxx
TONY CONSING : So karon, unsay plano nimo karon?
(So what is your plan now?)
BAGABUYO : Sumala sa akong gui-ingon moundang lang ako kon
matangtang na siya sa pagka
abogado. . . .
(As I have said, I will only stop if he is already disbarred. . . .)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Nasuko siya niini kay hambugero kuno, pero angayan
niyang hibaw-an nga ang trabajo
sa Huwes dili ang pagtan-aw kon
ang tawo hambugero . . . . Ug ang
akong gisulti mao lamang ang
balaod nga siya in fact at that time
I said he is not conversant of the
law, with regards to the case of
murder. . . .
(He got angry because I was allegedly bragging but he should know
that it is not for a judge to
determine if a person is a
braggart. . . .And what I said was
based on the law. In fact, at that
time, I said he is not conversant of
the law, with regards to the case
of murder . . . .)
xxx
BAGABUYO : Ah, mi sit down sab ako, contempt ra ba kadto . . . .
Mao kana, pero unsa may iyang
katuyoan ang iyang katuyoan nga
ipa-adto ako didto kay didto, iya
akong pakauwawan kay iya kong
sikopon, iya kong ipa-priso, pero
kay di man lagi mahibalo sa
balaod, ang iyang gui orderan
BJMP, intawon por dios por Santo,
Mr. Tan, pagbasa intawon ug
balaod, naunsa ka ba Mr.
Tan? Unsa may imong hunahuna
nga kon ikaw Huwes, ikaw na ang
diktador, no way, no sir, ours is a
democratic country where all and
everyone is entitled to due
process of law you did not accord
me due process of law . . . .
(I sat down. . . . Thats it. But what was his purpose? He made me
come in order to humiliate me
because he wanted me arrested,
he wanted me imprisoned, but
because he is ignorant of the law,
he ordered the BMJP. For Gods
sake, Mr. Tan, whats wrong with
you, Mr. Tan? Please read the
law. What is your thinking? That
when you are a judge, you are also
a dictator? No way, no sir, ours is
a democratic country where all
and everyone is entitled to due
process of law you did not accord
me due process of law. . . .)
TONY CONSING: So mopasaka kang disbarment, malaumon kita
nga maaksiyonan kini, with all this
problem sa Korte Suprema.
 (So you are filing a disbarment case? We hope that this be given
action with all the problems in the
Supreme Court.)
BAGABUYO : Dili ako mabalaka niana kay usa ka truck ang
akong jurisprudence, nga ang mga
Huwes nga di mahibalo sa balaod
pagatangtangon gayod sa ilang
pagka Huwes. . . . Apan unsa man
intawon ang balaod ang iyang
gibasa niini nadunggan ko nga kini
kuno siya madjongero, mao bitaw
na, madjong ang iyang guitunan?
(I am not worried because I have a truckload of jurisprudence that
judges who are ignorant of the law
must be removed from the
Bench. But what law has he been
reading? I heard that he is a
mahjong aficionado (mahjongero)
and that is why he is studying
mahjong.[11]
The trial court concluded that respondent, as a member of the bar and an
officer of the court, is duty bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the court, and
should not promote distrust in the administration of justice.
The trial court stated that it is empowered to suspend respondent from the
practice of law under Sec. 28, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court[12] for any of the causes
mentioned in Sec. 27[13] of the same Rule. Respondent was given the opportunity to be
heard, but he opted to be silent. Thus, it held that the requirement of due process has
been duly satisfied.
In accordance with the provisions of Sec. 29,[14] Rule 138 and Sec. 9,[15] Rule
139 of the Rules of Court, the RTC of Surigao City, Branch 29, transmitted to the Office
of the Bar Confidant the Statement of Facts of respondents suspension from the
practice of law, dated July 14, 2005, together with the order of suspension and other
relevant documents.
In its Report dated January 4, 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant found
that the article in the August 18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily, which
maligned the integrity and independence of the court and its officers, and respondents
criticism of the trial courts Order dated November 12, 2002, which was aired in radio
station DXKS, both in connection with Crim. Case No. 5144, constitute grave violation
of oath of office by respondent. It stated that the requirement of due process was
complied with when respondent was given an opportunity to be heard, but
respondent chose to remain silent.
The Office of the Bar Confidant recommended the implementation of the
trial courts order of suspension dated February 8, 2004, and that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for one year, with a stern warning that
the repetition of a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
The Court approves the recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant. It has been reiterated in Gonzaga v. Villanueva, Jr.[16] that:
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any violation
of his oath, a patent disregard of his duties, or an odious
deportment unbecoming an attorney. Among the grounds
enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court are deceit;
malpractice; gross misconduct in office; grossly immoral conduct;
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude; any violation of
the oath which he is required to take before admission to the
practice of law; willful disobedience of any lawful order of a
superior court; corrupt or willful appearance as an attorney for a
party to a case without authority to do so. The grounds are not
preclusive in nature even as they are broad enough as to cover
practically any kind of impropriety that a lawyer does or commits
in his professional career or in his private life. A lawyer must at no
time be wanting in probity and moral fiber which are not only
conditions precedent to his entrance to the Bar, but are likewise
essential demands for his continued membership therein.
 Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts who are empowered to appear,
prosecute and defend; and upon whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities
are devolved by law as a consequence.[17] Membership in the bar imposes upon them
certain obligations.[18] Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility mandates a
lawyer to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers
and [he] should insist on similar conduct by others. Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 states that
a lawyer shall submit grievances against a judge to the proper authorities only.
Respondent violated Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 when he admittedly caused the
holding of a press conference where he made statements against the Order
dated November 12, 2002 allowing the accused in Crim. Case No. 5144 to be released
on bail.
Respondent also violated Canon 11 when he indirectly stated that Judge Tan
was displaying judicial arrogance in the article entitled, Senior prosecutor lambasts
Surigao judge for allowing murder suspect to bail out, which appeared in the August
18, 2003 issue of the Mindanao Gold Star Daily. Respondents statements in the article,
which were made while Crim. Case No. 5144 was still pending in court, also violated
Rule 13.02 of Canon 13, which states that a lawyer shall not make public statements in
the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a
party.
In regard to the radio interview given to Tony Consing, respondent violated
Rule 11.05 of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility for not resorting to
the proper authorities only for redress of his grievances against Judge
Tan. Respondent also violated Canon 11 for his disrespect of the court and its officer
when he stated that Judge Tan was ignorant of the law, that as a mahjong aficionado,
he was studying mahjong instead of studying the law, and that he was a liar.
uphold the dignity and authority of the court to which he owes
fidelity, according to the oath he has taken. Respect for the courts
guarantees the stability of our democratic institutions which,
without such respect, would be resting on a very shaky foundation.
The Court is not against lawyers raising grievances against erring judges but
the rules clearly provide for the proper venue and procedure for doing so, precisely
because respect for the institution must always be maintained.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, Atty. Rogelio Z. Bagabuyo is found
guilty of violating Rule 11.05, Canon 11 and Rule 13.02, Canon 13 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, and of violating the Lawyers Oath, for which he
is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year effective upon finality of this
Decision, with a STERN WARNING that the repetition of a similar offense shall be
dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be
appended to respondents personal record as an attorney, the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines, the Department of Justice, and all courts in the country for their
information and guidance.
No costs.
SO ORDERED

Respondent also violated the Lawyers Oath, as he has sworn to conduct

[himself] as a lawyer according to the best of [his] knowledge and discretion with all
good fidelity as well to the courts as to [his] clients.

As a senior state prosecutor and officer of the court, respondent should have
set the example of observing and maintaining the respect due to the courts and to
judicial officers. Montecillo v. Gica[19] held:

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts

a respectful attitude. As an officer of the court, it is his duty to