Nuke Criticalreflectionsdoel3tihange2

Critical reflections about the integrity of
the reactor vessels of the Doel 3 and

Tihange 2 nuclear power plants.
Authors:
dr.ir.ing. Boonen René
email: rene.boonen@kuleuven.be
dr.ir. Jan Peirs
email: janpeirs1@gmail.com
R.Boonen & J.Peirs May 18, 2017

Integrity reactor vessels Doel 3 and Tihange 2 Page: 2
Preface
For an engineer who has followed the news about the reactors of Doel 3 and Tihange 2, it was quite
amazing and against common engineering sense that these two reactors are put in service again after
three years of research, whereby more than 13000 flaws in the reactor vessel shells have been re-
ported. This forms the cause to search for relevant information. A number of reports concerning the
reactor vessels of Doel 3 and Tihange 2 are present at the FANC website http://www.fanc.fgov.
be/nl/page/dossier-pressure-vessel-doel-3-tihange-2/1488.aspx?LG=2. Unfortu-
nately, these reports are difficult to read, they are tedious, the information is very fragmented and
spread out over a large number of different reports. In order to understand how such an investi-
gation is carried out, it is recommended to read a report about another case of Structural Integrity
Associates Inc. [1]. This 82 page report deals with a crack of a weld inside a reactor vessel, it ex-
plains clearly the course of the investigation, provides the data of the materials and the load cycles,
cites where necessary the approach and the data from the "ASME Boiler and Vessel Code", describes
the calculations and presents the results in such a way that technical skilled people outside the nu-
clear sector can understand these calculations. This is not possible with the material provided in
these reports on the FANC website. To do calculations, data from the report of Structural Integrity
Associates Inc. [1] are used, as these data lack in the reports provided by FANC.
The findings will be illuminated in this note. First, the construction of the pressurized water reactor
(PWR) will be illuminated such as it is presented in the reports of Electrabel. Then, some principles
of fracture mechanics will be explained. Next, the most important issues from the Electrabel reports
will be illuminated. This will be done at hand of the reports itself, the reader must have these reports
at his disposal to follow the explanations, such that a biased viewpoint will be avoided. Then, the
critical attention points will be formulated. The consulted sources will be cited by their internet
addresses in the bibliography where possible, such that the reader is capable to find them quickly.
The authors are totally independent from any organisation or political party and want to keep it
that way. The authors believe that nuclear energy will be indispensable in a low–carbon economy. It
will not be possible to fully replace the current production of electricity by wind turbines and solar
cells [2]. These energy sources consume too much space in our highly populated areas and varies
too strong with the weather conditions. Nuclear energy can be safely used on the condition that
normal engineering rules will be followed with reactors which follow the state of the art and that
exploitants and government accept that every technical installation has a finite lifetime and needs to
be replaced by new ones which comply with the actual state of the art. An accident in the primary
circuit of a nuclear reactor, even when the consequences remain inside the nuclear plant itself, will
make nuclear energy impossible in the future.

Contents:
p3: Construction of a nuclear reactor vessel.
p4: Main points of criticism on the Electrabel safety cases
p6: Identification of the flaws in the reactor vessel.
p12: Hydrogen as cause of metal cracking.
p17: Fracture mechanics.
p18: Treatment of flaws by Electrabel.
p20: Chronology of the events leading to the nuclear code case N-848.
p23: Minor issues.
p25: References.
p28: Communication with FANC.
1 Construction of a nuclear reactor vessel.
Figure 1 presents the construction of a nuclear reactor vessel [21]. In the Electrabel–report [14]p17-
21, the construction of a nuclear reactor vessel is also described.
The reactor consists of a cylindrical steel vessel with a diameter of 4 m, a wall thickness of 200 mm
and a height of 13 m. It is a PWR–reactor ("Pressurized Water Reactor"). The water in the reactor is
pressurized by an external pressurizer at 155bar such that the water does not boil in the reactor. This
primary water is heated by the nuclear core and circulated by pumps through the steam generators
with a volume flow of 21190 m3 /h in each loop, which produces the steam for the turbines which
generate the electricity. The electrical power amounts 1020MW. The primary water enters the reac-
tor vessel at a temperature of 282 o C, flows between the core barrel and the vessel wall downwards
and subsequently back upwards through the core and leaves the reactor vessel at a temperature of
325 o C.
The reactor vessel is designed to withstand a pressure of 171 bar and is tested at a pressure of
215 bar.
Figure 2 (figure 3.5 in the report [14]p20) presents the construction of the reactor vessel of Doel 3.
The vessel has been welded together from different forged parts.
The reactor has started up in 1982 and is about 34 years in use.

Figure 1: Principle of a nuclear reactor [21].
2 Main points of criticism on the Electrabel safety cases
1. Hydrogen as cause of the flaws. The normal volume H2 necessary to form 41 cracks in 1dm3
steel at cracking pressure amounts between 818 ml and 1374 ml, which is 6 to 10 times more
than the 131 ml H2 which was dissolved in the steel. However, not all hydrogen takes part in
crack formation. It is estimated that only 61 ml H2 is available for crack formation. Then 13 to
22 times 61 ml H2 is necessary to form the cracks. This would implicate that hydrogen flaking
cannot be not the only cause of the flaws, but that another cause has resulted in flaking and/or
that the flaws have been growing during time. This is discussed in more detail in section 4.

Figure 2: Components of the Doel 3 reactor pressure vessel and vessel head [14]p20.
2. The absence of a consolidated theory for material with a high density of cracks. The
fracture mechanics theory mainly deals with the behaviour of a single crack under stress with-
out interaction of neighbouring cracks. In recent research, the interaction between two cracks
have been published in several articles, and multiple crack situations are still in the research
phase. There are no precedent cases published wherein such high crack densities in construc-
tions occur. Electrabel has proposed grouping rules which led to the ASME BPVC nuclear code
case N-848. In this code case, flaws in close proximity to each other are grouped in rectangu-
lar boxes. The circle or ellipse with the largest dimension fitting in this box is then treated as
a single ”equivalent flaw”, which then will be evaluated according to the ASME BPVC criteria.
No proof has been found if the ”equivalent flaw” is the worst case flaw in all possible flaw
combinations in the vessel wall. It makes the nuclear reactor vessels of Doel3 and Tihange2
an experimental case for a non–consolidated fracture mechanics theory. This is discussed in
more detail in section 6.

3 Identification of the flaws in the reactor vessel
In 2012, flaws have been detected during an ultrasonic inspection. These flaws are located mainly
in the lower core shell of the Doel3 reactor vessel. The number of flaws amounts 7205 ([14] p32).
The distribution in position with respect to the inner wall is presented in figure 3 (figure 4.7 in [14]
p34) and the distribution in size is presented in figure 4 (figure 4.21 in [14] p55).
Figure 3: Distribution of the flaws with respect to the inner wall distance [14] p34.
Figure 5 (figure 4.6 on [14] p33) shows the distribution of the flaws in the lower core shell. The
left side shows an actual cross-section measurement, the right side shows the flaws within a sector
of 20o . Figure 6 (figure 4.16 in [14] p47) presents an image of the flaws in the lower core shell for
different sectors. The sectors between 200o [14] p47 and 220o exhibit a high flaw density. Figure 7
presents the distribution of the flaws around the circumference of the lower core shell, measured in
2012 and in 2014.
The mean flaw density between the first 100 mm from the inner reactor surface amounts 2.1 /dm3
and the maximum flaw density is 25.8 /dm3 ([15]p7). The mean flaw distance is 20.4 mm, the
maximum distance is 565 mm ([15]p7). The smallest flaw distance was not mentioned in these
reports.
In 2014, a new ultrasonic inspection has been performed. During this inspection, a higher number
of flaws has been found, i.e. 11607 instead of 7205 in the lower inner shell. ([16]p27). Also the
reported flaws appear to be larger, the mean size found in the 2012 inspection was 9.6 × 7.6 mm,
in 2014 16.0 × 12.7 mm and the largest flaws in 2012 67.9 × 38.4 mm, in 2014 179.0 × 72.3 mm
([16]p29). In figure 8 (4.9 in [16]p28), the new distribution of the flaw distance to the inner vessel
wall is presented and in figure 9 (4.11 in [16]p30) the distribution of the flaw size. In the reports

Figure 4: Distribution of the flaw size with respect to the inner wall distance [14] p55.
is mentioned that this increase in number and size of the flaws is due to the increased resolution
of the measurement equipment used in 2014 compared to the equipment used in 2012 and not to
a physical increase of the flaws in the reactor vessel. ([17]p11). Based on the new flaw data, the
mean flaw density within the first 100 mm wall thickness should amount 3.4 flaws/dm3 and the
maximum flaw density 41.6 flaws/dm3 ([15]p7).

Figure 5: Picture of the flaws in the lower core shell, on the right a local cross section, on the left a
collection over a sector of 20o [14] p33.

Figure 6: Picture of the flaw distribution in the lower core shell in different sectors [14] p47.

Figure 7: Distribution of the flaws over the Doel3 lower shell circumference, measured in 2012
(upper part) and in 2014 (lower part). [20].
Figure 8: Comparison of the measurements of the depth distribution of the flaws with respect to the
inner wall distance in 2012 and 2014 [16] p28.

Figure 9: Comparison of the measurements of the flaw size distribution in 2012 and 2014 [16] p30.

4 Hydrogen as cause of metal cracking.
In this section, it will be demonstrated that the hypothesis of Electrabel that hydrogen segregation
which occurred during the vessel production as the only cause of metal cracking cannot be correct.
To demonstrate this, the amount of available hydrogen for cracking has to be estimated, then, the
amount of hydrogen necessary to cause all the cracks has to be estimated. If the amount of hydrogen
available for cracking is smaller than the amount of hydrogen necessary to cause all the cracks, the
hypothesis that hydrogen flaking during the manufacturing process of the shell as the only cause
cannot be correct.
Figure 10: Solubility of hydrogen in steel in terms of temperature and pressure [11]
The ingots of which the reactor shells have been manufactured were poured using a state-of-the-art
vacuum technique, to remove the hydrogen from the molten steel. Before casting the ingot from
which the lower core shell of the Doel3 reactor has been manufactured, the molten steel has been

sampled and the hydrogen content was measured [14] p43. After cooling down the ingot in a
controlled manner, samples of the metal are taken and the hydrogen content was measured again.
The amount of hydrogen present in the steel of the Doel3 lower core shell was for all measurements
1.5 ppm [14] p44.
During cooling of the ingot, impurities and alloying elements segregates into so called ghost lines
which are sensitive to hydrogen cracking [9]. As solidification progresses from the outside wall
inwards, the internal part of the ingot will be enriched with impurities and alloying elements, while
the outside part will be poor in alloying elements, due to the higher solubility of the alloying ele-
ments in the liquid phase. During forging, the parts of the ingot with the high segregation areas
have been removed by cutting off the bottom and the top from the ingot and in a next step the
centre part of the ingot which also contain high segregation areas has been pierced out. From the
resulting hollow cylinder, the reactor vessel shell has been forged. After forging and cooling until
room temperature, the inner and the outer wall will be machined by cutting away about 40 mm at
each side on a lathe.
Hypothesis of Electrabel. The hypothesis of Electrabel, as presented in the paper [9] and also
in their communication on page 28, is that when the segregation areas finally transform from the
γ-phase to the α-phase during cooling of the ingot, they become supersaturated in hydrogen which
will recombine to hydrogen gas H2 at trapping sites in the metal, building up an internal pressure.
The combination of this internal pressure and local stresses can lead to cracking during or shortly
after fabrication of the shells. So, Electrabel concludes that the cracks were already present at the
start-up of the reactor.
Available amount of hydrogen in case of a uniform distribution over the shell. Figure 10
presents the solubility of hydrogen in iron, where the curve of 1 atm should be followed. The
necessary hydrogen concentration on the curve in figure 10 is 5 ppm at 900 o C before the γ-α-
transformation starts to be supersaturated in the α-phase. However, as the hydrogen concentration
has been measured in the melt to be 1.5 ppm and afterwards in the cooled metal also to be 1.5 ppm,
concentration of hydrogen did not occur as the metal has never become saturated, the level of
hydrogen present in the metal remains at least 3 times below the saturation level. The saturation of
hydrogen occurs on the curve in figure 10 at 400 o C at a hydrogen level of 1.5ppm. It is unrealistic to
Total dissolved available H2 volume

concentration H2 volume for cracking
(ppm) (Nml /dm3 ) (Nml /dm3 )
threshold concentration 0.8 70 –
uniform concentration 1.5 131 61
Table 1: Volume of normal cm3 H2 in 1 dm3 steel
assume that each individual atom hydrogen diffuses towards the crack zones. Some of the hydrogen
will escape to the atmosphere, another part will be trapped on the crystal boundaries and inclusions
in the metal without initiating crack formation, and a part remains in solution. In order to have
an estimate of the amount of hydrogen which does not take part to crack formation, the amount of

hydrogen is taken from the solubility curve presented in figure 10 where the curve of 1 atm crosses
the abscissa, which corresponds to 0.8 ppm at 100 o C, which corresponds to 70 ml H2 /dm3 . Table 1
summarizes the amounts of hydrogen in the steel. The last column of table 1 presents the amount
of hydrogen involved in the flaw creation process.
Figure 11: Axisymmetric 2D-FEM model of a crack.
Figure 12: Von Mises stress distribution around a crack loaded by an internal pressure inside the
crack from the center to the edge of the crack.
Necessary amount of hydrogen to cause the high density of cracks in the shell. In the next
paragraphs, it will be demonstrated that there is not sufficient hydrogen dissolved in the metal to

20
crack ceiling displacement (µm)
15
10
0
0 2 4 6 8 10
radius from centre of crack (mm)
Figure 13: Displacement of the crack wall as result of an internal pressure of 3796 bar, from the
center to the edge of the crack.
create such a high density of cracks present in the high crack zones of the Doel3 lower shell.
In order to obtain a first estimate the amount of hydrogen needed to generate the flaws in the high
flaw density material, it is assumed that 41 flaws of a mean diameter of 17 mm are present in 1 dm3
steel. The flaw is caused by accumulating hydrogen at a hydrogen trap (impurities, segregation
zones) in the vessel wall material and at a certain pressure, the material cracks. During cracking
of the material, the pressure in the crack drops until the material stress intensity factor (SIF) drops
below the threshold value and the crack gets its final dimensions. For a crack of 17 mm diameter,
π KI c
the internal pressure inside the flaw equals for are circular shaped flake σ = p , [4] in which
p 2 πa
K I c = 40 MPa/ m is the stress intensity factor at room temperature and a = 8.5 mm is the half
diameter of the flaw.
To estimate the volume of such a crack, a linear elastic finite element simulation has been carried
out. Figure 11 presents the axisymmetric 2D-FEM model of a circular crack of 17mm diameter in the
center of a block steel of 400 mm diameter and 800 mm high, such that the crack can be considered
as if it is present in an infinite medium. Only the bottom is fixed, all the other boundaries are free.
Inside the crack, the pressure is introduced which should remains directly after the cracking, in this
case 3796 bar. The resulting stress distribution around the crack is shown in figure 12, where the
stress concentration at the crack tip is visible.
Figure 13 presents the resulting displacement of the crack upper boundary, from which the volume
can be estimated. The volume of such a crack amounts 0.00525 ml. The normal volume H2 from 41
cracks at 3796 bar pressure amounts then 818 ml, which is 13 times higher than the 61 ml H2 which

Size Number Content H2 pressure H2 Volume H2 Total Volume

(mm) – (ml) (bar) (Nml) (Nml)
10 2000 0.001373 4948.9 6.80 13590
15 4000 0.003829 4040.8 15.47 61887
20 2300 0.007970 3499.4 27.89 64145
25 1100 0.01400 3130.0 43.82 48202
30 800 0.02220 2857.3 63.42 50734
35 400 0.03291 2645.3 87.04 34818
40 200 0.04613 2474.5 114.14 22828
45 150 0.06218 2332.9 145.05 21758
50 100 0.08126 2213.2 179.85 17985
55 80 0.10362 2110.2 218.66 17493
60 50 0.12946 2020.4 261.56 13078
65 30 0.15903 1941.1 308.70 9261
Total 11210 – – – 375777
Table 2: Distribution of the cracks in the Doel3 lower shell, with the volumes and pressure of
hydrogen to cause them.
was available for flaw generation.

If the size distribution of the cracks is equal to the distribution over the complete lower shell, the
result will be as follows. The lower shell contains 11607 indications ([16]p27). The distribution
to size in the Doel 3 lower shell has been reconstructed from the graph ([16]p30) and is presented
in table 2. The finite element analysis has been carried out for each different flaw diameter. The
corresponding pressures and volumes of hydrogen necessary to form the flaws are tabulated in
table 2.
When it is assumed that the high density area has the same distribution as the whole lower shell
presented in table 2, the volume of H2 to cause the cracks will be 375777 11210
· 41 = 1374 ml/dm3
steel, which is approximately 22 times the hydrogen available for flaw formation. This leads to the
conclusion that there is not sufficient hydrogen dissolved in the steel to generate such high density
of cracks.
In the complete lower shell with a wall thickness of 200mm, a diameter of 4m and a height of 2.5m,
823 l H2 is dissolved of which 383 l H2 is available for cracking for the uniform case. This is slightly
more than the 375 l H2 necessary to cause all the cracks. Then this hydrogen has to diffuse several
meters following the circumference of the reactor vessel to form flaws in the high density areas. It is
more likely that a large part of the hydrogen diffuses out of the 200 mm thick wall or being trapped
in the metal than to travel a few meters to the high flaw density areas.
In both calculations, the amount of dissolved hydrogen initially in the steel is far too small (13 to
22 times too small) to cause such high density of flakes. This leads to the conclusion that hydrogen
flaking cannot be the only cause of the flaws, but that another cause has resulted in flaking or that
the flaws have been growing during time.

5 Fracture mechanics.
The phenomenon of crack propagation has been subject to extended research in different mechanical
applications, particularly in reactor and aviation applications. A crack in a metal does not propagate
without reason, it needs energy to propagate. This energy is supplied as elastic energy due to the
mechanical stresses as result of the reactor’s operation. The growth of the crack consumes a part of
this elastic energy. As cousins phenomena, a part of the elastic energy will be dissipated in plastic
deformation, a small part in surface energy and a small part in kinetic energy of the moving metal,
generating sound waves in the metal.
A brittle material uses the majority of the available elastic energy for crack growth and a small
part for plastic deformation. A ductile material is the opposite, the majority of the available elastic
energy is used for plastic deformation and only a small part for crack growth. For this reason, crack
growth is slow in ductile materials.
As criterion for crack tip stresses, the stress intensity factor (SIF) is introduced. In the SIF, the crack
geometry and the bulk stress is taken into account. This SIF will then be evaluated to the critical
SIF, which is determined as a material property at hand of tensile and Sharpy impact tests.
There is a lot of literature available about this subject. However, most of the literature looks very
specialized, but there is also some good non-specialist literature [4], [5], [6], [7].
Three types of loading modes can occur:
1. Crack opening mode, mode I: The material tension is perpendicular to the crack and pulls the
p
crack further open. The stress intensity factor of SIF is K I = β σ π a, wherein β is a geometry
factor, σ the bulk tensile stress and a is the half length of the crack. The SIF will be evaluated
to K I C , which is a material parameter which is a measure for ductility. It is determined by
tensile and Sharpy impact tests.
2. Crack shear mode, mode II: The material tension is parallel to the crack and and shears the
p
crack further open. The stress intensity factor of SIF is K I I = β τ π a, wherein β is a geometry
factor, τ the bulk shear stress and a is the half length of the crack. In principle, this SIF will
be evaluated to K I I C , but in most cases, it is converted to mode I and evaluated to K I C .
3. Crack tearing mode, mode III: In this mode the opening is torn sidewards. This mode does
not appear in this investigation.
This theory is based on the research of one single crack in the material, i.e. there is no interac-
tion with other cracks. Studies about multiple cracks in the material are very recent and is not
consolidated in a profound theory. In most of these studies, two cracks with interaction are under
investigation. Some studies point out that this aspect is not fully covered in the ASME Boiler and
Vessel Code and that the effects of multiple cracks on the strength of the vessel is not sufficiently
conservative estimated [8],p363-364, [3].

6 Treatment of flaws by Electrabel
The absence of a consolidated theory about multiple cracks and interaction between cracks, and
the absence of publications of other applications of such a theory on other cases such as aviation or
other reactor vessels (chemical industry) is the main point of concern.
Electrabel has conducted research to multiple cracks and has developed grouping rules for closely
spaced flaws [18],p18. As far as the author could trace the method to group these flaws from their
publications, one of the publications on which the grouping method Electrabel has developed is
based on is the work of Kunio Hasegawa, Koichi Saito and Katsumasa Miyzaki [22]. A similar study
has been carried out by Ali Abbaszadeh Bidokhti and Amir Reza Shahani which is published in the
Latin American Journal of Solids and Structures [23]. Hasegawa et al. are searching for alignment
rules to decide if cracks which are in close proximity to each other should be treated as non-aligned
or as coplanar. The criteria for these alignment rules are defined in many fitness-for-service codes
(AMSE, JSME, etc. . . ), however, these criteria are different in the different codes. Based on finite
elements simulations and tensile tests on steel specimen with two parallel cracks in opening mode
at different distances from each other, they propose new alignment rules for cracks for linear elastic
fracture mechanics evaluation.
Figure 14: Illustration of flaw grouping [14] p74.
Based on the paper of Kunio Hasegawa, Koichi Saito and Katsumasa Miyzaki [22], Electrabel de-
veloped grouping rules for flaws which are published in two papers which are presented at two
different conferences [24, 25]. This work has led to the proposal of an ASME code case N–848
"Alternative characterization rules for quasi-laminar flaws – Section XI, Division I" [26], [27]. Using
these newly developed rules, a part of the flaws will be grouped in rectangular boxes ([14]p71-75)
based on the proximity of the flaws to each other as presented in figure 14 (figure 4.37 in [14]p74).
Then, the circle or ellipse with the largest dimension, as illustrated in figure 15 (figure 4.38 in
[14]p75), will be taken as an ”equivalent flaw” which should be the worst case flaw and will then
be evaluated as a single flaw using the ASME BPVC criteria.
There is no proof found in the literature or in the reports available at the FANC website which

Figure 15: Equivalent flaw as result of the flaw grouping [14] p75.
Figure 16: Flaw content of a grouped flaw with 69 mm equivalent size [13] p16.
demonstrates that the "equivalent flaw" is really the worst case flaw, which could imply that some
flaw groups are less conservatively evaluated than the individual flaws. For example, a large flaw
together with some other flaws in its shadow could result in a box with the same dimensions as the
large flaw, i.e. in such a case the effect of the other flaws in the box is not considered. Also branched
flaws will not be considered, although it is an almost certainty that with such a high flaw density in

the vessel walls, branched flaws are present.

An example of a grouped box is presented in figure 16 (figure in [13]p16). This box has as dimen-
sion 69 mm and is composed of 7 flaws of which 4 flaws with a dimension of 11 mm, 1 flaw of
13 mm, 1 flaw of 14 mm and 1 flaw of 42 mm. To what extend this boxed flaw behaves as a single
flaw of 69 mm is not described in the FANC reports. As stated before, current research concerns
the interaction of two or a few flaws [8],p361, but never in such flaw density as reported in de
Electrabel reports about the reactor vessels.
The Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL) performed a detailed technical review of the 2015
Electrabel Safety Cases prepared for the Belgium reactor pressure vessels at Doel3 and Tihange2
[18]. The ORNL carried out an independent quantitative assessment of the entire flaw popula-
tion in the two Belgian reactors according to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code, Section
XI, Appendix G, "Fracture Toughness Criteria for Protection Against Failure", New York (1992 and
2004) using ORNL tools, methodologies, and the ASME Code Case N-848, "Alternative Character-
ization Rules for Quasi-Laminar Flaws". The ORNL also pointed to an internal Electrabel report
CNT-KCD/4NT/20374/000/01, dd. 30/07/2014, wherein proximity rules for flaws are been inves-
tigated [18]p18.
In the investigation of the ORNL, the majority of the flaws are treated as single flaws according
to the ASME BPVC criteria. The other flaws were grouped according to the code case N–848, the
grouped flaws were treated as a single flaw with as dimension the largest circular dimension of the
resulting box diagonal.
For the flaw groups which were found non-compliant to the ASME BPVC acceptance criteria after
screening, the circle is replaced by an ellipse fitting into the 3D-boxes (see figure 15, the ellipse in
dashed line) and screened again. [18]p23. The grouped flaws which do not comply the ASME BPVC
acceptance criteria are listed in tables 5.2, 5.3, 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 in the ORNL report [18]p39-45.
After the new screening of the elliptical equivalent flaws, the flaw groups which were found non-
compliant to the ASME BPVC criteria, the flaws previously in a group are no longer treated as a
group, but are modelled individually in a finite element multi-flaw model that should account for
mechanical interactions among closely spaced flaws.
Particularly for the latter group, the results are questionable as in these cases, there is no con-
solidated fracture mechanics theory available for multiple closely spaced cracks with interaction
between these cracks and no precedent cases have been published.
It makes the nuclear reactor vessels of Doel3 and Tihange 2 an experimental case for a non-
consolidated fracture mechanics theory.
7 Chronology of the events leading to the nuclear code case N-848
As the nuclear code case N–848 is of prime importance to the analysis of the flaws in the Doel 3
and Tihange 2 nuclear reactor vessels, the chronology of the events which led to this code case has
been reconstructed as well as possible by the authors using internet information. In this section, the
time sequence is represented with the internet addresses which lead to technical documents, which

should allow the reader to find the appropriate information rapidly.
1. July 20, 2014: Publication of the conference paper: LACROIX, V., DULIEU, P., and COUPLET,
D., "Alternative Characterization Rules for Quasi-Laminar Flaws", PVP2014-28200, ASME PVP
Conference, Anaheim, CA, July, 2014." [24],
http://proceedings.asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/proceeding.aspx?articleid=
1937821
This paper is based on the paper of Kunio Hasegawa, Koichi Saito and Katsumasa Miyzaki
[22], and has led to the proposal of an ASME code case N–848 "Alternative characterization
rules for quasi-laminar flaws – Section XI, Division I" [26].
2. June 23, 2015: Approval of the code case N848 "Alternative Characterization Rules for
Quazi-Laminar Flaws"
https://cstools.asme.org/csconnect/CodeCaseForm.cfm?Action=View&CaseNumber=
2420&NoToolbar=yes
and click on "View the Code Case File" for downloading the code case.
or
https://www.asme.org/wwwasmeorg/media/ResourceFiles/AboutASME/WhoWeAre/
BPVCResources/BPVC-CC-NC.pdf
3. July 1, 2015: Publication of the the code case N–848 "Alternative Characterization Rules for
Quazi-Laminar Flaws – Section XI, Division I"
http://standards.globalspec.com/std/9971057/asme-bpvc-case-n-848
4. July 19, 2015: Publication of the conference paper: V. LACROIX, P. DULIEU and A. S.
BOGEART, "Alternative Characterization Rules for Quasi-Laminar Flaws Based on 3D X-FEM
Calculations" ASME PVP Conference, July 2015 [25].
http://proceedings.asmedigitalcollection.asme.org/proceeding.aspx?articleid=
2471890
5. November 2015: Publication of the ORNL report ORNL/TM-2015/59349 "ORNL Evaluation
of Electrabel Safety Cases for Doel 3 / Tihange 2: Final Report (R2)"
http://info.ornl.gov/sites/publications/files/Pub59349.pdf
or
www.fanc.fgov.be/GED/00000000/4000/4030.pdf
In this report, the ORNL applies the code case N–848 to recalculate the entire flaw population
in the Doel 3 and Tihange 2 reactors according to the ASME Boiler and Pressure Vessel Code,
Section XI, Appendix G, "Fracture Toughness Criteria for Protection Against Failure", New York
(1992 and 2004).

6. November 12, 2015:

FANC publishes its final report [19] and authorizes the Doel 3 and Tihange 2 reactor units to
resume operation until they reach the age of 40 years ( [19] p6).

8 Minor issues
Figure 17: Effect of the flaws on the temperature distribution of the vessel wall.
1. Temperature gradient over the vessel wall in the flaw zone. The reactor vessel is ther-
mally isolated such that the temperature gradient over the vessel wall amounts about 10 o C.
However, the zones with a high density of flaws obstructs the thermal flow and a higher
temperature gradient occurs at these areas, which leads to increased shear stresses (approx.
2.5 MPa/o C) at the crack tips. Figure 17 illustrates that effect.

Figure 18: Effect of unequal distributed flaws on the roundness of the reactor vessel.
2. Boundary conditions for flaw simulation in shell segment. As far as the authors could
understand the modelling of the flaws, a small segment from the reactor vessel shell has been
selected for finite element simulation. The boundary conditions are the stresses resulting
from the internal pressure in the reactor and the top of the segment can move parallel with
the bottom. The latter boundary condition holds in the case the rest of the shell is solid,
however due to the high flaw density, this can be an underestimation of the resulting stresses.
[18]p77-81.
Also the fact that only a segment is selected can lead to an underestimation of the resulting
stresses. The hoop stress in the vessel wall is only pure tensile in the case that the vessel is
perfectly cylindrical and the material is homogeneous. Due to the flaws, the material isn’t
homogeneous any more, which has the same effect as unroundness, and additional bending
stresses are introduced. This effect is demonstrated in figure 18.
3. Vibration levels are unknown.
4. Opinion of Westinghouse. The reactor is designed by Westinghouse, however the author

has not found any opinion of Westinghouse about the implications of the flaws found in the
reactor vessels in the reports available at the FANC website.

References
[1] "Edwin I. Hatch Nuclear Plant - Unit 2 Reactor Pressure Vessel2N2G Recirculation Inlet Nozzle-
To-Safe End Weld Full Structural Weld Overlay Crack Growth Calculations and Stress Analysis
Spring 2011 Outage", Structural Integrety Associates Inc.
http://www.ewp.rpi.edu/hartford/~wuy8/EP/other/References/
Ref5ML111880660.pdf
[2] Hans-Werner Sinn, "The Green Paradox", MIT Press, 2012, ISBN: 9780262016681
http://www.hanswernersinn.de/en/topics/GreenParadox
[3] R. Daud1, M.S. Abdul Majid1, M. Afendi1, A.K. Ariffin, S. Abdullah, " INVESTIGATION OF ELAS-
TIC STRESS SHIELDING DAMAGE INTERACTION BASED ON FITNESS FOR SERVICE (FFS)
CODES ", International Conference on Mechanical Engineering Research (ICMER2013), 1-3
July 2013, Paper ID: P286
https://afendirojan.files.wordpress.com/2010/04/p286.pdf
[4] Broek, David, "Elementary engineering fracture mechanics", Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986,
ISBN 90-247-2580-1.
[5] P.J.G. Schreurs,"Fracture Mechanics", course notes 4A780, TUEindhoven, 2012

www.mate.tue.nl/~piet/edu/frm/pdf/frmsyl1213.pdf
[6] David Roylance, "Introduction to Fracture Mechanics", Department of Materials Science and
Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2001.
http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/materials-science-and-engineering/3-11-
mechanics-of-materials-fall-1999/modules/frac.pdf
[7] M. Patricio, Robert M.M. Mattheij, "Crack Propagation Analysis"
www.win.tue.nl/analysis/reports/rana07-23.pdf
[8] Ruslizam Daud, Ahmad Kamal Ariffin, Shahrum Abdullah and Al Emran Ismail, "Interacting
Cracks Analysis Using Finite Element Method", chapter 13 in "Applied Fracture Mechanics",
edited by Alexander Belov, ISBN 978-953-51-0897-9, 392 pages, Publisher: InTech, Chapters
published December 12, 2012 under CC BY 3.0 license
http://www.intechopen.com/books/applied-fracture-mechanics
[9] Evy De Bruycker, Séverine De Vroey, Staf Huysmans and Jacqueline Stubbe, "Phenomenology
of Hydrogen Flaking in Nuclear Reactor Pressure Vessels", DOI 10.3139/120.110580, Materials
Testing, 56 (2014) 6, Carl Hanser Verlag GmbH & Co. KG, ISSN 0025-5300
[10] Zhiye Chen, "Quality of as-cast ingots with extreme large shapes", Doctoral Thesis, Fakutät für
Georessourcen und Materialtechnik der Rheinisch-Westfälische Technische Hochschule Aachen,
December 9, 2014

[11] E.E. Fletcher and A.R. Elsea, "The effects of high-pressure, high-temperature hydrogen on
steel", DMIC Report 202, March 26, 1964.
[12] WENDRA Report: " Activities in WENRA countries following the Recommendation regarding
flaw indications found in Belgian reactors" December 2014
www.wenra.org/media/filer_public/2014/12/26/flaws_in_rpv_feedback_2014-
12-19.pdf
[13] "REPORT ON INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS AND ADVICE REGARDING THE SAFETY CASE Doel
3: Reactor Pressure Vessel Assessment"
[14] "SAFETY CASE REPORT: Doel 3: Reactor Pressure Vessel Assessment", 5/12/2012.
[15] "SAFETY CASE REPORT: ADDENDUM: Doel 3: Reactor Pressure Vessel Assessment",
5/12/2012.
[16] "SAFETY CASE 2015: Doel 3: Reactor Pressure Vessel Assessment"
[17] "REPORT ON INDEPENDENT ANALYSIS AND ADVICE REGARDING THE SAFETY CASE 2015:
Doel 3: Reactor Pressure Vessel Assessment"
[18] "ORNL Evaluation of Electrabel Safety Cases for Doel 3 / Tihange 2: Final Report (R1)",
[19] "Flaw indications in the reactor pressure vessels of Doel 3 and Tihange 2 Final Evaluation
Report 2015", FANC-AFCN, 12-11-2015.
[20] Eric van Walle, "The Detection of Hydrogen Flakes in the Belgian Doel3/Tihange2 Reactor
Pressure Vessels; Overview of Technical Developments to support Restart Justification", NENE
2013, Bled, Slovenia, September 11, 2013
www.djs.si/proc/nene2013/pdf/NENE2013_106.pdf
[21] MIT Nuclear Engineering Course,
http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/nuclear-engineering/22-06-engineering-of-
nuclear-systems-fall-2010/lectures-and-readings/MIT22_06F10_lec06a.pdf
[22] Kunio Hasegawa, Koichi Saito and Katsumasa Miyzaki, "Alignment Rule for Non-Aligned Flaws
for Fitness-for-Service Evaluations Based on LEFM", Journal of Pressure Vessel Technology, Vol
131/041403-1, August 2009.

[23] Ali Abbaszadeh Bidokhti and Amir Reza Shahani, "Interaction Analysis of Non-aligned Cracks
Using Extended Finite Element Method", Latin American Journal of Solids and Structures, Au-
gust 3, 2015,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1590/1679-78251664
[24] V. Lacroix, P. Dulieu and D. Coupet, "Alternative characterization rules for quasi-laminar flaws",
Proc. of the ASME 2014 Pressure Vessels and Piping Conference, PVP2014, July 20-24,2014,
Anaheim, California, USA, papernr. PVP2014-28200
[25] V. Lacroix, P. Dulieu and A. S. Bogeart, "Alternative Characterization Rules for Quasi-laminar
Flaws Based on 3D X–FEM Calculations", Proc. of the ASME 2015 Pressure Vessels and Piping
Conference, Boston, MA, July, 2015, PVP2015-45792
[26] Nuclear Code Case N-848, "Alternative characterization rules for quasi-laminar flaws", ASME
BPVC.CC.NC.S2-2015, approved June 23, 2015, available on the "cstools.asme.org"–website,
"Working Group on Flaw Evaluation (SGES) (SC XI)", Code Cases, N848
[27] HASEGAWA K., STRNADEL B., LACROIX V., "Introduction and definition of laminar flaws pro-
vided by flaw evaluation code", Metal2015, Jun 3rd - 5th 2015, Brno, Czech Republic, EU

9 Communication with FANC.
The critical reflections have been discussed with the FANC experts. Prior to the meeting on Januri
26, 2017, FANC has sent a note which is presented directly below. During the meeting the hydrogen
balance has been the main discussion point. Although saturation of hydrogen cannot occur during
the cooling after production of the shell, some concentration of hydrogen in the crack sensitive areas
should occur. After the meeting, an additional calculation has been carried out to obtain an estimate
of the possible hydrogen concentration in the crack sensitive areas with the data available. It will
appear that the hydrogen concentration gradient over the shell wall is insignificant. This calculation
has been communicated with the FANC also. Finally, a set of questions has been sent to the FANC
in order to get more accurate data, however, the FANC refuses a reply to these questions. As result,
the FANC will not consider our critical reflections nor take any action to let investigate further the
cause of the flakes in the reactor shells more profoundly.
Below follows the communication with FANC:
Answer from FANC to the critical reflections Doel3 and Tihange2 prior to the meeting
of January 26, 2017.
Issue 1: Hydrogen as cause of the flaws

When discussing hydrogen flaking as the most likely cause of the indications detected in the Doel 3
and Tihange 2 reactor pressure vessels, the Safety Cases of Doel 3 and Tihange 2 (version dated 5
December 2012) mention that ”The measured hydrogen level in the liquid metal of around 1.5 ppm,
could be above the threshold for hydrogen flaking, since the sulphur level is relatively low. AREVA
recommends a conservative maximum allowed hydrogen content of 0.8 ppm.”
From this information, the authors of [1] deduce that an amount of 61 ml/dm3 of H2 is set free
during the cooling of the material. After some calculations, and by assuming that there is no sig-
nificant diffusion of hydrogen coming from the rest of the base metal towards the high flaw density
areas, the authors of [1] conclude that hydrogen flaking cannot be the only cause of the flaws, and
that another cause has resulted in flaking or that the flaws have been growing during time.
The reasoning used to conclude this is misleading, mainly because the two following assumptions
are not correct:
• an amount of 61 ml of H2 is set free: to our understanding, the authors of [1] make a confusion
between the concept of hydrogen solubility in steel and the concept of the hydrogen content
threshold to avoid hydrogen flaking;
• there is no significant diffusion of hydrogen coming from the rest of the base metal towards
the high flaw density areas: hydrogen diffusion is on the contrary at the heart of the flaking
formation.
More information is given below, especially to understand how hydrogen flakes develop.

As developed below, hydrogen flakes appear during the fabrication of heavy forgings, when these
have a mean hydrogen content which exceeds some acceptable critical value or threshold. Different
values can be found in the literature (mainly because it is dependent of the content of other chemical
species, such as Sulphur), but typically, for modern clean steels, this threshold is considered to be
about 0.8 ppm. This means that when the mean hydrogen content of the forging is below this
threshold, hydrogen flakes will most probably not develop. On the other hand, when the hydrogen
content is above this threshold, there is a high risk of hydrogen flaking in the forging. When such
flakes develop, they generally appear in large quantities, even when the hydrogen content is only
about 1.5 ppm. This is because the amount of hydrogen that will participate in this phenomenon is
not equal to the difference between the mean hydrogen content of the ingot and the threshold of
0.8 ppm, as supposed by the authors of [1], and the reason is explained below.
The amount of hydrogen that can be contained in the steel is characterized by its solubility (which is
a different concept from the threshold of 0.8 ppm). This solubility expresses the maximum amount
of (atomic) hydrogen which can be dissolved into the material. As illustrated by Figure 1, the
solubility of (atomic) hydrogen is much higher in liquid steel than in the solid metal. Furthermore,
the solubility in the solid steel depends on the phase: the hydrogen solubility in the γ-phase is higher
than in the α-phase. At room temperatures, the hydrogen solubility is much smaller than 0.8 ppm.
Figure 1: Temperature dependence of hydrogen solubility in iron
The solidification of the large castings is a complex metallurgical process and the resulting ingot
is characterized by several particular regions, differentiated by their chemical composition. When
liquid steel locally solidifies, for solubility reasons, alloying elements (solute) are rejected in the
surrounding liquid, which become enriched in those elements. Thus, the first region to solidify in an

ingot is poor in solute (negative segregation) and the last region to solidify is rich in solute (positive
segregation). Local areas of highly solute-rich liquid can also form small channels rising to the top of
the ingot and are termed A-segregates of ghost lines after their solidification. During solidification of
the casting, hydrogen segregates to the surrounding liquid areas due to the difference in hydrogen
solubility between the liquid steel and the solid steel. However, after the solidification, when the in-
got is maintained at the high temperature at which the forging will be performed, the steel structure
is austenitic (γ-phase). After forging, the forged component is cooled down but the resulting trans-
formation from the γ-phase to the α-phase is not uniform in the whole volume of the component.
Due to their higher enrichment in alloying elements, the segregated areas have a lower transfor-
mation temperature, which means that there is a time-lag between the transformation to ferrite
of the unsegregated areas and that of the segregated areas. Unsegregated regions are first trans-
formed to ferrite and due to the lower hydrogen solubility in α-phase, the hydrogen in the (ferritic)
unsegregated regions diffuses to the (austenitic) segregated regions where it accumulates. When
the segregated regions finally transform to ferrite, they become supersaturated in hydrogen, which
precipitates in molecular form at trapping sites such as inclusions, grain boundaries and microvoids,
building up an internal pressure. The ghost lines that are the most enriched areas are the last to
transform to α-phase. So, the precipitation of molecular hydrogen occurs preferentially at the trap-
ping sites in the ghost lines and in particular at the MnS inclusions. It is generally accepted that the
internal H2 pressure at the trapping sites is not sufficient to cause micro-cracks (flakes). Additional
stresses such as transformation stresses, local stress concentrations around defects (inclusions) and
deformation stresses during forging are believed to promote flaking. Moreover, another parameter
promoting the occurrence of flaking is a cracking-sensitive microstructure. With regard to that, the
ghost lines have a high content in alloying elements (e.g., C, Mn, P, Mo) that are quenching elements
and are therefore more sensitive to quenching, which promotes the formation of a martensitic struc-
ture which, under untempered condition, has a brittle nature. For all those reasons, when flaking is
present in a forging, the flakes are located preferentially in the ghost lines.
Calculations to estimate the final dimension of the flakes and the hydrogen pressure needed to
form these cracks are very difficult, since they should take into account dynamical effects due to
the cracking itself as well as deformation stresses due to the forging process (as it is known that
these latter play an important role in the hydrogen flaking mechanism). The results obtained by the
simulations made in [1] and which did not take into account these effects are thus questionable.
Finally, we can convince ourselves that hydrogen flakes can form in large quantities, even if the
measured hydrogen level seems quite small. Indeed, the VB395, which has not been used in service,
had a relatively similar measured hydrogen level and destructive testing showed that it contained
large quantities of hydrogen flakes having similar dimensions as the ones lying in the Doel 3 and
Tihange 2 reactor pressure vessels (RPV).
Issue 2: The absence of a consolidated theory for material with a high density of cracks
It is known that the driving force acting on a given crack (stress intensity factor) can be significantly
affected by the presence of one or more cracks in the close neighbourhood. Depending on the rel-
ative position and orientation of the neighbouring cracks, this interaction effect can either increase
or decrease the stress intensity factor. When assessing the fracture strength of structures affected
by multiple cracks, the classical procedure used by the fitness- for-service Codes for avoiding the

calculation of the interaction effect between neighbouring cracks is to replace the closely-spaced in-
teracting flaws by one single larger flaw that envelopes those flaws. Such a procedure is acceptable
subject to the condition that the fracture potential of each interacting flaw is conservatively assessed
by the fracture potential of the larger enveloping flaw. Otherwise stated, the stress intensity factor
of the enveloping flaw shall be larger than the stress intensity factor of each individual flaw taking
into account the interaction effect. The usual practice is to define interaction criteria or proximity
rules that are used to determine which flaws are not to be assessed separately as isolated flaws but
are to be merged.
The damage of the Doel 3 and Tihange 2 RPV core shells is characterized by a high number of
closely-spaced flaw indications. Due to the presence of multiple closely-spaced flaws, the local
stress field in the zone containing the flaws may be significantly affected. As the stress intensity
factors are governed by the stresses in the vicinity of the cracks, the perturbation to the local stress
field is the underlying cause of the interaction effect. An adequate and conservative assessment of
the interaction effect between multiple flaws is therefore a key step in the evaluation of the fracture
behaviour of the RPV core shells.
The definition of the proximity rules using 3D flaw calculations is based, as mentioned by [1], on
the results of a research work performed by K. Hasegawa showing that two non-aligned thru-wall
cracks in a flat plate will connect to each other once the brittle fracture is initiated at the condition
that the interaction factor is greater than 1.06. The interaction factor quantifies the increase of the
stress intensity factor for a flaw due to the interaction with another flaw. While recognizing that
those results have provided the technical basis for the definition of the revised grouping criteria of
Section XI of the ASME B&PV Code, Bel V remained reluctant to the basic idea of requiring grouping
of two flaws when coalescence of these two flaws is expected in the brittle fracture process. To
Bel V understanding, the objective of calculating the stress intensity factor and comparing it to the
fracture toughness is to prevent the crack initiation. An accurate estimate of the value of the stress
intensity factor is therefore required. Due to the interaction effect, calculating the stress intensity
factor of a crack as an isolated crack while being in the neighbourhood of other cracks may be non-
conservative. For practical purpose however, it may be found necessary to define a threshold below
which the interaction effect should not be considered in fracture assessment. The threshold of the
interaction factor should not be too low to account for the accuracy in the evaluation of the stress
intensity factor but also not too high. A threshold value of 1.06 for the interaction factor appeared
acceptable to Bel V.
One of the main concerns raised by Bel V in his evaluation of the revised proximity rules was
the assumption made by Electrabel that the interaction between two neighbouring flaws was not
affected by the presence of other flaws in the close neighbourhood. By doing so, Electrabel assumed
that the interaction between two neighbouring flaws in a cluster was not affected by the presence of
the other flaws in the cluster. Otherwise stated, Electrabel assumed that the local stress field around
two neighbouring flaws in a cluster was not affected by the other flaws in the cluster. A potential
consequence of taking into account the impact of other flaws in the neighbourhood would be the
enlargement of the interaction domain, the latter being defined as the limiting distances between
two flaws for which interaction has to be considered. Bel V recognized that the boundaries of the
interaction domain for two flaws had been enlarged by 20% to define the proximity rules but he

wondered whether that arbitrary enlargement was sufficient to cover the potential enlargement of
the interaction domain when other flaws in the close neighbourhood of the two analysed flaws were
considered.
Electrabel and Bel V agreed that an acceptable answer to that concern was to show by using multi-
flaw 3D analyses of typical flaw configurations from the Doel 3 RPV lower core shell that the en-
largement by 20% was actually not necessary. In other words, in regions affected by closely-spaced
flaws, some groups of flaws defined by using the proposed proximity rules are expected to contain
more flaws than the groups that would be defined by using proximity rules without the 20% en-
largement. For those groups, the enlargement could be considered as not necessary if the maximum
equivalent stress intensity factor Keq in the group defined using the proposed proximity rules was
not significantly higher than the maximum equivalent intensity factor Keq in the group defined with-
out 20% enlargement. Otherwise stated, the consideration of additional neighbouring flaws did not
increase significantly the maximum equivalent intensity factor Keq . Two groups of flaws belonging
to the Doel 3 lower core shell were considered as typical flaws for illustrating the non-necessity of
enlarging by 20% the interaction domain. When using the proposed proximity rules, the first group
contained 3 flaws and the second group contained 9 flaws. When using proximity rules without en-
largement of the interaction domain by 20%, the number of flaws in those groups was reduced to 2
and 5 flaws respectively. However, it was found that the value of the maximum equivalent intensity
factor Keq was not significantly changed. Adding one flaw in the first group increased the maximum
equivalent intensity factor Keq by 0.01% and in the second group, adding 4 flaws increased the
maximum equivalent intensity factor Keq by 0.34%.
Bel V concluded that for the flaw configurations in the Doel 3 and Tihange 2 RPVs, the interaction
between two neighbouring flaws was not significantly affected by the presence of other flaws in the
close neighbourhood.
It should be highlighted that if the grouping methodology which led to Code Case N-848 was indeed
used in the Safety Case of 2012 and constituted an important part of the structural integrity demon-
stration, this was not the case for the Safety Case of 2015. In particular, the grouping methodology
of Code Case N-848 is based on 2D Finite Elements calculations, whereas the grouping methodology
of the 2015 Safety Case is based on 3D calculations. Moreover, the critical groups of flaws as well
as a sample of appropriately selected other groups have been specifically studied in refined analyses
in which the flaws were not grouped, which means that the grouping step has not the importance
given by [1].
Note finally that the UT inspection of the RPV core shells with straight beam transducers does
not allow to identify any hypothetical radial connection between flakes located at slightly different
depths (called branched flaws in [1]). In order to reject that assumption, the data recorded by
the eight 45o transducers installed on the UT inspection tool were analysed in order to detect any
such connections. Bel V acknowledged that no radial connections between flakes were detected.
Destructive examinations of the VB395 have confirmed the absence of such radial connections even
in high flaw density regions.
Minor issues
1. Temperature gradient over the vessel wall in the flaw zone. For circumferential or axial

planar flaws that are perpendicular to the RPV surface, it may be assumed without any signifi-
cant loss of accuracy in the calculation that the temperature distribution is not affected by the
presence of the flaws. For quasi-laminar flaws such as the flakes, their orientation with respect
to the (radial) heat flux makes that the same conclusion might be invalid. Indeed, depending
on their thermal resistance, the quasi-laminar flaws may act as thermal barriers. As a result,
the temperature distribution in the wall thickness may depart from the normal one (i.e., with-
out flaw) and the temperature gradient in the vicinity of the flaws may potentially be higher.
This concern may be of importance for the 20mm thick zone beneath the cladding where
the thermal stresses due to the small break loss of coolant accident (small LOCA) contribute
significantly to the stress intensity factor.
Postulating the thermal conductance of the flakes equal to the thermal conductance of the
sound material is an idealization of the actual physical condition because the thermal contact
resistance between the contacting surfaces of the flakes should at least be considered. In order
to better substantiate the effect of the flakes on the thermal distribution, Bel V asked Electra-
bel in the frame of the Safety Case to investigate the consequences of the other bounding
assumption, i.e., no heat transfer thru the flakes, on the flaw assessment.
As an answer to the Bel V request, Electrabel provided the results of the finite-element MORFEO-
CRACK analysis of a 2D model of a RPV sector. The model includes two closely-spaced flaws
located close to the cladding. In addition to the pressure, the boundary conditions of the
model include the small-break LOCA temperature transient at the inner surface. The model
considers no heat transfer through the flakes by modelling the flakes with a small opening
in the mesh. In order to assess the impact of the assumption of no-heat transfer through the
flakes, a second analysis is performed on the same model, but assuming perfect heat transfer
through the flakes. The results given by Electrabel are those corresponding to the time in
the transient for which the margin to the acceptance criterion is the lowest. When compared
to the case of perfect heat transfer through the flakes, the maximum stress intensity factor
at the front of the flaws (assumed to have a tilt angle of 8o ) is increased by about 10%. As
expected, that increase is due to the local increase of the thermal gradient at the crack front
and between the flaws. However, the impact on the flaw assessment is lower. Indeed, as the
flaws act as thermal barriers, the temperature at the crack front is slightly increased and, as a
result thereof, the material fracture toughness is slightly increased also.
Recognizing (i) that the 2D model overestimates somewhat the perturbation to the tempera-
ture field and (ii) that, as a result at least of the radiation heat transfer, the actual heat transfer
through the flakes has definitely a non-null value even if the flakes are open, Bel V concludes
that the potential underestimation of the crack driving force due to the lower heat transfer
through the flakes should have a low impact of the flaw assessment.
2. Boundary conditions for flaw simulation in shell segment Due to the quasi-laminar nature
of the flakes, it is not expected that they will have a significant impact on the hoop stresses.
Also, it has been shown that for the load cases to be considered, even with this high flaw
density, the stress field is significantly affected only in the very close neighbourhood of each
flake. On a macroscopic scale flakes have no influence on the stress field, see also answer to
issue 2.

3. Vibration levels are unknown Vibration levels are insignificant.
4. Opinion of Westinghouse AREVA, which has bought the Westinghouse license and which is
also a nuclear power plant designer, has been strongly involved in the assessment. Moreover,
as an answer to the return of experience of Doel 3 and Tihange 2, Westinghouse participated
in the elaboration of [2], which is a bounding safety assessment for a vessel postulated to
have a large number of quasi-laminar indications in the beltline shell forgings. The bounding
assessment included a Probabilistic Fracture Mechanic analysis of the U.S. PWR with highest
mean reference temperature in a beltline ring forging at the end of a sixty-year license. This
study determined that the incremental risk would be a factor of 10 below the risk criteria set
by the USNRC. Therefore, the potential for vessel failure was considered acceptably low. This
conclusion has been assessed and endorsed by the USNRC [3].
Minor correction In §1: the primary water is circulated by pumps through the steam generators
with a volume flow of 21.000 m3/h, instead of 21 m3/h.
References
[1] ”Critical reflection about the integrity of the reactor vessels of the Doel 3 and Tihange 2 nuclear
power plants”, René Boonen and Jan Peirs, 8 December 2016
[2] ”Materials Reliability Program: Evaluation of the reactor vessel beltline shell forgings of operat-
ing U.S. PWRs for quasi-laminar indications (MRP-367)”, October 2013
[3] ”Technical assessment of potential quasi-laminar indications in reactor pressure vessel forgings”,
USNRC, 8 September 2015, ADAMS ML15282A218
Estimation of the hydrogen concentration gradient in the cracking sensitive areas.
In the FANC answer (see page 30), a concentration of hydrogen should occur towards the crack
sensitive zones. The reasoning in the FANC answer follow the viewpoint that the hydrogen migrates
as if it would be saturated. However, the steel is far from saturated as the hydrogen was largely
removed by a vacuum treatment of the molten steel. Consequently, such migrations of hydrogen
did not take place as described in the FANC answer. Even in the case that the hydrogen migrates
in the same manner as if it would be saturated, the hydrogen concentration gradient over the shell
wall thickness as consequence of the temperature gradient during cooling of the ingot remains
insignificant. This will now be demonstrated by the authors.
The ingots were poured using a state-of-the-art vacuum technique, to remove the hydrogen from the
molten steel. Before casting the ingot from which the lower core shell of the Doel3 reactor has been
manufactured, the molten steel has been sampled and the hydrogen content was measured [14]
p43. After cooling down the ingot in a controlled manner, samples of the metal are taken and the
hydrogen content was measured again. The amount of hydrogen present in the steel of the Doel3
lower core shell was for all measurements 1.5 ppm [14] p44.
During cooling of the ingot, impurities and alloying elements segregates into so called ghost lines
which are sensitive to hydrogen cracking [9]. As solidification progresses from the outside wall

Figure 19: Solubility of hydrogen in steel in terms of temperature and pressure [11]
inwards, the internal part of the ingot will be enriched with impurities and alloying elements, while
the outside part will be poor in alloying elements, due to the higher solubility of the alloying ele-
ments in the liquid phase. During forging, the parts of the ingot with the high segregation areas
have been removed by cutting off the bottom and the top from the ingot and in a next step the
centre part of the ingot which also contain high segregation areas has been pierced out. From the
resulting hollow cylinder, the reactor vessel shell has been forged. After forging and cooling until
room temperature, the inner and the outer wall will be machined by cutting away about 40 mm at
each side on a lathe.
Available amount of hydrogen in case of a concentration gradient. As temperature gradients
during cooling of the ingot occur, some gradient of hydrogen concentration will appear. As data
lacks for a profound analysis, a linearised model will be used. The model will be developed such
that the gradient of hydrogen will be "a bad case", i.e. a refined analysis will probably result in a
lower hydrogen concentration gradient.
To estimate the hydrogen concentration gradient, four steps have to be followed. The first step
is to localize the future shell in the ingot. Second, the temperature drop over the ingot during

cooling at the time point when the hydrogen concentration is maximum in the future shell has to be
estimated. Third, the hydrogen concentration in terms of temperature has to be estimated. At last,
the hydrogen concentration in the cracked zone and in the non-cracked zone has to be estimated.
The result will be that a significant hydrogen concentration has not occurred.
Figure 20: Position of the metal of the future shell inside the ingot.
1. Localization of the future shell in the ingot. The weight of the ingot is 110 tons and the result-
ing shell about 50 tons ([15]p17). The steps to manufature the shell are illustrated in paper [9].
During forging, the top and the bottom has been cut off, leaving a cylinder of 104 tons. Then the
cylinder is compressed until its height is 2.5 m and the inner cylinder with 820 mm diameter has
been pierced out, leaving a hollow cylinder of 94 tons. After forging, the resulting cylinder will be
machined until it leaves a shell of 50 tons. By following back all these manufacturing steps, the
position of the metal which will form the future shell is presented in figure 20. The dotted line
represents the future shell in the ingot. Zone A will be the flaked zone, zone B will be free of flakes.
All the other material will be removed during the manufacturing process.
2. Temperature drop over the ingot during cooling. During cooling, hydrogen will diffuse from
the lower temperature zone towards the melt. The process starts with a uniform melt with 1.5 ppm
hydrogen. The solidification starts at the ingot wall. The hydrogen concentration increases in the
future shell by hydrogen coming from the outer part of the ingot. After some time, solidification
has been progressed and reaches the radius which will become the inner wall of the future shell. At
that time point, the hydrogen concentration will be maximum. As solidification further progresses,
hydrogen will be diffused from the future shell further inward and the hydrogen concentration
decreases. During forging, the core enriched with hydrogen will be pierced out. The maximum
hydrogen concentration will be taken as the hydrogen concentration responsible for cracking.
An estimate of the temperature gradient at the time point the melt core has reached the inner wall
radius has been carried out. An ingot of 100 tons needs 24 hours to solidify ([10]p13). During
that time, it has to dissipate the heat of fusion and a part of the heat capacity of the solid ingot.

A temperature difference between ingot wall and molten core of about 500 o C is estimated to let
solidify the melt in 24 hours. Also a FEM simulation with an isolated ingot wall leads to a similar
temperature drop.
3. Hydrogen concentration in terms of temperature. As data for subsaturated hydrogen diffusion
are not available, the hydrogen concentration is estimated from the solubility curve presented in
figure 19. This should be a worst case assumption. The largest drop in solubility of hydrogen
in solid material is taken for a temperature difference of 500 o C on the solubility curve of 1 atm
presented in figure 19. Then, the same ratio of hydrogen concentration on the solubility curve is
used for the hydrogen concentration in the subsaturated steel. The largest drop in solubility occurs
on the curve between 900 o C and 1400 o C, including the α-γ-transformation, is from 8 ppm to 3 ppm,
so a concentration ratio of 8/3 is used to calculate the hydrogen concentration gradient between
the outer ingot wall and the inner radius of of the future shell.
4. Hydrogen concentration in the cracked zone and in the non-cracked zone. The total amount
of hydrogen present in the ingot with a level of 1.5 ppm is redistributed over the ingot, such that the
total amount of hydrogen is conserved. The hydrogen concentration in the solidified part follows
the temperature gradient and remains constant in the liquid part. A linear function is used to
approximate the hydrogen concentration in terms of the radius for the solidified part of the ingot.
2.2
liquid solid
2
hydrogen concentration (ppm)
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
0.8
0.6
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1 1.2
ingot radius (m)
Figure 21: Hydrogen concentration in terms of ingot radius using a linearized model.
The result is presented in figure 21. At the outer wall, the hydrogen concentration has decreased
until 0.75 ppm. At the radius which will become the inner wall of the future shell, the hydrogen
concentration has increased until 2 ppm. The mean hydrogen concentration drops from 1.5 ppm to
1.31 ppm in the metal of the future shell (Zone A plus zone B in figure 20) as the central part of
the ingot which is the most enriched with hydrogen will be machined out during manufacturing.
The mean hydrogen concentration in the part of the ingot which will become zone A in figure 20

wherein all the hydrogen flakes are found amounts 1.61 ppm. The mean hydrogen concentration in
the part of the ingot which will become zone B in figure 20 wherein no hydrogen flakes are found
amounts 1.0 ppm. By using a more refined analysis, the gradient will be probably smaller, but data
lacks for such an analysis.
Total dissolved available H2 volume

concentration H2 volume for cracking
(ppm) (Nml /dm3 ) (Nml /dm3 )
threshold concentration 0.8 70 –
outer shell concentration 1.0 87 17
mean total shell concentration 1.31 114 44
uniform concentration 1.5 131 61
inner shell concentration 1.61 141 71
Table 3: Volume of normal cm3 H2 in 1 dm3 steel for different concentrations in the shell.
Table 3 presents the amounts of hydrogen in the steel for different hydrogen concentrations in the
different cases. The maximum concentration of hydrogen amounts 1.61ppm, which is slightly higher
than the 1.5 ppm in the uniform case.
This implies that significant enrichment of hydrogen in the inner 100 mm of the shell did not occur.
The conclusion remains that hydrogen flaking cannot be the only cause of the flaws, but that another
cause has resulted in flaking or that the flaws have been growing during time.
Communication of the list of questions to FANC. (e-mail February 16, 2017)
First, I want to thank you for the opportunity to have a meeting with the FANC experts on January
26. The information you provided me was very useful. The most important point we have discussed
was the hydrogen balance and the amount of hydrogen which could be present in the ingot. As far
as I understood from your side, the process of concentration of hydrogen in the segregated zones
was as follows: In the melt, hydrogen was dissolved. After pouring the ingot, the ingot starts to
cool down. First, the outside of the ingot solidifies and impurities and alloy elements are diffusing
to the molten part inside the ingot. Once the inside part of the ingot solidifies, these impurities and
alloy elements segregate in segregation zones where they form ghost lines, which are sensitive to
hydrogen cracking. Also the hydrogen diffuses to the high temperature zones, where the hydrogen
segregates as the ingot further cools down, and in the ghost line areas, they cause hydrogen flaking.
My viewpoint is that there is not sufficient hydrogen dissolved in the melt to cause such high density
of flakes, a fraction of 10So, I’m still puzzled and I’m looking for answers of the following questions:
1. The melt contains 1.5ppm H according to a measurement of KRUPP, and samples from the
solidified ingot also contain 1.5ppm H. The level of H-concentration was very low compared
to the solubility of H in the steel. What could be the maximum concentration of H in the
centre of the ingot after cooling down to room temperature?

2. At which temperature did the flaking occur? As far as I could reconstruct, the temperature
should be below 400 o C. At this temperature, 1.5ppm is the saturation point. However, the
p
material is very though above 100 o C. The fracture toughness remains at 195MPa/ m until
the temperature drops below 100 o C. Then the fracture toughness rapidly decreases until
p
40MPa/ m at room temperature. So I believe that flaking occurs below 100 o C when the
material is more brittle. Is this reasoning correct?
3. You mention that residual stresses resulting from the forging process influence the cracking
process. Any idea how large these stresses could be? Are these stresses mainly thermal stresses
due to the cooling? Is it necessary to take these stresses into account when evaluating the
acceptability of the flaws with the ASME code?
4. You mention the existence of an UT-report of the shell at delivery. Is it possible to see this
report?
5. Walter Bogaerts mentions in his paper that during operation of the reactor hydrogen is gen-
erated and that hydrogen dissolves into the vessel steel. Are there hydrogen solubility curves
available on which the hydrogen solubility at 150 atm and 300 o C can be determined?
6. In the paper of Evy De Bruycker "Phenomenology of Hydrogen Flaking in Nuclear Reactor

Pressure Vessels" which we have discussed, on page 4, it is mentioned that a martensite trans-
formation takes place at 200 o C. Is this valid for the steel of the reactor shell? Is this a
reversible transformation? I ask this because this temperature is within the operating temper-
ature of the reactor.
7. Are the data from the UT-measurements of 2016 of DOEL3 available? (number of flakes, size
distribution etc..., such as presented in the previous reports of ENGIE)
I realize these are a lot of questions, and it will take some effort to answer them.
I’m looking forward to these answers. It would be a great help.
FANC answer to the list of questions (e-mail March 9, 2017)
FANC greatly appreciates your strong interest in the highly technical issue of the flaw indications in
the reactor pressure vessels of Doel 3 and Tihange 2. These last months, FANC took carefully note
of your reflections on this issue, summarized in your report. The primary mission of the FANC is to
ensure the safety of the population and the environment. In this framework, FANC and Bel V have
thoroughly assessed from 2012 to 2015 the safety cases introduced by Electrabel and all studies and
documents supporting them in order to justify the structural integrity of the two reactor pressure
vessels. Based on our assessment and supported by the peer review by several groups of independent
international experts, FANC decided to allow the restart of the two reactors in November 2015. As
a Safety Authority, it is also our duty to continuously assess any new insights or arguments on
safety topics which could challenge our previous positions or decisions. After thorough analysis
of your arguments and the discussions you had with our experts on January 26, FANC however

concludes that none of your reflections, questions and/or arguments are challenging the position of
the Belgian Safety Authority on the RPV issue. You have not convinced us that your reflections show
any weakness in the safety demonstration of the structural integrity of the two reactor vessels. As
stated above, the role of the FANC is to ensure the protection of the population and the environment,
among others by continuously assessing the safety of the nuclear reactors. Our primary mission is
not to answer in detail all scientific or technical questions raised by members of the public. Of course,
in the framework of our duty to inform the population and to be transparent on this very sensitive
issue, FANC already made available an important amount of information and technical details on
the FANC website. However this is only a tiny fraction, high level, of the technical investigations
performed by the licensee on this issue. We regret that the documents made available are not
enough to satisfy your scientific curiosity. In conclusion FANC thanks your for your interest on the
RPV issue and for your reflections but will not follow up on your remaining questions.

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Critical reflections about the integrity of

the reactor vessels of the Doel 3 and

R.Boonen & J.Peirs May 18, 2017

R.Boonen & J.Peirs May 18, 2017

p3: Construction of a nuclear reactor vessel.

p4: Main points of criticism on the Electrabel safety cases

p6: Identification of the flaws in the reactor vessel.

p12: Hydrogen as cause of metal cracking.

p17: Fracture mechanics.

p18: Treatment of flaws by Electrabel.

p23: Minor issues.

p28: Communication with FANC.

1 Construction of a nuclear reactor vessel.

R.Boonen & J.Peirs May 18, 2017

Figure 1: Principle of a nuclear reactor [21].

2 Main points of criticism on the Electrabel safety cases

R.Boonen & J.Peirs May 18, 2017

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3 Identification of the flaws in the reactor vessel

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4 Hydrogen as cause of metal cracking.

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Total dissolved available H2 volume

Table 1: Volume of normal cm3 H2 in 1 dm3 steel

R.Boonen & J.Peirs May 18, 2017

Figure 11: Axisymmetric 2D-FEM model of a crack.

R.Boonen & J.Peirs May 18, 2017

crack ceiling displacement (µm)

R.Boonen & J.Peirs May 18, 2017

Size Number Content H2 pressure H2 Volume H2 Total Volume

was available for flaw generation.

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6 Treatment of flaws by Electrabel

Figure 14: Illustration of flaw grouping [14] p74.

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the vessel walls, branched flaws are present.

7 Chronology of the events leading to the nuclear code case N-848

R.Boonen & J.Peirs May 18, 2017

should allow the reader to find the appropriate information rapidly.

R.Boonen & J.Peirs May 18, 2017

6. November 12, 2015:

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3. Vibration levels are unknown.

4. Opinion of Westinghouse. The reactor is designed by Westinghouse, however the author

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[5] P.J.G. Schreurs,"Fracture Mechanics", course notes 4A780, TUEindhoven, 2012

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9 Communication with FANC.

Issue 1: Hydrogen as cause of the flaws

R.Boonen & J.Peirs May 18, 2017

Figure 1: Temperature dependence of hydrogen solubility in iron

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