SECOND DIVISION, A.C. No. 7250 [Formerly CBD Case No.

05-1448], April
20, 2015, ATTY. RICARDO M. ESPINA, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. JESUS
G. CHAVEZ, RESPONDENT.
The Facts:
Atty. Ricardo filed a complaint for ejectment against Remedios Engiuo before the MTC of Carmen, Agusan del Norte,
who was represented by Atty. Jesus G. Chavez, then employed by the Public Attorneys Office. In the course of the
trial, Ricardo wrote the Department of Justice complaining about Jesus’ conduct during the pendency of the case, such
as his writing a transmittal letter to the Provincial Prosecutor recommending the filing of a case for falsification of private
document and use of falsified document against Ricardo, his wife and his parents. The case was eventually dismissed
by the Provincial Prosecutor. The DOJ on the other hand transmitted Ricardo’s letter to the Chief of PAO, who required
Jesus to submit his Comment and for Ricardo to submit his rebuttal. In his rebuttal, Ricardo wrote “Baka kulangpo ng
indoctrination itong si Atty. Chavez sa concept ng Torrens system, i-suspend nyo po muna siya not for the purpose of
penalizing him but for him to be given time to take continuing legal education on Torrens system. “. The Chief PAO
dismissed his complaint. Ricardo hence filed his Complaint for Disbarment against Jesus. The IBP Commissioner
ruled that Jesus’ act of transmitting the complaint for falsification against Ricardo and his parents in connection with
the ejectment case was not an unfair and dishonest means employed by Atty. Chavez., since the complaint contained
conflicting averments thus she concluded that Atty. Chavez was honestly mistaken when he construed the contradictory
allegations in the complaint for ejectment as criminal falsification under the Revised Penal Code. He noted that lawyers
are not liable for honest mistakes. He dismissed the complaint given the dearth of competent evidence on record to
substantiate Atty. Espina’s allegation that the transmission of the complaint for falsification was intended to gain an
advantage in the civil complaint for ejectment. The IBP Board affirmed the findings and recommendation of the IBP
Investigating Commissioner.

The Issue:
1. Whether or not Atty. Chavez should be held administratively liable for endorsing the falsification complaint.
2. Whether or not Atty. Chavez intended to obtain improper advantage in a case or proceeding.

The Ruling:
We affirm the IBP Report and Recommendation.
The complaint is anchored on the alleged violation by Atty. Chavez of Canon 19, Rule 19.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, viz:

Canon 1: A lawyer shall represent his client with zeal within the bounds of law.
Rule 19.01: A lawyer shall employ only fair and honest means to attain the lawful objectives of his client and shall not
present, participate in presenting or threaten to present unfounded criminal charges to obtain an improper advantage
in any case or proceeding.(Underscoring supplied.)

Atty. Espina contends that Atty. Chavez violated the above-quoted provisions when he indispensably participated in
the filing of the falsification complaint against him, his wife and his parents. The falsification case was filed, according
to Atty. Espina, solely for the purpose of gaining an improper advantage and leverage in the ejectment case.⁠1 Atty.
Espina further argues that Atty. Chavez participated in the filing of the baseless criminal complaint by (i) goading Enguio
to file the criminal complaint and (ii) ensuring that the criminal complaint was acted upon by the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor by sending the transmittal letter to the said office under Atty. Chavez’s signature.⁠2
We find Atty. Espina’s position unmeritorious and without basis.
What Rule 19.01 prohibits is the filing or the threat of filing patently frivolous and meritless appeals or clearly groundless
actions for the purpose of gaining improper advantage in any case or proceeding.⁠3
Two elements are indispensable before a lawyer can be deemed to have violated this rule: (i) the filing or threat of filing
a patently frivolous and meritless action or appeal and (ii) the filing or threat of filing the action is intended to gain
improper advantage in any case or proceeding.
Our jurisprudence is replete with cases on these points.

In Pena v. Atty. Aparicio,⁠4 the lawyer sent a demand letter to his client’s employer which contained threats of filing
criminal charges for tax evasion, falsification of documents and cancellation of business license ifthe separation pay
allegedly due to his client was not paid. The lawyer drafted the demand letter in response to the notice to return to work
sent by the employer. We held that Atty. Aparicio did exactly what Canon 19 and its Rules prohibit. The threat to file
the cases against the employer was designed to secure leverage to compel the latter to give in to Atty. Aparicio’s
demands. The letter in this case contained more than just a simple demand to pay. It contained threat to file retaliatory
charges against the complainant which had nothing to do with the claim for separation pay. The letter was obviously
designed to secure leverage to compel the employer to yield to the client’s claims. ⁠5 In Ong v. Atty. Unto,⁠6 we
reprimanded a lawyer when he sent a demand letter which also contained the threat of various charges against the
complainant if the latter failed to comply with the lawyer’s demands. The lawyer, in fact, made good his promise when
the complainant did not heed his warning. The lawyer filed an array of criminal and administrative charges against the
complainant, which charges were irrelevant to his client’s claim. We held in Ong that: It is evident from the records that
he tried to coerce the complainant to comply with his letter-demand by threatening to file various charges against the
latter. When the complainant did not heed his warning, he made good his threat and filed a string of criminal and
administrative cases against the complainant. We find the respondent’s action to be malicious as the cases he instituted
against the complainant did not have any bearing or connection to the cause of his client. ⁠7 In Atty. Briones v. Atty.
Gimenez,⁠8 Atty. Briones charged Atty. Gimenez (a special administrator of an estate) for violating Rule 19.01 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. In this case, the Atty. Gimenez filed a criminal complaint ⁠9 against Atty. Briones
for resisting and seriously disobeying an order of the trial court in an estate settlement proceeding, directing him (Atty.
Briones) to deliver the residue of the estate to the heirs.

We noted that before Atty. Gimenez assisted the heirs in filing the criminal complaint, he
sent demand letters to Atty. Briones to comply with the order to deliver the residue of the
estate to the heirs. When Atty. Briones did not reply to the demand letters, Atty. Gimenez
filed the criminal complaint on behalf of his clients against Atty. Briones for refusing to
obey the lawful order of the court.⁠10

We held that Atty. Gimenez should have first filed the proper motion with the Regional
Trial Court for execution of the order instead of immediately filing the criminal complaint.
We concluded that fair play demands that Atty. Gimenez should have filed the proper
motion with the Regional Trial Court to attain his goal of having the residue of the estate
delivered to his clients, instead of prematurely filing criminal charges against Atty.
Briones.⁠11
It can be gleamed from the above-cited cases that Rule 19.01 is violated only when the criminal complaint filed or
threatened to be filed is patently frivolous, meritless and clearly groundless and is aimed solely at gaining the sole
purpose of improper advantage.
In Pena v. Atty. Aparicio, the demand letter was explicit and blatant in its threat of filing several actions (which included
tax evasion, a matter totally unrelated to the pending labor case) if the employer failed to accede to the demand for
payment of separation pay allegedly due to the employee. It was clearly and obviously done to compel the employer
to grant the demand for separation pay.
Similarly, in Ong v. Atty. Unto, the letter contained threats of criminal prosecution if the complainant did not accede to
the lawyer’s demand. The lawyer subsequently filed totally unrelated and irrelevant criminal and administrative cases
against the complainant when the latter failed to comply with the demand letter. Without doubt, these cases were filed
to force the complainant to give in to the lawyer’s demands.
Finally, in Atty. Briones v. Atty. Gimenez, the criminal complaint was filed after the complainant did not comply with the
demand letter. There was also an available remedy in the civil action which could have given effect to Atty. Gimenez’s
demand without having to file the criminal complaint.
The facts of the present case differed from the above-cited cases. We note that Atty. Espina did not only fail to
substantiate his allegation that Atty. Chavez masterminded the filing of the criminal complaint for falsification; he also
failed to show that the criminal complaint was patently frivolous, meritless and groundless, and that it was filed to gain
improper advantage in favor of his client.
First, the fact that Atty. Chavez endorsed the criminal complaint to the Provincial Prosecutor was, in itself, not contrary
to Rule 19.01.
We point out that Atty. Chavez was then a PAO lawyer. In this capacity, he had the duty to assist clients who could not
afford the services of a private lawyer. His assessment on the merit of the criminal complaint might have been
erroneous but the act of endorsing the affidavit-complaint to the Provincial Prosecutor did not per se violate Rule 19.01.
Moreover, the affidavit-complaint for Falsification was signed and executed by Enguio and not by Atty. Chavez. Atty.
Chavez merely transmitted the affidavit-complaint to the Provincial Prosecutor for the latter’s consideration. We cannot
conclude, solely given these facts and Atty. Espina’s bare assertions, that Enguio was goaded into filing the criminal
complaint.
Second, the criminal complaint was not patently frivolous and groundless. It was not unreasonable for Atty. Chavez to
conclude (albeit incorrectly according to the assessment of the Provincial Prosecutor) that there was a case for violation
of Article 172 of the RPC.
Article 172 in relation to paragraph 4 of Article 171 of the RPC penalizes the making of untruthful statements in a
narration of facts. The basis of Enguio’s affidavit-complaint was the contrary statements in the ejectment complaint on
when Atty. Espina’s parents acquired knowledge of Enguio’s alleged illegal possession of the property.
The body of the ejectment complaint alleged that the plaintiffs discovered Enguio’s illegal possession in November
2003. On the other hand, the letter attached to the complaint explicitly indicated that Enguio has been notified as early
as 1997 that her possession and occupation of the land was illegal. This explains Enguio’s allegation in her affidavit-
complaint that “in order to fashion a case for Ejectment, respondent made an untruthful statement in the narration of
facts.”
As the IBP Commissioner correctly observed, the criminal complaint was not exactly unfounded or wanting in basis.
That it was later dismissed by the Provincial Prosecutor for lack of probable cause is of no consequence. We cannot
expect and require Atty. Chavez (or any lawyer for that matter) to be infallible in his judgment on the merit of every
criminal charge he endorses to the prosecutor. It is only required that the complaint is not patently frivolous and filed
solely to ensure improper advantage.
It is also unwise to characterize every criminal complaint that arose from or is connected with a separate case or
proceeding to be within the coverage of Rule 19.01. The better policy is to balance the prohibition under Rule 19.01
with the equally important right of the State to prosecute criminal offenses. We stress that the key test is whether the
criminal complaint is patently meritless and clearly filed to gain improper advantage.
Unless the criminal complaint is patently frivolous and obviously meant to secure an improper advantage, a lawyer who
files such criminal complaint should not be automatically deemed to have violated Rule 19.01. Otherwise, lawyers who
have a valid cause for filing a criminal action may be compelled not to proceed because of fear of administrative
sanctions.
Finally, unlike in the cases cited above, there is no clear and concrete proof that the falsification complaint was filed to
ensure improper advantage to Enguio.
Other than the fact that the falsification complaint arose from the narration of facts in the ejectment complaint, Atty.
Espina failed to show that the falsification complaint was meant to ensure improper advantage to Enguio. Atty. Espina
merely made this conclusion by inference but his basic premises were not supported by evidence. We cannot presume
that Enguio gained or stood to gain improper advantage to the detriment of Atty. Espina’s parents by the mere filing of
the falsification complaint. After all, both the ejectment and falsification complaints were eventually dismissed.
As a final point, we note with concern the excessive antagonism between Atty. Espina and Atty. Chavez. It appears
that this case is no longer about the alleged violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility but a protracted and
bitter fight between brothers in the legal profession. Both claim that the other party is arrogant and ignorant of the law.
The pleadings contained serious attacks on the professional competence and personal integrity of one another. These
are acts that this Court should not allow to pass without comments.
We take this occasion to remind lawyers of their duties to their professional colleagues. Rule 8.01 of Canon 8 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility is clear: a lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
While the fervor shown by Atty. Espina and Atty. Chavez in defending their clients’ respective claims has been
admirable, we find it unfortunate that they allowed their personal animosity and bruised egos to affect their handling of
these cases.
Although we dismiss the present complaint because of lack of merit, we strongly warn both counsels that any future
infraction of the Code of Professional Responsibility may warrant actual penalty.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we hereby AFFIRM the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and DISMISS the Disbarment/Suspension complaint against ATTY. JESUS G. CHAVEZ. At the same time, we warn
both counsels about their use of intemperate language in their pleadings and in dealing with one another.
SO ORDERED.
BRION, J.:
Carpio, (Chairperson), Del Castillo, Mendoza, and Leonen, JJ., concur.

Mercado vs. Vitriolo

Post under case digests, Legal Ethics at Thursday, March 08, 2012 Posted by Schizophrenic Mind

Facts: Rosa Mercado is seeking for the disbarment of Atty.

Julito Vitriolo as he allegedly maliciously filed a criminal
case for falsification of public documents against her
thereby violating the attoyrney client privilege. It appears
that Vitriolo filed a case against complainant as she
apparently made false entries in the certificate of live birth
of her children. More specifically she allegedly indicated
that she is married to a certain Ferdinand Fernandez when
in fact her real husband is Ruben Mercado. Mercado claims
that by filing the complaint the attorney client privilege has
been violated. Mercado filed a case for Vitriolos disbarment.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the rule on
privileged communication between attorney-client when he
filed the criminal case for falsification

Held: No. The evidence on record fails to substantiate

complainants allegations. Complainant did not even specify
the alleged communication disclosed by the respondents. All
her claims were couched in general terms and lacked
specificity. Indeed the complaint failed to attend the hearings
at the IBP. Without any testimony from the complainant as to
the specific confidential information allegedly divulged by
respondent without her consent, it would be difficult if not
impossible to determine if there was any violation of the rule
on privileged communication. Such information is a crucial
link in establishing a breach of the rule on privileged
communication between attorney and

client. It is not enough to merely assert the attorney client

privilege. The burden of proving that the privilege applies
is placed upon the party asserting the privilege.
 Masmud vs NLRC

The facts of the case are as follows:

On July 9, 2003, Evangelina Masmud’s (Evangelina) husband, the late

Alexander J. Masmud (Alexander), filed a complaint [3] against First Victory
Shipping Services and Angelakos (Hellas) S.A. for non-payment of permanent
disability benefits, medical expenses, sickness allowance, moral and exemplary
damages, and attorney’s fees. Alexander engaged the services of Atty. Rolando B.
Go, Jr. (Atty. Go) as his counsel.

In consideration of Atty. Go’s legal services, Alexander agreed to pay

attorney’s fees on a contingent basis, as follows: twenty percent (20%) of total
monetary claims as settled or paid and an additional ten percent (10%) in case of
appeal. It was likewise agreed that any award of attorney’s fees shall pertain to
respondent’s law firm as compensation.

On November 21, 2003, the Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision granting
the monetary claims of Alexander. The dispositive portion of the decision, as quoted
in the CA Decision, reads:

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, judgment is rendered finding the

[First Victory Shipping Services and Angelakos (Hellas) S.A.] jointly and severally
liable to pay [Alexander’s] total permanent disability benefits in the amount of
US$60,000.00 and his sickness allowance of US$2,348.00, both in Philippine
currency at the prevailing rate of exchange at the time of payment; and to pay
further the amount of P200,000.00 as moral damages, P100,000.00 as exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees equivalent to ten percent (10%) of the total monetary
award.
 [Alexander’s] claim for payment of medical expenses is dismissed for lack
of basis.

SO ORDERED.[4]

Alexander’s employer filed an appeal before the National Labor Relations

Commission (NLRC). During the pendency of the proceedings before the NLRC,
Alexander died. After explaining the terms of the lawyer’s fees to Evangelina, Atty.
Go caused her substitution as complainant. On April 30, 2004, the NLRC rendered
a Decision dismissing the appeal of Alexander’s employer. The employer
subsequently filed a motion for reconsideration. The NLRC denied the same in an
Order dated October 26, 2004.

On appeal before the CA, the decision of the LA was affirmed with
modification. The award of moral and exemplary damages was deleted.[5]
Alexander’s employers filed a petition for certiorari[6] before this Court. On
February 6, 2006, the Court issued a Resolution dismissing the case for lack of merit.

Eventually, the decision of the NLRC became final and executory. Atty. Go
moved for the execution of the NLRC decision, which was later granted by the LA.
The surety bond of the employer was garnished. Upon motion of Atty. Go, the surety
company delivered to the NLRC Cashier, through the NLRC Sheriff, the check
amounting to P3,454,079.20. Thereafter, Atty. Go moved for the release of the said
amount to Evangelina.

On January 10, 2005, the LA directed the NLRC Cashier to release the amount
of P3,454,079.20 to Evangelina. Out of the said amount, Evangelina paid Atty. Go
the sum of P680,000.00.

Dissatisfied, Atty. Go filed a motion to record and enforce the attorney’s lien
alleging that Evangelina reneged on their contingent fee agreement. Evangelina paid
only the amount of P680,000.00, equivalent to 20% of the award as attorney’s fees,
thus, leaving a balance of 10%, plus the award pertaining to the counsel as attorney’s
fees.

In response to the motion filed by Atty. Go, Evangelina filed a comment with
motion to release the amount deposited with the NLRC Cashier. In her comment,
Evangelina manifested that Atty. Go’s claim for attorney’s fees of 40% of the total
monetary award was null and void based on Article 111 of the Labor Code.
 On February 14, 2005, the LA issued an Order[7] granting Atty. Go’s motion,
the fallo of which reads:
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, and further considering the
substitute complainant’s initial payment of 20% to movant-counsel of the monetary
claims as paid, let the balance or unpaid twenty (20%) per cent of attorney’s fees
due movant-counsel (or the amount of P839,587.39) be recorded as lien upon all
the monies that may still be paid to substitute complainant Evangelina Masmud.

Accordingly, the NLRC Cashier is directed to pay movant-counsel the

amount of P677,589.96 which is currently deposited therein to partially satisfy the
lien.

SO ORDERED.[8]

Evangelina questioned the February 14, 2005 Order of the LA before the
NLRC. On January 31, 2006, the NLRC issued a Resolution[9] dismissing the appeal
for lack of merit.

Evangelina then elevated the case to the CA via a petition for certiorari.[10]
On October 31, 2007, the CA rendered a Decision[11] partially granting the petition.
The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The

Resolutions dated January 31, 2006 and July 18, 2006 are herebyAFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that the Attorney’s fees of respondent Atty. Rolando B. Go,
Jr. is declared fully compensated by the amount of P1,347,950.11 that he has
already received.

SO ORDERED.[12]
 Evangelina filed a motion for reconsideration. However, on June 6, 2008, the
CA issued a Resolution[13] denying the motion for reconsideration for lack of merit.

Hence, the instant petition.

Evangelina presented this issue, viz.:

 THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS AND
REVERSIBLE ERROR OF LAW IN ITS DECISION DATED 31 OCTOBER
2007 AND RESOLUTION DATED 6 JUNE 2008 INSOFAR AS IT UPHOLDS

RESPONDENT LAWYER’S CLAIM OF FORTY PERCENT (40%) OF THE

MONETARY AWARD IN A LABOR CASE AS ATTORNEY’S FEES.[14]

In effect, petitioner seeks affirmance of her conviction that the legal

compensation of a lawyer in a labor proceeding should be based on Article 111 of
the Labor Code.

There are two concepts of attorney's fees. In the ordinary sense, attorney's fees
represent the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal
services rendered to the latter. On the other hand, in its extraordinary concept, attorney's
fees may be awarded by the court as indemnity for damages to be paid by the losing
party to the prevailing party,[15] such that, in any of the cases provided by law where
such award can be made, e.g., those authorized in Article 2208 of the Civil Code, the
amount is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless they

have agreed that the award shall pertain to the lawyer as additional compensation or
as part thereof.[16]

Here, we apply the ordinary concept of attorney’s fees, or the compensation

that Atty. Go is entitled to receive for representing Evangelina, in substitution of her
husband, before the labor tribunals and before the court.

Evangelina maintains that Article 111 of the Labor Code is the law that should
govern Atty. Go’s compensation as her counsel and assiduously opposes their agreed
retainer contract.
 Article 111 of the said Code provides:

ART. 111. Attorney's fees. — (a) In cases of unlawful withholding of wages

the culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten percent of the
amount of the wages recovered.

Contrary to Evangelina’s proposition, Article 111 of the Labor Code deals

with the extraordinary concept of attorney’s fees. It regulates the amount recoverable
as attorney's fees in the nature of damages sustained by and awarded to the prevailing
party. It may not be used as the standard in fixing the amount payable to the lawyer
by his client for the legal services he rendered.[17]
 In this regard, Section 24, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court should be observed in
determining Atty. Go’s compensation. The said Rule provides:

SEC. 24. Compensation of attorney's; agreement as to fees. — An attorney shall be entitled

to have and recover from his client no more than a reasonable compensation for his services, with
a view to the importance of the subject matter of the controversy, the extent of the services
rendered, and the professional standing of the attorney. No court shall be bound by the opinion of
attorneys as expert witnesses as to the proper compensation, but may disregard such testimony and
base its conclusion on its own professional knowledge. A written contract for services shall control
the amount to be paid therefor unless found by the court to be unconscionable or unreasonable.[18]

The retainer contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina provides for a contingent fee. The
contract shall control in the determination of the amount to be paid, unless found by the court to
be unconscionable or unreasonable.[19] Attorney's fees are unconscionable if they affront one's
sense of justice, decency or reasonableness.[20] The decree of unconscionability or
unreasonableness of a stipulated amount in a contingent fee contract will not preclude recovery.
It merely justifies the fixing by the court of a reasonable compensation for the lawyer's
services.[21]

The criteria found in the Code of Professional Responsibility are also to be considered in
assessing the proper amount of compensation that a lawyer should receive. Canon 20, Rule 20.01
of the said Code provides:

CANON 20 — A LAWYER SHALL CHARGE ONLY FAIR AND REASONABLE

FEES.

Rule 20.01. — A lawyer shall be guided by the following factors in determining his fees:

The time spent and the extent of the services rendered or required;

The novelty and difficulty of the question involved;

The importance of the subject matter;

The probability of losing other employment as a result of acceptance of the proffered case;

The customary charges for similar services and the schedule of fees of the IBP Chapter to which
he belongs;

The amount involved in the controversy and the benefits resulting to the client from the service;
 The contingency or certainty of compensation;

The character of the employment, whether occasional or established; and

The professional standing of the lawyer.

Contingent fee contracts are subject to the supervision and close scrutiny of the court in order
that clients may be protected from unjust charges.[22] The amount of contingent fees agreed upon by
the parties is subject to the stipulation that counsel will be paid for his legal services only if the suit
or litigation prospers. A

much higher compensation is allowed as contingent fees because of the risk that the lawyer may get
nothing if the suit fails.[23] The Court finds nothing illegal in the

contingent fee contract between Atty. Go and Evangelina’s husband. The CA committed no error
of law when it awarded the attorney’s fees of Atty. Go and allowed him to receive an equivalent
of 39% of the monetary award.

The issue of the reasonableness of attorney's fees is a question of fact. Well-settled is the
rule that conclusions and findings of fact of the CA are entitled to great weight on appeal and will
not be disturbed except for strong and cogent reasons which are absent in the case at bench. The
findings of the CA, which are supported by substantial evidence, are almost beyond the power of
review by the Supreme Court.[24]

Considering that Atty. Go successfully represented his client, it is only proper that he
should receive adequate compensation for his efforts. Even as we agree with the reduction of the
award of attorney's fees by the CA, the fact that a lawyer plays a vital role in the administration
of justice emphasizes the need to secure to him his honorarium lawfully earned as a means to
preserve the decorum

Wilfredo Anglo, Complainant, v. Atty. Jose Ma. V. Valencia, Atty. Jose Ma. J. Ciocon, Atty. Philip Z.
Dabao, Atty. Lily Uyv Alencia, Atty. Joey P. De La Paz, Atty. Cris G. Dionela, Atty. Raymundo T.
Pandan, Jr., Atty. Rodney K. Rubica, and Atty. Wilfred Ramon M. Penalosa, Respondents | A.C. No.
10567, 25 February 2015
January 15, 2018
Wilfredo Anglo, Complainant, v. Atty. Jose Ma. V. Valencia, Atty. Jose Ma. J. Ciocon, Atty. Philip Z.
Dabao, Atty. Lily Uyv Alencia, Atty. Joey P. De La Paz, Atty. Cris G. Dionela, Atty. Raymundo T.
Pandan, Jr., Atty. Rodney K. Rubica, and Atty. Wilfred Ramon M. Penalosa, Respondents.
A.C. No. 10567, 25 February 2015
Facts:
Complainant alleged that he availed the services of the law firm of the respondents for labor cases. Atty. Dionela, a partner of the
law firm, was assigned to represent the complainant. The labor cases were terminated upon the agreement of both parties. A criminal
case for qualified theft was filed against the complainant and his wife by FEVE Farms, represented by the law which handled the
complainant’s labor cases. Aggrieved. Complainant filed disbarment case against the respondents, alleging that they violated the rule
on conflict of interest.

IBP Commissioner found the respondents to have violated the rule on conflict of interest and recommended that the respondents be
reprimanded.

Issue
Whether or not the respondents are guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of the pertinent provisions of Code of
Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Held:
There is conflict of interest when a lawyer represents inconsistent interests of two or more opposing parties. The Supreme Court
found the respondents guilty of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 and Canon 21 of the CPR and are
therefore Reprimanded for said violations, with a Stern Warning that a repetition of the same or similar infraction would be dealt with
more severely. Meanwhile, the case against Atty. Philip Dabao is Dismissed in view of his death

Elisa Venterez, Genero de Vera, Inocencia V. Ramirez, Pacita V. Mills, Antonina V. Palma and
Ramon De Vera, Complainants, v. Atty. Rodrigo R. Cosme , Respondent
A.C. No. 7421, 10 October 2007

Facts:
Venterez and friends hired Atty. Cosme as counsel for a land title dispute. The court ruled against the complainants.
They wanted to file a motion of reconsideration but Atty. Cosme failed or refused to do so. Because of this, the
complainants were constrained to contact another lawyer to prepare the motion for reconsideration.

Atty. Cosme claims that the son of one of the complainants informed him that the complainants were withdrawing the
case from him because he (the son) engaged another lawyer to take over the case. Atty. Cosme further explained that
he even turned over the records of the case to the son, ceased to be counsel of the complainants.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent violated the Code of the Professional Responsibility (CPR).

Held:
The Supreme Court find the respondent guilty of violating Rule 22.01, Canon 22 of the CPR for abandoning the
complainant’s case without a good cause. An attorney may only retire from the case either by a written consent of his
client or by permission of the court after due notice and hearing, in which event, the attorney should see to it that the
name of the new attorney is recorded in the case.

For failing to protect the interests of the complainants, the respondent violated Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR.

The Supreme Court suspended the respondent from the practice of law for a period of three months