1.
Hernaez vs Hernaez Instance of the city of Manila, in which he had legalized
Facts:
The subject of the action was the will executed by Dona
Juana Espinosa. The annulment of the will was sought,
first, upon the ground of the incapacity of the testatrix.
She was over 80 years of age, so ill that three days
before she executed the will she received the
sacraments and extreme unction, and two days
afterwards she died. Prior thereto she walked in
stooping attitude, and gave contradictory orders, “as a
result of here senile debility.”
Held:
Old age is not sufficient to establish lack of
testamentary capacity.
It is sufficient to state that neither from the facts
elicited by the interrogatories nor the documents
presented with the complaint can the conclusion be
reached that the testatrix was deprived of her mental
faculties.
The fact that an old woman gives contradictory orders,
that she walks in stooping position, that she has fainting
fits, that she received the sacraments some days before
making her will, are circumstances which even if fully
demonstrated by proof could not lead the court to
establish a conclusion contrary to the mental soundness
of a person who is to be presumed to be in the full
enjoyment of the mental faculties until the contrary is
conclusively proven.
The mental soundness is always to be presumed with
respect to a person who has not been previously
incapacitated until the contrary is demonstrated and
proven by the proper person and the correctness of this
choice is beyond doubt; in the meantime the
intervention of the notary and the witness constitutes a
true guaranty of the capacity of the testator, by reason
of their knowledge of the matter.
2. DOLORES AVELINO vs. VICTORIANA DE LA CRUZ
(Full text na ni. 1 page lang)
The present is an appeal from an order of the
Honorable George N. Hurd, judge of the Court of First
the will of the said Pascual de la Cruz, deceased.
The contention of the opponent is that at the time of
the making of the will the said Pascual de la Cruz was
blind and had been for a number of years, and was
incompetent to make the will in question.
Against this contention of the opponent, all of the
witnesses who signed the will were called as witnesses,
and each declared that the deceased was of sound mind
at the time said will was made and fully understood its
contents and signed the same in their presence and that
they each signed the will in the presence of each other,
as well as in the presence of the deceased.
The appellant attempted to show that the deceased
was incompetent to make his will because he was blind
at the time the same was executed and had been for
several years theretofore. There is absolutely no proof
to show that the deceased was incapacitated at the
time he executed his will. No presumption of incapacity
can arise from the mere fact that he was blind. The only
requirement of the law as to the capacity to make a will
is that the person shall be of age and of sound mind and
memory. (Sec. 614, Code of Procedure in Civil Actions.)
Section 620 of the same code prohibits blind persons
from acting as witnesses in the execution of wills, but
no limitation is placed upon the testamentary capacity,
except age and soundness of mind.
In our opinion the record contains nothing which
justifies the modification of the order made legalizing
the will in the present case. The order of the lower
court admitting to probate and legalizing the will in
question is therefore hereby affirmed with costs.
3. TOMAS GUISON vs. MARIA CONCEPCION
Jacoba Concepcion Salcedo made her will in Manila, on
January 3, 1904. The last part of the will is as follows:
I hereby grant it to witnesses Ambrosio Reyes,
Mariano de Leon and Felix Polintan, of Manila,
Philippines, and for not being able to sign, I sign
the same Feliciano Maglaqui, in my presence
and those witnesses, who also Subscribe, each
of them in the presence of the others and mine.
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 (Signed) FELICIANO MAGLAQUI.
(Signed) AMBROSIO REYES.
(Signed) MARIANO DE LEON.
(Signed) FELIX POLINTAN.
It will be seen that the witness Feliciano Maglaqui,
instead of writing the name of the testatrix on the will,
wrote his own. Probate of the will was refused in the
court below on the ground that the name of the
testatrix was not signed thereto, and the petitioner has
appealed.
Issue: WON the will is valid
Held: No, the will is not valid because the name of the
testator was not written on the will upon the signing of
the Feliciano. Thus, it is as if the witness signed for
himself.
4. IN RE WILL SIASON
FACTS: Where the will which was presented for
probate, ends in this form: “ At the request of Senora
Maria Siason, CatalinoGeva,” followed by the signatures
of the three witnesses and the attestation clause.
Held: The signature is defective.
The question presented in this case is, Are the words
"Señora Maria Siason" her name written by some other
person? They undoubtedly are her name, but occurring
as they do after the words "at request of," it is
contended that they form a part of the recital and not a
signature, the only signature being the names of the
witnesses themselves.
5. PERFECTO GABRIEL, vs. RITA R. MATEO
FACTS
The judgment appealed from allowed the will of
Florencia Mateo to probate. Opposition to such probate
was filed by Rita Mateo, the testatrix's sister, and by
other relatives. She alleged that Florencia Mateo did
not sign the will.
The testatrix from girlhood knew how to sign her name
and did so with her right hand; but as the right side of
her body later became paralyzed, she learned to sign
with her left hand.
The attesting witnesses testified that the testratrix
signed before they did. The signatures of the testatrix
on the left margin of the two sheets of the will are
between the signatures of the two witnesses, and
below her surname is the signature of the other
witness. The signatures of the 2 former witnesses are
on a level with each other, while that of the latter is
found a little lower down. The testatrix's signatures
start on the line with the 3rd witness’ signature, but
tend to rise and her surname reaches a level with the
2nd witness’ signature.
From this detail it is pretended to draw the inference
that the attesting witnesses signed before testatrix,
contrary to their testimony that she signed before they
did.
Attention is also called to the apparently different kinds
of ink used by the testatrix in her signature and by the
attesting witnesses.
Lastly, attention is called to the unreasonableness of
the testatrix in not leaving anything to the principal
opponent, her sister Rita Mateo, and to her nephews
and nieces, to whom she had been so affectionate
during life.
ISSUE
WON the notarial will is valid. YES.
RULING
At all events, even admitting that there is a certain
question as to whether the attesting witnesses signed
before or after the testatrix, or whether or not they
signed with the same pen and ink, these are details of
such trivial importance, considering that this will was
signed two years before the date on which these
witnesses gave their testimony, that it is not proper to
set aside the will for this reason alone.
The attesting witnesses to this will, who testified also as
witnesses at the trial of this case, showed themselves to
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be intelligent and honest, one of them being a lawyer of
twelve year's practice, and there is no reason to reject
their testimony, and to suppose that they were
untruthful in testifying, and that they falsified the will in
question.
With regard to the affectionate relations between the
deceased and the opponents, only the opponent Rita
Mateo testified, and she only stated that she was on
good terms with her sister during the latter's lifetime.
But even supposing that this were so, there is nothing
strange in the testatrix having left nothing to the
opponents, or in her having left all of her estate to the
only heir instituted in her will, Tomas Mateo, who is
also one of her nieces.
The opposition presented Doctor Banks as expert. He
testified that the signatures of the testatrix in the will
are not genuine. The petitioner, on the other hand,
presented another expert, Pedro Serrano Laktao, who
affirmed that these signatures are genuine. But, over
the testimony of these experts, we have the categorical
and positive declaration of veracious witnesses who
affirm that these signatures were written by the
testatrix herself.
6. ANDALIS v. PULGUERAS
This is an appeal for admitting to probate an alleged will
of Victor Pulgueras, deceased. The testimony of only
one of the attesting witnesses was taken. His testimony
was the effect that six pages of the will were signed on
the margin by the testator and two of the witnesses
about the 4th of January, 1931, that on the 11th of
January, 1931, the remaining three pages were signed
by the testator and the three attesting witnesses, and
that the third attesting witness then signed the first six
pages.
Issue: WON the will is valid
Held: No, Such an execution of the will was not in
conformity with article 618 of the Code of Civil
Procedure as amended. Under our statute, the
execution of a will is supposed to be one act and cannot
be legally effective if the various participants sign on
various days and in various combinations of those
present.
7. GILLESANIA vs MENESALVAS
FACTS:
The probation of the will GracianoFadrigonwas opposed
by some of his relatives based upon two grounds:
First. That the witnesses who signed the will did not all
sign in the presence of the testator and in the presence
of each other as required by section 618 of the Code of
Procedure in Civil Actions; and
Second. That the said testator was mentally incapable
of making said will at the time the same was authorized
and made.
HELD:
With reference to the first above assignment of error,
an examination of the will shows that it was signed by
six witnesses. Said section 618 only requires that wills
be signed by three persons, in the presence of the
testator and in the presence of each other. An
examination of the evidence shows that each of the six
persons who signed the said will were examined as
witnesses and it appears, beyond peradventure of
doubt, that five of the six witnesses signed the said will
at the request of the testator, in the presence of the
testator and in the presence of each other. It is true
that one of the witnesses, Mateo Mena, who was the
first witness to sign the will, immediately left the room
where the will was executed, and did not see the other
witnesses sign the said will. We are of the opinion and
so hold that, when three of all the witnesses who signed
the will, signed at the request of the testator and in his
presence and in the presence of each other, the
requirements of the law were thereby complied with.
The mere fact that there were six witnesses to the said
will and that one of them did not see the others sign is
not sufficient to invalidate the said will when the other
requirements of the law are satisfied.
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With reference to the second above assignment of
error, while the evidence is somewhat conflicting, yet
all of the persons who signed the said will as witnesses,
declared that the testator at the time of the execution
of the said will was of sound mind and memory. There is
no evidence to show that the witnesses to the will had
any interest in the result of the will nor any motive in
declaring other than the truth with reference to the
questions presented to them.
8. YAP TUA, vs. YAP CA KUAN and YAP CA KUAN
FACTS
Gabriel, representing Yap Tua presented a petition in
the CFI asking that the will of Tomasa Caong, deceased,
be admitted to probate.
The witnesses (Zacarias, Tabora, and Paez) attested to
the due execution of the aforesaid will.
The CFI allowed and admitted the will to probate. It
further ordered that Yap Tua be appointed as executor
of the will.
Respondents Kuan and Llu appeared and desired to
intervene and asked that a guardian ad litem be
appointed to represent them in the cause. They alleged
that the will admitted to probate was null, for the
following reasons:
(a) Because the same had not been authorized
nor signed by the witnesses as the law
prescribes.
(b) Because at the time of the execution of the
will, the said Tomasa Caong was not then
mentally capacitated to execute the same, due
to her sickness (UREMIA) per doctor’s
statement.
(c) Because her signature to the will had been
obtained through fraud and illegal influence
upon the part of persons who were to receive a
benefit from the same, and because the said
Tomasa Elizaga Yap Caong had no intention of
executing the same.
Further they contend that before the execution of the
said will, Tomasa had executed another will, with all the
formalities required by law.
ISSUE
WON the will made by Tomasa is valid. YES.
RULING
Upon a full consideration of the record, we find that a
preponderance of the proof shows that Tomasa Caong
did execute, freely and voluntarily, while she was in the
right use of all her faculties the will.
While it is true that some of the witnesses testified that
the brother of Tomasa, one Lorenzo, had attempted to
unduly influence her mind in the execution of he will,
upon the other hand, there were several witnesses who
testified that Lorenzo did not attempt, at the time of
the execution of the will, to influence her mind in any
way. The lower court having had an opportunity to see,
to hear, and to note the witnesses during their
examination reached the conclusion that a
preponderance of the evidence showed that no undue
influence had been used. We find no good reason in the
record for reversing his conclusions upon that question.
As to the contention that Tomasa Caong was not of
sound mind and memory at the time of the execution of
the will, we find the same conflict in the declarations of
the witnesses which we found with reference to the
undue influence. While the testimony of Dr. Papa is very
strong relating to the mental condition of Tomasa, yet,
nevertheless, his testimony related to a time perhaps
twenty-four hours before the execution of the will in
question. Several witnesses testified that at the time
the will was presented to her for her signature, she was
of sound mind and memory and asked for a pen and ink
and kept the will in her possession for ten or fifteen
minutes and finally signed it.
Tomasa Caong did execute the will. Several witnesses
testified to that fact. The mere fact, however, that she
executed a former will is no proof that she did not
execute a later will. She had a perfect right, by will, to
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dispose of her property, in accordance with the
provisions of law, up to the very last of moment her life.
She had a perfect right to change, alter, modify or
revoke any and all of her former wills and to make a
new one. Neither will the fact that the new will fails to
expressly revoke all former wills, in any way sustain the
charge that she did not make the new will.
On the issue that "The signature of Tomasa in her first
will was not identical with that which appears in her
second will" it must be said that several witnesses
testified that they saw her write the name "Tomasa."
One of the witnesses testified that she had written her
full name. We are of the opinion, and we think the law
sustains our conclusion, that Tomasa signed any portion
of her name to the will, with the intention to sign the
same, that the will amount to a signature. It has been
held time and time again that one who makes a will
may sign the same by using a mark, the name having
been written by others. If writing a mark simply upon a
will is sufficient indication of the intention of the person
to make and execute a will, then certainly the writing of
a portion or all of her name ought to be accepted as a
clear indication of her intention to execute the will.
As to the last issue of whether Tomasa did not sign her
name in the presence of the witnesses and that they did
not sign their names in their presence nor in the
presence of each other it may be said that while the
rule is absolute that one who makes a will must sign the
same in the presence of the witnesses and that the
witnesses must sign in the presence of each other, as
well as in the presence of the one making the will, yet,
nevertheless, the actual seeing of the signatures made
is not necessary. It is sufficient if the signatures are
made where it is possible for each of the necessary
parties, if they desire to see, may see the signatures
placed upon the will.
9. GERMAN JABONETA, vs. RICARDO GUSTILO, ET AL.,
MacarioJaboneta executed under the following
circumstances the document in question
Being in the house of ArcadioJarandilla, he
ordered that the document in question be
written, and calling Julio Javellana,
AnicetoJalbuena, and Isabelo Jena as witnesses,
executed the said document as his will. They
were all together, and were in the room where
Jaboneta was, and were present when he
signed the document, Isabelo Jena signing
afterwards as a witness, at his request, and in
his presence and in the presence of the other
two witnesses. AnicetoJalbuena then signed as
a witness in the presence of the testator, and in
the presence of the other two persons who
signed as witnesses. At that moment Isabelo
Jena, being in a hurry to leave, took his hat and
left the room. As he was leaving the house, Julio
Javellana took the pen in his hand and put
himself in position to sign the will as a witness,
but did not sign in the presence of Isabelo Jena;
but nevertheless, after Jena had left the room
the said Julio Javellana signed as a witness in
the presence of the testator and of the witness
AnicetoJalbuena.
Issue: WON the will was signed in the presence of the
testator and witnesses
Held: YES, We cannot agree with so much of the above
finding of facts as holds that the signature of Javellana
was not signed in the presence of Jena. The fact that
Jena was still in the room when he saw Javellana
moving his hand and pen in the act of affixing his
signature to the will, taken together with the testimony
of the remaining witnesses which shows that Javellana
did in fact there and then sign his name to the will,
convinces us that the signature was affixed in the
presence of Jena. The fact that he was in the act of
leaving, and that his back was turned while a portion of
the name of the witness was being written, is of no
importance. He, with the other witnesses and the
testator, had assembled for the purpose of executing
the testament, and were together in the same room for
that purpose, and at the moment when the witness
Javellana signed the document he was actually and
physically present and in such position with relation to
Javellana that he could see everything which took place
by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction, and
without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing
so, therefore we are of opinion that the document was
in fact signed before he finally left the room.
5
In the matter of Bedell (2 Connoly (N.Y.), 328) it was
held that it is sufficient if the witnesses are together for
the purpose of witnessing the execution of the will, and
in a position to actually see the testator write,and there
are many cases which lay down the rule that the true
test of vision is not whether the testator actually saw
the witness sign, but whether he might have seen him
sign, considering his mental and physical condition and
position at the time of the subscription.
We are of opinion from the evidence of record that the
instrument propounded in these proceedings was
satisfactorily proven to be the last will and testament of
MacarioJaboneta, deceased, and that it should
therefore be admitted to probate.
10. NERA vs. RIMANDO
FACTS: There was a dispute as to the circumstances
attending the signing of the will on the day of its
execution:
1. whether one of the subscribing witnesses was
present in the small room where it was executed at the
time when the testator and the other subscribing
witnesses attached their signatures
2. whether at that time he was outside, some
eight or ten feet away, in a large room connecting with
the smaller room by a doorway, across which was hung
a curtain which made it impossible for one in the
outside room to see the testator and the other
subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their
signatures to the instrument
HELD: The SC admitted the first one and the will was
admitted for probate.
If the 2nd circumstance had happened, had the
subscribing witness been proven to have been in the
outer room at the time when the testator and the other
subscribing witnesses attached their signatures to the
instrument in the inner room, it would have been
invalid as a will, the attaching of those signatures under
circumstances not being done "in the presence" of the
witness in the outer room. This because the line of
vision from this witness to the testator and the other
subscribing witnesses would necessarily have been
impeded by the curtain separating the inner from the
outer one "at the moment of inscription of each
signature."
The question whether the testator and the subscribing
witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the
presence of each other does not depend upon proof of
the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the
paper at the moment of its subscription by each of
them, but that at that moment existing conditions and
their position with relation to each other were such that
by merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they
could have seen each other sign.
11. NEYRA v. NEYRA
FACTS:
Encarnacion, single, and who had no longer any
ascendants, executed a will, disposing of her properties
in favor of the "Congregacion de Religiosas de la Virgen
Maria" and her other relatives, making no provision
whatsoever in said will in favor of her only sister
Trinidad, who had become her bitter enemy.
In the meanwhile, Encarnacion had become seriously ill,
suffering from Addison's disease. Before Encarnacion
died, the two sisters saw each other, on seeing one
another, the two greeted each other in a most
affectionate manner, and became reconciled.
As agreed between the two sisters a lawyer was
appointed to prepare a new will and testament naming
Trinidad and Eustaquio Mendoza beneficiaries therein,
pursuant to the express instructions given by
Encarnacion.
The lawyer read said will and testament to Encarnacion
slowly and in a loud voice, in the presence of 3 doctors
as the instrumental witnesses including Trinidad and
other people. Encarnacion placed her thumb mark at
the foot of said will, in the presence of the three
attesting witnesses and Atty. Panis, after which the
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attesting witnesses signed at the foot of the document,
in the presence of Encarnacion, and of each and
everyone of the other attesting witnesses.
Encarnacion Neyra died due to heart attack.
Teodora Neyra, et al, witnesses for the oppositors,
testified, however, that when the thumb mark of
Encarnacion was affixed, she was sleeping on her bed in
the sala; and that the attesting witnesses were not
present, as they were in the caida. But the other
witness for the oppositors also stated that the attesting
witnesses signed the documents thumb marked by
Encarnacion, in the sala near her bed, thus contradicting
herself and Teodora Neyra.
Strange to say, Teodora Neyra also testified that
Encarnacion's thumb mark was affixed to the will by
Trinidad Neyra, when Encarnacion was already dead.
The testimony of Dr. Parulan, alleged medical expert, as
to the nature and effects of Addison's disease, is
absolutely unreliable. He had never seen or talked to
the testatrix Encarnacion.
According to medical authorities, the cause or causes of
the sleeping sickness, known as Addison's disease, are
not yet fully known; that persons attacked by said
disease often live as long as ten (10) years after the first
attack, while others die after a few weeks only, and that
as the disease progresses, asthenia sets in, and from 80
per cent to 90 per cent of the patients develop
tuberculosis, and complications of the heart also
appear.
ISSUE: WON the will made by Encarnacion in favor of
her sister Trinidad was valid. YES.
HELD:
Insomnia, in spite of the testimony of two doctors who
testified for the opponents of the probate of a will, who
stated that it tended to destroy mental capacity, was
held not to affect the full possession of the mental
faculties deemed necessary and sufficient for its
execution. The testatrix was held to have been compos
mentis, inspite of the physician's testimony to the
contrary, to the effect that she was very weak, being in
the third or last stage of tuberculosis.
The testimony of the attending physician that the
deceased was suffering from diabetes and had been in a
comatose condition for several days, prior to his death,
was held not sufficient to establish testamentary
incapacity, in view of the positive statement of several
credible witnesses that he was conscious and able to
understand what was said to him and to communicate
his desires.
Where it appears that a few hours and also a few days
after the execution of the will, the testator intelligently
and intelligibly conversed with other persons, although
lying down and unable to move or stand up unassisted,
but could still effect the sale of property belonging to
him, these circumstances show that the testator was in
a perfectly sound mental condition at the time of
executing the will.
It may, therefore, be reasonably concluded that the
mental faculties of persons suffering from Addison's
disease, like the testatrix in this case, remains
unimpaired, partly due to the fact, on account of the
sleep they enjoy, they necessarily receive the benefit of
physical and mental rest. And that like patients
suffering from tuberculosis, insomnia or diabetes, they
preserve their mental faculties until the moments of
their death.
It has been fully shown that the attesting witnesses
were present at the time of the signing and execution of
the agreement and will in question, in the sala, where
the testatrix was lying on her bed.
The true test is not whether they actually saw each
other, at the time of the signing of the will, but whether
they might have seen each other sign, had they chosen
to do so; and the attesting witnesses actually saw it in
this case.
The thumbmark placed by the testatrix on the will is
equivalent to her signature.
The conduct of Encarnacion, in making altogether a new
will, with new beneficiaries named therein, including
principally her bitterest enemy, which is completely
uncompatible with her first will, may really seem
strange and unusual; but, as it has been truly said,
above the logic of the head is the feeling of the heart,
always understand, as in the case of intuitive knowledge
of eternal verity.
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12. SAGUINSIN vs. SAGUINSIN,
There was presented in the Court of First Instance of
the city of Manila for allowance an instrument which
the petitioner calls the will of RemigiaSaguinsin. It is a
manuscript signed by the alleged testatrix and three
witnesses on October 3, 1918, the conclusion of which
says: "I, the testatrix, sign in the presence of the
witnesses this will written by D. Lino Mendoza at my
request and under my direction.Then follows a
signature and then these expressions: "The testatrix
signed in our presence and each of us signed in the
presence of the others."Witness who wrote this will at
the request and under the free and voluntary personal
direction of the testatrix herself."
(Sgd.)
Lino Mendoza — "Attesting witnesses
Then come three signatures.
These three signature together with that of the alleged
testatrix are written also on the left margin of the firs
page or folio and on the third page or second folio, but
not on the second page or reverse side of the first page
where, as is seen, the manuscript is continued, the
second folio not containing anything but the date of the
manuscript.
Issue: WON the will is valid despite the 2nd page thereof
was not signed by the testator and witnesses
Held: No, The attestation shall state the number of
sheets or pages used upon which the will is written . . .
." None of these requirements appear in the attesting
clause at the end of the document presented. The
second page, i.e., what is written on the reverse side of
the first, engenders the doubt whether what is written
thereon was ordered written by the alleged testatrix or
was subsequently added by the same hand that drew
the first page and the date that appears on the third.
With this non-fulfillment alone of Act No. 2645 it is
impossible to allow the so-called will which violates said
law.
That besides this violation there is another as evident as
the preceding. Said Act No. 2645 provides: "The testator
or the person requested by him to write his name and
the instrumental witnesses of the will shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left
margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively
in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet
The English text differs from the Spanish text: the
former say only pages (paginas) while the latter puts
(hojas). "Hoja," according to the Diccionario de la
Academia, "is with respect to books or notebooks folio."
According to the same dictionary "pagina (page) is each
of one of the two faces or planes of the leaf of a book or
notebook; that which is written or printed on each
page, for example I have read only two pages of this
book." Two pages constitute one leaf. One page
represents only one-half of one leaf. The English text
requires that the signature which guarantees the
genuineness of the testament shall be placed on the left
hand margin of each page and that each page should be
numbered by letter in the upper part This requirement
is entirely lacking on the second page that is, on the
reverse side of the first.
By the failure to comply with this requisite the law has
been obviously violated.
There is nothing which guarantees all the contents of
page 2. The margin of this page is absolutely blank.
there is nothing which gives the assurance that the
testatrix ordered the insertion of all the contents of
page 2. It may very well be that it was subsequently
added thereby substituting the will of the testatrix, a
result for the prevention of which this manner of
authenticity by affixing the signature on each page and
not merely on each folio was provided for by law. This
defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is
not enough that the signatures guaranteeing
authenticity should appear upon two folios or leaves;
three pages having been written, the authenticity of all
three of them should be guaranteed with the signature
of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses.
13. AVERA vs GARCIA
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FACTS: The admission for probate of the will of Esteban
is being appealed on the grounds that only one of the
attesting witnesses was presented and by reason of the
fact that the signature of the testator and of the 3
attesting witnesses are written on the right margin of
each page of the will instead of the left.
HELD: All attesting witnesses must be examined, if alive
and within reach of the process of the court. However,
this point was not raised by appellant in the lower
court, hence deemed waived.
So far as concerns the authentication of the will, and of
every part thereof, it can make no possible difference
whether the names appear on the left or no the right
margin, provided they are on one or the other.
By the mode of signing here adopted every page and
provision of the will is authenticated and guarded from
possible alteration in exactly the same degree that it
would have been protected by being signed in the left
margin.
14. NAYVE vs. MOJAL
FACTS
The will in question is composed of four sheets. The
sheets are paged "Pag. 1," "Pag. 2," "Pag. 3," "Pag. 4,"
successively. The first two pages which were issued and
signed by the testator and the three witnesses on the
left margin. On the third page actually used, the
signatures of the three witnesses appear also on the left
margin, but the signature of the testator is not on the
margin, but about the middle of the page, at the end of
the will and before the attestation clause. On the fourth
page, the signatures of the witnesses do not appear on
the margin, but at the bottom of the attestation clause,
it being the signature of the testator that is on the
margin, left side of the reader.
ISSUE
WON the will is valid considering that:
A. the testator and the witnesses did not sign on each
and every sheet on the left margin;
B. the sheets of the document were not being paged
with letters;
C. the attestation clause does not state the number of
sheets or pages actually used on the will; and
D. that the testator does not appear to have signed all
the sheets in the presence of the three witnesses, and
that the latter have not attested and signed all the
sheets in the presence of the testator and of each
other.
RULING
YES the will is valid.
A. The holding of this court in the case of Avera vs.
Garcia and Rodriguez, is applicable, wherein the will in
question was signed by the testator and the witnesses,
not on the left, but right, margin. The rule laid down in
that case is that the document contained the necessary
signatures on each page, whereby each page of the will
was authenticated and safeguarded against any
possible alteration. In that case, the validity of the will
was sustained, and consequently it was allowed to
probate.
Applying that doctrine to the instant case, we hold that,
as each and every page used of the will bears the
signatures of the testator and the witnesses, the fact
that said signatures do not all appear on the left margin
of each page does not detract from the validity of the
will.
B. In Unson vs. Abella the court held that paging with
Arabic numerals and not with letters, as in the case
before us, is within the spirit of the law and is just as
valid as paging with letters.
C. As may be seen, the number of sheets is stated in
said last paragraph of the will. It is true that in the case
of Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, it was held that the
9
attestation clause must state the number of sheets or
pages composing the will; but when, as in the case
before us, such fact, while it is not stated in the
attestation clause, appears at the end of the will proper,
so that no proof aliunde is necessary of the number of
the sheets of the will, then there can be no doubt that it
complies with the intention of the law that the number
of sheets of which the will is composed be shown by the
document itself, to prevent the number of the sheets of
the will from being unduly increased or decreased.
D. With regard to the last defect pointed out, it must be
noted that in the attestation clause, it is said that the
testator signed the will "in the presence of each of the
witnesses" and the latter signed "in the presence of
each other and of the testator." So that, as to whether
the testator and the attesting witnesses saw each other
sign the will, such a requirement was clearly and
sufficiently complied with. What is not stated in this
clause is whether the testator and the witnesses signed
all the sheets of the will.
The act of the testator and the witnesses seeing
reciprocally the signing of the will is one which cannot
be proven by the mere exhibition of the will unless it is
stated in the document. And this fact is expressly stated
in the attestation clause now before us. But the fact of
the testator and the witnesses having signed all the
sheets of the will may be proven by the mere
examination of the document, although it does not say
anything about this, and if that is the fact, as it is in the
instant case, the danger of fraud in this respect, which is
what the law tries to avoid, does not exist.
Therefore, as in the instant case the fact that the
testator and the witnesses signed each and every page
of the will is proven by the mere examination of the
signatures in the will, the omission to expressly state
such evident fact does not invalidate the will nor
prevent its probate.
15. ROSA K. KALAW, vs. RELOVA
Private respondent GREGORIO K. KALAW, claiming to be
the sole heir of his deceased sister, Natividad K. Kalaw,
filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of
Batangas, Branch VI, Lipa City, for the probate of her
holographic Will executed on December 24, 1968.
ROSA K. Kalaw opposed probate alleging, in substance,
that the holographic Will contained alterations,
corrections, and insertions without the proper
authentication by the full signature of the testatrix as
required by Article 814 of the Civil Code
ROSA's position was that the holographic Will, as first
written, should be given effect and probated so that she
could be the sole heir thereunder.
After trial, respondent Judge denied probate in an
Order, dated September 3, 197 3, reading in part:
The document Exhibit "C" was submitted to the
National Bureau of Investigation for examination. The
NBI reported that the handwriting, the signature, the
insertions and/or additions and the initial were made by
one and the same person.
From that Order, GREGORIO moved for reconsideration
arguing that since the alterations and/or insertions
were the testatrix, the denial to probate of her
holographic Will would be contrary to her right of
testamentary disposition.
ROSA filed this Petition for Review on certiorari on the
sole legal question of whether or not the original
unaltered text after subsequent alterations and
insertions were voided by the Trial Court for lack of
authentication by the full signature of the testatrix,
should be probated or not, with her as sole heir.
Issue: WON the will is entire will is void for failure to
comply with Article 814
Held: In this case, Yes. However, the general rule is that
only those which contains the alterations and
cancellation are considered void and not the whole will
10
16. PCIB vs. ESCOLIN (digest)
Ordinarily, when a number of erasures, corrections, and
interlineations made by the testator in a holographic
Will litem not been noted under his signature, ... the
Will is not thereby invalidated as a whole, but at most
only as respects the particular words erased, corrected
or interlined
However, when as in this case, the holographic Will in
dispute had only one substantial provision, which was
altered by substituting the original heir with another,
but which alteration did not carry the requisite of full
authentication by the full signature of the testator, the
effect must be that the entire Will is voided or revoked
for the simple reason that nothing remains in the Will
after that which could remain valid. To state that the
Will as first written should be given efficacy is to
disregard the seeming change of mind of the testatrix.
But that change of mind can neither be given effect
because she failed to authenticate it in the manner
required by law by affixing her full signature,
The ruling in Velasco, supra, must be held confined to
such insertions, cancellations, erasures or alterations in
a holographic Will, which affect only the efficacy of the
altered words themselves but not the essence and
validity of the Will itself. As it is, with the erasures,
cancellations and alterations made by the testatrix
herein, her real intention cannot be determined with
certitude.
PCIB vs. ESCOLIN (digest)
Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank,
Administrator of the Testate Estate of Charles Newton
Hodges, vs. Hon. VenicioEscolin (CFI-Iloilo) and Avelina
A. Magno; Testate Estate of the late Linnie Jane Hodges.
Testate Estate of the late Charles Newton Hodges. PCIB,
administrator-appellant, vs. Lorenzo Carles, Jose
Pablico, Alfredo Catedral, Salvador Guzman, Belcesar
Causing, FloreniaBarrido, Purificacion Coronado,
Graciano Lucero, Ariteo Thomas Jamir,
MelquiadesBatisanan, PepitoIyulores,
EsperidionPartisala, WinifredoEspada, Rosario Alingasa,
AdelfaPremaylon, Santiago Pacaonsis, and Avelina A.
Magno, appellees, Western Institute of Technology, Inc.,
movant-appellee
March 29, 1974; Barredo, J.
Short version: The Hodges lived in the Philippines for
almost half a century and died leaving substantial
properties in Iloilo and in the US. The missus died 5
years before the husband, providing in her will that
while her estate would go to him, upon his death, the
remainder should pass to her siblings. (They were
childless.) The court held that this testamentary
provision, while probably ineffectual as a substitution
under the Civil Code, is not actually a substitution, but is
a valid and simultaneous institution of heirs, though the
passing of title to the inheritance to the others (the
siblings) was made to depend on a resolutory condition
(the husband’s death). Case was remanded to the trial
court for the determination of the proper application of
the renvoi principle (conflict of laws between
Philippines and Texas law), and the proper distribution
of Linnie’s, Charles’, and their conjugal estates.
Facts:
Charles Newton Hodges and Linnie Jane Hodges were
originally from Texas, USA. During their marriage, they
had acquired and accumulated considerable assets and
properties in the Philippines and in Oklahoma and Texas
in the US. They both lived, worked and were domiciled
in Iloilo City for around 50 years. Before her death,
Linnie Jane executed a will leaving her estate, less her
debts and funeral expenses, to her husband Charles.
Should Charles die, the will provided that the remainder
of her estate go to her brothers and sisters, share and
share alike. Should any of the brothers and sisters die
before the husband, Linnie willed that the heirs of the
said sibling be substituted in the deceased’s sibling’s
place.
When Linnie died, Charles took the will to probate
court, and was appointed Executor, then later, Special
Administrator. He moved to be allowed to continue
administering the family business, as per Linnie Jane’s
wishes, and to engage in sales, conveyances, leases,
mortgages and other necessary transactions. He also
filed the necessary and appurtenant
administration/accounting records, and income tax
returns for the estate. Charles named seven brothers
and sisters of Linnie Jane as her heirs (Esta, Emma,
Leonard, Aline, David, Sadie, Era and Nimroy), but the
order admitting the will to probate unfortunately
omitted one of the heirs, Roy (Nimroy?) Higdon, so
Charles filed a verified motion to have Roy’s name
included.
11

As an executor, he was bound to file tax returns for the
estate he was administering under American law. He
did file such as estate tax return on August 8, 1958. In
Schedule "M" of such return, he answered "Yes" to the
question as to whether he was contemplating
"renouncing the will". On the question as to what
property interests passed to him as the surviving
spouse, he answered:
“None, except for purposes of administering the
Estate, paying debts, taxes and other legal
charges. It is the intention of the surviving
husband of deceased to distribute the
remaining property and interests of the
deceased in their Community estate to the
devisees and legatees named in the will when
the debts, liabilities, taxes and expenses of
administration are finally determined and paid.”
Charles died in Iloilo in December 1962 without having
liquidated Linnie’s estate, which includes her share in
the conjugal partnership. A longtime employee of the
Hodges, AvelinaMagno, was appointed Administratrix
(for Linnie’s estate) and a Special Administratrix (for
Charles’). Magno was appointed, but later Harold
Davies (representative of Charles’ heirs in the US) was
designated Co-Special Administrator, who was then
replaced by one Joe Hodges, Charles’ nephew. One
Atty. Mirasol was also appointed as co-administrator,
and an order of probate and letters of administration
were issued to Hodges and Mirasol.
At this point, the SC was already very much confused
about the gaps in the facts, convinced that the parties
representing both estates had cooked up a modus
operandi to settle money matters (a settlement with
records the Court never saw)—which, however, went
awry, with more and more heirs from the US flocking to
the Iloilo shores, and lawyers (Ozaetas! Mabantas!
Manglapuses!)filing their respective claims for retainer
fees. Much much later, PCIB became the administrator
of Charles’ estate, asserting a claim to all of his estate,
including those properties/assets that passed to him
upon Linnie Jane’s death. Avelina naturally opposed
this, as Linnie Jane’s other heirs (the HIGDONS) would
be prejudiced, so she continued acting in her capacity as
administrator (entering into sales and other such
conveyances). For these acts, the PCIB dismissed her as
an employee of Charles’ estate, to which she responded
by locking up the premises being used by PCIB as
offices, which were among the estate’s properties.
PCIB’s Claims
Linnie Jane’s will should be governed by Philippine Law,
with respect to the order of succession, the amount of
successional rights, and the intrinsic validity of its
testamentary provisions.
 Linnie intended Philippine laws to govern her
Will.
 Article 16, CC, provides that "the national law of
the person whose succession is under
consideration, whatever may be the nature of
the property and regardless of the country
wherein said property may be found", shall
prevail. However, the Conflict of Law of Texas,
which is the "national law" of the testatrix,
Linnie Jane Hodges, provide that the domiciliary
law (Philippine law) should govern the
testamentary dispositions and successional
rights over movables, and the law of the situs of
the property (also Philippine law as to
properties located in the Philippines) as regards
immovables.
 Thus applying the "Renvoi Doctrine", as
approved and applied in the Christensen case
(1963), Philippine law should apply.
 Under Philippine and Texas law, the conjugal or
community estate of spouses shall, upon
dissolution, be divided equally between them.
Thus, upon Linnie’s death, ½ of the entirety of
the assets of the Hodges spouses constituting
their conjugal estate pertained automatically to
Charles, not by way of inheritance, but in his
own right as partner in the conjugal
partnership.
 The other one-half (1/2) portion forming part of
Linnie’s estate, cannot, under a clear and
specific provision of her Will, be enhanced or
12
 increased by income, earnings, rents, or
emoluments accruing after her death. “All rents,
emoluments and income from said estate shall
belong to him (C. N. Hodges) and he is further
authorized to use any part of the principal of
said estate as he may need or desire."
 Articles 900, 995 and 1001 provide that the
surviving spouse of a deceased leaving no
ascendants or descendants is entitled, as a
matter of right and by way of irrevocable
legitime, to at least one-half (1/2) of the estate
of the deceased, and no testamentary
disposition by the deceased can legally and
validly affect this right of the surviving spouse.
In fact, her husband is entitled to said one-half
(1/2) portion of her estate by way of legitime.
(Article 886)
 Clearly, therefore, immediately upon the death
of Linnie Jane Hodges, C. N. Hodges was the
owner of at least 3/4 or 75% percent of all of
the conjugal assets of the spouses, 50% by way
of conjugal partnership share and 1/4 or 25% by
way of inheritance and legitime) plus all "rents,
emoluments and income" accruing to said
conjugal estate from the moment of Linnie Jane
Hodges' death.
 In his capacity as sole heir and successor to
Linnie’s estate, Charles appropriated to himself
the entirety of her estate. He operated all the
assets, engaged in business and performed all
acts in connection with the entirety of the
conjugal estate, in his own name alone, just as
he had been operating, engaging and doing
while the late Linnie Jane Hodges was still
alive. Upon his death on December 25, 1962,
therefore, all said conjugal assets were in his
sole possession and control, and registered in
his name alone, not as executor, but as
exclusive owner of all said assets.
 As the sole and exclusive heir, Charles did not
need to liquidate the estate. Neither was there
any asset left to Linnie’s estate at the time of
Charles’ death, though Linnie’s estate may have
referred to “all of the rest, residue and
remainder of my estate” which would go to her
siblings in the event of Charles death. The
provision is thus void and invalid at least as to
Philippine assets.
 There are generally only two kinds of
substitution provided for and authorized by our
Civil Code (Articles 857-870), namely, (1) simple
or common substitution, sometimes referred to
as vulgar substitution (Article 859), and (2)
fideicommissary substitution (Article 863). All
other substitutions are merely variations of
these. The substitution provided for by
paragraph four of the Will of Linnie Jane Hodges
is not fideicommissary substitution, because
there is clearly no obligation on the part of C. N.
Hodges as the first heir designated, to preserve
the properties for the substitute heirs. At most,
it is a vulgar or simple substitution. However, in
order that a vulgar orsimple substitution can be
valid, three alternative conditions must be
present, namely, that the first designated heir
(1) should die before the testator; or (2) should
not wish to accept the inheritance; or (3) should
be incapacitated to do so. None of these
conditions apply to C. N. Hodges, and,
therefore, the substitution provided for by the
above-quoted provision of the Will is not
authorized by the Code, and, therefore, it is
void. Manresa even said, “when another heir is
designated to inherit upon the death of a first
heir, the second designation can have effect
only in case the first instituted heir dies before
the testator, whether or not that was the true
intention of said testator.”
 The remedy of the Higdons, then, who are
claiming dubious rights to ¼ of the conjugal
estate of the Hodges, is to file a claim against
the estate of Charles.
 It also follows that the conveyances executed
by Avelina, claiming to be merely in
continuation of the Hodges’ businesses, and
which corresponding deeds of sale were
confirmed by the probate court, are null and
void and should be subject to reconveyance.
Avelina’s Claims
(At one point, even Linnie’s heirs wanted to have Avelina
removed from her capacity as administrator, but the
lower court reversed its earlier grant of the motion, on
account of a previous injunction it issued.)
 Linnie Jane merely gave Charles a life-estate or
a usufruct over all her estate, and gave a vested
13
 remainder-estate or the naked title over the
same estate, to her relatives.
 After Linnie’s death, Charles, as administrator
and executor of the will, unequivocably and
clearly through oral and written declarations
and sworn public statements, renounced,
disclaimed and repudiated his life-estate and
usufruct.
 Since there was no separation or segregation of
the interests of Linnie and Charles in the
combined conjugal estate, as there has been no
such separation or segregation, and because of
Charles’ repudiation, both interests have
continually earned exactly the same amount of
rents, emoluments and income.
Issue:
1. Is Linnie’s disposition in favor of her siblings void? –
NO
2. How should the estate be partitioned/liquidated? –
REMAND!
Reasoning:
1. To a certain extent, PCIB’s contention that Linnie’s
testamentary substitution, when viewed as a
substitution, may not be given effect, is correct. Indeed,
legally speaking, Linnie’s will provides neither for a
simple or vulgar substitution under Article 859 of the
Civil Code nor for a fideicommissary substitution under
Article 863 thereof. There is no vulgar substitution
because there is no provision for either (1) predecease
of the testator by the designated heir or (2) refusal or
(3) incapacity of the latter to accept the inheritance, as
required by Article 859; and neither is there a
fideicommissary substitution therein because no
obligation is imposed thereby upon Hodges to preserve
the estate or any part thereof for anyone else. But from
these premises, it is not correct to jump to the
conclusion, as PCIB does, that the testamentary
dispositions in question are therefore inoperative and
invalid.
The error in PCIB's position lies simply in the fact that it
views the said disposition exclusively in the light of
substitutions covered by the Civil Code section on that
subject, (Section 3, Chapter 2, Title IV, Book III) when it
is obvious that substitution occurs only when another
heir is appointed in a will "so that he may enter into
inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted,"
(Article 857) and, in the present case, no such possible
default is contemplated. The brothers and sisters of
Mrs. Hodges are not substitutes for Hodges because,
under her will, they are not to inherit what Hodges
cannot, would not or may not inherit, but what he
would not dispose of from his inheritance; rather,
therefore, they are also heirs instituted simultaneously
with Hodges, subject, however, to certain conditions,
partially resolutory insofar as Hodges was concerned
and correspondingly suspensive with reference to his
brothers and sisters-in-law. It is partially resolutory,
since it bequeaths unto Hodges the whole of her estate
to be owned and enjoyed by him as universal and sole
heir with absolute dominion over them only during his
lifetime, which means that while he could completely
and absolutely dispose of any portion thereof inter
vivos to anyone other than himself, he was not free to
do so mortis causa, and all his rights to what might
remain upon his death would cease entirely upon the
occurrence of that contingency, inasmuch as the right of
his brothers and sisters-in-law to the inheritance,
although vested already upon the death of Mrs.
Hodges, would automatically become operative upon
the occurrence of the death of Hodges in the event of
actual existence of any remainder of her estate then.
Contrary to Avelina’s view, however, it was not the
usufruct alone of Linnie’s estate, as contemplated in
Article 869, that she bequeathed to Charles during his
lifetime, but the full ownership thereof, although the
same was to last also during his lifetime only, even as
there was no restriction whatsoever against his
disposing or conveying the whole or any portion thereof
to anybody other than himself. The Court saw no legal
impediment to this kind of institution, except that it
cannot apply to the legitime of Charles as the surviving
spouse, consisting of one-half of the estate, considering
that Linnie had no surviving ascendants nor
descendants. (Arts. 872, 900, and 904.)
Hodges’ acts of administration and accounting strongly
negate PCIB’s claims that he had adjudicated to himself
all of Linnie’s estate. While he may have used language
like “herein executor (being) the only devisee or legatee
of the deceased, in accordance with the last will and
testament already probated… there is no other person
interested in the Philippines of the time and place of
14
examining herein account to be given notice,” he
would’ve known that doing so would impute bad faith
unto him. Also, in his very motions, Hodges asserted the
rights of Linnie’s named heirs. He even moved to
include Roy’s name included in the probate court’s
order, lest Roy’s heirs think that they had been omitted.
Thus, he recognized, in his own way, the separate
identity of his wife’s estate from his own share of the
conjugal partnership up to the time of his death, more
than 5 years after that of his wife. He never considered
the whole estate as a single one belonging exclusively to
himself. The only conclusion one can gather from this is
that he could have been preparing the basis for the
eventual transmission of his wife's estate, or, at least,
so much thereof as he would not have been able to
dispose of during his lifetime, to her brothers and
sisters in accordance with her expressed desire, as
intimated in his tax return in the US. And assuming that
he did pay the corresponding estate and inheritance
taxes in the Philippines on the basis of his being sole
heir, such payment is not necessarily inconsistent with
his recognition of the rights of his co-heirs. The Court
thus viewed that under the peculiar provisions of his
wife's will, and for purposes of the applicable
inheritance tax laws, Hodges had to be considered as
her sole heir, pending the actual transmission of the
remaining portion of her estate to her other heirs, upon
the eventuality of his death, and whatever adjustment
might be warranted should there be any such
remainder then is a matter that could well be taken
care of by the internal revenue authorities in due time.
The Court also considered as basis of Charles’ intentions
several questionnaires in solemn forms in filing estate
taxes abroad, though they have not been introduced in
evidence (!!!), only referred to several times by the
parties.
It is obvious, though, that Charles’ procrastinating in
settling Linnie’s estate, and his sole administration of it,
commingled his and his co-heirs interests, making it
difficult to properly make an accounting of their shares.
PCIB, then, cannot administer the properties on its own.
What would be just and proper is for both
administrators of the two estates to act conjointly until
after said estates have been segregated from each
other.
2. The parties were in disagreement as to how Article 16
of the Civil Code should be applied. On the one hand,
PCIB claimed that inasmuch as Linnie was a resident of
the Philippines at the time of her death, under said
Article 16, construed in relation to the pertinent laws of
Texas and the principle of renvoi, what should be
applied here should be the rules of succession under
the Civil Code, and, therefore, her estate could consist
of no more than one-fourth of the said conjugal
properties, the other fourth being, as already explained,
the legitime of her husband (Art. 900) which she could
not have disposed of nor burdened with any condition
(Art. 872). On the other hand, Avelina denied that Linnie
died a resident of the Philippines, since allegedly she
never changed nor intended to change her original
residence of birth in Texas, United States of America,
and contends that, anyway, regardless of the question
of her residence, she being indisputably a citizen of
Texas, under said Article 16 of the Civil Code, the
distribution of her estate is subject to the laws of said
State which, according to her, do not provide for any
legitime, hence, Linnie’s brothers and sisters are
entitled to the remainder of the whole of her share of
the conjugal partnership properties consisting of one-
half thereof. Avelina further maintained that, in any
event, Charles had renounced his rights under the will in
favor of his co-heirs, as allegedly proven by the
documents touching on the point already mentioned
earlier, the genuineness and legal significance of which
PCIB questioned.
The Court cannot decide on the claims, though, for
neither the evidence submitted by the parties appeared
to be adequate enough for it to render an intelligent
comprehensive and just resolution. No clear and
reliable proof of what in fact the possibly applicable
laws of Texas are, was presented (Remember judicial
notice in case of foreign laws?). Then also, the
genuineness of documents relied upon by Avelina is
disputed. In Justice, therefore, to all the parties
concerned, these and all other relevant matters should
first be threshed out fully in the trial court in the
proceedings thereafter to be held for the purpose of
ascertaining and adjudicating and/or distributing the
estate of Mrs. Hodges to her heirs in accordance with
her duly probated will.
15
Linnie’s estate is the remainder of 1/4 of the conjugal
partnership properties, considering that even PCIB did
not maintain that the application of the laws of Texas
would result in the other heirs of Mrs. Hodges not
inheriting anything under her will. And since PCIB's
representations in regard to the laws of Texas virtually
constitute admissions of fact which the other parties
and the Court are being made to rely and act upon, PCIB
is not permitted to contradict them or subsequently
take a position contradictory to or inconsistent with
them.
The only question that remains to be settled in the
remand to the court below are:
(1) whether or not the applicable laws of Texas do
provide in effect for more, such as, when there is no
legitime provided therein
(2) whether or not Hodges has validly waived his whole
inheritance from Mrs. Hodges.
In the course of the deliberations, it was brought out by
some members of the Court that to avoid or, at least,
minimize further protracted legal controversies
between the respective heirs of the Hodges spouses, it
is imperative to elucidate on the possible consequences
of dispositions made by Charles after Linnie’s death,
from the mass of the unpartitioned estates without any
express indication in the pertinent documents as to
whether his intention is to dispose of part of his
inheritance from his wife or part of his own share of the
conjugal estate as well as of those made by PCIB after
the death of Hodges. After a long discussion, the
consensus arrived at was as follows:
(1) any such dispositions made gratuitously in favor of
third parties, whether these be individuals, corporations
or foundations, shall be considered as intended to be of
properties constituting part of Hodges' inheritance from
his wife, it appearing from the tenor of his motions of
May 27 and December 11, 1957 that in asking for
general authority to make sales or other disposals of
properties under the jurisdiction of the court, which
include his own share of the conjugal estate, he was not
invoking particularly his right over his own share, but
rather his right to dispose of any part of his inheritance
pursuant to the will of his wife;
(2) as regards sales, exchanges or
other remunerative transfers, the proceeds of such
sales or the properties taken in by virtue of such
exchanges, shall be considered as merely the products
of "physical changes" of the properties of her estate
which the will expressly authorizes Hodges to make,
provided that whatever of said products should remain
with the estate at the time of the death of Hodges
should go to her brothers and sisters;
(3) the dispositions made by PCIB after the death of
Hodges must naturally be deemed as covering only the
properties belonging to his estate considering that
being only the administrator of the estate of Hodges,
PCIB could not have disposed of properties belonging to
the estate of his wife. Neither could such dispositions
be considered as involving conjugal properties, for the
simple reason that the conjugal partnership
automatically ceased when Linnie died, and by the
peculiar provision of her will, under discussion, the
remainder of her share descended also automatically
upon the death of Hodges to her brothers and sisters,
thus outside of the scope of PCIB's administration.
Accordingly, these constructions of Linnie’s will should
be adhered to by the trial court in its final order of
adjudication and distribution and/or partition of the
two estates in question.
Disposition
Remand for determination of proper application of Art.
16, CC (renvoi), and of Charles’ alleged renunciation of
his ineritance under Linnie’s will. Avelina remains to be
the administrator of Linnie’s estate. The said estate
consists of ¼ of the community properties of the said
spouses, as of the time of Linnie’s death on May 23,
1957, minus whatever the husband had already
gratuitously disposed of in favor of third persons from
said date until his death, provided, first, that with
respect to remunerative dispositions, the proceeds
thereof shall continue to be part of the wife's estate,
unless subsequently disposed of gratuitously to third
parties by the husband, and second, that should the
purported renunciation be declared legally effective, no
deductions whatsoever are to be made from said
estate. PCIB and Avelina should act thenceforth always
conjointly, never independently from each other, as
administrators.
16
17. SANCHO, vs. MARCIANA ABELLA,
The testatrix, MateaAbella, resident of the municipality
of Sinait, Ilocos Sur, had been informed that Dr. Antonio
Querol of San Fernando La Union, was a good physician.
On April 13, 1932, she left her home situated in the said
municipality of Sinait, accompanied by her niece,
FilomenaInay, to consult the said physician in his clinic
in San Fernando, La Union, stopping at the convent of
the parish church of the said municipality, in charge of
Father Cordero with whom she was acquainted he
having been the parish priest of Sinait. During her stay
in the said convent, she went to Dr. Antonio Querol's
clinic twice within the period of one week accompanied
by her aforesaid niece, FilomenaInay, to consult the said
physician who, after submitting her to a general medical
examination, found that she was suffering from
dyspepsia and cancer of the stomach.
MateaAbella ordered a sexton of the convent to call
Attorney Teodoro R. Reinoso to whom she expressed
her desire to make a will, in the presence of the Father
Cordero's sister, Father ZoiloAguda, MacarioCalug and
the fiscal of the convent. Inasmuch as the aforesaid
attorney had to attend to other business, he could not
finish his interview with the testatrix on the first day
and had to continue it the following day, also in the
presence of Father Cordero, his sister, FilomenaInay and
some children who were then at the convent.
Inasmuch as he did not finish the interview on the
second day, the said attorney returned again on the
afternoon of the 28th and continued it in the presence
of the same persons who entered and left the sala. At
the end of the interview, MateaAbella ordered he niece,
FilomenaInay, to bring her some papers which were in
her trunk, which she delivered to the said attorney.
After the will had been drafted in Ilocano, the dialect of
the testatrix, MacarioCalug read it to her and she
approved it. When the will had been copied clean, it
was again read to the testatrix and she express her
approval thereof, but inasmuch as it was rather late at
night, she did not care to sign the same suggesting that
it be postponed to the following day, April 29, 1932,
which was done. At about 7:30 o'clock on the morning
of April 29, 1932, the signing of the will took place in the
corridor of the convent. The testatrix MateaAbella was
the first to sign it on a table in the presence of each and
every one of the instrumental witnesses thereto and of
other persons, including Father Cordero. After the
testatrix, each of the instrument witnesses signed in the
presence of the testatrix and of each and every one of
the other witnesses. After the will had been signed,
Attorney Teodoro R. Reinoso delivered the original and
the copies thereof to the testatrix, retaining one for his
file. On July 3, 1932, MateaAbella died of the senile
debility in the municipality of Sinait at the age of 88
years.
The opponent herein attempted to prove that the
testatrix was deaf and that her eyesight was defective
The opponent claims that, inasmuch as the testatrix was
88 years of age when she made her will, she was
already suffering from senile debility and therefore her
mental faculties were not functioning normally
anymore and that she was not fully aware of her acts.
Issue: Won the will is void because of the attending
circumstances of old age, senile ability, and poor
memory
Held: In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of
the opinion and so hold: (1) That neither senile ability,
nor deafness, nor blindness, nor poor memory, is by
itself sufficient to establish the presumption that the
person suffering therefrom is not in the full enjoyment
of his mental faculties, when there is sufficient evidence
of his mental sanity at the time of the execution of the
will
18. JUANA CAGUIOA, versus MARIA CALDERON,
Presented is a petition in the Court of First Instance of
the Province of Pangasinan, praying for the probation of
the last will and testament of EmigdioZarate, deceased.
Maria Calderon appeared, by her attorney, and
opposed the probation of said will upon the following
grounds:
"1. That the said EmigdioZarate was mentally
incapacitated at the time he authorized and signed his
will.
"2. That he executed the said will under illegal and
undue influence or persuasion on the part of some
persons who acted in behalf of the beneficiaries or
heirs.
17
"3. That the signature of the testator was obtained by
deceit or fraud, for the reason that it was not his
intention that all that was recorded in the said
instrument should be his will at the time he signed it
the lower court reached the following conclusion
"It having been proved completely on the part of the
petitioner that the will in question was executed and
signed in entire conformity with all the requirements
and solemnities set out in the Code of Civil Procedure,
the court overrules the opposition, sustains the
petition, admits to probate Exhibit A, holding that the
same is legal in all its parts as the last will and
testament of the deceased EmigdioZarate
From an examination of said Exhibit A it appears to have
been signed by EmigdioZarate and by four witnesses,
Sabino M. Sandoval, Esteban Sandoval, George Zarate
and Eugenio Zarate. From the record it appears that the
testator dictated his will in the Pangasinan dialect and it
was then translated into Spanish. After the will had
been written in Spanish it was read to the deceased and
translated to him in the Pangasinan dialect, and,
according to the allegations of the appellee, the said
Exhibit A received his approval as his last will and
testament.
Issue: WON the will is void because the testator was not
in full possession of his mental faculties
No, the lower court found that EmigdioZarate, at the
time of the execution of the said will, was in the
possession of his faculties. Two of the witnesses who
signed the will, as well as others who were present in
the house at the time the said will was executed,
testified that in their opinion EmigdioZarate was of
sound mind and memory at the time he signed the said
will.
The appellant attempted to show that EmigdioZarate
for some months prior to his death had been troubled
with insomnia, as well as some other physical
infirmities. The hypothetical questions were based upon
the question whether or not a person who had been
suffering with insomnia for some months would have
sufficient mental capacity to execute a will. The two
doctors who appeared on behalf of the opponents
testified that insomnia tended to destroy the mental
capacity, but that there were times, even during the
period while they were suffering from insomnia, when
they would be perfectly rational. Even admitting that
there was some foundation for the supposition that
EmigdioZarate had suffered from the alleged infirmities,
we do not believe that the testimony was sufficiently
direct and positive, based upon the hypothetical
questions, to overcome the positive and direct
testimony of the witnesses who were present at the
time of the execution of the will in question.
Issue: Won the will is void because there is undue
influence in signing of the will
There is nothing in the record to indicate in the slightest
degree that any person interested in the will, or who
was present at the time of the making of the same,
induced or attempted to induce the deceased not to
will the said house to the opponent herein.
Issue: WON the will is void because it was not executed
in accordance with the law
During the trial of the cause two of the persons who
signed the will as witnesses appeared and testified.
They testified that the deceased signed the will in their
presence and in the presence of the other witnesses to
the will; that they each signed the will in the presence
of the testator and in the presence of the other
witnesses; that the other two witnesses who were not
called also signed the will in the presence of the
testator and in the presence of each of the other
witnesses. There is no sufficient proof in the record to
overcome the declarations of these witnesses. We find
no reason, therefore, for modifying the conclusion of
the lower court upon these assignments of error
Upon a full consideration of the evidence and the
assignments of error, we are of the opinion that the will
of EmigdioZarate, deceased, was executed and signed in
entire conformity with all the requirements and
solemnities required by law. Therefore the judgment of
the lower court is hereby affirmed with costs.
19. ALBORNOZ vs ALBORNOZ
18
(Dilinakomasearchjudangfulltextani..Naakonakitapero
criminal2 man ang topic.Kanilang summary
nabasahannakomaoang decision sa SC)
HELD: Lack of memory and understanding and pre-
senile dementia is an instance where a testator is
considered as of unsound mind.
20. Alsua – Betts vs CA
Facts: On November 25, 1949, Don Jesus alsua and his
wife, with all his living children entered into a duly
notarized agreement of extrajudicial partition over the
then present and existing properties of the spouses. The
spouses also separately executed their respective
holographic wills, which were in conformity and in
implementation of the extrajudicial partition. Their
holographic wills similarly provided for the institution of
the other to his or her share in the conjugal properties,
the other half of the conjugal assets having been
partitioned to constitute their legitime among their four
living children in the Extrajudicial Partition of 1949.
The spouses executed their mutual and reciprocal
codicils amendig and supplementing their respective
holographic wills. Again, the codicils similarly
acknowledged and provided that one-half of all the
properties of the spouses, conjugal and paraphernal,
had been disposed of, conveyed to and partitioned
among their legitimate heirs.
Upon the death of donaTinay, Don Jesus was named
executor. Thereafter in the early part of November
1959, he cancelled his holographic will in the presence
of his bookkeeper and secretary whom he instructed to
make a list of all his remaining properties with their
corresponding descriptions. His lawyer, Atty Imperial
was then instructed to draft a new will, which was duly
signed, by Don Jesus and his attesting witnesses.
When Don Jesus died, petitioner, as executrix name in
the will of November 14, 1959, filed a petition for the
probate of said new will of Don Alsua. Oppositions
thereto were filed by Pablo, Amparo and Fernando, thru
his judicial guardian Clotide Samson on the ground that
Don Jesus was not of sound and disposing mind at the
time of the execution of the alleged will.
Held:
The test of testamentary capacity is at the time of the
making of the will. Mere weakness of mind or partial
imbecility from disease of body or from age-does not
render a person incapable of making a will.
The Civil Code itself provides under Article 798 that in
order to make a will, it is essential that the testator be
of sound mind at the time of its execution, and under
Article 800, the law presumes that every person is of
sound mind in the absence of proof to the contrary. In
the case at bar, the acceptance by the respondent court
of the findings of fact of the trial court on the due
execution of the last win and testament of Don Jesus
has foreclosed any and all claim to the contrary that the
will was not executed in accordance with the
requirements of the law. But more than that, gleaned
from the quoted portions of the appealed decision, the
described behavior of Don Jesus is not that of a
mentally incapacitated person nor one suffering from
"senile dementia" as claimed by private respondents.
The court finds that: (a) it was Don Jesus himself who
gave detailed instructions to his lawyer as to how he
wanted to divide his properties among his children by
means of a list of his properties should pertain; (b) the
semi-final draft of the contested will prepared by his
lawyer w-as even corrected by Don Jesus; (c) on the day
of the signing of the will at his house in Ligao, "Don
Jesus was in bright and lively spirits ..., leading in the
conversation which ran from problems of farming and
the merits of French-made wines"; (d) the signing of the
will by Don Jesus and his attesting witnesses was made
after a statement from Don Jesus of the purpose of
their meeting or gathering.
The fact that Don Jesus did not cause his will to be
probated during his lifetime while his previous
holographic win and codicil were duly probated when
he was still alive is a mere speculation which depends
entirely on the discretion of Don Jesus as the testator.
The law does not require that a will be probated during
the lifetime of the testator and for not doing so there
cannot arise any favorable or unfavorable consequence
therefrom.
19
21. Miciano vs Brimo
Facts: Joseph Brimo, an alien died in the Philippines. He
left a will partitioning his estate among his heirs.
However, he provided in his will that his estate should
be disposed of “in accordance with Philippine Laws”.
Further the testator provided that whoever would
oppose his wishes that his estate be distributed in
accordance with Philippine Laws would forfeit their
inheritance.
The judicial administrator of this estate filed a scheme
of partition. Andre Brimo, one of the brothers of the
deceased, opposed it. The court, however, approved it.
The appellant’s opposition is based on the fact that the
partition in question puts into effect the provisions of
Joseph G. Brimo’s will which are not in accordance with
the laws of his Turkish nationality, for which reason
they are violation of Article 16 of the Civil Code.
Issues:
1. WON the will which provides as to how his estate be
disposed of be given effect.
2. WON the heirs will forfeit their inheritance because
they opposed the expressed dispositionin the will of the
decedent.
3. WON the testamentary dispositions are in
accordance with Turkish laws.
Held:
1. No. Even if the testator’s wishes must be given
paramount importance, if the wishes of the testator
contravene a specific provision of law, then that
provision in the will should not be given effect.
A person’s will is merely an instrument, which is
permitted, so his right is not absolute. It should be
subject to the provision of Philippine Laws.
2. The heirs would not forfeit their inheritance because
that provision in the will is not legal. The imposition of
an illegal condition in the institution of a will would be
considered as not written. The estate of the decedent
should be distributed in accordance with his national
law. He cannot provide otherwise. He cannot provide
that anyone who opposes his will should forfeit their
inheritance.
The institution of legatees in this will is conditional, and
the condition is that the instituted legatees must
respect the testator's will to distribute his property, not
in accordance with the laws of his nationality, but in
accordance with the laws of the Philippines.
The fact is, however, that the said condition is void,
being contrary to law, for article 792 of the civil Code
provides the following:
Impossible conditions and those contrary to law or good
morals shall be considered as not imposed and shall not
prejudice the heir or legatee in any manner whatsoever,
even should the testator otherwise provide.
It results from all this that the second clause of the will
regarding the law which shall govern it, and to the
condition imposed upon the legatees, is null and void,
being contrary to law.
All of the remaining clauses of said will with all their
dispositions and requests are perfectly valid and
effective it not appearing that said clauses are contrary
to the testator's national law.
3. The oppositor did not prove that said testimentary
dispositions are not in accordance with the Turkish
laws, inasmuch as he did not present any evidence
showing what the Turkish laws are on the matter, and in
the absence of evidence on such laws, they are
presumed to be the same as those of the Philippines.
22. TORRES vs. LOPEZ
FACTS:
Tomas Rodriguez executed a last will and testament,
the second clause of which declared:
I institute as the only and universal heirs to all
my property, my cousin Vicente Lopez and his
daughter Luz Lopez de Bueno.
On probate of the will, opposition was entered by
Margarita Lopez, the first cousin of the deceased on the
grounds:
20
 (1) that the testator lacked mental capacity
because at the time of senile dementia
and was under guardianship;
(2) that undue influence had been
exercised by the persons benefited in
the document in conjunction with
others who acted in their behalf; and
(3) that the signature of Tomas Rodriguez
to the document was obtained through
fraud and deceit.
For a long time prior to the making of the will, Tomas
was in feeble health. His breakdown was undoubtedly
due to organic weakness, to advancing years and to an
accident which occurred in 1921.
Prior to his death, he was hospitalized and was
diagnosed with "Senility; Hernia inguinal; Decubitus."
Four days after the will was made, Tomas Rodriguez,
died.
The attending physician and three other doctors who
were present at the execution of the will expressed
opinions entirely favorable to the capacity of the
testator.
Three other members of the medical profession
expressed opinions entirely unfavorable to the capacity
of the testator and certified that he was of unsound
mind.
ISSUE: Did Tomas Rodriguez on the making of the will
possess sufficient mentality to make it valid. YES
HELD:
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend
the nature of the transaction in which the testator is
engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be
disposed of and the persons who would naturally be
supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to
comprehend the manner in which the instrument will
distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.
The mental capacity of the testator is determined as of
the date of the execution of his will.
Neither old age, physical infirmities, feebleness of mind,
weakness of the memory, the appointment of a
guardian, nor eccentricities are sufficient singly or
jointly to show testamentary incapacity.
The nature and rationality of the will is of some
practical utility in determining capacity.
The effect of an order naming a guardian for an
incapacitated person is not conclusive with respect to
the condition of the person, pursuant to the provisions
of section 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure. The
decree does not conclusively show that the
testamentary capacity of a person under guardianship is
entirely destroyed.
The presumption created by the appointment of a
guardian may be overcome by evidence proving that
such person at the time he executed a will was in fact of
sound and disposing mind and memory.
To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not
necessary that the mind shall be wholly unbroken,
unimpaired, or unshattered by disease or otherwise, or
that the testator should be in the full possession of his
reasoning faculties.
Senile dementia is childishness. In the first stages of the
disease, a person may possess reason and have will
power.
When Tomas Rodriguez, made his will, he was 76 years
old, physically decrepit, weak of intellect, suffering from
a loss of memory, had a guardian of his person and his
property, and was eccentric, but he still possessed that
spark of reason and of life, that strength of mind to
form a fixed intention and to summon his enfeebled
thoughts to enforce that intention, which the law terms
"testamentary capacity."
With special reference of the definition of testamentary
capacity, we may say this: in making his will, Tomas
Rodriguez, in our opinion comprehended the nature of
the transaction in which he was engaged. He had two
conferences with his lawyer and knew what the will was
to contain. The will was read to him by Mr. Legarda. He
signed the will and its two copies in the proper places at
the bottom and on the left margin.
At that time the testator recollected the property to be
disposed of and the persons who would naturally be
supposed to have claims upon him while for some
21
months prior to the making of the will he had not
manage his property he seem to have retained a
distinct recollection of what it consisted and of his
income.
Occasionally his memory failed him with reference to
the names of his relatives. Ordinarily, he knew who they
were, he seemed to entertain a prediliction towards
Vicente F. Lopez as would be natural since Lopez was
nearest in which the instrument distributed the
property naming the objects of his bounty.
His conversations with Judge Mina disclosed as
insistence on giving all of his property to the two
persons whom he specified.
23. BUGNAO vs. UBAG, ET AL.
FACTS
Appellants contend that the evidence of record is not
sufficient to establish the execution of the alleged will in
the manner and form prescribed in section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure; and that at the time when it is
alleged that the will was executed, Ubag was not of
sound mind and memory, and was physically and
mentally incapable of making a will.
Two of the subscribing witnesses testified in support of
the will, and their testimony was corroborated in all
important details by the testimony of the proponent
herself, who was present when the will was made. It
does not appear from the record why the third
subscribing witness was not called; but since counsel for
the contestants makes no comment upon his absence,
we think it may safely be inferred that there was some
good and sufficient reason therefore. In passing,
however, it may be well to observe that, when because
of death, sickness, absence, or for any other reason, it is
not practicable to call to the witness stand all the
subscribing witnesses to a will offered for probate, the
reason for the absence of any of these witnesses should
be made to appear of record, and this especially in
cases such as the one at bar, wherein there is a
contests.
ISSUE
WON the will is valid. YES
RULING
It is true that the testimony of the oppositor of the will
discloses the fact that he was at that time extremely ill,
in an advanced stage of tuberculosis complicated with
severe intermittent attacks of asthma; that he was too
sick to rise unaided from his bed; that he needed
assistance even to rise himself to a sitting position; and
that during the paroxysms of asthma to which he was
subject he could not speak; but all this evidence of
physical weakness in no wise establishes his mental
incapacity or a lack of testamentary capacity, and
indeed the evidence of the subscribing witnesses as to
the aid furnished them by the testator in preparing the
will, and his clear recollection of the boundaries and
physical description of the various parcels of land set
out therein, taken together with the fact that he was
able to give to the person who wrote the will clear and
explicit instructions as to his desires touching the
disposition of his property, is strong evidence of his
testamentary capacity.
Counsel for appellant suggests that the fact that the
alleged will leaves all the property of the testator to his
widow, and wholly fails to make any provision for his
brothers or sisters, indicates a lack of testamentary
capacity and undue influence; and because of the
inherent improbability that a man would make so
unnatural and unreasonable a will, they contend that
this fact indirectly corroborates their contention that
the deceased never did in fact execute the will. But
when it is considered that the deceased at the time of
his death had no heirs in the ascending or descending
line; that a bitter family quarrel had long separated him
from his brothers and sisters, who declined to have any
relations with the testator because he and his wife were
adherents of the Aglipayano Church; and that this
quarrel was so bitter that none of his brothers or
sisters, although some of them lived in the vicinity,
were present at the time of his death or attended his
funeral; we think the fact that the deceased desired to
leave and did leave all of his property to his widow and
made no provision for his brothers and sisters, who
themselves were grown men and women, by no means
tends to disclose either an unsound mind or the
presence of undue influence on the part of his wife, or
22
in any wise corroborates contestants' allegation that
the will never was executed.
To constitute a sound and disposing mind, it is not
necessary that the mind should be unbroken or
unimpaired, unshattered by disease or otherwise; "it
has not been understood that a testator must possess
these qualities (of sound and disposing mind and
memory) in the highest degree. . . . Few indeed would
be the wills confirmed, if this is correct. Pain, sickness,
debility of body, from age or infirmity, would, according
to its violence or duration, in a greater or less degree,
break in upon, weaken, or derange the mind, but the
derangement must be such as deprives him of the
rational faculties common to man; and, that "Sound
mind does not mean a perfectly balanced mind.
Weakness of intellect, whether it arises from extreme
old age from disease, or great bodily infirmities or
suffering, or from all these combined, may render the
testator incapable of making a valid will, providing such
weakness really disqualifies her from knowing or
appreciating the nature, effects, or consequences of the
act she is engaged in."
Testamentary capacity is the capacity to comprehend
the nature of the transaction which the testator is
engaged at the time, to recollect the property to be
disposed of and the person who would naturally be
supposed to have claims upon the testator, and to
comprehend the manner in which the instrument will
distribute his property among the objects of his bounty.
24. JUNQUERA vs. BORROMEO
FACTS
Vito Borromeo, a widower died at the age of 88 years,
without forced heirs but leaving extensive properties in
the province of Cebu.
Junquera, filed with the Court of First Instance a
petition for the probate of a one page document as the
last will left by said deceased, devising all his properties
to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed
Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and
designating Junquera as executor thereof (Special
Proceedings No. 916-R). The document was drafted in
Spanish, and allegedly signed, and thumbmarked by
said deceased, in the presence of Dr. Gandionco,
Cabiluna and Leonardo as attesting witnesses.
Teofilo Borromeo filed an opposition to the probate of
the will based on the following grounds: (1) that the
formalities required by law had not been complied with;
(2) that the testator was mentally incapable of making a
will at the time of its execution (he was found positive
for bacillus leprosy, and that his sense of hearing and
his eyesight had been considerably impaired, his eyes
being always watery due to the progress of his leprosy);
(3) that the will was procured by undue and improper
influence, on the part of the beneficiaries and/or some
other person; (4) that the signature of the testator was
procured by fraud; and (5) that the testator acted by
mistake or did not intend the instrument he signed to
be his will at the time he affixed his signature thereto.
Vitaliana Borromeo, a niece of the deceased, filed her
own opposition, on the ground that the signature "Vito
Borromeo" appearing thereon was a forgery.
The Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for leave
to intervene and join the oppositors in contesting the
probate of the will, on the ground that, should the
estate be adjudicated the latter by intestacy, it stood to
collect a considerable amount by way of estate and
inheritance taxes.
The Court rendered a decision denying the probate of
the will because of the serious discrepancies in the
testimonies of the proponents of the will with respect
to the number of copies made of the disputed
document. The court also found that the physical
condition of the deceased at the time of the execution
of the questioned document was such that it was highly
improbable, if not impossible, for him to have affixed
his signatures on the documents in the spontaneous
and excellent manner they appear to have been
written.
ISSUE
WON the will was duly executed. NO
23
RULING
It must be conceded that in this jurisdiction, the
subscribing witnesses to a contested will are regarded
as the best witnesses in connection with its due
execution. It is similarly true, however, that to deserve
full credit, their test, testimony must be reasonable and
unbiased, and that, as in the case of any other witness,
their testimony may be overcome by any competent
evidence — direct or circumstantial.
While it is true that the testimony of these subscribing
witnesses was given around eight years after the
alleged execution of the questioned will, still we believe
that the transaction in which they claim to have taken
an important part is of such character and importance
that it cannot be a very easy matter for anyone of them
to have a hazy recollection of the number of copies
signed by the testator and by them. Stranger still would
it be for them to say something in open contradiction
with the reality on the matter. If, as may be clearly
deduced from their testimony — Cabiluna and
Leonardo's — there was only the original and one copy
signed by the testator and the subscribing witnesses,
why is it that three — original and two copies — were
really in existence and were produced in court during
the trial?
Upon the face of the original and two copies of the
contested will appear a total of six alleged signatures of
the testator. They are all well written along a practically
straight line, without any visible sign of tremor or lack
of firmness in the hand that wrote them. According to
the evidence, the testator was then a sick man, eighty-
two years old, with the entire left half of his body
paralyzed since six years before, while the oldest
attesting witness (Cabiluna) was around sixty-five years
of age and Leonardo and Gandionco were only forty-
four and forty-five years old respectively, and were all in
good health. Despite the obviously very poor physical
condition of the testator, Leonardo claims that he
signed the alleged will unaided, writing his name
thereon slowly but continuously or without
interruption. Considering all the attendant
circumstances, we agree with the lower court that Vito
Borromeo could not have written the questioned
signatures.
As stated at the outset, the contested will is claimed to
have been signed and thumbmarked by the testator. An
examination of the thumbmarks, however, readily
shows that, as the lower court found, the same are
"glaringly far from being distinct and clear"; that "they
are not a possible means of identification" nor can "they
possibly be identified to be those of Vito Borromeo, or
for that matter, of any other person whatsoever". It is,
therefore, obvious, that they are of little use in the
resolution of the issue before Us.
ADDITIONAL CASES: OVER AND ABOVE NI SA ATO
ASSIGNED CASES. AKO NA LANG GI-APIL BASI DIAY
MOGAWAS. GIKAN RA NI SA INTERNET. PASENSYA.
25. CRUZ VS. VILLASOR
FACTS
The probate of the last will and testament of the late
Valente Z. Cruz was opposed by petitioner Agapita on
the ground of fraud, deceit, misrepresentation and
undue influence, and that it was not executed in
accordance with law. Of the three instrumental
witnesses thereto, namely Deogracias T. Jamaloas Jr.,
Dr. Francisco Pañares and Atty. Angel H. Teves, Jr., one
of them, the last named, is at the same time the Notary
Public before whom the will was supposed to have been
acknowledged.
ISSUE
Whether or not the probate of a will is valid if one of
the three instrumental witnessed is the notary public to
whom the will was acknowledged.
RULING
NO. To allow the notary public to act as third witness, or
one the attesting and acknowledging witnesses, would
have the effect of having only two attesting witnesses
to the will which would be in contravention of the
provisions of Article 80 be requiring at least three
credible witnesses to act as such and of Article 806
which requires that the testator and the required
number of witnesses must appear before the notary
public to acknowledge the will. The result would be, as
24
has been said, that only two witnesses appeared before W/N notarial will of Brigido Alvarado should be
the notary public for or that purpose. In the admitted to probate despite allegations of defects in
circumstances, the law would not be duly in observed. the execution and attestation thereof as testator was
allegedly blind at the time of execution and the double-
reading requirement under Art. 808 of the NCC was not
complied with.
26. ALVARADO VS. GAVIOLA
HELD:
FACTS:
YES. The spirit behind the law was served though the
letter was not. Although there should be strict
On 5 November 1977, 79-year old Brigido Alvarado
compliance with the substantial requirements of law in
executed a notarial will entitled “Huling Habilin”
order to insure the authenticity of the will, the formal
wherein he disinherited an illegitimate son, petitioner
imperfections should be brushed aside when they do
Cesar Alvarado, and expressly revoked a previously
not affect its purpose and which, when taken into
executed holographic will at the time awaiting probate
account, may only defeat the testator’s will.
before the RTC of Laguna.
According to Bayani Ma. Rino, private respondent, he
Cesar Alvardo was correct in asserting that his father
was present when the said notarial will was executed,
was not totally blind (of counting fingers at 3 feet) when
together with three instrumental witnesses and the
the will and codicil were executed, but he can be so
notary public, where the testator did not read the will
considered for purposes of Art. 808.
himself, suffering as he did from glaucoma.
That Art. 808 was not followed strictly is beyond cavil.
Rino, a lawyer, drafted the eight-page document and
read the same aloud before the testator, the three
However, in the case at bar, there was substantial
instrumental witnesses and the notary public, the latter
compliance where the purpose of the law has been
four following the reading with their own respective
satisfied: that of making the provisions known to the
copies previously furnished them.
testator who is blind or incapable of reading the will
himself (as when he is illiterate) and enabling him to
Thereafter, a codicil entitled “Kasulatan ng Pagbabago
object if they do not accord with his wishes.
ng Ilang Pagpapasiya na Nasasaad sa Huling Habilin na
May Petsa Nobiembre 5, 1977 ni Brigido Alvarado” was
Rino read the testator’s will and codicil aloud in the
executed changing some dispositions in the notarial will
presence of the testator, his three instrumental
to generate cash for the testator’s eye operation.
witnesses, and the notary public.
Said codicil was likewise not read by Brigido Alvarado
Prior and subsequent thereto, the testator affirmed,
and was read in the same manner as with the previously
upon being asked, that the contents read corresponded
executed will.
with his instructions.
Only then did the signing and acknowledgment take
When the notarial will was submitted to the court for
place.
probate, Cesar Alvarado filed his opposition as he said
that the will was not executed and attested as required
There is no evidence that the contents of the will and
by law; that the testator was insane or mentally
the codicil were not sufficiently made known and
incapacitated due to senility and old age; that the will
communicated to the testator.
was executed under duress, or influence of fear or
With four persons, mostly known to the testator,
threats; that it was procured by undue pressure and
following the reading word for word with their own
influence on the part of the beneficiary; and that the
copies, it can be safely concluded that the testator was
signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick.
reasonably assured that what was read to him were the
terms actually appearing on the typewritten
ISSUE:
documents.

25
The rationale behind the requirement of reading the
will to the testator if he is blind or incapable of reading
the will to himself (as when he is illiterate), is to make
the provisions thereof known to him, so that he may be
able to object if they are not in accordance with his
wishes.
Although there should be strict compliance with the
substantial requirements of law in order to insure the
authenticity of the will, the formal imperfections should
be brushed aside when they do not affect its purpose
and which, when taken into account, may only defeat
the testator’s will.
27. Enriquez v. Abadia
The validity of a will as to its form depends upon the
law in force at the time it was made. (Art. 795, NCC)
Facts: Case: probate of will. Sept. 6, 1923: Fr. Sancho
Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu, executed a
document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament.
The document was composed of 3 pages, handwritten
in Spanish (a language spoken and understood by the
testator), and signed by the testator on the left margin
of the front of each of the 3 pages and at the end of the
document on the last page. The document was
numbered with Arabic numerals. At the time of the
execution of aforesaid document, holographic wills
were not permitted by law. Still, the CFI ruled that
because at the time of the hearing and when the case
was to be decided, the NCC was already in force, a
liberal view ought to be taken to carry out the intention
of the testator. According to the lower court, the
intention of the testator is the controlling factor and
may override any defect in form.
Issue: Whether a holographic will executed before the
effectivity of the NCC, which allows therefor, is valid?
Held: No. The will was denied probate. The validity of a
will is to be judged not by the law in force at the time of
the testator’s death or at the time the supposed will is
presented in court for probate or when the petition is
decided by the court but at the time the instrument was
executed. Art. 810 of the NCC provides that a person
may execute a holographic will which must be entirely
written, dated and signed by the testator himself and
need not be witnessed.
28. BAGTAS VS. PAGUIO
Perfect soundness of mind is not essential to
testamentary capacity. Neither age, nor sickness, nor
extreme distress, nor debility of body will affect
the capacity to make a will, if sufficient
intelligence remains.
Facts: The last will and testament executed by Pioquinto
Paguio who died a year and five months from the
execution, was propounded by by the executrix, Juliana
Bagtas, widow of Paguio. But Paguio’s son and several
grandchildren by a former marriage opposed the
probate asserting that Paguio was not in the full of
enjoyment and use of his mental faculties and was
without the mental capacity necessary to execute a
valid will. According to them, Paguio suffered from a
paralysis of the left side of his body. This resulted to the
impairment of his hearing, lost of the power of speech
and uncontrolled saliva discharge. Despite the paralysis,
Paguio retained the use of his right hand and was able
to write fairly well. Through the medium of signs Paguio
was able to indicate his wishes to his wife and to the
other members of his family.
Issue:
Whether or not paralysis would establish mental
incapacity that would disqualify the testator from
executing a valid will.
Ruling:
No. Neither age, nor sickness, nor extreme distress, nor
debility of body will affect the capacity to make a will, if
sufficient intelligence remains. The law does not require
that a person shall continue in the full enjoyment and
use of his pristine physical and mental powers in order
to execute a valid will. Perfect soundness of mind is not
essential to testamentary capacity. Even the failure of
memory is not sufficient to create the incapacity, unless
it be total, or extend to his immediate family or
property because if such were the legal standard, few
indeed would be the number of wills that could meet
26
such exacting requirements. The presumption of law is
in favor of the mental capacity of the testator and the
burden is upon the contestants of the will to prove the
lack of testamentary capacity. On the case at hand, it
does not appear that Paguio’s conduct was irrational in
any particular and he seems to have comprehended
clearly what the nature of the business was in which he
was engaged. Therefore, mental incapacity which
renders the will invalid, cannot be established.
29. Nenita Suroza vs Honrado – Succession – Will
Should be Written in a Language Known to the
Testator
SYLLABUS
1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; SUPREME COURT
SUPERVISION OVER LOWER COURTS; ADMINISTRATIVE
CASE AGAINST JUDGES; REQUIREMENTS TO BE FOUND
GUILTY OF SERIOUS MISCONDUCT OR INEFFICIENCY. —
Administrative action may be taken against a judge of
the court of first instance for serious misconduct or
inefficiency (Sec. 67, Judiciary Law). Misconduct implies
malice or a wrongful intent, not a mere error of
judgment. "For serious misconduct to exist, there must
be reliable evidence showing that the judicial acts
complained of were corrupt or inspired by an intention
to violate the law, or were in persistent disregard of
well-known legal rules (In re Impeachment of
Horrilleno, 43 Phil. 212, 214-215).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INEFFICIENCY DEFINED. —
Inefficiency implies negligence, incompetence,
ignorance and carelessness. A judge would be
inexcusably negligent if he failed to observe in the
performance of his duties that diligence, prudence and
circumspection which the law requires in the rendition
of any public service (In re Climaco, Adm. Case No. 134-
J, Jan. 21, 1974, 35 SCRA 107, 119).
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE CASE
AT BAR SHOWING NEGLIGENCE AND DERELICTION OF
DUTY. — In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the
will and noting that it was written in English and was
thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, could
have readily perceived that the will is shown in the
attestation clause and notarial acknowledgment where
the testatrix is repeatedly referred to as the "testator"
instead of "testatrix", that he could have noted not only
the anomaly as to the language of the will but also that
there was something wrong in instituting the supposed
granddaughter as sole heiress and giving nothing at all
to her supposed father who was still alive, that after the
hearing conducted by respondent deputy clerk of court,
respondent judge could have noticed that the notary
was not presented as a witness, and that in spite of the
absence of an opposition, respondent judge should
have personally conducted the hearing on the probate
of the will so that he could have ascertained whether
the will was validly executed.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; INSUFFICIENCY IN HANDLING
THE TESTATE CASE; PENALTY; CASE AT BAR. — For
inefficiency in handling the testate case of Marcelina S.
Suroza, a fine equivalent to his salary for one month is
imposed on respondent judge.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT
AGAINST DEPUTY CLERK OF COURT; BECOMES MOOT
AND ACADEMIC WHEN RESPONDENT IS NO LONGER
EMPLOYED IN THE JUDICIARY; CASE AT BAR. — The case
against respondent Deputy Clerk of Court has become
moot and academic because she is no longer employed
in the judiciary. Since September 1, 1980, she has been
assistant city fiscal of Surigao City. She is beyond this
Court's disciplinary jurisdiction (Peralta vs. Firme, Adm.
Matter No. 2044-CFI, November 21, 1980, 101 SCRA
225).
FACTS:
In 1973, Marcelina Suroza supposedly executed a
notarial will bequeathing her house and lot to a certain
Marilyn Suroza. In 1974, Marcelina died. Marina Paje
was named as the executrix in the said will and she
petitioned before CFI Rizal that the will be admitted to
probate. The presiding judge, Honrado admitted the will
to probate and assigned Paje as the administratrix.
Honrado also issued an ejectment order against the
occupants of the house and lot subject of the will.
Nenita Suroza, daughter in law of Marcelina (her
husband, son of Marcelina was confined in the
Veteran’s Hospital), learned of the probate proceeding
when she received the ejectment order (as she was
residing in said house and lot).
Nenita opposed the probate proceeding. She alleged
that the said notarial will is void because (a) the
instituted heir therein Marilyn Suroza is actually Marilyn
27
Sy and she is a stranger to Marcelina, (b) the only son of
Marcelina, Agapito Suroza, is still alive and is the
compulsory heir, (c) the notarial will is written in
English a language not known to Marcelina because the
latter was illiterate so much so that she merely
thumbmarked the will, (d) the notary public who
notarized will admitted that Marcelina never appeared
before him and that he notarized the said will merely to
accommodate the request of a lawyer friend but with
the understanding that Marcelina should later appear
before him but that never happened.
Honrado still continued with the probate despite the
opposition until testamentary proceeding closed and
the property transferred to Marilyn Sy.
Nenita then filed this administrative case against
Honrado on the ground of misconduct.
ISSUE: Whether or not Honrado is guilty of misconduct
for admitting into probate a void will.
HELD: Yes. Despite the valid claim raised by Nenita, he
still continued with the testamentary proceeding, this
showed his wrongful intent. He may even be criminally
liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or
interlocutory order or rendering a manifestly unjust
judgment or interlocutory order by reason of
inexcusable negligence or ignorance.
The will is written in English and was thumb marked by
an obviously illiterate Marcelina. This could have readily
been perceived by Honrado that that the will is void. In
the opening paragraph of the will, it was stated that
English was a language “understood and known” to the
testatrix. But in its concluding paragraph, it was stated
that the will was read to the testatrix “and translated
into Filipino language.” That could only mean that the
will was written in a language not known to the
illiterate testatrix and, therefore, it is void because of
the mandatory provision of Article 804 of the Civil Code
that every will must be executed in a language or dialect
known to the testator. Had Honrado been careful and
observant, he could have noted not only the anomaly as
to the language of the will but also that there was
something wrong in instituting to Marilyn Sy as sole
heiress and giving nothing at all to Agapito who was still
alive.
Honrado was fined by the Supreme Court.
30. Dolar vs. Diancin
1. WILLS, EXECUTION OF; SIGNING BY
THUMBMARKS. — The requirement of the statute that
the will shall be "signed" is satisfied not only by the
customary written signature but also by the testator's
or testatrix' thumbmark.
2. ID.; ID.; EXPERT'S TESTIMONY AS TO IDENTITY
OF THUMBMARKS. — Expert's testimony as to the
identity of thumbmarks or fingerprints is admissible.
The method of identification of fingerprints is a science
requiring close study.
3. ID.; ID.; ID. — Where thumb impressions are
blurred and many of the characteristic marks far from
clear, thus rendering it difficult to trace the features
enumerated by experts as showing the identity or lack
of identity of the impressions, the court is justified in
refusing to accept the opinions of alleged experts and in
substituting its own opinion that a distinct similarity in
some respects between the admittedly genuine
thumbmark and the questioned thumbmarks, is
evident. (Emperor vs. Abdul Hamid [1905], 32 Indian L.
Rep., 759.)
4. WITNESSES, CREDIBILITY OF. — The testimony
of a witness called by both parties is worthy of credit.
Facts:
The deceased Paulino Diancin made will, and signed it
by his thumbmark. When the will was presented for
probate, the parties presented a document wherein
Diancin’s thumbmark was affixed in order to compare it
with the thumbark on the will. Another witness also
testified that he saw Diancin placed the same on the
will. The trial court denied the probate on the ground
that there were differences between thumbmark on the
will and the documentary evidence.
Issue:
Whether or not the will must be probabated?
Ruling:
Yes. The requirement of the statute that the will shall
be "signed" is satisfied not only the customary written
signature but also by the testator's or testatrix'
thumbmark .Expert testimony as to the identity
of thumbmarks or fingerprints is of course
28
admissible. The method of identification of fingerprints
is a science requiring close study .Where thumb
impressions are blurred and many of the characteristic
marks far from clear, thus rendering it difficult to trace
the features enumerated by experts as showing the
identity or lack of identity of the impressions, the court
is justified in refusing to accept the opinions of alleged
experts and in substituting its own opinion that a
distinct similarity in some respects between the
admittedly genuine thumbmark and the questioned
thumbmarks, is evident .This we do here. (Emperor vs.
Abdul Hamid [1905], 32 Indian L. Rep., 759, cited in 3
Chamberlayne on the Modern Law of Evidence,
sec. 2561, notes 3.)
There is another means of approach to the question
and an obvious one. The three instrumental witnesses
united in testifying concerning the circumstances
surrounding the execution of the will. It was stated that
in addition to the testator and themselves, on other
person, Diosdado Dominado, was present. This latter
individual was called as a witness by the oppositors to
the will to identify Exhibit 8. He was later placed on the
witness stand by the proponent on rebuttal, and
thereupon declared positively that he was the one
who prepared the will for the signature of Paulino
Diancin; that the thumbmarks appearing on the will
were those of Paulino Diancin, and that he saw Paulino
Diancin make these impressions. The testimony of a
witness called by both parties is worthy of credit.
We reach the very definite conclusion that the
document presented for probate as the last will of the
deceased Paulino Diancin was, in truth, his will, and that
the thumbmarks appearing thereon were the
thumbmarks of the testator .Accordingly, error is found,
which means that the judgment appealed from must
be, as it is hereby, reversed, and the will ordered
admitted to probate, without special finding as to costs
in this instance.
31. Lee v. Tambago 544 SCRA 393
FACTS:
Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty.
Regino B. Tambago, with violation of Notarial Law and
the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a will
that is alleged to be spurious in nature in containing
forged signatures of his father, the decedent, Vicente
Lee Sr. and two other witnesses. In the said will, the
decedent supposedly bequeathed his entire estate to
his wife Lim Hock Lee, save for a parcel of land which he
devised to Vicente Lee, Jr. and Elena Lee, half-siblings of
complainant.
The will was purportedly executed and acknowledged
before respondent on June 30, 1965.Complainant,
however, pointed out that the residence certificateof
the testator noted in the acknowledgment of the will
was dated January 5, 1962.Furthermore, the signature
of the testator was not the same as his signature as
donor in a deed of donationwhich supposedly contained
his purported signature. Complainant averred that the
signatures of his deceased father in the will and in the
deed of donation were “in any way entirely and
diametrically opposed from one another in all angle[s].”
Complainant also questioned the absence of notation of
the residence certificates of the purported witnesses
Noynay and Grajo. He alleged that their signatures had
likewise been forged and merely copied from their
respective voters’ affidavits.
Complainant further asserted that no copy of such
purported will was on file in the archives division of the
Records Management and Archives Office of the
National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA).
ISSUE:
Was the will spurious?
HELD:
Yes, thus Tambago violated the Notarial Law and the
ethics of legal profession.
The law provides for certain formalities that must be
followed in the execution of wills. The object of
solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to
close the door on bad faith and fraud, to avoid
substitution of wills and testaments and to guarantee
their truth and authenticity.
A notarial will, as the contested will in this case, is
required by law to be subscribed at the end thereof by
the testator himself. In addition, it should be attested
and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in
the presence of the testator and of one another. The
29
will in question was attested by only two witnesses. On
this circumstance alone, the will must be considered
void. This is in consonance with the rule that acts
executed against the provisions of mandatory or
prohibitory laws shall be void, except when the law
itself authorizes their validity. The Civil Code likewise
requires that a will must be acknowledged before a
notary public by the testator and the witnesses. An
acknowledgment is the act of one who has executed a
deed in going before some competent officer or court
and declaring it to be his act or deed. It involves an
extra step undertaken whereby the signatory actually
declares to the notary public that the same is his or her
own free act and deed. The acknowledgment in a
notarial will has a two-fold purpose: (1) to safeguard the
testator’s wishes long after his demise and (2) to assure
that his estate is administered in the manner that he
intends it to be done.
A cursory examination of the acknowledgment of the
will in question shows that this particular requirement
was neither strictly nor substantially complied with. For
one, there was the conspicuous absence of a notation
of the residence certificates of the notarial witnesses
Noynay and Grajo in the acknowledgment. Similarly, the
notation of the testator’s old residence certificate in the
same acknowledgment was a clear breach of the law.
These omissions by respondent invalidated the will.
ID.; ID.; ID. — An attestation clause is made for the purpose of
preserving, in permanent form, a record of the facts attending the
execution of the will, so that in case of failure of the memory of the
subscribing witnesses, or other casualty, they may still be proved.
(Thompson on Wills, 2d ed., sec. 132.) will, therefore, should not be
rejected where its attestation clause serves the purposes of the
law. The law-making body, in recognition of the dangers to which
testamentary dispositions are apt to be subject in the hands of
unscrupulous individuals, has surrounded the execution of wills
with every solemnity deemed necessary to safeguard it. This
purpose was indicated when our legislature provided for the
exclusion of evidence aliunde to prove the due execution of the
will. We should not, however, attribute the prohibition as indicative
of a desire to impose unreasonable restraint or beyond that reason
and justice permit. It could not have been the intention of the
legislature in providing for the essential safeguards in the execution
of a will to shackle the very right of testamentary disposition which
the law recognizes and holds sacred. The pronouncement of this
court in Abangan vs. Abangan (40 Phil., 476, 479). expresses the
sound rule to which we have recently adhered in principle
(Rodriguez vs. Yap, G. R. No. 45924, promulgated May 18, 1939;
and Grey vs. Fabie, G. R. No. 45160, promulgated May 23, 1939).

As the acknowledging officer of the contested will,

respondent was required to faithfully observe the
formalities of a will and those of notarization. These
formalities are mandatory and cannot be disregarded.

32. G.R. No. L-46097 October 18, 1939

TEOFILA ADEVA VIUDA DE LEYNEZ vs. IGNACIO
LEYNEZ,

.WILLS; PROBATE; ATTESTATION CLAUSE. — The requirement that

the attestation clause, among other things, shall state "that the
testator signed the will and every page thereof in the presence of
three witnesses, and that the witnesses signed the will in the
presence of the testator and of each other," is sufficiently complied
with, it appearing that the testator and the witnesses signed each
and every page of the will according to the stipulation of the parties
(Record on Appeal, stipulation, pp. 10, 14, 15); and this fact being
shown in the will itself, and there being, furthermore, no question
raised as to the authenticity of the signatures of the testator and
the witnesses.

30