06 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador.

RULE 39 continued to Rule 65 107

(Certiorari)
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable 1) REPUBLIC V. CARMEL DEVELOPMENT, G.R. NO.142572, FEBRUARY 20, 2002 - DE LA
and enforceable. PAZ

Thus, in the same light that the Court dismissed the SC petitions in the Southern Republic v. Carmel Development, G.R. No.142572, February 20, 2002 – (rule 65)
Hemisphere cases on the basis of, among others, lack of actual justiciable controversy
(or the ripening seeds of one), the   RTC  should  have  dismissed  ROQUE,  ET  AL.’  petition   Doctrine: Rule 46 primarily governs original actions for certiorari filed in the Court of
for declaratory relief all the same. Appeals but Rule 65 generally serves to supplement the same. Rules 46 and 65 co-exist
with each other and should be construed so as to give effect to every provision of both
It is well to note that ROQUE, ET AL. also lack the required locus standi to mount their rules. THEREFORE, the petition should be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate
constitutional challenge against the implementation of the above-stated provisions of original OR certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject
RA 9372 since they have not shown any direct and personal interest in the case. thereof.
While it has been previously held that transcendental public importance
dispenses with the requirement that the petitioner has experienced or is in Emergency Digest: Carmel filed a Complaint for recovery of possession with
actual danger of suffering direct and personal injury, it must be stressed that preliminary injunction against DEPED and Caloocan. DEPED filed an MR of the Orders
cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether denying the Extension of Time to file an Answer and Declaring DEPED in default. The
different genus of constitutional litigation. RTC set aside the orders yet denied to dismiss the case. The RTC citing substantial
Towards this end, compelling State and societal interests in the proscription of compliance decided that DEPED should instead be allowed to submit an Answer. DEPED
harmful conduct necessitate a closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi, as in this filed an MR. DEPED filed a Petition for Certiorari. CA dismissed stating that that the
case. To rule otherwise, would be to corrupt the settled doctrine of locus petition does not contain certified true copies of the assailed orders.
standi, as every worthy cause is an interest shared by the general public.
Rule 46 primarily governs original actions for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals but
As to the fifth requisite for an action for declaratory relief, neither can it be inferred that Rule 65 generally serves to supplement the same. Rules 46 and 65 co-exist with each
the controversy at hand is ripe for adjudication since the possibility of abuse, based on other and should be construed so as to give effect to every provision of both rules.
the above-discussed   allegations   in   ROQUE,   ET   AL.’   petition,   remain   highly-speculative THEREFORE, the petition should be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate
and merely theorized. original OR certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject
It is well-settled that a question is ripe for adjudication when the act being thereof. Clearly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition
challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging for certiorari filed by the Department of Education on the ground that it was
it. This ROQUE, ET AL. failed to demonstrate in the case at bar. accompanied by mere duplicate originals instead of certified true copies of the assailed
orders. Indeed, the copies of the orders attached to the petition were the copies
Finally, as regards the sixth requisite, the Court finds it irrelevant to proceed with a furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General by the trial court as counsel of the
discussion on the availability of adequate reliefs since no impending threat or injury to Department of Education. We note that the Order dated June 15, 1998 was duly signed
the ROQUE, ET AL. exists in the first place. by the presiding judge of the trial court. However, the Order dated August 17, 1998 falls
short of the requirements found in Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 3-96
All told, in view of the absence of the fourth and fifth requisites for an action for considering that it was not duly signed or initialed by the judge or other appropriate
declaratory   relief,   as   well   as   the   irrelevance   of   the   sixth   requisite,   ROQUE,   ET   AL.’   officer of the court nor does it bear the dry seal thereof. Instead, it contains the stamp
petition for declaratory relief should have been dismissed. Thus, by giving due course to mark  `ORIGINAL  SIGNED’  atop  the  name  of  the  presiding  judge. Still, there is substantial
the same, it cannot be gainsaid that the RTC gravely abused its discretion. compliance with the requirement that the petition be accompanied by duplicate
originals of the orders being assailed since the Order dated June 15, 1998 is what is
being primarily assailed in the petition, while the Order dated August 17, 1998 was
C. REVIEW OF JUDGMENT OF COA OR COMELEC (RULE 64) merely the denial of the motion to reconsider the same. A liberal construction of the
Rules may be invoked in this instance to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as
possible.
D. CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS (RULE 65)

Complete Digest:
D.1 CERTIORARI
Facts: Carmel Development, Inc. filed with a Complaint for recovery of possession
with preliminary injunction against the Department of Education, Culture and Sports
 06 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 39 continued to Rule 65 108
(Certiorari)
and the Caloocan City School Board. Carmel sought to recover possession of a parcel of On August 17, 1998, the RTC denied the MR stating that the Motion is based on bare
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. (64007)15807, allegedly occupied by assertions and no proof has been presented to substantiate their claims. Substantial
the Pangarap Elementary School and the Pangarap High School which were established compliance with the SC circular is sufficient.
by the Department of Education.
Dissatisfied, the Department of Education filed a petition for certiorari under Rule
DEPED filed a Motion for Extension of Time to File Answer dated April 16, 1998 as well as 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure before the Court of Appeals
a Manifestation with Motion to Dismiss dated April 24, 1998. seeking   to   annul   the   trial   court’s   orders   dated June 15, 1998 and August 17,
1998. Carmel filed a Comment as well as a Supplemental Comment while the
On April 27, 1998, Carmel filed a Motion to Declare Defendants in Default alleging that Department of Education filed its Reply.
the period to answer had already lapsed since the subpoenas were served upon the
Department of Education and the School Board on April 2, 1998 and March 2, 1998, On   August   16,   1999,   the   Court   of   Appeals   dismissed   the   Department   of   Education’s  
respectively. RTC granted the motion to declare in default and allow presentation of petition for certiorari and denied on March 17, 2000 the motion to reconsider the same.
evidence ex parte. CA held that the petition does no contain certified true copies of the assailed orders.
Under Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, it is required that the
In an Order dated April 29, 1998, the trial court declared the “Motion  for  Extension of petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the assailed orders and not by
Time to File Answer filed on April 28, 1998 by the Department of Education and the mere duplicate originals.
School  Board  as  moot  and  academic.”[7] Thereafter, in an Order dated April 30, 1998, the
trial   court   declared   that   “no   action   shall   be   taken   on   the Manifestation with Motion to Hence, this Petition.
Dismiss filed on April 30, 1998 by the Department of Education and the School Board
considering that the defendants have already been declared in default and have lost
their  standing  in  court.”[8] Issue:
A. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE
On May 14, 1998, the Department of Education filed a Motion for Reconsideration PETITION ON THE GROUND THAT IT WAS NOT ACCOMPANIED BY CERTIFIED
of the Orders dated April 27, 29 and 30, 1998 and to Lift Order of TRUE COPIES OF THE ASSAILED DECISION AND RESOLUTION BUT ONLY
Default It contended that it seasonably filed its motion for extension of time to file its DUPLICATE ORIGINALS. YES, DUPLICATES ALLOWED.
answer on April 16, 1998. It also claimed that it filed its motion to dismiss within the
reglementary period. It explained that the summons issued on March 23, 1998 was B. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT
received by the School Board on March 27, 1998 and not on March 2, 1998 as GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WAS COMMITTED BY THE TRIAL COURT WHEN
erroneously found by the trial court. The Department of Education further claimed THE   LATTER   DENIED  PETITIONER’S   MOTION  TO   DISMISS   NOTWITHSTANDING  
that Carmel failed to notify and furnish it with a copy of the motion to declare it in THE  FACT   THAT   PRIVATE   RESPONDENT’S   PLEADING  SHOWS   LITIS   PENDENTIA.    
default. Aside from praying for the lifting of the order of default, the Department of YES
Education likewise sought the dismissal of the case for violation of Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94[10] on forum shopping. Carmel filed an Opposition C. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT PRIVATE
on June 8, 1998. RESPONDENT HAS COMPLIED WITH SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE
CIRCULAR NO. 04-94. NO
In an Order dated June 15, 1998, the RTC set aside its orders dated April 27, 29 and
30, 1998 and lifted the order of default. The trial court, however, denied the
dismissal of the case, saying that justice would be better served if DEPED was allowed Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Court of
to submit their answer. Appeals dated August 16, 1999 and Resolution dated March 17, 2000 dismissing the
Department  of  Education’s  petition  are  SET  ASIDE.  The  complaint  filed  by  respondent  
The Department of Education filed a Manifestation with Motion for Carmel Development, Inc. against the Department of Education with the Regional Trial
Reconsideration of the Order dated June 15, 1998. It  contended  that  the  trial  court’s   Court of Caloocan City (Branch 125) in Civil Case No. C-18264 is DISMISSED without
finding  of  “substantial  compliance”  with  the  Supreme  Court  Circular  had  “no  factual  or   prejudice.
legal   bases   to   stand   on.” It also maintained that Carmel is engaged in forum SO ORDERED.
shopping. Carmel filed its Opposition dated July 31, 1998 claiming that the issues in the
other pending cases are different.
Ratio:
 06 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 39 continued to Rule 65 109
(Certiorari)
First Issue: Propriety of Dismissal of the Petition accompanied by mere duplicate originals instead of certified true copies of the assailed
“The   filing   of   original   actions   for certiorari in the Court of Appeals is governed by orders.
Section 3, Rule 46 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which requires that the petition Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 3-96 defines duplicate originals in this
for   certiorari   “be   accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or certified true wise:
copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof x   x   x.” The same “1. The   “duplicate   original   copy”   shall   be   understood   to   be   that   copy   of   the  
Section  provides  that  “the  failure  of the petitioner to comply with any of the foregoing decision, judgment, resolution or order which is intended for and furnished to a
requirements  shall  be  sufficient  ground  for  the  dismissal  of  the  petition.” party in the case or proceeding in the court or adjudicative body which rendered
and issued the same. xxx.
This is the clear import of Sections 1, 2 and 3, Rule 46 (Original Cases) of the 1997 Rules 2. The duplicate original copy must be duly signed or initialed by the authorities
which read in pertinent parts: or the corresponding officer or representative of the issuing entity, or shall at least
“SECTION  1. Title of cases. – In all cases originally filed in the Court of Appeals, the party bear the dry seal thereof or any other official indication of the authenticity and
instituting the action shall be called the petitioner and the opposing party the completeness of such copy. xxx.”
respondent.
SEC. 2. To what actions applicable. – This Rule shall apply to original actions Indeed, the copies of the orders attached to the petition were the copies furnished
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus and quo warranto. to the Office of the Solicitor General by the trial court as counsel of the Department of
Except as otherwise provided, the actions for annulment of judgment shall be Education. We note that the Order dated June 15, 1998 was duly signed by the presiding
governed by Rule 47, for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus by Rule 65, and for quo judge of the trial court. However, the Order dated August 17, 1998 falls short of the
warranto by Rule 66. requirements found in Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 3-96 considering that
SEC. 3. Contents and filing of petition; effect of non-compliance with requirements. - x x x. it was not duly signed or initialed by the judge or other appropriate officer of the court
It shall be filed in seven (7) clearly legible copies together with proof of service thereof nor does it bear the dry seal thereof. Instead, it contains the stamp mark `ORIGINAL
on the respondent with the original copy intended for the court indicated as such by the SIGNED’  atop  the  name  of  the  presiding  judge. Still, there is substantial compliance with
petitioner, and shall be accompanied by a clearly legible duplicate original or the requirement that the petition be accompanied by duplicate originals of the orders
certified true copy of the judgment, order, resolution, or ruling subject thereof, being assailed since the Order dated June 15, 1998 is what is being primarily assailed in
such material portions of the record as are referred to therein, and other documents the petition, while the Order dated August 17, 1998 was merely the denial of the motion
relevant or pertinent thereto. xxx.” (Emphasis supplied) to reconsider the same. A liberal construction of the Rules may be invoked in this
instance to achieve substantial justice as expeditiously as possible.
The  phrase  “[e]xcept   as  otherwise  provided”   means   exactly  what   it  says,  that   is,   except  
as otherwise provided in Rule 46, original actions for certiorari shall be governed by Second issue: Litis Pendentia
Rule 65. Rule 46 should be construed in relation to Rule 65 without rendering any of its
provisions useless. This   is   evident   in   Section   6   of   Rule   65   which   provides   that   “[i]n   DEPED says that there two other cases pending before another court (seeking
petitions for certiorari before the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals, the provision recovery of possession of the parcel of land, enjoining the principal and other
of  Section  2,  Rule  56,  shall  be  observed.” representatives from building additional buildings of the same parcel of land, and an
action for declaration of ownership and quieting of title involving the same parcel of
This simply means that “the following rules which are of primary governance in the land.) In sum, the Department of Education argues that all three cases revolve
Court of Appeals, viz.: Rule 46 (Original Actions in the Court of Appeals), Rule 48 around the same parties' conflicting claims of ownership and possession over the
(Preliminary Conference), Rule 49 (Hearings on Oral Argument), Rule 51 (Judgment), same parcel of land. Carmel insists there is no forum shopping.
and Rule 52 (Motion for Reconsideration) have been expressly made applicable to An important issue of fact exists - whether there are two other similar cases
original actions in the Supreme Court save for those portions which deal strictly with pending in another court as alleged in the motion to dismiss. Since resolution of
and  are  specifically  intended   for  appealed  cases  in  the  Court  of  Appeals.” [17] (Emphasis this issue requires presentation of proof, the trial court should not have decided
supplied) the issue without giving the parties an opportunity to present proof of their
respective stand in a hearing duly held for that purpose.
In fine, Rule 46 primarily governs original actions for certiorari filed in the Court In light of Sections 2 and 3 of Rule 16, the appellate court erred in finding that
of Appeals but Rule 65 generally serves to supplement the same. Rules 46 and 65 there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in precipitately
co-exist with each other and should be construed so as to give effect to every denying the motion to dismiss without so much as a hearing and giving the party
provision of both rules. concerned an opportunity to present its proof. Verily, the charge of forum shopping
or litis pendentia, which works havoc upon orderly judicial procedure, requires the
Clearly, it was error for the Court of Appeals to dismiss the petition presentation of proof and the Department of Education should have been given an
for certiorari filed by the Department of Education on the ground that it was opportunity to do so.
 06 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 39 continued to Rule 65 110
(Certiorari)
retained counsel will be deemed substantial compliance with the rule. A certification
Third Issue: Compliance with Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94 against forum shopping executed by retained counsel should not pass muster in
We have ruled that the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition on a this case lest the objectives of the rule be subverted.
technicality. However, we find that remanding the case to the appellate court to resolve
the remaining issue will serve no useful purpose. It is more in consonance with the
2) JIAO ET AL. V. NLRC, G.R. NO. 182331, APRIL 18, 2012 – GERALDEZ
speedy disposition of justice for us to resolve this particular legal question since no
factual issues are involved.
The Supreme Court Circular, with minor modifications, has been incorporated in G.R. No. 182331 April 18, 2012
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure which took effect on July 1, 1997 before Carmel filed
its complaint on March 17, 1998. The requirement of a certification against forum MA. CORINA C. JIAO, et al. vs. NLRC, GLOBAL BUSINESS BANK, METROBANK, et al.
shopping has likewise been adopted in Rules 42, 43, 45, 46, 47, 64 and 65.[20]
The rule on certification against forum shopping is intended to prevent the
actual filing of multiple petitions or complaints involving identical causes of ER: The employees of Philbank were under a Gratuity Pay Plan which provided for 1
action, subject matter and issues in other tribunals or agencies as a form of forum month salary for every year of service in the event of separation without fault of the
shopping.[21] This is rooted in the principle that a party-litigant should not be employee. Eventually, Philbank merged with Globalbank, and the petitioners were
allowed to pursue simultaneous remedies in different forums, as this practice is redundated.  They  received  a   Special   Separation  Program   that  gave   them   150%  month’s  
detrimental to orderly judicial procedure. [22] salary for every year of service. After receiving their separation pay, they filed a
The rule expressly requires that a certification against forum shopping complaint  for  more  separation  pay,  saying  they  lacked  50%  of  a  month’s  salary  because  
should be attached to complaints or other initiatory pleadings filed before the 100% of the 150% rightfull belonged to them as separation pay (in other words,
courts. The rule also requires that the party, not counsel must certify under oath they want 200% salary: 100% separation pay and 100% gratuity pay). The LA ruled in
that he has not commenced any other action involving the same issues in the favor of the Banks. NLRC affirmed the LA. Without filing an MR, the petitioners went
courts or any other tribunal or agency. straight to the CA via Rule 65 certiorari. The CA dismissed for lack of an MR. Held: The
A cursory examination  of  Carmel’s  complaint  shows  that  the  certification  against   SC affirmed the CA, saying the petitioners may not arrogate to themselves the
forum shopping found at the end thereof was attested by its counsel Juan Victor R. determination of whether a motion for reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense
Llamas and not by plaintiff or any of the principal parties as required by the rule. This with the requirement of filing a motion for reconsideration, the petitioners must show a
is fatal to  Carmel’s  cause. concrete, compelling, and valid reason for doing so. Whimsical and arbitrary deviations
The certification against forum shopping must be by the plaintiff or any of the from the rules cannot be condoned in the guise of a plea for a liberal interpretation
principal parties and not by the attorney. It is mandatory that the certification be thereof.
executed by the petitioner himself, and not by the attorney. A certification against forum
shopping executed by counsel is cause for dismissal of the case. COMPLETE
In this case, Carmel admits that their lawyer signed the certification against forum
shopping. Carmel   now   asserts   that   their   lawyer’s   signature   must   be   accepted   as   Facts: [*Note: All the labor stuff has nothing to do for our class. No need to read them
substantial compliance with the requirements of the Supreme Court Circular intently.]
citing Robern Development Corporation vs. Quitain.[29] Regrettably, reliance on said case
is misplaced and could not relieve Carmel of the adverse effect of non-compliance. The
same could not be said of the instant case. Carmel does not claim or imply that Atty. 1. The numerous petitioners here were regular employees of Philbank. They were
Juan Victor R. Llamas who executed the certification against forum shopping was subject to a Gratuity Pay Plan for employees, wherein basically any separation
Carmel’s   internal   legal   counsel   or   corporate   officer   charged  with  monitoring   Carmel’s   without fault from the employee (reaching 60, death, sickness, resignation, etc.) will
legal cases before courts, tribunals or quasi-judicial agencies. For all intents and be paid 1 month salary for every year of service. (Old Plan)
purposes, he was merely a retained lawyer and his execution of the certification does 2. Another plan was devised by Philbank. Now, employees separated without fault
not constitute substantial compliance with the rule. shall be entitled to either one hundred percent (100%) of his accrued gratuity
The mandatory character of the requirement that the certification be signed by the party benefit or the actual benefit due him under the Plan, whichever is greater. (New
and not merely by the retained counsel is underscored by the Department of Plan)
Education’s   allegation   in  its   Motion   to   Dismiss   and   subsequent   pleadings   that   Carmel   is   3. Eventually, Philbank merged with Globalbank. Although Philbank was the surviving
actually engaged in forum shopping. The rationale for this requirement assumes greater entity, it opted to operate under the name Globalbank.
importance considering that the retained counsel may be unaware of the other pending 4. As a result of this merger, a Special Separation Program (SSP) was implemented
cases which he may not be handling. Surely, the policy of the rule to promote and and the petitioners were granted a separation package equivalent to one and a half
facilitate the orderly administration of justice will be undermined if certification by the
 06 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 39 continued to Rule 65 111
(Certiorari)
month’s   pay   (or   150%   of   one   month’s   salary)   for   every   year  of   service  based   on   The petitioners claim that it was error for the CA to have dismissed their petition on the
their current salary. sole basis thereof. According to the petitioners, they had opted not to file a motion for
5. The petitioners here availed of the SSP and executed the Letters of Acceptance and reconsideration as the issues that will be raised therein are those that the NLRC had
Waiver and Quitclaims. already passed upon. The petitioners likewise invoke the liberal application of
6. Metrobank then acquired all the assets and liability of Globalbank. procedural rules.
7. Subsequently, petitioners filed separate complaints for non-payment of separation
pay  with  prayer  for  damages  and  attorney’s  fees. To begin with, the petitioners do not have the discretion or prerogative to determine the
a. The petitioners asserted that, under the Old Plan, they were entitled to an propriety of complying with procedural rules. This Court had repeatedly emphasized in
additional  50%  of  their  gratuity  pay  on  top  of  150%  of  one  month’s  salary   various cases involving the tedious attempts of litigants to relieve themselves of the
for every year of service they had already received. They insisted that consequences of their neglect to follow a simple procedural requirement for perfecting a
100% of the 150% rightfully belongs to them as their separation pay. petition for certiorari that he who seeks a writ of certiorari must apply for it only in the
Thus, the remaining 50% was only half of the gratuity pay that they are manner and strictly in accordance with the provisions of the law and the Rules. The
entitled to under the Old Plan. petitioners may not arrogate to themselves the determination of whether a motion for
b. They further allege they were defrauded into signing the quitclaims and reconsideration is necessary or not. To dispense with the requirement of filing a motion
that these were done without full knowledge of its legal implications. for reconsideration, the petitioners must show a concrete, compelling, and valid reason
8. In defense, Globalbank said that the additional 50% gratuity pay was already for doing so.
included in the computation of the separation pay. Further, the waivers should be
considered completely valid.
a. Metrobank disclaimed liability, saying it acquired Globalbank only after As the CA correctly noted, the petitioners did not bother to explain their omission and
this termination thing happened. Hence, there was no employment only did so in their motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of their petition. Aside
relationship. from the fact that such belated effort will not resurrect their application for a writ of
9. Labor Arbiter ruled for the banks and against herein petitioners. NLRC affirmed the certiorari, the reason proffered by the petitioners does not fall under any of the
LA. recognized instances when the filing of a motion for reconsideration may be dispensed
10. Petitioners went up to the CA via certiorari under Rule 65. with. Whimsical and arbitrary deviations from the rules cannot be condoned in the guise
a. Apparently, they did not MR the NLRC decision. of a plea for a liberal interpretation thereof. We cannot respond with alacrity to every
11. CA dismissed the petition for failing to file an MR of the decision under review claim of injustice and bend the rules to placate vociferous protestors crying and
before resorting to certiorari. It further ruled that this case did not fall under claiming to be victims of a wrong.
any of the recognized exceptions to the rule on MRs.
12. Petitioners filed an MR of the CA decision. Denied. Substantive Issues

Issues: In sum, the New Gratuity Plan and SSP are valid and must be given effect, inasmuch as
their provisions are not contrary to law; and, indeed, grant benefits that meet the
1. W/N it was an error for the CA to dismiss the petition for failing to file an MR before minimum amount required by the Labor Code. The petitioners have voluntarily sought
filing the petition under Rule 65 – NO. CA was correct. such   benefits   and   upon   their   receipt   thereof,   executed   quitclaims   in   Globalbank’s   favor.
2. Substantive – W/N they were entitled to the additional pay, the validity of the quit The petitioners cannot, upon a mere change of mind, seek to invalidate such quitclaims
claims, etc. – NO. Lower courts were correct. and renege on their undertaking thereunder, which, to begin with, is supported by a
substantial consideration and which they had knowingly assumed and imposed upon
themselves.
Employees lose. Banks win. CA decision affirmed.
We   hold  that  Metrobank  cannot   be  held  liable   for  the  petitioners’  claims.   The  liabilities  
Ratio: that   Metrobank   assumed   can   be   characterized   as   those   pertaining   to   Globalbank’s  
banking  operations.  They  do  not  include  Globalbank’s  liabilities  to  pay  separation pay to
The   petitioners’   unexplained   failure   to   move   for   the   reconsideration   of   the   NLRC’s   its former employees.
resolution before applying for a writ of certiorari in the CA is reason enough to deny
such application. While Metrobank is indeed a parent of Globalbank, one fact cannot be ignored – that
Globalbank has a separate and distinct juridical personality. In the instant case, none of
Procedural Issue
 06 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 39 continued to Rule 65 112
(Certiorari)
these circumstances is present such as to warrant piercing the veil of corporate fiction In her Affidavit6 executed on May 5, 1999, Arcobillas admitted her mistake, apologized
and treating Globalbank and Metrobank as one. for it, and stated that she did not benefit from the unintentional misposting. She
narrated that she erroneously posted US$5,517.10, instead ofP5,517.10, which figure
represents the peso value of US$138.00. She honestly believed that the US$5,517.10 was
3) PNB V. ARCOBILLAS, 2013 - KING
correct because when added to the other on-line dollar transaction of US$1,004.60 the
result   was   US$6,521.70,   which   tallied   with   the   teller’s   machine   reading.   Arcobillas  
PNB v. Arcobillas, 2013 – KING, G.R. No. 179648 further explained that the heavy workload that day, a Friday coinciding with payroll day,
plagued with intermittent power interruptions, brought on a severe headache which
ER:
greatly affected her work performance.
Arcobillas, teller of PNB, wrongly credited the Savings account of Nomad-Spoor. Instead
of adding P5,517.00 to the account, that amount was added in dollars. ($5,517). Nomad- On   February   24,   2000,   PNB’s   Administrative   Adjudication   Panel   found   Arcobillas   guilty  
Spoor withdrew the amounts and ran away with all the money. PNB fired Arcobillas on of gross neglect of duty and meted upon her the penalty of forced resignation with
the ground of gross and habitual negligence. Arcobillas filed an illegal dismissal benefits, to take effect immediately upon her receipt thereof. Upon denial of her plea for
complaint. reconsideration, Arcobillas instituted a Complaint 7 for illegal dismissal with money
claims   against   PNB,   PNB’s   Senior   Manager   Reynald   A.   Rey   and   Senior   Vice-President
LA: reinstate Arcobillas. Rosauro C. Macalagay.

NLRC: same. Rule 65 with the CA. LA ruling

CA: same. But note here that CA took cognizance of the case without an MR of the NLRC PNB should reinstate Arcobilla. No finding of gross and habitual negligence. There was
decision – this was fatal. no bad faith involved.
SC:

The filing of a Motion for Reconsideration is not a mere technicality of procedure.27 It is Appeal to NLRC
a jurisdictional and mandatory requirement which must be strictly complied with. 28
PNB alleges that bad faith is not a requirement before an employer may dismiss an
A Motion for Reconsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party employee.
can resort to the special civil action for certiorari.
But NLRC still affirmed LA.
Thus,  PNB’s  "failure  to   file  a   Motion  for   Reconsideration  with  the  NLRC   before availing
itself of the special civil action for certiorari is a fatal infirmity."

Facts: CA  took  cognizance  of  PNB’s  petition  for  certiorari  even without PNB filing an MR of the
NLRC.
On May 15, 1998, the PNB Foreign Currency Denomination-Savings Account (FCD-S/A) Nevertheless, CA affirmed NLRC with a modification that the losses be shouldered as
No. 305703555-1 of Avelina Nomad-Spoor (Nomad-Spoor) was credited with follows:
US$138.00. However, instead of posting its peso equivalent of P5,517.10, Arcobillas, the
assigned administrative teller at PNB Bacolod-Lacson branch, erroneously posted PNB – 40%
US$5,517.10, resulting in an overcredit of US$5,379.10. Said amount was later
withdrawn by Nomad-Spoor on May 29, 1998 and June 8, 1998 to the damage of PNB in Arcobillas – 60%
the amount of P214,641.23.

The misposting was discovered only about seven months later. After investigation by
PNB’s   Inspection  and   Investigation   Unit   Arcobillas   was   administratively   charged with MR denied. Petition with the SC assailing the CA decision.
neglect of duty.5
 06 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 39 continued to Rule 65 113
(Certiorari)
Issue: May a petition for certiorari against an NLRC decisions be entertained by the CA
despite the non-filing of a Motion for Reconsideration with the NLRC? No
SC affirmed that Arcobillas should not be dismissed because there was no finding of
gross and habitual negligence.

Ratio:

The assailed CA Decision must be vacated and set aside.

PNB’s  failure  to  file  a  Motion  for Reconsideration with the NLRC before filing its Petition
for Certiorari before the CA is a fatal infirmity.

At the outset, the Court notes that after PNB received a copy of the August 31, 2004
Decision of the NLRC on October 14, 2004, it did not file any Motion for Reconsideration
such that the said Decision became final and executory on October 19, 2004. Instead,
PNB went directly to the CA to assail the NLRC Decision through a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court which the said court took cognizance of.

"a [M]otion for [R]econsideration is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved

party can resort to the special civil action for certiorari x x x. The rationale for the rule is
that the law intends to afford the NLRC an opportunity to rectify such errors or mistakes
it may have committed before resort to courts of justice can be had. Of course, the rule is
not absolute and jurisprudence has laid down exceptions when the filing of a [P]etition
for [C]ertiorari is proper notwithstanding the failure to file a [M]otion for
[R]econsideration,"25 such as "(a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court
a quo has no jurisdiction; (b) where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings
have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are the same as those
raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the
resolution of the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the
Government or of the petitioner or the subject matter of the action is perishable; (d)
where, under the circumstances, a [M]otion for [R]econsideration would be useless; (e)
where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f)
where, in a criminal case, relief from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of
such relied by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings in the lower
court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceeding was ex parte or in
which the petitioner had no opportunity to object; and, (i) where the issue raised is one
purely of law or where public interest is involved."26 Here, PNB did not at all allege to
which of the above-mentioned exceptions this case falls. Neither did it present any
plausible justification for dispensing with the requirement of a prior Motion for
Reconsideration before the NLRC.

It bears to stress that the filing of a Motion for Reconsideration is not a mere technicality
of procedure.27 It is a jurisdictional and mandatory requirement which must be strictly
complied with.28 Thus,   PNB’s   "failure   to  file   a   [M]otion   for   [R]econsideration   with   the  
NLRC before availing [itself] of the special civil action for certiorari is a fatal infirmity."
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 1

h. Judicial Partition (Rule 69) .....................................................................................................................55

C O N TE N TS 1) Sepulveda v. Pelaez, G.R. No. 152195, January 31, 2005 - AQUINO ..........................55
i. Ejectment (Rule 70) .....................................................................................................................................57
d. Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus (Rule 65) ......................................................................... 2 1) Inocencio v. Hospicio de San Jose, 2013 – ARCEO ...............................................................57
d.2 Prohibition ................................................................................................................................................ 2 2) Serrano v. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 162366, November 10, 2006 – BASCARA ................59
1) City Government of Quezon City v. Bayantel, G.R. No. 162015, March 6, 2006 – 3) Esteban v. Marcelo, 2013 – CHAN ................................................................................................61
LAGOS .................................................................................................................................................................. 2
4) Philippine Tourism Authority v. Sabandal-Herzentiel, 2013 – MUTI .......................63
2) LTFRB v. Stronghold Insurance Company, Inc., 2013 – LIBONGCO ............................. 5
j. Contempt (Rule 71) ......................................................................................................................................64
3) Vivas v. Monetary Board of the BSP, 2013 – LOPA ................................................................ 6
1) Curata v. PPA, G.R. No. 154211, June 22, 2009 – NARVASA ...........................................64
4) Corales v. Republic, 2013 – LUCENARIO..................................................................................... 9
2) Fuentes v. Albarracin, A.M. RTJ 05-1587, April 15, 2005 – PEREZ DE TAGLE .....67
d.3 Mandamus .............................................................................................................................................. 11
1) Raul Lambino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006 – MAGTAGNOB . 11
2) Esquivel v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 137237, September 17, 2002 – MUTI ............... 14
3) Dolot v. Paje, 2013 - NARVASA ................................................................................................... 16
e. Quo Warranto (Rule 66)........................................................................................................................... 19
1) Liban v. Gordon, G.R. No. 175352, July 15, 2009 – ORTIZ............................................... 19
2) Divinagracia v. Consolidated Broadcasting, G.R. No. 162272, April 7, 2009 -
PEREZ DE TAGLE ........................................................................................................................................ 22
f. Expropriation (Rule 67) ............................................................................................................................ 24
1) Bardillon v. Bgy. Masili, G.R. No. 146886, April 30, 2003 – PUNO .............................. 24
2) Republic v. Mangotara, G.R. No. 170375, July 7, 2010 - QUIJANO-BENEDICTO . 26
3) Republic v. Court of Appeals, July 7, 2010, - RAZON.......................................................... 28
3.5 Republic v. Court of Appeals, August 14, 2009 – PASCUAL ......................................... 32
4) NPC v. Santa Loro, G.R. No. 175176, October 17, 2008 – RESPICIO .......................... 36
5) Apo Fruits v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164195, December 4, 2009 – SANCHEZ
.............................................................................................................................................................................. 40
6) Republic v. Holy Trinity Development Corp., G.R. No. 172410, April 14, 2008 –
SUPERABLE ................................................................................................................................................... 42
g. Judicial Foreclosure (Rule 68)............................................................................................................... 44
1) Huerta Alba v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 128567, September 1, 2000 – TANDOC
.............................................................................................................................................................................. 44
2) Bacaling v. Muya, G.R. No. 148404, April 11, 2002 – TEVES (sub – ORTIZ).......... 49
3) Monzon v. Relova, G.R. No. 171827, September 17, 2008 – TIU ................................. 51
4) Nagtalon v. UCPB, 2013 - VELASQUEZ ...................................................................................... 54
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
D. CERTIORARI, PROHIBITION AND MANDAMUS (RULE 65)
D.2 PROHIBITION
1) CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY V. BAYANTEL, G.R. NO. 162015, MARCH 6,
2006 – LAGOS
THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF QUEZON CITY, AND THE CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON
CITY, DR. VICTOR B. ENRIGA, Petitioners, vs. BAYAN TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
INC., Respondent.
A bit long, but the ER is enough for purposes of the rem issue.
Doctrine:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. – When the proceedings of any tribunal, … are without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the
action or matter specified therein, or otherwise, granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be exhausted before resort to
judicial action can prosper, there is a well-settled exception in cases where the
controversy does not involve questions of fact but only of law.
ER
• Bayantel was granted a franchise to operate radio stations for domestic
telecommunications and broadcasting. It owns several real properties in QC. The
law granting its franchise provides a taxing provision which says that it shall be
liable to pay the same taxes on its real and personal property, exclusive of this
franchise, as what other persons are required to pay. ( in the ratio, this really means
that it is liable for all other taxes except realty tax)
• The LGC then took effect, granting LGUs the power to levy realty tax.
• Congress then amended Bayantel’s franchise, containing the same taxing provision
(that it will pay the same taxes other people do, exclusive of its franchise) and
adding that they shall pay a franchise tax.
• The QC Govt then issued a city ordinance, imposing realty tax on all real properties
in QC and withdrawing tax exemptions. Tax declarations were then sent to
Bayantel.
2
• Bayantel refused to pay the realty tax. It requested for the exemption of its real
properties but this was denied. So it appealed to the LBAA.
• Because of Bayantel’s refusal to pay the taxes, it was issued delinquency notices,
warrants of levy and eventually a notice of public auction for its properties.
• Thus, Bayantel withdrew is appeal in the LBAA and filed a petition for prohibition
with urgent application for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction. RTC granted
and issued a TRO and preliminary injunction. RTC then rendered a decision
declaring Bayantel exempt from realty tax.
• QC Govt thus filed this petition for review, assailing that the petition for prohibition
of Bayantel was improper for failure of Bayantel to exhaust admin remedies
provided in the LGC.
• The SC ruled Bayantel was correct in filing a petition for prohibition. Section 2 of
Rule 65 governs petitions for prohibition.
o SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. – When the proceedings of any tribunal, …
are without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in
the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further
proceedings in the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise,
granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.
• In this case, Bayantel’s properties were already levied and about to be sold on
public auction because of its failure to pay realty taxes. Thus, an appeal to the LBAA
would not have been a speedy and adequate remedy. Also, it should be noted that
before an appeal to the LBAA can be considered, there should be a prior payment
under protest of P43 M should be given. . It is thus understandable why Bayantel
opted to withdraw its earlier appeal with the LBAA and, instead, filed its petition
for prohibition with urgent application for injunctive relief. Moreover, one of the
recognized exceptions to the exhaustion- of-administrative remedies rule is when,
as here, only legal issues are to be resolved.
Facts:
• This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 seeking to nullify the
decision and order of the RTC QC declaring the BayanTel exempt from real estate
tax and denying the QC Gov’t’s MR
• BAYANTEL is a legislative franchise holder under Republic Act (Rep. Act) No.
3259 to establish and operate radio stations for domestic telecommunications,
radiophone, broadcasting and telecasting.
o Section 14 of RA 3259 provides:
o (a) The grantee shall be liable to pay the same taxes on its real estate,
buildings and personal property, exclusive of the franchise, as other
persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law to
pay.
o (b) The grantee shall further pay to the Treasurer of the Philippines each
year, within ten days after the audit and approval of the accounts as
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
prescribed in this Act, one and one-half per centum of all gross receipts
from the business transacted under this franchise by the said grantee
• RA 7160 or the Local Govt Code then took effect, which grants local govt units
within Metro Manila the power to levy tax on real properties.
o The 2nd paragraph of Sec 234 of LGC withdrew any exemption from realty
tax previously granted to all persons, natural or juridical.
• RA 7633 then took effect, amending BAYANTEL’s franchise, containing the
following tax provision:
o SEC. 11. The grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the
same taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive
of this franchise, as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter
may be required by law to pay. In addition thereto, the grantee, its
successors or assigns shall pay a franchise tax equivalent to three percent
(3%) of all gross receipts of the telephone or other telecommunications
businesses transacted under this franchise by the grantee, its successors
or assigns and the said percentage shall be in lieu of all taxes on this
franchise or earnings thereof. Provided, That the grantee, its successors or
assigns shall continue to be liable for income taxes payable under Title II
of the National Internal Revenue Code …. xxx.
• Bayantel owned several real properties in QC on which it maintained various
telecommunications facilities. (Roosevelt St, Maginhawa St., and in Proj. 8)
• The QC GOVT, pursuant to the taxing power vested on local government units by
Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, infra, in relation to Section 232 of the
LGC, supra, enacted City Ordinance No. SP-91, S-93, otherwise known as the Quezon
City Revenue Code (QCRC),5 imposing, under Section 5 thereof, a real property tax
on all real properties in Quezon City, and, reiterating in its Section 6, the
withdrawal of exemption from real property tax under Section 234 of the LGC,
supra. Furthermore, much like the LGC, the QCRC, under its Section 230, withdrew
tax exemption privileges in general, as follows:
o SEC. 230. Withdrawal of Tax Exemption Privileges. – Unless otherwise
provided in this Code, tax exemptions or incentives granted to, or
presently enjoyed by all persons, whether natural or juridical, including
government owned or controlled corporations, except local water
districts, cooperatives duly registered under RA 6938, non-stock and non-
profit hospitals and educational institutions, business enterprises certified
by the Board of Investments (BOI) as pioneer or non-pioneer for a period
of six (6) and four (4) years, respectively, … are hereby withdrawn
effective upon approval of this Code
• Thus, new tax declarations for Bayantel’s real properties in Quezon City were
issued by the City Assessor and were received by Bayantel
• Meanwhile, RA 7925, Public Telecommunications Policy Act was passed which
envisaged to level the playing field among telecomm companies:
o Sec. 23 - Any advantage, favor, privilege, exemption, or immunity granted
under existing franchises, or may hereafter be granted, shall ipso facto
become part of previously granted telecommunications franchises and
shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to the grantees of such
franchises: Provided, however, That the foregoing shall neither apply to
nor affect provisions of telecommunications franchises concerning
3
territory covered by the franchise, the life span of the franchise, or the
type of service authorized by the franchise.
• Bayantel wrote the office of the City Assessor seeking the exclusion of its real
properties in the city from the roll of taxable real properties.
o Request was denied so Bayantel appealed with the Local Board of
Assessment Appeals (LBAA)
• Because Bayantel firmly believed in its exempt status, it refused to pay the realty
tax.
o Thus, Quezon City Treasurer sent out notices of delinquency for the total
amount of P43,878,208.18, followed by the issuance of several warrants
of levy against Bayantel’s properties preparatory to their sale at a public
auction
• Threatened, Bayantel withdrew its appeal with the LBAA and filed with the RTC QC
a petition for prohibition with and urgent application for TRO and/or writ of
preliminary injunction
• On the eve of the set public auction, the RTC issued a TRO, followed by a writ of
preliminary injunction.
• RTC rendered a decision declaring BAYANTEL exempt from realty tax and made the
prohibitory injunction permanent.
• Hence this petition on pure questions of law by the QC Govt.
o They were assailing that Bayantel failed to exhaust admin remedies
provided in the LGC. And that Bayantel is not exempt from realty taxes.
Issue:
[REM ISSUE] Whether Bayantel is required to exhaust administrative remedies before
seeking judicial relief with the trial court? NO
Whether Bayantel’s real properties in Quezon City are exempt from real property taxes
under its legislative franchise?
Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
Ratio:
BAYANTEL is not required to exhaust administrative remedies before seeking
judicial relief
QC GOVT argues that Bayantel had failed to avail itself of the administrative remedies
provided for under the LGC, adding that the trial court erred in giving due course to
Bayantel’s petition for prohibition. To QC GOVT, the appeal mechanics under the LGC
constitute Bayantel’s plain and speedy remedy in this case.
The Court does not agree.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
Petitions for prohibition are governed by the following provision of Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. – When the proceedings of any tribunal, … are without or
in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified
petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the
action or matter specified therein, or otherwise, granting such incidental reliefs as law
and justice may require.
With the reality that Bayantel’s real properties were already levied upon on account of
its nonpayment of real estate taxes thereon, the Court agrees with Bayantel that an
appeal to the LBAA is not a speedy and adequate remedy within the context of the
aforequoted Section 2 of Rule 65. This is not to mention of the auction sale of said
properties already scheduled on July 30, 2002.
Moreover, one of the recognized exceptions to the exhaustion- of-administrative
remedies rule is when, as here, only legal issues are to be resolved. In fact, the Court,
cognizant of the nature of the questions presently involved, gave due course to the
instant petition. As the Court has said in Ty vs. Trampe:
xxx. Although as a rule, administrative remedies must first be exhausted before resort to
judicial action can prosper, there is a well-settled exception in cases where the
controversy does not involve questions of fact but only of law. xxx.
Lest it be overlooked, an appeal to the LBAA, to be properly considered, required prior
payment under protest of the amount of P43,878,208.18, a figure which, in the light of
the then prevailing Asian financial crisis, may have been difficult to raise up. Given this
reality, an appeal to the LBAA may not be considered as a plain, speedy and adequate
remedy. It is thus understandable why Bayantel opted to withdraw its earlier appeal
with the LBAA and, instead, filed its petition for prohibition with urgent application for
injunctive relief. The remedy availed of by Bayantel under Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court must be upheld.
BAYANTEL is exempt from realty tax
Indeed, the grant of taxing powers to local government units under the Constitution and
the LGC does not affect the power of Congress to grant exemptions to certain persons,
pursuant to a declared national policy. The legal effect of the constitutional grant to local
governments simply means that in interpreting statutory provisions on municipal taxing
powers, doubts must be resolved in favor of municipal corporations.
4
Admittedly, Rep. Act No. 7633 was enacted subsequent to the LGC. Perfectly aware that
the LGC has already withdrawn Bayantel’s former exemption from realty taxes,
Congress opted to pass Rep. Act No. 7633 using, under Section 11 thereof, exactly the
same defining phrase "exclusive of this franchise" which was the basis for Bayantel’s
exemption from realty taxes prior to the LGC. In plain language, Section 11 of Rep. Act
No. 7633 states that "the grantee, its successors or assigns shall be liable to pay the
same taxes on their real estate, buildings and personal property, exclusive of this
franchise, as other persons or corporations are now or hereafter may be required by law
to pay." The Court views this subsequent piece of legislation as an express and real
intention on the part of Congress to once again remove from the LGC’s delegated taxing
power, all of the franchisee’s (Bayantel’s) properties that are actually, directly and
exclusively used in the pursuit of its franchise
The legislative intent expressed in the phrase "exclusive of this franchise" cannot be
construed other than distinguishing between two (2) sets of properties, be they real or
personal, owned by the franchisee, namely, (a) those actually, directly and exclusively
used in its radio or telecommunications business, and (b) those properties which are
not so used. It is worthy to note that the properties subject of the present controversy
are only those which are admittedly falling under the first category.
To the mind of the Court, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 effectively works to grant or
delegate to local governments of Congress’ inherent power to tax the franchisee’s
properties belonging to the second group of properties indicated above, that is, all
properties which, "exclusive of this franchise," are not actually and directly used in the
pursuit of its franchise. As may be recalled, the taxing power of local governments under
both the 1935 and the 1973 Constitutions solely depended upon an enabling law.
Absent such enabling law, local government units were without authority to impose and
collect taxes on real properties within their respective territorial jurisdictions. While
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 may be validly viewed as an implied delegation of power
to tax, the delegation under that provision, as couched, is limited to impositions over
properties of the franchisee which are not actually, directly and exclusively used in the
pursuit of its franchise. Necessarily, other properties of Bayantel directly used in the
pursuit of its business are beyond the pale of the delegated taxing power of local
governments. In a very real sense, therefore, real properties of Bayantel, save those
exclusive of its franchise, are subject to realty taxes. Ultimately, therefore, the inevitable
result was that all realties which are actually, directly and exclusively used in the
operation of its franchise are "exempted" from any property tax
With the LGC’s taking effect on January 1, 1992, Bayantel’s "exemption" from real estate
taxes for properties of whatever kind located within the Metro Manila area was, by force
of Section 234 of the Code, supra, expressly withdrawn. But, not long thereafter,
however, or on July 20, 1992, Congress passed Rep. Act No. 7633 amending Bayantel’s
original franchise. Worthy of note is that Section 11 of Rep. Act No. 7633 is a virtual
reenacment of the tax provision, i.e., Section 14, supra, of Bayantel’s original franchise
under Rep. Act No. 3259. Stated otherwise, Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 3259 which was
deemed impliedly repealed by Section 234 of the LGC was expressly revived under
Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 7633. In concrete terms, the realty tax exemption heretofore
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
enjoyed by Bayantel under its original franchise, but subsequently withdrawn by force
of Section 234 of the LGC, has been restored by Section 14 of Rep. Act No. 7633.
2) LTFRB V. STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC., 2013 – LIBONGCO
ER:
- During the first run of the LTFRB’s passenger personal accident insurance program,
Stronghold qualified as a bidder and ultimately was awarded a 5-year contract. It
was embodied in a MOA.
- Prior to the expiration of the first MOA, bidding was again conducted for the
program. LTFRB required a minimum peso capitalization as well as minimum
number of minimum member insurers.
- Stronghold did not meet both requirement and was disqualified. It prayed for a writ
of prohibition with the CA, which was granted.
Whether CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition, annulling LTFRB’s bidding
- The writ of prohibition lies upon a showing that the assailed proceedings "are
[conducted] without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." It is the extra-jurisdictional nature of
the contested proceedings that grounds the issuance of the writ, enjoining a
tribunal or officer from further acting on the matter before it.
- Stronghold made no claim that LTFRB lacked jurisdiction to implement the
Program or to issue the References for each round of bidding to set the parameters
for the accreditation of insurance providers. Rather, it rested its case on the theory
that LTFRB acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when LTFRB required in the Third Reference a minimum capital
requirement on a "per insurer" basis.
Doctrine:
- The standard under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of prohibition is "grave
abuse of discretion" and not mere "abuse of discretion." The difference is not a
simple matter of semantics. Unlike the first category of errors which the lower
tribunal commits in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the latter class of errors is
committed by a lower tribunal devoid of jurisdiction or, alternatively, for exercising
jurisdiction in an "arbitrary or despotic manner." By conflating "abuse of
discretion" with "grave abuse of discretion," the Court of Appeals failed to follow
the rigorous standard of Rule 65, diluting its office of correcting only jurisdictional
errors.
COMPLETE
Facts:
- LTFRB created the passenger personal accident insurance program. Under the
program, the LTFRB will accredit two groups of insurance providers, selected
through open bidding, to provide insurance policies to public utility vehicle
operators, covering their passengers against accident-related risks.
5
- Following a bidding, LTFRB accredited Unitrans as one of the two insurance
providers. Stronghold Insurance was the lead insurer of Unitrans.
- LTFRB made a 5-year contract, embodied in a MOA, containing the following clause:
o WHEREAS, after the expiration of the contract for accreditation, all
facilities used by the accredited management groups shall be donated to
the government. In consideration, however, of the initial investment and
the assumption of initial risk, the two management groups herein shall be
given the right to match the best bid/proposal in event another
management group qualifies at the end of the term of this agreement.
- Shortly before the first MOA expired and after its term was extended, LTFRB thrice
opened bidding for the accreditation of new insurance providers. In each round of
bidding, LTFRB required minimum peso capitalization for the lead and member
insurers.
- Unlike the first 2 references which allowed aggregation of the group members’
capital to comply with the capitalization threshold, the third reference reckoned
compliance with the minimum capital requirement for the lead and member
insurers single or on a per insurer basis. It also required a minimum of at least 10
members for each group of insurers.
- Stronghold participated in the 3 biddings but failed to qualify in the third because
its group only had six members and its minimum capitalization, as the lead
insurers, was below the minimum. As such, was disqualified.
- Before LTFRB can select the winning bids, Stronghold sought a writ of prohibition
form the CA to enjoin the LTFRB from opening the bid documents and to nullify the
bidding proceedings.
o Stronghold theorized that “per insurer” basis for reckoning compliance
with the minimum capital requirement under the third bidding violated
the right of first refusal under the first MOA but also the equal protection
clause under the Constitution.
- The CA merely required the LTFRB to file comment. This allowed the LTFRB to
declare the winners of the bidding and sign the contract with 2 new groups of
insurers effective for 2 years.
o LTFRB prayed for the dismissal of Stronghold’s petition on procedural and
substantive grounds.
- CA found merit in Stronghold’s petition and nullified the third round bidding. It
enjoined the LTFRB from enforcing the second MOA until Stronghold shall have
been given the chance to exercise its right to match the best bidder.
Issue:
Whether CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition, annulling LTFRB’s bidding
Held:
Ratio:
LTFRB Committed No Grave Abuse of Discretion
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
- The writ of prohibition lies upon a showing that the assailed proceedings "are
[conducted] without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." It is the extra-jurisdictional nature of
the contested proceedings that grounds the issuance of the writ, enjoining a
tribunal or officer from further acting on the matter before it.
o Stronghold made no claim that LTFRB lacked jurisdiction to implement
the Program or to issue the References for each round of bidding to set the
parameters for the accreditation of insurance providers. Rather, it rested
its case on the theory that LTFRB acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when LTFRB required in the
Third Reference a minimum capital requirement on a "per insurer" basis.
- The standard under Rule 65 for the issuance of the writ of prohibition is "grave
abuse of discretion" and not mere "abuse of discretion." The difference is not a
simple matter of semantics. The writs governed by Rule 65 – certiorari, mandamus,
and prohibition – are extraordinary remedies designed to correct not mere errors
of judgment (i.e., in the appreciation of facts or interpretation of law) but errors of
jurisdiction (i.e., lack or excess of jurisdiction). Unlike the first category of errors
which the lower tribunal commits in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the latter class
of errors is committed by a lower tribunal devoid of jurisdiction or, alternatively,
for exercising jurisdiction in an "arbitrary or despotic manner." By conflating
"abuse of discretion" with "grave abuse of discretion," the Court of Appeals failed to
follow the rigorous standard of Rule 65, diluting its office of correcting only
jurisdictional errors.
o LTFRB committed no abuse of discretion, much less a grave one, in
disqualifying Stronghold from the third round of bidding. It is not
disputed that Stronghold did not meet the minimum capitalization
required for a lead insurer under the Third Reference, leaving LTFRB no
choice but to disqualify it.
There was also no undue haste on the part of the LTFRB. It clearly complied with the
posting/publication requirements. It was clearly Stronghold who experienced difficulty
in complying with the requirements.
3) VIVAS V. MONETARY BOARD OF THE BSP, 2013 – LOPA
ALFEO D. VIVAS, ON HIS BEHALF AND ON BEHALF OF THE SHAREHOLDERS OF
EUROCREDIT COMMUNITY BANK vs. THE MONETARY BOARD OF THE BANGKO
SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS AND THE PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE
CORPORATION
Topic: Special Civil Actions; Prohibition [Note: really confusing facts. I tried to simplify
them in the ER. Super summary: ECBI had unsound banking practices so the BSP put
them under receivership]
Doctrines:
-
Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior court
prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or
exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law, and
6
confines them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred. Its office is to
restrain subordinate courts, tribunals or persons from exercising jurisdiction over
matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which
it has cognizance.
- Prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which
would direct the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an
act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the proper function of a writ of prohibition is
to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to
provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.
- Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that where the
issuance of the extraordinary writs is also within the competence of the CA or the
RTC, the special action for the obtainment of such writ must be presented to
either court. As a rule, the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts; or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and
with serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of
writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction. The judicial policy must be observed to prevent an imposition on the
precious time and attention of the Court.
Emergency Digest: Rural Bank of Faire, Inc. (RBFI) was a rural bank in Cagayan. Vivas et
al acquired the controlling interest of the bank and transformed it to EuroCredit
Community Bank, Incorporated (ECBI). The BSP conducted a general examination on ECBI
in 2007. Thereafter, they cancelled the rediscounting line of the bank. The bank issued
several resolutions basically saying that the bank had many unsound banking practices
(transferred majority shares of RBFI without securing prior approval of the Monetary
Board MB, did not obtain the prior approval of the BSP anent the establishment and
operation of the bank’s sub-offices). Come 2009, the bank was refusing to go thru another
general examination. BSP fined the bank and referred the matter to the Office of the
Special Investigation (OSI) for the filing of appropriate legal action.OSI filed a complaint
for Estafa Through Falsification of Commercial Documents against certain officials and
employees of ECBI with the DOJ. MB eventually also released Resolution No. 276 putting
ECBI under receivership (grounds: unable to pay its liabilities, insufficient realizable
assets to meet liabilities, cannot continue in business without involving probable losses
to its depositors and creditors, willfully violated a cease and desist order of the
Monetary Board for acts or transactions which are considered unsafe and unsound
banking practices and other acts or transactions constituting fraud or dissipation of the
assets of the institution. Assailing MB Resolution No. 276, Vivas filed this petition for
prohibition before this Court, ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the MB for
prohibiting ECBI from continuing its banking business and for placing it under
receivership. [So many complicated banking issues i don't understand but basically, SC
said there was no GADLEJ, MB may forbid a bank from doing business and place it under
receivership without prior notice and hearing] As to the REM issues…
W/N petition for prohibition was the proper remedy? Nope! Certiorari dapat!
-
Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior court
prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or
exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law, and
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
confines them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred. Its office is to
restrain subordinate courts, tribunals or persons from exercising jurisdiction over
matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which
it has cognizance.
- Prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which
would direct the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an
act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the proper function of a writ of prohibition is
to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to
provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.
- In this case, the petition for prohibition apparently seeks to prevent the acts of
closing of ECBI and placing it under receivership. Resolution No. 276, however,
had already been issued by the MB and the closure of ECBI and its placement
under receivership by the PDIC were already accomplished. Apparently, the
remedy of prohibition is no longer appropriate. Settled is the rule that prohibition
does not lie to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli.
W/N the case was properly filed before the SC? Nope! CA dapat!
- Section 4 of Rule 65 reads:
Section 4. When and where petition filed. — xxx If it involves the acts or
omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these
Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
-
That the MB is a quasi-judicial agency was already settled and reiterated in the case
of Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank And Bangko Sentral Ng
Pilipinas.30
- Even in the absence of such provision, the petition is also dismissible because it
simply ignored the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
- Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to this Court only on pure
questions of law. In the case at bench, there are certainly factual issues as Vivas is
questioning the findings of the investigating team.
- Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that where the
issuance of the extraordinary writs is also within the competence of the CA or the
RTC, the special action for the obtainment of such writ must be presented to
either court. As a rule, the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts; or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and
with serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of
writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction. The judicial policy must be observed to prevent an imposition on the
precious time and attention of the Court.
Facts:
- Rural Bank of Faire, Inc. (RBFI) was a duly registered rural banking institution with
principal office in Cagayan
- Despite the records showing that the bank’s corporate life was to expire on May 31,
2005, Vivas and his principals acquired the controlling interest of RBFI sometime in
7
January 2006. Internal audit conducted by Vivas et al showed the dismal operation of
the bank. Measures to revitalize the bank were introduced.
- On December 8, 2006, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) issued the Certificate of
Authority extending the corporate life of RBFI for another fifty (50) years. The BSP
also approved the change of its corporate name to EuroCredit Community Bank,
Incorporated, (ECBI) as well as the increase in the number of the members of its
BOD, from five (5) to eleven (11)
- Pursuant to the Central Bank Act, the Integrated Supervision Department II (ISD II)
of the BSP conducted a general examination on ECBI with the cut-off date of
December 31, 2007. Exit conference was held on March 27, 2008 wherein BSP
officials apprised Vivas et al of their findings. ECBI submitted its comments via a
letter dated April 8, 2008.
- Sometime in April 2008, the examiners from the Department of Loans and Credit of
the BSP arrived at the ECBI and cancelled the rediscounting line of the bank. Vivas
appealed the cancellation to BSP.5 Thereafter, the Monetary Board (MB) issued
Resolution No. 1255, dated September 25, 2008, placing ECBI under Prompt
Corrective Action (PCA) framework because of the ff. findings:
- 1] negative capital of P14.674 million and capital adequacy ratio of negative
18.42%;
- 2] CAMEL (Capital Asset Management Earnings Liquidity) composite rating of "2"
with a Management component rating of "1"; and
- 3] serious supervisory concerns particularly on activities deemed unsafe or
unsound.6
- BSP letter dated September 30, 2008:
- Furnished ECBI with a copy of the Report of Examination
- Directed ECBI’s BOD and senior management to
1] infuse fresh capital of P22.643 million;
2] book the amount of P28.563 million representing unbooked valuation
reserves on classified loans and other risks assets on or before October 31,
2008; and
3] take appropriate action necessary to address the violations/exceptions
noted in the examination.
- Vivas moved for a reconsideration of Resolution No. 1255 on the grounds of non-
observance of due process and arbitrariness. The ISD II, on several instances, had
invited the BOD of ECBI to discuss matters pertaining to the placement of the bank
under PCA framework and other supervisory concerns before making the
appropriate recommendations to the MB. The proposed meeting, however, did not
materialize due to postponements sought by Vivas.
- BSP letter dated Feb 20, 2009 - directed ECBI to explain why it transferred majority
shares of RBFI without securing prior approval of the MB in violation of the Manual
of Regulation for Banks (MORB)
- BSP letter dated March 31, 2009 - ISD II required ECBI to explain why it did not
obtain the prior approval of the BSP anent the establishment and operation of the
bank’s sub-offices.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
- The scheduled March 31, 2009 general examination of the books, records and
general condition of ECBI with the cut-off date of December 31, 2008, did not push
through.
- In view of ECBI’s refusal to comply with the required examination, the MB issued
Resolution No. 726 dated May 14, 2009, imposing monetary penalty/fine on ECBI,
and referred the matter to the Office of the Special Investigation (OSI) for the filing of
appropriate legal action.
- banks under receiverships is unconstitutional for being a diminution or invasion of the
BSP letter dated May 26, 2009 - advised ECBI to comply with MB Resolution No. 771,
which essentially required the bank to follow its directives.
- ECBI kept delaying stating that they had unresolved issued subject of its appeal
before the MB and because Vivas was out of the country. ISD II denied and ordered
the general examination to proceed.
- MB issued Resolution No. 823. Approved the issuance of a cease and desist order
against ECBI, which enjoined it from pursuing certain acts and transactions that were
considered unsafe or unsound banking practices, and from doing such other acts or
transactions constituting fraud or might result in the dissipation of its assets.
- OSI filed a complaint for Estafa Through Falsification of Commercial Documents
against certain officials and employees of ECBI with the DOJ.
- General examination of the books and records of ECBI was commenced and ended in
December 2009.
- ISD II reminded ECBI of the non-submission of its financial audit reports for 2007-
2008 with a warning that failure to submit those reports and the written explanation
for such omission shall result in the imposition of a monetary penalty
- MB Resolution No. 276 put ECBI under receivership on the following grounds:
- (a) is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due in the ordinary course of
business;
- (b) has insufficient realizable assets to meet liabilities;
- (c) cannot continue in business without involving probable losses to its
depositors and creditors; and
- (d) has willfully violated a cease and desist order of the Monetary Board for
acts or transactions which are considered unsafe and unsound banking
practices and other acts or transactions constituting fraud or dissipation of the
assets of the institution, and considering the failure of the Board of
Directors/management of Eurocredit Bank to restore the bank’s financial
health and viability despite considerable time given to address the bank’s
financial problems, and that the bank had been accorded due process, the
Board, in accordance with Section 30 of Republic Act No. 7653 (The New
Central Bank Act), approved the recommendation of ISD II.
- Assailing MB Resolution No. 276, Vivas filed this petition for prohibition before this
Court, ascribing grave abuse of discretion to the MB for prohibiting ECBI from
continuing its banking business and for placing it under receivership.
Issue:
1. W/N petition for prohibition was the proper remedy? Nope! Certiorari dapat!
2. W/N the case was properly filed before the SC? Nope! CA dapat!
8
3. W/N its GADLEJ to apply the general law embodied in Sec 30 of the New Central Bank
as opposed to the specific law embodied in Sec 11 and 14 of the Rural Banks Act of
1992
4. W/N MB acted with GADLEJ when it executed the law with manifest arbitrariness,
abuse of discretion, and bad faith, violation of constitutional rights and to further
execute a mandate well in excess of its parameters.
5. W/N the power delegated in favor of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas to place rural
powers of the Supreme Court, in violation of Section 2, Article VIII of the Philippine
Constitution.
Held: WHEREFORE, the petition for prohibition is DENIED.
Ratio:
Vivas availed of the wrong remedy!
- The MB issued Resolution No. 276, dated March 4, 2010, in the exercise of its power
under R.A. No. 7653. Under Section 30 thereof, any act of the MB placing a bank
under conservatorship, receivership or liquidation may not be restrained or set aside
except on a petition for certiorari.
- Granting that a petition for prohibition is allowed, it is already an ineffective remedy
under the circumstances obtaining.
-
Prohibition or a "writ of prohibition" is that process by which a superior court
prevents inferior courts, tribunals, officers, or persons from usurping or
exercising a jurisdiction with which they have not been vested by law, and
confines them to the exercise of those powers legally conferred. Its office is to
restrain subordinate courts, tribunals or persons from exercising jurisdiction over
matters not within its cognizance or exceeding its jurisdiction in matters of which
it has cognizance.
- Prohibition is a preventive remedy seeking that a judgment be rendered which
would direct the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an
act perceived to be illegal. As a rule, the proper function of a writ of prohibition is
to prevent the doing of an act which is about to be done. It is not intended to
provide a remedy for acts already accomplished.
-
In this case, the petition for prohibition apparently seeks to prevent the acts of
closing of ECBI and placing it under receivership. Resolution No. 276, however, had
already been issued by the MB and the closure of ECBI and its placement under
receivership by the PDIC were already accomplished. Apparently, the remedy of
prohibition is no longer appropriate. Settled is the rule that prohibition does not lie
to restrain an act that is already a fait accompli.
The Petition Should Have Been Filed in the CA
- Section 4 of Rule 65 reads:
Section 4. When and where petition filed. — xxx If it involves the acts or
omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these
Rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
-
That the MB is a quasi-judicial agency was already settled and reiterated in the case
of Bank of Commerce v. Planters Development Bank And Bangko Sentral Ng
Pilipinas.30
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
- Even in the absence of such provision, the petition is also dismissible because it
simply ignored the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
- Under the Rules of Court, a party may directly appeal to this Court only on pure
questions of law. In the case at bench, there are certainly factual issues as Vivas is
questioning the findings of the investigating team.
- Strict observance of the policy of judicial hierarchy demands that where the
issuance of the extraordinary writs is also within the competence of the CA or the
RTC, the special action for the obtainment of such writ must be presented to
either court. As a rule, the Court will not entertain direct resort to it unless the
redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate lower courts; or where
exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and
with serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of
writ of certiorari, prohibition, or mandamus calling for the exercise of its primary
jurisdiction. The judicial policy must be observed to prevent an imposition on the
precious time and attention of the Court.
The MB Committed No Grave Abuse of Discretion
- Vivas argues that implementation of the questioned resolution was tainted with
arbitrariness and bad faith, stressing that ECBI was placed under receivership
without due and prior hearing, invoking Section 11 of R.A. No. 7353 which states that
the BSP may take over the management of a rural bank after due hearing. He adds
that because R.A. No. 7353 is a special law, the same should prevail over R.A. No.
7653 which is a general law.
- The Court has taken this into account, but it appears from all over the records that
ECBI was given every opportunity to be heard and improve on its financial standing.
-
BSP officials and examiners met with the representatives of ECBI, including Vivas,
and discussed their findings.
-
There were also reminders that ECBI submit its financial audit reports for the
years 2007 and 2008 with a warning that failure to submit them and a written
explanation of such omission shall result in the imposition of a monetary penalty.
- ECBI was heard on its motion for reconsideration.
- For failure of ECBI to comply, the MB came out with Resolution No. 1548 denying
its request for reconsideration of Resolution No. 726. Having been heard on its
motion for reconsideration, ECBI cannot claim that it was deprived of its right
under the Rural Bank Act.
Close Now, Hear Later
- At any rate, if circumstances warrant it, the MB may forbid a bank from doing
business and place it under receivership without prior notice and hearing. (Section
30 of R.A. No. 7653)
- The Court, in several cases, upheld the power of the MB to take over banks without
need for prior hearing. It is not necessary inasmuch as the law entrusts to the MB the
appreciation and determination of whether any or all of the statutory grounds for the
closure and receivership of the erring bank are present. The MB, under R.A. No. 7653,
has been invested with more power of closure and placement of a bank under
receivership for insolvency or illiquidity, or because the bank’s continuance in
9
business would probably result in the loss to depositors or creditors. In the case of
Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas Monetary Board v. Hon. Antonio-Valenzuela,36 the Court
reiterated the doctrine of "close now, hear later," stating that it was justified as a
measure for the protection of the public interest.
- In light of the circumstances obtaining in this case, the application of the corrective
measures enunciated in Section 30 of R.A. No. 7653 was proper and justified.
Management take-over under Section 11 of R.A. No. 7353 was no longer feasible
considering the financial quagmire that engulfed ECBI showing serious conditions of
insolvency and illiquidity. Besides, placing ECBI under receivership would effectively
put a stop to the further draining of its assets.
No Undue Delegation of Legislative Power
- “There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation
of legislative power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test.
- Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when
it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches the delegate the only thing he
will have to do is enforce it.
-
Under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations
in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority and prevent the
delegation from running riot. Both tests are intended to prevent a total
transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step
into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.”44
-
In this case, under the two tests, there was no undue delegation of legislative
authority in the issuance of R.A. No. 7653. To address the growing concerns in the
banking industry, the legislature has sufficiently empowered the MB to effectively
monitor and supervise banks and financial institutions and, if circumstances
warrant, to forbid them to do business, to take over their management or to place
them under receivership. The legislature has clearly spelled out the reasonable
parameters of the power entrusted to the MB and assigned to it only the manner
of enforcing said power. In other words, the MB was given a wide discretion and
latitude only as to how the law should be implemented in order to attain its
objective of protecting the interest of the public, the banking industry and the
economy.
4) CORALES V. REPUBLIC, 2013 – LUCENARIO
Corales vs. Republic (A lot of this digest was copy pasted from the previous digest
made by Jech Tiu in REM DIGESTS 04, some changes in the ratio focusing on
prohibition)
ER: Corales was the Mayor of Nagcalran, Laguna for 3 consecutive terms. During his first
term, Corales appointed Dr. Angeles as Municipal Admistrator, which appointment was
approved by the Sangguniang Bayan (SB). The SB disapproved the reappointment of Dr.
Angeles during the second and third term of Corales. Nevertheless, Dr. Angeles
continued to discharge the duties of such office and received salary therefor. Eventually,
Andal (Provincial State Auditor) issued an Audit Observation Memorandum, requiring
the comment of Corales on the finding that while Dr. Angeles is a de facto officer, it is
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
Corales who must shoulder the salary to be paid. Corales did not reply, but instead filed
a petition for prohibition and mandamus in the RTC. CA eventually denied the Petition
for Prohibition. The issue is W/N the CA was correct in dismissing the Petition for
Prohibition and Mandamus. HELD: No. CA was correct.
Reason 1: The AOM issued by Andal was not conclusive on the liability of Corales to pay.
Hence, there being no clear legal wrong yet, such was premature and not yet ripe.
Reason 2: What petitioners actually assail is Andal’s authority to request them to file the
desired comment/reply to the AOM, which is beyond the scope of the action for
prohibition, as such request is neither an actionable wrong nor constitutive of an act
perceived to be illegal. Andal, being the Provincial State Auditor, is clothed with the
authority to audit petitioners’ disbursements, conduct an investigation thereon and
render a final finding and recommendation thereafter.
Reason 3: Moreover, prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment
ordering the defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act
perceived to be illegal, may only be resorted to when there is “no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.” In this case,
there were other administrative orders available which petitioners did not take. Hence,
failure to do so is fatal to their action.
Facts: Petitioner Corales was the Municipal Mayor of Nagcarlan, Laguna for 3
consecutive terms, i.e., the 1998, 2001 and 2004 elections.
• 1st term – Corales appointed petitioner Dr. Angeles to the position of Municipal
Administrator, whose appointment was unanimously by the Sangguniang
Bayan (SB).
• 2nd term – Corales renewed the appointment the said appointment, but such
was disapproved by the SB due to nepotism. [NOTE] Even so, petitioner Dr.
Angeles continued to discharge the functions and duties of his office for which
he received an annual salary of P 210K.
- Maximo Andal (Andal), the Provincial State Auditor of Laguna, issued an Audit
Observation Memorandum (AOM, asking for a reply/comment from Corales. The AOM
states that:
• (1) Dr. Angeles’ appointment as Municipal Administrator during the second
and third terms was without legal basis;
• (2) But Dr. Angeles can be considered as a de facto officer entitled to the
emoluments of the office for the actual services rendered;
• (3) Nonetheless, it is not the Municipality that should be made liable for the
salary, but the appointing authority, Corales.
- Instead of submitting his comment/reply thereon, Corales, together with petitioner Dr.
Angeles, opted to file a Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus against Andal and the
then members of the Sangguniang Bayan before the RTC of San Pablo City, Laguna.
10
• Prohibition – To require the Office of the Provincial Auditor recall its AOM and
to eventually desist from collecting reimbursement from Corales
• Mandamus – To compel the then members of the Sangguniang Bayan to recall
its Resolutions denying confirmation Dr. Angeles’ appointment
- The OSG, on Andal’s behalf, filed a Motion to Dismiss (MTD) Corales’ Petition grounded
on lack of cause of action, prematurity, and non-exhaustion of administrative remedies –
the issuance of the AOM was merely an initiatory step in the administrative
investigation.
- The RTCdenied the MTD – Andal was merely a nominal party.
- Respondent Republic filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA – as the RTC unjustly
denied the Republic’s right to actively prosecute the case.
- The CA granted the Petition.
- Corales filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari to the CA decision. Corales argued
[RELEVANT TO TOPIC] that by filing a MTD on the ground of lack of cause of action, the
Republic, in essence, admitted all the material averments and narration of facts stated
his petition. As such, what remains is a pure question of law and the judgment of the
RTC denying the MTD is no longer subject to any appeal or review by the CA. Instead, it
is already appealable and reviewable by the SC under Rule 45, as ruled in China Road v.
CA. It contested that its Petition for Prohibition should not have been dismissed.
Issue: Whether or not the CA exceeded its jurisdiction in denying the Petition for
Prohibition? No.
Held: Petition for Prohibition denied.
Ratio:
It is beyond doubt that the issuance of an AOM is, indeed, an initial step in the conduct of
an investigative audit considering that after its issuance there are still several steps to
be conducted before a final conclusion can be made or before the proper action can be
had against the Auditee. There is, therefore, no basis for petitioner Corales’ claim that
his comment thereon would be a mere formality.
The action therefore is not ripe for adjudication. The requisites of actual case and
ripeness are absent in the present case. To repeat, the AOM issued by Andal merely
requested petitioner Corales to comment/reply thereto. Truly, the AOM already
contained a recommendation to issue a Notice of Disallowance; however, no Notice of
Disallowance was yet issued. Similarly, there was no clear showing that petitioners,
particularly petitioner Corales, would sustain actual or imminent injury by reason of the
issuance of the AOM.
What petitioners actually assail is Andal’s authority to request them to file the desired
comment/reply to the AOM, which is beyond the scope of the action for prohibition, as
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
such request is neither an actionable wrong nor constitutive of an act perceived to be
illegal. Andal, being the Provincial State Auditor, is clothed with the authority to audit
petitioners’ disbursements, conduct an investigation thereon and render a final finding
and recommendation thereafter. Hence, it is beyond question that in relation to his audit
investigation function, Andal can validly and legally require petitioners to submit
comment/reply to the AOM, which the latter cannot pre-empt by prematurely seeking
judicial intervention, like filing an action for prohibition.
Moreover, prohibition, being a preventive remedy to seek a judgment ordering the
defendant to desist from continuing with the commission of an act perceived to be
illegal, may only be resorted to when there is “no appeal or any other plain, speedy,
and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.”
The action for prohibition is premature since there are still many administrative
remedies available to petitioners to contest the said AOM. Section 1, Rule V of the 1997
Revised Rules of Procedure of the COA, provides: “[a]n aggrieved party may appeal from
an order or decision or ruling rendered by the Auditor embodied in a report,
memorandum, letter, notice of disallowances and charges, Certificate of Settlement and
Balances, to the Director who has jurisdiction over the agency under audit.” From the
final order or decision of the Director, an aggrieved party may appeal to the Commission
proper.28 It is the decision or resolution of the Commission proper which can be
appealed to this Court
In Fua, Jr. v. COA,30 citing Sison v. Tablang,31 this Court declared that the general rule is
that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first avail himself
of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The premature
invocation of the intervention of the court is fatal to one’s cause of action. The
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is based on practical and legal
reasons. The availment of administrative remedy entails lesser expenses and provides
for a speedier disposition of controversies. Furthermore, the courts of justice, for
reasons of comity and convenience, will shy away from a dispute until the system
of administrative redress has been completed and complied with, so as to give the
administrative agency concerned every opportunity to correct its error and
dispose of the case. x x x. Moreover, courts have accorded respect for the
specialized ability of other agencies of government to deal with the issues within
their respective specializations prior to any court intervention.
As one of the three (3) independent constitutional commissions, COA has been
empowered to define the scope of its audit and examination and to establish the
techniques and methods required therefor; and to promulgate accounting and
auditing rules and regulations, including those for the prevention and
disallowance of irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant or unconscionable
expenditures or uses of government funds and properties.
Thus, in the light of this constitutionally delegated task, the courts must exercise caution
when intervening with disputes involving these independent bodies, for the general
rule is that before a party may seek the intervention of the court, he should first
avail of all the means afforded him by administrative processes. The issues which
11
administrative agencies are authorized to decide should not be summarily taken
from them and submitted to a court without first giving such administrative agency the
opportunity to dispose of the same after due deliberation.
D.3 MANDAMUS
1) RAUL LAMBINO V. COMELEC, G.R. NO. 174153, OCTOBER 25, 2006 – MAGTAGNOB
Lambino v Comelec
Topic: Mandamus
Note: Mandamus was only discussed in the Opinions after the Decision.
EMERGENCY DIGEST
Quick Facts:
• Lambino et al filed a petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite to ratify their
initiative petition (signed by millions of voters) to change the 1987 Constitution.
COMELEC denied their request in a Resolution. Lambino group filed a petition for
mandamus and certiorari.
Issue: WON Mandamus is proper? Was discussed only in the opinions part. Concurring
said that Mandamus was properly denied because their petition did not present a clear
right to warrant the relief granted. In the dissenting, it said that Mandamus should have
been granted because Lambino group has standing.
Ratio:
Ratio talked about the Constitutional provision re referendum and initiative. In short,
they said that the petition failed to comply with the Constitutional provision. It was not
initiated by the people. No draft of the proposals was shown to them. It was a revision,
not an amendment. Only an amendment of the constitution was allowed if it was
initiated by the people.
Doctrine:
Concurring opinion
Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who act to enforce a public right and to
compel the persons of a public duty most especially when mandated by the
Constitution.99 However, under Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, for a
petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition is a
ministerial act or duty and not purely discretionary on the part of the board, officer or
person, and that petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to warrant the
grant thereof. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or tribunal
performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to the mandate
of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own judgment upon the
propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a duty upon a public official
and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty should be performed, such duty
is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of
the same requires neither the exercise of an official discretion nor judgment.100
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
To stress, in a petition for mandamus, petitioner must show a well defined, clear and
certain right to warrant the grant thereof.101 In this case, petitioners failed to establish
their right to a writ of mandamus as shown by the foregoing disquisitions.
Dissenting opinion
SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins
as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station x x x and there is no other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person aggrieved
thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court x x x x.
COMPLETE DIGEST:
Facts:
• Raul L. Lambino and Erico B. Aumentado ("Lambino Group"), with other groups1
and individuals, commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to
change the 1987 Constitution. On 25 August 2006, the Lambino Group filed a
petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative
petition under Section 5(b) and (c)2 and Section 73 of the Initiative and Referendum
Act ("RA 6735").
• The Lambino Group alleged that their petition had the support of 6,327,952
individuals constituting at least 12% of all registered voters, with each legislative
district represented by at least 3% of its registered voters. The Lambino Group also
claimed that COMELEC election registrars had verified the signatures of the 6.3
million individuals.
• The Lambino Group's initiative petition changes the 1987 Constitution by
modifying Sections 1-7 of Article VI (Legislative Department) 4 and Sections 1-4 of
Article VII (Executive Department)5 and by adding Article XVIII entitled "Transitory
Provisions."6 These proposed changes will shift the present Bicameral-Presidential
system to a Unicameral-Parliamentary form of government. The Lambino Group
prayed that after due publication of their petition, the COMELEC should submit the
following proposition in a plebiscite for the voters' ratification:
• DO YOU APPROVE THE AMENDMENT OF ARTICLES VI AND VII OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION, CHANGING THE FORM OF GOVERNMENT FROM THE PRESENT
BICAMERAL-PRESIDENTIAL TO A UNICAMERAL-PARLIAMENTARY SYSTEM, AND
PROVIDING ARTICLE XVIII AS TRANSITORY PROVISIONS FOR THE ORDERLY
SHIFT FROM ONE SYSTEM TO THE OTHER?
• The Lambino Group filed an Amended Petition with the COMELEC indicating
modifications in the proposed Article XVIII (Transitory Provisions) of their
initiative.7
• COMELEC issued its Resolution denying due course to the Lambino Group's petition
for lack of an enabling law governing initiative petitions to amend the Constitution.
The COMELEC invoked this Court's ruling in Santiago v. Commission on Elections8
declaring RA 6735 inadequate to implement the initiative clause on proposals to
amend the Constitution.9
• The Lambino Group prays for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and mandamus
to set aside the COMELEC Resolution and to compel the COMELEC to give due
course to their initiative petition. The Lambino Group contends that the COMELEC
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committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to their petition since
Santiago is not a binding precedent. Alternatively, the Lambino Group claims that
Santiago binds only the parties to that case, and their petition deserves cognizance
as an expression of the "will of the sovereign people."
• The Solicitor General proposed that the Court treat RA 6735 and its implementing
rules "as temporary devises to implement the system of initiative." (in short, OSG
sided with Lambino group)
• Various groups and individuals sought intervention, filing pleadings supporting or
opposing the Lambino Group's petition. The opposing intervenors challenged (1)
the Lambino Group's standing to file the petition; (2) the validity of the signature
gathering and verification process; (3) the Lambino Group's compliance with the
minimum requirement for the percentage of voters supporting an initiative petition
under Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; 12 (4) the nature of the
proposed changes as revisions and not mere amendments as provided under
Section 2, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution; and (5) the Lambino Group's
compliance with the requirement in Section 10(a) of RA 6735 limiting initiative
petitions to only one subject.
• The Court heard the parties and intervenors in oral arguments.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Lambino Group's initiative petition complies with Section 2, Article XVII
of the Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people's initiative- No.
2. Whether this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735
"incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms and conditions" to implement the
initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution -
3. W/N COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the
Lambino Group's petition for mandamus – NO.
HELD: WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition in G.R. No. 174153.
RATIO:
There is no merit to the petition.
The Lambino Group miserably failed to comply with the basic requirements of the
Constitution for conducting a people's initiative. Thus, there is even no need to revisit
Santiago, as the present petition warrants dismissal based alone on the Lambino
Group's glaring failure to comply with the basic requirements of the Constitution. For
following the Court's ruling in Santiago, no grave abuse of discretion is attributable to
the Commision on Elections.
PART 1 →NOT IMPORTANT FOR REM
1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People
• Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution is the governing constitutional provision
that allows a people's initiative to propose amendments to the Constitution. This
section states:
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
• Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative upon a petition of at least twelve per centum of the
total number of registered voters of which every legislative district must be
represented by at least three per centum of the registered voters therein. x x x x
(Emphasis supplied)
• The framers of the Constitution intended that the "draft of the proposed
constitutional amendment" should be "ready and shown" to the people "before"
they sign such proposal. The framers plainly stated that "before they sign there is
already a draft shown to them." The framers also "envisioned" that the people
should sign on the proposal itself because the proponents must "prepare that
proposal and pass it around for signature."
• The essence of amendments "directly proposed by the people through initiative
upon a petition" is that the entire proposal on its face is a petition by the
people. This means two essential elements must be present. First, the people must
author and thus sign the entire proposal. No agent or representative can sign on
their behalf. Second, as an initiative upon a petition, the proposal must be
embodied in a petition.
• The Lambino Group did not attach to their present petition with this Court a copy of
the paper that the people signed as their initiative petition. The Lambino Group
submitted to this Court a copy of a signature sheet20 after the oral arguments
when they filed their Memorandum. There is not a single word, phrase, or
sentence of text of the Lambino Group's proposed changes in the signature
sheet. Neither does the signature sheet state that the text of the proposed
changes is attached to it.
• The signature sheet merely asks a question whether the people approve a shift
from the Bicameral-Presidential to the Unicameral-Parliamentary system of
government. The signature sheet does not show to the people the draft of the
proposed changes before they are asked to sign the signature sheet. Clearly,
the signature sheet is not the "petition" that the framers of the Constitution
envisioned when they formulated the initiative clause in Section 2, Article XVII of
the Constitution.
• The Lambino Group's statement that they circulated to the people "the petition for
initiative filed with the COMELEC" appears an afterthought, made after the
intervenors Integrated Bar of the Philippines (Cebu City Chapter and Cebu Province
Chapters) and Atty. Quadra had pointed out that the signature sheets did not
contain the text of the proposed changes.
• In any event, the Lambino Group's signature sheets do not contain the full text of
the proposed changes, either on the face of the signature sheets, or as attachment
with an indication in the signature sheet of such attachment.
• For sure, the great majority of the 6.3 million people who signed the signature
sheets did not see the full text of the proposed changes before signing. They could
not have known the nature and effect of the proposed changes, among which are:
o 1. The term limits on members of the legislature will be lifted and
thus members of Parliament can be re-elected indefinitely;26
o 2. The interim Parliament can continue to function indefinitely until its
members, who are almost all the present members of Congress, decide to
call for new parliamentary elections. Thus, the members of the interim
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Parliament will determine the expiration of their own term of office;
27
o 3. Within 45 days from the ratification of the proposed changes, the
interim Parliament shall convene to propose further amendments or
revisions to the Constitution.28
• In short, the Lambino Group's initiative is void and unconstitutional because it
dismally fails to comply with the requirement of Section 2, Article XVII of the
Constitution that the initiative must be "directly proposed by the people through
initiative upon a petition."
2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing
Revision through Initiatives
• A people's initiative to change the Constitution applies only to an amendment of the
Constitution and not to its revision. In contrast, Congress or a constitutional
convention can propose both amendments and revisions to the Constitution. Article
XVII of the Constitution provides:
ARTICLE XVII - AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS
• Sec. 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
o The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members, or
o A constitutional convention.
• Sec. 2. Amendments to this Constitution may likewise be directly proposed by the
people through initiative x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
• The framers of the Constitution intended, and wrote, a clear distinction between
"amendment" and "revision" of the Constitution. The framers intended, and
wrote, that only Congress or a constitutional convention may propose revisions to
the Constitution. The framers intended, and wrote, that a people's initiative may
propose only amendments to the Constitution.
• Revision broadly implies a change that alters a basic principle in the
constitution, like altering the principle of separation of powers or the system of
checks-and-balances. There is also revision if the change alters the substantial
entirety of the constitution, as when the change affects substantial provisions
of the constitution. On the other hand, amendment broadly refers to a change
that adds, reduces, or deletes without altering the basic principle involved.
Revision generally affects several provisions of the constitution, while amendment
generally affects only the specific provision being amended.
• In California where the initiative clause allows amendments but not revisions to the
constitution just like in our Constitution, courts have developed a two-part test:
the quantitative test and the qualitative test. The quantitative test asks whether the
proposed change is "so extensive in its provisions as to change directly the
'substantial entirety' of the constitution by the deletion or alteration of numerous
existing provisions."36 The court examines only the number of provisions affected
and does not consider the degree of the change.
• The qualitative test inquires into the qualitative effects of the proposed change in
the constitution. The main inquiry is whether the change will "accomplish such far
reaching changes in the nature of our basic governmental plan as to amount to a
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
revision."37 Whether there is an alteration in the structure of government is a
proper subject of inquiry.
• Under both the quantitative and qualitative tests, the Lambino Group's initiative is
a revision and not merely an amendment. Quantitatively, the Lambino Group's
proposed changes overhaul two articles - Article VI on the Legislature and Article
VII on the Executive - affecting a total of 105 provisions in the entire Constitution.40
Qualitatively, the proposed changes alter substantially the basic plan of
government, from presidential to parliamentary, and from a bicameral to a
unicameral legislature.
• A change in the structure of government is a revision of the Constitution, as when
the three great co-equal branches of government in the present Constitution are
reduced into two. This alters the separation of powers in the Constitution. A
shift from the present Bicameral-Presidential system to a Unicameral-
Parliamentary system is a revision of the Constitution. Merging the legislative and
executive branches is a radical change in the structure of government.
3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary
The present petition warrants dismissal for failure to comply with the basic
requirements of Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on the conduct and scope of a
people's initiative to amend the Constitution. There is no need to revisit this Court's
ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 "incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential
terms and conditions" to cover the system of initiative to amend the Constitution.
4. The COMELEC Did Not Commit Grave Abuse of Discretion in Dismissing the
Lambino Group's Initiative
5. Conclusion
The Lambino Group thus admits that their "people's" initiative is an "unqualified
support to the agenda" of the incumbent President to change the Constitution. This
forewarns the Court to be wary of incantations of "people's voice" or "sovereign will" in
the present initiative.
PART 2 – MUST READ→ IMPORTANT FOR REM: MANDAMUS
SEPARATE CONCURRING of J. Callejo
DISSENTING OF J. Puno
(They said the same thing. Copied only portion re mandamus)
• It is argued by petitioners that, assuming arguendo that the COMELEC is correct in
relying on Santiago that RA 6735 is inadequate to cover initiative to the
Constitution, this cannot be used to legitimize its refusal to heed the people's will.
The fact that there is no enabling law should not prejudice the right of the
sovereign people to propose amendments to the Constitution, which right has
already been exercised by 6,327,952 voters. The collective and resounding act of
the particles of sovereignty must not be set aside. Hence, the COMELEC should be
ordered to comply with Section 4, Article XVII of the 1987 Constitution via a writ of
mandamus. The submission of petitioners, however, is unpersuasive.
• Mandamus is a proper recourse for citizens who act to enforce a public right and to
compel the persons of a public duty most especially when mandated by the
14
Constitution.99 However, under Section 3, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Court, for a
petition for mandamus to prosper, it must be shown that the subject of the petition
is a ministerial act or duty and not purely discretionary on the part of the board,
officer or person, and that petitioner has a well-defined, clear and certain right to
warrant the grant thereof. A purely ministerial act or duty is one which an officer or
tribunal performs in a given state of facts, in a prescribed manner, in obedience to
the mandate of a legal authority, without regard to or the exercise of his own
judgment upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done. If the law imposes a
duty upon a public official and gives him the right to decide how or when the duty
should be performed, such duty is discretionary and not ministerial. The duty is
ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the exercise of an
official discretion nor judgment.100
• To stress, in a petition for mandamus, petitioner must show a well defined, clear
and certain right to warrant the grant thereof.101 In this case, petitioners failed to
establish their right to a writ of mandamus as shown by the foregoing disquisitions.
• Dissenting opinion of J. Puno
• Neither is it necessary for said signatories to authorize Lambino and Aumentado to
file the petition for certiorari and mandamus before this Court.
• SEC. 3. Petition for mandamus.—When any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law specifically
enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station x x x and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the person
aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court x x x x.
• Thus, any person aggrieved by the act or inaction of the respondent tribunal,
board or officer may file a petition for certiorari or mandamus before the
appropriate court. Certainly, Lambino and Aumentado, as among the proponents of
the petition for initiative dismissed by the COMELEC, have the standing to file the
petition at bar.
2) ESQUIVEL V. OMBUDSMAN, G.R. NO. 137237, SEPTEMBER 17, 2002 – MUTI
Keywords: police vs. mayor; Ombudsman’s discretionary duty not subject to mandamus
ER: PO2 EDUARDO alleges that the ESQUIVELS brought him to the municipal hall where
he was mauled and threatened because he was one of the officers who raided a jueteng
den connected to mayor ESQUIVEL. Prior to his release, he was forced to sign a
statement that he was in good physical condition. After investigation, Deputy
Ombudsman issued the assailed resolution recommending that the ESQUIVELS be
indicted for less serious physical injuries and grave threats. ESQUIVELS brought the
matter to the SC via certiorari, prohibition and MANDAMUS alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the Ombudsman when it failed to consider the admission of
EDUARDO in his statement that he was in good physical condition as exculpatory
evidence.
Are the ESQUIVELS entitled to a writ of mandamus in this case? Mandamus is
employed to compel the performance of a ministerial duty and NOT A DISCRETIONARY
duty. The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires neither the
exercise of official discretion nor judgment. Hence, this Court cannot issue a writ of
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
mandamus to control or review the exercise of discretion by the Ombudsman, for it is
his discretion that is to be exercised and not that of the Court. When a decision has been
reached in a matter involving discretion, mandamus may not be availed of to review or
correct it, however erroneous it may be. Moreover, where another remedy is available
(i.e. appeal or motion to quash info), mandamus will not lie.
FACTS:
• PO2 Herminigildo C. Eduardo (“EDUARDO”) and SPO1 Modesto P. Catacutan
(“CATACUTAN”), both residents of Jaen, Nueva Ecija, filed their respective
complaint-affidavits before the PNP – Criminal Investigation and Detection Group
(PNP-CIDG).
• They charged herein petitioners Antonio Prospero Esquivel (“ESQUIVEL”)
municipal mayor of Jaen and his brother, Mark Anthony “Eboy” Esquivel
(“EBOY”), barangay captain of barangay Apo, Jaen, with alleged illegal arrest,
arbitrary detention, maltreatment, attempted murder, and grave threats.
o Also included in the charges were other police and LTO officers of the Jaen
Municipal Police Force for dereliction of duty.
• The initial investigation conducted by the PNP-CIDG showed that at about 12:30
p.m., EDUARDO was about to eat lunch at his parents’ house at Jaen when
ESQUIVEL and EBOY arrived with police officers and disarmed EDUARDO. They
then forced him to board their vehicle and brought him to the Jaen Municipal Hall.
• While they were on their way to the town hall, ESQUIVEL mauled him with the use
of a firearm and threatened to kill him. ESQUIVEL pointed a gun at him and
said, “Putang-ina mo, papatayin kita, aaksidentihin kita dito, bakit mo ako
kinakalaban!”
• Upon reaching the municipal hall, EBOY shoved EDUARDO inside an adjacent hut.
ESQUIVEL then ordered one of the officers to kill him, saying “Patayin mo na iyan
at gawan ng senaryo at report.”
• At this point, according to CATACUTAN, he arrived to verify what happened to his
teammate EDUARDO, but ESQUIVEL likewise threatened him and ordered one of
the officers of the Jaen Police Station to file charges against EDUARDO. He once
again struck EDUARDO in the nape with a handgun, while EBOY was holding the
latter.
• EDUARDO then fell and lost consciousness. When he regained his consciousness,
he was told that he would be released. Prior to his release, however, he was forced
to sign a statement in the police blotter that he was in good physical condition.
• EDUARDO told the PNP-CIDG investigators that he was most likely maltreated and
threatened because ESQUIVEL believed he was among the law enforcers who
raided a jueteng den in Jaen that same day. He surmised that the mayor disliked the
fact that he arrested members of crime syndicates with connections to the mayor.
He also presented a medical certificate showing the injuries he suffered and other
documentary evidence.
15
• After the initial investigation, the PNP-CIDG forwarded the pertinent records to the
Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon for appropriate action. The latter
conducted a preliminary investigation and required the ESQUIVEL BROTHERS and
their companions to file their respective counter-affidavits.
o In their joint counter-affidavit, ESQUIVEL BROTHERS and their
companions denied the charges and alleged that EDUARDO is a fugitive
from justice with an outstanding warrant of arrest for malversation. They
further alleged that the gun confiscated from EDUARDO was the subject of
an illegal possession of firearm complaint.
• Deputy Ombudsman issued the impugned resolution recommending that the
ESQUIVEL BROTHERS be indicted for the crime of less serious physical injuries, and
ESQUIVEL alone for grave threats. Ombudsman Desierto approved.
• Thereafter, separate informations for less serious physical injuries against the
ESQUIVEL BROTHERS and for grave threats against ESQUIVEL alone were filed
with the Sandiganbayan.
• ESQUIVEL BROS moved for reconsideration of the resolution. They likewise filed a
motion for reconsideration/reinvestigation with the Office of the Special
Prosecutor (OSP). That motion was, however, denied by the OSP. They were
arraigned and pleaded not guilty.
• ESQUIVEL BROS elevated the matter to this Court and filed this special civil action
for certiorari, prohibition, and MANDAMUS with prayer for PI and/or TRO seeks to
annul and set aside: (1) the Ombudsman resolution finding prima facie case against
them, and (2) the order denying their MR.
• ESQUIVEL BROS argue that the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion
when he failed to consider the admission of EDUARDO that he was in good physical
condition when he left the police station. With such admission, EDUARDO is now
estopped from claiming that he was injured since it is conclusive evidence against
him and need not be proven in any other proceeding.
o Public respondents counter that ESQUIVEL BROS raise a factual issue
which is not a proper subject of a certiorari action. They further postulate
that being evidentiary in nature, its resolution can only be threshed out in
a full-blown trial.
ISSUE: whether mandamus is proper in this case – NO!!!
HELD: WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit We find the
present petition without merit.
RATIO:
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
NOTE: The ratio is divided into three: the propriety of issuing writ of (1) certiorari, (2)
prohibition, and (3) mandamus. The discussion on mandamus is very short so I briefly
included the first 2 just in case Sir asks, but you can SKIP TO THE MANDAMUS part!
Re: CERTIORARI – not proper
• The Ombudsman is empowered to determine whether there exists reasonable
ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof and, thereafter, to file the corresponding information. SC will not
ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his investigatory and
prosecutory powers provided there is no grave abuse of discretion.
• In this case, the ESQUIVEL BROS failed to establish that the Ombudsman acted with
grave abuse of discretion in rendering the disputed resolution and order.
o The issue on EDUARDO’s admission was raised only in their MR. In his
opposition to said motion, EDUARDO did admit signing a document to the
effect that he was in good physical condition when he left the police
station. However, the admission merely applied to the execution of said
document and not to the truthfulness of its contents.
o Consequently, the said admission is evidentiary in nature and its
probative value can be best passed upon after a full-blown trial on the
merits.
• The ESQUIVEL BROS further theorize that the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over their persons as they hold positions excluded in R.A. 7975.
o Jurisprudence already held that municipal mayors fall under the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Since brgy. Captain EBOY is a co-
accused with mayor ESQUIVEL, Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over
him.
Re: PROHIBITION – not proper
• First, writ of prohibition is directed to the court itself, commanding it to cease from
the exercise of a jurisdiction to which it has no legal claim. As earlier discussed, the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over this case is clearly founded on law.
• Second, prohibition is granted only where no other remedy is available or sufficient
to afford redress. The ESQUIVELS have another and complete remedy at law-
through an appeal or otherwise. Also, they could have filed a motion to quash the
informations at the first instance. They did make a belated oral motion for time to
file a motion to quash the informations, but its denial is not a proper subject for
certiorari or prohibition because it is an interlocutory order.
• Third, a writ of prohibition will not be issued against an inferior court unless the
attention of the court whose proceedings are sought to be stayed has been called to
the alleged lack of jurisdiction. The records show that ESQUIVELS only raised the
issue of the alleged lack of jurisdiction by the Sandiganbayan before this Court.
Re: MANDAMUS (IMPORTANT PART!!!)
16
• Mandamus is employed to compel the performance, when refused, of a
ministerial duty, this being its chief use and NOT A DISCRETIONARY duty.
o The duty is ministerial only when the discharge of the same requires
neither the exercise of official discretion nor judgment.
• Hence, this Court cannot issue a writ of mandamus to control or review the
exercise of discretion by the Ombudsman, for it is his discretion and
judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the Court.
• When a decision has been reached in a matter involving discretion, a writ of
mandamus may not be availed of to review or correct it, however erroneous it
may be.
Moreover, as earlier discussed, petitioners had another remedy available in the
ordinary course of law. Where such remedy is available in the ordinary course of
law, mandamus will not lie.
3) DOLOT V. PAJE, 2013 - NARVASA
MARICRIS D. DOLOT, CHAIRMAN OF THE BAGONG ALYANSANG MAKABAYAN-
SORSOGON,
vs.
HON. RAMON PAJE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE SECRETARY OF THE DENR
Topic: Mandamus
ER: Dolot filed a petition for continuing mandamus and a TEPO, for some mining
companies have been mining iron ore without permits. That the governor of Sorsogon
apparently issued them some sort of permits, but he is without authority to do so. The
RTC summarily dismissed their case, under the ground that to maintain an action for
continuing mandamus there needs to be a final court decree, order or decision
that the public officials allegedly failed to act on. Is this correct? NO!
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to
compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law.” The petition should
mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right
therein.
• It enjoys a distinct for the enforcement/violation of environmental laws
(Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules) it requires that:
• The petition filed should be sufficient in form and substance before a court
may take further action;
o On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain
supporting evidence as well as a sworn certification of non-
forum shopping.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
▪ It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is
aggrieved by an act or omission of the government agency,
instrumentality or its officer concerned.
o Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand, necessitates that the
petition must contain substantive allegations specifically
constituting an actionable neglect or omission and must
establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of
the writ:
(1) an agency or instrumentality of government or its officer unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a
right; (2) the act to be performed by the government agency, instrumentality or its
officer is specifically enjoined by law as a duty;
(3) such duty results from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement
or violation of an environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4) there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.
The RTC’s mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is
apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4,
Rule 1 of the Rules. The final court decree alluded to by the rules actually pertains to the
judgment or decree that that same court would eventually render in an environmental
case for continuing mandamus.
• Such court still retains jurisdiction over the case to ensure that the
government agency concerned is performing its tasks as mandated by law and
to monitor the effective performance of said tasks.
• It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a
final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds that the
judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be
entered in the court docket.
A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance
with a final judgment as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment
in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under
the court’s decision."
Facts:
This case is an appeal through Rule 45 of a case for Continuing Mandamus, Damages and
Attorney’s Fees with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Environment Protection
Order.
17
Dolot,together with the parish priest of the Holy Infant Jesus Parish and the officers of
Alyansa Laban sa Mina sa Matnog (petitioners), filed a petition for continuing
mandamus, damages and attorney’s fees with the RTC of Sorsogon, alleging:
Sometime in 2009, they protested the iron ore mining operations being conducted by
Antones Enterprises etc. Matnog is located in the southern tip of Luzon and there is a
need to protect, preserve and maintain the geological foundation of the municipality;
Matnog is susceptible to flooding and landslides, and confronted with the environmental
dangers of flood hazard, liquefaction, ground settlement, ground subsidence and
landslide hazard;
After investigation, they learned that the mining operators did not have the required
permit to operate; Sorsogon Governor Raul Lee and his predecessor Sally Lee issued to
the operators a small-scale mining permit, which they did not have authority to issue;
The DENR, despite knowledge, did not do anything to protect the interest of the people
of Matnog; and the respondents violated Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7076 or the People’s
Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, R.A. No. 7942 or the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and
the Local Government Code.
The case was referred by the Executive Judge to the RTC of Sorsogon, being the
designated environmental court. The case was summarily dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
• The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied.
1. Whether it was correct in dismissing the case under the grounds that: (1)
there is no final court decree, order or decision that the public officials
allegedly failed to act on; (2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies; and (3) the petitioners failed to attach
judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the complaint to the government
or appropriate agency?
Continuing Mandamus
(1) there is no final court decree, order or decision that the public officials
allegedly failed to act on;
The concept of continuing mandamus was first introduced in Metropolitan Manila
Development Authority v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
• Codified in Rule 8 of the Rules, the writ of continuing mandamus enjoys a
distinct procedure than that of ordinary civil actions for the
enforcement/violation of environmental laws, which are covered by Part II
(Civil Procedure).
• Similar to the procedure under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for special civil
actions for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, Section 4, Rule 8 of the Rules
requires that:
o The petition filed should be sufficient in form and substance before a
court may take further action; otherwise, the court may dismiss the
petition outright.
• Courts must be cautioned, however, that the determination to give due course
to the petition or dismiss it outright is an exercise of discretion that must be
applied in a reasonable manner in consonance with the spirit of the law and
always with the view in mind of seeing to it that justice is served.
Sufficiency in form and substance refers to the contents of the petition filed under Rule
8, Section 1:
When any agency or instrumentality of the government or officer
thereof unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station
in connection with the enforcement or violation of an environmental
law rule or regulation or a right therein, or unlawfully excludes
another from the use or enjoyment of such right and there is no other
plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, the
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper
court, alleging the facts with certainty, attaching thereto supporting
evidence, specifying that the petition concerns an environmental law,
rule or regulation, and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to do an act or series of acts until the
judgment is fully satisfied, and to pay damages sustained by the
petitioner by reason of the malicious neglect to perform the duties of
the respondent, under the law, rules or regulations. The petition shall
also contain a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
On matters of form, the petition must be verified and must contain supporting
evidence as well as a sworn certification of non-forum shopping.
• It is also necessary that the petitioner must be one who is aggrieved by an act
or omission of the government agency, instrumentality or its officer concerned.
Sufficiency of substance, on the other hand, necessitates that the petition must contain
substantive allegations specifically constituting an actionable neglect or omission
and must establish, at the very least, a prima facie basis for the issuance of the
writ, viz:
18
(1) an agency or instrumentality of government or its officer unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act or unlawfully excludes another from the use or enjoyment of a
right; (2) the act to be performed by the government agency, instrumentality or its
officer is specifically enjoined by law as a duty;
(3) such duty results from an office, trust or station in connection with the enforcement
or violation of an environmental law, rule or regulation or a right therein; and (4) there
is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the course of law.
The writ of continuing mandamus is a special civil action that may be availed of "to
compel the performance of an act specifically enjoined by law.” The petition should
mainly involve an environmental and other related law, rule or regulation or a right
therein.
The RTC’s mistaken notion on the need for a final judgment, decree or order is
apparently based on the definition of the writ of continuing mandamus under Section 4,
Rule 1 of the Rules, to wit:
(c) Continuing mandamus is a writ issued by a court in an
environmental case directing any agency or instrumentality of the
government or officer thereof to perform an act or series of acts
decreed by final judgment which shall remain effective until judgment
is fully satisfied.
The final court decree, order or decision erroneously alluded to by the RTC actually
pertains to the judgment or decree that a court would eventually render in an
environmental case for continuing mandamus and which judgment or decree shall
subsequently become final.
Under the Rules, after the court has rendered a judgment in conformity with Rule 8,
Section 7 and such judgment has become final, the issuing court still retains jurisdiction
over the case to ensure that the government agency concerned is performing its tasks as
mandated by law and to monitor the effective performance of said tasks.
• It is only upon full satisfaction of the final judgment, order or decision that a
final return of the writ shall be made to the court and if the court finds that the
judgment has been fully implemented, the satisfaction of judgment shall be
entered in the court docket.
A writ of continuing mandamus is, in essence, a command of continuing compliance
with a final judgment as it "permits the court to retain jurisdiction after judgment
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
in order to ensure the successful implementation of the reliefs mandated under
the court’s decision."
(2) the case was prematurely filed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies;
(can skip)
The RTC is wrong in its decision that petitioners must first file a case with the Panel of
Arbitrators.
• The Panel has jurisdiction over mining disputes. But the petition filed below
does not involve a mining dispute.
• What was being protested are the alleged negative environmental impact of
the small-scale mining operation being conducted; the authority of the
Governor of Sorsogon to issue mining permits.
• Arbitration before the Panel of Arbitrators is proper only when there is a
disagreement between the parties as to some provisions of the contract
between them, which needs the interpretation and the application of that
particular knowledge and expertise possessed by members of that Panel.
• Resort to the Panel would be completely useless and unnecessary.
(3) the petitioners failed to attach judicial affidavits and furnish a copy of the
complaint to the government or appropriate agency?
The Court also finds that the RTC erred in ruling that the petition is infirm for failure to
attach judicial affidavits.
• As previously stated, Rule 8 requires that the petition should be verified,
contain supporting evidence and must be accompanied by a sworn
certification of non-forum shopping.
• There is nothing in Rule 8 that compels the inclusion of judicial affidavits,
albeit not prohibited.
Finally, failure to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents is not a fatal defect
such that the case should be dismissed. The RTC could have just required the petitioners
to furnish a copy of the petition to the respondents.
E. QUO WARRANTO (RULE 66)
1) LIBAN V. GORDON, G.R. NO. 175352, JULY 15, 2009 – ORTIZ
19
LIBAN V. GORDON
Doctrine:
Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party plaintiff.
However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the ROC, an individual may commence such an
action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another, in
which case he can bring the action in his own name. The person instituting quo
warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show that he is
entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at any stage.
ER:
Petitioners Liban et al. are officers of the Board of the QC Red Cross chapter. They filed a
petition in the SC to declare Senator Gordon, as having forfeited his seat in the
Senate, upon his acceptance of the chairmanship of the Phil. National Red Cross as
provided by section 13, Art. VI of the Constitution which states that no member of
Congress may hold any other office or employment in the Government, or any
subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including government- owned or
controlled corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.
RESPONDENT Gordon challenges the petitioners’ legal standing to file a quo warranto
petition (it appears that the petition had not been specifically designated as quo
warranto). Petitioners claim that they are instituting the action as a taxpayer’s suit.
Gordon also claimed that the PHIL NATIONAL RED CROSS is not a GOCC. Petitioners on
the other hand cited Camporedondo v. NLRC, which held that the PNRC is a GOCC
Petitioners claim that in accepting and holding the position of Chairman of the PNRC
Board of Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate,
pursuant to Flores v. Drilon,[3] which held that incumbent national legislators lose their
elective posts upon their appointment to another government office.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
ISSUE: w/n the petition is quo warranto (yes); w/n petitioners have legal standing (NO)
Petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short,
petitioners filed an action for usurpation of public office against respondent, a public
officer who allegedly committed an act which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of
his public office. Clearly, such an action is for quo warranto, specifically under
Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the ROC.
Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party plaintiff.
However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the ROC, an individual may commence such an
action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another, in
which case he can bring the action in his own name. The person instituting quo
warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show that he is
entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at any stage. In
the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of
respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present petition. ON this
basis alone, this petition should be dismissed.
Facts:
Petitioners Dante V. Liban, Reynaldo M. Bernardo, and Salvador M. Viari filed with the
SC a Petition to Declare Richard J. Gordon as Having Forfeited His Seat in the Senate.
Petitioners are officers of the Board of Directors of the QC Red Cross Chapter while
respondent Gordon is Chairman of the Philippine National Red Cross (PNRC) Board of
Governors.
During respondent’s incumbency as a member of the Senate, he was elected Chairman of
the PNRC. Petitioners allege that by accepting the chairmanship of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent has ceased to be a member of the Senate as provided in Section
13, Article VI of the Consti, which reads:
SEC. 13. No Senator or Member of the House of Representatives may hold any
other office or employment in the Government, or any subdivision, agency, or
instrumentality thereof, including government- owned or controlled
corporations or their subsidiaries, during his term without forfeiting his seat.
Neither shall he be appointed to any office which may have been created or the
emoluments thereof increased during the term for which he was elected.
20
In his Comment, respondent Gordon asserts that
1. petitioners have no standing to file this petition which appears to be
an action for quo warranto, since the petition alleges that respondent
committed an act which, by provision of law, constitutes a ground for
forfeiture of his public office.Petitioners do NOT claim to be entitled
to the Senate office of respondent.Under Section 5, Rule 66 of the
Rules of CivPro, only a person claiming to be entitled to a public office
usurped or unlawfully held by another may bring an action for quo
warranto in his own name.
2. If the petition is one for quo warranto, it is already barred by
prescription since under Section 11, Rule 66 of the Rules of CivPro,
the action should be commenced within one year after the cause of
the public officer’s forfeiture of office. In this case, respondent has
been working as a Red Cross volunteer for the past 40 years.
Respondent was already Chairman of the PNRC Board of Governors
when he was elected Senator in May 2004, having been elected
Chairman in 2003 and re-elected in 2005.
3. If the petition is treated as a taxpayer’s suit, petitioners cannot be
allowed to raise a constitutional question in the absence of any claim
that they suffered some actual damage or threatened injury as a
result of the allegedly illegal act of respondent. Furthermore,
taxpayers are allowed to sue only when there is a claim of illegal
disbursement of public funds, or that public money is being diverted
to any improper purpose, or where petitioners seek to restrain
respondent from enforcing an invalid law that results in wastage of
public funds.
4. If the petition is treated as one for declaratory relief, SC would have
no jurisdiction since original jurisdiction for declaratory relief lies
with the RTC.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
5. Respondent further insists that the PNRC is not a GOCC and that the
prohibition under Section 13, Article VI of the Consti does not apply
in the present case since volunteer service to the PNRC is neither an
office nor an employment.
Issues: (if in a hurry, just read the first issue)
1. (1) w/n petitioners may legally institute this petition (for quo warranto)
against respondent – NO !!! (rem issue)
2. (2) w/n the PNRC is GOCC – NO, it is a private org performing public functions
3. (3) w/n Section 13, Article VI of the Consti applies to the case of respondent
who is Chairman of the PNRC and at the same time a Member of the
Senate - NO
4. (4) w/n respondent should be automatically removed as a Senator pursuant
to
Section 13, Article VI of the Consti - NO
Held:
(1) A careful reading of the petition reveals that it is an action for quo warranto. Section
1, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. – An action for the usurpation of a
public office, position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in
the name of the Republic of the Philippines against:
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office,
position or franchise;
(b) A public officer who does or suffers an act which by provision of law, constitutes a
ground for the forfeiture of his office; or
(c) An association which acts as a corporation within the Philippines without being
legally incorporated or without lawful authority so to act.
21
Petitioners are alleging that by accepting the position of Chairman of the PNRC Board of
Governors, respondent has automatically forfeited his seat in the Senate. In short,
petitioners filed an action for usurpation of public office against respondent, a public
officer who allegedly committed an act which constitutes a ground for the forfeiture of
his public office. Clearly, such an action is for quo warranto, specifically under
Section 1(b), Rule 66 of the ROC.
Quo warranto is generally commenced by the Government as the proper party plaintiff.
However, under Section 5, Rule 66 of the ROC, an individual may commence such an
action if he claims to be entitled to the public office allegedly usurped by another, in
which case he can bring the action in his own name. The person instituting quo
warranto proceedings in his own behalf must claim and be able to show that he is
entitled to the office in dispute, otherwise the action may be dismissed at any stage. In
the present case, petitioners do not claim to be entitled to the Senate office of
respondent. Clearly, petitioners have no standing to file the present petition. ON this
basis alone, this petition should be dismissed.
------------------------------
BONUS
(2) On Mar. 22, 1947, President Roxas signed RA No. 95, known as the PNRC Charter.
The PNRC is a non-profit, donor-funded, voluntary, humanitarian organization, whose
mission is to bring timely, effective, and compassionate humanitarian assistance for the
most vulnerable without consideration of nationality, race, religion, gender, social
status, or political affiliation.
The PNRC is a member of the National Society of the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement, which is composed of the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
(International Federation), and the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
(National Societies). The Movement is united and guided by its 7 Fundamental
Principles. (Humanity, Impartiality, Neutrality, Independence, Voluntary Service,
Unity, Universality)
The Fundamental Principles provide a universal standard of reference for all members
of the Movement. The PNRC, as a member National Society of the Movement, has the
duty to uphold the Fundamental Principles and ideals of the Movement.
The reason for this autonomy is fundamental. To be accepted by warring belligerents as
neutral workers during international or internal armed conflicts, the PNRC volunteers
must not be seen as belonging to any side of the armed conflict. In the Philippines where
there is a communist insurgency and a Muslim separatist rebellion, the PNRC cannot be
seen as government-owned or controlled, and neither can the PNRC volunteers be
identified as government personnel or as instruments of government policy. Otherwise,
the insurgents or separatists will treat PNRC volunteers as enemies when the volunteers
tend to the wounded in the battlefield or the displaced civilians in conflict areas.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
To ensure and maintain its autonomy, neutrality, and independence, the PNRC cannot be
owned or controlled by the government. Indeed, the Philippine government does not
own the PNRC. The PNRC does not have government assets and does not receive any
appropriation from the Philippine Congress. The PNRC is financed primarily by
contributions from private individuals and private entities obtained through solicitation
campaigns organized by its Board of Governors.
(3) The President does not appoint the Chairman of the PNRC. Neither does the head of
any department, agency, commission or board appoint the PNRC Chairman. Thus, the
PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Executive branch since his
appointment does not fall under Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. Certainly, the
PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the Judiciary or Legislature. This leads
to the obvious conclusion that the PNRC Chairman is not an official or employee of the
Philippine Government. Not being a government official or employee, the PNRC
Chairman, as such, does not hold a government office or employment. Since it is not a
government office or employment, his appointment is not prohibited.
2) DIVINAGRACIA V. CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING, G.R. NO. 162272, APRIL 7, 2009
- PEREZ DE TAGLE
ER:
CBS and PBS were grantees of legislative franchises by virtue of 2 laws. Divinagracia
filed 2 complaints with the NTC, alleging that he was the actual and beneficial owner of
12% of the stock of PBS and CBS separately, and that despite the laws mandating a
public offering of at least 30% of the common stock of both entities, neither had done so.
The NTC ruled that it was not competent to make that decision because it involved
constituted collateral attacks on the legislative franchises of PBS and CBS. It therefore
ruled that a quo warranto proceeding was the appropriate remedy. Upon petition for
review under Rule 43 to the CA, that ruling was affirmed.
Issue: W/N quo warranto is the proper proceeding [Yes]
Held: The role of the courts, through quo warranto proceedings, neatly complements
the traditional separation of powers that come to bear in our analysis. The courts are
entrusted with the adjudication of the legal status of persons, the final arbiter of their
rights and obligations under law. The question of whether a franchisee is in breach of
the franchise specially enacted for it by Congress is one inherently suited to a court of
law, and not for an administrative agency, much less one to which no such function has
been delegated by Congress. In the same way that availability of judicial review over
laws does not preclude Congress from undertaking its own remedial measures by
appropriately amending laws, the viability of quo warranto in the instant cases does not
preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative by abrogating the legislative
franchises of respondents should it be distressed enough by the franchisees’ violation of
the franchises extended to them.
Evidently, the suggested theory of petitioner to address his plaints simply overpowers
the delicate balance of separation of powers, and unduly grants superlative prerogatives
22
to the NTC to frustrate the exercise of the constitutional freedom speech, expression,
and of the press. A more narrowly-tailored relief that is responsive to the cause of
petitioner not only exists, but is in fact tailor-fitted to the constitutional framework of
our government and the adjudication of legal and constitutional rights. Given the
current status of the law, there is utterly no reason for this Court to subscribe to the
theory that the NTC has the presumed authority to cancel licenses and CPCs issued to
due holders of legislative franchise to engage in broadcast operations
COMPLETE
FACTS:
• Respondents Consolidated Broadcasting System, Inc. (CBS) and People’s
Broadcasting Service, Inc. (PBS) were grantees of legislative franchises by virtue of
two laws, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7477 and R.A. No. 7582.
• The CBS and PBS radio networks are two of the three networks that comprise the
well-known "Bombo Radyo Philippines.
• Section 9 of R.A. No. 7477 and Section 3 of R.A. No. 7582 contain a common
provision predicated on the "constitutional mandate to democratize ownership of
public utilities.
• It further appears that following the enactment of these franchise laws, the NTC
issued four (4) Provisional Authorities to PBS and six (6) Provisional Authorities to
CBS, allowing them to install, operate and maintain various AM and FM broadcast
stations in various locations throughout the nation. These Provisional Authorities
were issued between 1993 to 1998, or after the enactment of R.A. No. 7477 and R.A.
No. 7582.
• Petitioner Santiago C. Divinagracia filed two complaints both dated 1 March 1999
with the NTC, respectively lodged against PBS and CBS. He alleged that he was "the
actual and beneficial owner of Twelve percent (12%) of the shares of stock" of PBS
and CBS separately, and that despite the provisions in R.A. No. 7477 and R.A. No.
7582 mandating the public offering of at least 30% of the common stocks of PBS
and CBS, both entities had failed to make such offering.
o Thus, Divinagracia commonly argued in his complaints that the failure on
the part of PBS and CBS "to comply with the mandate of their legislative
franchise is a misuse of the franchise conferred upon it by law and it
continues to exercise its franchise in contravention of the law to the
detriment of the general public and of complainant who are unable to
enjoy the benefits being offered by a publicly listed company.”
• The NTC issued a consolidated decision dismissing both complaints.
o It held that the complaints actually constituted collateral attacks on the
legislative franchises of PBS and CBS since the sole issue for
determination was whether the franchisees had violated the mandate to
democratize ownership in their respective legislative franchises.
o The NTC ruled that it was not competent to render a ruling on that issue,
the same being more properly the subject of an action for quo warranto to
be commenced by the Solicitor General in the name of the Republic of the
Philippines, pursuant to Rule 66 of the Rules of Court.
• After the NTC had denied Divinagracia’s motion for reconsideration, he filed a
petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court with the Court of Appeals.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
o The Court of Appeals rendered a decision upholding the NTC. The
appellate court agreed with the earlier conclusion that the complaints
were indeed a collateral attack on the legislative franchises of CBS and
PBS and that a quo warranto action was the proper mode to thresh out the
issues raised in the complaints.
ISSUES (pertinent to REM):
WHETHER OR NOT THE CORRECT REMEDY IS AN ACTION FOR QUO WARRANTO
UNDER RULE 66 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
RATIO:
• There is in fact a more appropriate, more narrowly-tailored and least restrictive
remedy that is afforded by the law. Such remedy is that adverted to by the NTC and
the Court of Appeals - The resort to quo warranto proceedings under Rule 66 of the
Rules of Court.
• Under Section 1 of Rule 66, "an action for the usurpation of a public office, position
or franchise may be brought in the name of the Republic of the Philippines against a
person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises public office,
position or franchise."
• Even while the action is maintained in the name of the Republic, the Solicitor
General or a public prosecutor is obliged to commence such action upon complaint,
and upon good reason to believe that any case specified under Section 1 of Rule 66
can be established by proof.
• The special civil action of quo warranto is a prerogative writ by which the
Government can call upon any person to show by what warrant he holds a public
office or exercises a public franchise.
• It is settled that "[t]he determination of the right to the exercise of a franchise, or
whether the right to enjoy such privilege has been forfeited by non-user, is more
properly the subject of the prerogative writ of quo warranto , the right to assert
which, as a rule, belongs to the State ‘upon complaint or otherwise,’ the reason
being that the abuse of a franchise is a public wrong and not a private injury."
• A forfeiture of a franchise will have to be declared in a direct proceeding for the
purpose brought by the State because a franchise is granted by law and its unlawful
exercise is primarily a concern of Government.
23
• Quo warranto is specifically available as a remedy if it is thought that a government
corporation has offended against its corporate charter or misused its franchise.
• Petitioners argue that since their prayer involves the cancellation of the provisional
authority and CPCs, and not the legislative franchise, then quo warranto fails as a
remedy.
o The argument is artificial. The authority of the franchisee to engage in
broadcast operations is derived in the legislative mandate. To cancel the
provisional authority or the CPC is, in effect, to cancel the franchise or
otherwise prevent its exercise. By law, the NTC is incapacitated to
frustrate such mandate by unduly withholding or canceling the
provisional authority or the CPC for reasons other than the orderly
administration of the frequencies in the radio spectrum.
o What should occur instead is the converse. If the courts conclude that
private respondents have violated the terms of their franchise and thus
issue the writs of quo warranto against them, then the NTC is obliged to
cancel any existing licenses and CPCs since these permits draw strength
from the possession of a valid franchise. If the point has not already been
made clear, then licenses issued by the NTC such as CPCs and provisional
authorities are junior to the legislative franchise enacted by Congress.
• The licensing authority of the NTC is not on equal footing with the franchising
authority of the State through Congress. The issuance of licenses by the NTC
implements the legislative franchises established by Congress, in the same manner
that the executive branch implements the laws of Congress rather than creates its
own laws. And similar to the inability of the executive branch to prevent the
implementation of laws by Congress, the NTC cannot, without clear and proper
delegation by Congress, prevent the exercise of a legislative franchise by
withholding or canceling the licenses of the franchisee.
• And the role of the courts, through quo warranto proceedings, neatly complements
the traditional separation of powers that come to bear in our analysis. The courts
are entrusted with the adjudication of the legal status of persons, the final arbiter of
their rights and obligations under law. The question of whether a franchisee is in
breach of the franchise specially enacted for it by Congress is one inherently suited
to a court of law, and not for an administrative agency, much less one to which no
such function has been delegated by Congress. In the same way that availability of
judicial review over laws does not preclude Congress from undertaking its own
remedial measures by appropriately amending laws, the viability of quo warranto
in the instant cases does not preclude Congress from enforcing its own prerogative
by abrogating the legislative franchises of respondents should it be distressed
enough by the franchisees’ violation of the franchises extended to them.
• Evidently, the suggested theory of petitioner to address his plaints simply
overpowers the delicate balance of separation of powers, and unduly grants
superlative prerogatives to the NTC to frustrate the exercise of the constitutional
freedom speech, expression, and of the press. A more narrowly-tailored relief that
is responsive to the cause of petitioner not only exists, but is in fact tailor-fitted to
the constitutional framework of our government and the adjudication of legal and
constitutional rights. Given the current status of the law, there is utterly no reason
for this Court to subscribe to the theory that the NTC has the presumed authority to
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
cancel licenses and CPCs issued to due holders of legislative franchise to engage in
broadcast operations
F. EXPROPRIATION (RULE 67)
1) BARDILLON V. BGY. MASILI, G.R. NO. 146886, APRIL 30, 2003 – PUNO
DEVORAH E. BARDILLON v BARANGAY MASILI of Calamba, Laguna
DOCTRINE
An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls within
the jurisdiction of regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject property.
True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms in the
pleading, this is merely incidental to the expropriation suit.
ER
BRGY wanted to build a multi-purpose hall. BRGY filed a case for expropriation of a lot
owned by BARDILLON in the MTC. This case was dismissed by the MTC for lack of
interest and failure of the BRGY and its counsel to appeal on pre-trial.
BRGY filed a second case for expropriation of same lot in the RTC. BARDILLON objected
by filing an MTD on the basis of Section 19(f) of Rule 16 wherein BRGY’s cause of action
is barred by prior judgment (based on first case), pursuant to the doctrine of res
judicata.
The MTD was denied on the ground that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the
expropriation proceeding. Therefore, there is no bar to the second case. RTC issued writ
of possession to BRGY.
On appeal, CA agreed with RTC
Issue: Whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the first expropriation case which would
result in res judicata based on prior judgment? – NO.
Held: PETITION DENIED. RULING OF RTC and CA affirmed.
Ratio: An expropriation suit is incapable of pecuniary estimation. Accordingly, it falls
within the jurisdiction of regional trial courts, regardless of the value of the subject
property. THUS, MTC never had jurisdiction and THEREFORE its judgment cannot be
considered a bar to the second proceeding in the RTC.
FACTS
Two complaints for eminent domain were filed by BRGY to expropriate 144 sqm land
owned by Bardillon (BARDILLON) when they failed to agree on the purchase price of
24
TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00). The expropriation was for the
construction of a multi-purpose hall for the use and benefit of BRGY constituents.
However, the first case was dismissed by the MTC ‘for lack of interest’ for failure of the
BRGY and its counsel to appear at the pre-trial. The MTC denied BRGY’s MR.
The second case for expropriation was filed in the RTC of Calamba. BARDILLON filed an
MTD alleging that it violated Section 19(f) of Rule 16 since BRGY’s cause of action is
barred by prior judgment (based on first case), pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata.
The MTD was denied on the ground that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the
expropriation proceeding. Therefore, there is no bar to the second case.
The CA concurred with the RTC.
Issue:
(1) whether the MTC had jurisdiction over the expropriation case;
(2) whether the dismissal of that case before the MTC constituted res judicata;
(3) whether respondent is guilty of forum shopping.
Ruling:
ON JURISDICTION
BARDILLON claims that the value of the land is only P11,448 and thus the MTC had
jurisdiction over the case. On the other hand, the CA held that the assessed value of the
property was P28,960.[10] Thus, the MTC did not have jurisdiction over the
expropriation proceedings, because the amount involved was beyond the P20,000
jurisdictional amount cognizable by MTCs.
An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals
with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take property for
public use. As such, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the
regional trial courts.
In Barangay San Roque v. Heirs of Francisco Pastor, the court said that the “primary
consideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its
instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property.
Hence, the courts determine: 1) the authority of the government entity, 2) the necessity
of the expropriation, and the 3) observance of due process. In the main, the subject of
an expropriation suit is the government’s exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is
incapable of pecuniary estimation.”
“True, the value of the property to be expropriated is estimated in monetary terms, for
the court is duty-bound to determine the just compensation for it. This, however, is
merely incidental to the expropriation suit. Indeed, that amount is determined only
after the court is satisfied with the propriety of the expropriation.”
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
“Verily, the Court held in Republic of the Philippines v. Zurbano that ‘condemnation
proceedings are within the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance,’ the forerunners of
the regional trial courts. The said case was decided during the effectivity of the Judiciary
Act of 1948 which, like BP 129 in respect to RTCs, provided that courts of first instance
had original jurisdiction over ‘all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is not
capable of pecuniary estimation.’ The 1997 amendments to the Rules of Court were not
intended to change these jurisprudential precedents.”
To reiterate, an expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the
value of the land, because the subject of the action is the government’s exercise of
eminent domain -- a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.
ON RES JUDICATA
BARDILLON claims that the MTC’s dismissal of the first Complaint for eminent domain
was with prejudice, since there was no indication to the contrary in the Order of
dismissal. She contends that the filing of the second Complaint before the RTC should
therefore be dismissed on account of res judicata.
Res judicata literally means a matter adjudged, judicially acted upon or decided, or
settled by judgment. It provides that a final judgment on the merits rendered by a court
of competent jurisdiction is conclusive as to the rights of the parties and their privies;
and constitutes an absolute bar to subsequent actions involving the same claim, demand
or cause of action.
The following are the requisites of res judicata: (1) the former judgment must be final;
(2) the court that rendered it had jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties;
(3) it is a judgment on the merits; and (4) there is -- between the first and the second
actions -- an identity of parties, subject matter and cause of action.
Since the MTC had no jurisdiction over expropriation proceedings, the doctrine of res
judicata finds no application even if the Order of dismissal may have been an
adjudication on the merits.
ON FORUM SHOPPING
BARDILLON claims that BRGY is guilty of forum shopping, because it scouted for
another forum after obtaining an unfavorable Decision from the MTC.
The test for determining the presence of forum shopping is whether the elements of litis
pendentia are present in two or more pending cases, such that a final judgment in one
case will amount to res judicata in another.
The earlier case lodged with the MTC had already been dismissed when the Complaint
was filed before the RTC. Even granting arguendo that both cases were still pending, a
final judgment in the MTC case will not constitute res judicata in the RTC, since the
former had no jurisdiction over the expropriation case.
25
ON THE WRIT OF POSSESSION
BARDILLON argues that the CA erred when it ignored the RTC’s Writ of Possession over
her property, issued despite the pending Motion for Reconsideration of the ruling
dismissing the Complaint. She is incorrect.
The requirements for the issuance of a writ of possession in an expropriation case are
expressly and specifically governed by Section 2 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
“SECTION 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized
government depositary. — Upon the filing of the complaint or at any
time thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff
shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real
property involved if he deposits with the authorized government
depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank subject to
the orders of the court.
xxx
“After such deposit is made the court shall order the sheriff or
other proper officer to forthwith place the plaintiff in possession of
the property involved and promptly submit a report thereof to the
court with service of copies to the parties.”
On the part of local government units, expropriation is also governed by Section 19 of
the Local Government Code.
“SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. — A local government unit may,
through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance,
exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose, or
welfare for the benefits of the poor and the landless, upon payment of
just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and
pertinent laws; Provided, however, That the power of eminent
domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has
been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted:
Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately
take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation
proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at
least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property
based on the current tax declaration of the property to be
expropriated: Provided, finally, That the amount to be paid for the
expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court,
based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the
property.”
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
Accordingly, in expropriation proceedings, the requisites for authorizing immediate
entry are as follows: (1) the filing of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and
substance; and (2) the deposit of the amount equivalent to 15 percent of the fair market
value of the property to be expropriated based on its current tax declaration.
In the instant case, the issuance of the Writ of Possession in favor of respondent after it
had filed the Complaint for expropriation and deposited the amount required was
proper, because it had complied with the foregoing requisites.
The issue of the necessity of the expropriation is a matter properly addressed to the RTC
in the course of the expropriation proceedings. If BARDILLON objects to the necessity of
the takeover of her property, she should say so in her Answer to the Complaint. The RTC
has the power to inquire into the legality of the exercise of the right of eminent domain
and to determine whether there is a genuine necessity for it.
2) REPUBLIC V. MANGOTARA, G.R. NO. 170375, JULY 7, 2010 - QUIJANO-BENEDICTO
REPUBLIC V. MANGUTARA (JULY 7, 2010)
EMERGENCY DIGEST
Before the Court are seven consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari and a
Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, arising
from actions for quieting of title, expropriation, ejectment, and reversion, which all
involve the same parcels of land. The consolidated seven cases have for their common
genesis the 1914 case of Cacho v. Government of the United States and the 1997 Cacho
case. These cases proceeded independently of each other in the courts a quo until they
reached the SC, that consolidated the seven Petitions.
The Complaint for Expropriation was originally filed in 1983 by the Iron and Steel
Authority (ISA), now the National Steel Corporation (NSC), against Maria Cristina
Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), and the latter’s mortgagee, the Philippine National Bank
(PNB). The Complaint was raffled to RTC-Branch 1, presided over by Judge Mangotara.
ISA was created pursuant to PD No. 2729 in 1973. Its existence was extended until
October 10, 1988. In 1982, President Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No.
2239, reserving in favor of ISA a parcel of land in Iligan City, measuring 30.25 hectares.
MCFC occupied certain portions of this parcel of land. When negotiations with MCFC
failed, ISA filed a Complaint for Expropriation. The statutory existence of ISA expired
during the pendency of Civil Case No. 106, MCFC filed a Motion to Dismiss. RTC granted
the MTD. CA affirmed the dismissal. ISA appealed to SC, SC remanded the case to RTC to
allow substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff (1998 Judgment). In an Order
(2001), RTC allowed the substitution of the Republic for ISA.
Alleging that Lots 1 and 2 involved in the 1997 Cacho case encroached and overlapped
the parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 106, Republic filed with the RTC a Motion for
Leave to File Supplemental Complaint and to Admit the Attached Supplemental
Complaint seeking to implead Teofilo Cacho and Demetria Vidal and their respective
successors-in-interest, LANDTRADE and AZIMUTH. MCFC opposed the Motion on the
26
ground that the Republic was without legal personality to file the same because ISA was
the plaintiff. MCFC argued that the Republic failed to move for the execution of the
decision in the ISA case within the prescriptive period. In its Reply, the Republic
referred to the Order (2001) of the RTC allowing the substitution of the Republic for ISA.
RTC denied the Motion of the Republic for leave to file and to admit its Supplemental
Complaint. Since no such motion for execution had been filed, the RTC ruled that its
Order dated November 16, 2001, which effected the substitution of the Republic for ISA
as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106, was an honest mistake. The Republic filed a MR of the
April 4, 2005 Order of the RTC. MCFC filed a MTD Civil Case No. 106. RTC denied MR of
Republic and granted MTD. MR of Republic denied. Republic filed with SC the
consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45
and 65.
Issue:
1. W/N the owner of the property is an indispensable party in an expropriation
proceeding. - NOT NECESSARILY
2. 2. W/N forum shopping was committed by the Republic with the filing of the
expropriation and reversion complaint. - NO
Held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders the following judgment in the
Petitions at bar:
1) In G.R. No. 170375 (Expropriation Case), the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review
of the Republic of the Philippines. It REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Resolutions of the
RTC of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. It further ORDERS the reinstatement of the
Complaint in Civil Case No. 106, the admission of the Supplemental Complaint of the
Republic, and the return of the original record of the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings.
Ratio:
The ISA case had already become final and executory, and entry of judgment was made
in said case on August 31, 1998. The RTC, in an Order, effected the substitution of the
Republic for ISA.
RTC dismissed the Complaint on another ground: that MCFC is not a proper party to the
expropriation proceedings, not being the owner of the parcels of land sought to be
expropriated.
Rule 67, Section 1 of the ROC provides that expropriation proceedings may be instituted
even when "title to the property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic
of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals." The same rule provides
that a complaint for expropriation shall name as defendants "all persons owning or
claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest" in the property sought to be
condemned. When the property already appears to belong to the Republic, there is no
sense in the Republic instituting expropriation proceedings against itself. It can still,
however, file a complaint for expropriation against the private persons occupying the
property. In such an expropriation case, the owner of the property is not an
indispensable party.
Presidential Proclamation No. 2239 explicitly states that the parcels of land reserved to
NSC are part of the public domain, hence, owned by the Republic. LOI NO. 1277
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
recognized only the occupancy rights of MCFC and directed NSC to institute
expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation for said occupancy
rights. Therefore, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party in the original
Complaint for Expropriation.
The Republic is not engaging in contradictions when it instituted both expropriation and
reversion proceedings for the same parcels of land. The expropriation and reversion
proceedings are distinct remedies that are not necessarily exclusionary of each other.
The filing of a complaint for reversion does not preclude the institution of an action for
expropriation. Even if the land is reverted back to the State, the same may still be
subject to expropriation as against the occupants thereof.
COMPLETE DIGEST:
Facts: (Relevant to EXPROPRIATION only) - G.R. No. 170375
The Complaint for Expropriation was originally filed on August 15, 1983 by the Iron and
Steel Authority (ISA), now the National Steel Corporation (NSC), against Maria Cristina
Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC), and the latter’s mortgagee, the Philippine National Bank
(PNB). The Complaint was raffled to RTC-Branch 1, presided over by Judge Mangotara.
ISA was created pursuant to PD No. 2729 in 1973, to strengthen, develop, and promote
the iron and steel industry in the Philippines. Its existence was extended until October
10, 1988. In 1982, President Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. 2239,
reserving in favor of ISA a parcel of land in Iligan City, measuring 30.25 hectares, to be
devoted to the integrated steel program of the Government. MCFC occupied certain
portions of this parcel of land. When negotiations with MCFC failed, ISA was compelled
to file a Complaint for Expropriation.
The statutory existence of ISA expired during the pendency of Civil Case No. 106, MCFC
filed a Motion to Dismiss the case alleging the lack of capacity to sue of ISA. RTC granted
the MTD. MR denied. CA affirmed the dismissal. ISA appealed to SC, SC remanded the
case to RTC to allow substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff (1998). In an Order
(2001), RTC allowed the substitution of the Republic for ISA in Civil Case No. 106.
Alleging that Lots 1 and 2 involved in the 1997 Cacho case encroached and overlapped
the parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 106, the Republic filed with the RTC a Motion
for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint and to Admit the Attached Supplemental
Complaint seeking to implead in Civil Case No. 106 Teofilo Cacho and Demetria Vidal
and their respective successors-in-interest, LANDTRADE and AZIMUTH.
MCFC opposed the Motion for leave to file and to admit the Supplemental Complaint on
the ground that the Republic was without legal personality to file the same because ISA
was the plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106. MCFC argued that the Republic failed to move for
the execution of the decision in the ISA case within the prescriptive period of five years,
hence, the only remedy left was for the Republic to file an independent action to revive
the judgment. MCFC further pointed out that the unreasonable delay of more than six
years of the Republic in seeking the substitution and continuation of the action for
expropriation effectively barred any further proceedings therein on the ground of
estoppel by laches.
27
In its Reply, the Republic referred to the Order (2001) of the RTC allowing the
substitution of the Republic for ISA.
RTC denied the Motion of the Republic for leave to file and to admit its Supplemental
Complaint. The RTC agreed with MCFC that the Republic did not file any motion for
execution of the judgment of this Court in the ISA case. Since no such motion for
execution had been filed, the RTC ruled that its Order dated November 16, 2001, which
effected the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff in Civil Case No. 106, was an
honest mistake. The Republic filed a MR of the April 4, 2005 Order of the RTC.
MCFC filed a MTD Civil Case No. 106 for: (1) failure of the Republic to implead
indispensable parties because MCFC insisted it was not the owner of the parcels of land
sought to be expropriated; and (2) forum shopping considering the institution by the
Republic on October 13, 2004 of an action for the reversion of the same parcels subject
of the instant case for expropriation.
Judge Mangotara of RTC issued a Resolution, denying for lack of merit the MR of the
Order dated April 4, 2005 filed by the Republic, and granted the MTD. Judge Mangotara
justified the dismissal of the Expropriation Case thus:
What the Republic seeks [herein] is the expropriation of the subject parcels
of land. Since the exercise of the power of eminent domain involves the
taking of private lands intended for public use upon payment of just
compensation to the owner x x x, then a complaint for expropriation must, of
necessity, be directed against the owner of the land subject thereof. In the
case at bar, the decision of the Supreme Court in Cacho v. Government of the
United States x x x, decreeing the registration of the subject parcels of land in
the name of the late Doña Demetria Cacho has long attained finality and is
conclusive as to the question of ownership thereof. Since MCFC, the only
defendant left in this case, is not a proper party defendant in this complaint
for expropriation, the present case should be dismissed.
RTC denied MR. Republic filed with SC the consolidated Petition for Review on
Certiorari and Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court,
respectively.
Issue:
1. W/N the owner of the property is an indispensable party in an expropriation
proceeding. - NOT NECESSARILY
2. W/N forum shopping was committed by the Republic with the filing of the
expropriation and reversion complaint. - NO
Held:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court renders the following judgment in the
Petitions at bar:
1) In G.R. No. 170375 (Expropriation Case), the Court GRANTS the Petition for Review
of the Republic of the Philippines. It REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Resolutions of the
RTC of Iligan City, Lanao del Norte. It further ORDERS the reinstatement of the
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
Complaint in Civil Case No. 106, the admission of the Supplemental Complaint of the
Republic, and the return of the original record of the case to the court of origin for
further proceedings.
Ratio:
The ISA case had already become final and executory, and entry of judgment was made
in said case on August 31, 1998. The RTC, in an Order, effected the substitution of the
Republic for ISA.
The failure of the Republic to actually file a motion for execution does not render the
substitution void. A writ of execution requires the sheriff or other proper officer to
whom it is directed to enforce the terms of the writ. The November 16, 2001 Order of
the RTC should be deemed as voluntary compliance with a final and executory judgment
of this Court, already rendering a motion for and issuance of a writ of execution
superfluous.
No substantive right was violated by the voluntary compliance by the RTC-Branch 1
with the directive in the ISA case even without a motion for execution having been filed.
To the contrary, the RTC-Branch 1 merely enforced the judicially determined right of the
Republic to the substitution. While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and
even meticulously observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that
do not really impair the administration of justice. If the rules are intended to insure the
orderly conduct of litigation it is because of the higher objective they seek which is the
protection of the substantive rights of the parties.71
MCFC did not seek any remedy from the Order of the RTC. Consequently, the said Order
already became final, which even the RTC itself cannot reverse and set aside on the
ground of "honest mistake."
RTC dismissed the Complaint on another ground: that MCFC is not a proper party to the
expropriation proceedings, not being the owner of the parcels of land sought to be
expropriated. The RTC argued that since the exercise of the power of eminent domain
involves the taking of private land intended for public use upon payment of just
compensation to the owner, then a complaint for expropriation must be directed against
the owner of the land sought to be expropriated.
Rule 67, Section 1 of the ROC provides that expropriation proceedings may be instituted
even when "title to the property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic
of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals." The same rule provides
that a complaint for expropriation shall name as defendants "all persons owning or
claiming to own, or occupying, any part thereof or interest" in the property sought to be
condemned. Clearly, when the property already appears to belong to the Republic, there
is no sense in the Republic instituting expropriation proceedings against itself. It can
still, however, file a complaint for expropriation against the private persons occupying
the property. In such an expropriation case, the owner of the property is not an
indispensable party.
Presidential Proclamation No. 2239 explicitly states that the parcels of land reserved to
28
NSC are part of the public domain, hence, owned by the Republic. LOI NO. 1277
recognized only the occupancy rights of MCFC and directed NSC to institute
expropriation proceedings to determine the just compensation for said occupancy
rights. Therefore, the owner of the property is not an indispensable party in the original
Complaint for Expropriation.
Assuming for the sake of argument that the owner of the property is an indispensable
party in the expropriation proceedings, the non-joinder of said party would still not
warrant immediate dismissal of the complaint for expropriation. In Vda. De Manguerra
v. Risos, the Court applied Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court even in case of non-
joinder of an indispensable party.
RTC did not first require the Republic to implead the alleged owner/s of the parcel of
land sought to be expropriated. Despite the absence of any order from the Court, the
Republic – upon becoming aware that the parcels of land involved in the 1914 Cacho
case and 1997 Cacho case, claimed by Teofilo and LANDTRADE, and Vidal and
AZIMUTH, encroached into and overlapped with the parcel of land subject of Civil Case
No. 106 – sought leave of court to file a Supplemental Complaint to implead these four
parties. The RTC did not take the Supplemental Complaint of the Republic into
consideration. Instead, it dismissed outright the original Complaint for Expropriation
against MCFC.
Expropriation vis-à-vis reversion
The Republic is not engaging in contradictions when it instituted both expropriation and
reversion proceedings for the same parcels of land. The expropriation and reversion
proceedings are distinct remedies that are not necessarily exclusionary of each other.
The filing of a complaint for reversion does not preclude the institution of an action for
expropriation. Even if the land is reverted back to the State, the same may still be
subject to expropriation as against the occupants thereof.
Also, Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows the filing of a complaint for
expropriation even when "the title to any property sought to be condemned appears to
be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the
title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy or
certainty specify who are the real owners."
Hence, the filing by the Republic of the Supplemental Complaint for Expropriation
impleading Teofilo, Vidal, LANDTRADE, and AZIMUTH, is not necessarily an admission
that the parcels of land sought to be expropriated are privately owned. At most, the
Republic merely acknowledged in its Supplemental Complaint that there are private
persons also claiming ownership of the parcels of land. The Republic can still
consistently assert, in both actions for expropriation and reversion, that the subject
parcels of land are part of the public domain.
3) REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS, JULY 7, 2010, - RAZON
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
Republic v. CA
G.R. No. 170375 July 7, 2010
Doctrine: The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the
property condemned. They include all other persons owning, occupying or claiming to
own the property. When property is taken by eminent domain, the owner is not
necessarily the only person who is entitled to compensation. The owner of the property
sought to be expropriated is not necessarily an indispensable party.
Note: Before the Court are seven consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari and a
Petition for Certiorari under Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court, respectively, arising
from actions for quieting of title, expropriation, ejectment, and reversion, which all
involve the same parcels of land. This case is listed under EXPRORIATION so this digest
focuses only on the case on expropriation.
Predecessor Cases:
1914 Cacho Case – The late Dona Demetria Cacho applied for registration of 2 parcels
of land in Iligan City. The Land Registration Court ruled that Cacho was the owner of
only a portion of land sought to be registered, while ownership of the rest of the land
was not established, and registration of which was denied.
1997 Cacho Case – 83 years later, Teofilo, claiming to be the sole heir of Dona Demetria,
filed before RTC a petition for reconstitution of 2 OCTs (probably covering the parcels of
land subject of 1914 Cacho Case). RTC granted reconstitution of DECREES only, as it was
not established that OCTs were issued in the LRC cases. CA reversed. In the SC, RTC
decision was affirmed. As a result of the 1997 Cacho case, the decrees of registration
were re-issued bearing new numbers and OCTs were issued for the two parcels of land
in Doña Demetria’s name.
Emergency Digest:
Facts: Pres. Marcos issued PD2239 reserving in favor of Iron and Steel Authority (ISA), a
parcel of land in Iligan City to be devoted to the integrated steel program of the
Government. But Maria Cristina Fertilizer Corporation (MCFC) occupied certain
portions of this parcel of land. When negotiations with MCFC failed, ISA was compelled
to file a Complaint for Expropriation.
During the pendency of the case for expropriation, the statutory existence of ISA
expired. Thus, MCFC filed a MTD alleging ISA’s lack of capacity to sue. RTC granted MTD.
ISA filed MR and moved to be substituted by the REPUBLIC, which was denied by RTC.
CA affirmed TC. But in the SC, it finally ordered the substitution of ISA by the REPUBLIC,
to which the RTC issued an Order allowing the substitution.(ISA Case)
Thereafter, alleging that lots subject of 1997 CACHO CASE encroached or overlapped
with the parcels of land sought to be expropriated, REPUBLIC filed a Supplemental
Complaint seeking to implead TEOFILO and other successors-in-interest of the lots.
29
MCFC opposed on ground that REPUBLIC has no personality to sue at it failed to move
for execution of the ISA Case allowing substitution, within 5years. RTC denied
REPUBLIC’s Supplemental Complaint.
MCFC then filed a Motion to Dismiss expropriation case for: (1) failure of the REPUBLIC
to implead indispensable parties because MCFC insisted it was not the owner of the
parcels of land sought to be expropriated; and (2) forum shopping considering the
institution by the REPUBLIC of an action for the reversion of the same parcels subject of
the instant case for expropriation. RTC granted MTD. MR denied. Thus, REPUBLIC filed
this instant petition – Consolidated Petition for Review on Certiorari under 45 and
Petition for Certiorari under 65.
Issue: WON the owner of the property is an indispensable party in an expropriation
case? NO
Ratio: On the substitution issue: SC said that a motion for execution was not necessary
in this case, as the Order of RTC allowing substitution was already a voluntary
compliance with the SC decision which became final and executory.
On indispensable party: Rule 67 Section 1 of the Rules of Court provides that defendants
in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of the property to be
expropriated, and just compensation is not due to the property owner alone. Defendants
in the case could be all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any part
thereof or interest therein. In this case, it is undisputed that MCFC has possessory rights
over the parcels of land sought to be expropriated. Also, assuming arguendo that the
owner of the property is an indispensable party in the expropriation proceedings, the
non-joinder of said party would still not warrant immediate dismissal of the complaint
for expropriation, as non-joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for dismissal.
In such a case, the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. The
Court noted that REPUBLIC sough to implead all parties-in-interest in its Supplemental
Complaint, which however, was denied by the RTC.
On forum shopping: The expropriation and reversion proceedings are distinct remedies
that are not necessarily exclusionary of each other. The filing of a complaint for
reversion does not preclude the institution of an action for expropriation. Even if the
land is reverted back to the State, the same may still be subject to expropriation as
against the occupants thereof.
Complete Digest:
Facts:
• ISA was created pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 2729 dated August 9,
1973, to strengthen, develop, and promote the iron and steel industry in the
Philippines. Its existence was extended until October 10, 1988.
• On November 16, 1982, during the existence of ISA, then President Ferdinand
E. Marcos issued Presidential Proclamation No. 2239, reserving in favor of ISA
a parcel of land in Iligan City, measuring 302,532 square meters or 30.25
hectares, to be devoted to the integrated steel program of the Government.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
MCFC occupied certain portions of this parcel of land. When negotiations with
MCFC failed, ISA was compelled to file a Complaint for Expropriation.
• When the statutory existence of ISA expired during the pendency of the
expropriation case, MCFC filed a Motion to Dismiss the case alleging the lack of
capacity to sue of ISA. RTC granted MTD. ISA filed MR and to be substituted by
Republic. RTC denied the MR. CA affirmed RTC. On appeal to SC (ISA Case), the
Court remanded the case to RTC, which was ordered to allow the substitution
of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff. Entry of Judgment was made in the ISA case
on August 31, 1998. In an Order dated November 16, 2001, the RTC allowed
the substitution of the Republic for ISA as plaintiff in the expropriation case.
• Alleging that lots involved in the 1997 Cacho case encroached and overlapped
the parcel of land subject of the expropriation, the Republic filed with the RTC
a Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Complaint dated October 7, 2004 and
to Admit the Attached Supplemental Complaint dated September 28, 2004
seeking to implead Teofilo Cacho and Demetria Vidal and their respective
successors-in-interest, LANDTRADE and AZIMUTH. MCFC opposed the motion
on the ground that the Republic was without legal personality to file the same
because ISA was the plaintiff in the case since Republic failed to move for
execution of the judgment in ISA Case. RTC denied the Supplemental
Complaint.
• MCFC then filed a Motion to Dismiss the expropriation case for: (1) failure of
the Republic to implead indispensable parties because MCFC insisted it was
not the owner of the parcels of land sought to be expropriated; and (2) forum
shopping considering the institution by the Republic on October 13, 2004 of an
action for the reversion of the same parcels subject of the instant case for
expropriation.
• RTC Judge Mangatora dismissed the expropriation case. MR was denied. Thus,
the instant consolidated petitions were filed before the Supreme Court.
Issue:
WON motion for execution was necessary to effect substitution? NO
WON owner of property is an indispensable party in an expropriation case? NO
WON there was forum shopping when Republic filed both expropriation case and
reversion proceeding? NO
Held: In G.R. No. 170375 (Expropriation Case), the Court GRANTS the Petition for
Review of the Republic of the Philippines. It REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Resolutions
dated July 12, 2005 and October 24, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 1 of Iligan
City, Lanao del Norte. It further ORDERS the reinstatement of the Complaint in Civil
Case No. 106, the admission of the Supplemental Complaint of the Republic, and the
return of the original record of the case to the court of origin for further proceedings.
No costs.
Ratio: (only portion pertinent to topic)
PROCEDURAL: Filing of Consolidated PetRevOnCert under 45 and PetOnCert under 65
30
• It is apparent in the case at bar that the Republic availed itself of the wrong
mode of appeal by filing Consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 and
for Certiorari under Rule 65, when these are two separate remedies that are
mutually exclusive and neither alternative nor successive. Nevertheless, the
Court shall treat the Consolidated Petitions as a Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45 and the allegations therein as errors of judgment. As
the records show, the Petition was filed on time under Rules 45. Before the
lapse of the 15-day reglementary period to appeal under Rule 45, the Republic
filed with the Court a motion for extension of time to file its petition. The
Court, in a Resolution dated January 23, 2006, granted the Republic a 30-day
extension, which was to expire on December 29, 2005. The Republic was able
to file its Petition on the last day of the extension period.
• The reliance of the Republic on the MWSS case to justify its mode of appeal is
misplaced, taking the pronouncements of this Court in said case out of context.
The issue in the MWSS case was whether a possessor in good faith has the
right to remove useful improvements, and not whether consolidated petitions
under both Rules 45 and 65 of the Rules of Court can be filed. Therein
petitioner MWSS simply filed an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, but named the Court of Appeals as a respondent. The Court
clarified that the only parties in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court are the appellant as petitioner and the appellee as respondent.
The court which rendered the judgment appealed from is not a party in said
appeal. It is in the special civil action of certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court where the court or judge is required to be joined as party defendant or
respondent. The Court, however, also acknowledged that there may be an
instance when in an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45, the petitioner-
appellant would also claim that the court that rendered the appealed judgment
acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion,
in which case, such court should be joined as a party-defendant or respondent.
While the Court may have stated that in such an instance, “the petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is at the same time a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65,” the Court did not hold that consolidated
petitions under both Rules 45 and 65 could or should be filed.
MAIN: Proper parties in expropriation proceeding
• The ISA case had already become final and executory. The failure of the
Republic to actually file a motion for execution does not render the
substitution void. A writ of execution requires the sheriff or other proper
officer to whom it is directed to enforce the terms of the writ. The Order of the
RTC should be deemed as voluntary compliance with a final and executory
judgment of the Court, already rendering a motion for and issuance of a writ of
execution superfluous. Consequently, the said Order already became final,
which even the RTC itself cannot reverse and set aside on the ground of
“honest mistake.” Besides, no substantive right was violated by the voluntary
compliance by the RTC with the directive in the ISA case even without a
motion for execution having been filed. To the contrary, the RTC merely
enforced the judicially determined right of the Republic to the substitution.
While it is desirable that the Rules of Court be faithfully and even meticulously
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
observed, courts should not be so strict about procedural lapses that do not
really impair the administration of justice. If the rules are intended to insure
the orderly conduct of litigation it is because of the higher objective they seek
which is the protection of the substantive rights of the parties.
• Rule 67, Section 1 of the then Rules of Court described how expropriation
proceedings should be instituted:
Section 1. The complaint. – The right of eminent domain shall be exercised by
the filing of a complaint which shall state with certainty the right and purpose
of condemnation, describe the real or personal property sought to be
condemned, and join as defendants all persons owning or claiming to own,
or occupying, any part thereof or interest therein, showing, so far as
practicable, the interest of each defendant separately. If the title to any
property sought to be condemned appears to be in the Republic of the
Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, or if the title is
otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff cannot with accuracy
or certainty specify who are the real owners, averment to that effect may
be made in the complaint. (Emphases supplied.)
• For sure, defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of
the property to be expropriated, and just compensation is not due to the
property owner alone. As this Court held in De Knecht v. Court of Appeals:
The defendants in an expropriation case are not limited to the owners of
the property condemned. They include all other persons owning,
occupying or claiming to own the property. When [property] is taken by
eminent domain, the owner x x x is not necessarily the only person who is
entitled to compensation. In the American jurisdiction, the term ‘owner’
when employed in statutes relating to eminent domain to designate the
persons who are to be made parties to the proceeding, refer, as is the rule in
respect of those entitled to compensation, to all those who have lawful interest
in the property to be condemned, including a mortgagee, a lessee and a vendee
in possession under an executory contract. Every person having an estate or
interest at law or in equity in the land taken is entitled to share in the award. If
a person claiming an interest in the land sought to be condemned is not made a
party, he is given the right to intervene and lay claim to the compensation.
(Emphasis supplied.)
• At the time of the filing of the Complaint for Expropriation in 1983,
possessory/occupancy rights of MCFC over the parcels of land sought to be
expropriated were undisputed. In fact, Letter of Instructions No. 1277 dated
November 16, 1982 expressly recognized that portions of the lands reserved
by Presidential Proclamation No. 2239, also dated November 16, 1982, for the
use and immediate occupation by the NSC, were then occupied by an idle
fertilizer plant/factory and related facilities of MCFC.
• Being the occupant of the parcel of land sought to be expropriated, MCFC
could very well be named a defendant. The RTC evidently erred in
dismissing the Complaint for Expropriation against MCFC for not being a
proper party.
31
• Also erroneous was the dismissal by the RTC-Branch 1 of the original
Complaint for Expropriation for having been filed only against MCFC, the
occupant of the subject land, but not the owner/s of the said property.
Dismissal is not the remedy for misjoinder or non-joinder of parties.
According to Rule 3, Section 11 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 11. Misjoinder and non-joinder of parties. – Neither misjoinder nor non-
joinder of parties is ground for dismissal of an action. Parties may be dropped
or added by order of the court on motion of any party or on its own initiative at
any stage of the action and on such terms as are just. Any claim against a
misjoined party may be severed and proceeded with separately. (Emphasis
supplied.)
• Now, is the owner of the property an indispensable party in an action for
expropriation? Not necessarily. Going back to Rule 67, Section 1 of the
Rules of Court, expropriation proceedings may be instituted even when
“title to the property sought to be condemned appears to be in the
Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals.”
The same rule provides that a complaint for expropriation shall name as
defendants “all persons owning or claiming to own, or occupying, any
part thereof or interest” in the property sought to be condemned.
Clearly, when the property already appears to belong to the Republic,
there is no sense in the Republic instituting expropriation proceedings
against itself. It can still, however, file a complaint for expropriation
against the private persons occupying the property. In such an
expropriation case, the owner of the property is not an indispensable
party.
• In this case, the RTC-Branch 1 did not first require the Republic to
implead the alleged owner/s of the parcel of land sought to be
expropriated. Despite the absence of any order from the Court, the
Republic – upon becoming aware that the parcels of land involved in the
1914 Cacho case and 1997 Cacho case, claimed by Teofilo and
LANDTRADE, and Vidal and AZIMUTH, encroached into and overlapped
with the parcel of land subject of Civil Case No. 106 – sought leave of
court to file a Supplemental Complaint to implead these four parties. The
RTC-Branch 1 did not take the Supplemental Complaint of the Republic
into consideration. Instead, it dismissed outright the original Complaint
for Expropriation against MCFC.
ON FORUM SHOPPING:
• The Republic is not engaging in contradictions when it instituted both
expropriation and reversion proceedings for the same parcels of land. The
expropriation and reversion proceedings are distinct remedies that are not
necessarily exclusionary of each other.
• The filing of a complaint for reversion does not preclude the institution of an
action for expropriation. Even if the land is reverted back to the State, the
same may still be subject to expropriation as against the occupants thereof.
• Also, Rule 67, Section 1 of the Rules of Court allows the filing of a complaint for
expropriation even when “the title to any property sought to be condemned
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
appears to be in the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private
individuals, or if the title is otherwise obscure or doubtful so that the plaintiff
cannot with accuracy or certainty specify who are the real owners.” Rule 67,
Section 9 of the Rules of Court further provides:
SEC. 9. Uncertain ownership; conflicting claims. – If the ownership of the
property taken is uncertain, or there are conflicting claims to any part thereof,
the court may order any sum or sums awarded as compensation for the
property to be paid to the court for the benefit of the person adjudged in the
same proceeding to be entitled thereto. But the judgment shall require the
payment of the sum or sums awarded to either the defendant or the court
before the plaintiff can enter upon the property, or retain it for the public use
or purpose if entry has already been made. (Emphasis supplied.)
Hence, the filing by the Republic of the Supplemental Complaint for
Expropriation impleading Teofilo, Vidal, LANDTRADE, and AZIMUTH, is not
necessarily an admission that the parcels of land sought to be expropriated are
privately owned. At most, the Republic merely acknowledged in its
Supplemental Complaint that there are private persons also claiming
ownership of the parcels of land. The Republic can still consistently assert, in
both actions for expropriation and reversion, that the subject parcels of land
are part of the public domain.
3.5 REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS, AUGUST 14, 2009 – PASCUAL
G.R. No. 160379. August 14, 2009.*
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINE through THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND
HIGHWAYS, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and ROSARIO RODRIGUEZ REYES,
respondents.
LONG CASE
QUICKEST FACTS
REYES owns a prime lot which REPUBLIC took possession of WITHOUT expropriation
proceedings. REYES filed a COMPLAINT claiming JUST COMPENSATION and DAMAGES
against REPUBLIC. Commissioners found that the USABLE area left to REYES after the
taking would be very small and would not be ideal for any building. RTC favored REYES,
granting consequential damages to REYES (But RTC neglected to state in its ruling its
basis for the just compensation). Hence, on appeal, CA remanded the case to RTC for
determination of just compensation.
DOCTRINE:
• Although the determination of just compensation lies within the trial court’s
discretion, it should not be done arbitrarily or capriciously. The decision of the trial
court must be based on all established rules, correct legal principles, and competent
32
evidence. The court is proscribed from basing its judgment on speculations and
surmises.
• No actual taking of the remaining portion of the real property is necessary to grant
consequential damages.
EMERGENCY (is sufficient, but best to read Ratio of Complete digest.)
• REYES is the owner of a prime lot along a national highway in Cagayan De Oro.
• REPUBLIC, through DPWH, informed REYES via letter that DPWH will begin
construction of a road extension over REYES’ property.
• REPUBLIC took possession of REYES’s property WITHOUT initiating expropriation
proceedings
• REYES objected to the taking of her property and rejected the Appraisal
Committee’s APPRAISAL of her property.
• REYES filed with RTC of CDO a COMPLAINT claiming JUST COMPENSATION and
DAMAGES against REPUBLIC.
• The commissioners submitted their report, which considered the lot’s prime
location (KP: see footnote). 1
o Karen: Note that the size of the lot was 1,043 sqm
▪ REPUBLIC said that they wanted to expropriate 663 sqm,
leaving 380 sqm to REYES
▪ BUT in truth, they took 746 sqm, leaving only 297 sqm to
REYES.
▪ Of this 297 sqm left to REYES, the only USABLE portion
is only a little over 50 sqm. (Karen: in the ratio, SC says
that because of this, REYES should be paid consequential
damages kahit walang actual taking of the 297 sqm kasi nga
hindi nya rin magagamit ng maayos)
• Due to its small triangular size, this portion
would not command a good price if sold nor
would it be ideal for purposes of any building
construction.
• RTC RULING & AMENDED RTC RULING → FAVORED REYES. (Karen: BUT Note that
RTC Ruling did not really state clearly its basis for the just compensation)
o Declaring REYES as having the right to retain 590 sqm and ordering
the REPUBLIC to return 293 sqm of the 746 sqm taken
o REPUBLIC→to pay P4.6MIO, the fair market value in 1990, as just
compensation for the 453 sqm
o Damages: P185K
o Attorney’s fees: P10K plus costs of suit.
o REPUBLIC appealed to CA.
• CA RULING: AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS→ REMANDED TO RTC the
determination of just compensation
1i.e. Commissioners considered the fact that the lot is strategically located along a National Highway in a
commercial district + lot is in front of a Coca Cola Plant and Shell Gas Station + it adjoins Palana Grocery Store and
a Bank + a few meters away is a Gaisano Mall, the Ororama Superstore and the Limketkai Mall Complex.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
o CA said that the commissioners’ recommendations on just
compensation were NOT SUPPORTED BY VALID DOCUMENTS.
o UNCLEAR whether the RTC merely adopted the commissioners’
recommendations or the court made its own independent valuation
of the subject property
o CA held that a RECONVENING of the commissioners or an
appointment of new commissioners to determine just
compensation was necessary.
• REPUBLIC filed MR, but DENIED by CA.
• Hence, this appeal.
ISSUES:
1. WON proper to REMAND of the case to the trial court to order the
reconvening of the commissioners or appointment of new commissioners to
determine the consequential damages for the remaining 297-square meter
lot? PROPER!
2. WON consequential damages awarded for the lot which was retained by the
owner is tantamount to unjust enrichment on the part of the latter? NO (not
directly stated in the case as an issue)
RATIO 1:
• Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing of complaint for eminent domain with the
appropriate court by the expropriator—if no such complaint is filed, the
expropriator is considered to have violated procedural requirements, and hence,
waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of
commissioners to ascertain just compensation; When there is no action for
expropriation and the case involves only a complaint for damages or just
compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court on ascertainment of just
compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67) are no longer applicable, and a trial
before commissioners is dispensable.
• RTC’s decision is not clear as to its basis for ascertaining just compensation.
The trial court mentioned in its decision the valuations in the reports of the City
Appraisal Committee and of the commissioners appointed pursuant to Rule 67. But
whether the trial court considered these valuations in arriving at the just
compensation, or the court made its own independent valuation based on the
records, was obscure in the decision. The trial court simply gave the total amount of
just compensation due to the property owner without laying down its basis. Thus,
there is no way to determine whether the adjudged just compensation is
based on competent evidence. For this reason alone, a remand of the case to the
trial court for proper determination of just compensation is in order.
o Although the determination of just compensation lies within the trial
court’s discretion, it should not be done arbitrarily or capriciously.
The decision of the trial court must be based on all established rules,
correct legal principles, and competent evidence. The court is
proscribed from basing its judgment on speculations and surmises.
RATIO 2:
33
• No actual taking of the remaining portion of the real property is necessary to
grant consequential damages. If as a result of the expropriation made by
REPUBLIC, the remaining lot (i.e., the 297-square meter lot) of REYES suffers from
an impairment or decrease in value, consequential damages may be awarded to
REYES. On the other hand, if the expropriation results to benefits to the remaining
lot of REYES, these consequential benefits may be deducted from the awarded
consequential damages, if any, or from the market value of the expropriated
property.
• To determine just compensation, the trial court should first ascertain the
market value of the property, to which should be added the consequential
damages after deducting therefrom the consequential benefits which may
arise from the expropriation, and if the consequential benefits exceed the
consequential damages, these items should be disregarded altogether as the
basic value of the property should be paid in every case.
COMPLETE
FACTS
CARPIO, J.:
• This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the CA Decision and Resolution. The
CA affirmed with modifications the Amended Decision of the RTC of Cagayan de
Oro(RTC-CDO), Branch 19.
• Private respondent Rosario Rodriguez REYES (REYES) is the absolute owner of a
parcel of land identified as Lot 849-B and covered by TCT No. T-7194.
• The 1,043-square meter lot is situated on Claro M. Recto and Osmeña Streets,
Cagayan de Oro City.2
• 6 Nov 1990: REYES received a letter from petitioner REPUBLIC of the Philippines
(REPUBLIC), through the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH),
requesting permission to enter into a portion of REYES’s lot consisting of 663
square meters, and to begin construction of the Osmeña Street extension road.
• 20 Dec 1990: REPUBLIC took possession of REYES’s property WITHOUT
initiating expropriation proceedings.
• 4 & 7 Jan 1991: REYES sent letters to the DPWH stating her objection to the
taking of her property.
• 16 May 1991: REYES sent a letter to the City Appraisal Committee (CAC) rejecting
the latter’s APPRAISAL of the subject property
o REYES requested the City Assessor for a REAPPRAISAL of her property,
but said request was DENIED.
• 17 Mar 1992: REYES filed with RTC of CDO a complaint claiming just compensation
and damages against REPUBLIC.
• 30 June 1993: RTC appointed 3 commissioners to determine the subject property’s
fair market value, as well as the consequential benefits and damages of its
expropriation.
• 15 Sept 1993: 1 of 3 Commissioners, Beltran, submitted to the RTC a separate
report, saying that she deems it just, fair and reasonable to adopt the market value
of P4K per square meter as the highest price obtaining and prevailing in 1990, the
2KP Trivia: This particular corner lot is in a prime location in CDO coz it’s on a major highway + very near
shopping malls and the old Coca Cola plant
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 34

time of the taking of the property and an additional value equivalent to 5% of the • 15 June 1995: AMENDED RTC RULING (KP: initial ruling is not relevant and is
market value as fixed for severance fee. substantially the same as amended5)→ STILL FAVORED REYES
• 13 Apr 1994: the scheduled hearing was reset to 19 May 1994, to give REYES o declaring the REYES as having the right to retain 590 sqm and ordering
(plaintiff) time to consider the offer of REPUBLIC (defendant) to amicably settle the the REPUBLIC to return 293 sqm of the 746 sqm taken
case and to accept the just compensation of P3,200 per square meter, or a total of o REPUBLIC→ to pay P4.6MIO, the fair market value in 1990, as just
P2.2MIO, for the 663-square meter portion of REYES’s lot. compensation for the 453 sqm
• 16 May 1994: REYES filed with the RTC an “Urgent Motion to Deposit The Amount o Damages: P185K
of P2.1MIO in Court,” alleging that REPUBLIC’s counsel previously manifested in o Attorney’s fees: P10K plus costs of suit.
open court that the amount of P2.1MIO was ready for release should the amount be • REPUBLIC appealed to CA.
acceptable to REYES, and praying that said amount of P2.1MIO be deposited by • CA RULING: AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS the decision of the RTC. 6
REPUBLIC with the trial court. The RTC granted the motion in an Order dated 16 o The CA found that the commissioners’ recommendations on just
June 1994. compensation were not supported by valid documents.
• 21 Oct 1994: However, it was only on 21 October 1994 that REPUBLIC deposited o Also, it was unclear in the RTC decision whether the trial court merely
with the RTC Clerk of Court a Landbank check amounting to P2.1MIO as just adopted the commissioners’ recommendations or the court made its
compensation. own independent valuation of the subject property.
• 16 Jun 1994: Since the commissioners failed to submit their (collective) report, o Thus, the CA held that a reconvening of the commissioners or an
upon motion of REYES, the RTC issued an order appointing a new set of appointment of new commissioners to determine just compensation
commissioners. was necessary.
• 11 Oct 1994: the new commissioners submitted their report, which considered the o CA further held that the trial court’s order for REPUBLIC’s return of the
lot’s prime location (KP: see footnote)3 293-sqm lot had no legal basis and was no longer feasible since the lot
o For a fair assessment of the market value the Commissioners divided the was already part of the completed Sergio Osmeña extension road.
whole parcel of land into 3 parts, viz.: o Moreover, consequential damages should be awarded in lieu of actual
Portion Land Area CURRENT VALUE VALUATION as of damages for REYES’s alleged loss of income from the remaining 297-
(1994) 1990 (time of taking) square meter lot.
• REPUBLIC filed MR, but DENIED by CA.
Front portion 347.66 SQM PHP 18K – 20K PHP 10K – 12K • Hence, this appeal.
Middle portion 347.66 SQM PHP 16K – 18K PHP 8K – 10K
Rear/back 347.66 SQM PHP 14K – 16K PHP 6K – 8K ISSUES:
portion
TOTAL 1,043 SQM
52 June 1995: INITIAL RTC RULING→ FAVORED REYES
o The Commissioners also noted that what has been taken over and used by o declaring REYES as having the right to retain 590 sqm and ordering the REPUBLIC to return
210 sqm of the 663 sqm taken
the REPUBLIC is NOT ONLY 663 sqm BUT 746 sqm4 o REPUBLIC→ to pay P5.5MIO, the fair market value in 1990, as just compensation for the 536
o Likewise, Commissioners noted that the remaining USABLE portion left to sqm
the REYES will not actually be 297 sqm, but rather would only be a little o Damages: P185K
over 50 sqm. o Attorney’s fees: P10K plus costs of suit.
▪ Due to its small triangular size, this portion would not command 6 CA DECISION→ WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby MODIFIED.
a good price if sold nor would it be ideal for purposes of any 1. The case is REMANDED to the trial court which is ordered to reconvene the commissioners or appoint new
building construction. commissioners to determine, in accordance with this Decision, the amount of just compensation due to plaintiff-
appellee Rosario Rodriguez Reyes for the 746 square meters of land taken from her and consequential damages
to the 297-square meter portion left.
3i.e. strategically located along a National Highway in a commercial district + lot is in front of a Coca Cola Plant 2. Defendant-appellant DPWH is ordered to pay plaintiff-appellee the following amounts:
and Shell Gas Station + it adjoins Palana Grocery Store and a Bank + a few meters away is a Gaisano Mall, the a. the balance, if any, of just compensation to be finally determined after deducting the amount of
Ororama Superstore and the Limketkai Mall Complex. P2,121,600 DPWH previously advanced and deposited with the trial court;
b. 6% legal interest per annum on the amount it provisionally deposited from the time of taking up
4The undersigned Commissioners would however like to bring to the attention of the Honorable Court that in the to the time it is deposited with the trial court on October 21, 1994; and on the balance, if any, from
subdivision plan prepared by the City Engineer’s Office, the whole of plaintiff’s property was subdivided into the time of taking on December 20, 1990 until fully paid;
three (3) lots designated as follows: c. attorney’s fees of P20,000.00.
Lot 849-B-1 (Road Lot)-83 square meters; 3. Defendant-appellant City Government of Cagayan de Oro is relieved from any liability;
Lot 849-B-2 (Road Lot traversed by the RCDP Osmeña Extension Street)-663 SQM; 4. The award of P185,000.00 as actual damages is deleted;
Lot 849-B-3 remaining portion with an area of 297 square meters; 5. No pronouncement as to costs.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
1. Whether the CA erred in ordering the remand of the case to the trial court, to order
the reconvening of the commissioners or appointment of new commissioners to
determine the consequential damages for the remaining 297- square meter lot. NO
ERROR.
2. WON consequential damages awarded for the lot which was retained by the owner
is tantamount to unjust enrichment on the part of the latter? NOT UNJUST
ENRICHMENT (not directly stated in the case as an issue)
3. Whether the CA erred in ordering REPUBLIC to pay attorney’s fees. NO ERROR.
HELD: We find the appeal unmeritorious. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We
AFFIRM the Court of Appeals’ Decision dated 15 November 2002 and Resolution dated
17 September 2003 in CA-G.R. CV No. 50358.
RATIO:
PART 1: WON proper to remand of the case to the trial court to order the
reconvening of the commissioners or appointment of new commissioners to
determine the consequential damages for the remaining 297-square meter lot?
PROPER!
• Eminent domain is the authority and right of the State, as sovereign, to take private
property for public use upon observance of due process of law and payment of just
compensation. The Constitution provides that, “[p]rivate property shall not be
taken for public use without just compensation.”
• Just compensation is the full and fair equivalent of the property sought to be
expropriated. Among the factors to be considered in arriving at the fair market
value of the property are the cost of acquisition, the current value of like properties,
its actual or potential uses, and in the particular case of lands, their size, shape,
location, and the tax declarations thereon. The measure is not the taker’s gain but
the owner’s loss. To be just, the compensation must be fair not only to the owner
but also to the taker.
• Just compensation is based on the price or value of the property at the time it was
taken from the owner and appropriated by the government. However, if the
government takes possession before the institution of expropriation proceedings,
the value should be fixed as of the time of the taking of said possession, not of the
filing of the complaint. The value at the time of the filing of the complaint should be
the basis for the determination of the value when the taking of the property
involved coincides with or is subsequent to the commencement of the proceedings.
• The procedure for determining just compensation is set forth in Rule 67 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states that “[u]pon the
rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three
(3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report
to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken.”
• However, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals that Rule 67 presupposes a
prior filing of complaint for eminent domain with the appropriate court by
the expropriator. If no such complaint is filed, the expropriator is considered
to have violated procedural requirements, and hence, waived the usual
procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of
commissioners to ascertain just compensation.
35
• In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we clarified that when there
is no action for expropriation and the case involves only a complaint for
damages or just compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court on
ascertainment of just compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67) are no longer
applicable, and a trial before commissioners is dispensable, thus:
o “In this case, NPC appropriated Pobre’s Property without resort to
expropriation proceedings. NPC dismissed its own complaint for the
second expropriation. At no point did NPC institute expropriation
proceedings for the lots outside the 5,554 square-meter portion
subject of the second expropriation. The only issues that the trial
court had to settle were the amount of just compensation and
damages that NPC had to pay Pobre.
o This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when NPC
dismissed its complaint for expropriation. Since this case has been
reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages, the provisions
of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment of the just
compensation to be paid were no longer applicable. A trial
before commissioners, for instance, was dispensable.”
• In this case, REPUBLIC took possession of the subject property without
initiating expropriation proceedings. Consequently, REYES filed the instant
case for just compensation and damages. To determine just compensation,
the trial court appointed three commissioners pursuant to Section 5 of Rule
67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. None of the parties objected to such
appointment.
• The trial court’s appointment of commissioners in this particular case is not
improper. The appointment was done mainly to aid the trial court in determining
just compensation, and it was not opposed by the parties. Besides, the trial court is
not bound by the commissioners’ recommended valuation of the subject property.
The court has the discretion on whether to adopt the commissioners’ valuation or
to substitute its own estimate of the value as gathered from the records. 7
• However, we agree with the CA that the trial court’s decision is not clear as to
its basis for ascertaining just compensation. The trial court mentioned in its
decision the valuations in the reports of the City Appraisal Committee and of
the commissioners appointed pursuant to Rule 67. But whether the trial court
considered these valuations in arriving at the just compensation, or the court
made its own independent valuation based on the records, was obscure in the
decision. The trial court simply gave the total amount of just compensation
due to the property owner without laying down its basis.
o Thus, there is no way to determine whether the adjudged just
compensation is based on competent evidence. For this reason alone,
7Republic of the Philippines v. Santos, 225 Phil. 29, 35; 141 SCRA 30, 34 (1986), citing Manila Railroad Company
v. Velasquez, 32 Phil. 286 (1915).
Section 8 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that, “the court may x x x accept the report and
render judgment in accordance therewith; or, for cause shown, it may recommit the same to the commissioners
for further report of facts; or it may set aside the report and appoint new commissioners; or it may accept the
report in part and reject it in part; and it may make such order or render such judgment as shall secure to the
plaintiff the property essential to the exercise of his right of expropriation, and to the defendant just
compensation for the property so taken.”
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
a remand of the case to the trial court for proper determination of
just compensation is in order. In National Power Corporation v.
Bongbong, we held that although the determination of just
compensation lies within the trial court’s discretion, it should not be
done arbitrarily or capriciously. The decision of the trial court must
be based on all established rules, correct legal principles, and
competent evidence. The court is proscribed from basing its
judgment on speculations and surmises.
PART 2: WON consequential damages for the lot which was retained by the owner is
tantamount to unjust enrichment on the part of the latter? NO
• REPUBLIC’S CONTENTION: REPUBLIC questions the CA’s decision to remand the
case to determine the consequential damages for the remaining 297-square meter
lot of REYES. REPUBLIC contends that no consequential damages may be awarded
as the remaining lot was “not actually taken” by the DPWH, and to award
consequential damages for the lot which was retained by the owner is tantamount
to unjust enrichment on the part of the latter.
• REPUBLIC’s contention is unmeritorious.
• No actual taking of the remaining portion of the real property is necessary to
grant consequential damages. If as a result of the expropriation made by
REPUBLIC, the remaining lot (i.e., the 297-square meter lot) of REYES suffers
from an impairment or decrease in value, consequential damages may be
awarded to REYES. On the other hand, if the expropriation results to benefits to
the remaining lot of REYES, these consequential benefits8 may be deducted from
the awarded consequential damages, if any, or from the market value of the
expropriated property.
• We held in B.H. Berkenkotter & Co. v. Court of Appeals that:
o “To determine just compensation, the trial court should first
ascertain the market value of the property, to which should be added
the consequential damages after deducting therefrom the
consequential benefits which may arise from the expropriation. If the
consequential benefits exceed the consequential damages, these
items should be disregarded altogether as the basic value of the
property should be paid in every case.”
• Section 6 of Rule 67 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
o “x x x The commissioners shall assess the consequential damages
to the property not taken and deduct from such consequential
damages the consequential benefits to be derived by the owner
from the public use or purpose of the property taken, the operation of
its franchise by the corporation or the carrying on of the business of
the corporation or person taking the property. But in no case shall
the consequential benefits assessed exceed the consequential
8The consequential benefits that shall be deducted refer to the actual benefits derived by the owner on the
remaining portion of his land which are the direct and proximate results of the improvements consequent to the
expropriation, and not the general benefits which he receives in common with the community. (Regalado,
Remedial Law Compendium, Vol. 1, p. 746)
36
damages assessed, or the owner be deprived of the actual value of his
property so taken.”
• An award of consequential damages for property not taken is not tantamount
to unjust enrichment of the property owner. There is unjust enrichment “when a
person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss of another, or when a person retains
money or property of another against the fundamental principles of justice, equity
and good conscience.” Article 22 of the Civil Code provides that “[e]very person
who through an act of performance by another, or any other means, acquires or
comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without just or legal
ground, shall return the same to him.” The principle of unjust enrichment under
Article 22 requires two conditions: (1) that a person is benefited without a valid
basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at another’s expense or
damage.
• There is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit has a valid
claim to such benefit.
• As stated, consequential damages are awarded if as a result of the expropriation,
the remaining property of the owner suffers from an impairment or decrease in
value. Thus, there is a valid basis for the grant of consequential damages to the
property owner, and no unjust enrichment can result therefrom.
BONUS
PART 3: WON proper to order REPUBLIC to pay attorney’s fees? PROPER
• The Court of Appeals did not err in granting attorney’s fees to REYES. Article
2208(2) of the New Civil Code provides that attorney’s fees may be awarded:
o (2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the
plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect
his interest.
• Attorney’s fees may be awarded by a court if one who claims it is compelled to
litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect one’s interest by reason
of an unjustified act or omission on the part of the party from whom it is sought. In
this case, REPUBLIC took possession of REYES’s real property without initiating
expropriation proceedings, and over the latter’s objection. As a result, REYES was
compelled to litigate and incur expenses to protect her interests over her property.
4) NPC V. SANTA LORO, G.R. NO. 175176, OCTOBER 17, 2008 – RESPICIO
EMERGENCY
NPC asked permission from Santa Loro to enter their lands and construct transmission
lines. Santa Loro: Ok, just pay me just compensation. Santa Loro discovered his
neighbours got higher compensations. Santa Loro: I hereby rescind agreement. I will file
case in court. Case filed. Only issue is just compensation. RTC decided in favour of Santa
through summary judgment, as motioned.
Issue: RTC should have appointed commissioners to determine just compensation as
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
per Rule 67 sec. 5.
SC: nope. This is not an expropriation case per se. The case filed was rescission of
agreement with damages. Therefore, the rules of court on expropriation does not apply.
The RTC may determine just compensation without referring to commissioners. lol.
FACTS
Petitioner is a government-owned and controlled corporation duly organized
under Philippine laws and vested with the power of eminent domain by its Charter
under Republic Act No. 6395,[5] as amended by Presidential Decree No.
938.[6] Pursuant to its 230 KV Leyte-Cebu Interconnection Project (Interconnection
Project), petitioner expropriated several parcels of land in the Municipality of Carmen
and City of Danao in the Province of Cebu, which will be traversed and affected by its
transmission towers and lines.
Among the lots affected by the petitioner’s Interconnection Project were
those owned by the respondents located in Dawis Sur, Carmen, Cebu. Respondent Santa
Loro Vda. To be able to enter the said properties, petitioner obtained from each of the
respondents Santa Loro Vda. De Capin and Spouses Quimco a “Permission to Enter for
Construction of Transmission Line Project,” The permits were signed by the
respondents upon representation by the petitioner that it would pay them just
compensation for the intrusion into their properties.
Thereafter, petitioner began to construct on respondents’ properties its
power lines and transmission towers. Petitioner’s Interconnection Project affected
portions of respondents’ properties. Upon its completion of the construction of the
power lines and transmission towers, petitioner imposed several restrictions upon the
respondents on the use of their lands, which included the prohibition against planting or
building anything higher than three meters below the area traversed by its transmission
lines as the high tension electric current passing through said lines pose danger to life
and limbs. Additionally, respondent-Spouses Quimco, holder of a Small Scale Quarry
Permit, were also prohibited from continuing their quarry business near petitioner’s
transmission towers because of the great possibility that the quarry might weaken the
foundation of the transmission towers. In other words, respondents lost substantial
amount of income due to the restriction imposed on their properties by the petitioner.
Petitioner then paid respondents Santa Loro Vda. De Capin and Spouses
Quimco the amounts of P8,015.90[11] and P5,350.49,[12] respectively, for the portions
of their lots affected by the Interconnection Project. Only later did respondents discover
that in comparison to the measly sums they were paid by petitioner, the other
landowners within their area who resisted the expropriation of their properties in court
or who entered into compromise agreements with the petitioner were paid by
petitioner the amount of P448.30 to P450.00 per square meter as just compensation for
the portions of their properties similarly affected by the petitioner’s Interconnection
Project.
37
Accordingly, respondents filed a Complaint[13] for Rescission of Agreement,
Recovery of Possession of Parcels of Land, Removal of Tower and Transmission Lines,
Damages and Other Reliefs, against the petitioner before the RTC.
During the Pre-trial Conference, the parties conceded that there was no dispute as
to the material fact that petitioner had taken portions of respondents’ lots. They also
agreed that the only issue for resolution by the RTC was the determination of the
amount of just compensation due the respondents for the portions of their land taken by
the petitioner. Thus, respondents assented that they would file a Motion for Summary
Judgment.
ISSUE
Petitioner argues that although the Complaint filed by the respondents
before the RTC was one for rescission of agreement and/or damages, it was
subsequently transformed into one for “reversed eminent domain”[24] where the
determination of the amount of just compensation was the issue. In fact, respondents’
Motion for Summary Judgment focused only on the payment of just
compensation. Resultantly, the RTC erred in resolving the respondents’ Complaint on
the basis of the provisions of the Rules of Court on Summary Judgment. The rules on
summary judgment apply only to ordinary taking of properties. Instead of granting
respondents’ Motion for Summary Judgment, the RTC should have appointed
commissioners who would ascertain the amount of just compensation for the subject
properties, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court.[25] Thus, the
determination of just compensation by the RTC based only on the pleadings submitted,
was palpably void.
The Petition is bereft of merit.
RATIO
In this case, during the Pre-trial Conference, petitioner already admitted
that it had taken portions of respondents’ lands for the construction of its power lines
and transmission towers pursuant to its Interconnection Project. However, the parties
could not agree on the amount of just compensation or damages that petitioner should
pay respondents for the lands taken. Respondents insist that they be paid the full
market value of the portions of their lots taken by the petitioner, while petitioner
believed that it was only bound to pay respondents easement fees, which was equivalent
to 10% of the market value of the respondents’ lots as indicated in their tax declarations,
pursuant to Section 3-A of petitioner’s Charter. Evidently, based on the foregoing, what
remained for the determination of the RTC was the proper amount of damages due the
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
respondents for the portions of their lots taken by the petitioner.
Accordingly, respondents filed a Motion for Summary Judgment before the
RTC
Futile is petitioner’s insistence that respondents’ Complaint is actually for
“reversed eminent domain,” which requires the appointment of commissioners for the
determination of just compensation, as provided under Section 5, Rule 67 of the Revised
Rules of Court, rather than the promulgation of a summary judgment.
It should be emphasized that the present case stemmed from a Complaint
for Rescission of Agreement, Recovery of Possession of Parcels of Land, Removal of
Tower and Transmission Lines, Damages and Other Reliefs filed by the respondents
against the petitioner. It was an ordinary civil action for the rescission of respondents’
agreement with petitioner, as well as recovery of the possession of the lots taken, for
failure of petitioner to comply with its obligation to pay just compensation for the
respondents’ properties. Payment of just compensation or damages was an alternative
remedy, akin to specific performance by the petitioner of its obligation under its
agreement with respondents, which would prevent the rescission of the agreements
altogether and the return of the possession of the properties to respondents. The
parties, at the Pre-Trial Conference, implicitly agreed to pursue the remedy for payment
of damages rather than rescission of the agreement. Clearly, the proceedings before the
RTC were not for expropriation, but were for damages, to which Section 5, Rule 67 of the
Revised Rules of Court is irrelevant.
Reference may be made to National Power Corporation v. Court of
Appeals.[34] In the said case, after therein petitioner NAPOCOR withdrew its second
Petition for Expropriation, what was left for the trial court’s determination was the
counterclaim of therein private respondent Antonino Pobre, contained in his Motion to
Dismiss, for damages. The Court ruled therein:
“In this case, NPC appropriated [private respondent’s]
Property without resort to expropriation proceedings. NPC
dismissed its own complaint for the second expropriation. At
no point did NPC institute expropriation proceedings for the
lots outside the 5,554 square-meter portion subject of the
second expropriation. The only issues that the trial court had
to settle were the amount of just compensation and damages
that NPC had to pay [private respondent].
This case ceased to be an action for expropriation when
NPC dismissed its complaint for expropriation. Since this case
has been reduced to a simple case of recovery of damages,
the provisions of the Rules of Court on the ascertainment
of the just compensation to be paid were no longer
applicable. A trial before commissioners, for instance, was
dispensable.” (Emphasis supplied.)
38
Petitioner herein cannot hide behind the mantle of protection of procedural laws
when it has so arbitrarily violated respondents’ right to just compensation for their
properties taken for public use.
Petitioner assured respondents that it will pay them just compensation for
the portions of their lots needed for the Interconnection Project, on the basis of which
respondents agreed in good faith to allow petitioner to already enter their properties
and build thereon. Yet, instead of paying respondents just compensation for the
portions of their lots taken, they were paid negligible amounts as easements fees.
More lopsided is the fact that the other landowners within their area who
resisted the taking of their properties were paid by petitioner way more than
respondents who voluntarily dealt with petitioner. Petitioner had to bring some of the
resisting landowners to court in expropriation proceedings where petitioner willingly
paid just compensation for the said landowners’ properties, as determined by a panel of
commissioners. Petitioner entered into compromise agreements with the other
resisting landowners in which it likewise paid just compensation for the latter’s
properties. There is no rhyme or reason why respondents were the only ones paid with
easement fees, which were of much lesser values.
Petitioner attached to their Motion for Summary Judgment several pieces of
document in support of their allegations therein, and they furnished petitioner copies of
the same. The petitioner was given ample time to study, challenge, and controvert
respondents’ evidences, yet it failed to do so. The RTC only rightfully proceeded, based
on its evaluation of the evidence on record, to render a Decision awarding to the
respondents just compensation or damages for the taking of their lots, equivalent to the
fair market value thereof at the rate of P448.33 per square meter.
Finally, petitioner cannot insist that it only acquired an easement of right of
way on the properties of the respondents and that it was liable to pay respondents only
an easement fee not exceeding 10% of the fair market value of the portions of their
property actually affected by the Interconnection Project, pursuant to Section 3-A(b) of
its Charter.
Expropriation is not limited to the acquisition of real property with a
corresponding transfer of title or possession. The right-of-way easement resulting in a
restriction or limitation on property rights over the land traversed by transmission lines
also falls within the ambit of the term “expropriation.”[37]
After petitioner’s transmission lines were fully constructed on portions of
respondents’ lots, petitioner imposed restrictions thereon such as the prohibition
against planting or building anything higher than three meters below the area traversed
by said lines. In addition, respondent-Spouses Quimco, holders of a Small Scale Quarry
Permit, Series of 1995,[38] were also prohibited from continuing their quarry business
near petitioner’s transmission towers because of the great possibility that it could
weaken the foundation thereof. Hence, the respondent-spouses Quimco suffered
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
substantial loss of income. It is clear then that petitioner’s acquisition of an easement of
right of way on the lands of the respondents amounted to an expropriation of the
portions of the latter’s properties and perpetually deprived the respondents of their
proprietary rights thereon and for which they are entitled to a reasonable and just
compensation. Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the
property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the
taker’s gain, but the owner’s loss. The word “just” is used to intensify the meaning of
the word “compensation” and to convey thereby the idea that the equivalent to be
rendered for the property to be taken shall be real, substantial, full and ample.[39]
As the Court thoroughly explained in National Power Corporation v. Gutierrez,[40]
viz:
The trial court’s observation shared by the appellate
court show that “x x x While it is true that plaintiff [is] only
after a right-of-way easement, it neverthelessperpetually
deprives defendants of their proprietary rights as
manifested by the imposition by the plaintiff upon defendants
that below said transmission lines no plant higher than three
(3) meters is allowed. Furthermore, because of the high-
tension current conveyed through said transmission lines,
danger to life and limbsthat may be caused beneath said
wires cannot altogether be discounted, and to cap it all, plaintiff
only pays the fee to defendants once, while the latter
shallcontinually pay the taxes due on said affected portion
of their property.”
The foregoing facts considered, the acquisition of the
right-of-way easement falls within the purview of the power
of eminent domain. Such conclusion finds support in similar
cases of easement of right-of-way where the Supreme Court
sustained the award of just compensation for private property
condemned for public use (See National Power Corporation vs.
Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 665, 1984; Garcia vs. Court of
Appeals, 102 SCRA 597, 1981). The Supreme Court, in Republic
of the Philippines vs. PLDT, thus held that:
“Normally, of course, the
power of eminent domain results in
the taking or appropriation of
title to, and possession of, the
expropriated property; but no cogent
reason appears why said power may
not be availed of to impose only a
burden upon the owner of
condemned property, without loss
of title and possession. It is
unquestionable that real property
39
may, through expropriation, be
subjected to an easement of right-of-
way.”
In the case at bar, the easement of right-of-way is definitely
a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the nature
and effect of the installation of the 230 KV Mexico-Limay transmission
lines, the limitation imposed by NPC against the use of the land
for an indefinite period deprives private respondents of its ordinary
use.[41] (Emphasis supplied.)
Having established that petitioner’s acquisition of right-of-way easement over the
portions of respondents’ lots was definitely a taking under the power of eminent
domain, petitioner then is liable to pay respondents just compensation and not merely
an easement fee. The Court quotes with affirmation the ruling of the Court of Appeals
on this matter:
The [herein petitioner] vehemently insists that its Charter [Section 3A
(b) of R.A. 6395] obliges it to pay only a maximum of 10% of
the market value declared by the owner or administrator or
anyone having legal interest in the property, or such market
value as determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. To
uphold such a contention would not only interfere with a
judicial function but would also render as useless the
protection guaranteed by our Constitution in Section 9, Article
III of our Constitution that no private property shall be taken
for public use without payment of just compensation.
Moreover, the valuation of a property in the tax declaration cannot be an absolute
substitute to just compensation. Stated differently, the market value stated in the tax
declaration of the condemned property is no longer conclusive.[42] It is violative of due
process to deny to the owner the opportunity to prove that the valuation in the tax
documents is unfair or wrong. It is also repulsive to the basic concepts of justice and
fairness to allow the haphazard work of a minor bureaucrat or clerk to absolutely
prevail over the judgment of a court which is promulgated only after expert
commissioners have actually viewed the property, after evidence, arguments pro and
con have been presented, and after all factors and considerations essential to a fair
and just determination have been judicially evaluated.[43] 10% of the market value of
the expropriated property cannot in any way be considered as the fair and full
equivalent to the loss sustained by the owner of the property, such would be 90% less
than what is due him. Thus, we are of the conclusion that Section 3A of [petitioner’s]
Charter cannot prevail over the mandate of our Constitution on the payment of just
compensation. The court a quo did not commit an error when it held that the
[petitioner’s] charter encroached on the function of the court in determining just
compensation.[44]
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
5) APO FRUITS V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 164195, DECEMBER 4, 2009 – SANCHEZ
Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) & Hijo Plantation, Inc. (HPI) v. CA & Land Bank
ER:
- Apo Fruits and Hijo Plantation (AFC and HPI, respectively) voluntarily offered
to sell their 5 parcels of land to the DAR/Republic of the Phils because of the
Agrarian Reform Program. DAR initially valued their land to be 86 Million and
164 Million. AFC and HPI refused, prompting DAR to direct the Land Bank
(LBP) to deposit 26 Million to AFC and 45 Million to HPI’s account. AFC and
HPI withdrew the money. The TCT was transferred to the Republic, to be
distributed to the individual farmers.
SUMMARY OF APPEALS (can skip this if you’re in a hurry, basta at the end, AFC and
HPI were the Petitioners!):
- AFC and HPI filed complaints in the DAR adjudication Board for proper
valuation, but the DARAB refused to render a decision. (aka they want more
money)
- AFC and HPI went to the RTC of Tagum City (acting as Special Agrarian Court),
which ruled that the value of the land is 1.383 BILLION PESOS.
- LBP filed an MR, but the value was retained except for atty’s fees.
- LBP filed a notice of appeal, but got denied because LBP v. De Leon was
decided—stating that appeals from RTCs acting as Special Agrarian Courts
should be via Petition for Review.
- LBP filed a petition for review in the CA, which nullified the RTC decision.
- AFC and HPI filed a joint MR in the CA, which the CA denied.
- The DAR also filed an MR with the CA, but was denied for failure to state the
material date.
- AFC and HPI file a petition for review with the SC, which was partially granted.
- Land Bank filed an MR at the 3rd division of the SC, WHICH DELETED THE
ATTY’S FEES AND 12% interests (aka MAS MURA BABAYARAN NG
REPUBLIC)
- AFC and HPI filed the current case, arguing that interest and Atty’s fees
should be granted (they want more money).
Held: No. Interest is to be imposed on the just compensation only in case of delay
in its payment, which fact must be sufficiently established, based on Article 2209 of the
Civil Code.9 In this case, there was no delay in payment, because the facts show that LBP
already deposited the money in the accounts of AFC and HPI. Their subsequent appeals
9Article 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of money and the
debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there being no stipulation to
the contrary, shall be the payment of the interest agreed upon, and in the
absence of stipulation, the legal interest, which is six per cent per annum.
(1108)
40
cannot show bad faith, because the right to appeal is a remedy accorded by law. It is not
an unjustified delay.
FACTS: [SOBRANG HASSLE NG PROCEDURAL HISTORY NG CASE NA ITO, pero sobrang
simple lang siya concerning DELAY.]
- On October 12, 1995, Apo Fruits Corporation (AFC) and Hijo Plantation, Inc.
(HPI) offered to sell five parcels of land to the government through the Dep’t of
Agrarian Reform (DAR) for the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
o The DAR gave a Voluntary Offer to Sell to both AFC and HPI, with a
valuation of 165,000 php per hectare. [AFC – 86 Million; HPI – 164
Million]
o Both AFC and HPI found the value to be unreasonably low, and
rejected the offer to sell.
- Due to the rejection, the DAR directed the Land Bank of the Philippines to
deposit the amounts equivalent to their valuations in the names and for the
accounts of AFC and HPI.
o LBP deposited 26 Million to AFC’s account; and 45 Million to HPI’s
account.
o Both AFC and HPI withdrew the amounts from LBP.
- DAR directed the Register of Deeds of Davao to cancel the TCTs and transfer
them to the Republic of the Philippines, which would be distributed to
qualified farmer-beneficiaries.
- On 14 February 1997, AFC and HPI filed separate complaints for determination
of just compensation with the DAR Adjudication Board (DARAB). Despite the
lapse of more than three years from the filing of the complaints, the DARAB
failed and refused to render a decision on the valuation of the land.
o Hence, two complaints for determination and payment of just
compensation were filed by AFC and HPI before Branch 2 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tagum City (acting as a Special
Agrarian Court), which were subsequently consolidated.
o The RTC rendered a decision in favour of AFC and HPI, giving a value
of 1.383 BILLION php to the land. RTC ordered to pay in the amount
of 91-day T-bills, interest, attorney’s fees, costs of suit, and
Commissioner’s Fees.
- Land Bank filed an MR, on the ground that the RTC valued the land based on
residential and industrial lands, and not agricultural. It also sought
reconsideration over the atty’s fees, interest, and the payment of the
Commissioners.
o MR Result – the attorney’s fees has been modified, but for everything
else, it’s the same.
- Land Bank filed a notice of appeal. However, during the appeal, the case of
Land Bank of the Philippines v. De Leon was decided, which ruled that the
proper mode of appeal of an RTC decision acting as a Special Agrarian Court is
via a petition for review.
o RTC denied the notice of appeal.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
- Land Bank filed a petition for certiorari, in the CA. The CA nullified the
decision of the RTC.
- AFC and HPI filed a joint MR in the CA, which the CA denied.
- The DAR also filed an MR with the CA, but was denied for failure to state the
material date.
- AFC and HPI file a petition for review with the SC, which was partially granted.
- [note the deletions!!!] Land Bank filed an MR at the 3rd division of the SC,
where the SC ruled that:
o (1) The award of 12% interest rate per annum in the total amount of
just compensation is DELETED.
o (2) This case is ordered REMANDED to the RTC for further hearing
on the amount of Commissioners’ Fees.
o (3) The award of attorney’s fees is DELETED.
o (4) The Motion for Referral of the case to the Supreme Court sitting
En Banc and the request or setting of the Omnibus Motion for Oral
Arguments are all DENIED for lack of merit. In all other respects, our
Decision dated 6 February 2007 is MAINTAINED.
- ALL (HPI, AFC and LBP) OF THEM FILED THEIR MOTIONS FOR
RECONSIDERATION, WHICH THE SC DENIED. There was entry of judgment on
May 16, 2008.
- [sobrang kulit ng HPI and AFC] Even after entry of judgment, HPI and AFC
filed their (1) motion for leave to file and admit second motion for
reconsideration; (2) second motion for reconsideration (with respect to the
denial of the award of legal interest and attorney's fees); and (3) motion to
refer the second motion for reconsideration to the Honorable Court en banc.
- The en banc session hall took cognizance of their petition, hence the current
case.
ISSUE:
Whether interest and attorney’s fees should be granted to AFC and HPI (NO)
HELD:
WHEREFORE, the Court denies the petitioners’ second motion for reconsideration (with
respect to the denial of the award of legal interest and attorney's fees), and reiterates the
decision dated February 6, 2007 and the resolution dated December 19, 2007 of the
Third Division.
RATIO:
The taking of property under CARL is an exercise by the State of the power of eminent
domain. A basic limitation on the State’s power of eminent domain is the constitutional
directive that private property shall not be taken for public use without just
compensation.
- Just compensation refers to the sum equivalent to the market value of the
property, broadly described to be the price fixed by the seller in open market
in the usual and ordinary course of legal action and competition, or the fair
41
value of the property as between one who receives and one who desires to sell.
It is fixed at the time of the actual taking by the State.
o Thus, if property is taken for public use before compensation is
deposited with the court having jurisdiction over the case, the final
compensation must include interests on its just value, to be computed
from the time the property is taken up to the time when
compensation is actually paid or deposited with the court.
- In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Wycoco however, the Court came to explicitly
rule that interest is to be imposed on the just compensation only in case of
delay in its payment, which fact must be sufficiently established.
Significantly, Wycoco was moored on Article 2209, Civil Code, which provides:
o Article 2209. If the obligation consists in the payment of money
and the debtor incurs in delay, the indemnity for damages, there
being no stipulation to the contrary, shall be the payment of the
interest agreed upon, and in the absence of stipulation, the legal
interest, which is six per cent per annum. (1108)
THERE IS NO DELAY.
- Land Bank did not incur delay in the payment of the just compensation.
As earlier mentioned, after AFC and HPI voluntarily offered to sell their lands
on October 12, 1995, DAR referred their VOS applications to Land Bank for
initial valuation. Land Bank initially fixed the just compensation at
P165,484.47/hectare, that is, P86,900,925.88, for AFC, and P164,478,178.14,
for HPI.
- However, AFC and HPI rejected Land Bank’s initial valuation, prompting Land
Bank to open deposit accounts in the petitioners’ names, and to credit in said
accounts the amounts equivalent to their valuations. Although AFC withdrew
the amount of P26,409,549.86, while HPI withdrew P45,481,706.76, they still
filed with DARAB separate complaints for determination of just compensation.
When DARAB did not act upon their complaints for more than three years, AFC
and HPI commenced their respective actions for determination of just
compensation in the Tagum City RTC, which rendered its decision
on September 25, 2001.
- It is explicit from LBP v. Wycoco that interest on the just compensation is
imposed only in case of delay in the payment thereof which must be
sufficiently established. Given the foregoing, we find that the imposition
of interest on the award of just compensation is not justified and should
therefore be deleted.
It must be emphasized that “pertinent amounts were deposited in favor of AFC and HPI
within fourteen months after the filing by the latter of the Complaint for determination
of just compensation before the RTC”. It is likewise true that AFC and HPI already
collected P149.6 and P262 million, respectively, representing just compensation for the
subject properties. Clearly, there is no unreasonable delay in the payment of just
compensation which should warrant the award of 12% interest per annum in AFC and
HPI’s favor.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
6) REPUBLIC V. HOLY TRINITY DEVELOPMENT CORP., G.R. NO. 172410, APRIL 14, 2008
– SUPERABLE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, REPRESENTED BY THE TOLL REGULATORY
BOARD (TRB), petitioners, vs. HOLY TRINITY REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORP.,
respondent. G.R. No. 172410. April 14, 2008. (NONS)
NSS: Please take note of the differences between RA 8974 and Rule 67 on the process of
expropriation.
EMERGENCY RECIT
QUICK FACTS: The TRB sought to expropriate several parcels of land for its
construction and expansion of NLEX. One of the affected landowners is Holy Trinity.
TRB deposited an amount representing 100% of the zonal value of the properties
sought to be expropriated. Later on, Holy Trinity wanted to withdraw the deposit for its
land, including interest. This was opposed by TRB on the ground that the landowner is
only entitled to the deposit, and not the interest. The RTC originally ruled in favor of
Holy Trinity but later on reversed. The CA ruled in favor of Holy Trinity and ruled that
the deposit belongs to Holy Trinity per the rule of accession, and the interest is
considered fruits of the principal amount.
ISSUE: Whether the interest belongs to Holy Trinity, per the rule of accession?
YES!!
HELD: Preliminarily, the expropriation being done is for a national government
infrastructure project. Thus, RA 8974 should govern the expropriation proceedings and
not Rule 67, Sec. 2. Under RA 8974, the government agency should pay 100% of the
zonal value of the property sought to be expropriated. Once paid, such amount
automatically becomes the property of the landowner. Per the right of accession, the
civil fruits—the interest that accrued on the amount—belong to the landowner. Here,
TRB paid Holy Trinity the amount required by law, and the principal amount belongs to
Holy Trinity, and that includes the interest that accrued thereon, pursuant to the
principle of accession.
DOCTRINE: RA 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the
property owner than Rule 67, applies in instances when the national government
expropriates property "for national government infrastructure projects." Thus, if
expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than
national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode
prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply. Also, by virtue of the principle of accession, the
interest that accrued on the deposit paid by the expropriating agency belongs to the
landowner, since it is considered as civil fruits.
FACTS:
The government through the Toll Regulatory Board (“TRB”) sought to
expropriate parcels of lands that would be affected by the construction,
rehabilitation and expansion of the North Luzon Expressway. It filed a
Consolidated Complaint for Expropriation and raffled to Branch 85, Malolos
42
Bulacan. Holy Trinity Realty and Development Corp. (“Holy Trinity”) was one
of the respondents.
• Per Republic Act 8974, TRB deposited P28,406,700.00 in the account of DPWH
in Land Bank Philippines-South Harbor Branch, representing 100% of the
zonal value of the affected properties, in compliance with Sec. 4 of R.A. 89745
(concerning expropriation of private property for national infrastructure
projects). TRB filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the issuance of a Writ of
Possession since it deposited the amount and thus, the issuance of the writ is
ministerial per Sec. 2, Rule 67.
• This was granted by the RTC in March 2002. In October 2002, per the Sheriff’s
report that the landowners are not voluntarily vacating the properties sought
to be expropriated, TRB filed an Omnibus Motion requesting the help of the
PNP to implement the writ of execution.
• Relevantly, in March 2003, Holy Trinity filed a Motion to Withdraw
Deposit before the RTC, seeking to withdraw the amount due to it for the
land expropriated amounting to P22,968,000.00, including the interest that
accrued thereon. The RTC allowed the withdrawal of the principal amount
since Holy Trinity already proved absolute ownership over the land sought to
be expropriated and paid taxes thereon. However, the issue on the accrued
interest was to be threshed out in a subsequent hearing.
• During the proceedings, the DPWH reported that the DPWH Expropriation
account, including the deposit of TRB, was earning interest. In March 2004,
the RTC ruled that the interest properly belongs to Holy Trinity, as it is
considered fruits per the principle of accession.
• TRB filed a MR, arguing that the payment of interest on money deposited
and/or consigned for the purpose of securing a writ of possession was
sanctioned neither by law nor by jurisprudence. During the proceedings, the
RTC issued the Order of Expropriation.
• In February 2005, the RTC granted TRB’s MR and ruled that the issue of
payment of interest should determined before the Board of Commissioners
who will likewise determine the payment of just compensation. Holy Trinity’s
MR of this order was denied so Holy Trinity went to the Court of Appeals.
• The Court of Appeals granted the petition for certiorari of Holy Trinity and
vacated the order of the RTC that stated that a Board of Commissioners should
determine the issue of interest. The CA ruled that the interest, which
accrued on the amount deposited in the expropriation account, belongs
to Holy Trinity by virtue of accession.
ISSUE: Whether the interest that accrued from the deposit made in the expropriation
proceedings belong to the landowner? YES, per the principle of accession.
HELD: WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 21
April 2006 in CA-G.R. SP No. 90981, which set aside the 7 February 2005 and 16 May
2005 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, is AFFIRMED. No costs. SO
ORDERED.
RATIO:
TRB’s Arguments
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
• First, the owner of the properties is only entitled to the exact amount
deposited per Sec. 4 of RA 8974:
Section 4. Guidelines for Expropriation Proceedings. – Whenever it is
necessary to acquire real property for the right-of-way, site or
location for any national government infrastructure project through
expropriation, the appropriate implementing agency shall initiate the
expropriation proceedings before the proper court under the
following guidelines:
(a) Upon the filing of the complaint, and after due notice to the
defendant, the implementing agency shall immediately pay the
owner of the property the amount equivalent to the sum of (1)
one hundred (100%) percent of the value of the property based
on the current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR); and (2) the value of the improvements and/or
structures as determined under Section 7 hereof.
• and Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 2. Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with authorized
government depositary. – Upon the filing of the complaint or at
anytime thereafter and after due notice to the defendant, the plaintiff
shall have the right to take or enter upon the possession of the real
property involved if he deposits with the authorized government
depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the
property for purposes of taxation to be held by such bank
subject to the orders of the court. Such deposit shall be in money,
unless in lieu thereof the court authorizes the deposit of a certificate
of deposit of a government bank of the Republic of the Philippines
payable on demand to the authorized government depositary.
• Second, since there are 2 stages in an expropriation proceedings, the
determination of interest will only happen during the second stage which is
where just compensation is determined.
• Third, the account where the deposit is found is in the name of DPWH and not
Holy Trinity, and thus, it does not exclusively belong to DPWH.
Difference between RA 8974 and Rule 67, Sec. 2
• TRB failed to distinguish between the expropriation procedures under
Republic Act No. 8974 and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. Republic Act No. 8974
and Rule 67 of the Rules of Court speak of different procedures, with the
former specifically governing expropriation proceedings for national
government infrastructure projects.
• In Republic v. Gingoyon, the Court pointed out the crucial differences between
the two:
o With respect to the issuance of a writ of possession, RA. 8974
mandates immediate payment to the property owner upon the filing
of the complaint while under Rule 67, what is required is only initial
deposit with an authorized government depositary.
o With respect to the initial deposit, RA 8974 requires payment the
market value of the property as stated in the tax declaration or the
43
current relevant zonal valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue
(BIR), whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or
structures using the replacement cost method, while under Rule 67,
the initial deposit should be equivalent to the assessed value of the
property for purposes of taxation.
o Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be
exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it serve at
present as the solitary guideline through which the State may
expropriate private property. For example, Section 19 of the Local
Government Code governs as to the exercise by local government
units of the power of eminent domain through an enabling ordinance.
And then there is RA. 8974, which covers expropriation proceedings
intended for national government infrastructure projects.
o RA 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable
to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances
when the national government expropriates property "for national
government infrastructure projects." Thus, if expropriation is
engaged in by the national government for purposes other than
national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard
and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply.
• Here, since the expropriation is for a national government infrastructure
project, the procedure under RA 8974 should be followed.
Ownership of the Interest
• Under Art. 440 of the Civil Code, the right of accession is conferred by
ownership of the principal property.10
• The principal property in the case at bar is part of the deposited amount in the
expropriation account of DPWH which pertains particularly to HTRDC. Such
amount, determined to be P22,968,000.00 of the P28,406,700.00 total deposit,
was already ordered by the RTC to be released to HTRDC or its authorized
representative.
• The CA correctly held that Holy Trinity is the owner of the deposited amount,
then the latter should also be entitled to the interest which accrued thereon.
• The deposit was made in order to comply with Section 4 of Republic Act
No. 8974, which requires nothing less than the immediate payment of
100% of the value of the property, based on the current zonal valuation
of the BIR, to the property owner.
• Pursuant to Republic v. Gingoyon, the plain intent of RA 8974 is to supersede
the system of deposit under Rule 67. According to the Senate deliberations, the
payment of 100% of the value of the property is to favor the landowners.
• The intention of the TRB in depositing such amount through DPWH was
clearly to comply with the requirement of immediate payment in
Republic Act No. 8974, so that it could already secure a writ of possession
over the properties subject of the expropriation and commence
implementation of the project.
10Art. 440. The ownership of property gives the right by accession to everything which is produced
thereby, or which is incorporated or attached thereto, either naturally or artificially.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
• TRB contends that Holy Trinity is only entitled to the amount equivalent to the
zonal value of the property, and that is correct pursuant to RA 8974.
• By depositing the said amount required by law in the Land Bank account,
TRB is already considered to have paid the same to Holy Trinity, and it
became the owner thereof. The amount earned interest after the deposit;
hence, the interest should pertain to the owner of the principal who is
already determined as Holy Trinity. The interest is paid by Land Bank on
the deposit, and the TRB cannot claim that it paid an amount more than what it
is required to do so by law.
• TRB cited NAPOCOR v. Angas and Land Bank v. Wycoco to support its
contention that the Board of Commissioners should determine the payment of
interest. However these cases are not applicable to this case.
• The issue in Angas is whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate of
interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, the applicable law is
Article 2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate, or
Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal rate at 12% per annum. We
ruled in Angas that since the kind of interest involved therein is interest by
way of damages for delay in the payment thereof, and not as earnings from
loans or forbearances of money, Article 2209 of the Civil Code prescribing the
6% interest shall apply. In Wycoco, on the other hand, we clarified that
interests in the form of damages cannot be applied where there is prompt and
valid payment of just compensation.
• The case at bar, however, does not involve interest as damages for delay
in payment of just compensation. It concerns interest earned by the
amount deposited in the expropriation account.
• Under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8974, the implementing agency of the
government pays just compensation twice: (1) immediately upon the filing of
the complaint, where the amount to be paid is 100% of the value of the
property based on the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR (initial
payment); and (2) when the decision of the court in the determination of just
compensation becomes final and executory, where the implementing agency
shall pay the owner the difference between the amount already paid and the
just compensation as determined by the court (final payment).
• Holy Trinity never claimed interest due to delay of the two payments
enumerated. Here, Holy Trinity is actually claiming the payment made to it
already. Being the owner of the amount paid, HTRDC is claiming, by the right of
accession, the interest earned by the same while on deposit with the bank.
• That the expropriation account was in the name of DPWH, and not of Holy
Trinity, is of no moment. The CA correctly held that the amount deposited
transferred by operation of law to Holy Trinity, and the interests that accrued
on that amount are considered civil fruits.
o Bank interest partake the nature of civil fruits under Art. 442 of
the New Civil Code. And since these are considered fruits,
ownership thereof should be due to the owner of the principal.
Undoubtedly, being an attribute of ownership, the [HTRDC’s]
right over the fruits (jus fruendi), that is the bank interests, must
be respected.
44
• DPWH is merely a trustee of the amounts deposited in its account, since these
are merely initial payment for the landowners of the properties subject of the
expropriation, until said landowners are allowed by the RTC to withdraw the
same.
As a final note, TRB does not object to Holy Trinity’s withdrawal of the amount of
P22,968,000.00 from the expropriation account, provided that it is able to show (1) that
the property is free from any lien or encumbrance and (2) that it is the absolute owner
thereof. The said conditions do not put in abeyance the constructive delivery of the
said amount to HTRDC pending the latter’s compliance therewith. Article 1187 of
the Civil Code provides that the "effects of a conditional obligation to give, once
the condition has been fulfilled, shall retroact to the day of the constitution of the
obligation." Hence, when Holy Trinity with the given conditions, as determined by the
RTC in its order, the effects of the constructive delivery retroacted to the actual date of
the deposit of the amount in the expropriation account of DPWH.
G. JUDICIAL FORECLOS URE (RU LE 68)
1) HUERTA ALBA V. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 128567, SEPTEMBER 1, 2000 –
TANDOC
ER: For the facts of the case, the ER will suffice. You can go straight to ratio for the
doctrines.
Huerta Alba mortgaged four parcels of land in favor of Intercon, a banking institution.
Intercon assigned its rights over the mortgaged properties to Syndicated Management.
Syndicated Management sought to judicially foreclose these properties. RTC and CA
ruled in favor of Syndicated Management. Huerta Alba went to SC via certiorari. SC
denied. SC’s decision became final and executory and was entered in the Book of Entries
of Judgment. Syndicated Management filed a writ of execution with the trial court that
rendered the judgment. It was granted. Huerta Alba sought to nullify the order by filing
a motion to quash stating that the 150-day period for EQUITY REDEMPTION has not
yet lapsed. This was denied. Heurta Alba appealed to the CA. CA denied the appeal as
well. Huerta Alba filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion for Clarification seeking
"clarification" of the date of commencement of the one (1) year period for the RIGHT OF
REDEMPTION of the properties in question . (Ngayon lang ni-raise yung one year right
of redemption…delaying tactics). CA denied. The pertinent part of the CA decision: the
question of whether the Syndicated Management Group,. Inc., is a bank or credit institution
was never brought before us squarely, and it is indeed odd and strange that petitioner
Huerta Alba would now sarcastically ask a rhetorical question in its motion for
clarification. Note that in a judicial foreclosure, there is no right of redemption except if
one is a banking institution.
ISSUES:
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
1. W/on Huerta Alba is entitled to Right of Redemption. –Nope, only equity of
redemption because Huerta Alba is not a banking institution.
2. W/on Huerta Alba is estopped in invoking the right of redemption of
Syndicated Management’s predecessor-in-interest Intercon (banking
institution)for failing to raise the argument at the earliest opportunity. –yes
HELD:
1.Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, no equivalent right of redemption exists.
The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale 'when confirmed be an order of the court. .
. . shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in
the purchaser, subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law.' Such rights
exceptionally 'allowed by law' (i.e., even after confirmation by an order of the court) are
those granted by the charter of the Philippine National Bank (Acts No. 2747 and 2938),
and the General Banking Act (R.A. 337). These laws confer on the mortgagor, his
successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the right to redeem
the property sold on foreclosure — after confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale
— which right may be exercised within a period of one (1) year, counted from the date
of registration of the certificate of sale in the Registry of Property.
But, to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of a
mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank or banking institution.
2. In light of the aforestated facts, it was too late in the day for petitioner Huerta Alba to
invoke a right to redeem under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 (General Banking Act).
Petitioner Huerta Alba failed to assert a right to redeem in several crucial stages of the
proceedings. A party to a case who failed to invoked his claim in the main case, while
having the opportunity to do so, will be precluded, subsequently, from invoking his
claim, even if it were true, after the decision has become final, otherwise the judgment
may be reduced to a mockery and the administration of justice may be placed in
disrepute."
Petitioner Huerta Alba has only itself to blame for not alleging at the outset that the
predecessor-in-interest of the private respondent Syndicated Management is a credit
institution. Thus, when the trial court, and the Court of Appeals repeatedly passed upon
the issue of whether or not petitioner Alba had the right of redemption or equity of
redemption over subject properties in the decisions, resolutions and orders, particularly
in Civil Case no. 89-5424, CA-G.R. CV No. 39243, CA-G.R. SP No. 35086, and CA-G.R. SP
No. 38747, it was unmistakable that the petitioner was adjudged to just have the equity
of redemption without any qualification whatsoever, that is, without any right of
redemption allowed by law.
COMPLETE
FACTS:
45
- In a complaint for judicial foreclosure of mortgage with preliminary injunction filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, the herein private respondent Syndicated
Management sought the foreclosure of four (4) parcels of land mortgaged by petitioner
Huerta Alba to Intercon Fund Resource, Inc. ("Intercon").
-the RTC ruled in favor of Syndicated Management
-Huerta Alba appealed the decision of the trial court to the Court of Appeals which
dismissed the case on June 29, 1993 on the ground of late payment of docket fees.
-Huerta Alba went to the Supreme Court via a petition for certiorari, docketed as G.R. No.
112044, which this court resolved to dismiss on December 13, 1993, on the finding that
the Court of Appeals erred not in dismissing the appeal of petitioner.
-A motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of its petition in G.R. No. 112044 was
denied with finality in the Supreme Court's Resolution promulgated on February 16,
1994. On March 10, 1994, leave to present a second motion for reconsideration in G.R.
No. 112044 or to submit the case for hearing by the Court en banc was filed, but to no
avail. The Court resolved to deny the same on May 11, 1994.
On March 14, 1994, the Resolution dated December 13, 1993, in G.R. No. 112044
became final and executory and was entered in the Book of Entries of Judgment.
-Syndicated Management filed with the trial court of origin a motion for execution of the
Decision promulgated on April 30, 1992 in Civil Case No. 89-5424. The said motion was
granted on July 15, 1994.
-Huerta Alba filed with the same trial court an Urgent Motion to Quash and Set Aside
Writ of Execution ascribing to it grave abuse of discretion in issuing the questioned Writ
of Execution.
-To support its motion, petitioner Huerta Alba invited attention and argued that the
records of the case were still with the Court of Appeals and therefore, issuance of the
writ of execution was premature since the 150-day period for petitioner Huerta Alba to
pay the judgment obligation had not yet lapsed and Huerta Alba had not yet defaulted in
the payment thereof since no demand for its payment was made by the private
respondent.
-In Huerta Alba's own words, the dispute between the parties was "principally on
the issue as to when the 150-day period within which Huerta Alba may exercise its
equity of redemption should be counted."
-The trial court denied the motion to quash
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
- Challenging the said order granting execution, petitioner Huerta Alba filed once more
with the Court of Appeals another petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction, docketed as C.A.-G.R. SP No. 35086, predicated on the same
grounds invoked for its Motion to Quash Writ of Execution.
On September 6, 1994, the scheduled auction sale of subject pieces of properties
proceeded and the private respondent Syndicated Management was declared the
highest bidder. Thus, private respondent Syndicated Management was awarded subject
bidded pieces of property. The covering Certificate of Sale issued in its favor was
registered with the Registry of Deeds on October 21, 1994.
On September 7, 1994, petitioner Huerta Alba presented an Ex-Parte Motion for
Clarification asking the trial court to "clarify" whether or not the twelve (12) month
period of redemption for ordinary execution applied in the case.
On September 26, 1994, the trial court ruled that the period of redemption of subject
property should be governed by the rule on the sale of judicially foreclosed property
under Rule 68 of the Rules of Court.
Thereafter, petitioner Huerta Alba then filed an Exception to the Order dated September
26, 1994 and Motion to Set Aside Said Order, contending that the said Order materially
altered the Decision dated April 30, 1992 "which declared that the satisfaction of the
judgment shall be in the manner and under the regulation that govern sale of real estate
under execution."
Meanwhile, in its Decision of September 30, 1994, the Court of Appeals resolved the
issues raised by the petitioner in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 35086, holding that the one hundred-
fifty day period within which petitioner may redeem subject properties should be
computed from the date petitioner was notified of the Entry of Judgment in G.R. No.
112044; and that the 150-day period within which petitioner may exercise its equity of
redemption expired on September 11, 1994
- Petitioner Huerta Alba moved for reconsideration of the Decision of the Court of
Appeals in C.A.-G.R. SP No. 35086. In its Motion for Reconsideration dated October 18,
1994, petitioner theorized that the period of one hundred fifty (150) days should not be
reckoned with from Entry of Judgment but from receipt on or before July 29, 1994 by
the trial court of the records of Civil Case No. 89-5424 from the Court of Appeals. So also,
petitioner maintained that it may not be considered in default, even after the expiration
of 150 days from July 29, 1994, because prior demand to pay was never made on it by
the private respondent. According to petitioner Huerta Alba, it was therefore, premature
for the trial court to issue a writ of execution to enforce the judgment.
The trial court deferred action on the Motion for Confirmation of the Certificate of Sale
in view of the pendency of petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No.
35086.
46
On December 23, 1994, the Court of Appeals denied petitioner Huerta Alba's motion for
reconsideration in CA-G.R. SP No. 35086. Absent any further action with respect to the
denial of the subject motion for reconsideration, private respondent Syndicated
Management presented a Second Motion for Confirmation of Certificate of Sale before
the trial court.
As regards the Decision rendered on September 30, 1994 by the Court of Appeals in CA
G.R. SP No. 35086 it became final and executory on January 25, 1995.
On February 10, 1995, the lower court confirmed the sale of subject properties to the
private respondent. The pertinent Order declared that all pending incidents relating to
the Order dated September 26, 1994 had become moot and academic. Conformably, the
Transfer Certificates of Title to subject pieces of property were then issued to the
private respondent.
On February 27, 1995, petitioner Huerta Alba filed with the Court of Appeals a Motion
for Clarification seeking "clarification" of the date of commencement of the one (1) year
period for the redemption of the properties in question.
- In its Resolution dated March 20, 1995, the Court of Appeals merely noted such Motion
for Clarification since its Decision promulgated on September 30, 1994 had already
become final and executory; ratiocinating thus:
- We further ruled that the one-hundred fifty day period within which
petitioner may exercise its equity of redemption should be counted, not from
the receipt of respondent court of the records of Civil Case No. 89-5424 but
from the date petitioner was notified of the entry of judgment made by the
appellate court.
But we never made any pronouncement on the one-year right of redemption of
petitioner because, in the first place, the foreclosure in this case is judicial. and as such the
mortgagor has only the equity not the right of redemption . . . While it may be true that
under Section 78 of R.A. 337 as amended, otherwise known as the General Banking Act,
a mortgagor of a bank, banking or credit institution, whether the foreclosure was done
judicially or extrajudicially, has a period of one year from the auction sale within which
to redeem the foreclosed property, the question of whether the Syndicated Management
Group,. Inc., is a bank or credit institution was never brought before us squarely, and it is
indeed odd and strange that petitioner would now sarcastically ask a rhetorical question
in its motion for clarification."3
ISSUES:
1. W/on Huerta Alba is entitled to Right of Redemption. –Nope, only equity of
redemption because Huerta Alba is not a banking institution.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
2. W/on Huerta Alba is estopped in invoking the right of redemption of
Syndicated Management’s predecessor-in-interest Intercon(banking
institution) for failing to raise the argument at the earliest opportunity. –yes
Held:
1. From the various decisions, resolutions and orders a quo it can be gleaned that
what petitioner has been adjudged to have was only the equity of redemption
over subject properties. On the distinction between the equity of redemption
and right of redemption, the case of Gregorio Y. Limpin vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court,7 comes to the fore. Held the Court in the said case:
"The equity of redemption is, to be sure, different from and should not be
confused with the right of redemption.
The right of redemption in relation to a mortgage – understood in the sense of a
prerogative to re-acquire mortgaged property after registration of the
foreclosure sale – exists only in the case of the extrajudicial foreclosure of the
mortgage. No such right is recognized in a judicial foreclosure except only
where the mortgagee is the Philippine National Bank or a bank or banking
institution.
Where a mortgage is foreclosed extrajudicially, Act 3135 grants to the
mortgagor the right of redemption within one (1) year from the registration of
the sheriff's certificate of foreclosure sale.
Where the foreclosure is judicially effected, however, no equivalent right of
redemption exists. The law declares that a judicial foreclosure sale 'when
confirmed be an order of the court. . . . shall operate to divest the rights of all the
parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser, subject to such
rights of redemption as may be allowed by law.' Such rights exceptionally
'allowed by law' (i.e., even after confirmation by an order of the court) are
those granted by the charter of the Philippine National Bank (Acts No. 2747
and 2938), and the General Banking Act (R.A. 337). These laws confer on the
mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the
mortgagor, the right to redeem the property sold on foreclosure — after
confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale — which right may be
exercised within a period of one (1) year, counted from the date of registration
of the certificate of sale in the Registry of Property.
But, to repeat, no such right of redemption exists in case of judicial foreclosure of
a mortgage if the mortgagee is not the PNB or a bank or banking institution. In
such a case, the foreclosure sale, 'when confirmed by an order of the court. . .
shall operate to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their
rights in the purchaser.' There then exists only what is known as the equity of
redemption. This is simply the right of the defendant mortgagor to extinguish
47
the mortgage and retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt
within the 90-day period after the judgment becomes final, in accordance with
Rule 68, or even after the foreclosure sale but prior to its confirmation.
Section 2, Rule 68 provides that —
'. . If upon the trial . . the court shall find the facts set forth in the complaint to
be true, it shall ascertain the amount due to the plaintiff upon the mortgage
debt or obligation, including interest and costs, and shall render judgment for
the sum so found due and order the same to be paid into court within a period
of not less than ninety (90) days from the date of the service of such order, and
that in default of such payment the property be sold to realize the mortgage
debt and costs.'
This is the mortgagor's equity (not right) of redemption which, as above stated,
may be exercised by him even beyond the 90-day period 'from the date of
service of the order,' and even after the foreclosure sale itself, provided it be
before the order of confirmation of the sale. After such order of confirmation,
no redemption can be effected any longer."8 (Emphasis supplied)
2. Petitioner Huelta Alba failed to seasonably invoke its purported right under
Section 78 of R.A. No. 337.
Petitioner Huelta Alba avers in its petition that the Intercom, predecessor in interest of
the private respondent, is a credit institution, such that Section 78 of Republic Act No.
337 should apply in this case. Stated differently, it is the submission of petitioner that it
should be allowed to redeem subject properties within one year from the date of sale as
a result of the foreclosure of the mortgage constituted thereon.
The pivot of inquiry here therefore, is whether the petitioner seasonably invoked its
asserted right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 to redeem subject properties.
Petitioner theorizes that it invoked its "right" in "timely fashion", that is, after
confirmation by the court of the foreclosure sale, and within one (1) year from the date
of registration of the certificate of sale. Indeed, the facts show that it was only on May 2,
1995 when, in opposition to the Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession, did petitioner
file a Motion to Compel Private Respondent to Accept Redemption, invoking for the very
first time its alleged right to redeem subject properties under to Section 78 of R.A. No.
337.
In light of the aforestated facts, it was too late in the day for petitioner to invoke a right
to redeem under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337. Petitioner failed to assert a right to redeem
in several crucial stages of the proceedings.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
For instance, on September 7, 1994, when it filed with the trial court an Ex-part Motion
for Clarification, petitioner failed to allege and prove that private respondent's
predecessor in interest was a credit institution and therefore, Section 78 of R.A. No. 337
was applicable. Petitioner merely asked the trial court to clarify whether the sale of
subject properties was execution sale or judicial foreclosure sale.
So also, when it presented before the trial court an Exception to the Order and Motion to
Set Aside Said Order dated October 13, 1994, petitioner again was silent on its alleged
right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337, even as it failed to show that private respondent's
predecessor in interest is a credit institution. Petitioner just argued that the
aforementioned Order materially altered the trial court's Decision of April 30, 1992.
Then, too, nothing was heard from petitioner on its alleged right under Section 78 of R.A.
No. 337 and of the predecessor in interest of private respondent as a credit institution,
when the trial court came out with an order on February 10, 1995, confirming the sale
of subject properties in favor of private respondent and declaring that all pending
incidents with respect to the Order dated September 26, 1994 had become moot and
academic.
Similarly, when petitioner filed on February 27, 1995 a Motion for Clarification with the
Court of Appeals, seeking "clarification" of the date of commencement of the one (1)
year redemption period for the subject properties, petitioner never intimated any
alleged right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 nor did it invite attention to its present
stance that private respondent's predecessor-in-interest was a credit institution.
Consequently, in its Resolution dated March 20, 1995, the Court of Appeals ruled on the
said motion thus:
"But we never made any pronouncement on the one-year right of redemption
of petitioner because, in the first place, the foreclosure in this case is judicial,
and as such. the mortgagor has only the equity. not the right of redemption . . .
While it may be true that under Section 78 of R.A. 337 as amended, otherwise
known as the General Banking Act, a mortgagor of a bank, banking or credit
institution, whether the foreclosure was done judicially or extrajudicially, has a
period of one year from the auction sale within which to redeem the foreclosed
property, the question of whether the Syndicated Management Group. Inc., is
bank or credit institution was never brought before us squarely, and it is indeed
odd and strange that petitioner would now sarcastically ask a rhetorical
question in its motion for clarification."9 (Emphasis supplied).
If petitioner were really acting in good faith, it would have ventilated before the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. No. 35086 its alleged right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337; but
petitioner never did do so.
Indeed, at the earliest opportunity, when it submitted its answer to the complaint for
judicial foreclosure, petitioner should have alleged that it was entitled to the beneficial
provisions of Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 but again, it did not make any allegation in its
48
answer regarding any right thereunder. It bears stressing that the applicability of
Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 hinges on the factual question of whether or not private
respondent's predecessor in interest was a credit institution. As was held in Limpin, a
judicial foreclosure sale, "when confirmed by an order of the court, . . shall operate to
divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights in the purchaser,
subject to such rights of redemption as may be allowed by law'," 10 which confer on the
mortgagor, his successors in interest or any judgment creditor of the mortgagor, the
right to redeem the property sold on foreclosure after confirmation by the court of the
judicial foreclosure sale. Thus, the claim that petitioner is entitled to the beneficial
provisions of Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 —since private respondent's predecessor-in-
interest is a credit institution — is in the nature of a compulsory counterclaim which
should have been averred in petitioner's answer to the compliant for judicial
foreclosure.
". . . A counterclaim is, most broadly, a cause of action existing in favor of the
defendant against the plaintiff. More narrowly, it is a claim which. if established,
will defeat or in some way qualify a judgment or relief to which plaintiff is
otherwise entitled It is sometimes defined as any cause of action arising in
contract available against any action also arising in contract and existing at the
time of the commencement of such an action. It is frequently defined by the
codes as a cause of action arising out of the contract or transaction set forth in
the complaint as the foundation of the plaintiff's claim, or connected with the
subject of the action."11 (emphasis supplied)
"The counterclaim is in itself a distinct and independent cause of action, so that
when properly stated as such, the defendant becomes, in respect to the
matters stated by him, an actor, and there are two simultaneous actions
pending between the same parties, wherein each is at the same time both a
plaintiff and a defendant. Counterclaim is an offensive as well as a defensive
plea and is not necessarily confined to the justice of the plaintiff's claim. It
represents the right of the defendant to have the claims of the parties
counterbalanced in whole or in part, and judgment to be entered in excess, if any.
A counterclaim stands on the same footing, and is to be tested be the same rules,
as if it were an independent action."12 (emphasis supplied)
The very purpose of a counterclaim would have been served had petitioner alleged in its
answer its purported right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337:
". . . The rules of counterclaim are designed to enable the disposition of a whole
controversy of interested parties' conflicting claims, at one time and in one
action, provided all parties' be brought before the court and the matter
decided without prejudicing the rights of any party."13
The failure of petitioner to seasonably assert its alleged right under Section 78 of R.A.
No. 337 precludes it from so doing at this late stage case. Estoppel may be successfully
invoked if the party fails to raise the question in the early stages of the proceedings. 14
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
Thus, "a party to a case who failed to invoked his claim in the main case, while having
the opportunity to do so, will be precluded, subsequently, from invoking his claim, even
if it were true, after the decision has become final, otherwise the judgment may be
reduced to a mockery and the administration of justice may be placed in disrepute." 15
All things viewed in proper perspective, it is decisively clear that the trial court erred in
still allowing petitioner to introduce evidence that private respondent's predecessor-in-
interest was a credit institution, and to thereafter rule that the petitioner was entitled to
avail of the provisions of Section 78 of R.A. No. 337. In effect, the trial court permitted
the petitioner to accomplish what the latter failed to do before the Court of Appeals, that
is, to invoke its alleged right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 although the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. no. 35086 already found that 'the question of whether the Syndicated
Management Council Group, Inc. is a bank or credit institution was never brought before
(the Court of Appeals) squarely." The said pronouncement by the Court of Appeals
unerringly signified that petitioner did not make a timely assertion of any right under
Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 in all the stages of the proceedings below.
Verily, the petitioner has only itself to blame for not alleging at the outset that the
predecessor-in-interest of the private respondent is a credit institution. Thus, when the
trial court, and the Court of Appeals repeatedly passed upon the issue of whether or not
petitioner had the right of redemption or equity of redemption over subject properties
in the decisions, resolutions and orders, particularly in Civil Case no. 89-5424, CA-G.R.
CV No. 39243, CA-G.R. SP No. 35086, and CA-G.R. SP No. 38747, it was unmistakable that
the petitioner was adjudged to just have the equity of redemption without any
qualification whatsoever, that is, without any right of redemption allowed by law.
The "law of case" holds that petitioner has the equity of redemption without
any qualification.
There is, therefore, merit in private respondent's contention that to allow petitioner to
belatedly invoke its right under Section 78 of R.A. No. 337 will disturb the "law of the
case." However, private respondent's statement of what constitutes the "law of the case"
is not entirely accurate. The "law of the case" is not simply that the defendant possesses
an equity of redemption. As the Court has stated, the "law of the case" holds that
petitioner has the equity of the redemption without any qualification whatsoever, that
is, without the right of redemption afforded by Section 78 of R.A. No. 337. Whether or
not the "law of the case" is erroneous is immaterial, it still remains the "law of the case".
A contrary rule will contradict both the letter and spirit of the rulings of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 35086, CA-G.R. CV No. 39243, and CA-G.R. 38747, which
clearly saw through the repeated attempts of petitioner to forestall so simple a matter as
making the security given for a just debt to answer for its payment.
Hence, in conformity with the ruling in Limpin, the sale of the subject properties, as
confirmed by the Order dated February 10, 1995 of the trial court in Civil Case No. 89-
5424 operated to divest the rights of all the parties to the action and to vest their rights
in private respondent. There then existed only what is known as the equity of
49
redemption, which is simply the right of the petitioner to extinguish the mortgage and
retain ownership of the property by paying the secured debt within the 90-day period
after the judgment became final. There being an explicit finding on the part of the Court
of Appeals in its Decision of September 30, 1994 in CA-G.R. No. 35086 — that the herein
petitioner failed to exercise its equity of redemption within the prescribed period,
redemption can no longer be effected. The confirmation of the sale and the issuance of
the transfer certificates of title covering the subject properties to private respondent
was then, in order. The trial court therefore, has the ministerial duty to place private
respondent in the possession of subject properties.
2) BACALING V. MUYA, G.R. NO. 148404, APRIL 11, 2002 – TEVES (SUB – ORTIZ)
BACALING V. MUYA
ER: please read full digest☺ Magulo yung case, peace☺
Spouses Bacaling were the owners of 3 parcels of land that were subsequently
subdivided into 110 sublots. The landholding was processed and approved by the
National Urban Planning Commission. The Bureau of lands approved the corresponding
subdivision plan for purposes of developing the property into a low-cost residential
community, to be known as Bacaling-Moreno subdivision.
In 1957, spouses obtained a loan from GSIS, secured by a REM over the land for the
development of the subdivision. The spouses defaulted so the mortgaged property was
foreclosed. (note: in 1989, through a SC case, Nenita was able to recover possession)
PETITIONERS CLAIM:
That respondents Muya et. al, clandestinely entered and took possession of the land in
1972. They took advantage of the problematic peace and order situation at the onset of
martial law and the foreclosure of the lots by GSIS.
RESPONDENTS CLAIM
They were legally instituted by Bacaling's administrator/overseer as tenant-tillers of
the subject parcels of land. In 1974, their relationship with the landowner was
changed to one of leasehold. They religiously delivered their rental payments to
Bacaling as agricultural lessor. In 1980, they secured certificates of land transfer in their
names for the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots. They have made various payments to the
Land Bank of the Philippines as amortizing owners-cultivators of their respective tillage.
OTHER NOTES:
In 1977- City Council of Iloilo enacted Zoning Ordinance No. 212 declaring the one
hundred ten (110) sub-lots as "residential" and "non- agricultural.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 50

IN 1978- Nelita Bacaling was able to register the subject property as the Bacaling- Sps. Bacaling were the owners of three (3) parcels of land.
Moreno Subdivision with the National Housing Authority and obtained a license to sell
the subject one hundred ten (110) sub-lots comprising the said subdivision to
consummate the original and abiding design to develop a low-cost residential
community.
In 1955, the lots were subdivided into one hundred ten (110) sub-lots.
IN 1989- SC case case wherein Nenita was able to recover possession of the property.

In 1990, petitioner Jose Juan Tong bought from Nelita Bacaling the subject lots. The said
sale was effected after Bacaling had repurchased the subject property from the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS).
Petitioner Tong (together with Bacaling) filed a petition for cancellation of the
certificates of land transfer against respondents with the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) Region VI Office in Iloilo City. The DAR, however, dismissed the
petition on the ground that there had been no legitimate conversion of the
classification of the 110 sub-lots from agricultural to residential prior to October
21, 1972 when Operation Land Transfer under P.D. No. 72 took effect.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent are agricultural lessee?
The landholding was processed and approved as "residential" or "subdivision" by the
National Urban Planning Commission (NUPC). The Bureau of Lands approved the
corresponding subdivision plan for purposes of developing the said property into a low-
cost residential community which the spouses referred to as the Bacaling- Moreno
Subdivision.
In 1957, a real estate loan amounting to P600,000.00 was granted to the spouses
Bacaling by GSIS for the development of the subdivision.
To secure the repayment of the loan, the Bacalings executed in favor of the GSIS a real
estate mortgage over their parcels of land including the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots.

HELD NO:
The Bacalings failed to pay the amortizations on the loan and consequently the
mortgage constituted on the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots was foreclosed by the GSIS.
The requisites in order to have a valid agricultural leasehold relationship are: (1) The
parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) The subject matter
After a court case that reached all the way to the SC ,Nelita Bacaling (by then a widow)
of the relationship is agricultural land; (3) There is consent between the parties to the
in 1989 was eventually able to restore to herself ownership of the one hundred ten
relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
(110) sub-lots.
production; (5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and (6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee. According to the Petitioners (Bacaling and Jose Jan Tong) , in 1972, respondents Muya
and 4 otherpersons, clandestinely entered and occupied the entire sub-lots and grabbed
exclusively for themselves the said lots. Apparently, respondents took advantage of the
We find that the first, third and sixth requisites are lacking in the case at bar. One
problematic peace and order situation at the onset of martial law and the foreclosure of
legal conclusion adduced from the facts in Government Service Insurance System
the lots by GSIS. They sowed the lots as if the same were their own, and altered the
v. Court of Appeal provides that GSIS, not Bacaling, was the owner of the subject
roads, drainage, boundaries and monuments established thereon.
properties from 1961 up to 1989 as a result of the foreclosure and confirmation of
the sale of the subject properties.
Respondents, on the other hand, claim that in 1964 they were legally instituted by
Although the confirmation only came in 1975, the ownership is deemed to have Bacaling's administrator/overseer as tenant-tillers of the subject parcels of land. In
1974, their relationship with the landowner was changed to one of leasehold. They
been vested to GSIS way back in 1961, the year of the sale of the foreclosed
religiously delivered their rental payments to Bacaling as agricultural lessor. In 1980,
properties. This is due to the fact that the date of confirmation by the trial court of
they secured certificates of land transfer in their names for the one hundred ten (110)
the foreclosure sale retroacts to the date of the actual sale itself.[The confirmation
sub-lots. They have made various payments to the Land Bank of the Philippines as
of sale is not provided in the full case]
amortizing owners-cultivators of their respective tillage.

COMPLETE
In 1977, however, the City Council of Iloilo enacted Zoning Ordinance No. 212 declaring
the one hundred ten (110) sub-lots as "residential" and "non- agricultural." In 1978,
Facts: Nelita Bacaling was able to register the subject property as the Bacaling-Moreno
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
Subdivision with the National Housing Authority and to obtain therefrom a license to
sell the subject one hundred ten (110) sub-lots comprising the said subdivision to
consummate the original and abiding design to develop a low-cost residential
community.
In 1990, petitioner Jose Juan Tong bought from Nelita Bacaling the subject lots. The said
sale was effected after Bacaling has repurchased the subject property from the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). To secure performance of the contract
of absolute sale and facilitate the transfer of title of the lots to Jose Juan Tong, Bacaling
appointed him in 1992 as her attorney-in- fact, under an irrevocable special power of
attorney.
Petitioner Tong (together with Bacaling) filed a petition for cancellation of the
certificates of land transfer against respondents with the Department of Agrarian
Reform (DAR) Region VI Office in Iloilo City. The DAR, however, dismissed the
petition on the ground that there had been no legitimate conversion of the
classification of the 110 sub-lots from agricultural to residential prior to October
21, 1972 when Operation Land Transfer under P.D. No. 72 took effect. Bacaling
and Tong appealed to the DAR Central Office but their appeal was similarly
rejected the motion for reconsideration failed to overturn the ruling of the Central
Office Order.
On September 19, 1997, Bacaling and Tong appealed the adverse DAR Orders to the
Office of the President which reversed the Decision. The Certificates of land transfers
were cancelled.
Respondents elevated the OP Decision to the Court of Appeals on a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. On January 2001, the Court of Appeals
reversed the OP Decision and validated the certificates of land transfers.
ISSUE: W/N the respondent are agricultural lessee? [No] [This is important because if
they are agricultural lessees, they will have a right to the land.]
HELD: On the issue of whether the private respondents are agricultural tenants and
entitled to the benefits accorded by our agrarian laws, we rule in the negative. The
requisites in order to have a valid agricultural leasehold relationship are: (1) The parties
are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) The subject matter of the
relationship is agricultural land; (3) There is consent between the parties to the
relationship; (4) the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural
production; (5) There is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural
lessee; and (6) The harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or
agricultural lessee.
51
We find that the first, third and sixth requisites are lacking in the case at bar. One
legal conclusion adduced from the facts in Government Service Insurance System
v. Court of Appeal sprovides that GSIS, not Bacaling, was the owner of the subject
properties from 1961 up to 1989 as a result of the foreclosure and confirmation of
the sale of the subject properties.
Although the confirmation only came in 1975, the ownership is deemed to have
been vested to GSIS way back in 1961, the year of the sale of the foreclosed
properties. This is due to the fact that the date of confirmation by the trial court of
the foreclosure sale retroacts to the date of the actual sale itself.[The confirmation
of sale is not provided in the full case]
Thus, the respondents cannot validly claim that they are legitimate and recognized
tenants of the subject parcels of land for the reason that their agreement to till the land
was not with GSIS, the real landowner. There is no showing that GSIS consented to such
tenancy relationship nor is there proof that GSIS received a share in the harvest of the
tenants. Consequently, the respondents cannot claim security of tenure and other rights
accorded by our agrarian laws considering that they have not been validly instituted as
agricultural lessees of the subject parcels of land. And from the time Bacaling recovered
the subject properties from GSIS up to the time the former changed her legal position in
the instant case, Bacaling has consistently disclaimed respondents as her alleged
tenants.
The respondents argue that GSIS cannot be considered as the owner of the said
properties from 1961 up to 1989 inasmuch as the foreclosure proceedings that started
in 1957 only attained finality during its promulgation by this Court in 1989.
Respondents contend that GSIS was the owner of the said parcels of land only from
1989.
We disagree. The pendency of the GSIS case cannot be construed as a maintenance of
status quo with Bacaling as the owner from 1957 up to 1989 for the reason that what
was appealed to this Court was only the issue of redemption, and not the validity of the
foreclosure proceedings including the public auction sale, the confirmation of the public
auction sale and the confirmation and transfer of ownership of the foreclosed parcels of
land to GSIS. The ownership of GSIS over the subject parcels of land was not disputed. It
was the existence of the right to redeem in a judicial foreclosure that was the subject of
the controversy. We ruled that there was no longer any right of redemption in a judicial
foreclosure proceeding after the confirmation of the public auction. Only foreclosures of
mortgages in favor of banking institutions and those made extrajudicially are subject to
legal redemption. Since GSIS is not a banking institution and the procedure of the
foreclosure is not extrajudicial in nature, no right of redemption exists after the judicial
confirmation of the public auction sale of the said lots.
3) MONZON V. RELOVA, G.R. NO. 171827, SEPTEMBER 17, 2008 – TIU
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 52

ER: Monzon executed in favor of two separate payees, the Spouses Relova and Perez - The winning bidder in the extrajudicial foreclosure, Addio Properties (Addio),
(Spouses), promissory notes, which were secured by a REM over two separate lots (Lot paid the amount of about 5M, [NOTE] leaving about 1.6M as residue.
2A and Lot 2B). Deeds of Sale were later executed by Monzon in favor of the Spouses. It
turns out, however, that Monzon was also a mortgagor of Coastal Corporation (CLC). CLC - The Spouses claim that the residue, which is in the custody of Atty. Luna,
extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage, which included Lots 2A and 2B. The winning should be turned over to them pursuant to Sec. 4 of Rule 68.
bid of Addio Properties (Addio) was more than the mortgage debt to CLC, resulting in a
residue. The Spouses filed a Petition for Injunction against Monzon and Atty. Luna
(Branch Clerk of Court, RTC Tagaytay), seeking that the residue in the custody of Atty.
Luna be delivered to them based on Sec. 4, Rule 68. Were the Spouses entitled to the - Monzon, in her Answer, claimed:
residue? Nay! Here, CLC extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage, in which case, the
applicable law is Act 3135, as amended, and not Rule 68, which refers to judicial - That the Petition should be dismissed for failure to state a cause of action.
foreclosure of mortgage. Unlike Sec. 4 of Rule 68, Act 3135 does not grant to junior
encumbrances the right to receive any residue after settling the principal debt. Instead, - That the Spouses could no longer ask for the enforcement of the PNs because
Act 3135 only gives second mortgagees the right to redeem the foreclosed property she had already performed her obligation to them by way of dacion en pago.
pursuant to Sec. 6 thereof. In other words, the Spouses invoked the incorrect law,
making their action dismissible for failure to state a cause of action as against Atty. Luna. - That the Spouses could still claim the portions sold to them, if they would
[NOTE] However, the case was not dismissed as to Monzon because the petition of the only file the proper civil cases.
Spouses can be construed as a money claim. If that were the case, then the doctrine that
a mortgage creditor has the option of waiving the security and enforcing his credit - That as regards the residue, the Spouses cannot acquire the same without a
against all the properties of the debtor in an ordinary action, comes into play. Thus, writ of preliminary attachment or a writ of garnishment in accordance with
upon REMAND of the case to the RTC, the Spouses must be asked if they will choose to the provisions of Rule 57 and Sec. 9(c) of Rule 39.
go with this option.

COMPLETE
- During the hearing, Monzon and her counsel was absent and, thus, the RTC allowed the
Facts: The Spouses Relova and the Spouses Perez (collectively, the Spouses) filed against Spouses to present evidence ex parte. The RTC later rendered a Decision in favor of the
Atty. Luna, Clerk of Court (Branch 18, RTC Tagaytay) and Monzon a Petition for Spouses.
Injunction.
- The RTC held that the Spouses are entitled to the residue, which was to be
- The Spouses alleged that in December 1998, Monzon in favor of the Spouses divided among them, such that Atty. Luna had to deliver the same to them.
Perez a promissory note (PN) secured by a lot (Lot 2A) in Tagaytay
City. Monzon later executed a Deed of Absolute Sale over Lot 2A in favor of the
Spouses Perez.
- Monzon filed a Notice of Appeal. Monzon claims that the RTC gravely erred in
rendering its Decision because she was not giving a chance to present her evidence.
- The Spouses also claim that in March 1999, Monzon executed another PN,
this time in favor of the Spouses Relova, which PN was also secured by a lot
(Lot 2B). Monzon later executed a Deed of Conditional Sale over Lot 2B in favor
of the Spouses Relova.
- [REMEMBER] Addio filed before the RTC a Motion for Intervention. The RTC granted
the motion.

- In October 1999, the Coastal Lending Corporation (CLC) extrajudicially foreclosed lots
belonging to Monzon, including the portions mortgaged and later sold to the Spouses.
- The CA dismissed the appeal and subsequent MR of Monzon.
- It turns out that Monzon was indebted to CLC [NOTE] for about 3M.

- JT: The date of the mortgage in favor of CLC was never mentioned in
- Thus, Monzon filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45. Monzon stressed
the case.
that she was never declared in default by the RTC [THIS IS TRUE] and, thus, the proper
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
thing to do was to have set the case for hearing for the reception of the evidence.
Monzon argued that had she been given the opportunity to present her evidence, she
would have been able to prove that there was no more obligation to the Spouses due to
the dacion.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not Monzon was properly declared in default? No. [BONUS
KNOWLEDGE]
(2) Whether or not the claim of the Spouses as to the residue was proper? No – failure
to state a cause of action! Case is DISMISSED as against to Atty. Luna, but
REMANDED with respect to Monzon.
Held:
(1) Here, despite the fact that Monzon was not declared in default, the RTC,
nevertheless, applied the effects of a default order under Sec. 3 of Rule 9. However,
failure to appear in hearings is not a ground for the declaration of a defendant in
default. Failure to file a responsive pleading within the reglementary period, and not
failure to appear at the hearing, is the sole ground for an order of default (Rosario, et
al. vs. Alonzo, et al., L-17320, June 29, 1963), except the failure to appear at a pre-trial
conference wherein the effects of a default on the part of the defendant are
followed, that is, the plaintiff shall be allowed to present evidence ex parte and a
judgment based thereon may be rendered against the defendant (Section 5, Rule 18).
Also, a default judgment may be rendered, even if the defendant had filed his answer,
under the circumstance in Sec. 3(c), Rule 29.
• Thus, the effects of default are followed only in three instances:
o (1) When there is an actual default for failure to file a responsive
pleading;
o (2) Failure to appear in the pre-trial conference; and
o (3) Refusal to comply with modes of discovery under the
circumstance in Sec. 3(c), Rule 29.
• It must be noted, however, that such failure to attend hearings despite due
notice, when committed during hearing dates for the presentation of the
complainant’s evidence, would amount to the waiver of such defendant’s right
to object to the evidence presented during such hearing, and to cross-examine
the witnesses presented therein. Nevertheless, it would not amount to a
waiver of the defendant’s right to present evidence during the trial dates
scheduled for the reception of evidence for the defense. It would be an entirely
different issue if the failure to attend of the defendant was on a hearing date
set for the presentation of the evidence of the defense, but such did not occur
in the case at bar.
53
(2.1) Sec. 4 of Rule 68 is the basis of the Spouses alleged cause of action entitling them to
the residue of the amount paid in the foreclosure sale.
SEC. 4. Disposition of proceeds of sale.— xxx and when there
shall be any balance or residue, after paying off the
mortgage debt due, the same shall be paid to junior
encumbrancers in the order of their priority xxx
- However, Rule 68 governs the judicial foreclosure of mortgages. Extra-judicial
foreclosure of mortgages, which was what transpired in this case, is governed by Act
3135, as amended. Moreover, AM 99-10-05-0 provides for the procedure to be
observed in the conduct of an extrajudicial foreclosure sale.
- [IMPORTANT] Neither Act 3135, as amended, nor A.M. No. 99-10-05-0 grants to
junior encumbrancers the right to receive the balance of the purchase price. The only
right given to second mortgagees is the right to redeem the foreclosed property
pursuant to Sec. 6 of Act 3135, as amended.
SEC. 6. Redemption. xxx any person having a lien on the
property subsequent to the mortgage or deed of trust
under which the property is sold, may redeem the same at
any time within the term of one year from and after the
date of the sale xxx
- Even if, for the sake of argument, Rule 68 is to be applied to extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgages, such right can only be given to second mortgagees who are made parties to
the judicial foreclosure. While a second mortgagee is a proper and in a sense even a
necessary party to a proceeding to foreclose a first mortgage on real property, he is not
an indispensable party, because a valid decree may be made, as between the mortgagor
and the first mortgagee, without regard to the second mortgage; but the consequence of
a failure to make the second mortgagee a party to the proceeding is that the lien of the
second mortgagee on the equity of redemption is not affected by the decree of
foreclosure.
→ [THUS] It is clear that the Spouses do not have a cause of action against Atty. Ana Liza
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
Luna for the delivery of the residue.
(2.2) The rule is now settled that a mortgage creditor may elect to waive his security
and bring, instead, an ordinary action to recover the indebtedness with the right to
execute a judgment thereon on all the properties of the debtor including the subject
matter of the mortgage, subject to the qualification that if he fails in the remedy elected
by him, he cannot pursue further the remedy he has waived.
• So, while the case should indeed be dismissed against Atty. Luna, the same is
not necessarily true with respect to Monzon. Other than the Spouses’ prayer
that the residue be delivered, they also pray for a judgment declaring Monzon
liable for such amounts. Said prayer may constitute a cause of action for
collection of sum of money against Monzon.
• But because construing the Spouses’ Petition for Injunction to be one for a
collection of sum of money would entail a waiver by them of the mortgage
executed over the subject properties, there must be utmost caution before
making such construction. Thus, upon the REMAND of this case to the RTC,
the Spouses should be ordered to manifest whether the Petition for Injunction
should be treated as a complaint for the collection of a sum of money.
• Two possible scenarios:
o If the Spouses answer in the affirmative, then the case shall proceed
with the presentation of the evidence for the defense. If Monzon
would be successful in proving her defense of dacion en pago, there
would, in effect, be a double sale of the mortgaged properties: the
same properties were sold to the Spouses and to intervenor Addio.
▪ If, pursuant to the rules on double sales, the Spouses are
entitled to the properties, their remedy is to file the proper
action to recover possession.
▪ If, pursuant to said rules, Addio Properties, Inc. is entitled to
the properties, the Spouses’ remedy is to file an action for
damages against Monzon.
o If the Spouses answer in the negative, the case shall be dismissed,
without prejudice to the exercise of their rights as mortgage
creditors.
▪ If the Spouses’ mortgage contract was executed before the
execution of the mortgage contract with Addio, then the
Spouses would be the first mortgagors. Pursuant to Art.
2126 of the Civil Code, they would be entitled to foreclose
the property as against any subsequent possessor thereof.
▪ If the Spouses mortgage contract was executed after the
execution of the mortgage contract with Addio, then the
Spouses would be the second mortgagors. As such, they are
entitled to a right of redemption pursuant to Sec. 6 of Act
3135, as amended.
54
4) NAGTALON V. UCPB, 2013 - VELASQUEZ
Nagtalon vs UCPB (Short case)
Doctrine: Any question regarding the validity of ther mortgage or its foreclosure is not
a legal groud for refusing the issuance of a writ of exectuion/possession.
ER: Spouses Nagtalon mortgaged several lands in Aklan to secure a credit
accommodation with UCPB. The spouses defaulted so UCPB foreclosed extra judicially.
When the redemption period expired (1 year), UCPB asked for a writ of possession. It
was opposed by the spouses saying that there is a pending case for the declaration of
nullity of foreclosure among others. The spouses said the issuance of the writ is no
longer ministerial and cannot be issued because of the pending case.
Issue: W/N the pending case will bar the issuance of the writ. NO
Ratio: It has long been held in jurisprudence that the pendency of a case will not bar the
issuance of the writ. Only equitable reasons will bar the issuance. The SC also said there
are 3 exemptions: 1.) Gross inadequacy of purchase price; 2.) Third party claiming right
adverse to debtor/mortgagor; 3.) Failure to pay surplus proceeds of the sale to the
mortgagor.
Facts:
Spouses Nagtalon entered into a credit accommodation agreement with UCPB. It was
secured by a REM over several parcels of land in Kalibo, Aklan. The spouses failed to pay
and the properties were extrajudicial foreclosed with UCPB being the highest bidder.
The one year period of redemption lapsed. UCPB filed an ex parte petition for the
issuance of a writ of possession with the RTC.
Spouses Nagtalon opposed the same citing the pendency of Civil Case 6602 (for
declaration of nullity of foreclosure, fixing of true indebtedness, redemption, damages
and injunction with temporary restraining order). The stipulations in the credit
agreement and interest in the promissory notes were being challenged for bein void.
Spouses allege that the issuance of the writ is no longer ministerial due to the pendency
of the case.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
RTC ruled in favor of the spouses. MR denied. UCPB went up to CA on certiorari (65).
CA reversed RTC: it is ministerial to isue a writ of possession after the lapse of the
redemption but there are exeptions and the case was not one of them. Equitable
circumstances must first be shown to deferr the issuance of the writ. Spouses failed to
show such circumstance.
Issue: whether the pendency of a civil case challenging the validity of the credit
agreement, the promissory notes and the mortgage can bar the issuance of a writ of
possession after the foreclosure and sale of the mortgaged properties and the lapse of
the one-year redemption period.
Held: NO. CA CORRECT. We see no merit in the petition, and rule that the CA did not
commit any reversible error in the assailed decision.
Ratio:
The issuance of a writ of possession to a purchaser in a public auction is a ministerial
function of the court, which cannot be enjoined or restrained, even by the filing of a civil
case for the declaration of nullity of the foreclosure and consequent auction sale. Once
title to the property has been consolidated in the buyer’s name upon failure of the
mortgagor to redeem the property within the one-year redemption period, the writ of
possession becomes a matter of right belonging to the buyer. His rights are already that
of an owner.
Rule on issuance of writ as established in Spouses Ruben and Violeta Sagun vs. PBCom
and CA pursuant to ACT 3135: a writ of possession may be issued either (1) within the
one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or (2) after the lapse of the
redemption period, without need of a bond (ex parte motion).
Past cases already showed that any question regarding the validity of ther mortgage or
its foreclosure is not a legal groud for refusing the issuance of a writ of
exectuion/possession.
55
Exceptions to the rule when issuance of writ is not ministerial: 1.) Gross inadequacy of
purchase price; 2.) Third party claiming right adverse to debtor/mortgagor; 3.) Failure
to pay surplus proceeds of the sale to the mortgagor.
H. JUDICIAL PARTITIO N (RULE 69)
1) SEPULVEDA V. PELAEZ, G.R. NO. 152195, JANUARY 31, 2005 - AQUINO
PEDRO SEPULVEDA, SR., substituted by SOCORRO S. LAWAS, Administratrix of His
Estate, petitioner, vs. ATTY. PACIFICO S. PELAEZ, respondent.
Emergency Recit: Pacifico Pelaez (PELAEZ) filed a complaint for recovery of possession
and ownership of property against his granduncle PEDRO. The property was inherited
from DIONISIA. However, PEDRO made it appear that he was the owner of DULCE’s
(Pelaez’s mother) share. PEDRO died intestate and was substituted by SOCORRO.
SOCORRO adduced evidence that SANTIAGO (Pedro’s brother, Pelaez’s other
granduncle) died intestate and was survived by his wife, PAZ and their minor
children. It was pointed out that PELAEZ failed to implead PAZ and her minor children
as parties-defendants in the complaint. PELAEZ also failed to implead his father
RODOLFO. Issue is whether the complaint should have been dismissed for the failure of
PELAEZ to implead all indispensable parties. The Supreme Court held that the absence
of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and void for
want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those present.
Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides that in an action for partition, all
persons interested in the property shall be joined as defendants. Hence, the trial court
should have ordered the dismissal of the complaint.
Facts:
• Atty. Pacifico Pelaez (PELAEZ) filed a complaint against his granduncle, Pedro
Sepulveda, Sr. (PEDRO), for the recovery of possession and ownership of his
one-half (1/2) undivided share of several parcels of and for the partition
thereof among the co-owners.
• The 11 lots were among the 25 parcels of land which PELAEZ’s mother, Dulce
Sepulveda (DULCE), inherited from her grandmother, Dionisia Sepulveda
(DIONISIA) under the Project of Partition submitted by PEDRO as the
administrator of the former’s estate.
• Under the said deed, PEDRO appeared to be the owner of an undivided portion
while his brother, Santiago Sepulveda (SANTIAGO), was the undivided owner
of one-half (1/2) of the parcels of land. DULCE and her uncles, PEDRO and
SANTIAGO, were likewise indicated therein as the co-owners of the eleven
other parcels of land, each with an undivided one-third (1/3) share thereof.
• In his complaint, the PELAEZ alleged that his mother DULCE died intestate and
was survived by her husband Rodolfo Pelaez (RODOLFO) and her mother
Carlota Sepulveda (CARLOTA). DULCE’s grandfather Vicente Sepulveda
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
(VICENTE) died intestate. According to PELAEZ, CARLOTA repeatedly
demanded the delivery of her mother’s share but PEDRO refused to do so.
DULCE and PELAEZ demanded the same but to no avail.
• PELAEZ further narrated that his granduncle executed an affidavit, stating that
he was the sole heir of DIONISIA when she died intestate when, in fact, the
latter was survived by her three sons. PEDRO also executed a Deed of Absolute
Sale over the property in favor of the City of Danao.
• In his answer to the complaint, PEDRO admitted having executed a deed of sale
over the parcel of land in favor of Danao City, but averred that the latter failed
to pay the purchase price thereof; besides, PELAEZ had no right to share in the
proceeds of the said sale. He likewise denied having received any demand for
the delivery of DULCE’s share of the subject properties.
• During the trial, PEDRO died intestate. A petition for the settlement of his
estate was filed. His daughter, petitioner Socorro Sepulveda Lawas (SOCORRO)
was appointed administratrix of his estate.
• According to the SOCORRO, DULCE and PEDRO had a verbal agreement
wherein the 11 parcels of land would serve as the latter’s compensation for his
services as administrator of DIONISIA’s estate.
• SOCORRO likewise adduced evidence that SANTIAGO died intestate and
was survived by his wife, Paz Velez Sepulveda (PAZ) and their minor
children. It was pointed out that PELAEZ failed to implead PAZ and her
minor children as parties-defendants in the complaint.
• Trial court rendered judgment in favor of PELAEZ.
• The trial court ruled that PELAEZ’s action for reconveyance based on
constructive trust had not yet prescribed when the complaint was filed; that he
was entitled to a share in the proceeds of the sale of the property to Danao
City; and that the partition of the subject property among the adjudicatees
thereof was in order.
• CA affirmed the trial court decision.
Issue: Whether the complaint should have been dismissed.
Held: IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 43758 and of the Regional Trial Court are SET
ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to dismiss the complaint without
prejudice. No pronouncement as to costs.
Ratio:
• The Rule 65 petition is granted for the sole reason that PELAEZ failed to
implead as parties, all the indispensable parties in his complaint.
• It appears that when PELAEZ filed the complaint, his father, RODOLFO, was
still alive. Thus, when his mother DULCE died intestate, she was survived by
RODOLFO and PELAEZ.
• Gamis v. Court of Appeals: Under articles 807 and 834 of the old Civil Code the
surviving spouse is a forced heir and entitled to a share in usufruct in the
56
estate of the deceased spouse equal to that which by way of legitime
corresponds or belongs to each of the legitimate children or descendants who
have not been bettered or have not received any share in the one-third share
destined for betterment.
• Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court provides that in an action for
partition, all persons interested in the property shall be joined as
defendants.
• Section 1. Complaint in action for partition of real estate.- A person having the
right to compel the partition of real estate may do so as in this rule prescribed,
setting forth in his complaint the nature and extent of his title and an adequate
description of the real estate of which partition is demanded and joining as
defendants all the other persons interested in the property.
• Thus, all the co-heirs and persons having an interest in the property are
indispensable parties; as such, an action for partition will not lie without the
joinder of the said parties.
• The mere fact that PEDRO has repudiated the co-ownership between him and
the respondent does not deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the action for partition, for, in a complaint for partition, the
plaintiff seeks, first, a declaration that he is a co-owner of the subject property;
and, second, the conveyance of his lawful shares.
• De Mesa v. Court of Appeals: The first stage of an action for judicial partition
and/or accounting is concerned with the determination of whether or not a co-
ownership in fact exists and a partition is proper, that is, it is not otherwise
legally proscribed and may be made by voluntary agreement of all the parties
interested in the property.
o This phase may end in a declaration that plaintiff is not entitled to the
desired partition either because a co-ownership does not exist or a
partition is legally prohibited.
o It may also end, on the other hand, with an adjudgment that a co-
ownership does in truth exist, that partition is proper in the
premises, and that an accounting of rents and profits received by the
defendant from the real estate in question is in order.
▪ In the latter case, “the parties may, if they are able to agree,
make partition among themselves by proper instruments of
conveyance, and the court shall confirm the partition so
agreed upon by all the parties.”
▪ In either case, whether the action is dismissed or partition
and/or accounting is decreed, the order is a final one and
may be appealed by any party aggrieved thereby.
• The second stage commences when the parties are unable to agree upon the
partition ordered by the court.
o In that event, partition shall be effected for the parties by the court
with the assistance of not more than three (3) commissioners.
o This second phase may also deal with the rendition of the accounting
itself and its approval by the Court after the parties have been
accorded the opportunity to be heard thereon, and an award for the
recovery by the party or parties thereto entitled of their just shares in
the rents and profits of the real estate in question.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
• PELAEZ failed to implead the following indispensable parties: his father,
RODOLFO; the heirs of SANTIAGO, namely, PAZ and their children; and the City
of Danao which purchased the property.
• RODOLFO is an indispensable party he being entitled to a share in usufruct,
equal to the share of the respondent in the subject properties.
• Indeed, the presence of all indispensable parties is a condition sine qua non for
the exercise of judicial power. It is precisely when an indispensable party is
not before the court that the action should be dismissed. Thus, the plaintiff is
mandated to implead all the indispensable parties, considering that the
absence of one such party renders all subsequent actions of the court null and
void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as
to those present.
• One who is a party to a case is not bound by any decision of the court,
otherwise, he will be deprived of his right to due process.
• The failure of the private respondent to implead the other heirs as parties-
plaintiffs constituted a legal obstacle to the trial court and the appellate court’s
exercise of judicial power over the said case, and rendered any orders or
judgments rendered therein a nullity
I. EJECTMENT (RULE 7 0)
1) INOCENCIO V. HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE, 2013 – ARCEO
ANALITA P. INOCENCIO, substituting for RAMON INOCENCIO (Deceased) v.
HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE (HDSJ)
EMERGENCY DIGEST
• HDSJ leased a parcel of land to German Inocencio. Sec. 6 of the contract: “This
contract is nontransferable unless prior consent of the lessor is obtained in
writing.” German built 2 buildings that he subleased. German died. Ramon (son)
collected the rents from the sublessees and paid the rents to HDSJ. HDSJ notified
Ramon that it is terminating the lease effective 31 Mar. ‘01. On 3 Mar. ‘05, HDSJ
reiterated the termination of the lease and gave Ramon 30 days to vacate. On 28
Jun. ‘05, HDSJ filed a Complaint before the MTC for unlawful detainer. MTC, RTC,
and CA all ruled for HDSJ. SC HELD:
1. The action for unlawful detainer was not barred by prescription. The 1-year
period under Rule 70 should be counted from the date of last demand to vacate,
because only upon the lapse of that period does the possession become unlawful.
HDSJ’s last demand: 3 Mar. ‘05, filing of complaint 28 Jun. ‘05. The complaint
was filed within the proper period;
57
2. The death of German did not terminate the lease. The rights and obligations in
a lease contract are transmissible to the heirs except when the same are not
transmissible by nature, stipulation or law. Sec. 6 of the contract refers to
transfers inter vivos and not mortis causa.
3. Sec. 6 of the lease contract did not prohibit subleasing. Transfer of lease is
different from sublease. In a sublease, the lessee becomes a lessor to a
sublessee but the juridical relation between the lessor and lessee is not
dissolved. Ramon had a right to sublease the since the lease contract did not
contain any stipulation forbidding subleasing;
4. HDSJ did not commit tortious interference, as it entered into contracts with
Ramon’s former sublessees for purely economic reasons;
5. The Inocencios do not have the right to lease the buildings to third persons
after the termination of their lease contract with HDSJ;
6. HDSJ should have reimbursed German half of the value of the improvements as
of 2001. If HDSJ is not willing to reimburse the Inocencios, then the latter
should be allowed to demolish the buildings.
COMPLETE DIGEST
FACTS:
HDSJ leased a parcel of land in Pasay to German Inocencio. It was effective for
1 year, and was renewed for 1-year periods. Sec. 6 of the last written contract (31 May
1951) provides: “This contract is nontransferable unless prior consent of the lessor
is obtained in writing.” German built 2 buildings that he subleased. HDSJ postponed the
effectivity of increase in rentals "to give him (German) ample time to make the
necessary rental adjustments with his sublessees."
German died. Ramon (son) did not notify HDSJ of German’s death. He collected
the rentals from the sublessees and paid the rentals and taxes.
HDSJ’s administrator, Five Star, notified Ramon that HDSJ is terminating the
lease effective 31 March 2001. It refused Ramon’s request for renegotiation because
the latter has "continually subleased the premises to 20 families and to a commercial
establishment without the knowledge and consent of the lessor. On 3 March 2005, HDSJ
sent a letter to Ramon: (1) reiterating that the lease contract was terminated on 31
March 2001; (2) demanding payment for unrealized fruits; and (3) giving him 30 days to
vacate.
The sublessees received notices to vacate. HDSJ’s Patalastas stated that it is
willing to have an amicable arrangement with the sublessees, thus some sublessees
refused to pay rents to Ramon. HDSJ entered into lease contracts with Ramon’s former
sublessees.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
On 28 June 2005, HDSJ filed a Complaint before the MTC Pasay for unlawful
detainer against Ramon and his sublessees. It alleged that illegal occupation started
since 31 March 2001. Ramon died after filing an Answer. His wife, Analita, substituted
him.
MTC ruled for HDSJ based on Sec. 6 of the contract. RTC denied Analita’s
appeal and MR. Analita then filed a Rule 42 petition for review with the CA, which
affirmed RTC but modified the award for damages.
ISSUES:
1. WON the action for unlawful detainer was barred by prescription. [1st demand: 1 Mar.
’01; 2nd demand: 3 Mar. ’05; Complaint: 28 Jun. ‘05] (NO)
2. WON the death of German terminated the lease contract. (NO)
3. WON Sec. 6 of the lease contract prohibited subleasing. (NO)
4. WON HDSJ committed tortious interference. (NO)
5. WON Inocencio has the right to lease the building to third persons even after the
termination of the lease contract with HDSJ. (NO)
6. WON Inocencio should be reimbursed for the value of the buildings. (YES)
HELD: PARTLY GRANTED. CA Decision is AFFIRMED with modification. The case is
REMANDED to the MTC for determination of the value or the improvements to be paid
to lnocencios, if HDSJ desires to keep the same. Otherwise, the Inocencios can demolish
the buildings at their expense.
RATIO:
1. The action for unlawful detainer was not barred by prescription. Sec. 1,
Rule 70 provides that actions for unlawful detainer must be filed "within 1 year after
such unlawful deprivation or withholding of possession." In Republic v. Sunvar, we held
that: The one-year period to file an unlawful detainer case is not counted from the
expiration of the lease contract. Indeed, the last demand for petitioners to vacate is the
reckoning period for determining the one-year period in an action for unlawful detainer.
Such one-year period should be counted from the date of plaintiff’s last demand on
58
defendant to vacate the real property, because only upon the lapse of that period
does the possession become unlawful.
HDSJ’s last demand was made on 3 March 2005, and it filed the complaint for
unlawful detainer on 28 June 2005. Thus, the complaint was filed within the period
provided under the Rules of Court.
2. The death of German did not terminate the lease. (See Art. 1311 of CC)11 A
lease contract is not essentially personal in character. The rights and obligations therein
are transmissible to the heirs except when the same are not transmissible by (1) nature,
(2) stipulation or (3) law. The death of a party does not excuse nonperformance of a
contract, which involves a property right, and the rights and obligations thereunder pass
to the successors or representatives of the deceased. Nonperformance is not excused by
death of the party when the other party has a property interest in the subject matter of
the contract.
Sec. 6 of the contract refers to transfers inter vivos, not mortis causa.
What it seeks to avoid is for the lessee to substitute a third party in place of the lessee
without the lessor’s consent. Art. 1649 of the CC: “The lessee cannot assign the lease
without the consent of the lessor, unless there is a stipulation to the contrary.” In any case,
HDSJ also acknowledged that Ramon is its month-to-month lessee in a demand letter
dated 1 March 2001.12
3. Sec. 6 of the lease contract did not prohibit subleasing. Sec. 6 of the
contract requires written consent of the lessor before the lease may be assigned or
transferred. In assignment, there is a novation by the substitution of the person of one
of the parties - the lessee. Only two persons remain in the juridical relation - the lessor
and the assignee who is the new lessee. Assignment of lease (Art. 1649 of the CC) is
different from sublease (Art. 1650). In a sublease, the lessee becomes in turn a lessor to
11Contracts take effect only between the parties, their assigns and heirs, except in case where the
rights and obligations arising from the contract are not transmissible by their nature, or by
stipulation or by provision of law ...
12 We acknowledge the fact HDSJ has been accepting the payment of your rentals since the demise
of German. Hence, an implied contract of lease between the two of you exists. However, since
there is no stipulation as to the period of the contract and you are paying a monthly rental to our
client, the period for the lease is on a month-to-month basis (Art. 1687). Thus as of this date, your
contract should expire on March 31, 2001.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
a sublessee. However, the juridical relation between the lessor and lessee is not
dissolved.
Ramon had a right to sublease the premises since the lease contract did not
forbid subleasing. Art. 1650 of the CC: “When in the contract of lease of things there is
no express prohibition, the lessee may sublet the thing leased, in whole or in part,
without prejudice to his responsibility for the performance of the contract toward the
lessor.” The sublease contracts were valid.
4. HDSJ did not commit tortious interference. Art. 1314 of CC: “Any third
person who induces another to violate his contract shall be liable for damages to the other
contracting party.” Tortious interference elements: (1) valid contract; (2) knowledge on
the part of the third person of the contract; and (3) interference of the third person
without legal justification or excuse. The third element is lacking. There was no tortious
interference if the intrusion was impelled by purely economic motives. HDSJ entered
into agreements with Ramon’s former sublessees for purely economic reasons.
5. The Inocencios do not have the right to lease the buildings to third
persons after the termination of their lease contract with HDSJ. They claim that as
owners of the buildings (which are distinct and separate from the land), they have a
right to lease the same to third persons, even after termination of the lease contract with
HDSJ. We do not agree. The lease of a building includes the lease of the lot and
consequently, the rentals of the building include the rentals of the lot. As correctly
pointed out by HDSJ: “When the Inocencios leased the buildings to third parties, they also
"leased" to the third parties the plot of land on which the buildings stood — either by
implied transfer of the lease covering the plot of the land, or by sublease.” When the
contract with HDSJ ended on 31 March ‘01, Ramon lost his status as lessee of the land,
and therefore, had no authority to sublease the land.
6. CA erred in not applying Art. 1678 of the Civil Code. 13 It applies if the
improvements were: (1) introduced in good faith; (2) useful; and (3) suitable to the use
for which the lease is intended, without altering the form and substance. The
aforementioned requisites are satisfied in this case. The buildings were constructed
13If the lessee makes, in good faith, useful improvements which are suitable to the use for which
the lease is intended, without altering the form or substance of the property leased, the lessor upon
the termination of the lease shall pay the lessee one-half of the value of the improvements at that
time. Should the lessor refuse to reimburse said amount, the lessee may remove the improvements,
even though the principal thing may suffer damage thereby. He shall not, however, cause any more
impairment upon the property leased than is necessary. ...
59
before German’s demise, during the subsistence of a valid contract of lease. HDSJ did not
prohibit German from constructing the buildings. Thus, HDSJ should have reimbursed
German half of the value of the improvements as of 2001. If HDSJ is not willing to
reimburse the Inocencios, then the latter should be allowed to demolish the buildings.
2) SERRANO V. GUTIERREZ, G.R. NO. 162366, NOVEMBER 10, 2006 – BASCARA
Serrano vs Gutierrez
The Gutierrez spouses filed a forcible entry case against Serrano et al. The Gutierrez
spouses alleged that they are the owners of a piece of agricultural land situated in
Pampanga and that Serrano et al entered into the said land, constructed concrete
structures on it and dumped truckload of filling materials into said property without the
knowledge and consent of the Gutierrez spouses. They further alleged that Serrano et al
refused to demolish the structure and vacate the premises even after demand. The MTC
dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction because it found that the real issue involved
the question of ownership, whereas it held that it can only resolve the issue of mere
possession de facto. On appeal the RTC exercised its jurisdiction over the case by
invoking its power under the 2nd paragraph of Sec. 8, Rule 409 of the Rules of Court
which states that “If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on appeal shall not dismiss
the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof, but shall decide the case in accordance with
the preceding section, without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and
additional evidence in the interest of justice.”(The RTC ruled in favor of the Gutierrez
Spouses). Serrano et al argue that the trial court erroneously applied the said provision
of the law in deciding the ejectment case brought to it on appeal by the Gutierrez
spouses. They contend that since the MTC acted without jurisdiction, the RTC can only
decide the case on appeal if it has original jurisdiction. They proffer that the assessed
value of the subject property is less than P20,000.00, thus outside the jurisdiction of the
RTC.
• Whether or not it is the RTC erred in applying the 2nd paragraph of Section 8,
Rule 40 of the Rules of Court – YES
• Whether or not the MTC erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction-
YES
• Whether or not the RTC has appellate jurisdiction over the case- YES
Ratio:
• The MTC clearly erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. As the law
now stands, inferior courts have jurisdiction to resolve questions of ownership
whenever it is necessary to decide the question of possession in an ejectment
case.
• The RTC blundered in applying the 2nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule 40 of the
Rules of Court as it deals with an appeal from an order of dismissal but the
case was tried on the merits. Clearly, the Section is inapplicable to the present
case since, as the Court of Appeals correctly held, the MTC had jurisdiction
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
over this ejectment case even if the question of possession could be resolved
without passing upon the issue of ownership.
• The assessed value of the subject property does not remove the case from the
RTC jurisdiction as the amount involved is immaterial for purposes of the
RTC's appellate jurisdiction. All cases decided by the MTC are generally
appealable to the RTC irrespective of the amount involved.
• Gutierrez spouses have established by preponderance of evidence their claim
of ownership over the subject property. It is settled law that a certificate of
title is the best proof of ownership of a piece of land.
Facts:
• Spouses Anselmo and Carmelita Gutierrez (Gutierrez spouses) filed a
complaint for forcible entry with application for a writ of preliminary
mandatory and prohibitory injunction with temporary restraining order
and damages against Federica M. Serrano, Lucila M. Razon, Armando Layug
and Romeo Morales (Serrano et al.) before the MTC of Lubao, Pampanga.
• The subject of the complaint was a piece of untenanted agricultural land
situated at San Roque Dau I, Lubao, Pampanga
• The complaint alleged, among others, that the Gutierrez spouses are the
registered owners of the said piece of land and that Serrano et al by means of
strategy and stealth, criminally entered into the said land and constructed
concrete structures on it and dumped truckload of filling materials into said
property without the knowledge and consent of the Gutierrez spouses, thus
rendering the land unsuitable for agricultural purposes for which it is
intended. They further alleged that upon demand to vacate premises and
demolish the structures therein, Serrano et al refused to do so.
• Serrano et al denied the allegations in the complaint and claimed that the
subject land was a portion of the estate of Albino Morales, and as heirs of
Albino Morales, they were in actual, adverse, continuous and physical
possession thereof.
• The MTC ordered the parties to submit their position papers and evidence to
support their corresponding claims. The Gutierrez spouses’ presented the
original certificate of title, deed of absolute sale, and transfer certificate of title,
among others, to prove their claim of ownership. On the other hand, Serrano et
al presented tax declaration receipts as proofs of tax payment.
• The MTC found that the real issue involved the question of ownership and not
mere possession de facto since both parties claimed that they were the
absolute, lawful and legal owners of the aforesaid property. Thus, it refused to
assume jurisdiction by insisting that it can only resolve the issue of possession
de facto and not de jure, and consequently, dismissed the case for lack of
jurisdiction.
• The RTC rendered its Decision ordering Serrano et al to vacate the premises
and surrender possession of subject lot to the Gutierrez spouses. Although it
approved of the dismissal by the MTC for lack of jurisdiction, it invoked its
power under the second paragraph of Section 8, Rule 409 of the Rules of Court
and deemed itself (the RTC) capable of resolving the issue of ownership and
thus ruling in favor of the Gutierrez spouses.
60
• Serrano et al filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Appeals
questioning the jurisdiction of the RTC on the ground that the instant case
involves an agricultural land and thus, appropriate jurisdiction vested with the
DARAB. They further questioned the adjudication of ownership in a mere
ejectment case.
• The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the RTC.
• Serrano et al filed their motion for reconsideration but this was denied.
• Serrano et al argue that the trial court erroneously applied the second
paragraph of Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court in deciding the ejectment
case brought to it on appeal by the Gutierrez spouses. They contend that since
the MTC acted without jurisdiction, the RTC can only decide the case on appeal
if it has original jurisdiction. They proffer that the assessed value of the subject
property is less than P20,000.00, thus outside the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Issues
Whether or not it is the RTC erred in applying the 2 nd paragraph of Section 8, Rule
40 of the Rules of Court – YES
Whether or not the MTC erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction- YES
Whether or not the RTC has appellate jurisdiction over the case- YES
Held: WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. SP No. 67395 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that the award of attorney's fees
is DELETED. Costs against petitioners.
Ratio:
• The MTC clearly erred in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Section 33
of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691, states:
o Exclusive original jurisdiction over cases of forcible entry and
unlawful detainer: Provided, That when, in such cases, the defendant
raises the question of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.
• Section 16, Rule 70 of the Rules of Court further affirms this provisional
determination of ownership in ejectment cases, thus:
o Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership. When the defendant raises
the defense of ownership in his pleadings and the question of
possession cannot be resolved without deciding the issue of
ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.
• As the law now stands, inferior courts have jurisdiction to resolve
questions of ownership whenever it is necessary to decide the question
of possession in an ejectment case.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
• Corollarily, the RTC erred when it agreed with the MTC's decision to dismiss
the case. Along with the erroneous premise, the RTC also blundered in
applying Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. The provision reads:
o Sec. 8. Appeal from orders dismissing case without trial; lack of
jurisdiction. If an appeal is taken from an order of the lower court
dismissing the case without a trial on the merits, the Regional Trial
Court may affirm or reverse it, as the case may be. In case of
affirmance and the ground of dismissal is lack of jurisdiction over the
subject matter, the Regional Trial Court, if it has jurisdiction
thereover, shall try the case on the merits as if the case was originally
filed with it. In case of reversal, the case shall be remanded for
further proceedings.
o If the case was tried on the merits by the lower court without
jurisdiction over the subject matter, the Regional Trial Court on
appeal shall not dismiss the case if it has original jurisdiction thereof,
but shall decide the case in accordance with the preceding section,
without prejudice to the admission of amended pleadings and
additional evidence in the interest of justice.
• The first paragraph contemplates an appeal from an order of dismissal issued
without trial of the case on the merits. On the other hand, the second
paragraph deals with an appeal from an order of dismissal but the case was
tried on the merits. Both paragraphs, however, involve the same ground for
dismissal, i.e., lack of jurisdiction. Clearly, the Section is inapplicable to the
present case since, as the Court of Appeals correctly held, the MTC had
jurisdiction over this ejectment case even if the question of possession could
be resolved without passing upon the issue of ownership.
• Nonetheless, the RTC had appellate jurisdiction over the case and its decision
should be deemed promulgated in the exercise of that jurisdiction.
• Serrano et al submit that the assessed value of the subject property removes
the case from the RTC jurisdiction by citing Section 19 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7691
o SECTION 19. Jurisdiction in Civil Cases. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise exclusive original jurisdiction:
▪ In all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of,
real property, or any interest therein, where the assessed
value of the property involved exceeds Twenty Thousand
Pesos (P20,000.00) or for civil actions in Metro Manila,
where such value exceeds Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) except actions for forcible entry into and
unlawful detainer of lands or buildings, original jurisdiction
over which is conferred upon the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts
• We do not agree. At first glance, it appears that based on the P13,300.00
assessed value of the subject property as declared by the Gutierrez spouses,
the RTC would have no jurisdiction over the case. But the above-quoted
provision refers to the original jurisdiction of the RTC.
• The RTC's appellate jurisdiction, as contrasted to its original jurisdiction, is
provided in Section 22 of the same Act, thus:
61
o SECTION 22. Appellate jurisdiction. Regional Trial Courts shall
exercise appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by Metropolitan
Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial
Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. Such cases shall be
decided on the basis of the entire record of the proceedings had in
the court of origin such memoranda and/or briefs as may be
submitted by the parties orrequired by the Regional Trial Courts. The
decision of the Regional Trial Courts in such cases shall be
appealable by Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals which may
give it due course only when the petition shows prima facie that the
lower court has committed an error of fact or law that will warrant a
reversal or modification of the decision or judgment sought to be
reviewed.
• Primarily, the above quoted provision vests upon the RTC the exercise of
appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts,
Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective
territorial jurisdictions. Clearly then, the amount involved is immaterial for
purposes of the RTC's appellate jurisdiction. All cases decided by the MTC
are generally appealable to the RTC irrespective of the amount involved.
• The Gutierrez spouses have established by preponderance of evidence their
claim of ownership over the subject property.They presented the original
certificate of title, deed of absolute sale, and transfer certificate of title, among
others, to prove their claim of ownership. In contrast, Serrano et al merely
introduced as evidence tax declarations and official receipts of tax payments.
• It is settled law that a certificate of title is the best proof of ownership of a
piece of land. The Court categorically declared in Spouses Camara v. Spouses
Malabao that a party's declaration of real property, his payment of realty taxes
and his designation as owner of the subject property in the cadastral survey or
even in the records of an agency such as the former Ministry of Agrarian
Reform Office cannot defeat a certificate of title, as the latter is the absolute
and indefeasible evidence of ownership of the property in favor of the person
whose name appears therein.
3) ESTEBAN V. MARCELO, 2013 – CHAN
Esteban vs Marcelo
ER
The Late Gabriel Esteban, substituted by his son, Mark, had been in possession of a
parcel of land since the 1950s. In 1960s Gabriel’s sister constructed a foundry shop. In
the 1970s, the foundry shop’s operations were failing so they just allowed the Marcelo’s
to reside therein for a monthly rental fee of P50.00. In 2001, they payment of rental fees
stopped. On October 31, 2005, Gabriel sent a demand letter to Marcelo’s requiring them
to settle their arrears and to vacate within 5 days from receipt. Marcelo’s failed to
comply so Gabriel filed an unlawful detainer case. MeTC ruled for Gabriel. RTC affirmed.
Marcelo’s appealed to the CA. CA reversed the RTC.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
CA claims that from the year of dispossession in 2001 until 2005, the year of filing of the
complaint for ejectment, more than a year had passed. This means that the action should
no longer be one of an accion interdictal, which is cognizable by the MeTC. It was
already an accion publiciana cognizable by the RTC.
ISSUE – Is it still an accion interdictal? YES!!!
RATIO - Revised Rules of Court clearly state that there should first be a demand to pay
or to comply with the terms of the lease and a demand to vacate before unlawful
detainer arises. Mere failure to pay rents does not ipso facto make unlawful tenant's
possession of the premises. It is the owner's demand for tenant to vacate the premises,
when the tenant has failed to pay the rents on time, and tenant’s refusal or failure to
vacate, which make unlawful withholding of possession. In cases where there were
more than one demand to pay and vacate, the reckoning point of one year for filing
the unlawful detainer is from the last demand as the lessor may choose to waive
his cause of action and let the defaulting lessee remain in the premises.
FACTS
- The Late Gabriel Esteban, substituted by his son, Mark Esteban, had been in
possession of a piece of land located at 702 Tiaga St., Barangka Drive,
Mandaluyong City, since the 1950s.
- 1960s = Gabriel’s sister constructed a foundry shop at the property.
- 1970s = Foundry operations were unproductive so respondetns-spouses
Rodrigo and Carmen Marcelo (Marcelo’s) were allowed to reside therein for a
monthly rental fee of P50.00.
- March 2001 = Marcelo’s stopped paying the rental fee.
- October 31, 2005 = Gabriel sent a demand letter to Marcelo’s requiring them to
settle their arrears and to vacate within 5 days from receipt thereof.
- Marcelo’s failed to comply so Gabriel filed an unlawful detainer case against
them.
- MeTC ruled that there was a valid ground for ejectment. RTC affirmed MeTC
ruling.
- Marcelo’s appealed to the CA. CA reversed the RTC. It ruled that from the year
of dispossession in 2001 (year when paying of rent stopped), until 2005 (year
of filing of the complaint for ejectment), more than a year had passed.
o Therefore, the case no longer involved an accion interdictal
cognizable by the MeTC. It was already an accion publiciana that
should have been filed before the RTC.
o Therefore, MeTC had no jurisdiction and the decision was a nullty.
o CA also said that Marcelo’s cannot be evicted because thay are
protected by Section 6, PD 151714. Also, they qualify as beneficiaries
under Section 16, RA 7279.
o MR DENIED. MR was based on Esteban’s failure to effect a
substitution of parties upon the death of Gabriel. CA said, however,
14PROCLAIMING URBAN LAND REFORM IN THE PHILIPPINES AND
PROVIDING FOR THE IMPLEMENTING MACHINERY THEREOF
62
that mere failure to substitute a deceased party is not a sufficient
ground to nullify a trial court’s decision.
- Esteban argues that the case has been properly filed as an accion interdictal
cognizable by the MeTC and was filed on December 6, 2005, or within the one-
year prescriptive period counted from the date of the last demand on
October 31, 2005; hence, the MeTC had proper jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE – Whether the filing of the accion interdictal cognizable by the MeTC was proper.
YES!!!
HELD - WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the petition for review
on certiorari. The decision dated January 1 7, 2011 and the resolution dated July 15, 20
II of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 112609 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The decision dated January 13, 2010 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 211,
Mandaluyong City, in Civil Case No. 20270, is hereby REINSTATED. Costs against the
respondents spouses Rodrigo and Carmen Marcelo.
RATIO
- Petition of Esteban is meritorious. Revised Rules of Court clearly state that
there should first be a demand to pay or to comply with the terms of the lease
and a demand to vacate before unlawful detainer arises.
- Mere failure to pay rents does not ipso facto make unlawful tenant's
possession of the premises. It is the owner's demand for tenant to vacate the
premises, when the tenant has failed to pay the rents on time, and tenant’s
refusal or failure to vacate, which make unlawful withholding of possession.
- in cases where there were more than one demand to pay and vacate, the
reckoning point of one year for filing the unlawful detainer is from the last
demand as the lessor may choose to waive his cause of action and let the
defaulting lessee remain in the premises
- OTHER MATTERS
o CA was wrong for ruling that Marcelo’s were protected by PD1517.
This decree does not apply to them. In Sps. Frilles v. Sps. Yambao, the
Court declared that the purpose of the law is to protect the rights of
legitimate tenants who have resided for 10 years or more on parcels
of land situated in declared Urban Land Reform Zone. For P.D. 1517
to apply, the tenants must have been a legitimate tenant for ten (10)
years who have built their homes on the disputed property. These
circumstances do not obtain in the present case as it was not the
respondents-spouses who built their dwelling on the land;
o Issues not raised may not be considered and ruled upon. As the
petitioner correctly observed, the respondents-spouses never
intimated, directly or indirectly, that they were seeking the
protection of RA 7279.
Marcelo’s claim that the present petition is irregular because the compulsory heirs (co-
owners) have not been impleaded. While all co-owners are real parties in interest in
suits to recover properties, anyone of them may bring an action for the recovery of co-
owned properties.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
4) PHILIPPINE TOURISM AUTHORITY V. SABANDAL-HERZENTIEL, 2013 – MUTI
Keywords: implied use of force in unlawful entry
ER: PTA filed a forcible entry complaint against the TAPALESES and SABANDAL. PTA
alleges that they entered into a portion of the subject property by force, strategy and
stealth, planted coconut trees, introduced improvements and fenced the area. TAPALES
argued that PTA has no proof of prior possession. MCTC and RTC ruled in favor of PTA.
CA reversed. Did PTA fail to prove its prior possession? More specifically, does PTA
need to prove the use of force in the unlawful entry? NOOO!
In forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior possession and that the
defendant deprived him of his possession by means of FISTS15. Possession in the eyes of
the law does not mean that a man has to have his feet on every square meter of the
ground.
Here, PTA is the lawful possessor as shown by its deed of sale, tax declarations, and act
of leasing portions of the property. Its supposed failure to describe in detail the manner
of TAPALESES and SABANDAL’s entry is inconsequential. Proving the fact of unlawful
entry and the exclusion of the lawful possessor would necessarily imply the use of force.
David v. Cordova: “the action of forcible entry can be maintained even though NO force is
used by the trespasser other than such as is necessarily implied from the mere acts of
planting himself on the ground and excluding the other party.”
FACTS:
• Petitioner Philippine Tourism Authority (now Tourism Infrastructure and
Enterprise Zone Authority) (“PTA”) is the owner of the subject property and other
parcels of land located in Cebu since 1981 when it bought the same from Tri-Island
Corporate Holdings, Inc. (“TRI-ISLAND”).
o It had then been in actual, physical, continuous, and uninterrupted
possession of the subject property and had declared the same for taxation
purposes.
• In 1997, however, respondents Pedro Tapales, Luis Tapales, Romeo Tapales
(“TAPALESES”), and SabandalHerzenstiel (“SABANDAL”) by force, strategy and
stealth entered into a portion of the subject property, on which they proceeded to
cut down some coconut trees, introduced improvements and fenced the area.
• PTA made demands to vacate, which respondents ignored, prompting the filing of a
forcible entry complaint against them before the MCTC of Cebu.
• In their Answer with Counterclaim, the TAPALESES acknowledged that the subject
property had already been sold by its administrator, Josefina Abrenica
(“ABRENICA”), to TRI-ISLAND.
15 Force Intimidation Stealth Threats Strategy
63
o They, however, claimed that the sale was tainted with force and
intimidation and hence void, including the subsequent transactions
covering the same property.
• Notwithstanding the sale, they remained in actual and physical possession of the
subject property and even introduced improvements thereon. Consequently, absent
any proof of prior possession on the part of PTA, they claimed that the forcible
entry complaint must necessarily be dismissed.
The MCTC Ruling: in favor of PTA
• MCTC ordered TAPALESES to: (a) vacate the property and remove all the
improvements introduced therein; (b) pay PTA monthly rental from the date of
judicial demand until they have effectively vacated the premises; and (c) pay the
costs of suit.
• The MCTC declared that PTA is the lawful owner of the subject property and had
been in prior possession thereof as shown by the following: (a) the deed of sale; (b)
the tax declarations; and (c) its act of leasing portions of the subject property to
others in the exercise of its right of ownership and possession.
o In contrast, TAPALESES failed to substantiate their claim of ownership
and possession. Neither have they established any relationship with
ABRENICA, the previous owner of the subject property.
o On the other hand, SABANDAL never claimed to be the owner of the same
and even acknowledged PTA’s ownership when she offered to buy back
the land.
The RTC Ruling: in favor of PTA pa rin!
• TAPALESES’ appeal to the RTC was dismissed for their failure to file a
memorandum on appeal as required under Section 7(b), Rule 40 of the ROC. Their
MR was also denied.
• Only SABANDAL appealed before the CA via a petition for review under Rule 42.
The CA Ruling: in favor of SABANDAL
• The CA declared SABANDAL as the lawful possessor of the subject property.
• It held that RTC should have relaxed the rules on procedure in the interest of
substantial justice and for a full determination of the rights of the parties taking
into account the subsequent compliance of the respondents.
• CA found PTA to have failed to establish prior possession of the subject property
and rebut SABANDAL’s claim of continued physical possession in spite of the sale of
the subject property to TRI-ISLAND during which, SABANDAL leased and converted
the property into a resort.
• PTA filed MR which was denied. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 64

ISSUE: whether the TAPALESES and SABANDAL may be lawfully ejected from the is necessarily implied from the mere acts of planting himself on the ground
subject property – YES!!! and excluding the other party.”
• Arbizo v. Santillan: “it has been held that the acts of unlawfully entering the
disputed premises, erecting a structure thereon, and excluding therefrom the prior
HELD: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The CA Decision and Resolution are
possessor would necessarily imply the use of force, as in this case.”
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The MCTC Decision is REINSTATED.
The Court upholds the findings and conclusions of the MCTC, adjudging PTA to be the
lawful possessor of the subject property, square as they are with existing law and
RATIO:
jurisprudence.
• In an action for forcible entry, the plaintiff must prove that he was in prior
possession of the disputed property and that the defendant deprived him of his
possession by any of the means provided for in Sec. 1, Rule 70 of the Rules, namely:
force, intimidation, threats, strategy, and stealth.
J. CONTEMPT (RULE 71 )
• In this case, SABANDAL failed to establish their prior and continued possession of
the subject property after its sale in favor of PTA in 1981. On the contrary, they
even admitted in their answer to the complaint that PTA exercised dominion over 1) CURATA V. PPA, G.R. NO. 154211, JUNE 22, 2009 – NARVASA
the same by instituting caretakers and leasing portions thereof to third persons.
Curata v. PPA
• Suffice it to state that possession in the eyes of the law does not mean that a man
has to have his feet on every square meter of the ground before he is deemed in
possession.
o Thus, finding PTA’s assertion to be well-founded, the MCTC properly [Note: This is a super long case with 7 consolidated petitions. And Mr. Geraldez already
adjudged PTA to have prior possession over the subject property as tackled one of these. For today’s purposes, I am sticking to the case topic as specified in
against SABANDAL, who never claimed ownership or possession thereof. our syllabus, namely contempt (Rule 71). The other GR Nos. are omitted from this
• PTA’s supposed failure to describe in detail the manner of TAPALESES and digest.]
SABANDAL’s entry into the subject property is inconsequential. Jurisprudence
states that proving the fact of unlawful entry and the exclusion of the lawful
possessor – as PTA had sufficiently demonstrated – would necessarily imply the
use of force. Norby’s ER (just in case a background is needed): The Batnagas Port Zone was placed
• Estel v. Heirs of Recaredo P. Diego, Sr.: “Unlawfully entering the subject property under the administrative jursidiction of the Philippine Ports Authority. Pursuant
and excluding therefrom the prior possessor would necessarily imply the use thereto, the PPA filed a complaint to expropriate 185 lots in Batangas. The RTC split the
of force and this is all that is necessary. In order to constitute force, the affected owners according to their counsel. and pertinent to our case is the Dimayacyac
trespasser does not have to institute a state of war. No other proof is necessary. In group (representing Curata, et al.). The RTC had 3 commissioners come up with the fair
the instant case, it is, thus, irrefutable that respondents sufficiently alleged that the market value of the lots, and they came up with a Php 4,800 per square meter figure.
possession of the subject property was wrested from them through violence and The judge then ordered that the owners be compensated at the amount of Php 5,500 per
force.” square. Soon after, the RTC issued writs of execution and a notice of garnishment of
PPA’s bank accounts.
• David v. Cordova: “The words ‘by force, intimidation, threat, strategy or stealth’
include every situation or condition under which one person can wrongfully
enter upon real property and exclude another, who has had prior possession
therefrom. If a trespasser enters upon land in open daylight, under the very eyes of
the person already clothed with lawful possession, but without the consent of the ER: Phil. Ports Authority (PPA) filed a petition to cite Paterno V. Tac-an for contempt
latter, and there plants himself and excludes such prior possessor from the when said judge issued Orders in defiance of the CA-issued temporary restraining
property, the action of forcibly entry and detainer can unquestionably be orders (TROs) and writs of preliminary injunction. He keeps trying to execute his
maintained, even though no force is used by the trespasser other than such as orders, despite the CA enjoining him. Judge Tac-an also held a hearing on the
consolidated cases despite having received a cease and desist order from the CA.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 65

Whether the retirement of Judge Tac-an has rendered moot the petition to cite
said respondent for contempt. No! 7. The filing by PPA of a petition for certiorari with the CA questioning order 3,
The objective of criminal contempt is to vindicate public authority. Contempt of order 4, the Writ of Execution and Notices of Garnishments.
court applies to all persons, whether in or out of government. Thus, it covers
government officials or employees who retired during the pendency of the petition for 8. (Order 5) granting the execution of the Supplemental Order. [Judge Tac-an
contempt. While there is still no definitive ruling on this issue when the respondent order]
charged with contempt has retired, we apply by analogy the settled principle in
administrative disciplinary cases that separation from service does not render the case 9. (Order 6) directing DBP to deliver PPA’s deposit of PhP 441,067,893.63 to the
moot and academic. Cruz Group.
Whether respondent Judge Tac-an is guilty of indirect contempt for alleged
disregard of the CA resolutions. Yep! 10. (Order 6) directing the BT to hold in escrow PPA’s investments in treasury
Despite a cease and desist order enjoining him from further proceeding with the case, he bills.
continued to hear and make orders upon the case. Judge Tac-an violated four (4)
resolutions/processes of the CA, namely: the January 10, 2000 TRO, the March 15, 2005 11. The CA issued a TRO enjoining respondent judge from implementing and
Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the April 19, 2005 TRO and the June 3, 2005 Resolution, enforcing orders 3, 4 the Writ of Execution, and Notices of Garnishment against the
for which he is hereby fined PhP 30,000 for each violation. National Treasury and several banks.
a. The TRO was valid up to March 10, 2005.
Based on the totality of the foregoing circumstances, the Court finds Judge Paterno
Tac-an guilty of indirect contempt of court. His acts are contumacious, continuing acts 12. The issuance by Judge Tac-an, despite the effectivity of the TRO, of the
in clear disobedience and disrespect of the resolutions of the CA. following orders, to wit:
a. February 1, 2005 Order directing the issuance of a writ of execution
A person guilty of indirect contempt may be punished by a fine not exceeding PhP of the November 24, 2004 Supplemental Order;
30,000 or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months or both. He is ordered to pay a b. February 2, 2005 Writ of Execution;
fine in the total amount of PhP 120,000. c. February 3, 2005 Notice of Garnishment addressed to the Phil
Veterans Bank.

13. PPA then filed a Supplemental Petition assailing the February 1, 2005 Order,
the Writ of Execution and the Notice of Garnishment against PVB.
With regard to the citation of Judge Paterno Tac-an for contempt, these are the facts:
14. A writ of preliminary injunction issued by the CA’s Ninth Division in relation to
1. (Order 1) fixing in general the just compensation of PhP 5,500 per square the assailed orders and processes subject of the Resolution granting the TRO.
meter for the lots of defendant-owners excluding the Dimayacyac Group. [Judge Tac-an
order] 15. On April 19, 2005, the issuance by the CA’s Ninth Division of a TRO against
Judge Tac-an, which orders him or any other acting under his authority from
2. (Order 2) listing the names of the lot owners represented by different lawyers implementing abovementioned orders.
led by Atty. Cruz (Cruz Group), the tax declarations of the lots, the area, and the
compensation to be paid for each lot. 16. On April 14, 2005, a Manifestation and Motion was filed by the Bureau of
Treasury (BT).
3. (Order 3) granting the motion for execution of the August 23, 2000 Order filed
by the Cruz Group. 17. On April 20, 2005, the Order issued by Judge Tac-an setting the BT’s
Manifestation and Motion for hearing on April 25, 2005.
4. (Order 4) granting the motion of the Cruz Group for the issuance of a writ of a. Such hearing failed to push through because of the filing by the BT of another
execution. Manifestation and Motion praying that it be excused from attending the
hearing.
5. The issuance of a Writ of Execution.
18. On June 3, 2005, the issuance by the CA’s 10th Division of a Resolution
6. The issuance of a Notices of Garnishment addressed to the National Treasury, enjoining respondent Judge from further proceeding with the case.
DBP, PNB and PVB (w/ a supplemental Order).
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
19. Despite the CA cease-and-desist Order in the consolidated cases, Judge Tac-an
proceeded with a hearing of the case.
20. PPA filed a petition before the CA to cite Judge Tac-an for contempt.
CA: It denied PPA’s “Petition to Cite Respondent Paterno V. Tac-an in Contempt” for lack
of merit, reasoning this way:
• According to PPA, Judge committed indirect contempt of
Court when he conducted a hearing despite the issuance of a [TRO].
o But the scheduled hearing on did not
push through because the Bureau of Treasury filed
a Manifestation and Motion praying that it be
excused from attending the hearing.
First Division SC: the issue is in view of the compulsory retirement of Judge
Tac-an.
This is an MR.
Whether the retirement of Judge Tac-an has rendered moot the petition to
cite said respondent for contempt. No!
The objective of criminal contempt is to vindicate public authority. It is an effective
instrument of preserving and protecting the dignity and authority of courts of law. Any
act or omission that degrades or demeans the integrity of the court must be sanctioned,
lest it prejudice the efficient administration of justice if left unpunished.
Contempt of court applies to all persons, whether in or out of
government. Thus, it covers government officials or employees who retired during the
pendency of the petition for contempt. Otherwise, a civil servant may strategize to avail
himself of an early retirement to escape the sanctions from a contempt citation, if he
perceives that he would be made responsible for a contumacious act.
While there is still no definitive ruling on this issue when the respondent
charged with contempt has retired, we apply by analogy the settled principle in
administrative disciplinary cases that separation from service does not render the case
moot and academic.
Whether respondent Judge Tac-an is guilty of indirect contempt for alleged
disregard of the CA resolutions. Yep!
We find that Judge Tac-an committed contumacious acts in utter disobedience of
the Resolutions of the CA. Consider the following:
1. April 20, 2005 setting the Manifestation and Motion of the Bureau of Treasury for
hearing on April 25, 2005, he was already aware of the TRO that prohibited him
from implementing orders 3, 4 the Writ of Execution, and Notices of Garnishment.
2. The TRO was effective for sixty (60) days from notice to the party enjoined.
Assuming that the January 10, 2005 TRO was received by the trial court on the
same day, the TRO lapsed on March 9, 2005.
66
a. Yet on February 1, 2005, Judge Tac-an issued an order directing that a
Writ of Execution be issued to implement the Supplemental Order (order
4).
b. On February 2, 2005, he also issued the Writs of Execution and a Notice of
Garnishment addressed to PVB.
From these facts, it is clear that Judge Tac-an violated the January 10, 2005 TRO.
1. On March 15, 2005, Judge Tac-an was already notified that a writ of preliminary
injunction was issued against him, prohibiting and restraining him from executing
the orders he previously made.
a. To effectively restrain Judge Tac-an, CA again issued another TRO
notwithstanding the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction to
specifically prohibit Judge Tac-an from implementing certain orders,
which were designed to implement the May 29, 2001 and November 18,
2004 Orders, all relating to the payment of just compensation to the Cruz
Group.
2. Despite the writ of preliminary injunction and the TRO, Judge Tac-an still acted on
the Manifestation and Motion of the Bureau of Treasury pertaining to the money
deposited by PPA with said bureau, when he knew fully well that such incident was
already subject of the injunctive writ and the CA TRO, which was a clear breach of
said processes.
a. By such act, Judge Tac-an betrayed his intention to continue implementing
the compensation order in favor of the Cruz Group.
3. Again on April 26, 2005, Judge Tac-an issued another order further implementing
the Writ of Execution and ordering the BT to deliver the escrowed proceeds, again
in violation TRO and injunctive writ.
4. Lastly, Judge Tac-an set and conducted a hearing of the case.
5. June 21, 2005, the Judge was already notified of the CA Resolution ordering him to
“cease and desist from further proceeding in such case.
a. Yet, over the objection in open court by petitioner PPA, he continued with
the hearing of (1) the “Motion for the Release of Additional Sum for
Humanitarian Purposes.” and (2) the “Urgent Motion for Immediate
Payment of the 100% zonal valuation of the properties.
He continued to act on the civil case even if there is a clear directive to cease and desist
and altogether stop acting on said case and wait for further instructions from the
appellate court.
Based on the totality of the foregoing circumstances, the Court finds Judge Paterno
Tac-an guilty of indirect contempt of court. His acts are contumacious, continuing acts
in clear disobedience and disrespect of the resolutions of the CA.
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
A person guilty of indirect contempt may be punished by a fine not exceeding PhP
30,000 or imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months or both. Judge Tac-an violated
four (4) resolutions/processes of the CA, namely: the January 10, 2000 TRO, the March
15, 2005 Writ of Preliminary Injunction, the April 19, 2005 TRO and the June 3, 2005
Resolution, for which he is hereby fined PhP 30,000 for each violation. Let this serve as
a warning to all trial courts to strictly comply with the resolutions and orders of the
appellate courts and this Court. The Court rules that Judge Paterno Tac-an is guilty of
indirect contempt and is, thus, ordered to pay a fine in the total amount of PhP 120,000.
2) FUENTES V. ALBARRACIN, A.M. RTJ 05-1587, APRIL 15, 2005 – PEREZ DE TAGLE
Barredo-Fuentes v. Judge Albarracin
ER:
Facts: Judge Albarracin granted an ex-parte motion for the issuance of an order
specifically directing Sheriff Aguinaldo Del Campo to enforce the writ of execution and
special writ of demolition, including the demolition of defendants’ buildings and other
improvement. Complainants in this admin case allege that respondent judge’s acting on
an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion without hearing and without the motion served on the
complainants. The OCA eventually recommended that he administrative case be
dismissed for lack of merit and that complainants be FINED in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) each for filing this baseless harassment
administrative case
Issue: Were the recommendations of the OCA correct?
Held: First recommendation: correct! No basis. Just see the facts. Not too important for
REM, more ethics etc.
Second recommendation. Incorrect!
Assuming that the acts of the complainants may be considered as “delaying tactics,”
remedial action may be enforced against them through contempt of court proceedings. A
brief review of the rules governing contempt proceedings is useful.
Any improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade
the administration of justice would constitute indirect contempt. The employment of
delaying tactics to obstruct the administration of justice falls under this category.
67
Section 4 of Rule 71, however, provides that proceedings for indirect contempt may be
initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was committed by an
order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should
not be punished for contempt. There is no way for this Court to initiate indirect
contempt proceedings against complainants for the injury was not committed against
this tribunal, but against respondent judge.
The penalty as recommended by the OCA cannot be sustained and the question of
whether the complainants should be penalized for filing the instant complaint is best
litigated in a separate proceeding, if warranted, within the confines of Rule 71 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Facts:
• The instant case arose from an administrative case filed by Barredo-Fuentes et
al [complainants] against Judge Albarracin [respondent].
o The admin case refers to respondent judge’s acting on an Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion without hearing and without the motion served on the
complainants.
o The Urgent Ex-Parte Motion sought the issuance of an order
specifically directing Sheriff Aguinaldo Del Campo to enforce the writ
of execution and special writ of demolition, including the demolition
of defendants’ buildings and other improvement.
• [GPT SUMMARY OF THE FACTS]
o In the cases [3 forcible entry cases], the complainants here were the
defendants. They lost the 3 cases but filed a case to annul the
judgments.
o Despite the pendency of the case to annul the judgments, the
plaintiffs in the forcible entry case eventually filed an Urgent Ex Parte
Motion to the Court to issue an order to the sheriff to execute the
writs of execution and special writ of demolition.
o The judge granted this motion despite the motion not being served to
the complainants and not being set for hearing, contrary to the
provisions of Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
o The OCA eventually received this complaint and acted in the
following manner:
▪ After a perusal of the evidence on record, the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) ruled that complainants have no
basis for their charges. Complainants’ contention that
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71)
respondent judge should not have acted on the motion for
issuance of special writ of demolition due to the pendency
of the petition for annulment of the decisions in the subject
cases with the RTC is baseless.
▪ It would not bar respondent judge from acting on the said
motion considering that there was no TRO or injunction to
prevent him from proceeding with the subject cases.
▪ Further, the decisions in the subject cases had already
become final and executory. However, due to the numerous
delaying tactics employed by complainants the same
remained unexecuted.
▪ The OCA concluded that the allegation that respondent
judge violated Sections 5 and 6 of Rule 15 of the Revised
Rules of Court had no leg to stand on.
▪ The ex-parte motion was merely to request the branch
sheriff to implement the special writ of demolition which
had long been issued by the court after several hearings.
▪ As such, it could be considered as a non-litigable motion
which may be acted upon by the court without prejudicing
the rights of herein complainants.
▪ Thus, the OCA recommended that the administrative case
be dismissed for lack of merit and that complainants be
FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) each for filing this baseless harassment
administrative case
Issue:
W/N the recommendations [see below] of the OCA are correct:
(1) that the administrative case be dismissed for lack of merit [YES, CORRECT]; and
(2) that complainants be FINED in the amount of Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) each for filing this baseless harassment administrative case IS
CORRECT? [NO, INCORRECT]
Held:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we modify the conclusion reached by the OCA.
The administrative case filed against Judge Romeo C. Albarracin is hereby DISMISSED.
68
Ratio:
[GPT – SKIPPED THE PORTION ON THE FIRST RECO – basically, for the first reco, the SC
affirmed what the OCA said in the FACTS portion above]
RE: THE OCA’s SECOND RECO
• As to the recommendation to impose fine on the complainants, we rule that the
circumstances of the case fail to warrant such course of action. The OCA cannot
just penalize complainants by way of imposing fine on them without the
benefit of a thorough determination of the liability based on evidence adduced
by the parties. They must be given an opportunity to refute the charges by
adducing evidence on specific charges against them, not in a mere
administrative case which involves a matter different from the alleged
culpability of the complainants. This requirement is fundamentally a part of
due process enshrined in the Constitution[17] that a person can only be
penalized for a charge of which he was sufficiently informed and only after he
was given an opportunity to be heard and present evidence to prove the
contrary.
• Nonetheless, assuming that the acts of the complainants may be considered as
“delaying tactics,” remedial action may be enforced against them through
contempt of court proceedings. A brief review of the rules governing contempt
proceedings is useful.
• Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority, justice or dignity of the court,
such conduct as tends to bring the authority and administration of the law into
disrespect or to interfere with or prejudice parties, litigant or their witnesses
during litigation.
• There are two kinds of contempt punishable by law: direct contempt and
indirect contempt. Direct contempt is committed when a person is guilty of
misbehavior in the presence of or so near a court as to obstruct or interrupt
the proceedings before the same, including disrespect toward the court,
offensive personalities toward others, or refusal to be sworn or to answer as a
witness, or to subscribe an affidavit or deposition when lawfully required to do
so. Indirect contempt or constructive contempt is that which is committed out
of the presence of the court. Any improper conduct tending, directly or
indirectly, to impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of justice would
constitute indirect contempt. The employment of delaying tactics to obstruct
the administration of justice falls under this latter category.
• Section 3, Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court provides for the following
requisites prior to conviction of indirect contempt: (a) a charge in writing to be
filed; (b) an opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by the court; and (c) to be heard by himself or
counsel. With respect to constructive contempts or those which are committed
 07 Remedial Law Digests. 4C 2015. Atty. Tranquil Salvador. RULE 65 (Prohibition) to Rule 71) 69

without the actual presence of the court, it is essential that a hearing be

allowed and the contemner permitted, if he so desires, to interpose a defense
to the charges before punishment is imposed. The proceedings for punishment
of indirect contempt are criminal in nature. The modes of procedure and rules
of evidence adopted in contempt proceedings are similar in nature to those
used in criminal prosecutions.
• Section 4 of Rule 71, however, provides that proceedings for indirect contempt
may be initiated motu proprio by the court against which the contempt was
committed by an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to
show cause why he should not be punished for contempt. There is no way for
this Court to initiate indirect contempt proceedings against complainants for
the injury was not committed against this tribunal, but against respondent
judge.
There is no basis for this Court to initiate contempt proceedings or condemn the
complainants to suffer the penalty for contempt, considering that the “contemptuous”
act was not directed against the Court itself. The penalty as recommended by the OCA
cannot be sustained and the question of whether the complainants should be penalized
for filing the instant complaint is best litigated in a separate proceeding, if warranted,
within the confines of Rule 71 of the Revised Rules of Court.