SECOND DIVISION
[8] They arrived at this conclusion after finding a piece of wire inserted in
[G.R. No. 111193. January 28, 1997]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FERDINAND SUAREZ, alias
"Jojo", LORETO REYES, alias "Dondon" and "Larry"; WILFREDO LARA, alias "Cortal"
and "Willy"; MARIA VICTORIA G. SUAREZ; NOLI LICSI, alias "Nio"; VICENTE
RODRIGUEZ, alias "Waway"; and MORRIS SANTOS, alias "Wanky", accused,
WILFREDO LARA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
REGALADO, J.:
In the early hours of December 8, 1987, Arlene Tuyor was awakened by loud knocking
sounds on the door of her room. She was a domestic helper at that time, working in the
household of Estrellita Guzman at 22 Sta. Teresita Street, Barrio Capitolyo, Pasig, Metro
Manila. Also in the house then were the nieces of Estrellita, namely, Maria Prescilla
Guzman (Babyruth), Maria Cristina Guzman (Cristy) and Maria Victoria Suarez (Marivic).
Babyruth and Marivic had been adopted by Estrellita as her own daughters. Marivic's
husband, Ferdinand Suarez (Jojo), and her three children likewise lived in Estrellita's
bungalow-type house.
Upon opening the door, Tuyor was surprised to see Ferdinand Suarez, her "Seorito Jojo,"
surrounded by two men wearing black nylon cloths over their heads and faces. One of
the men had a big body frame while the other had a small physique. The men
immediately entered her room, tied her up and asked for her money. She was also asked
if she knew Jojo. Getting no response from Tuyor, the intruders left her room bringing
Suarez with them.
From her room, Tuyor heard the sound of the microwave oven located in the kitchen. She
also heard the main door of the house slamming and someone crying in the house. When
Tuyor went out of her room, she saw Marivic weeping in the living room. She proceeded
to her employer's bedroom and found Estrellita bleeding and lying on her bed. All this
time, accused Suarez was just sitting on the chair of the piano. [1]
Estrellita later died due to severe hemorrhage secondary to stab wounds. Post-mortem
examinations revealed that she had sustained an elliptical and gaping wound on the right
side of her abdomen and another wound of the same nature on the left side of her back.
Further examination also disclosed that the deceased suffered an incised wound on her
left thumb.[2]
When police investigators arrived at the scene of the crime, they found a half-eaten
chicken on the dining table, [3] four pieces of black nylon cloth, [4] pieces of blue and
white ropes, [5] three pieces of cloth, [6] and two strands of ordinary wire. [7] They initially
surmised that the intruders had forcibly entered the house through its back door located
in the kitchen.
the knob of the kitchen door [9] and its chain lock's anchor detached from the doorjamb.
However, the door's dead bolt lock was intact and in perfect condition. [10]
Ferdinand Suarez narrated to Patrolman Pablo Roxas [11] of the Eastern Police District
(EPD) at Meralco Avenue, Pasig what he claimed to have experienced on that fateful
day, in this wise:
At around 3:00 A.M. of December 8, 1987, he was awakened by someone holding his
hands and putting a piece of rag in his mouth. When he opened his eyes, he saw
somebody pointing a knife at him and another at his wife. He saw inside their room six
men with nylon cloths over their faces. When he was about to resist, one of the men hit
him on the face and threatened to kill him, his wife and his children. After they had tied
and gagged him and also covered his eyes, the men brought him out to the dining room.
He heard the door of Estrellita being pushed open, and then Estrellita shouting.
Afterwards, he was brought to the room shared by Cristy and Babyruth and mauled in
front of them. After that, he was brought to the room of Arlene Tuyor. From the maid's
room, he was again brought to the dining room where he was tied to one of the chairs of
the dining table. From there, he heard the men cooking with the use of the microwave
oven in the kitchen. After a while, Estrellita cried loudly and called for Marivic. He later
heard the running of the engine of one of their cars and the main door being slammed
shut. After the men left at about five o'clock in the morning, he discovered that the
trespassers had taken some things in the house such as a television set, a radio, a
betamax and other household items.
As the police were getting no leads about the identity of the malefactors, the lawyer of the
family of the deceased sought the help of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). The
case was assigned to Atty. Salvador Ranin. Atty. Ranin concluded that the perpetrators
could not have entered the house without the aid of somebody inside as the bolt lock of
the kitchen door can only be released from within. He had one suspect in mind, that is,
Ferdinand Suarez, or Jojo. [12]
Ranin had discovered in the course of his investigation that there were no signs of
injuries or rope marks on Suarez and that he was not on good terms with Estrellita when
the crime happened. He was even found positive for deception after taking the polygraph
test at the NBI. Suarez eventually revealed to Ranin his involvement in the commission of
the crime after Ranin told him that he had damaging information to the effect that Suarez
had left the house in the evening of December 7, 1987.
In his sworn statement [13] before the NBI, Suarez said that one Loreto Reyes, alias
"Dondon" or Larry, approached him during the last week of November, 1987 and talked to
him to allow Reyes and his group to rob their house as they badly needed money for the
Christmas season. It was only after the group threatened to kill him that Suarez acceded
to their demand, on the condition that they would only steal but should not kill him.
On November 29, 1987, Suarez gave to Reyes and his gang the keys to the door of the
house, the door of Babyruth's and Cristy's room, and the door of Estrellita's room in order
to have them duplicated. He returned to Reyes and the others on December 5, 1987 to
receive instructions on what to do. He was told that the group would go to their place in
the early morning of December 8, 1987. On the agreed date, at around twelve o'clock
noon, Suarez disengaged the bolt lock of the kitchen door and unlocked the door of their
rooms as earlier instructed by the gang.
The felons arrived at the house at around two o'clock in the morning and proceeded to
Suarez and Marivic' s room. Suarez saw four men with covers on their faces, but he
recognized one of them as Reyes through his voice and build. They immediately bound
Marivic and when one of the members of the gang was about to tie up Suarez, Reyes
stopped him.
After Suarez was dragged out of the room, he told the group who were the occupants of
the different rooms in the house. Two men entered the room of Babyruth and Cristy while
Reyes and the fourth man went to Estrellita's room. They were able to enter Estrellita's
room with the use of their duplicate key and after they had kicked open the door of her
room. Estrellita shrieked when they went inside her room.
The two men brought Suarez to his sisters-in-law's room to point out to them what they
could get from that room. Afterwards, he was brought to the dining table. From there, he
saw the men asking Estrellita for the keys of the gate of the house and the car. After they
brought Estrellita back to her room, two of the men brought Suarez to the maid's
quarters.
Reyes asked Suarez to cook a chicken he found in the refrigerator. While Suarez was
cooking the chicken in the microwave oven, the men took off the covers on their faces,
smoked marijuana and drank liquor. They were not able to finish eating the chicken
because it was not evenly cooked. When Estrellita shouted the name of Marivic,
Rodriguez, one of the companions of Reyes, went to her room. Suarez heard only soft
and fading moans from Estrellita after that.
Before they left, the marauders told Suarez not to tell the police or the NBI or else they
would kill his mother. They slammed the front door shut and used the car of Estrellita to
leave the house at around five o'clock in the morning.
The NBI soon found out that "Dondon" or Larry is Loreto Reyes, a former neighbor of
Suarez in San Miguel, Pasig where he used to live before he transferred to his wife's
residence at Barrio Capitolyo.[14] Reyes also admitted his participation in the commission
of the crime and gave a written statement [15] to the NBI.
He began his confession by implicating Wilfredo Lara in the crime. He said that while he,
Arthur Lara, Morris Santos, and Eduardo Lozada were doing nothing in their place in San
Miguel, Pasig, Lara approached them and told them that he had some good news. Lara
told them that he was asked by Suarez to look for some men who could kill his Auntie
Estrellita. Reyes could not believe what he heard, so Lara called Suarez to let him tell the
gang about his offer.
Apparently, Suarez wanted his aunt killed so that he and his wife could get at once any
property that Marivic might inherit from Estrellita upon the latter's demise. In exchange for
the job, Suarez would allow them to steal what they wanted from the house, in addition to
giving them P100,000.00 after one month from the killing of Estrellita.
They initially planned to carry out the criminal plot on December 5, 1987 but the group of
Reyes backed out on the agreed date when they felt unsure about the plan. However,
they had duplicates made of the keys to the house, which keys had been left by Suarez
under one of Estrellita's cars. The plan finally materialized on December 8, 1987 at about
two o'clock in the morning. The persons who were to execute the plan were Noli Licsi,
Vicente Rodriguez, Morris Santos, and Reyes. Before they went to Capitolyo, the group
took some prohibited drugs and smoked marijuana.
Aided by the sketch of the house provided by Suarez, the group went directly to the back
of the house and opened the back door with their duplicate key. As agreed upon earlier,
Suarez had released the bolt and chain lock of the said door to facilitate their entry into
the house. Once inside, Suarez, who was waiting for them there, instructed them to tie
him and his wife. After doing so, they opened the bedrooms of Babyruth, Cristy and
Estrellita. The men then tied them up inside their respective rooms. Since Santos and
Licsi were the ones who entered Cristy's and Babyruth's room, Reyes could not be sure
what they got from those rooms.
Reyes further revealed that before they went into the house, Suarez had earlier loosened
the screws of the chain lock on the door of Estrellita's room. So, with their duplicate key
and a little push from outside, Reyes and Rodriguez were able to easily enter Estrellita's
room. As Estrellita was surprised by the entry of the two men, she instinctively held the
knife being brandished by Reyes which thereby cut her thumb. The two men then tied
Estrellita.
It was after the gang was able to tie all the occupants of the house that they started
taking the betamax, jewelry, computer machine, camera, watches and other things inside
the house. Estrellita Guzman pointed out to them where they could find her jewelry. They
brought Suarez inside her room so that he could also show them where Estrellita's other
jewelry and valuables were, and then they covered her with a blanket.
After taking what they wanted, the scoundrels ate the chicken Suarez had cooked for
them and drank the imported liquor he offered. They also smoked marijuana. While they
were drinking, Suarez remembered the maid, Tuyor, so he and two men went to her room
and staged a show of their mauling Suarez in front of her. They then tied the maid and
continued drinking outside. Thereafter, Suarez told the gang to kill Estrellita. Reyes said
that Santos and Rodriguez were the ones who stabbed Estrellita because they told him
later that each of them stabbed the old lady once.
Before Reyes and the gang left the place, Marivic told them to get their television ranger
and to disarrange the things in their room to show that the couple was not spared by the
criminals. Suarez ordered them to cut the telephone line and Reyes did so. Then, Suarez
told Reyes to pull the chain lock of the kitchen door to make it appear that the door had
been forced open from outside. Reyes complied with Suarez instructions. To hide the fact
that a duplicate key was used in opening the kitchen door, the perpetrators inserted a
wire in the doorknob keyhole of the kitchen door upon the prodding of Suarez.
The intruders left the house at around four o'clock in the morning. In getting out of the
house, the gang used the front door and rode in one of the cars of Estrellita. From the
statement of Reyes, it appears that the cabal wore black nylon cloths over their heads
and faces when they committed the despicable crime.
Atty. Ranin was able to retrieve the duplicate keys used by the gang [16] from the father
of Reyes [17] after Reyes had admitted that the keys could be found in his father's house
in Montalban. Wilfredo Lara was arrested by the NBI at the house of his parents- in-law in
Northern Samar. When brought to the NBI office at Taft Avenue, Manila, he likewise
confessed his participation in the crime and gave a sworn statement. [18]
According to Lara, Suarez went to his house at San Miguel, Pasig on December 2, 1987
to ask him if he knew people who would be willing and capable of robbing a house. Lara
told him that there were some persons he knew who could do the job and he brought
Suarez to the group of Larry Reyes, Noli Licsi, Morris Santos and Vicente Rodriguez at
Dr. Pilapil Street, San Miguel, Pasig. When Reyes and Suarez started talking, Lara left
the place.
On December 4, 1987, Lara saw Suarez talking with the same group in front of a store.
He overheard them planning the robbery of a house in Barrio Capitolyo on December 8,
1987. On December 7, 1987, he again saw Suarez and the gang when they agreed to
consummate their earlier plan. Lara denied that he joined the group that robbed the
house in Barrio Capitolyo and added that he never received any share of the loot from
them. He did not report the matter to the police for fear of reprisal. He even went to the
place of his in-laws at Nabas, Samar to avoid the group.
Based on the foregoing statements and on other evidence submitted by the NBI to the
then provincial fiscal of the former municipality of Pasig, an information for the crime of
robbery with homicide was filed against Ferdinand Suarez, Loreto Reyes, Wilfredo Lara,
Maria Victoria G. Suarez, Noli Licsi, Vicente Rodriguez, and Morris Santos. The case was
raffled to Branch 152 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig[19] and docketed as Criminal
Case No. 72249.
As stated in the information, which was twice amended, the felony was-allegedly
committed as follows:
That on or about the 8th day of December, 1987 in the Municipality of Pasig, Metro
Manila, Philippines a place within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring and confederating together with one Mauro Santos whose
true identity and present whereabouts is still unknown and mutually helping and aiding
with one another, by means of force, violence and intimidation employed upon the person
of one Estrellita Guzman did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, rob
and carry away from the house of said Estrellita Guzman the following articles, to wit:
a. Jewelry
b. Computer machine
c. TC Sony Ranger
d. Radio Cassette
e. Five (5) assorted cameras and other valuables
all in the total amount of P650,000.00 more or less, that on the occasion of the said
robbery and for the purpose of enabling them to take, rob and carry away the articles
above-mentioned, herein accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually
helping and aiding with one another, armed with bladed weapons, with intent to kill, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously stab said Estrellita Guzman, thereby
causing the latter to sustain fatal injuries which directly caused her death. [20]
Only accused Suarez, Reyes and Lara were brought within the jurisdiction of the lower
court as the other accused went into hiding and were able to evade the joint manhunt set
up by the police and the NBI. Suarez, Reyes and Lara pleaded not guilty despite their
earlier confessions before the NBI. Although they admitted that they signed and placed
their thumbmarks on their respective statements, they tried to show during their trial that
those statements were procured through coercion, intimidation and violence by the NBI
agents and without the assistance of counsel. Accused Suarez reiterated the earlier
version he gave to the EPD, while accused Reyes and Lara raised the defense of alibi by
claiming that they were respectively at Montalban, Rizal and Samar at the time the crime
was committed.
The prosecution however, presented witnesses who were present during the taking of the
statements of the accused and they testified that those statements were given freely and
voluntarily, and were taken with observance of the constitutional guarantees, during the
custodial investigation.
Relying on the extrajudicial confessions of the accused and on the circumstantial
evidence adduced by the prosecution, the trial court found the three accused guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide, and sentenced them to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to solidarily pay to the heirs of the victim P30,000.00 as
death indemnity, P420,00.00 for loss of earning capacity, and the costs. [21]
While Suarez and Reyes have already accepted the trial court's verdict, Lara now
questions the lower court's decision by challenging the admissibility of their extrajudicial
declarations marked as Exhibits O, P and Q. He claims that their extrajudicial confessions
were obtained through force and intimidation and without the benefit of an effective
counsel. [22]
It is important to note at the outset that this Court has no jurisdiction to review the
judgment of conviction imposed upon Suarez and Reyes for they have not filed any
notice of appeal for themselves. [23] And while we are cognizant of the rule that the right
to claim the inadmissibility of an extrajudicial confession is personal in nature, in the
sense that only the confessant whose rights during an investigation were violated can
raise an objection, [24] we deem it necessary to discuss in this appeal the circumstances
surrounding the execution of Reyes's sworn statement in evaluating appellant Lara's own
extra curia declaration. Although an extrajudicial confession is admissible only against the
confessant, jurisprudence makes it admissible as corroborative evidence of other facts
that tend to establish the guilt of his co-accused. [25]
The lower court treated the confessions of the three accused as interlocking confessions
sufficient to corroborate and bolster the truth of each accused's own incriminating
statements. This doctrine of interlocking confessions has been accepted and recognized
in numerous decisions of this Court as an exception to the res inter alios acta rule and the
hearsay rule. [26] Reyes' confession is thus admissible against Lara to show the probable
involvement of the latter in the perpetration of the crime. Where the confession is used as
circumstantial evidence to show the probability of participation by an accused co-
conspirator, that confession is receivable as evidence against him. [27]
But while herein appellant does not deny the validity and operation of the above rule in
his situation, he maintains that his co-accused ' s confessions must comply with the
requirements found in Section 12, Article III of the Constitution before they can be
considered probative of his guilt. [28] We see no need to rule on the admissibility of
Suarez' statement because Lara was never mentioned or implicated therein. What
interests us is that of Reyes, since appellant Lara claims alleged violence, torture and
maltreatment suffered by him and Reyes at the hands of the NBI agents.
After a thorough review of the records of the case, we agree with the lower court' s
factual finding and conclusion that the extrajudicial confessions of accused Reyes and
appellant Lara were freely and voluntarily given and that their retraction and claims of
violence and coercion were merely belated contrivances and efforts at exculpation. Their
claim that they were forced to sign their respective statements was sufficiently refuted by
the witnesses for the prosecution who were present on the day and time the duo gave
and signed their sworn statements. [29]
Once the prosecution has shown that there was compliance with the constitutional
requirement on pre-interrogation advisories, a confession is presumed to be voluntary
and the declarant bears the burden of proving that his confession is involuntary and
untrue. [30] The burden is on the accused to destroy this presumption. [31] A confession
is admissible until the accused successfully proves that it was given as a result of
violence, intimidation, threat, or promise of reward or leniency. [32]
The sworn statements signed by accused Reyes and appellant Lara state that they had
been informed of their rights guaranteed under the Constitution. Reyes stated that he had
been assisted by counsel during the custodial investigation and appellant Lara confirmed
that he was assisted by a lawyer when he waived his constitutional rights. Additionally,
several witnesses for the People testified before the lower court that the constitutional
mandates were observed during their investigation. Reyes and Lara were not even able
to show any evil or dubious motive corrosive of the credibility of these witnesses whom
the court a quo found more worthy of belief than the witnesses for the defense.
Accused failed to submit any evidence, apart from their own testimony, that violence and
intimidation had been inflicted upon them to extort their sworn confessions. They never
complained to Prosecutor Capistrano nor to anyone else about the physical beatings that
they claim had been inflicted upon them. They did not ask for medical assistance and
there was no proof that any such request was denied. Although Reyes submitted a
medical certificate to attest to supposed injuries, the court below did not believe it and
accepted it merely to prove its existence. [33]
Extrajudicial confessions independently made without collusion, almost identical with
each other in their essential details which could have been known only to the declarants,
and corroborated by other evidence against the person or persons implicated to show the
probability of the latter' s actual participation in the commission of the crime, are thus
impressed with features of voluntariness in their execution. [34] Also, the failure of an
accused to complain to the swearing officer [35] or to file charges against the persons
who allegedly maltreated him, although he had all the chances to do so, manifests
voluntariness in the execution of the confession. [36]
We find no merit in herein appellant' s contention that Atty. Saunar was not Reyes' own
choice as counsel for the interrogation. While the initial choice of the lawyer in cases
where a person under custodial investigation cannot afford the services of a lawyer is
naturally lodged in the police investigators, the accused really has the final choice as he
may reject the counsel chosen for him and ask for another one. A lawyer provided by the
investigators is deemed engaged by the accused where he never raised any objection
against the former's appointment during the course of the investigation and the accused
thereafter subscribes to the veracity of his statement before the swearing officer. [37]
Here, while the lawyers of the accused were provided by the NBI, the accused never
signified their desire to have a lawyer of their own choice. Thus, we also disagree with
appellant' s claim that the lawyer who assisted him in his waiver came in only after he
had executed his waiver. His own statement shows that he waived his rights in the
presence and with the advice of Atty. Rodolfo Dahiroc.
To be an effective counsel, a lawyer need not challenge all the questions being
propounded to his client. The presence of a lawyer is not intended to stop an accused
from saying anything which might incriminate him but, rather, it was adopted in our
Constitution to preclude the slightest coercion as would lead the accused to admit
something false. [38] The counsel, however, should never prevent an accused from freely
and voluntarily telling the truth. [39] Hence, absent any showing that the lawyers who
assisted the accused were remiss in their duties, it can be safely concluded that the given the benefit of the doubt and be declared as a mere accomplice therein. [49] We are
custodial investigation of Reyes and Lara were regularly conducted. [40] sufficiently persuaded to declare appellant as a mere accomplice in the crime charged.

Even disregarding for a moment Reyes' extrajudicial declaration, appellant Lara can still
be held accountable under his own sworn statement. Well-entrenched is the rule that it is
not necessary that an eyewitness should testify to having seen the accused committing
the crime or had seen him under circumstances indicating his having committed the
crime, before the accused may be held liable under his confession. [41] This is how much
weight and credence our jurisprudence gives to a confession. The Rules of Court [42]
provide that "(t)he declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense
charged, or any offense necessarily included therein, may be given in evidence against
him. "
WHEREFORE, the penalty imposed upon accused-appellant Wilfredo Lara is hereby
MODIFIED and he is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of
prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion
temporal, as maximum.
The death indemnity awarded by the court a quo is hereby INCREASED to Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) in line with present case law and policy, to be assessed
against the accused and herein appellant in accordance with Article 110 of the Revised
Penal Code.

Of course, when the confession is made outside of court proceedings, it must be In all other respects, the judgment of the lower court is hereby AFFIRMED.
accompanied by evidence of the corpus delicti to be sufficient for conviction. [43] If it is
made freely and voluntarily, a confession constitutes evidence of a high order since it is SO ORDERED.
supported by the strong presumption that no sane person or one of a normal mind will
Romero, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
deliberately and knowingly confess himself to be the perpetrator of a crime unless
prompted by truth and conscience. [44]

Withal, appellant Lara did not appeal in vain. Although he himself admitted his role in the
crime of robbery with homicide, we deem it just and equitable to delineate in this decision
his exact criminal liability even though he failed to clearly raise it before us.

We reject the prosecution' s theory and the trial court ' s conclusion that appellant acted
as a lookout during the commission of the special complex crime. The prosecution did not
present any evidence showing that he took part in the planning or execution of the crime
nor any proof indicating that he profited from the fruits of the crime, or of acts indicative of
confederacy on his part.

The pictures of the reenactment depicting Lara' s role in the commission of the crime [45]
cannot be utilized as evidence of his participation as a principal therein as that
reenactment was conducted without any lawyer assisting appellant. We have held that
reenactments are covered by the right against self- incrimination.[46] Atty. Ranin himself
admitted on the witness stand that no lawyer assisted Lara during the reenactment
because he could not find any available lawyer at that time who could act as his counsel.
[47]

From Reyes and appellant's confessions, which we believe bear the mark of truth and
credibility, it can only be inferred that Lara merely introduced the group of Reyes to
Suarez. With such a nominal role, we cannot conscientiously declare that Lara was a co-
conspirator or a principal by inducement or indispensable cooperation in the crime of
robbery with homicide.

Where the accused does not fall under any of the three concepts of principals defined in
Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, he may only be considered guilty as an
accomplice. [48] And where there is no showing of conspiracy or confabulation on his
part, and the extent of the accused's participation in the crime is uncertain, he should be
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 162571. June 15, 2005]
ARNEL L. AGUSTIN, petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS AND MINOR MARTIN
JOSE PROLLAMANTE, REPRESENTED BY HIS MOTHER/GUARDIAN FE ANGELA
PROLLAMANTE, respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
At issue in this petition for certiorari [1] is whether or not the Court of Appeals (CA)
gravely erred in exercising its discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, in
issuing a decision[2] and resolution[3] upholding the resolution and order of the trial
court,[4] which denied petitioners motion to dismiss private respondents complaint for
support and directed the parties to submit themselves to deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA)
paternity testing.
Respondents Fe Angela and her son Martin Prollamante sued Martins alleged biological
father, petitioner Arnel L. Agustin, for support and support pendente lite before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 106.[5]
In their complaint, respondents alleged that Arnel courted Fe in 1992, after which they
entered into an intimate relationship. Arnel supposedly impregnated Fe on her 34th
birthday on November 10, 1999. Despite Arnels insistence on abortion, Fe decided
otherwise and gave birth to their child out of wedlock, Martin, on August 11, 2000 at the
Capitol Medical Hospital in Quezon City. The babys birth certificate was purportedly
signed by Arnel as the father. Arnel shouldered the pre-natal and hospital expenses but
later refused Fes repeated requests for Martins support despite his adequate financial
capacity and even suggested to have the child committed for adoption. Arnel also denied
having fathered the child.
On January 19, 2001, while Fe was carrying five-month old Martin at the Capitol Hills Golf
and Country Club parking lot, Arnel sped off in his van, with the open car door hitting Fes
leg. This incident was reported to the police. In July 2001, Fe was diagnosed with
leukemia and has, since then, been undergoing chemotherapy. On March 5, 2002, Fe
and Martin sued Arnel for support.[6]
In his amended answer, Arnel denied having sired Martin because his affair and intimacy
with Fe had allegedly ended in 1998, long before Martins conception. He claimed that Fe
had at least one other secret lover. Arnel admitted that their relationship started in 1993
but he never really fell in love with (Fe) not only because (she) had at least one secret
lover, a certain Jun, but also because she proved to be scheming and overly demanding
and possessive. As a result, theirs was a stormy on-and-off affair. What started as a
romantic liaison between two consenting adults eventually turned out to be a case of fatal
attraction where (Fe) became so obsessed with (Arnel), to the point of even entertaining
the idea of marrying him, that she resorted to various devious ways and means to
alienate (him) from his wife and family. Unable to bear the prospect of losing his wife and
children, Arnel terminated the affair although he still treated her as a friend such as by
referring potential customers to the car aircon repair shop[7] where she worked. Later on,
Arnel found out that Fe had another erstwhile secret lover. In May 2000, Arnel and his
entire family went to the United States for a vacation. Upon their return in June 2000,
Arnel learned that Fe was telling people that he had impregnated her. Arnel refused to
acknowledge the child as his because their last intimacy was sometime in 1998.[8]
Exasperated, Fe started calling Arnels wife and family. On January 19, 2001, Fe followed
Arnel to the Capitol Hills Golf and Country Club parking lot to demand that he
acknowledge Martin as his child. According to Arnel, he could not get through Fe and the
discussion became so heated that he had no alternative but to move on but without
bumping or hitting any part of her body.[9] Finally, Arnel claimed that the signature and
the community tax certificate (CTC) attributed to him in the acknowledgment of Martins
birth certificate were falsified. The CTC erroneously reflected his marital status as single
when he was actually married and that his birth year was 1965 when it should have been
1964.[10]
In his pre-trial brief filed on May 17, 2002, Arnel vehemently denied having sired Martin
but expressed willingness to consider any proposal to settle the case.[11]
On July 23, 2002, Fe and Martin moved for the issuance of an order directing all the
parties to submit themselves to DNA paternity testing pursuant to Rule 28 of the Rules of
Court.[12]
Arnel opposed said motion by invoking his constitutional right against self-
incrimination.[13] He also moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of cause of action,
considering that his signature on the birth certificate was a forgery and that, under the
law, an illegitimate child is not entitled to support if not recognized by the putative
father.[14] In his motion, Arnel manifested that he had filed criminal charges for
falsification of documents against Fe (I.S. Nos. 02-5723 and 02-7192) and a petition for
cancellation of his name appearing in Martins birth certificate (docketed as Civil Case No.
Q-02-46669). He attached the certification of the Philippine National Police Crime
Laboratory that his signature in the birth certificate was forged.
The trial court denied the motion to dismiss the complaint and ordered the parties to
submit themselves to DNA paternity testing at the expense of the applicants. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the trial court.
Thus, this petition.
In a nutshell, petitioner raises two issues: (1) whether a complaint for support can be
converted to a petition for recognition and (2) whether DNA paternity testing can be
ordered in a proceeding for support without violating petitioners constitutional right to
privacy and right against self-incrimination.[15]
The petition is without merit.
First of all, the trial court properly denied the petitioners motion to dismiss because the
private respondents complaint on its face showed that they had a cause of action against
the petitioner. The elements of a cause of action are: (1) the plaintiffs primary right and
the defendants corresponding primary duty, and (2) the delict or wrongful act or omission
of the defendant, by which the primary right and duty have been violated. The cause of
action is determined not by the prayer of the complaint but by the facts alleged.[16]
In the complaint, private respondents alleged that Fe had amorous relations with the
petitioner, as a result of which she gave birth to Martin out of wedlock. In his answer,
petitioner admitted that he had sexual relations with Fe but denied that he fathered
Martin, claiming that he had ended the relationship long before the childs conception and
birth. It is undisputed and even admitted by the parties that there existed a sexual
relationship between Arnel and Fe. The only remaining question is whether such sexual
relationship produced the child, Martin. If it did, as respondents have alleged, then Martin
should be supported by his father Arnel. If not, petitioner and Martin are strangers to each
other and Martin has no right to demand and petitioner has no obligation to give support.
Preliminaries aside, we now tackle the main issues.
Petitioner refuses to recognize Martin as his own child and denies the genuineness and
authenticity of the childs birth certificate which he purportedly signed as the father. He
also claims that the order and resolution of the trial court, as affirmed by the Court of
Appeals, effectively converted the complaint for support to a petition for recognition,
which is supposedly proscribed by law. According to petitioner, Martin, as an
unrecognized child, has no right to ask for support and must first establish his filiation in a
separate suit under Article 283[17] in relation to Article 265[18] of the Civil Code and
Section 1, Rule 105[19] of the Rules of Court.
The petitioners contentions are without merit.
The assailed resolution and order did not convert the action for support into one for
recognition but merely allowed the respondents to prove their cause of action against
petitioner who had been denying the authenticity of the documentary evidence of
acknowledgement. But even if the assailed resolution and order effectively integrated an
action to compel recognition with an action for support, such was valid and in accordance
with jurisprudence. In Tayag v. Court of Appeals,[20] we allowed the integration of an
action to compel recognition with an action to claim ones inheritance:
In Paulino, we held that an illegitimate child, to be entitled to support and successional
rights from the putative or presumed parent, must prove his filiation to the latter. We also
said that it is necessary to allege in the complaint that the putative father had
acknowledged and recognized the illegitimate child because such acknowledgment is
essential to and is the basis of the right to inherit. There being no allegation of such
acknowledgment, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be brought
after the death of the putative father. The ratio decidendi in Paulino, therefore, is not the
absence of a cause of action for failure of the petitioner to allege the fact of
acknowledgment in the complaint, but the prescription of the action.
Applying the foregoing principles to the case at bar, although petitioner contends that the
complaint filed by herein private respondent merely alleges that the minor Chad Cuyugan
is an illegitimate child of the deceased and is actually a claim for inheritance, from the
allegations therein the same may be considered as one to compel recognition. Further,
that the two causes of action, one to compel recognition and the other to claim
inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new in our jurisprudence.
As early as [1922] we had occasion to rule thereon in Briz vs. Briz, et al. (43 Phil. 763
[1922]) wherein we said:
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any event
maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at the same time
to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the opinion of this court
must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that the conditions justifying the
joinder of the two distinct causes of action are present in the particular case. In other
words, there is no absolute necessity requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment
should have been instituted and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action
in which that same plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there
is nothing so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule
should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. x x x
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this court, is
undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we have held in
numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled, that a natural child
having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not been in fact legally
acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division of the inheritance
against his coheirs x x x; and the same person may intervene in proceedings for the
distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother x x x. In neither of
these situations has it been thought necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree
compelling acknowledgment. The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution
proceedings the other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and
the declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings. (Underscoring supplied)
Although the instant case deals with support rather than inheritance, as in Tayag, the
basis or rationale for integrating them remains the same. Whether or not respondent
Martin is entitled to support depends completely on the determination of filiation. A
separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits, given how intimately related the
main issues in both cases are. To paraphrase Tayag, the declaration of filiation is entirely
appropriate to these proceedings.
On the second issue, petitioner posits that DNA is not recognized by this Court as a
conclusive means of proving paternity. He also contends that compulsory testing violates
his right to privacy and right against self-incrimination as guaranteed under the 1987
Constitution. These contentions have no merit.
Given that this is the very first time that the admissibility of DNA testing as a means for
determining paternity has actually been the focal issue in a controversy, a brief historical
sketch of our past decisions featuring or mentioning DNA testing is called for.
In the 1995 case of People v. Teehankee[21] where the appellant was convicted of
murder on the testimony of three eyewitnesses, we stated as an obiter dictum that while
eyewitness identification is significant, it is not as accurate and authoritative as the
scientific forms of identification evidence such as the fingerprint or the DNA test result
(emphasis supplied).
Our faith in DNA testing, however, was not quite so steadfast in the previous decade. In
Pe Lim v. Court of Appeals,[22] promulgated in 1997, we cautioned against the use of
DNA because DNA, being a relatively new science, (had) not as yet been accorded
official recognition by our courts. Paternity (would) still have to be resolved by such
conventional evidence as the relevant incriminating acts, verbal and written, by the
putative father.
In 2001, however, we opened the possibility of admitting DNA as evidence of parentage,
as enunciated in Tijing v. Court of Appeals:[23]
A final note. Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt
the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and
expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the
Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has
now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The
analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy
from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged
father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific
technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the
appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA
evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when
competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny
progress.
The first real breakthrough of DNA as admissible and authoritative evidence in Philippine
jurisprudence came in 2002 with our en banc decision in People v. Vallejo[24] where the
rape and murder victims DNA samples from the bloodstained clothes of the accused
were admitted in evidence. We reasoned that the purpose of DNA testing (was) to
ascertain whether an association exist(ed) between the evidence sample and the
reference sample. The samples collected (were) subjected to various chemical processes
to establish their profile.
A year later, in People v. Janson,[25] we acquitted the accused charged with rape for lack
of evidence because doubts persist(ed) in our mind as to who (were) the real
malefactors. Yes, a complex offense (had) been perpetrated but who (were) the
perpetrators? How we wish we had DNA or other scientific evidence to still our doubts!
In 2004, in Tecson, et al. v. COMELEC[26] where the Court en banc was faced with the
issue of filiation of then presidential candidate Fernando Poe Jr., we stated:
In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would
be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body
cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be
resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of
Appeals, this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing
Moreover, in our en banc decision in People v. Yatar,[27] we affirmed the conviction of
the accused for rape with homicide, the principal evidence for which included DNA test
results. We did a lengthy discussion of DNA, the process of DNA testing and the reasons
for its admissibility in the context of our own Rules of Evidence:
Deoxyribonucleic Acid, or DNA, is a molecule that encodes the genetic information in all
living organisms. A persons DNA is the same in each cell and it does not change
throughout a persons lifetime; the DNA in a persons blood is the same as the DNA found
in his saliva, sweat, bone, the root and shaft of hair, earwax, mucus, urine, skin tissue,
and vaginal and rectal cells. Most importantly, because of polymorphisms in human
genetic structure, no two individuals have the same DNA, with the notable exception of
identical twins.
xxx xxx xxx
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, courts should consider, inter alia, the
following factors: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility
of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples,
whether proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the
qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.
In the case at bar, Dr. Maria Corazon Abogado de Ungria was duly qualified by the
prosecution as an expert witness on DNA print or identification techniques. Based on Dr.
de Ungrias testimony, it was determined that the gene type and DNA profile of appellant
are identical to that of the extracts subject of examination. The blood sample taken from
the appellant showed that he was of the following gene types: vWA 15/19, TH01 7/8,
DHFRP29/10 and CSF1PO 10/11, which are identical with semen taken from the victims
vaginal canal. Verily, a DNA match exists between the semen found in the victim and the
blood sample given by the appellant in open court during the course of the trial.
Admittedly, we are just beginning to integrate these advances in science and technology
in the Philippine criminal justice system, so we must be cautious as we traverse these
relatively uncharted waters. Fortunately, we can benefit from the wealth of persuasive
jurisprudence that has developed in other jurisdictions. Specifically, the prevailing
doctrine in the U.S. has proven instructive.
In Daubert v. Merrell Dow (509 U.S. 579 (1993); 125 L. Ed. 2d 469) it was ruled that
pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles could be used as long as it was
relevant and reliable. Judges, under Daubert, were allowed greater discretion over which
testimony they would allow at trial, including the introduction of new kinds of scientific
techniques. DNA typing is one such novel procedure.
Under Philippine law, evidence is relevant when it relates directly to a fact in issue as to
induce belief in its existence or non-existence. Applying the Daubert test to the case at
bar, the DNA evidence obtained through PCR testing and utilizing STR analysis, and
which was appreciated by the court a quo is relevant and reliable since it is reasonably
based on scientifically valid principles of human genetics and molecular biology.
Significantly, we upheld the constitutionality of compulsory DNA testing and the
admissibility of the results thereof as evidence. In that case, DNA samples from semen
recovered from a rape victims vagina were used to positively identify the accused Joel
Kawit Yatar as the rapist. Yatar claimed that the compulsory extraction of his blood
sample for DNA testing, as well as the testing itself, violated his right against self-
incrimination, as embodied in both Sections 12 and 17 of Article III of the Constitution.
We addressed this as follows:
The contention is untenable. The kernel of the right is not against all compulsion, but
against testimonial compulsion. The right against self-incrimination is simply against the
legal process of extracting from the lips of the accused an admission of guilt. It does not
apply where the evidence sought to be excluded is not an incrimination but as part of
object evidence.
Over the years, we have expressly excluded several kinds of object evidence taken from
the person of the accused from the realm of self-incrimination. These include
photographs,[28] hair,[29] and other bodily substances.[30] We have also declared as
constitutional several procedures performed on the accused such as pregnancy tests for
women accused of adultery,[31] expulsion of morphine from ones mouth[32] and the
tracing of ones foot to determine its identity with bloody footprints.[33] In Jimenez v.
Caizares,[34] we even authorized the examination of a womans genitalia, in an action for
annulment filed by her husband, to verify his claim that she was impotent, her orifice
being too small for his penis. Some of these procedures were, to be sure, rather invasive
and involuntary, but all of them were constitutionally sound. DNA testing and its results,
per our ruling in Yatar,[35] are now similarly acceptable.
Nor does petitioners invocation of his right to privacy persuade us. In Ople v. Torres,[36]
where we struck down the proposed national computerized identification system
embodied in Administrative Order No. 308, we said:
In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all
incursions into individual privacy. The right is not intended to stifle scientific and
technological advancements that enhance public service and the common good...
Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards that enhance public
service and the common good.
Historically, it has mostly been in the areas of legality of searches and seizures,[37] and
the infringement of privacy of communication[38] where the constitutional right to privacy
has been critically at issue. Petitioners case involves neither and, as already stated, his
argument that his right against self-incrimination is in jeopardy holds no water. His hollow
invocation of his constitutional rights elicits no sympathy here for the simple reason that
they are not in any way being violated. If, in a criminal case, an accused whose very life
is at stake can be compelled to submit to DNA testing, we see no reason why, in this civil
case, petitioner herein who does not face such dire consequences cannot be ordered to
do the same.
DNA paternity testing first came to prominence in the United States, where it yielded its
first official results sometime in 1985. In the decade that followed, DNA rapidly found
widespread general acceptance.[39] Several cases decided by various State Supreme
Courts reflect the total assimilation of DNA testing into their rules of procedure and
evidence.
The case of Wilson v. Lumb[40] shows that DNA testing is so commonly accepted that, in
some instances, ordering the procedure has become a ministerial act. The Supreme
Court of St. Lawrence County, New York allowed a party who had already acknowledged
paternity to subsequently challenge his prior acknowledgment. The Court pointed out
that, under the law, specifically Section 516 of the New York Family Court Act, the Family
Court examiner had the duty, upon receipt of the challenge, to order DNA tests:[41]
516-a. Acknowledgment of paternity. (a) An acknowledgment of paternity executed
pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social services law or section four
thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public health law shall establish the paternity of
and liability for the support of a child pursuant to this act. Such acknowledgment must be
reduced to writing and filed pursuant to section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of
the public health law with the registrar of the district in which the birth occurred and in
which the birth certificate has been filed. No further judicial or administrative proceedings
are required to ratify an unchallenged acknowledgment of paternity.
(b) An acknowledgment of paternity executed pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k
of the social services law or section four thousand one hundred thirty-five-b of the public
health law may be rescinded by either signators filing of a petition with the court to vacate
the acknowledgment within the earlier of sixty days of the date of signing the
acknowledgment or the date of an administrative or a judicial proceeding (including a
proceeding to establish a support order) relating to the child in which either signator is a
party. For purposes of this section, the "date of an administrative or a judicial proceeding"
shall be the date by which the respondent is required to answer the petition. After the
expiration of sixty days of the execution of the acknowledgment, either signator may
challenge the acknowledgment of paternity in court only on the basis of fraud, duress, or
material mistake of fact, with the burden of proof on the party challenging the voluntary
acknowledgment. Upon receiving a partys challenge to an acknowledgment, the court
shall order genetic marker tests or DNA tests for the determination of the childs paternity
and shall make a finding of paternity, if appropriate, in accordance with this article.
Neither signators legal obligations, including the obligation for child support arising from
the acknowledgment, may be suspended during the challenge to the acknowledgment
except for good cause as the court may find. If a party petitions to rescind an
acknowledgment and if the court determines that the alleged father is not the father of the
child, or if the court finds that an acknowledgment is invalid because it was executed on
the basis of fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact, the court shall vacate the
acknowledgment of paternity and shall immediately provide a copy of the order to the
registrar of the district in which the childs birth certificate is filed and also to the putative
father registry operated by the department of social services pursuant to section three
hundred seventy-two-c of the social services law. In addition, if the mother of the child
who is the subject of the acknowledgment is in receipt of child support services pursuant
to title six-A of article three of the social services law, the court shall immediately provide
a copy of the order to the child support enforcement unit of the social services district that
provides the mother with such services.
(c) A determination of paternity made by any other state, whether established through the
parents acknowledgment of paternity or through an administrative or judicial process,
must be accorded full faith and credit, if and only if such acknowledgment meets the
requirements set forth in section 452(a)(7) of the social security act.
(emphasis supplied)
DNA testing also appears elsewhere in the New York Family Court Act:[42]
532. Genetic marker and DNA tests; admissibility of records or reports of test results;
costs of tests.
a) The court shall advise the parties of their right to one or more genetic marker tests or
DNA tests and, on the courts own motion or the motion of any party, shall order the
mother, her child and the alleged father to submit to one or more genetic marker or DNA
tests of a type generally acknowledged as reliable by an accreditation body designated
by the secretary of the federal department of health and human services and performed
by a laboratory approved by such an accreditation body and by the commissioner of
health or by a duly qualified physician to aid in the determination of whether the alleged
father is or is not the father of the child. No such test shall be ordered, however, upon a
written finding by the court that it is not in the best interests of the child on the basis of res
judicata, equitable estoppel, or the presumption of legitimacy of a child born to a married
woman. The record or report of the results of any such genetic marker or DNA test
ordered pursuant to this section or pursuant to section one hundred eleven-k of the social
services law shall be received in evidence by the court pursuant to subdivision (e) of rule
forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules where no timely objection in
writing has been made thereto and that if such timely objections are not made, they shall
be deemed waived and shall not be heard by the court. If the record or report of the
results of any such genetic marker or DNA test or tests indicate at least a ninety-five
percent probability of paternity, the admission of such record or report shall create a
rebuttable presumption of paternity, and shall establish, if unrebutted, the paternity of and
liability for the support of a child pursuant to this article and article four of this act.
(b) Whenever the court directs a genetic marker or DNA test pursuant to this section, a
report made as provided in subdivision (a) of this section may be received in evidence
pursuant to rule forty-five hundred eighteen of the civil practice law and rules if offered by
any party.
(c) The cost of any test ordered pursuant to subdivision (a) of this section shall be, in the
first instance, paid by the moving party. If the moving party is financially unable to pay
such cost, the court may direct any qualified public health officer to conduct such test, if
practicable; otherwise, the court may direct payment from the funds of the appropriate
local social services district. In its order of disposition, however, the court may direct that
the cost of any such test be apportioned between the parties according to their respective
abilities to pay or be assessed against the party who does not prevail on the issue of
paternity, unless such party is financially unable to pay. (emphasis supplied)
In R.E. v. C.E.W.,[43] a decision of the Mississippi Supreme Court, DNA tests were used
to prove that H.W., previously thought to be an offspring of the marriage between A.C.W.
and C.E.W., was actually the child of R.E. with whom C.E.W. had, at the time of
conception, maintained an adulterous relationship.
In Erie County Department of Social Services on behalf of Tiffany M.H. v. Greg G.,[44]
the 4th Department of the New York Supreme Courts Appellate Division allowed G.G.,
who had been adjudicated as T.M.H.s father by default, to have the said judgment
vacated, even after six years, once he had shown through a genetic marker test that he
was not the childs father. In this case, G.G. only requested the tests after the Department
of Social Services, six years after G.G. had been adjudicated as T.M.H.s father, sought
an increase in his support obligation to her.
In Greco v. Coleman,[45] the Michigan Supreme Court while ruling on the constitutionality
of a provision of law allowing non-modifiable support agreements pointed out that it was
because of the difficulty of determining paternity before the advent of DNA testing that
such support agreements were necessary:
As a result of DNA testing, the accuracy with which paternity can be proven has
increased significantly since the parties in this lawsuit entered into their support
agreement(current testing methods can determine the probability of paternity to
99.999999% accuracy). However, at the time the parties before us entered into the
disputed agreement, proving paternity was a very significant obstacle to an illegitimate
child's access to child support. The first reported results of modern DNA paternity testing
did not occur until 1985. ("In fact, since its first reported results in 1985, DNA matching
has progressed to 'general acceptance in less than a decade'"). Of course, while prior
blood-testing methods could exclude some males from being the possible father of a
child, those methods could not affirmatively pinpoint a particular male as being the father.
Thus, when the settlement agreement between the present parties was entered in 1980,
establishing paternity was a far more difficult ordeal than at present. Contested paternity
actions at that time were often no more than credibility contests. Consequently, in every
contested paternity action, obtaining child support depended not merely on whether the
putative father was, in fact, the child's biological father, but rather on whether the mother
could prove to a court of law that she was only sexually involved with one man--the
putative father. Allowing parties the option of entering into private agreements in lieu of
proving paternity eliminated the risk that the mother would be unable meet her burden of
proof.
It is worth noting that amendments to Michigans Paternity law have included the use of
DNA testing:[46]
722.716 Pretrial proceedings; blood or tissue typing determinations as to mother, child,
and alleged father; court order; refusal to submit to typing or identification profiling;
qualifications of person conducting typing or identification profiling; compensation of
expert; result of typing or identification profiling; filing summary report; objection;
admissibility; presumption; burden of proof; summary disposition.
Sec. 6.
(1) In a proceeding under this act before trial, the court, upon application made by or on
behalf of either party, or on its own motion, shall order that the mother, child, and alleged
father submit to blood or tissue typing determinations, which may include, but are not
limited to, determinations of red cell antigens, red cell isoenzymes, human leukocyte
antigens, serum proteins, or DNA identification profiling, to determine whether the alleged
father is likely to be, or is not, the father of the child. If the court orders a blood or tissue
typing or DNA identification profiling to be conducted and a party refuses to submit to the
typing or DNA identification profiling, in addition to any other remedies available, the court
may do either of the following:
(a) Enter a default judgment at the request of the appropriate party.
(b) If a trial is held, allow the disclosure of the fact of the refusal unless good cause is
shown for not disclosing the fact of refusal.
(2) A blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling shall be conducted by a person
accredited for paternity determinations by a nationally recognized scientific organization,
including, but not limited to, the American association of blood banks.
xxx xxx xxx
(5) If the probability of paternity determined by the qualified person described in
subsection (2) conducting the blood or tissue typing or DNA identification profiling is 99%
or higher, and the DNA identification profile and summary report are admissible as
provided in subsection (4), paternity is presumed. If the results of the analysis of genetic
testing material from 2 or more persons indicate a probability of paternity greater than
99%, the contracting laboratory shall conduct additional genetic paternity testing until all
but 1 of the putative fathers is eliminated, unless the dispute involves 2 or more putative
fathers who have identical DNA.
(6) Upon the establishment of the presumption of paternity as provided in subsection (5),
either party may move for summary disposition under the court rules. this section does
not abrogate the right of either party to child support from the date of birth of the child if
applicable under section 7. (emphasis supplied)
In Rafferty v. Perkins,[47] the Supreme Court of Mississippi ruled that DNA test results
showing paternity were sufficient to overthrow the presumption of legitimacy of a child
born during the course of a marriage:
The presumption of legitimacy having been rebutted by the results of the blood test
eliminating Perkins as Justin's father, even considering the evidence in the light most
favorable to Perkins, we find that no reasonable jury could find that Easter is not Justin's
father based upon the 99.94% probability of paternity concluded by the DNA testing.
In S.J.F. and J.C.F. v. R.C.W.,[48] the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld an order for
genetic testing given by the Court of Appeals, even after trial on the merits had concluded
without such order being given. Significantly, when J.C.F., the mother, first filed the case
for paternity and support with the District Court, neither party requested genetic testing. It
was only upon appeal from dismissal of the case that the appellate court remanded the
case and ordered the testing, which the North Dakota Supreme Court upheld.
The case of Kohl v. Amundson,[49] decided by the Supreme Court of South Dakota,
demonstrated that even default judgments of paternity could be vacated after the
adjudicated father had, through DNA testing, established non-paternity. In this case, Kohl,
having excluded himself as the father of Amundsons child through DNA testing, was able
to have the default judgment against him vacated. He then obtained a ruling ordering
Amundson to reimburse him for the amounts withheld from his wages for child support.
The Court said (w)hile Amundson may have a remedy against the father of the child, she
submit(ted) no authority that require(d) Kohl to support her child. Contrary to Amundson's
position, the fact that a default judgment was entered, but subsequently vacated, (did) not
foreclose Kohl from obtaining a money judgment for the amount withheld from his wages.
In M.A.S. v. Mississippi Dept. of Human Services,[50] another case decided by the
Supreme Court of Mississippi, it was held that even if paternity was established through
an earlier agreed order of filiation, child support and visitation orders could still be
vacated once DNA testing established someone other than the named individual to be
the biological father. The Mississippi High Court reiterated this doctrine in Williams v.
Williams.[51]
The foregoing considered, we find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the public
respondent for upholding the orders of the trial court which both denied the petitioners
motion to dismiss and ordered him to submit himself for DNA testing. Under Rule 65 of
the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the remedy of certiorari is only available when any
tribunal, board or officer has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no
appeal, nor any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.[52] In
Land Bank of the Philippines v. the Court of Appeals[53] where we dismissed a special
civil action for certiorari under Rule 65, we discussed at length the nature of such a
petition and just what was meant by grave abuse of discretion:
Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as
is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or personal hostility, and it must be so
patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law.

The special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for the correction of errors of
jurisdiction and not errors of judgment. The raison detre for the rule is when a court
exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so engaged does not deprive it of the
jurisdiction being exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every error committed
by a court would deprive it of its jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a
void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of justice would not survive. Hence,
where the issue or question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decisionnot the jurisdiction of the court to render said decisionthe same is beyond the
province of a special civil action for certiorari.

The proper recourse of the aggrieved party from a decision of the CA is a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court. On the other hand, if
the error subject of the recourse is one of jurisdiction, or the act complained of was
perpetrated by a quasi-judicial officer or agency with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the proper remedy available to the aggrieved party is a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. (emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, the petitioner has in no way shown any arbitrariness, passion,
prejudice or personal hostility that would amount to grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Court of Appeals. The respondent court acted entirely within its jurisdiction in
promulgating its decision and resolution, and any error made would have only been an
error in judgment. As we have discussed, however, the decision of the respondent court,
being firmly anchored in law and jurisprudence, was correct.

Epilogue

For too long, illegitimate children have been marginalized by fathers who choose to deny
their existence. The growing sophistication of DNA testing technology finally provides a
much needed equalizer for such ostracized and abandoned progeny. We have long
believed in the merits of DNA testing and have repeatedly expressed as much in the past.
This case comes at a perfect time when DNA testing has finally evolved into a
dependable and authoritative form of evidence gathering. We therefore take this
opportunity to forcefully reiterate our stand that DNA testing is a valid means of
determining paternity.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of
Appeals decision dated January 28, 2004 in CA-G.R. SP No. 80961 is hereby
AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines THE HONORABLE NICOLAS A. GEROCHI, JR., in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
SUPREME COURT Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 139, Makati and
FEDERICO L. MELOCOTTON JR., in his capacity as Trial Fiscal Regional Trial Court,
Manila
Branch 139, Makati, respondents.

EN BANC G.R No. 75812-13 December 18, 1986

G.R. No. L-63419 December 18, 1986 AMABLE R. AGUILUZ VII and SYLVIA V. AGUILUZ, spouses, petitioners,

FLORENTINA A. LOZANO, petitioner, vs.

vs. HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF BRANCH 154, now vacant but temporarily
presided by HONORABLE ASAALI S. ISNANI Branch 153, Court of First Instance of
THE HONORABLE ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge,
Pasig, Metro Manila, respondent.
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XX, Manila, and the
HONORABLE JOSE B. FLAMINIANO, in his capacity as City Fiscal of Manila, G.R No. 75765-67 December 18, 1986
respondents.
LUIS M. HOJAS, petitioner,
G.R. No. L-66839-42 December 18, 1986
vs.
LUZVIMINDA F. LOBATON petitioner,
HON. JUDGE SENEN PENARANDA, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Cagayan
vs. de Oro City, Branch XX, HONORABLE JUDGE ALFREDO LAGAMON, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City, Branch XXII, HONORABLE CITY FISCAL
HONORABLE GLICERIO L. CRUZ, in his capacity as Presiding Executive Judge, Branch
NOLI T. CATHI, City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City, respondents.
V, Region IV, Regional Trial Court, sitting at Lemery, Batangas, THE PROVINCIAL
FISCAL OF BATANGAS, and MARIA LUISA TORDECILLA, respondents. G.R. No. 75789 December 18, 1986

G.R No. 71654 December 18, 1986 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

ANTONIO DATUIN and SUSAN DATUIN, petitioners, vs.

vs. HON. DAVID G. NITAFAN, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region, Branch 52, Manila and THELMA SARMIENTO, respondents.
HONORABLE JUDGE ERNANI C. PANO, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
LXXXVIII, HONORABLE ClTY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY, respondents. R.R. Nogales Law Office for petitioner in G.R. No. 63419, G.R. Nos. 74524-25, G.R. Nos.
75812-13, G.R. Nos. 75765-67 and counsel for respondent in G.R. No. 75789.
G.R. No. 74524-25 December 18, 1986
Pio S. Canta for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 66839-42.
OSCAR VIOLAGO, petitioner,
Hermogenes Datuin, Jr. for petitioner in G.R. No. 71654.
vs.
Abinoja, Tabalingcos, Villalon & Associates for petitioner in G.R. Nos. 75122-49.
HONORABLE JUDGE ERNANI C. PAÑ;O Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
LXXXVIII, HONORABLE CITY FISCAL OF QUEZON CITY, respondents. The Solicitor General for respondent in G.R. No. 63419, G.R. Nos. 66839-42, G.R. No.
71654, G.R. Nos. 74524-25, G.R. Nos. 75122-49, G.R. Nos. 75812-13, G.R. Nos. 75765-
G.R. No. 75122-49 December 18, 1986
67 and counsel for petitioner in G.R. No. 75789.
ELINOR ABAD, petitioner,
YAP, J.:
vs.
The constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 (BP 22 for short), popularly known as
the Bouncing Check Law, which was approved on April 3, 1979, is the sole issue
presented by these petitions for decision. The question is definitely one of first impression
in our jurisdiction.
These petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under the statute. The
defendants in those cases moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground
that the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The
motions were denied by the respondent trial courts, except in one case, which is the
subject of G. R. No. 75789, wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and
dismissed the case. The parties adversely affected have come to us for relief.
As a threshold issue the former Solicitor General in his comment on the petitions,
maintained the posture that it was premature for the accused to elevate to this Court the
orders denying their motions to quash, these orders being interlocutory. While this is
correct as a general rule, we have in justifiable cases intervened to review the lower
court's denial of a motion to quash. 1 In view of the importance of the issue involved here,
there is no doubt in our mind that the instant petitions should be entertained and the
constitutional challenge to BP 22 resolved promptly, one way or the other, in order to put
to rest the doubts and uncertainty that exist in legal and judicial circles and the general
public which have unnecessarily caused a delay in the disposition of cases involving the
enforcement of the statute.
For the purpose of resolving the constitutional issue presented here, we do not find it
necessary to delve into the specifics of the informations involved in the cases which are
the subject of the petitions before us. 2 The language of BP 22 is broad enough to cover
all kinds of checks, whether present dated or postdated, or whether issued in payment of
pre-existing obligations or given in mutual or simultaneous exchange for something of
value.
BP 22 punishes a person "who makes or draws and issues any check on account or for
value, knowing at the time of issue that he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with
the drawee bank for the payment of said check in full upon presentment, which check is
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would
have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason,
ordered the bank to stop payment." The penalty prescribed for the offense is
imprisonment of not less than 30 days nor more than one year or a fine or not less than
the amount of the check nor more than double said amount, but in no case to exceed
P200,000.00, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court. 3
The statute likewise imposes the same penalty on "any person who, having sufficient
funds in or credit with the drawee bank when he makes or draws and issues a check,
shall fail to keep sufficient funds or to maintain a credit to cover the full amount of the
check if presented within a period of ninety (90) days from the date appearing thereon, for
which reason it is dishonored by the drawee bank. 4
An essential element of the offense is "knowledge" on the part of the maker or drawer of
the check of the insufficiency of his funds in or credit with the bank to cover the check
upon its presentment. Since this involves a state of mind difficult to establish, the statute
itself creates a prima facie presumption of such knowledge where payment of the check
"is refused by the drawee because of insufficient funds in or credit with such bank when
presented within ninety (90) days from the date of the check. 5 To mitigate the harshness
of the law in its application, the statute provides that such presumption shall not arise if
within five (5) banking days from receipt of the notice of dishonor, the maker or drawer
makes arrangements for payment of the check by the bank or pays the holder the amount
of the check.
Another provision of the statute, also in the nature of a rule of evidence, provides that the
introduction in evidence of the unpaid and dishonored check with the drawee bank's
refusal to pay "stamped or written thereon or attached thereto, giving the reason therefor,
"shall constitute prima facie proof of "the making or issuance of said check, and the due
presentment to the drawee for payment and the dishonor thereof ... for the reason written,
stamped or attached by the drawee on such dishonored check." 6
The presumptions being merely prima facie, it is open to the accused of course to present
proof to the contrary to overcome the said presumptions.
II
BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are
worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The practice,
as discussed later, is proscribed by the state because of the injury it causes to t public
interests.
Before the enactment of BP 22, provisions already existed in our statute books which
penalize the issuance of bouncing or rubber checks. Criminal law has dealth with the
problem within the context of crimes against property punished as "estafa" or crimes
involving fraud and deceit. The focus of these penal provisions is on the damage caused
to the property rights of the victim.
The Penal Code of Spain, which was in force in the Philippines from 1887 until it was
replaced by the Revised Penal Code in 1932, contained provisions penalizing, among
others, the act of defrauding another through false pretenses. Art. 335 punished a person
who defrauded another "by falsely pretending to possess any power, influence,
qualification, property, credit, agency or business, or by means of similar deceit."
Although no explicit mention was made therein regarding checks, this provision was
deemed to cover within its ambit the issuance of worthless or bogus checks in exchange
for money. 7
In 1926, an amendment was introduced by the Philippine Legislature, which added a new
clause (paragraph 10) to Article 335 of the old Penal Code, this time referring in explicit
terms to the issuance of worthless checks. The amendment penalized any person who 1)
issues a check in payment of a debt or for other valuable consideration, knowing at the
time of its issuance that he does not have sufficient funds in the bank to cover its amount,
or 2) maliciously signs the check differently from his authentic signature as registered at
the bank in order that the latter would refuse to honor it; or 3) issues a postdated check
and, at the date set for its payment, does not have sufficient deposit to cover the same. 8

In 1932, as already adverted to, the old Penal Code was superseded by the Revised
Penal Code. 9 The above provisions, in amended form, were incorporated in Article 315
of the Revised Penal Code defining the crime of estafa. The revised text of the provision
read as follows:
Art. 315. Swindling (estafa).—Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means
mentioned hereinbelow shall be punished by:
xxx xxx xxx
2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed
prior to or simultaneously with the commis sion of the fraud:
(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence,
qualifications, property, credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means
of other similar deceits;
xxx xxx xxx
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation the
offender knowing that at the time he had no funds in the bank, or the funds deposited by
him were not sufficient to cover the amount of the cheek without informing the payee of
such circumstances.
The scope of paragraph 2 (d), however, was deemed to exclude checks issued in
payment of pre-existing obligations. 10 The rationale of this interpretation is that in estafa,
the deceit causing the defraudation must be prior to or simultaneous with the commission
of the fraud. In issuing a check as payment for a pre-existing debt, the drawer does not
derive any material benefit in return or as consideration for its issuance. On the part of
the payee, he had already parted with his money or property before the check is issued to
him hence, he is not defrauded by means of any "prior" or "simultaneous" deceit
perpetrated on him by the drawer of the check.
With the intention of remedying the situation and solving the problem of how to bring
checks issued in payment of pre-existing debts within the ambit of Art. 315, an
amendment was introduced by the Congress of the Philippines in 1967, 11 which was
enacted into law as Republic Act No. 4885, revising the aforesaid proviso to read as
follows:
(d) By postdating a check, or issuing a check in payment of an obligation when the
offender had no funds in the bank, or his funds deposited therein were not sufficient to
cover the amount of the check. The failure of the drawer of the check to deposit the
amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of notice from the
bank and/or the payee or holder that said check has been dishonored for lack or
insufficiency of funds shall be puma facie evidence of deceit constituting false pretense or
fraudulent act.
However, the adoption of the amendment did not alter the situation materially. A divided
Court held in People vs. Sabio, Jr. 12 that Article 315, as amended by Republic Act 4885,
does not cover checks issued in payment of pre-existing obligations, again relying on the
concept underlying the crime of estafa through false pretenses or deceit—which is, that
the deceit or false pretense must be prior to or simultaneous with the commission of the
fraud.
Since statistically it had been shown that the greater bulk of dishonored checks consisted
of those issued in payment of pre-existing debts, 13 the amended provision evidently
failed to cope with the real problem and to deal effectively with the evil that it was
intended to eliminate or minimize.
With the foregoing factual and legal antecedents as a backdrop, the then Interim Batasan
confronted the problem squarely. It opted to take a bold step and decided to enact a law
dealing with the problem of bouncing or worthless checks, without attaching the law's
umbilical cord to the existing penal provisions on estafa. BP 22 addresses the problem
directly and frontally and makes the act of issuing a worthless check malum prohibitum.
14
The question now arises: Is B P 22 a valid law?
Previous efforts to deal with the problem of bouncing checks within the ambit of the law
on estafa did not evoke any constitutional challenge. In contrast, BP 22 was challenged
promptly.
Those who question the constitutionality of BP 22 insist that: (1) it offends the
constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for debt; (2) it impairs freedom of
contract; (3) it contravenes the equal protection clause; (4) it unduly delegates legislative
and executive powers; and (5) its enactment is flawed in that during its passage the
Interim Batasan violated the constitutional provision prohibiting amendments to a bill on
Third Reading.
The constitutional challenge to BP 22 posed by petitioners deserves a searching and
thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate consideration by the Court, involving as it does
the exercise of what has been described as "the highest and most delicate function which
belongs to the judicial department of the government." 15
As we enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and
coordinate branch of the government, we need not be reminded of the time-honored
principle, deeply ingrained in our jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid.
Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. This is not to say that
we approach our task with diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear that the legislature has
overstepped the limits of its authority under the constitution we should not hesitate to
wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending statute.
III
Among the constitutional objections raised against BP 22, the most serious is the alleged
conflict between the statute and the constitutional provision forbidding imprisonment for
debt. It is contended that the statute runs counter to the inhibition in the Bill of Rights
which states, "No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax." 16
Petitioners insist that, since the offense under BP 22 is consummated only upon the
dishonor or non-payment of the check when it is presented to the drawee bank, the
statute is really a "bad debt law" rather than a "bad check law." What it punishes is the
non-payment of the check, not the act of issuing it. The statute, it is claimed, is nothing
more than a veiled device to coerce payment of a debt under the threat of penal sanction.
First of all it is essential to grasp the essence and scope of the constitutional inhibition
invoked by petitioners. Viewed in its historical context, the constitutional prohibition
against imprisonment for debt is a safeguard that evolved gradually during the early part
of the nineteenth century in the various states of the American Union as a result of the
people's revulsion at the cruel and inhumane practice, sanctioned by common law, which
permitted creditors to cause the incarceration of debtors who could not pay their debts. At
common law, money judgments arising from actions for the recovery of a debt or for
damages from breach of a contract could be enforced against the person or body of the
debtor by writ of capias ad satisfaciendum. By means of this writ, a debtor could be
seized and imprisoned at the instance of the creditor until he makes the satisfaction
awarded. As a consequence of the popular ground swell against such a barbarous
practice, provisions forbidding imprisonment for debt came to be generally enshrined in
the constitutions of various states of the Union. 17
This humanitarian provision was transported to our shores by the Americans at the turn of
t0he century and embodied in our organic laws. 18 Later, our fundamental law outlawed
not only imprisonment for debt, but also the infamous practice, native to our shore, of
throwing people in jail for non-payment of the cedula or poll tax. 19
The reach and scope of this constitutional safeguard have been the subject of judicial
definition, both by our Supreme Court 20 and by American State courts. 21 Mr. Justice
Malcolm speaking for the Supreme Court in Ganaway vs. Queen, 22 stated: "The 'debt'
intended to be covered by the constitutional guaranty has a well-defined meaning.
Organic provisions relieving from imprisonment for debt, were intended to prevent
commitment of debtors to prison for liabilities arising from actions ex contractu The
inhibition was never meant to include damages arising in actions ex delicto, for the
reason that damages recoverable therein do not arise from any contract entered into
between the parties but are imposed upon the defendant for the wrong he has done and
are considered as punishment, nor to fines and penalties imposed by the courts in
criminal proceedings as punishments for crime."
The law involved in Ganaway was not a criminal statute but the Code of Procedure in
Civil Actions (1909) which authorized the arrest of the defendant in a civil case on
grounds akin to those which justify the issuance of a writ of attachment under our present
Rules of Court, such as imminent departure of the defendant from the Philippines with
intent to defraud his creditors, or concealment, removal or disposition of properties in
fraud of creditors, etc. The Court, in that case, declared the detention of the defendant
unlawful, being violative of the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt, and
ordered his release. The Court, however, refrained from declaring the statutory provision
in question unconstitutional.
Closer to the case at bar is People v. Vera Reyes, 23 wherein a statutory provision which
made illegal and punishable the refusal of an employer to pay, when he can do so, the
salaries of his employees or laborers on the fifteenth or last day of every month or on
Saturday every week, was challenged for being violative of the constitutional prohibition
against imprisonment for debt. The constitutionality of the law in question was upheld by
the Court, it being within the authority of the legislature to enact such a law in the
exercise of the police power. It was held that "one of the purposes of the law is to
suppress possible abuses on the part of the employers who hire laborers or employees
without paying them the salaries agreed upon for their services, thus causing them
financial difficulties. "The law was viewed not as a measure to coerce payment of an
obligation, although obviously such could be its effect, but to banish a practice considered
harmful to public welfare.
IV
Has BP 22 transgressed the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt? To
answer the question, it is necessary to examine what the statute prohibits and punishes
as an offense. Is it the failure of the maker of the check to pay a debt? Or is it the making
and issuance of a worthless check in payment of a debt? What is the gravamen of the
offense? This question lies at the heart of the issue before us.
The gravamen of the offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a
worthless check or a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not
the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes. The law is not intended or
designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under
pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in circulation.
Because of its deleterious effects on the public interest, the practice is proscribed by the
law. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against
public order.
Admittedly, the distinction may seem at first blush to appear elusive and difficult to
conceptualize. But precisely in the failure to perceive the vital distinction lies the error of
those who challenge the validity of BP 22.
It may be constitutionally impermissible for the legislature to penalize a person for non-
payment of a debt ex contractu But certainly it is within the prerogative of the lawmaking
body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious and inimical to public welfare. Acts
mala in se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act may not be considered
by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se but because of the harm that it
inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum
prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.
The police power of the state has been described as "the most essential, insistent and
illimitable of powers" which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety
and welfare of society. 24 It is a power not emanating from or conferred by the
constitution, but inherent in the state, plenary, "suitably vague and far from precisely
defined, rooted in the conception that man in organizing the state and imposing upon the
government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby to enable
individual citizens or group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such
salutary measures to ensure communal peace, safety, good order and welfare." 25
The enactment of BP 22 is a declaration by the legislature that, as a matter of public
policy, the making and issuance of a worthless check is deemed public nuisance to be
abated by the imposition of penal sanctions.
It is not for us to question the wisdom or impolicy of the statute. It is sufficient that a
reasonable nexus exists between means and end. Considering the factual and legal
antecedents that led to the adoption of the statute, it is not difficult to understand the
public concern which prompted its enactment. It had been reported that the approximate
value of bouncing checks per day was close to 200 million pesos, and thereafter when
overdrafts were banned by the Central Bank, it averaged between 50 minion to 80 million
pesos a day. 26
By definition, a check is a bill of exchange drawn on a bank and payable on demand. 27
It is a written order on a bank, purporting to be drawn against a deposit of funds for the
payment of all events, of a sum of money to a certain person therein named or to his
order or to cash and payable on demand. 28 Unlike a promissory note, a check is not a
mere undertaking to pay an amount of money. It is an order addressed to a bank and
partakes of a representation that the drawer has funds on deposit against which the
check is drawn, sufficient to ensure payment upon its presentation to the bank. There is
therefore an element of certainty or assurance that the instrument wig be paid upon
presentation. For this reason, checks have become widely accepted as a medium of
payment in trade and commerce. Although not legal tender, checks have come to be
perceived as convenient substitutes for currency in commercial and financial
transactions. The basis or foundation of such perception is confidence. If such confidence
is shakes the usefulness of checks as currency substitutes would be greatly diminished
or may become nit Any practice therefore tending to destroy that confidence should be
deterred for the proliferation of worthless checks can only create havoc in trade circles
and the banking community.
Recent statistics of the Central Bank show that one-third of the entire money supply of
the country, roughly totalling P32.3 billion, consists of peso demand deposits; the
remaining two. 29 These de deposit thirds consists of currency in circulation. ma deposits
in the banks constitute the funds against which among others, commercial papers like
checks, are drawn. The magnitude of the amount involved amply justifies the legitimate
concern of the state in preserving the integrity of the banking system. Flooding the
system with worthless checks is like pouring garbage into the bloodstream of the nation's
economy.
The effects of the issuance of a worthless check transcends the private interests of the
parties directly involved in the transaction and touches the interests of the community at
large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or holder, but also an injury
to the public. The harmful practice of putting valueless commercial papers in circulation,
multiplied a thousand fold, can very wen pollute the channels of trade and commerce,
injure the banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public
interest. As aptly stated — 30
The 'check flasher' does a great deal more than contract a debt; he shakes the pillars of
business; and to my mind, it is a mistaken charity of judgment to place him in the same
category with the honest man who is unable to pay his debts, and for whom the
constitutional inhibition against' imprisonment for debt, except in cases of fraud was
intended as a shield and not a sword.
In sum, we find the enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not
repugnant to the constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt.
This Court is not unaware of the conflicting jurisprudence obtaining in the various states
of the United States on the constitutionality of the "worthless check" acts. 31 It is
needless to warn that foreign jurisprudence must be taken with abundant caution. A
caveat to be observed is that substantial differences exist between our statute and the
worthless check acts of those states where the jurisprudence have evolved. One thing to
remember is that BP 22 was not lifted bodily from any existing statute. Furthermore, we
have to consider that judicial decisions must be read in the context of the facts and the
law involved and, in a broader sense, of the social economic and political environment—
in short, the milieu—under which they were made. We recognize the wisdom of the old
saying that what is sauce for the goose may not be sauce for the gander.
As stated elsewhere, police power is a dynamic force that enables the state to meet the
exigencies of changing times. There are occasions when the police power of the state
may even override a constitutional guaranty. For example, there have been cases
wherein we held that the constitutional provision on non-impairment of contracts must
yield to the police power of the state. 32 Whether the police power may override the
constitutional inhibition against imprisonment for debt is an issue we do not have to
address. This bridge has not been reached, so there is no occasion to cross it.
We hold that BP 22 does not conflict with the constitutional inhibition against
imprisonment for debt.
V
We need not detain ourselves lengthily in the examination of the other constitutional
objections raised by petitioners, some of which are rather flimsy.
We find no valid ground to sustain the contention that BP 22 impairs freedom of contract.
The freedom of contract which is constitutionally protected is freedom to enter into
"lawful" contracts. Contracts which contravene public policy are not lawful. 33 Besides,
we must bear in mind that checks can not be categorized as mere contracts. It is a
commercial instrument which, in this modem day and age, has become a convenient
substitute for money; it forms part of the banking system and therefore not entirely free
from the regulatory power of the state.
Neither do we find substance in the claim that the statute in question denies equal
protection of the laws or is discriminatory, since it penalizes the drawer of the check, but
not the payee. It is contended that the payee is just as responsible for the crime as the WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered granting the petition in G.R. No. 75789 and setting
drawer of the check, since without the indispensable participation of the payee by his aside the order of the respondent Judge dated August 19, 1986. The petitions in G.R.
acceptance of the check there would be no crime. This argument is tantamount to saying Nos. 63419, 66839-42, 71654, 74524-25, 75122-49, 75812-13 and 75765-67 are hereby
that, to give equal protection, the law should punish both the swindler and the swindled. dismissed and the temporary restraining order issued in G.R. Nos. 74524-25 is lifted.
The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal With costs against private petitioners.
protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals, who
may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is no
unreasonable or arbitrary. 34
SO ORDERED.
It is also suggested that BP 22 constitutes undue or improper delegation of legislative
powers, on the theory that the offense is not completed by the sole act of the maker or
drawer but is made to depend on the will of the payee. If the payee does not present the
check to the bank for payment but instead keeps it, there would be no crime. The logic of
the argument stretches to absurdity the meaning of "delegation of legislative power."
What cannot be delegated is the power to legislate, or the power to make laws. 35 which
means, as applied to the present case, the power to define the offense sought to be
punished and to prescribe the penalty. By no stretch of logic or imagination can it be said
that the power to define the crime and prescribe the penalty therefor has been in any
manner delegated to the payee. Neither is there any provision in the statute that can be
construed, no matter how remotely, as undue delegation of executive power. The
suggestion that the statute unlawfully delegates its enforcement to the offended party is
farfetched.

Lastly, the objection has been raised that Section 9 (2) of Article VII of the 1973
Constitution was violated by the legislative body when it enacted BP 22 into law. This
constitutional provision prohibits the introduction of amendments to a bill during the Third
Reading. It is claimed that during its Third Reading, the bill which eventually became BP
22 was amended in that the text of the second paragraph of Section 1 of the bill as
adopted on Second Reading was altered or changed in the printed text of the bill
submitted for approval on Third Reading.

A careful review of the record of the proceedings of the Interim Batasan on this matter
shows that, indeed, there was some confusion among Batasan Members on what was
the exact text of the paragraph in question which the body approved on Second Reading.
36 Part of the confusion was due apparently to the fact that during the deliberations on
Second Reading (the amendment period), amendments were proposed orally and
approved by the body or accepted by the sponsor, hence, some members might not have
gotten the complete text of the provisions of the bill as amended and approved on
Second Reading. However, it is clear from the records that the text of the second
paragraph of Section 1 of BP 22 is the text which was actually approved by the body on
Second Reading on February 7, 1979, as reflected in the approved Minutes for that day.
In any event, before the bin was submitted for final approval on Third Reading, the
Interim Batasan created a Special Committee to investigate the matter, and the
Committee in its report, which was approved by the entire body on March 22, 1979,
stated that "the clause in question was ... an authorized amendment of the bill and the
printed copy thereof reflects accurately the provision in question as approved on Second
Reading. 37 We therefore, find no merit in the petitioners' claim that in the enactment of
BP 22 the provisions of Section 9 (2) of Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution were violated.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 110315. January 16, 1998]
RENATO CUDIA, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, The HON.CARLOS D.
RUSTIA, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court Branch LVI,
Angeles City, respondents.
DECISION
ROMERO, J.:
Petitioner assails the decision[1] of the Court of Appeals dated May 14, 1993 dismissing
his petition and finding that he had not been placed in double jeopardy by the filing of a
second information against him, although a first information charging the same offense
had been previously dismissed, over petitioners vigorous opposition.
The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:
On June 28, 1989, petitioner was arrested in Purok 6, Barangay Santa Inez,
Mabalacat,[2] Pampanga, by members of the then 174th PC Company, allegedly for
possessing an unlicensed revolver. He was brought to Camp Pepito, Sto. Domingo,
Angeles City, where he was detained. A preliminary investigation was thereafter
conducted by an investigating panel of prosecutors. As a result thereof, the City
Prosecutor of Angeles City filed an information against him for illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11542, which reads as follows:
That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989, in the City of Angeles, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have in his possession and under his control one
(1) .38 Cal. Revolver (paltik) without any Serial Number with six (6) live ammunitions,
which he carried outside of his residence without having the necessary authority and
permit to carry the same.
ALL CONTRARY TO LAW.[3] (Emphasis petitioners.)
The case was raffled to Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City (hereafter
the Angeles City RTC). Upon his arraignment on August 14, 1989, petitioner pleaded not
guilty to the charges. During the ensuing pre-trial, the court called the attention of the
parties to the fact that, contrary to the information, petitioner had committed the offense in
Mabalacat, and not in Angeles City. Inasmuch as there was an existing arrangement
among the judges of the Angeles City RTCs as to who would handle cases involving
crimes committed outside of Angeles City, the judge ordered the re-raffling of the case to
a branch assigned to criminal cases involving crimes committed outside of the city.
Thereafter, the case was assigned to Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC.
On October 31, 1989 however, the provincial prosecutor of Pampanga also filed an
information charging petitioner with the same crime of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition, docketed as Criminal Case No. 11987. The case was likewise raffled to
Branch 56 of the Angeles City RTC. This prompted the prosecutor in Criminal Case No.
11542 to file a Motion to Dismiss/Withdraw the Information, stating that thru inadvertence
and oversight, the Investigating Panel was misled into hastily filing the Information in this
case, it appearing that the apprehension of the accused in connection with the illegal
possession of unlicensed firearm and ammunition was made in Bgy. Sta. Inez,
Mabalacat, Pampanga, within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga[4]
and that the Provincial Prosecutor had filed its own information against the accused, as a
result of which two separate informations for the same offense had been filed against
petitioner. The latter filed his opposition to the motion, but the trial court nonetheless,
granted said motion to dismiss in its order dated April 3, 1990.
On May 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash Criminal Case No. 11987 on the
ground that his continued prosecution for the offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunition for which he had been arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, and which had
been dismissed despite his opposition would violate his right not to be put twice in
jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. The trial court denied the motion to quash;
hence, petitioner raised the issue to the Court of Appeals. The appellate court, stating
that there was no double jeopardy, dismissed the same on the ground that the petitioner
could not have been convicted under the first information as the same was defective.
Petitioners motion for reconsideration was denied; hence, this appeal.
Petitioner points out the following as errors of the Court of Appeals:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND THAT THE CITY
PROSECUTOR OF ANGELES CITY DID NOT HAVE THE AUTHORITY TO FILE THE
FIRST INFORMATION.
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE FIRST JEOPARDY DID
NOT ATTACH BECAUSE THE FIRST INFORMATION FILED AGAINST THE ACCUSED
WAS NOT VALID.
We shall discuss the assigned errors jointly as they are closely related.
Section 21, Article III of the 1987 Constitution provides that (n)o person shall be twice put
in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense x x x. Pursuant to this provision, Section
7 of Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides in part that (w)hen an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the
accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, x x x.
In order to successfully invoke the defense of double jeopardy, the following requisites
must be present: (1) a first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second; (2) the first
jeopardy must have been validly terminated; and (3) the second jeopardy must be for the
same offense or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense
charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or a frustration
thereof.[5]
In determining when the first jeopardy may be said to have attached, it is necessary to
prove the existence of the following:
(a) Court of competent jurisdiction
(b) Valid complaint or information
(c) Arraignment
(c) Valid plea
(e) The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused.[6]
It is undisputed that petitioner was arraigned in Criminal Case No. 11542, that he pleaded
not guilty therein, and that the same was dismissed without his express consent, nay,
over his opposition even. We may thus limit the discussion to determining whether the
first two requisites have been met.
As to the first requisite, it is necessary that there be a court of competent jurisdiction, for
jurisdiction to try the case is essential to place an accused in jeopardy. The Court of
Appeals and the Solicitor General agreed that Branch 60, which originally had
cognizance of Criminal Case No. 11542, had no jurisdiction over the case. In the words of
the Solicitor General:
The first jeopardy did not also attach because Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of
Angeles City was not the proper venue for hearing the case. Venue in criminal cases is
jurisdictional, being an essential element of jurisdiction (Agbayani vs. Sayo, 89 SCRA
699). In all criminal prosecutions, the action shall be instituted and tried in the court of the
municipality or territory wherein the offense was committed or any one of the essential
ingredients thereof took place (People vs. Tomio, 202 SCRA 77). Although both
Branches 60 and 56 are sitting in Angeles City, it is Branch 56 which has jurisdiction to try
offenses committed in Mabalacat, Pampanga. Petitioner was arraigned before Branch 60,
not Branch 56.[7]
It must be borne in mind that the question of jurisdiction of a court over cases filed before
it must be resolved on the basis of the law or statute providing for or defining its
jurisdiction. Administrative Order No. 7, Series of 1983 provides that:
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 864 of the President of the Philippines,
dated January 17, 1983, the territorial areas of the Regional Trial Courts in Region One to
Twelve are hereby defined as follows:
xxxxxxxxx
PAMPANGA
xxxxxxxxx
1. Branches LVI to LXII, inclusive, with seats at Angeles City comprising ANGELES CITY
and the municipalities of Mabalacat, Magalang, and Porac as well as part of Clark Field
U.S. Airbase.
xxxxxxxxx
Clearly, Branches 56 to 62 had jurisdiction over the respective territories as apportioned.
Consequently, notwithstanding the internal arrangement of the judges of the Angeles City
RTCs, Branch 60 indubitably had jurisdiction over instant case. Writ large in lawbooks is
the doctrine that jurisdiction is conferred by law and not by mere administrative policy of
any trial court.
With respect to the second requisite, however, it is plainly apparent that the City
Prosecutor of Angeles City had no authority to file the first information, the offense having
been committed in the Municipality of Mabalacat, which is beyond his jurisdiction.
Presidential Decree No. 1275, in relation to Section 9 of the Administrative Code of 1987,
pertinently provides that:
Section 11. The provincial or the city fiscal shall:
xxxxxxxxx
b) Investigate and/or cause to be investigated all charges of crimes, misdemeanors and
violations of all penal laws and ordinances within their respective jurisdictions and have
the necessary information or complaint prepared or made against the persons accused.
In the conduct of such investigations he or his assistants shall receive the sworn
statements or take oral evidence of witnesses summoned by subpoena for the purpose.
x x x x x x x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
It is thus the Provincial Prosecutor of Pampanga, not the City Prosecutor, who should
prepare informations for offenses committed within Pampanga but outside of Angeles
City. An information, when required to be filed by a public prosecuting officer, cannot be
filed by another.[8] It must be exhibited or presented by the prosecuting attorney or
someone authorized by law. If not, the court does not acquire jurisdiction.[9]
Petitioner, however, insists that his failure to assert the lack of authority of the City
Prosecutor in filing the information in question is deemed a waiver thereof.[10] As
correctly pointed out by the Court of Appeals, petitioners plea to an information before he
filed a motion to quash may be a waiver of all objections to it insofar as formal objections
to the pleadings are concerned. But by clear implication, if not by express provision of the
Rules of Court, and by a long line of uniform decisions,[11] questions relating to want of
jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceeding. It is a valid information signed
by a competent officer which, among other requisites, confers jurisdiction on the court
over the person of the accused (herein petitioner) and the subject matter of the
accusation. In consonance with this view, an infirmity in the information, such as lack of
authority of the officer signing it, cannot be cured by silence, acquiescence, or even by
express consent.[12]

In fine, there must have been a valid and sufficient complaint or information in the former
prosecution. If, therefore, the complaint or information was insufficient because it was so
defective in form or substance that the conviction upon it could not have been sustained,
its dismissal without the consent of the accused cannot be pleaded. As the fiscal had no
authority to file the information, the dismissal of the first information would not be a bar to
petitioners subsequent prosecution. Jeopardy does not attach where a defendant pleads
guilty to a defective indictment that is voluntarily dismissed by the prosecution.[13]

Petitioner next claims that the lack of authority of the City Prosecutor was the error of the
investigating panel and the same should not be used to prejudice and penalize him. It is
an all too familiar maxim that the State is not bound or estopped by the mistakes or
inadvertence of its officials and employees.[14] To rule otherwise could very well result in
setting felons free, deny proper protection to the community, and give rise to the
possibility of connivance between the prosecutor and the accused.

Finally, petitioner avers that an amendment of the first information, and not its dismissal,
should have been the remedy sought by the prosecution. Suffice it to say that this Court,
in Galvez vs. Court of Appeals[15] has ruled that even if amendment is proper, pursuant
to Section 14 of Rule 110, it is also quite plausible under the same provision that, instead
of an amendment, an information may be dismissed to give way to the filing of a new
information.

In light of the foregoing principles, there is thus no breach of the constitutional prohibition
against twice putting an accused in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense for the
simple reason that the absence of authority of the City Prosecutor to file the first
information meant that petitioner could never have been convicted on the strength
thereof.

As the first information was fatally defective for lack of authority of the officer filing it, the
instant petition must fail for failure to comply with all the requisites necessary to invoke
double jeopardy.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby DENIED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 24958 is AFFIRMED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 97471 February 17, 1993
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ISABELO PUNO y GUEVARRA, alias "Beloy," and ENRIQUE AMURAO y PUNO, alias
"Enry," accused-appellants.
The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Edward C. Castañeda for accused-appellants.
REGALADO, J.:
The primal issue for resolution in this case is whether accused-appellants committed the
felony of kidnapping for ransom under Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged
in the information; or a violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-
Highway Robbery Law of 1974), as contended by the Solicitor General and found by the
trial court; or the offense of simple robbery punished by Paragraph 5, Article 294 of the
Revised Penal Code, as claimed by the defense.
In an information dated and filed on May 31, 1989 in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon
City, Branch 103, as Criminal Case No. Q-57404 thereof, appellants were charged with
kidnapping for ransom allegedly committed in the following manner:
That on or about the 13th day of January, 1988 in Quezon City, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then private individuals,
conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping each other, did, then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously kidnap and carry away one MARIA DEL
SOCORRO SARMIENTO y MUTUC * for the purpose of extorting ransom, to the damage
and prejudice of the said offended party in such amount as may be awarded to her under
the provisions of the Civil Code. 1
On a plea of not guilty when arraigned, 2 appellants went to trial which ultimately resulted
in a judgment promulgated on September 26, 1990 finding them guilty of robbery with
extortion committed on a highway, punishable under Presidential Decree No. 532, with
this disposition in the fallo thereof:
ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused ISABELO PUNO and
ENRIQUE AMURAO GUILTY as principals of robbery with extortion committed on a
highway and, in accordance with P.D. 532, they are both sentenced to a jail term of
reclusion perpetua.
The two accused are likewise ordered to pay jointly and severally the offended private
victim Ma. Socorro M. Sarmiento the sum of P7,000.00 as actual damages and
P3,000.00 as temperate damages. 3
Before us now in this appeal, appellants contend that the court a quo erred (1) in
convicting them under Presidential Decree No. 532 since they were not expressly
charged with a crime therein; (2) in applying Sections 4 and 5, Rule 120 of the Rules of
Court since the charge under said presidential decree is not the offense proved and
cannot rightly be used as the offense proved which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. 4
For the material antecedents of this case, we quote with approval the following counter-
statement of facts in the People's brief 5 which adopted the established findings of the
court a quo, documenting the same with page references to the transcripts of the
proceedings, and which we note are without any substantial divergence in the version
proffered by the defense.
This is a prosecution for kidnapping for ransom allegedly done on January 13, 1988 by
the two accused (tsn, Jan. 8, 1990, p. 7).
Mrs. Maria Socorro Mutuc-Sarmiento owns a bakeshop in Araneta Avenue, Quezon City
called Nika Cakes and Pastries. She has a driver of her own just as her husband does
(Ibid., pp. 4-6).
At around 5:00 in the afternoon of January 13, 1988, the accused Isabelo Puno, who is
the personal driver of Mrs. Sarmiento's husband (who was then away in Davao
purportedly on account of local election there) arrived at the bakeshop. He told Mrs.
Socorro that her own driver Fred had to go to Pampanga on an emergency (something
bad befell a child), so Isabelo will temporary (sic) take his place (Id., pp. 8-9).
Mrs. Socorro's time to go home to Valle Verde in Pasig came and so she got into the
Mercedes Benz of her husband with Isabelo on (sic) the wheel. After the car turned right
in (sic) a corner of Araneta Avenue, it stopped. A young man, accused Enrique Amurao,
boarded the car beside the driver (Id., pp. 9-10).
Once inside, Enrique clambered on top of the back side of the front seat and went onto
where Ma. Socorro was seated at the rear. He poke (sic) a gun at her (Id., p. 10).
Isabelo, who earlier told her that Enrique is his nephew announced, "ma'm, you know, I
want to get money from you." She said she has money inside her bag and they may get it
just so they will let her go. The bag contained P7,000.00 and was taken (Id., pp. 11-14).
Further on, the two told her they wanted P100,000.00 more. Ma. Socorro agreed to give
them that but would they drop her at her gas station in Kamagong St., Makati where the
money is? The car went about the Sta. Mesa area. Meanwhile, Ma. Socorro clutched her
Rosary and prayed. Enrique's gun was menacingly storing (sic) at her soft bread (sic)
brown, perfumed neck. He said he is an NPA and threatened her (Id., p.15).
The car sped off north towards the North superhighway. There Isabelo, Beloy as he is
called, asked Ma. Socorro to issue a check for P100,000.00. Ma. Socorro complied. She
drafted 3 checks in denominations of two for P30 thousand and one for P40 thousand.
Enrique ordered her to swallow a pill but she refused (Id., pp. 17-23).
Beloy turned the car around towards Metro Manila. Later, he changed his mind and
turned the car again towards Pampanga. Ma. Socorro, according to her, jumped out of
the car then, crossed to the other side of the superhighway and, after some vehicles
ignored her, she was finally able to flag down a fish vendors van. Her dress had blood
because, according to Ma. Socorro, she fell down on the ground and was injured when
she jumped out of the car. Her dress was torn too (Id., pp. 23-26).
On reaching Balintawak, Ma. Socorro reported the matter to CAPCOM (Id., p. 27).
Both accused were, day after, arrested. Enrique was arrested trying to encash Ma.
Socorro's P40,000.00 check at PCI Bank, Makati. (tsn, Oct. 18, 1989, pp. 10-13) 6
As observed by the court below, the defense does not dispute said narrative of
complainant, except that, according to appellant Puno, he stopped the car at North
Diversion and freely allowed complainant to step out of the car. He even slowed the car
down as he drove away, until he saw that his employer had gotten a ride, and he claimed
that she fell down when she stubbed her toe while running across the highway. 7
Appellants further testified that they brought the Mercedez Benz car to Dolores, San
Fernando, Pampanga and parked it near a barangay or police outpost. They thereafter
ate at a restaurant and divided their loot. 8 Much later, when he took the stand at the trial
of this case, appellant Puno tried to mitigate his liability by explaining that he was in dire
need of money for the medication of his ulcers. 9
On these relatively simple facts, and as noted at the start of this opinion, three theories
have been advanced as to what crime was committed by appellants. The trial court
cohered with the submission of the defense that the crime could not be kidnapping for
ransom as charged in the information. We likewise agree.
Prefatorily, it is worth recalling an accepted tenet in criminal law that in the determination
of the crime for which the accused should be held liable in those instances where his acts
partake of the nature of variant offenses, and the same holds true with regard to the
modifying or qualifying circumstances thereof, his motive and specific intent in
perpetrating the acts complained of are invaluable aids in arriving at a correct
appreciation and accurate conclusion thereon.
Thus, to illustrate, the motive of the accused has been held to be relevant or essential to
determine the specific nature of the crime as, for instance, whether a murder was
committed in the furtherance of rebellion in which case the latter absorbs the former, or
whether the accused had his own personal motives for committing the murder
independent of his membership in the rebellious movement in which case rebellion and
murder would constitute separate offenses. 10 Also, where injuries were inflicted on a
person in authority who was not then in the actual performance of his official duties, the
motive of the offender assumes importance because if the attack was by reason of the
previous performance of official duties by the person in authority, the crime would be
direct assault; otherwise, it would only be physical injuries. 11
In the case at bar, there is no showing whatsoever that appellants had any motive,
nurtured prior to or at the time they committed the wrongful acts against complainant,
other than the extortion of money from her under the compulsion of threats or
intimidation. This much is admitted by both appellants, without any other esoteric
qualification or dubious justification. Appellant Puno, as already stated, candidly laid the
blame for his predicament on his need for funds for, in his own testimony, "(w)hile we
were along the way Mam (sic) Corina was telling me "Beloy, I know your family very well
and I know that your (sic) not (a) bad person, why are you doing this?" I told her "Mam,
(sic), because I need money and I had an ulcer and that I have been getting an (sic)
advances from our office but they refused to give me any bale (sic). . . ." 12
With respect to the specific intent of appellants vis-a-vis the charge that they had
kidnapped the victim, we can rely on the proverbial rule of ancient respectability that for
this crime to exist, there must be indubitable proof that
the actual intent of the malefactors was to deprive the offended party of her liberty, 13
and not where such restraint of her freedom of action was merely an incident in the
commission of another offense primarily intended by the offenders. Hence, as early as
United States vs. Ancheta, 14 and consistently reiterated thereafter, 15 it has been held
that the detention and/or forcible taking away of the victims by the accused, even for an
appreciable period of time but for the primary and ultimate purpose of killing them, holds
the offenders liable for taking their lives or such other offenses they committed in relation
thereto, but the incidental deprivation of the victims' liberty does not constitute kidnapping
or serious illegal detention.
That appellants in this case had no intention whatsoever to kidnap or deprive the
complainant of her personal liberty is clearly demonstrated in the veritably confessional
testimony of appellant Puno:
Q At what point did Mrs. Sarmiento handed (sic) the bag containing the P7,000.00
to your nephew?
A Santo Domingo Exit.
Q And how about the checks, where were you already when the checks was (sic)
being handed to you?
A Also at the Sto. Domingo exit when she signed the checks.
Q If your intention was just to robbed (sic) her, why is it that you still did not allow
her to stay at Sto. Domingo, after all you already received the money and the checks?
A Because we had an agreement with her that when she signed the checks we will
take her to her house at Villa (sic) Verde.
Q And why did you not bring her back to her house at Valle Verde when she is
(sic) already given you the checks?
A Because while we were on the way back I (sic) came to my mind that if we reach
Balintawak or some other place along the way we might be apprehended by the police.
So when we reached Santa Rita exit I told her "Mam (sic) we will already stop and allow
you to get out of the car." 16
Neither can we consider the amounts given to appellants as equivalent to or in the nature
of ransom, considering the immediacy of their obtention thereof from the complainant
personally. Ransom, in municipal criminal law, is the money, price or consideration paid
or demanded for redemption of a captured person or persons, a payment that releases
from captivity. 17 It can hardly be assumed that when complainant readily gave the cash
and checks demanded from her at gun point, what she gave under the circumstances of
this case can be equated with or was in the concept of ransom in the law of kidnapping.
These were merely amounts involuntarily surrendered by the victim upon the occasion of
a robbery or of which she was summarily divested by appellants. Accordingly, while we
hold that the crime committed is robbery as defined in Article 293 of the Code, we,
however, reject the theory of the trial court that the same constitutes the highway robbery
contemplated in and punished by Presidential Decree No. 532.
The lower court, in support of its theory, offers this ratiocination:
The court agrees that the crime is robbery. But it is also clear from the allegation in the
information that the victim was carried away and extorted for more money. The accused
admitted that the robbery was carried on from Araneta Avenue up to the North
Superhighway. They likewise admitted that along the way they intimidated Ma. Socorro to
produce more money that she had with her at the time for which reason Ma. Socorro, not
having more cash, drew out three checks. . . .
In view of the foregoing the court is of the opinion that the crimes committed is that
punishable under P.D. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Highway Robbery Law of 1974) under
which where robbery on the highway is accompanied by extortion the penalty is reclusion
perpetua. 18
The Solicitor General concurs, with the observation that pursuant to the repealing clause
in Section 5 of said decree, "P.D. No- 532 is a modification of the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code, particularly Article 267 which
are inconsistent with it." 19 Such opinion and complementary submission consequently
necessitate an evaluation of the correct interplay between and the legal effects of
Presidential Decree No. 532 on the pertinent Provisions of the Revised Penal Code, on
which matter we are not aware that any definitive pronouncement has as yet been made.
Contrary to the postulation of the Solicitor General, Presidential Decree No. 532 is not a
modification of Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code on kidnapping and serious illegal
detention, but of Articles 306 and 307 on brigandage. This is evident from the fact that the
relevant portion thereof which treats of "highway robbery" invariably uses this term in the
alternative and synonymously with brigandage, that is, as "highway robbery/brigandage."
This is but in line with our previous ruling, and which still holds sway in criminal law, that
highway robbers (ladrones) and brigands are synonymous. 20
Harking back to the origin of our law on brigandage (bandolerismo) in order to put our
discussion thereon in the proper context and perspective, we find that a band of brigands,
also known as highwaymen or freebooters, is more than a gang of ordinary robbers.
Jurisprudence on the matter reveals that during the early part of the American occupation
of our country, roving bands were organized for robbery and pillage and since the then
existing law against robbery was inadequate to cope with such moving bands of outlaws,
the Brigandage Law was passed. 21
The following salient distinctions between brigandage and robbery are succinctly
explained in a treatise on the subject and are of continuing validity:
The main object of the Brigandage Law is to prevent the formation of bands of robbers.
The heart of the offense consists in the formation of a band by more than three armed
persons for the purpose indicated in art. 306. Such formation is sufficient to constitute a
violation of art. 306. It would not be necessary to show, in a prosecution under it, that a
member or members of the band actually committed robbery or kidnapping or any other
purpose attainable by violent means. The crime is proven when the organization and
purpose of the band are shown to be such as are contemplated by art 306. On the other
hand, if robbery is committed by a band, whose members were not primarily organized
for the purpose of committing robbery or kidnapping, etc., the crime would not be
brigandage, but only robbery. Simply because robbery was committed by a band of more
than three armed persons, it would not follow that it was committed by a band of
brigands. In the Spanish text of art. 306, it is required that the band "sala a los campos
para dedicarse a robar." 22 (Emphasis supplied).
In fine, the purpose of brigandage is, inter alia, indiscriminate highway robbery. If the
purpose is only a particular robbery, the crime is only robbery, or robbery in band if there
are at least four armed participants. 23 The martial law legislator, in creating and
promulgating Presidential Decree No. 532 for the objectives announced therein, could not
have been unaware of that distinction and is presumed to have adopted the same, there
being no indication to the contrary. This conclusion is buttressed by the rule on
contemporaneous construction, since it is one drawn from the time when and the
circumstances under which the decree to be construed originated. Contemporaneous
exposition or construction is the best and strongest in the law. 24
Further, that Presidential Decree No. 532 punishes as highway robbery or brigandage
only acts of robbery perpetrated by outlaws indiscriminately against any person or
persons on Philippine highways as defined therein, and not acts of robbery committed
against only a predetermined or particular victim, is evident from the preambular clauses
thereof, to wit:
WHEREAS, reports from law-enforcement agencies reveal that lawless elements are still
committing acts of depredation upon the persons and properties of innocent and
defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another, thereby disturbing the
peace, order and tranquility of the nation and stunting the economic and social progress
of the people:
WHEREAS, such acts of depredations constitute . . . highway robbery/brigandage which
are among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal statutes of all
countries;
WHEREAS, it is imperative that said lawless elements be discouraged from perpetrating
such acts of depredaions by imposing heavy penalty on the offenders, with the end in
view of eliminating all obstacles to the economic, social, educational and community
progress of the people. (Emphasis supplied).
Indeed, it is hard to conceive of how a single act of robbery against a particular person
chosen by the accused as their specific victim could be considered as committed on the
"innocent and defenseless inhabitants who travel from one place to another," and which
single act of depredation would be capable of "stunting the economic and social progress
of the people" as to be considered "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned
by the penal statutes of all countries," and would accordingly constitute an obstacle "to
the economic, social, educational and community progress of the people, " such that said
isolated act would constitute the highway robbery or brigandage contemplated and
punished in said decree. This would be an exaggeration bordering on the ridiculous.
True, Presidential Decree No. 532 did introduce amendments to Articles 306 and 307 of
the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties, albeit limiting its applicability to the
offenses stated therein when committed on the highways and without prejudice to the
liability for such acts if committed. Furthermore, the decree does not require that there be
at least four armed persons forming a band of robbers; and the presumption in the Code
that said accused are brigands if they use unlicensed firearms no longer obtains under
the decree. But, and this we broadly underline, the essence of brigandage under the
Code as a crime of depredation wherein the unlawful acts are directed not only against
specific, intended or preconceived victims, but against any and all prospective victims
anywhere on the highway and whosoever they may potentially be, is the same as the
concept of brigandage which is maintained in Presidential Decree No. 532, in the same
manner as it was under its aforementioned precursor in the Code and, for that matter,
under the old Brigandage Law. 25
Erroneous advertence is nevertheless made by the court below to the fact that the crime
of robbery committed by appellants should be covered by the said amendatory decree
just because it was committed on a highway. Aside from what has already been stressed
regarding the absence of the requisite elements which thereby necessarily puts the
offense charged outside the purview and intendment of that presidential issuance, it
would be absurd to adopt a literal interpretation that any unlawful taking of property
committed on our highways would be covered thereby. It is an elementary rule of
statutory construction that the spirit or intent of the law should not be subordinated to the
letter thereof. Trite as it may appear, we have perforce to stress the elementary caveat
that he who considers merely the letter of an instrument goes but skin deep into its
meaning, 26 and the fundamental rule that criminal justice inclines in favor of the milder
form of liability in case of doubt.
If the mere fact that the offense charged was committed on a highway would be the
determinant for the application of Presidential Decree No. 532, it would not be farfetched
to expect mischievous, if not absurd, effects on the corpus of our substantive criminal
law. While we eschew resort to a reductio ad absurdum line of reasoning, we apprehend
that the aforestated theory adopted by the trial court falls far short of the desideratum in
the interpretation of laws, that is, to avoid absurdities and conflicts. For, if a motor vehicle,
either stationary or moving on a highway, is forcibly taken at gun point by the accused
who happened to take a fancy thereto, would the location of the vehicle at the time of the
unlawful taking necessarily put the offense within the ambit of Presidential Decree No.
532, thus rendering nugatory the categorical provisions of the Anti-Carnapping Act of
1972? 27 And, if the scenario is one where the subject matter of the unlawful asportation
is large cattle which are incidentally being herded along and traversing the same highway
and are impulsively set upon by the accused, should we apply Presidential Decree No.
532 and completely disregard the explicit prescriptions in the Anti-Cattle Rustling Law of
1974? 28
We do not entertain any doubt, therefore, that the coincidental fact that the robbery in the
present case was committed inside a car which, in the natural course of things, was
casually operating on a highway, is not within the situation envisaged by Section 2(e) of
the decree in its definition of terms. Besides, that particular provision precisely defines
"highway robbery/brigandage" and, as we have amply demonstrated, the single act of
robbery conceived and committed by appellants in this case does not constitute highway
robbery or brigandage.
Accordingly, we hold that the offense committed by appellants is simple robbery defined
in Article 293 and punished under Paragraph 5 of Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code
with prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period.
Appellants have indisputably acted in conspiracy as shown by their concerted acts
evidentiary of a unity of thought and community of purpose. In the determination of their
respective liabilities, the aggravating circumstances of craft 29 shall be appreciated
against both appellants and that of abuse of confidence shall be further applied against
appellant Puno, with no mitigating circumstance in favor of either of them. At any rate, the
intimidation having been made with the use of a firearm, the penalty shall be imposed in
the maximum period as decreed by Article 295 of the Code.
We further hold that there is no procedural obstacle to the conviction of appellants of the
crime of simple robbery upon an information charging them with kidnapping for ransom,
since the former offense which has been proved is necessarily included in the latter
offense with which they are charged. 30 For the former offense, it is sufficient that the
elements of unlawful taking, with intent to gain, of personal property through intimidation
of the owner or possessor thereof shall be, as it has been, proved in the case at bar.
Intent to gain (animus lucrandi) is presumed to be alleged in an information where it is
charged that there was unlawful taking (apoderamiento) and appropriation by the
offender of the things subject of the robbery. 31
These foregoing elements are necessarily included in the information filed against
appellants which, as formulated, allege that they wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously
kidnapped and extorted ransom from the complainant. Such allegations, if not expressly
but at the very least by necessary implication, clearly convey that the taking of
complainant's money and checks (inaccurately termed as ransom) was unlawful, with
intent to gain, and through intimidation. It cannot be logically argued that such a charge of
kidnapping for ransom does not include but could negate the presence of any of the
elements of robbery through intimidation of persons. 32

WHEREFORE, the assailed judgment of the trial court is hereby SET ASIDE and another
one is rendered CONVICTING accused-appellants Isabelo Puno y Guevarra and Enrique
Amurao y Puno of robbery as Punished in Paragraph 5 of Article 294, in relation to Article
295, of the Revised Penal Code and IMPOSING on each of them an indeterminate
sentence of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as minimum, to ten
(10) years of prision mayor, as maximum, and jointly and severally pay the offended
party, Maria del Socorro M. Sarmiento, the amounts of P7,000.00 as actual damages and
P20,000.00 as moral damages, with costs.

SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-24447 June 29, 1968
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
WILLY OBSANIA, defendant-appellee.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellant.
Maximo V. Cuesta, Jr. for defendant-appellee.
CASTRO, J.:
Before us for review, on appeal by the People of the Philippines, is an order, dated
January 8, 1965, of the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan dismissing, upon motion of
the defense, an indictment for rape against Willy Obsania.
On November 22, 1964, barely a day after the occurence of the alleged crime, Erlinda
Dollente, the 14-year old victim, and her parents, Ciriaco Dollente and Carmelita Lureta,
filed in the municipal court of Balungao, Pangasinan a complaint for rape with robbery, 1
alleging
That on or about the 21st day of November 1964, at around 2:00 to 3:00 in the afternoon,
particularly in sitio Cawakalan, barrio of Capulaan, municipality of Balungao, Province of
Pangasinan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said
accused Willy Obsania, armed with a dagger, by means of violence and intimidation,
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously did then and there have carnal knowledge of the
complainant Erlinda Dollente, against her will and on the roadside in the ricefields at the
above-mentioned place while she was alone on her way to barrio San Raymundo.
After the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan for further
proceedings, the assistant provincial fiscal filed an information for rape against the
accused, embodying the allegations of the above complaint, with an additional averment
that the offense was committed "with lewd designs".
The accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment, and forthwith his counsel moved for
the dismissal of the case, contending that the complaint was fatally defective for failure to
allege "lewd designs" and that the subsequent information filed by the fiscal which
averred "lewd designs" did not cure the jurisdictional infirmity. The court a quo granted
the motion and ordered dismissal of the action, ruling that "the failure of the complaint
filed by the offended party to allege that the acts committed by the accused were with
'lewd designs' does not give this Court jurisdiction to try the case." From this order, the
fiscal brought the instant appeal.
Two issues are tendered for resolution, namely: first, are "lewd designs" an indispensable
element which should be alleged in the complaint?, and, second, does the present appeal
place the accused in double jeopardy?
Both must be answered in the negative.
The accused, in his motion to dismiss, as well as the trial judge, in his order of dismissal,
rely basically on the ruling in People vs. Gilo (L-18202, April 30, 1964). In the case which
involved a prosecution for acts of lasciviousness this Court, in passing, opined that "lewd
design" is
... an indispensable element of all crimes against chastity, such as abduction, seduction
and rape, including acts of lasciviousness ... an element that characterizes all crimes
against chastity, apart from the felonious or criminal intent of the offender, and such
element must be always present in order that they may be considered in contemplation of
law.
Nothing in the foregoing statement can be reasonably interpreted as requiring an explicit
allegation of "lewd design" in a complaint for rape. We hold in no uncertain terms that in a
complaint for rape it is not necessary to allege "lewd design" or "unchaste motive", for to
require such averment is to demand a patent superfluity. Lascivious intent inheres in rape
and the unchaste design is manifest in the very act itself — the carnal knowledge of a
woman through force or intimidation, or when the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or when the woman is under twelve years of age. 2
It is clear that the complaint here satisfies the requirements of legal sufficiency of an
indictment for rape as it unmistakably alleges that the accused had carnal knowledge of
the complainant by means of violence and intimidation. We therefore hold that the trial
judge erred in dismissing the case on the proffered grounds that the complaint was
defective for failure to allege "lewd design" and, as a consequence of such infirmity, that
the court a quo did not acquire jurisdiction over the case. The error of the trial judge was
in confusing the concept of jurisdiction with that of insufficiency in substance of an
indictment.
We come now to the more important issue of double jeopardy. The accused maintains
that "assuming, arguendo, that the argument is right that the court a quo has jurisdiction,
the appeal of the Government constitutes double jeopardy."
An appeal by the prosecution in a criminal case is not available if the defendant would
thereby be placed in double jeopardy. 3 Correlatively, section 9, Rule 117 of the Revised
Rules of Court provides:
When a defendant shall have been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him
dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the defendant, by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal
charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction, and after the defendant
had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the defendant or the dismissal of
the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt
to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or
is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
In order that the protection against double jeopardy may inure in favor of an accused, the
following requisites must have obtained in the original prosecution: (a) a valid complaint
or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and
(d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent.
The complaint filed with the municipal court in the case at bar was valid; the court a quo
was a competent tribunal with jurisdiction to hear the case; the record shows that the
accused pleaded not guilty upon arraignment. Hence, the only remaining and decisive
question is whether the dismissal of the case was without the express consent of the
accused.
The accused admits that the controverted dismissal was ordered by the trial judge upon
his motion to dismiss. However, he vehemently contends that under the prevailing
jurisprudence, citing People vs. Bangalao, et al. (94 Phil. 354, February 17, 1954),
People vs. Labatete (L-12917, April 27, 1960), People vs. Villarin (L-19795, July 31,
1964), and People vs. Cloribel (L-20314, August 31, 1964), an erroneous dismissal of a
criminal action, even upon the instigation of the accused in a motion to quash or dismiss,
does not bar him from pleading the defense of double jeopardy in a subsequent appeal
by the Government or in a new prosecution for the same offense. The accused suggests
that the above-enumerated cases have abandoned the previous ruling of this Court to the
effect that when a case is dismissed, other than on the merits, upon motion of the
accused personally or through counsel, such dismissal is to be regarded as with the
express consent of the accused and consequently he is deemed to have waived 4 his
right to plead double jeopardy and/or he is estopped 5 from claiming such defense on
appeal by the Government or in another indictment for the same offense.
This particular aspect of double jeopardy — dismissal or termination of the original case
without the express consent of the defendant — has evoked varied and apparently
conflicting rulings from this Court. We must untangle this jurisprudential maze and fashion
out in bold relief a ruling not susceptible of equivocation. Hence, a searching extended
review of the pertinent cases is imperative.
The doctrine of waiver of double jeopardy was enunciated and formally labelled as such
for the first time in 1949 in People vs. Salico, supra, with three justices dissenting. 6 In
that case, the provincial fiscal appealed from the order of the trial court dismissing, upon
motion of the defendant made immediately after the prosecution had rested its case, an
indictment for homicide, on the ground that the prosecution had failed to prove that the
crime was committed within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court, or, more
specifically, that the municipality of Victorias in which the crime was allegedly committed
was compromised within the province of Negros Occidental. Rejecting the claim of the
accused that the appeal placed him in double jeopardy, this Court held that the dismissal
was erroneous because the evidence on record showed that the crime was committed in
the town of Victorias and the trial judge should have taken judicial notice that the said
municipality was included within the province of Negros Occidental and therefore the
offense charged was committed within the jurisdiction of the court of first instance of the
said province. In ruling that the appeal by the Government did not put the accused in peril
of a second jeopardy, this Court stressed that with "the dismissal of the case by the court
below upon motion of the defendant, the latter has not been in jeopardy," and "assuming,
arguendo, that the defendant had been already in jeopardy in the court below and would
be placed in double jeopardy by the appeal, the defendant has waived his constitutional
right not to be put in danger of being convicted twice for the same offense." Mr. Justice
Felicisimo Feria, speaking for the majority, reasoned that
... when the case is dismissed with the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal
will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense; because, his action in
having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or privilege, for
the reason that he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits
and rendering a judgment of conviction against him.
The Salico doctrine was adhered to and affirmed in People vs. Marapao (85 Phil. 832,
March 30, 1950), Gandicela vs. Lutero (88 Phil. 299, March 5, 1951), People vs. Pinuela,
et al. (91 Phil. 53, March 28, 1952), Co Te Hue vs. Encarnacion (94 Phil. 258, January
26, 1954), and People vs. Desalisa (L-15516, December 17, 1966).
In Marapao, the defendant was indicted for slight physical injuries in the municipal court
of Sibonga, Cebu. After the prosecution had rested its case, a continuance was had, and
when trial was resumed, the court, upon motion of the defense, ordered the case
dismissed for failure of the prosecution to appear. However, the court reconsidered this
order upon representation of the fiscal who appeared moments later, and ordered the
defense to present its evidence. The accused moved to get aside the latter order on the
ground that it placed him in double jeopardy. Acceding to this motion, the court dismissed
the case. Subsequently, the accused was charged in the Court of First Instance of Cebu
with the offense of assault upon a person in authority, based on the same facts alleged in
the former complaint for slight physical injuries. Again, upon motion of the accused, the
trial court dismissed the new indictment on the ground of double jeopardy. From this
order, the prosecution appealed. In upholding the appeal of the Government, this Court
observed that although the information for assault necessarily embraced the crime of
slight physical injuries for which the accused was indicted in the justice of the peace
court,
... it appears that the appellee was neither convicted nor acquitted of the previous charge
against him for slight physical injuries, for that case was dismissed upon his own request
before trial could be finished. Having himself asked for such dismissal, before a judgment
of conviction or acquittal could have been rendered, the appellee is not entitled to invoke
the defense of double jeopardy...
In Gandicela, this Court had occasion to reiterate the Salico ruling:
But where a defendant expressly consents to, by moving for, the dismissal of the case
against him, as in the present case, even if the court or judge states in the order that the
dismissal is definite or does not say that the dismissal is without prejudice on the part of
the fiscal to file another information, the dismissal will not be a bar to a subsequent
prosecution of the defendant for the same offense. (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851;
People vs. Salico, 84 Phil. 722.).
And in denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the accused in that case, this Court
held:
According to Section 9 of Rule 13, if a criminal case is dismissed otherwise than upon the
merits at any stage before judgment, without the express consent of the defendant, by a
court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information, and after the
defendant has pleaded to the charge, the dismissal of the case shall be definite or a bar
to another prosecution for the same offense; but if it is dismissed upon the petition or with
the express consent of the defendant, the dismissal will be without prejudice or not a bar
to another prosecution for the same offense, because, in the last case, the defendant's
action in having the case dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right not to
be prosecuted again for the same offense.
In Pinuela, as in Salico, the prosecution had presented its evidence against the
defendant, and the trial court, upon motion of the accused, dismissed the criminal action
for lack of evidence showing that the crime charged was committed within its territorial
jurisdiction. On appeal by the Government, this Court found that the evidence showed
otherwise and, like in Salico, the majority rejected the plea of double jeopardy interposed
by the accused on the ground that his virtual instigation of the erroneous dismissal
amounted to a waiver of his right against a second jeopardy.
In Co Te Hue, it was the theory of the petitioner that the charge of estafa filed against him
having been dismissed, albeit provisionally, without his express consent, its revival
constituted double jeopardy which bars a subsequent prosecution for the same offense.
This claim was traversed by the Solicitor General who contended that considering what
had transpired in the conference between the parties, the provisional dismissal was no
bar to the subsequent prosecution for the reason that the dismissal was made with the
defendant's express consent. This Court sustained the view of the Solicitor General, thus:
We are inclined to uphold the view of the Solicitor General. From the transcript of the
notes taken at the hearing in connection with the motion for dismissal, it appears that a
conference was held between petitioner and the offended party in the office of the fiscal
concerning the case and that as a result of that conference the offended party filed the
motion to dismiss. It also appears that as no action has been taken on said motion,
counsel for petitioner invited the attention of the court to the matter who acted thereon
only after certain explanation was given by said counsel. And when the order came the
court made it plain that the dismissal was merely provisional in character. It can be plainly
seen that the dismissal was effected not only with the express consent of the petitioner
but even upon the urging of his counsel. This attitude of petitioner, or his counsel, takes
this case out of the operation of the rule.
In essence, this Court held that where a criminal case is dismissed provisionally not only
with the express consent of the accused but even upon the urging of his counsel, there
can be no double jeopardy under section 9, Rule 113, if the indictment against him is
revived by the fiscal. This decision subscribes substantially to the doctrine on waiver
established in Salico.
The validity and currency of the Salico doctrine were intimated in the recent case of
People vs. Fajardo (L-18257, June 29, 1966), and six months later were reaffirmed in
People vs. Desalisa, supra.
In Fajardo, this Court, through Mr. Justice Querube Makalintal, observed:
The record does not reveal that appellees expressly agreed to the dismissal of the
information as ordered by the trial Judge or that they performed any act which could be
considered as express consent within the meaning of the rule. While they did file a motion
asking that the case be quashed or that a reinvestigation thereof be ordered, the court
granted neither alternative. What it did was to order the prosecution to amend the
complaint. This order was in effect a denial of the motion to quash, and it was only after
the prosecution failed to amend that the court dismissed the case on that ground.
Consequently, even under the theory enunciated in some decisions of this Court (People
vs. Salico, etc.) that if a valid and sufficient information is erroneously dismissed upon
motion of the defendant he is deemed to have waived the plea of double jeopardy in
connection with an appeal from the order of dismissal, appellees here are not precluded
from making such plea.
To paraphrase, had the dismissal been anchored on the motion to dismiss, the
defendants would not have been entitled to protection against double jeopardy.
Then in Desalisa, this Court, in a unanimous decision penned by Mr. Justice Jesus
Barrera, held that
... The ruling in the case of Salico, that the act of the defendant in moving for the
dismissal of the case constitutes a waiver of the right to avail of the defense of double
jeopardy, insofar as it applies to dismissals which do not amount to acquittal or dismissal
of the case on the merits, cannot be considered to have been abandoned by the
subsequent decisions on the matter. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
... an appeal of the prosecution from the order of dismissal (of the criminal complaint) by
the trial court will not constitute double jeopardy if (1) the dismissal is made upon motion,
or with the express consent, of the defendant, and (2) the dismissal is not an acquittal or
based upon consideration of the evidence or of the merits of the case; and (3) the
question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal; so that should the
dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the court of origin
for further proceedings, to determine the guilt or innocence of the defendant. (Emphasis
supplied)
The doctrine of estoppel in relation to the plea of double jeopardy was first enunciated in
Acierto which held that when the trial court dismisses a case on a disclaimer of
jurisdiction, upon the instigation of the accused, the latter is estopped on appeal from
asserting the jurisdiction of the lower court in support of his plea of second jeopardy. The
doctrine of estoppel is in quintessence the same as the doctrine of waiver: the thrust of
both is that a dismissal, other than on the merits, sought by the accused in a motion to
dismiss, is deemed to be with his express consent and bars him from subsequently
interposing the defense of double jeopardy on appeal or in a new prosecution for the
same offense.
In Acierto, the defendant was charged before a United States court-martial with having
defrauded the Government of the United States, through falsification of documents, within
a military base of the United States in the Philippines. The challenge by the accused
against the jurisdiction of the military tribunal was brushed aside, and he was convicted.
On review, the verdict was reversed by the Commanding General who sustained
Acierto's position on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. Subsequently, he was convicted of
estafa and falsification based on the same facts by the Court of first Instance of Rizal. On
appeal to this Court, he claimed former jeopardy in the court-martial proceedings,
asserting that the military court actually had jurisdiction. In a unanimous 7 decision, this
Court, through Mr. Justice Pedro Tuason, ruled:
This is the exact reverse of the position defendant took at the military trial. As stated, he
there attacked the court-martial's jurisdiction with the same vigor that he now says the
court-martial did have jurisdiction; and thanks to his objections, so we incline to believe,
the Commanding General, upon consultation with, and the recommendation of, the Judge
Advocate General in Washington, disapproved the court-martial proceedings.
xxx xxx xxx
Irrespective of the correctness of the views of the Military authorities, the defendant was
estopped from demurring to the Philippine court's jurisdiction and pleading double
jeopardy on the strength of his trial by the court-martial, A party will not be allowed to
make a mockery of justice by taking inconsistent positions which if allowed would result in
brazen deception. It is trifling with the courts, contrary to the elementary principles of right
dealing and good faith, for an accused to tell one court that it lacks authority to try him
and, after he has succeeded in his effort, to tell the court to which he has been turned
over that the first has committed error in yielding to his plea. (Emphasis supplied)
The Acierto ruling was reiterated in People vs. Amada Reyes, et al. (96 Phil. 827, April
30, 1955); People vs. Reyes, et al. (98 Phil. 646, March 23, 1956); People vs. Casiano
(L-15309, February 16, 1961), and People vs. Archilla (L-15632, February 28, 1961).
The defendants in People vs. Amada Reyes, et al., were charged as accessories to the
crime of theft committed by their brother, Anselmo, the principal accused. The latter
pleaded guilty to simple theft and was sentenced accordingly. The former pleaded not
guilty and subsequently filed a motion to quash on the ground that being brothers and
sisters of the principal accused, they were exempt from criminal responsibility for the acts
charged against them in the information. Thereupon, the prosecution moved to amend
the information so as to allege that the defendants profited from the effects of the crime.
In view of this development, counsel for the defendants moved to withdraw their motion to
quash, and objected to the proposed amendment which sought to change materially the
information after plea without the consent of the accused. Without acting on the petition to
withdraw the motion to quash, the trial court denied the motion of the prosecution on the
ground that the proposed amendment would substantially affect the fundamental rights of
the accused who were exempt from liability under the information because of their
relation to the principal culprit. Then the prosecution moved for the dismissal of the case
against the alleged accessories with reservation to file a new information. The court
ordered the dismissal without ruling on the reservation. Subsequently, a new information
was filed virtually reproducing the previous one except that now there was an added
allegation of intent to gain. The lower court quashed the new information upon motion of
the accused on the ground of double jeopardy. On appeal by the prosecution, this Court,
thru Mr. Justice J. B. L. Reyes, held that the plea of double jeopardy was erroneously
sustained because
In the first place, the accused-appellees herein filed a motion to quash on the ground that
they incurred no criminal liability under the facts alleged in the information in the
preceding case, No. Q-972, and the trial court instead of allowing the withdrawal of the
motion to quash, virtually sustained the same when it denied the fiscal's motion to
amend, thereby forcing the latter to dismiss the case; hence, it can not be held that the
former case was terminated without the express consent of the accused. Secondly, the
defendants themselves showed that the information in the previous case was insufficient
to charge them with any criminal offense, in view of their relationship with the principal
accused; and it is well established doctrine that for jeopardy to attach, there must be an
information sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction. Lastly, the herein
accused having successfully contended that the information in the former case was
insufficient to sustain a conviction, they cannot turn around now and claim that such
information was after all, sufficient and did place them in danger of jeopardy of being
convicted thereunder. If, as they formerly contended, no conviction could be had in the
previous case, they are in estoppel to contend now that the information in the second
case places them in jeopardy for the second time. Their case comes within the spirit of
the rule laid down in People vs. Acierto.
Again, in People vs. Reyes, et al., supra, this Court, speaking thru Mr. Chief Justice
Paras, reiterated the Acierto ruling thus:
Where the complaint or information is in truth valid and sufficient, but the case is
dismissed upon the petition of the accused on the ground that the complaint or
information is invalid and insufficient, such dismissal will not bar another prosecution for
the same offense and the defendant is estopped from alleging in the second information
that the former dismissal was wrong because the complaint or information was valid.
In this particular case, upon motion of the defendants, the trial court dismissed the
information because it did not allege the use of violence, notwithstanding the fact that the
offense charged was coercion under article 287 of the Revised Penal Code. On appeal,
however, this Court ruled that the dismissal was erroneous because "although the
offense named in the information is coercion, it does not necessarily follow that the
applicable provision is the first paragraph, since the second paragraph also speaks of
'coercions'. Inasmuch as the recitals in the information do not include violence, the
inevitable conclusion is that the coercion contemplated is that described and penalized in
the second paragraph."
We come now to the case of People vs. Casiano. In this case the accused was charged
with estafa in a complaint filed with the justice of the peace court of Rosales, Pangasinan.
The accused waived her right to preliminary investigation and the record was accordingly
forwarded to the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan where the provincial fiscal filed an
information for "illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes." Upon
arraignment the defendant pleaded not guilty. Subsequently, the defense filed a motion to
dismiss on the thesis that there had been no preliminary investigation of the charge of
illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes, and that the absence of such
preliminary investigation affected the jurisdiction of the trial court. The motion was
granted on the ground that the waiver made by the defendant in the justice of the peace
court did not deprive her of the right to a preliminary investigation of an entirely different
crime. On appeal to this Court, it was held that the dismissal was erroneous because the
allegations of the information filed in the Court of First Instance were included in those of
the complaint filed in the justice of the peace court where the defendant had already
waived her right to a preliminary investigation. On the question of whether the appeal
placed the defendant in double jeopardy, this Court, thru Mr. Chief Justice (then
Associate Justice) Concepcion, observed that the situation of Casiano was identical to
that of the accused in Acierto
... were she to plead double jeopardy in this case, for such plea would require the
assertion of jurisdiction of the court of first instance to try her and that the same erred in
yielding to her plea therein for lack of authority therefor. In the language of our decision in
the Acierto case, it is immaterial whether or not the court a quo had said authority. It,
likewise, makes no difference whether or not the issue raised by defendant in the lower
court affected its jurisdiction. The fact is that she contested its jurisdiction and that,
although such pretense was erroneous, she led the court to believe that it was correct
and to act in accordance with such belief. The elementary principles of fair dealing and
good faith demand, accordingly, that she be estopped now from taking the opposite stand
in order to pave the way for a plea of double jeopardy, unless the rule of estoppel laid
down in the Acierto case is revoked. As a matter of fact, said rule applies with greater
force to the case at bar than to the Acierto case, because the same involved two (2)
separate proceedings before courts deriving their authority from different sovereignties,
whereas the appeal in the case at bar is a continuation of the proceedings in the lower
court, which like this Supreme Court, is a creature of the same sovereignty. In short the
inconsistency and impropriety would be more patent and glaring in this case than in that
of Acierto, if appellant herein pleaded double jeopardy in this instance.
This Court then forthnightly stated that "the rule of estoppel applied in the Acierto case
should be maintained, because:
1. It is basically and fundamentally sound and just.
2. It is in conformity with the principles of legal ethics, which demand good faith of the
higher order in the practice of law.
3. It is well settled that parties to a judicial proceeding may not, on appeal, adopt a theory
inconsistent with that which they sustained in the lower court.
xxx xxx xxx
4. The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly
depends whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction,
but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are
not barred on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same "must exist as a
matter of law, and may not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel" (5
C.J.S. 861-863). However, if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and
decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the
party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an
inconsistent position — that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of
estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction is conferred by law, and does not depend upon
the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon.
Twelve days after Casiano, this Court, in People vs. Archilla, supra, invoked anew the
doctrine of estoppel. In this case Alfreda Roberts, together with Jose Archilla, was
charged with bigamy. After pleading not guilty, Roberts, through his counsel, filed a
motion praying that the complaint be quashed with regard to her on the ground that the
facts alleged therein did not constitute the offense charged for failure to aver that "insofar
as Alfreda Roberts is concerned, her marriage to Jose Luis Archilla was her second
marriage ..." On appeal, the prosecution contended that the trial court erred in granting
the motion to quash, because the complaint was sufficient and at least charged the
accused as an accomplice. The defendant maintained that even if that were true, the
quashing of the information amounted to her acquittal which prevented the prosecution
from taking the said appeal as it would place her in double jeopardy. Mr. Justice Felix
Bautista Angelo, writing for the majority, ruled that the trial court erred, and proceeded to
emphasize that the accused
... cannot now be allowed to invoke the plea of double jeopardy after inducing the trial
court to commit an error which otherwise it would not have committed. In other words,
appellee can not adopt a posture of double dealing without running afoul with the doctrine
of estoppel. It is well-settled that the parties to a justiciable proceeding may not, on
appeal, adopt a theory inconsistent with that which they sustained in the lower court
(Williams v. McMicking, 17 Phil. 408; Molina v. Somes, etc.). Consequently, appellee is
now estopped from invoking the plea of double jeopardy upon the theory that she would
still be convicted under an information which she branded to be insufficient in the lower
court.
The accused in this case now before us nevertheless insists that the Salico doctrine and
"necessarily analogous doctrines" were abandoned by this Court in Bangalao, Labatete,
Villarin and Cloribel.
In Bangalao, the complaint filed by the victim's mother alleged that the rape was
committed "by means of force and intimidation" while the information filed by the fiscal
alleged that the offended party was a "minor and demented girl" and that the defendants
"successively had sexual intercourse with her by means of force and against the will of
Rosita Palban." After the accused had pleaded not guilty, the defense counsel moved for
the dismissal of the case on the ground that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to try the
offense of rape charged by the fiscal since it was distinct from the one alleged in the
complaint which did not aver that the victim was a demented girl". The lower court
sustained the motion and dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal by the
prosecution, this Court held that the trial judge erred in dismissing the case for lack of
jurisdiction, but ruled, however, that the appeal could not prosper because it placed the
accused in double jeopardy.
As the court below had jurisdiction to try the case upon the filing of the complaint by the
mother of the offended party, the defendants-appellees would be placed in double
jeopardy if the appeal is allowed.
After mature analysis, we cannot agree that this Court in Bangalao impliedly abandoned
the Salico doctrine on waiver. Bangalao was decided solely on the question of
jurisdiction. This Court, however, after holding that the lower tribunal had jurisdiction,
decided outright to repress the appeal by the Government on the ground of double
jeopardy without considering whether the appealed order of dismissal was issued with or
without the express consent of the accused (this aspect of double jeopardy not being in
issue). Hence, the ruling in Salico — that the dismissal was with the express consent of
the accused because it was granted upon his instigation thru a motion to dismiss — was
not passed upon in Bangalao.
A case of striking factual resemblance with Salico is People vs. Ferrer (100 Phil. 124,
October 23, 1956). In this case, after the prosecution had rested, the accused filed a
motion to dismiss on the ground that the territorial jurisdiction of the trial court had not
been published. Acting on this motion, the lower court dismissed the case. The
prosecution appealed. This Court found that the evidence on record, contrary to the
finding of the trial court, amply proved the jurisdiction of the lower tribunal. However,
without the defendant interposing the plea of double jeopardy, this Court held that "the
Government however meritorious its case cannot appeal the order of dismissal without
violating the right of the defendant not to be placed in double jeopardy." Again, like in
Bangalao, this Court did not consider the nature of dismissal — whether it was with or
without the express consent of the defendant.
The accused in the case at bar avers that the Salico doctrine was formally and expressly
abandoned in People vs. Labatete, supra. In the latter case, the trial court, upon motion
of the defendant, dismissed the original information for estafa on the ground that it did not
allege facts constituting the offense charged. The information recited that the accused
had contracted a loan from the complainant, giving as security the improvements and
products of his property (a piece of land), without averring that the said property, which
was allegedly mortgaged by the accused to the Rehabilitation Finance Corporation,
formed part of the security. Consequently, the fiscal filed an amended complaint alleging
that the accused also gave as security the land in question, which he later mortgaged to
the damage and prejudice of the complaining creditor. This amended information was
also dismissed upon motion of the defendant on the ground of double jeopardy. This
Court, in sustaining the appealed order of dismissal, held:
If the amended information were to be admitted, the accused will be deprived of his
defense of double jeopardy because by the amended information he is sought to be
made responsible for the same act of borrowing on a mortgage for which he had already
begun to be tried and acquitted by the dismissal of the original information.
xxx xxx xxx
... the trial court found that the accused could not be found guilty of any offense under the
information. The judgment entered was not one of dismissal but of acquittal, and whether
the judgment is correct or incorrect, the same constitutes a bar to the presentation of the
amended information sought to be introduced by the fiscal. (Emphasis supplied)
In not applying the Salico doctrine, this Court, through Mr. Justice Alejo Labrador,
expounded:
... The judgment of the trial court (in People vs. Salico) was in fact an acquittal because of
the failure on the part of the fiscal to prove that the crime was committed within the
jurisdiction of the court. The judgment was in fact a final judgment of acquittal. The mere
fact that the accused asked for his acquittal after trial on the merits (after the prosecution
had rested its case) is no reason for saying that the case was "dismissed" with his
express consent and he may again be subjected to another prosecution.
From the above named statement, it is clear that what in Salico was repudiated in
Labatete was the premise that the dismissal therein was not on the merits and not the
conclusion that a dismissal, other than on the merits, sought by the accused, is deemed
to be with his express consent and therefore constitutes a waiver of his right to plead
double jeopardy in the event of an appeal by the prosecution or a second indictment for
the same offense. This Court, in Labatete, merely pointed out that the controverted
dismissal in Salico was in fact an acquittal." Reasoning a contrario, had the dismissal not
amounted to acquittal, then the doctrine of waiver would have applied and prevailed. As a
matter of fact we believe with the majority in Salico that the dismissal therein was not on
the merits and therefore did not amount to an acquittal:
If the prosecution fails to prove that the offense was committed within the territorial
jurisdiction of the court and the case is dismissed, the dismissal is not an acquittal,
inasmuch as if it were so the defendant could not be again prosecuted for the same
offense before a court of competent jurisdiction; and it is elemental that in such case the
defendant may again be prosecuted for the same offense before a court of competent
jurisdiction.
Granting, however, that the Salico doctrine was abandoned in Labatete, it was
resurrected in Desalisa. Moreover, Labatete never mentioned the doctrine of estoppel
enunciated in Acierto which had been repeatedly reaffirmed.
To bolster his contention that the Salico doctrine has been dropped from the corpus of
our jurisprudence, the accused cites People vs. Villarin, supra. Here the accused
appealed to the Court of First instance his conviction in the inferior court for acts of
lasciviousness with consent. After conducting the preliminary investigation, the fiscal
charged the accused with corruption of minors. Villarin pleaded not guilty, and before the
case could be heard, his counsel filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the
information did not allege facts constituting the crime charged. Acting on this motion, the
trial court dismissed the case. On appeal by the prosecution, this Court thru Mr. Justice
Felix Angelo Bautista, held that the dismissal was erroneous, but that this error
... cannot now be remedied by setting aside the order dismissal of the court a quo and by
remanding the case to it for further proceedings as now suggested by the prosecution
considering that the case was dismissed without the express consent of the accused
even if it was upon the motion of his counsel, for to do so would place the accused in
double jeopardy. The only exception to the rule on the matter is when the dismissal is
with the consent of the accused, and here this consent has not been obtained. (Emphasis
supplied)
Villarin gives the impression, as gleaned from the above statement, that this Court therein
sustained the plea of double jeopardy on the ground that dismissal was without the
express consent of the defendant as it was ordered "upon the motion of his counsel" and
not upon motion of the defendant himself. This conclusion is rather unfortunate and must
be rectified, for the settled rule is that the acts of counsel in a criminal prosecution bind
his client. Thus, in People vs. Romero (89 Phil. 672, July 31, 1951), this Court held
categorically that
The fact that the counsel for the defendant, and not the defendant himself personally
moved for the dismissal of the case against him, had the same effect as if the defendant
had personally moved for such dismissal, inasmuch as the act of the counsel in the
prosecution of the defendant's cases was the act of the defendant himself , for the only
case in which the defendant cannot be represented by his counsel is in pleading guilty
according to Section 3, Rule 114, of the Rules of Court. (Emphasis supplied)
On this consideration alone, we cannot agree with the accused in the case at bar that this
Court in Villarin intended to abandon the Salico ruling. Had the motion to dismiss filed by
Villarin's counsel been considered as one made by the defendant himself, as should have
been done, the Villarin case should have been resolved consistent with the doctrine of
waiver in Salico and/or that of estoppel in Acierto.
As a final citation in support of his theory, the accused in the case at bar invokes People
vs. Clolibel, supra, where this Court, in sustaining the plea of double jeopardy interposed
by the defendants, stated inter alia:
In asserting that Criminal Case No. 45717 may still be reinstated, the petitioner adopts
the ruling once followed by the Court to the effect that a dismissal upon the defendant's
own motion is a dismissal consented to by him and, consequently, will not be a bar to
another prosecution for the same offense, because, his action in having the case
dismissed constitutes a waiver of his constitutional right or privilege, for the reason that
he thereby prevents the court from proceeding to the trial on the merits and rendering a
judgment of conviction against him. (People v. Salico, 84 Phil. 772) But, this authority has
long been abandoned and the ruling therein expressly repudiated.
Thus, in the case of People v. Robles, G.R. No. L-12761, June 29, 1959, citing People v.
Bangalao, L-5610, February 17, 1954; People v. Diaz, L-6518, March 30, 1954; People v.
Abano, L-7862, May 17, 1955; and People v. Ferrer, L-9072, October 23, 1956, We said:
... In reaching the above conclusion, this Court has not overlooked the ruling in People
vs. Salico, 47 O.G. 4765, to the effect that a dismissal upon defendant's motion will not
be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense as said dismissal was not without
the express consent of the defendant, which ruling the prosecution now invokes in
support of its appeal; but said ruling is not now controlling, having been modified or
abandoned in subsequent cases wherein this Court sustained the theory of double
jeopardy despite the fact that dismissal was secured upon motion of the accused.
(Emphasis supplied)
Also, the rule that a dismissal upon defendant's motion will not be a bar to another
prosecution for the same offense as said dismissal is not without the express consent of
the defendant, has no application to a case where the dismissal, as here, is predicated on
the right of a defendant to a speedy trial. (People vs. Tacneng, et al., G.R. No. L-12082,
April 30, 1959). (emphasis supplied)
The above statements must be taken in the proper context and perspective. As
previously explained, Bangalao, Ferrer, and even Labatete, did not actually abandon the
doctrine of waiver in Salico (and not one of the said cases even implied the slightest
departure from the doctrine of estoppel established in Acierto). In Diaz, Abaño, Tacneng
and Robles which are cited above, like in Cloribel, the dismissals therein, all sought by
the defendants, were considered acquittals because they were all predicated on the right
of a defendant to a speedy trial and on the failure of the Government to prosecute.
Therefore, even if such dismissals were induced by the accused, the doctrines of waiver
and estoppel were obviously inapplicable for these doctrines presuppose a dismissal not
amounting to an acquittal.
This Court, through Mr. Justice Marceliano Montemayor, held in People vs. Diaz (94 Phil.
714, March 30, 1954):
Here the prosecution was not even present on the day of trial so as to be in a position to
proceed with the presentation of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused. The case
was set for hearing twice and the prosecution without asking for postponement or giving
any explanation, just failed to appear. So the dismissal of the case, though at the
instance of defendant Diaz may, according to what we said in the Gandicela case, be
regarded as an acquittal. (emphasis supplied)
A similar result was reached by this Court thru Mr. Justice Sabino Padilla, in People vs.
Abano (97 Phil. 28, May 27, 1955), in this wise:
After a perusal of the documents attached to the petition for a writ of certiorari, we fail to
find an abuse of discretion committed by the respondent judge. He took pains to inquire
about the nature of the ailment from which the complaining witness claimed she was
suffering. He continued the trial three times, to wit: on 27 May, 1 and 12 June. The
defendant was entitled to a speedy trial. When on 15 June, the last day set for the
resumption of the trial, the prosecution failed to secure the continuance thereof and could
not produce further evidence because of the absence of the complaining witness, the
respondent judge was justified in dismissing the case upon motion of the defense ... The
defendant was placed in jeopardy for the offense charged in the information and the
annulment or setting aside of the order of dismissal would place him twice in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense. (emphasis supplied)
Then in People vs. Tacneng (L-12082, April 30, 1959), Mr. Justice Pastor Endencia,
speaking for a unanimous Court, stressed that
... when criminal case No. 1793 was called for hearing for the third time and the fiscal
was not ready to enter into trial due to the absence of his witnesses, the herein appellees
had the right to object to any further postponement and to ask for the dismissal of the
case by reason of their constitutional right to a speedy trial; and if pursuant to that
objection and petition for dismissal the case was dismissed, such dismissal ammounted
to an acquittal of the herein appellees which can be invoked, as they did, in a second
prosecution for the same offense. (emphasis supplied)
And this Court proceeded to distinguish the case from People vs. Salico, thus:
We are fully aware that pursuant to our ruling in the case of Peo. v. Salico, 45 O.G. No. 4,
1765-1776, and later reiterated in Peo vs. Romero, L-4517-20, July 31, 1951, a dismissal
upon defendant's motion will not be a bar to another prosecution for the same offense as
said dismissal was not without the express consent of the defendant. This ruling,
however, has no application to the instant case, since the dismissal in those cases was
not predicated, as in the case at bar, on the right of a defendant to a speedy trial, but on
different grounds. In the Salico case, the dismissal was based on the ground that the
evidence for the prosecution did not show that the crime was committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of the court which, on appeal, we found that it was, so the case was
remanded for further proceedings; and in the Romero case the dismissal was due to the
non-production of other important witnesses by the prosecution on a date fixed by the
court and under the understanding that no further postponement at the instance of the
government would be entertained. In both cases, the right of a defendant to a speedy trial
was never put in issue. (emphasis supplied)
'dismissal' but an acquittal. For it was entered upon the defendants' insistence on their
constitutional right to speedy trial and by reason of the prosecution's failure to appear on
the date of trial." (Emphasis supplied.)
Considering the factual setting in the case at bar, it is clear that there is no parallelism
between Cloribel and the cases cited therein, on the one hand, and the instant case, on
the other. Here the controverted dismissal was predicated on the erroneous contention of
the accused that the complaint was defective and such infirmity affected the jurisdiction of
the court a quo, and not on the right of the accused to a speedy trial and the failure of the
Government to prosecute. The appealed order of dismissal in this case now under
consideration did not terminate the action on the merits, whereas in Cloribel and in the
other related cases the dismissal amounted to an acquittal because the failure to
prosecute presupposed that the Government did not have a case against the accused,
who, in the first place, is presumed innocent.
The application of the sister doctrines of waiver and estoppel requires two sine qua non
conditions: first, the dismissal must be sought or induced by the defendant personally or
through his counsel; and second, such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not
necessarily amount to an acquittal. Indubitably, the case at bar falls squarely within the
periphery of the said doctrines which have been preserved unimpaired in the corpus of
our jurisprudence.
ACCORDINGLY, the order appealed from is set aside. This case is hereby remanded to
the court of origin for further proceedings in accordance with law. No costs.

The gravamen of the foregoing decisions was reiterated in People vs. Robles (L-12761,
June 29, 1959) where the trial court, upon motion of the defendant, dismissed the case
on the ground that the failure of the prosecution to present its evidence despite several
postponements granted at its instance, denied the accused a speedy trial. In rejecting the
appeal of the Government, this Court held:

In the circumstances, we find no alternative than to hold that the dismissal of Criminal
Case No. 11065 is not provisional in character but one which is tantamount to acquittal
that would bar further prosecution of the accused for the same offense.

In Cloribel, the case dragged for three years and eleven months, that is, from September
27, 1958 when the information was filed to August 15, 1962 when it was called for trial,
after numerous postponements, mostly at the instance of the prosecution. On the latter
date, the prosecution failed to appear for trial, and upon motion of defendants, the case
was dismissed. This Court held "that the dismissal here complained of was not truly a