SPECPRO RULE 80| 1
G.R. No. L-48585 March 3, 1980
FELICIANO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE TEOFILO GUADIZ, JR., Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan, and JULIAN VILLEGAS,
NATIVIDAD VILLEGAS, GEMINIANO VILLEGAS, CESAR VILLEGAS,
MAXIMO MATIAS, ROSARIO VILLEGAS MATIAS, ANA MARIE V.
MATIAS, and LOURDES V. MATIAS, respondents.
Remedial Law; Estates; Civil Law; Wills; Probate of the will; Appointment
of special administrator, basis of.—Under the above rule, the probate court
may appoint a special administrator should there be a delay in granting
letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by any cause including
an appeal from the allowance of disallowance of a will. Subject to this
qualification, the appointment of a special administrator lies in the
discretion of the Court. This discretion, however, must be sound, that is,
not whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle. The
basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad enough
to include any cause or reason for the delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration as where a contest as to the will is being
carried on in the same or in another court, or where there is an appeal
pending as to the proceeding on the removal of an executor or
administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree among
themselves. Likewise, when from any cause general administration cannot
be immediately granted, a special administrator may be appointed to collect
and preserve the property of the deceased.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Appointment of special administrator,
reasons for.—It is obvious that the phrase “by any cause” includes those
incidents which transpired in the instant case clearly showing that there is a
delay in the probate of the will and that the granting of letters testamentary
will consequently be prolonged necessitating the immediate appointment of
a special administrator. The reasons for the appointment of a special
administrator are: “The reason for the practice of appointing a special
administrator rests in the fact that estates of decedents frequently become
involved in protected litigation, thereby being exposed to great waste and
losses if there is no authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the
assets in the interim. The occassion for such an appointment usually arises
where, for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof
of the will, regular administration is delayed. No temporary administration
can be granted where there is an executor in being capable of acting,
however.” “Principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is to
preserve estate until it can pass into hands of person fully authorized to
administer it for benefit of creditors and heirs.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Nature of office of a special
administrator.—The respondent judge opined that there is no need for the
appointment of a special administrator in this case because the respondents
are already in possession of the properties covered by the will. The
respondent judge has failed to distinguish between the partisan possession
of litigants from that of the neutral possession of the special administrator
under the Rules of Court. When appointed, a special administrator is
regarded, not as a representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the
appointment, but as the administrator in charge of the estate, and in fact,
as an officer of the court. The accountability which attaches to the office of
a special administrator to be appointed by the court is absent from the
personal possession of private respondents.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutory construction; Phrase “by any
cause” in Rule 80, Sec. 1 of the Rules of Court, interpreted.—It is obvious
that the phrase “by any course” includes those incidents which transpired in
the instant case clearly showing that there is a delay in the probate of the
will and that the granting of letters testamentary will consequently be
prolonged necessitating the immediate appointment of a special
administrator.
PETITION for certiorari of the order of the Court of First Instance of
Nueva Ecija. [De Guzman vs. Guadiz, Jr., 96 SCRA 938(1980)]
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari instituted b Feliciano de Guzman against
Honorable Teofilo Guadiz, Jr. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, Branch V, Gapan, and Julian Villegas, Natividad Villegas, Geminiano
Villegas, Cesar Villegas, Maximo Matias, Rosario Villegas Matias, Ana Marie
V. Matias, and Lourdes V. Matias, seeking the following relief.
WHEREFORE, petitioner most respectively prays:
a) That respondents be ordered to answer this petition;

b) That after hearing the Order of respondent Judge dated December
23, 1977 denying petitioner's Motion for Appointment of a Special
Administrator and consequently, the Order dated July 15, 1978 denying
petitioners Motion for Reconsideration be annulled and that said respondent
Judge be declared to have committed a grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing the appointment of
the Special Administrator;
c) That respondent Judge be directed to appoint a Special
Administrator pending the probate of the Last Will of Catalina Bajacan.
Petitioner respectfully prays for such other relief just and equitable in the
premises.
Manila, Philippines, August 14, 1978. 1
On August 31, 1978, without giving due course to the instant petition, this
Court adopted a resolution directing the respondents to comment thereon
within ten (10) days from notice thereof. 2
The respondents filed on October 10, 1978 their comment dated October 9,
1978. 3
Meanwhile, on September 29, 1978, the petitioner submitted a Constancia
manifesting that the respondent judge cancelled the hearing on the petition
for probate of the will scheduled on September 20, 1978 "pending the
outcome of the case before the Supreme Court." 4
On October 18. 1978, this Court resolved: a) to GIVE DUE COURSE to the
petition; and b) to REQUIRE (1) the petitioner to deposit P80.40 for costs
and clerk's commission within five (5) days from notice thereof, and (2)
both parties to submit simultaneous memoranda within thirty (30) days
from notice thereof. 5
Both petitioner and respondents having filed their respective memoranda, 6
on December 6, 1978, this Court resolved to declare this case submitted for
decision. 7
The record discloses that on March 16, 1977, the petitioner filed a petition
with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan, docketed
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as Special Proceeding No. 865 8 for the probate of a will alleged to have
been executed by one Catalina Bajacan instituting the herein petitioner as
sole and universal heir and naming him as executor; that Catalina Bajacan
died on February 3, 1977; that on May 10, 1977, the private respondents
filed a motion to dismiss and/or opposition contending, among others, that
all the real properties of Catalina Bajacan are now owned by them by virtue
of a Deed of Donation Intervivos executed on June 19, 1972 by Arcadia
Bajacan and Catalina Bajacan in their favor; 9 that on September 30, 1977,
the respondent judge resolved to defer resolution on the said motion to
dismiss until the parties shall have presented their evidence; 10 that a
motion for the appointment of a special administrator 11 was filed by the
petitioner on September 23, 1977 alleging that the unresolved motion to
dismiss would necessarily delay the probate of the will and the appointment
of an executor; that the decedent's estate consists of eighty (80) hectares
of first class agricultural rice land, more or less, yielding fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) worth of rice harvested twice a year; that somebody
representing the estate should collect and receive the palay harvests
pending the probate of the will; that on December 23, 1977, the
respondent judge issued an order denying the motion for appointment of a
special administrator, the pertinent portion of which reads:
The appointment of a special administrator is predicated on the necessity of
enabling somebody to take care of the properties where there is a
considerable delay in the appointment of a regular administrator. In the
present case, since the properties covered by the will are undoubtedly in
the possession of the oppositors who claim to be the owners thereof, the
Court sees no necessity of appointing a special administrator.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby denies the motion
for the appointment of a special administrator filed by the petitioner dated
September 22, 1977 ... 12
that on June 5, 1978, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the
order dated December 23, 1977 13 ; that said motion was also denied by
the respondent judge in an order dated June 9, 1978 which states:
In a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner on June 5, 1978
praying for a reconsideration of the Order dated Dec. 23, 1977, which
denied the motion for appointment of a Special Administrator filed by him,
it is alleged that the Court made a premature determination of ownership
and possession of the oppositors over the properties of the estate of

Catalina Bajacan. This assertion is not accurate. What the Court merely
stated in said Order is that the oppositors, who claim to be the owners, are
in possession of the properties covered by the Will.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) denies the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner on June 5,
1978. 14
The main issue in this case is whether the respondent judge presiding the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V. Gapan, acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the
order dated December 23, 1977 denying petitioner's motion for the
appointment of a special administrator and the order dated June 9, 1978,
denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
It is the petitioner's contention that the respondent judge acted with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because the
facts warrant the appointment of a special administrator of the estate of
Catalina Bajacan.
Rule 80, Sec. 1, of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1 — Appointment of Special Administrator — When there is delay in
granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an
appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a
special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the
deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors
or administrators appointed.
Under the above rule, the probate court may appoint a special
administrator 15 should there be a delay in granting letters testamentary or
of administration occasioned by any cause including an appeal from the
allowance or disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification, the
appointment of a special administrator lies in the discretion of the Court. 16
This discretion, however, must be sound, that is, not whimsical, or Contrary
to reason, justice, equity or legal principle. 17
SPECPRO RULE 80| 3
The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad
enough to include any cause or reason for the delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration as where a contest as to the will is being
carried on in the same or in another court, or where there is an appeal
pending as to the proceeding on the removal of an executor or
administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree among
themselves. 18 Likewise, when from any cause general administration
cannot be immediately granted, a special administrator may be appointed
to collect and preserve the property of the deceased.
It is obvious that the phrase "by any cause" includes those incidents which
transpired in the instant case clearly showing that there is a delay in the
probate of the will and that the granting of letters testamentary will
consequently be prolonged necessitating the immediate appointment of a
special administrator.
The facts justifying the appointment of a special administrator are:
(1) Delay in the hearing of the petition for the probate of the win.
(2) The basis of the private respondents' claim to the estate of Catalina
Bajacan and opposition to the probate of the will is a deed of donation
dated June 19, 1972 allegedly executed by the deceased Catalina Bajacan
and her late sister Arcadia Bajacan in their favor. 19
There is an immediate need to file an action for the annulment of such deed
of donation in behalf of the estate. Precisely, the petitioner filed Civil Case
No. 1080 in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija Branch V, against the
herein private respondents. The case was dismissed by the respondent
judge in an order dated June 9, 1978 on the ground that the petitioner has
no personality to file the action because although he is named heir in the
will, the said will is not yet probated. 20 In the meantime there is nobody
to sue in order to protect the interest of the estate considering that the
probate of the will and the appointment of an executor will take time.
Upon the filing of this petition, the respondent judge, on motion of the
private respondents, postponed the hearing of the probate of the will which
was then scheduled on August 23, 1978 to September 20, 1978. Again, in
view of the motion for reconsideration of the private respondents dated
September 4, 1978, the respondent judge issued an order dated September
12, 1978, which in part reads: ... the hearing of this case scheduled on
 SPECPRO RULE 80| 4

September 20, 1978 is hereby cancelled pending the outcome of the case
before the Supreme Court. 21
The reasons for the appointment of a special administrator are:
The reason for the practice of appointing a special administrator rests in the
fact that estates of decedents frequently become involved in protracted
litigation, thereby being exposed to great waste and losses if there is no
authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the assets in the interim.
The occasion for such an appointment usually arises where, for some cause,
such as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the will, regular
administration is .delayed. No temporary administration can be granted
where there is an executor in being capable of acting, however. 22
The only way to test the validity of the alleged donation in favor of the
private respondents is to appoint a special adiu administrator who will have
the personality to file the corresponding action. In view of all the foregoing,
respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the
petitioner's motion for appointment of a special administrator.
WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of certiorari is hereby granted and the
Order of the respondent judge dated December 23, 1977, denying
petitioner's motion for appointment of a special administrator and the order
dated June 9, ,978 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration are
set aside. The respondent judge is ordered forthwith to appointment a
special administrator pending the probate of the last will of Catalina
Bajacan in Special Proceeding No. 865, without pronouncement as to costs.

Principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is to preserve SO ORDERED.

estate until it can pass into hands of person fully authorized to administer it
for benefit of creditors and heirs. 23

It appears that the estate the properties registered under the Torrens
system in the name of the deceased Catalina Bajacan consisting of eighty
(80) hectares of first class agricultural land. It is claimed that these 80
hectares produce P50,000.00 worth of palay each harvest twice a year.
Obviously there is an immediate need for a special administrator to protect
the interests of the estate as regards the products.

All the facts which warrant the appointment of a special administrator in

accordance with Rule 80, Sec. 1 of the Revised Rules of Court are present
in the case at bar.

The respondent judge opined that there is no need for the appointment of a
special administrator in this case because the respondents are already in
possession of the properties covered by the will. The respondent judge has
failed to distinguish between the partisan possession of litigants from that
of the neutral possession of the special administrator under the Rules of
Court. When appointed, a special administrator is regarded, not as a
representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment, but
as the administrator in charge of the estate, and in fact, as an officer of the
court. 24 The accountability which the court. which attaches to the office of
a special administrator to be appointed by the court is absent from the
personal possession of private respondents.

G.R. No. L-20735 August 14, 1965
GLICERIA C. LIWANAG, Special Administratrix of the Estate of PIO
D. LIWANAG, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS DE VEYRA, as Judge of the
Court of First Instance of Manila, and MANUEL AGREGADO,
respondents.
C. M. Baltazar and A. P. Narvasa for petitioner.
Manuel P. Calanog for respondents.
Remedial law; Civil actions; When denial of motion to dismiss, even if
erroneous, is reviewable by appeal; Case at bar.—The denial of a motion to
dismiss, even if it were erroneous, is reviewable, not by writ of certiorari,
but by appeal, after the rendition of judgment on the merits where the
alleged ground for dismissal, such as absence of a cause of action, does not
affect the lower court’s jurisdiction to hear the case.
Same; Special civil actions; Settlement of estate of deceased persons;
Mortgagee may bring action for foreclosure against special administrator.—
The theory that a mortgagee cannot bring an action for foreclosure against
the special admin istrator of the estate of a deceased person has already
been rejected by this Court in Liwanag v. Hon. Reyes, L-19159, Sept. 29,
1964 where the Supreme Court held that the “the Rules of Court do not
expressly prohibit making the special administratrix a defendant in a suit
against the estate. Otherwise, creditors would find the adverse effects of
the statute of limitations running against them in cases where the
appointment of a regular administrator is delayed. So that if We are not to
deny the present action on this technical ground alone, and the
appointment of a regular administrator will be delayed, the very purpose for
which the mortgage was constituted will be defeated.”
APPEAL by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
[Liwanag vs. Court of Appeals, 14 SCRA 922(1965)]
CONCEPCION, J.:
Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.
SPECPRO RULE 80| 5
Petitioner Gliceria C. Liwanag is the special administratrix of the estate of
Pio D. Liwanag, the settlement of which is the subject of Special Proceeding
No. 46599 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. On January 9, 1962
respondent Manuel Agregado commenced against her as such special
administratrix, Civil Case No. 50897 of the same court, for the foreclosure
of a real estate mortgage constituted in his favor by said Pio D. Liwanag
during his lifetime. On July 18, 1962, here petitioner moved to dismiss
Agregado's complaint, upon the ground that as special administratrix she
cannot be sued by a creditor of the deceased. In an order dated August 1,
1962, respondent, Hon. Jesus de Veyra, as Judge of said court, denied the
motion, whereupon petitioner filed case CA-G.R. No. 31168-R of the Court
of Appeals against respondent Judge and Agregado, to annul said order by
writ of certiorari and enjoin said Judge from entertaining said Case No.
50897. Upon petitioner's motion, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of
preliminary injunction directing respondent Judge to refrain from
proceeding with the trial of that case, until further orders. However,
subsequently, or on December 3, 1962, the Court of Appeals rendered a
decision denying the writ prayed for and dissolving said writ of preliminary
injunction, with costs against the petitioner. Hence this appeal taken by
petitioner upon the theory that, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 81 of the (old)
Rules of Court, "a special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts
of the deceased," and that, accordingly, Agregado has no cause of action
against her as a special administratrix.
In as much, however, as the alleged absence of a cause of action does not
affect respondent's jurisdiction to hear Case No. 50897, it follows that the
denial of petitioner's motion to the same, even if it were erroneous, is
reviewable, not by writ of certiorari, but by appeal, after the rendition of
judgment on the merits. Moreover, the theory that a mortgagee cannot
bring an action for foreclosure against the special administrator of the
estate of a deceased person has already been rejected by this Court. In
Liwanag vs. Hon. Luis B. Reyes, G.R. No. L-19159 (September 29, 1964),
involving the same petitioner herein, the same estate of the deceased Pio
D. Liwanag, a similar action for foreclosure, although of another mortgage
and an identical motion to dismiss and issue, we expressed ourselves as
follows:
The defendant Gliceria Liwanag filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for
foreclosure, on the theory that she may not be sued as special
administratrix.

xxx xxx xxx
Section 7 of Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court provides that a creditor
holding a claim against the deceased, secured by a mortgage or other
collateral security, may pursue any of these remedies: (1) abandon his
security and prosecute his claim and share in the general distribution of the
assets of the estate; (2) foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security
by an action in court, making the executor or administrator a party
defendant, and if there is a deficiency after the sale of the mortgaged
property, he may prove the same in the testate or intestate proceedings;
and (3) rely exclusively upon his mortgage and foreclose it any time within
the ordinary period of limitations, and if he relies exclusively upon the
mortgage, he shall not...share in the distribution of the assets.
Obviously, the herein respondent has chosen the second remedy, having
filed his action for foreclosure against the administratrix of the property.
Now the question arises as to whether the petitioner herein can be sued as
special administratrix. The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making
the special administratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate.
Otherwise, creditors would find the adverse effects of the statute of
limitations running against them in cases where the appointment of a
regular administrator is delayed. So that if We are not to deny the present
action on this technical ground alone, and the appointment of a regular
administrator will be delayed, the very purpose for which the mortgage was
constituted will be defeated.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs
against the petitioner. It is so ordered.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Dizon, Regala,
Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Barrera, J., is on leave.
SPECPRO RULE 80| 6
G.R. No. L-15388 January 31, 1961
DORA PERKINS ANDERSON, petitioner-appellee, vs.
IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, oppositor-appellant.
Executors and administrators; Special administrator; Authority to sett.—The
special administrator may be authorized to sell the personal estate of the
decedent even if it is not perishable property. His authority is not limited to
the sale of perishable property. His function is to preserve not only the
property of the decedent's estate but also its value. Hence, he may be
empowered to sell personal property which is not perishable.
Same; Conjugal partnership; Necessity of liquidating conjugal partnership
before sale of personal estate,—The sale of the alleged personal estate of
the deceased husband cannot be authorized where his widow claims that
some of the items thereof are conjugal or are her own personal property.
The conjugal partnership must first be liquidated and the issue of ownership
adjudicated.
1.WILLS AND TESTAMENTS; EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS; SPECIAL
ADMINISTRATORS; POWER TO SELL NOT LIMITED TO PERISHABLE
PROPERTY.—Since Sec. 2, Rule 81, Rules of Court specifically provides that
"the special administrator may sell such perishable and other property as
the court orders sold," the power of the special administrator to sell is
clearly not limited to "perishable" property.
2.ID.; ID.; ID.; SALE MADE PRIOR TO LIQUIDATION OF CONJUGAL
PARTNERSHIP PREMATURE.—While the law empowers the special
administrator to sell certain personal property belonging to the estate, yet
until the issue of the ownership of the properties sought to be sold heard
and decided, and the conjugal partnership liquidated, or at least, an
agreement be reached with appellant as to which properties of the conjugal
partnership she would not mind being sold to preserve their value the sale
would be premature. [Anderson vs. Perkins, 110 Phil. 999(1961)]
APPEAL from an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
[Anderson vs. Perkins, 1 SCRA 387(1961)]
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special
Proceedings No. 29636 authorizing the special administrator of the testate
estate of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins to sell at public auction certain
personal properties left by the deceased.
It appears that said special proceedings were commenced on May 10, 1956,
by a petition presented by Dora Perkin Anderson for the probate of the
supposed last will and testament of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins, who
died in Manila on April 28, 1956 allegedly possessed of personal and real
properties with a probable value of P5,000,000. On the same date of the
filing of the aforesaid petition, petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson also filed a
urgent petition for the appointment of Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special
administrator of the estate, and on the same day, the court issued an order
appointing Alfonso Ponce Enrile as such special administrator upon his
posting of a bond in the amount of P50,000. On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade
Perkins, surviving spouse of the deceased entered an opposition to the
probate of the will presented by petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson. On
September 28, 1956 the special administrator submitted an inventory of all
the assets which have come to his knowledge as belonging to the deceased
Eugene Arthur Perkins at the time of his death.
About two years later, or on September 4, 1958, the special administrator
submitted to the court a petition seeking authority to sell, or give away to
some charitable or educational institution or institutions, certain personal
effects left by the deceased, such as clothes, books, gadgets, electrical
appliances, etc., which were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in
value, in order to avoid their further deterioration and to save whatever
value migh be obtained in their disposition. When the motion was heard on
September 25, 1958, the court required the administrator to submit a
specification of the properties sought to be sold, and in compliance
therewith, the special administrator, on October 21, 1958, submitted to the
court, in place of a specification, a copy of the inventory of the personal
properties belonging to the estate with the items sought to be sold marked
with a check in red pencil, with the statement that said items were too
voluminous to enumerate.
On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade Perkins filed an opposetion to the proposed
sale. Reasons, for the opposition were that (1) most of the properties
sought to be sold were conjugal properties of herself and her deceased
husband; and (2) that unauthorized removal of fine pieces of furniture
belonging to the estate had been made.
SPECPRO RULE 80| 7
The opposition notwithstanding, the lower court, on December 2, 1958,
approved the proposed sale, authorizing the Sheriff of Manila to conduct the
same. Oppositor Idonah Slade Perkins moved to reconsider this order on
the grounds (1) that said order in effect authorized the special
administrator to sell the entire personal estate of the deceased, contrary to
Rule 81, section 2. Rules of Court; (2) that said order was issued without a
showing that the goods and chattels sought to be sold were perishable,
pursuant to Rule 81, section 2, Rules of Court; (3) that the personalty
sought to be sold represented the lifetime savings and collections of
oppositor; (4) that there is evidence on record showing unauthorized
withdrawals from the properties of the estate, and the sale of the
inventoried lot would prevent identification and recovery of the articles
removed; and (5) that there is also evidence showing oppositor's separate
rights to a substantial part of the personal estate.
On February 23, 1959, the lower court denied the above motion for
reconsideration. Whereupon, oppositor Idonah Slade Perkins appealed to
this court.
Appellant first claims that the personal properties sought to be sold not
being perishable, the special administrator has no legal authority to sell
them. This argument is untenable, because section 2, Rule 81, of the Rules
of Court, specifically provides that the special administrator "may sell such
perishable and other property as the court orders sold", which shows that
the special administrator's power to sell is not limited to "perishable"
property only.
It is true that the function of a special administrator is only to collect and
preserve the property of the deceased until a regular administrator is
appointed (sec. 2, Rule 81; De Gala v. Gonzales, 53 Phil. 104; Collins v.
Henry, 118 S.E. 729, 155 Ga. 886; Sqydelko v. Smith's Estate, 244 N.W.
149, 259 Mich. 519). But it is not alone the specific property of the estate
which is to be preserved, but its value as well, as shown by the legal
provision for the sale by a special administrator of perishable property (Cao
vs. Cascade Silver Mines & Mills, et al., 213 P. 109 66 Mont. 488). It is in
line with this general power of the special administrator to preserve not
only the property of the estate but also its value, that section 2, Rule 81,
also empowers such administrator to sell "other proerty as the court
ordered sold;" .
 SPECPRO RULE 80| 8

There is, however, a serious obstacle to the proposed sale, namely, the
vigorous opposition presented thereto the appellant, the surviving spouse
of the deceased, on the ground that she is allegedly entitled to a large
portion of the personal properties in question, either because the were
conjugal property of herself and the deceased, or because they are her
own, exclusive, personal property. Indeed the records show that up to the
time the propose sale was asked for and judicially approved, no proceeding
had as yet been taken, or even started, to segregate the alleged exclusive
property of the oppositor-appellant from the mass of the estate supposedly
left by the deceased or to liquidate the conjugal partnership property of the
oppositor-appellant and the deceased. Until, therefore the issue of the
ownership of the properties sought to be sold is heard and decided, and the
conjugal partnership liquidated; or, at least, an agreement be reached with
a appellant as to which properties of the conjugal partnership she would not
mind being sold to preserve their value the proposed sale is clearly
premature. After all, most of the items sought to be sold — pieces of
furniture, kitchen and dinner ware, electrical appliances, various gadget and
books — can easily be protected and preserved with proper care and
storage measures in either or both of two residential houses (in Manila and
in Baguio City left by the deceased, so that no reasons of extreme urgency
justify the proposed sale at this time over the strong opposition and
objection of oppositor-appellant who may later be adjudged owner of a
substantial portion of the personal estate in question.

The special administrator claims in his brief that t oppositor-appellant

should have indicated the alleged "fine furniture" which she did not want
sold and that her refusal to do so is an indication of her unmeritorious
claim. But it does not appear that appellant was given a reasonable
opportunity to point out which items in the inventory she did not want sold.
In fact, her opposition to the proposed sale and later her motion for
reconsideration to the order approving the same were overruled by the
court without so much as stating reasons why the grounds for her
opposition were not well-founded; the records do not even show that an
inquiry was made as to the validity of the grounds of her opposition.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of December 2, 1958 authorizing the

special administrator to sell certain personal properties of the estate is set
aside, with costs against the special administrator Alfonso Ponce Enrile and
petition-appellee Dora Perkins Anderson.