73.

Caberoy, principal of a HighSchool was charged with Oppression and Violation of

Sec 3(e) and (f) of RA 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) by Tuares for allegedly
withholding her salary for June 2002. The Ombudsman found Caberoy guilty of
Oppression and was meted out the penalty of dismissal from service. The Ombudsman
found that Tuares was not paid any amount in June 2002 because of her failure to submit
her clearance and Performance Appraisal Sheet for Teachers (PAST), while the other
teachers received their salaries. CA found that Caberoy’s "refusal" to release Tuares’
salary was justified and the element of "failure to so act x x x for the purpose of
obtaining, directly or indirectly, from any person interested in the matter some pecuniary
or material benefit or advantage in favor of an interested party, or [discrimination]
against another" under Section 3(f) of R.A. No. 3019, is absent and Caberoy’s acts are not
constitutive of oppression. Issue: Whether or not Caberoy is guilty of Oppression. Held: No.
Oppression or grave abuse of authority is a grave administrative offense penalized under the
Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service. It is a misdemeanor committed by a
public officer, who under color of his office, wrongfully inflict upon any person any bodily harm,
imprisonment or other injury. It is an act of cruelty, severity, or excessive use of authority. To be
held administratively liable for Oppression or Grave Abuse of Authority, there must be
substantial evidence presented proving the complainant’s allegations. Caberoy paid Tuares’
June 2002 salary albeit delayed. The delay in the release of Tuares’ salary hardly qualifies as
an "act of cruelty or severity or excessive use of authority," especially when she contributed to
the cause of the delay, that is, she submitted her Daily Time Record for June 2002 only on July
11, 2002. Bad faith must attend the act complained of. Bad faith connotes a dishonest purpose
or some moral obliquity and conscious doing of a wrong; a breach of sworn duty through some
motive or intent or ill will; it partakes of the nature of fraud. There must be evidence,
independent of such delay, which will lead to the inevitable conclusion that it was for the
purpose of singling out Tuares. (OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. CYNTHIA E. CABEROY
G.R. No. 188066, October 22, 2014)

74. Daradal, a clerk in the Provincial Engineering Office of Catbalogan, Samar charged
Engr. Prudencio Quimbo, Provincial Engineer of Samar, of Sexual Harassment and
Oppression before the with Ombudsman-Visayas. Her name was removed from the
payroll of the personnel from August 16-31,1996 because of her refusal to submit to his
sexual advances. The Ombudsman-Visayas in its Order dismissed the case of sexual
harassment against Quimbo but found him guilty of oppression and imposed the penalty
of suspension for 6 months without pay. Issue: Whether or not Quimbo is liable for Sexual
Harassment. Yes. Sec A, Subsec 13 of Civil Service Commission Memo Circular 30, series of
1989 (CSC MC No. 30), the applicable rule then, expressly provides: A. Grave Offenses x x x x
13. Oppression 1st Offense - Suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year;
2nd Offense - Dismissal. While Quimbo’s liability for Oppression is undisputed, it behooves the
Court to adjust the penalty imposed upon him to conform to CSC MC No. 30. Accordingly, the
Court finds it necessary to modify the penalty to suspension for six ( 6) months and one ( 1) day
without pay to accurately reflect the classification of the offense for which he was found liable.
(OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN vs. PRUDENCIO C. QUIMBO, COURT OF APPEALS, 20TH
DIVISION, CEBU CITY, G.R. No. 173277, February 25, 2015)

75. The Commission En Banc of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) issued
Resolution approving the appointment of Cortes as an Information Officer V.
Commissioner Mallari, father of Cortes, abstained from voting and requested the CHR to
render an opinion on the legality of the appointment. Director II of the CSC-NCR Field
Office informed Chairperson Quisumbing that the appointment of Cortes is not valid
because it is covered by the rule on nepotism under Sec 9 of the Revised Omnibus Rules
on Appointments and Other Personnel Actions. According to the CSC-NCR,
Commissioner Mallari is considered an appointing authority with respect to respondent
Cortes despite being a mere member of the Commission En Banc. Issue: WON the
appointment of Cortes as IO V in the CHR is covered by the prohibition against nepotism. Held:
Nepotism - an appointment issued in favor of a relative within the third civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity of any of the following: (1) appointing authority; (2) recommending
authority; (3) chief of the bureau or office; and (4) person exercising immediate supervision over
the appointee. Cortes is a relative of Commissioner Mallari in the first degree of consanguinity,
as in fact Cortes is the daughter of Commissioner Mallari. By way of exception, the following
shall not be covered by the prohibition: (1) persons employed in a confidential capacity; (2)
teachers; (3) physicians; and (4) members of the Armed Forces of the Phils. The appointment of
Cortes as IO V in the CHR does not fall to any of the exemptions provided by law.Commissioner
Mallari's abstention from voting did not cure the nepotistic character of the appointment because
the evil sought to be avoided by the prohibition still exists. His mere presence during the
deliberation for the appointment of IO V created an impression of influence and cast doubt on
the impartiality and neutrality of the Commission En Banc. (CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION vs.
MARICELLE M. CORTES, G.R. No. 200103, April 23, 2014, J. Abad)

76. Causing assumed office as the Municipal Civil Registrar of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo.
Mayor Biron issued an Office Order, commanding for the detailing of Causing at the
Office of the Municipal Mayor. Causing filed the complaint claiming that issuance
ordering her detail to the Office of the Municipal Mayor, being made within the election
period and without prior authority from the COMELEC, was illegal and it violated Sec 1(A)
No. 1, in connection with Sec 6(B) of COMELEC Resolution 8737. Mayor Biron countered
that the purpose of transferring the office of Causing was to closely supervise the
performance of her functions after complaints on her negative behavior in dealing with
her co-employees and with the public. Issue:WON the relocation of Causing by Mayor Biron
during the election period from her office as the Municipal Civil Registrar to the Office of the
Mayor constituted prohibited act under the Omnibus Election Code and the relevant Resolution
of the COMELEC. Held: No.The only personnel movements prohibited by COMELEC
Resolution 8737 are transfer and detail. Transfer is defined in the Resolution as “any personnel
movement from one government agency to another or from one department, division,
geographical unit or subdivision of a government agency to another with or without the issuance
of an appointment”. Detail as defined in the Administrative Code of 1987 is the movement of an
employee from one agency to another without the issuance of an appointment. The movement
involving Causing did not equate to either a transfer or a detail within the contemplation of the
law if Mayor Biron only thereby physically transferred her office area from its old location to the
Office of the Mayor "some little steps" away. Causing is not stripped of her functions as
Municipal Civil Registrar. She was merely required to physically report to the Mayor's Office and
perform her functions as MCR therein. She is still the MCR, albeit doing her work physically
outside of her usual work station. She is not deprived of her supervisory function over the staff
as she continues to review their work and signs documents they prepared. While she may
encounter difficulty in performing her duties as a supervisor as she is not physically near her
staff, that by itself, does not mean that she has lost supervision over them. Reassignment was
not prohibited by the Omnibus Election Code, there was no probable cause to criminally charge
Mayor Biron with the violation of the Omnibus Election Code. (ELSIE S. CAUSING vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND HERNAN D. BIRON, SR., G.R. No. 199139, Sep.9, 2014)

77. DOLE Sec Sto. Tomas issued an Administrative Order authorizing the payment of
healthcare maintenance allowance of P5,000 to all officials and employees of the DOLE,
including its bureaus and attached agencies (i.e.TESDA) based on CSC Memorandum
Circular 33, series of 1997, and Sec 34 of the General Provisions of the 2003 General
Appropriations Act. Upon post-audit, COA State Auditor IV Valenzuela issued AOM 04-
005 stating that there are no existing guidelines authorizing the grant of Health Care
Maintenance Allowance and medical Allowance to all government officials and
employees hence the DOLE Administrative Order is without legal basis. Atty. Mislang,
OIC of the COA LAO-National issued Notice of Disallowance to then TESDA Director
Syjuco, indicating that the payment of the allowance had no legal basis, it being contrary
to RA 6758 (Salary Standardization Law of 1989). Notice of Disallowance identified
TESDA Officials and employees as liable for the disallowance. Issue: WON the authorizing
TESDA officers are personally liable for the total disallowed payment. Held: No. The TESDA
officials who granted the allowance to the covered personnel acted in good faith in the honest
belief that there was lawful basis for such grant. The disallowed benefits approved and received
in good faith need not be reimbursed to the Government. The officials and chiefs of offices
concerned disbursed such incentive benefits in the honest belief that the amounts given were
due to the recipients and the latter accepted the same with gratitude, confident that they richly
deserve such benefits. TESDA officials and employees received the additional allowances and
bonuses in good faith under the honest belief that the memorandum circular authorized such
payment. (TECHNICAL EDUCATION AND SKILLS DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY (TESDA) vs.
THE COMMISSION ON AUDIT; CHAIRMAN REYNALDO A. VILLAR; COMMISSIONER
JUANITO G. ESPINO, JR.; AND COMMISSIONER EVELYN R. SAN BUENAVENTURA, G.R.
No. 196418, February 10, 2015)

78. Poe-Llamanzares, adopted child of Ronald Allan Kelley Poe and Jesusa Sonora Poe
was registered as a foundling with the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo. She married
Teodoro Llamanzares, dual citizen of US and RP and resided in the US from 1988-Dec
2004. She decided to stay in RP in the 1st quarter of 2005 after death of his father. On July
7 2006 she took oath of allegiance to RP pursuant to RA 9225 (Citizenship Retention and
Re-acquisition Act of 2003 and she was declared to have reacquired Philippine
citizenship. On Oct 2, 2012 Poe filed COC for Senator for 2013 Elections. David filed a
petition for quo warranto before the SET to disqualify Poe, contesting her status as a
natural born citizen. Issue: WON Poe-Llamanzares is a nautral-born citizen of the Philippines.
Held: Yes. Article IV, Sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution “Natural-born citizens are those who
are citizens of the Philippines from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect
their Philippine citizenship.” Natural-born citizenship is not concerned with being a human
thoroughbred. Sec 2 defines "natural-born citizens." By definition, she is natural-born. She did
not undergo the naturalization process to become a Filipino. Though subsequently naturalized,
she reacquired her natural-born status upon satisfying the requirement of RA 9225.Sec 1(2)
stipulates that to be a citizen, either one's father or one's mother must be a Filipino citizen. Sec
1(2) does not require one's parents to be natural-born Filipino citizens. One or both parents can,
therefore, be ethnically foreign. Section 1(2) requires nothing more than one ascendant degree:
parentage. There is no need, as petitioner insists, for a pure Filipino bloodline. Section 1(2)
requires citizenship, not identity. Section 1(2) requires citizenship, not identity. The evidence
adduced in attests to how at least one of her biological parents were Filipino citizens. Poe is
described as having "brown almond-shaped eyes, a low nasal bridge, straight black hair and an
oval-shaped face."She stands at 5 feet and 2 inches tall. In 1968, there was no international
airport in Jaro, Iloilo. These circumstances are substantial evidence justifying an inference that
her biological parents were Filipino. Her abandonment at a Catholic Church is more or less
consistent with how a Filipino who, in 1968, lived in a predominantly religious and Catholic
environment, would have behaved. The absence of an international airport in Jaro, Iloilo the
area where she was found precludes the possibility of a foreigner mother, along with a foreigner
father, swiftly and surreptitiously coming in and out of Jaro, Iloilo just to give birth and leave her
offspring there. Though proof of ethnicity is unnecessary, her physical features nonetheless
attest to it. The presumption that foundlings are natural-born citizens of the Philippines (unless
substantial evidence of the foreign citizenship of both of the foundling's parents is presented) is
validated by a parallel consideration or contemporaneous construction of the Constitution with
acts of Congress, international instruments in force in the Philippines, as well as acts of
executive organs such as the Bureau of Immigration, Civil Registrars, and the President of the
Philippines. (David v SET and Mary Grace Poe-Llamanzares. G.R. No. 221538, September 20,
2016)