Chapter III - Original Registration

Application - Who May Apply

Ong v. Republic [2008]
Section 14 (1) of P.D. 1529 ("Property Registration Decree"), as amended, provides
—
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may file in the proper
Court of First Instance an application for registration of title to land, whether
personally or through their duly authorized representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have
been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
alienable and disposable lands of the public domain under a bona fide claim of
ownership since June 12, 1945, or earlier.
Thus, pursuant to the aforequoted provision of law, applicants for registration of title
must prove: (1) that the subject land forms part of the disposable and alienable lands of
the public domain, and (2) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of the same under a bona fide claim of ownership
since June 12, 1945, or earlier. These requisites involve questions of fact which are not
proper in a petition for review on certiorari. After a careful review of the records, we
sustain the findings and conclusions of the Court of Appeals.
There is no dispute that the subject lot is classified as alienable and disposable land of the
public domain. The records show that petitioner and his brothers bought the subject lot
from spouses Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil on August 24, 1998, who in turn
purchased the same from spouses Teofilo Abellera and Abella Sarmen on January 16,
1997. The latter bought the subject lot from Cynthia, Agustin Jr., Jasmin, Omir and
Lauro, all surnamed Cacho, on July 10, 1979. The earliest tax declaration which was
submitted in evidence was Tax Declaration No. 25606 issued in 1971 in the names of
spouses Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Bautista. While tax declarations are not conclusive
proof of ownership, they constitute good indicia of possession in the concept of owner
and a claim of title over the subject property. Even if we were to tack petitioner's claim of
ownership over the subject lot to that of their alleged predecessors-in-interest, spouses
Agustin Cacho and Eufrosinia Bautista in 1971, still this would fall short of the required
possession from June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Further, as correctly pointed by the Court of Appeals, possession alone is not sufficient to
acquire title to alienable lands of the public domain because the law requires possession
and occupation.
Petitioner admitted that after he and his brothers bought the subject lot from spouses
Tony Bautista and Alicia Villamil in 1998, neither he nor his brothers actually occupied
the subject lot. No improvements were made thereon and the most that they did was to
visit the lot on several occasions. Clearly, petitioner's evidence failed to establish specific
acts of ownership to substantiate the claim that he and his predecessors-in-interest
possessed and occupied the subject lot in the nature and duration required by law.
The burden of proof in land registration cases rests on the applicant who must show by
clear, positive and convincing evidence that his alleged possession and occupation of the
land is of the nature and duration required by law. Unfortunately, petitioner's evidence do
not constitute the "well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence necessary in cases of this
nature. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the Decision of the trial
court and in denying his application for registration of title over the subject lot.

Cañete v. Genuino Ice Company [2008]

The subject lots are part of the Piedad Estate, Quezon City, a Friar Land acquired on
December 23, 1903 by the Philippine Government from the Philippine Sugar Estates
Development Company, Ltd., La Sociedad Agricola de Ultramar, the British-Manila
Estate Company, Ltd., and the Recoleto Order of the Philippine Islands, as indicated in
Public Act No. 1120 (Friar Lands Act) enacted on April 26, 1904.
After the Piedad Estate was registered in OCT No. 614 in the name of the Philippine
Government in 1910 under the provisions of Act 496, the area was subdivided originally
into 874 lots. As a result of subsequent surveys executed in the course of disposition, the
number of lots increased to 1,305. Disposition of these lots was made by the Bureau of
Lands thru sales, under the Friar Lands Act, as early as 1910 and records show that even
before the Second World War, all lots in the Piedad Estate have been disposed of. The
Piedad Estate has long been segregated from the mass of the public domain and has
become private land duly registered under the Torrens system following the procedure for
the confirmation of private lands prescribed in Act 496. Thus the lands inside the Piedad
Estate are no longer lands of the public domain.
One who acquires land under the Friar Lands Act, as well as his successors-in-interest,
may not claim successional rights to purchase by reason of occupation from time
immemorial, as this contravenes the historical fact that friar lands were bought by the
Government of the Philippine Islands, pursuant to an Act of Congress of the United
States, approved on July 1, 1902, not from individual persons but from certain
companies, a society and a religious order. Under the Friar Lands Act, only "actual
settlers and occupants at the time said lands are acquired by the Government" were given
preference to lease, purchase, or acquire their holdings, in disregard of the settlement and
occupation of persons before the government acquired the lands.
They do not pray to be declared owners of the subject property — despite their alleged
adverse possession — but only to be adjudged as the "bona fide occupants" thereof. In
other words, petitioners concede the State's ownership of the property.
Being so, petitioners may not be considered the real parties in interest for the purpose of
maintaining the suit for cancellation of the subject titles. The Court of Appeals is correct
in declaring that only the State, through the Solicitor General, may institute such suit.
 Judicial Confirmation of Imperfect or Incomplete Title
Suzi v. Razon [1925]
It clearly appears from the evidence that Valentin Susi has been
in possession of the land in question openly, continuously,
adversely and publicly, personally and through his predecessors,
since the year 1880, that is, for about forty-five years. While the
judgment of the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against
Angela Razon in the forcible entry case does not affect the
Director of Lands, yet it is controlling as to Angela Razon and
rebuts her claim that she had been in possession thereof. When on
August 15, 1914, Angela Razon applied for the purchase of said
land, Valentin Susi had already been in possession thereof
personally and through his predecessors for thirty-four years. And
if it is taken into account that Nemesio Pinlac had already made
said land a fish pond when he sold it on December 18, 1880, it can
hardly be estimated when he began to possess and occupy it, the
period of time being so long that it is beyond the reach of memory.
These being the facts, the doctrine laid down by the Supreme
Court of the United States in the case of Cariilo vs. Government of
the Philippine Islands (212 U. S., 449 1 ), is applicable here. In
favor of Valentin Susi, there is, more over, the presumption juris et
de jure established in paragraph (b) of section 45 of Act No. 2874,
amending Act No. 926, that all the necessary requirements for a
grant by the Government were complied with, for he has been in
actual and physical possession, personally and through his
predecessors, of an agricultural land of the public domain openly,
continuously, exclusively and publicly since July 26, 1894, with a
right to a certificate of title to said land under the provisions of
Chapter VIII of said Act. So that when Angela Razon applied for
the grant in her favor, Valentin Susi had already acquired, by
operation of law, not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the
Government, for it is not necessary that certificate of title should
be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts,
an application therefor is sufficient, under the provisions of section
47 of Act No. 2874. If by a legal fiction, Valentin Susi had
acquired the land in question by a grant of the State, it had already
ceased to be of the public domain and had become private
property, at least by presumption, of Valentin Susi, beyond the
control of the Director of Lands. Consequently, in selling the land
in question to Angela Razon, the Director of Lands disposed of a
land over which he had no longer any title or control, and the sale
thus made was void and of no effect, and Angela Razon did not
thereby acquire any right.
The Director of Lands contends that the land in question being
of the public domain, the plaintiff-appellee cannot maintain an
action to recover possession thereof.
If, as above stated, the land, the possession of which is in
dispute, had already become, by operation of law, private property
of the plaintiff, there lacking only the judicial sanction of his title,
Valentin Susi has the right to bring an action to recover the
possession thereof and hold it.

Director of Lands v. IAC and ACME Plywood and Veneer Co.

[1986]
The question turns upon a determination of the character of the
lands at the time of institution of the registration proceedings in
1981. If they were then still part of the public domain, it must be
answered in the negative. If, on the other hand, they were then
already private lands, the constitutional prohibition against their
acquisition by private corporations or associations obviously does
not apply.
Nothing can more clearly demonstrate the logical inevitability
of considering possession of public land which is of the character
and duration prescribed by statute as the equivalent of an express
grant from the State than the dictum of the statute itself 13 that the
possessor(s) ". . . shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and
shall be entitled to a certificate of title . . ." No proof being
admissible to overcome a conclusive presumption, confirmation
proceedings would, in truth be little more than a formality, at the
most limited to ascertaining whether the possession claimed is of
the required character and length of time; and registration
thereunder would not confer title, but simply recognize a title
already vested. The proceedings would not originally convert the
land from public to private land, but only confirm such a
conversion already affected by operation of law from the moment
the required period of possession became complete. As was so well
put in Cariño, ". . . (T)here are indications that registration was
expected from all, but none sufficient to show that, for want of it,
ownership actually gained would be lost. The effect of the proof,
wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it,
as already conferred by the decree, if not by earlier law."

If it is accepted — as it must be — that the land was already

private land to which the Infiels had a legally sufficient and
transferable title on October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from
said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right
to make such acquisition, there being nothing in the 1935
Constitution then in force (or, for that matter, in the 1973
Constitution which came into effect later) prohibiting corporations
from acquiring and owning private lands
The Court, in the light of the foregoing, is of the view, and so
holds, that the majority ruling in Meralco must be reconsidered and
no longer deemed to be binding precedent. The correct rule, as
enunciated in the line of cases already referred to, is that alienable
public land held by a possessor, personally or through his
predecessors-in-interest, openly, continuously and exclusively for
the prescribed statutory period (30 years under The Public Land
Act, as amended) is converted to private property by the mere
lapse or completion of said period, ipso jure. Following that rule
and on the basis of the undisputed facts, the land subject of this
appeal was already private property at the time it was acquired
from the Infiels by Acme. Acme thereby acquired a registrable
title, there being at the time no prohibition against said
corporation's holding or owning private land. The objection that, as
a juridical person, Acme is not qualified to apply for judicial
confirmation of title under section 48(b) of the Public Land Act is
technical, rather than substantial.

Republic v. CA and Naguit [2005]

Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, which reads:
Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of
the public domain or claiming to own any such land or an interest therein, but
those titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their
claims and the issuance of a certificate of title therefor, under the Land
Registration Act, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors in interest have been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition
of ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the
application for confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force
majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have performed all the
conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate
of title under the provisions of this chapter.
When the Public Land Act was first promulgated in 1936, the period of possession
deemed necessary to vest the right to register their title to agricultural lands of the public
domain commenced from July 26, 1894. However, this period was amended by R.A. No.
1942, which provided that the bona fide claim of ownership must have been for at least
thirty (30) years. Then in 1977, Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act was again amended,
this time by P.D. No. 1073, which pegged the reckoning date at June 12, 1945. This new
starting point is concordant with Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Indeed, there are no material differences between Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree and Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. True, the
Public Land Act does refer to "agricultural lands of the public domain," while
the Property Registration Decree uses the term "alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain." It must be noted though that the Constitution declares that "alienable
lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands." Clearly, the subject
lands under Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act and Section 14(1) of the Property
Registration Decree are of the same type.
Did the enactment of the Property Registration Decree and the amendatory P.D. No.
1073 preclude the application for registration of alienable lands of the public domain,
possession over which commenced only after June 12, 1945? It did not, considering
Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree, which governs and authorizes the
application of "those who have acquired ownership of private lands by prescription under
the provisions of existing laws."
Prescription is one of the modes of acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. There is a
consistent jurisprudential rule that properties classified as alienable public land may be
converted into private property by reason of open, continuous and exclusive possession
of at least thirty (30) years. With such conversion, such property may now fall within the
contemplation of "private lands" under Section 14(2), and thus susceptible to registration
by those who have acquired ownership through prescription. Thus, even if possession of
the alienable public land commenced on a date later than June 12, 1945, and such
possession being been open, continuous and exclusive, then the possessor may have the
right to register the land by virtue of Section 14(2) of the Property Registration Decree.
The land in question was found to be local in nature, it having been planted with coconut
trees now over fifty years old. The inherent nature of the land but confirms its
certification in 1980 as alienable, hence agricultural. There is no impediment to the
application of Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree, as correctly
accomplished by the lower courts.
We find no reason to disturb the conclusion of both the RTC and the Court of Appeals
that Naguit had the right to apply for registration owing to the continuous possession by
her and her predecessors-in-interest of the land since 1945. Notably, possession since
1945 was established through proof of the existence of 50 to 60-year old trees at the time
Naguit purchased the property as well as tax declarations executed by Urbano in 1945.
Although tax declarations and realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence
of ownership, nevertheless, they are good indicia of the possession in the concept of
owner for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or at least constructive possession. They constitute at least proof that the holder has
a claim of title over the property. The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for
taxation purposes manifests not only one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the
property and announces his adverse claim against the State and all other interested
parties, but also the intention to contribute needed revenues to the Government. Such an
act strengthens one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
Considering that the possession of the subject parcel of land by the respondent can be
traced back to that of her predecessors-in-interest which commenced since 1945 or for
almost fifty (50) years, it is indeed beyond any cloud of doubt that she has acquired title
thereto which may be properly brought under the operation of the Torrens system. That
she has been in possession of the land in the concept of an owner, open, continuous,
peaceful and without any opposition from any private person and the government itself
makes her right thereto undoubtedly settled and deserving of protection under the law.

Republic v. Herbieto [2005]

Respondents' application filed with the MTC did not state the statutory basis for their
title to the Subject Lots. They only alleged therein that they obtained title to the Subject
Lots by purchase from their parents, spouses Gregorio Herbieto and Isabel Owatan, on 25
June 1976. Respondent Jeremias, in his testimony, claimed that his parents had been in
possession of the Subject Lots in the concept of an owner since 1950.
Yet, according to the DENR-CENRO Certification, the Subject Lots are thus clearly part
of the public domain, classified as alienable and disposable as of 25 June 1963.
As already well-settled in jurisprudence, no public land can be acquired by private
persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government; and it is
indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was
acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition recognized by law.
Since respondents herein filed their application before the MTC, then it can be
reasonably inferred that they are seeking the judicial confirmation or legalization of their
imperfect or incomplete title over the Subject Lots.
Judicial confirmation or legalization of imperfect or incomplete title to land, not
exceeding 144 hectares, may be availed of by persons identified under Section 48 of the
Public Land Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073. Section 48. The
following-described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands
Not being members of any national cultural minorities, respondents may only be entitled
to judicial confirmation or legalization of their imperfect or incomplete title under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended. Section 48(b), as amended, now
requires adverse possession of the land since 12 June 1945 or earlier. In the present
Petition, the Subject Lots became alienable and disposable only on 25 June 1963. Any
period of possession prior to the date when the Subject Lots were classified as alienable
and disposable is inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession; such possession can never ripen into ownership and unless the land
had been classified as alienable and disposable, the rules on confirmation of imperfect
title shall not apply thereto. It is very apparent then that respondents could not have
complied with the period of possession required by Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act,
as amended, to acquire imperfect or incomplete title to the Subject Lots that may be
judicially confirmed or legalized.
 Heirs of Malabanan v. Republic [2009]
May a private person validly seek the registration in his/her
name of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain?
Section 11 of the Public Land Act acknowledges that public lands
suitable for agricultural purposes may be disposed of "by
confirmation of imperfect or incomplete titles" through "judicial
legalization". Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by
P.D. No. 1073, supplies the details and unmistakably grants that
right, subject to the requisites stated therein.
In connection with Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree, Section 48 (b)
of the Public Land Act recognizes and confirms that "those who by themselves or through
their predecessors in interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public domain, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945" have acquired
ownership of, and registrable title to, such lands based on the length and quality of their
possession.
(a) Since Section 48 (b) merely requires possession since 12 June 1945 and does
not require that the lands should have been alienable and disposable
during the entire period of possession, the possessor is entitled to secure
judicial confirmation of his title thereto as soon as it is declared
alienable and disposable, subject to the timeframe imposed by Section
47 of the Public Land Act.
(b) The right to register granted under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land Act is
further confirmed by Section 14 (1) of the Property Registration Decree.
In complying with Section 14 (2) of the Property Registration Decree, consider that
under the Civil Code, prescription is recognized as a mode of acquiring ownership of
patrimonial property. However, public domain lands become only patrimonial property
not only with a declaration that these are alienable or disposable. There must also be an
express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth, under Article 422 of the
Civil Code. And only when the property has become patrimonial can the prescriptive
period for the acquisition of property of the public dominion begin to run.
(a) Patrimonial property is private property of the government. The person
acquires ownership of patrimonial property by prescription under the
 Civil Code is entitled to secure registration thereof under Section 14 (2)
of the Property Registration Decree.
(b) There are two kinds of prescription by which patrimonial property may be
acquired, one ordinary and other extraordinary. Under ordinary
acquisitive prescription, a person acquires ownership of a patrimonial
property through possession for at least ten (10) years, in good faith and
with just title. Under extraordinary acquisitive prescription, a person's
uninterrupted adverse possession of patrimonial property for at least
thirty (30) years, regardless of good faith or just title, ripens into
ownership.
It is clear that the evidence of petitioners is insufficient to establish that Malabanan has
acquired ownership over the subject property under Section 48 (b) of the Public Land
Act. There is no substantive evidence to establish that Malabanan or petitioners as his
predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the property since 12 June 1945 or
earlier. The earliest that petitioners can date back their possession, according to their own
evidence — the Tax Declarations they presented in particular — is to the year 1948.
Thus, they cannot avail themselves of registration under Section 14 (1) of the Property
Registration Decree.
Neither can petitioners properly invoke Section 14 (2) as basis for registration. While the
subject property was declared as alienable or disposable in 1982, there is no competent
evidence that is no longer intended for public use service or for the development of the
national evidence, conformably with Article 422 of the Civil Code. The classification of
the subject property as alienable and disposable land of the public domain does not
change its status as property of the public dominion under Article 420 (2) of the Civil
Code. Thus, it is insusceptible to acquisition by prescription.
|||

Diaz v. Republic [2010]

We ruled there, and we so rule now, that in registration cases filed under the
provisions of the Public Land Act for the judicial confirmation of an incomplete and
imperfect title, an order dismissing an application for registration and declaring the land
as part of the public domain constitutes res judicata, not only against the adverse
claimant, but also against all persons.
Be that as it may, the fact is that, even before the CFI came out with its decision in favor
of petitioner on July 1, 1981, this Court, in Reyes, already made an earlier ruling on
November 28, 1975 that the disputed realty was inalienable as it formed part of a military
reservation. Thus, petitioner's argument that the findings of fact of the trial court on her
registrable title are binding on us — on the principle that findings of fact of lower courts
are accorded great respect and bind even this Court — is untenable. Rather, it was
incumbent upon the court a quo to respect this Court's ruling in Reyes, and not the other
way around.
However, despite having been apprised of the Court's findings in Reyes (which should
have been a matter of judicial notice in the first place), the trial court still insisted on its
divergent finding and disregarded the Court's decision in Reyes, declaring the subject
land as forming part of a military reservation, and thus outside the commerce of man.
By not applying our ruling in Reyes, the trial judge virtually nullified the decision of this
Court and therefore acted with grave abuse of discretion. Notably, a judgment rendered
with grave abuse of discretion is void and does not exist in legal contemplation.

Sps Fortuna v. Republic [2011]

Mere notations appearing in survey plans are inadequate proof of the covered
properties' alienable and disposable character. These notations, at the very least, only
establish that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the approved
alienable and disposable area per verification through survey by the proper government
office. The applicant, however, must also present a copy of the original classification
of the land into alienable and disposable land, as declared by the DENR Secretary
or as proclaimed by the President.
For failure to present incontrovertible evidence that Lot No. 4457 has been reclassified as
alienable and disposable land of the public domain though a positive act of the Executive
Department, the spouses Fortuna's claim of title through a public land grant under the
PLA should be denied.
In judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete title, the period of possession
should commence, at the latest, as of May 9, 1947
As mentioned, the PLA is the law that governs the grant and disposition of alienable
agricultural lands. Under Section 11 of the PLA, alienable lands of the public domain
may be disposed of, among others, by judicial confirmation of imperfect or incomplete
title. This mode of acquisition of title is governed by Section 48 (b) of the PLA,
On June 22, 1957, the cut-off date of July 26, 1894 was replaced by a 30-year period of
possession under RA No. 1942. On January 25, 1977, PD No. 1073 replaced the 30-year
period of possession by requiring possession since June 12, 1945.
Under the PD No. 1073 amendment, possession of at least 32 years — from 1945 up to
its enactment in 1977 — is required. This effectively impairs the vested rights of
applicants who had complied with the 30-year possession required under the RA No.
1942 amendment, but whose possession commenced only after the cut-off date of June
12, 1945 was established by the PD No. 1073 amendment. To remedy this, the Court
ruled in Abejaron v. Nabasa that "Filipino citizens who by themselves or their
predecessors-in-interest have been, prior to the effectivity of P.D. 1073 on January 25,
1977, in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of
agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of acquisition of
ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least since January 24, 1947 may apply for
judicial confirmation of their imperfect or incomplete title under Sec. 48 (b) of the
[PLA]." January 24, 1947 was considered as the cut-off date as this was exactly 30
years counted backward from January 25, 1977 — the effectivity date of PD No.
1073.
It appears, however, that January 25, 1977 was the date PD No. 1073 was enacted;
based on the certification from the National Printing Office, PD No. 1073 was
published in Vol. 73, No. 19 of the Official Gazette, months later than its enactment or
on May 9, 1977. This uncontroverted fact materially affects the cut-off date for
applications for judicial confirmation of incomplete title under Section 48 (b) of the PLA.
Although Section 6 of PD No. 1073 states that "[the] Decree shall take effect upon its
promulgation," the Court has declared in Tañada, et al. v. Hon. Tuvera, etc., et al. that the
publication of laws is an indispensable requirement for its effectivity. "[A]ll statutes,
including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity date is fixed by the legislature." Accordingly, Section 6 of PD No. 1073 should
be understood to mean that the decree took effect only upon its publication, or on May 9,
1977. This, therefore, moves the cut-off date for applications for judicial confirmation
of imperfect or incomplete title under Section 48 (b) of the PLA to May 8, 1947. In
other words, applicants must prove that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive
and notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least 30 years, or at least
since May 8, 1947.
Even if the Court assumes that Lot No. 4457 is an alienable and disposable agricultural
land of the public domain, the spouses Fortuna's application for registration of title would
still not prosper for failure to sufficiently prove that they possessed the land since May 8,
1947.

Forms and Contents

Republic v. Santos [2012]
Article 457 of the Civil Code provides that "(t)o the owners of lands adjoining the
banks of rivers belong the accretion which they gradually receive from the effects of the
Respondents as the applicants for land registration carried the burden of proof to establish
the merits of their application by a preponderance of evidence, by which is meant such
evidence that is of greater weight, or more convincing than that offered in opposition to
it. They would be held entitled to claim the property as their own and apply for its
registration under the Torrens system only if they established that, indeed, the property
was an accretion to their land.
Accretion is the process whereby the soil is deposited along the banks of rivers. The
deposit of soil, to be considered accretion, must be: (a) gradual and
imperceptible; (b) made through the effects of the current of the water; and (c) taking
place on land adjacent to the banks of rivers. Accordingly, respondents should establish
the concurrence of the elements of accretion to warrant the grant of their application for
land registration.
However, respondents did not discharge their burden of proof. They did not show that the
gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil through the effects of the current of the river
had formed Lot 4998-B. Instead, their evidence revealed that the property was the dried-
up river bed of the Parañaque River, leading both the RTC and the CA to themselves hold
that Lot 4998-B was "the land which was previously part of the Parañaque River . . .
(and) became an orchard after it dried up."
The RTC and the CA grossly erred in treating the dried-up river bed as an accretion that
became respondents' property pursuant to Article 457 of the Civil Code. That land was
definitely not an accretion. The process of drying up of a river to form dry land involved
the recession of the water level from the river banks, and the dried-up land did not equate
to accretion, which was the gradual and imperceptible deposition of soil on the river
banks through the effects of the current. In accretion, the water level did not recede and
was more or less maintained. Hence, respondents as the riparian owners had no legal
right to claim ownership of Lot 4998-B.
The State exclusively owned Lot 4998-B and may not be divested of its right of
ownership. Article 502 of the Civil Code expressly declares that rivers and their natural
beds are public dominion of the State. It follows that the river beds that dry up, like Lot
4998-B, continue to belong to the State as its property of public dominion, unless there is
an express law that provides that the dried-up river beds should belong to some other
person.

Dream Village v. Basess Development Authority [2013]

The DENR verification survey report states that Dream Village is not situated in Lot
1 of Swo-13-000298 but actually occupies Lots 10, 11 and part of 13 of Swo-00-
0001302: ". . . Inexplicably and gratuitously, the DENR also states that the area is outside
of BCDA, completely oblivious that the BCDA holds title over the entire Fort Bonifacio,
even as the BCDA asserts that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of SWO-00-0001302 are part of the
abandoned right-of-way of C-5 Road. This area is described as lying north of Lot 1 of
Swo-13-000298 and of Lots 3, 4, 5 and 6 of Swo-13-000298 (Western Bicutan) inside
the Libingan ng mga Bayani, and the boundary line of Lot 1 mentioned as C-5 Road is
really the proposed alignment of C-5 Road, which was abandoned when, as constructed,
it was made to traverse northward into the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Dream Village has
not disputed this assertion.
The mere fact that the original plan for C-5 Road to cross Swo-00-0001302 was
abandoned by deviating it northward to traverse the southern part of Libingan ng mga
Bayani does not signify abandonment by the government of the bypassed lots, nor that
these lots would then become alienable and disposable. They remain under the title of the
BCDA, even as it is significant that under Section 8 (d) of R.A. No. 7227, a relocation
site of 30.5 has. was to be reserved for families affected by the construction of C-5 Road.
It is nowhere claimed that Lots 10, 11 and 13 of Swo-00-0001302 are part of the said
relocation site. These lots border C-5 Road in the south, making them commercially
valuable to BCDA, a farther argument against a claim that the government has abandoned
them to Dream Village.
Article 1113 of the Civil Code provides that "property of the State or any of its
subdivisions not patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription."
One question laid before us is whether the area occupied by Dream Village is susceptible
of acquisition by prescription. In Heirs of Mario Malabanan v. Republic, it was pointed
out that from the moment R.A. No. 7227 was enacted, the subject military lands in Metro
Manila became alienable and disposable. However, it was also clarified that the said
lands did not thereby become patrimonial, since the BCDA law makes the express
reservation that they are to be sold in order to raise funds for the conversion of the former
American bases in Clark and Subic. The Court noted that the purpose of the law can be
tied to either "public service" or "the development of national wealth" under Article 420
(2) of the Civil Code, such that the lands remain property of the public dominion, albeit
their status is now alienable and disposable. The Court then explained that it is only upon
their sale to a private person or entity as authorized by the BCDA law that they become
private property and cease to be property of the public dominion:
For as long as the property belongs to the State, although already classified as
alienable or disposable, it remains property of the public dominion if when it is
"intended for some public service or for the development of the national
wealth."
Thus, under Article 422 of the Civil Code,public domain lands become patrimonial
property only if there is a declaration that these are alienable or disposable, together with
an express government manifestation that the property is already patrimonial or no longer
retained for public service or the development of national wealth. Only when the property
has become patrimonial can the prescriptive period for the acquisition of property of the
public dominion begin to run. .
The above proclamations notwithstanding, Fort Bonifacio remains property of public
dominion of the State, because although declared alienable and disposable, it is reserved
for some public service or for the development of the national wealth, in this case, for the
conversion of military reservations in the country to productive civilian uses. Needless to
say, the acquisitive prescription asserted by Dream Village has not even begun to run.
Moreover, it is a settled rule that lands under a Torrens title cannot be acquired by
prescription or adverse possession.
We add that Fort Bonifacio has been reserved for a declared specific public purpose
under R.A. No. 7227, which unfortunately for Dream Village does not encompass the
present demands of its members. Indeed, this purpose was the very reason why title to
Fort Bonifacio has been transferred to the BCDA, and it is this very purpose which takes
the dispute out of the direct jurisdiction of the COSLAP.

Republic v. Sarmiento [2007]

To support its contention that the lot does not form part of the disposable agricultural
lands of the public domain, petitioner submitted before the appellate court the technical
survey data and topographic map of the LLDA showing that the lot is situated below the
reglementary elevation of 12.50 meters. Since that was the first time petitioner raised the
issue, the appellate court correctly glossed over it, for offending basic rules of fair play,
justice, and due process. In any event, an examination of what purports to be the
technical survey data of the LLDA shows that it is not a certified original copy but a mere
photocopy, the veracity and genuineness of which cannot be ascertained by this Court.
The absence or weakness of the evidence for petitioner notwithstanding, respondent still
bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the lot he seeks to register forms
part of the alienable agricultural land of the public domain.
To discharge the onus, respondent relies on the blue print copy of the conversion and
subdivision plan approved by the DENR Center which bears the notation of the surveyor-
geodetic engineer that "this survey is inside the alienable and disposable area, Project No.
27-B. L.C. Map No. 2623, certified on January 3, 1968 by the Bureau of Forestry."
Menguito v. Republic teaches, however, that reliance on such a notation to prove that the
lot is alienable is insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to
overcome the presumption that it remains part of the inalienable public domain.

Carpo v. Ayala Land [2010]

To begin with, a perusal of the defendant's answer or amended answer would show
that, contrary to the trial court's allusions thereto, there is no admission on the part of ALI
that OCT No. 242 was issued without a survey plan that was duly approved by the
Director of the Bureau of Lands. There is likewise no evidence on record to support the
trial court's finding that the survey plan submitted to support the issuance of OCT No.
242 in the 1950 land registration proceedings was approved only by the Land
Registration Commissioner and not by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
It would appear the trial court came to the conclusion that OCT No. 242 was issued
without a duly approved survey plan simply because the notation "SWO" appeared in the
technical description of the said title which was attached to the answer and due to ALI's
failure to allege in its pleadings that the survey plan submitted in support of the issuance
of OCT No. 242 was approved by the Director of the Bureau of Lands.
It is incomprehensible how the trial court could conclude that the survey plan mentioned
in OCT No. 242 was unapproved by the appropriate authority all from the notation
"SWO" which appeared beside the survey plan number on the face of the title or from a
failure to allege on the part of ALI that a duly approved survey plan exists.
It cannot be gainsaid that the issuance of OCT No. 242 was a result of the
registration decree of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, pursuant to land registration
proceedings in Case No. 976. In the absence of proof to the contrary, OCT No. 242 and
its derivatives, including ALI's TCT No. T-41262, enjoy the presumption of regularity
and ALI need not allege or prove that its title was regularly issued.
The presumption of regularity enjoyed by the registration decree issued in Case No.
976 and OCT No. 242 includes the presumption that all the requisites for the issuance of
a valid title had been complied with. ALI need not allege or prove that a duly approved
survey plan accompanied the issuance of OCT No. 242 in 1950 because it is presumed. It
is the party who seeks to overcome the presumption who would have the burden to
present adequate and convincing evidence to the contrary. This, petitioners did not even
attempt to do.
We cannot accept petitioners' proposition that they did not have the burden of proof of
showing the irregularity of ALI's title since the burden of proof purportedly did not shift
to them since no full-blown trial was conducted by the RTC.

Publication, Opposition of and Default

Director of Lands v. CA and Abistado [1997]
Newspaper Publication Mandatory
The pertinent part of Section 23 of Presidential Decree No. 1529 requiring publication of
the notice of initial hearing reads as follows:
"Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. — The court shall, within
five days from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour
of the initial hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than
ninety days from the date of the order.
The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land
registration by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.
 1. By publication. —
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be
published once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the
Official Gazette shall be sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said
notice shall be addressed to all persons appearing to have an interest in the land
involved including the adjoining owners so far as known, and 'to all whom it
may concern.' Said notice shall also require all persons concerned to appear in
court at a certain date and time to show cause why the prayer of said application
shall not be granted.
xxx xxx xxx"
Admittedly, the above provision provides in clear and categorical terms that publication
in the Official Gazette suffices to confer jurisdiction upon the land registration court.
However, the question boils down to whether, absent any publication in a newspaper of
general circulation, the land registration court can validly confirm and register the title of
private respondents.
The law used the term "shall" in prescribing the work to be done by the Commissioner of
Land Registration upon the latter's receipt of the court order setting the time for initial
hearing. The said word denotes an imperative and thus indicates the mandatory character
of a statute.
It should be noted further that land registration is a proceeding in rem. Being in rem, such
proceeding requires constructive seizure of the land as against all persons, including the
state, who have rights to or interests in the property. An in rem proceeding is validated
essentially through publication.
It may be asked why publication in a newspaper of general circulation should be deemed
mandatory when the law already requires notice by publication in the Official Gazette as
well as by mailing and posting, all of which have already been complied with in the case
at hand. The reason is due process and the reality that the Official Gazette is not as
widely read and circulated as newspapers and is oftentimes delayed in its circulation,
such that the notices published therein may not reach the interested parties on time, if at
all. Additionally, such parties may not be owners of neighboring properties, and may in
fact not own any other real estate. In sum, the all-encompassing in rem nature of land
registration cases, the consequences of default orders issued against the whole world and
the objective of disseminating the notice in as wide a manner as possible demand a
mandatory construction of the requirements for publication, mailing and posting.
Admittedly, there was failure to comply with the explicit publication requirement of the
law. Thus, the application for land registration filed by private respondents must be
dismissed without prejudice to reapplication in the future, after all the legal requisites
shall have been duly complied with.
 Republic v. Dela Paz [2010]
In the present case, the records do not support the findings made by the CA that
the subject land is part of the alienable and disposable portion of the public domain.
From the foregoing, respondents need to prove that (1) the land forms part of
the alienable and disposable land of the public domain; and (2) they, by themselves or
through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of the subject land under a bona fide claim of
ownership from June 12, 1945 or earlier. These the respondents must prove by no less
than clear, positive and convincing evidence.
The burden of proof in overcoming the presumption of State ownership of the
lands of the public domain is on the person applying for registration (or claiming
ownership), who must prove that the land subject of the application is alienable or
disposable. To overcome this presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be
established that the land subject of the application (or claim) is alienable or disposable.
To support its contention that the land subject of the application for registration is
alienable, respondents presented survey Plan Ccn-00-000084.
Respondents' reliance on the afore-mentioned annotation is misplaced, it is
insufficient and does not constitute incontrovertible evidence to overcome the
presumption that the land remains part of the inalienable public domain.
In this connection, the Court has held that he must present a certificate of land
classification status issued by the Community Environment and Natural Resources
Office (CENRO), or the Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Office
(PENRO) of the DENR. He must also prove that the DENR Secretary had approved the
land classification and released the land as alienable and disposable, and that it is
within the approved area per verification through survey by the CENRO or PENRO.
Further, the applicant must present a copy of the original classification approved by the
DENR Secretary and certified as true copy by the legal custodian of the official records.
These facts must be established by the applicant to prove that the land is alienable and
disposable.
Clearly, the surveyor's annotation presented by respondents is not the kind of
proof required by law to prove that the subject land falls within the alienable and
disposable zone. Respondents failed to submit a certification from the proper
government agency to establish that the subject land is part of the alienable and
disposable portion of the public domain. In the absence of incontrovertible evidence to
prove that the subject property is already classified as alienable and disposable, we
must consider the same as still inalienable public domain.
 Anent respondents' possession and occupation of the subject property, a reading
of the records failed to show that the respondents by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest possessed and occupied the subject land since June 12, 1945 or
earlier.
The foregoing pieces of evidence, taken together, failed to paint a clear picture
that respondents by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, exclusive, continuous and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
land, under a bona fide claim of ownership since June 12, 1945 or earlier.
Evidently, since respondents failed to prove their application for confirmation
and registration of the subject property under PD 1529 should be denied.

Republic v. CA and Lapina [1994]

It must be noted that with respect to possession and occupation of the alienable and
disposable lands of the public domain, the law employs the terms "by themselves", the
applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-interest". Thus, it matters not whether the
vendee/applicant has been in possession of the subject property for only a day so long as
the period and/or legal requirements for confirmation of title has been complied with by
his predecessor-in-interest, the said period is tacked to his possession. In the case at bar,
respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession of the disputed land not only since June 12, 1945, but even as early
as 1937. As aforesaid, the disputed parcels of land were acquired by private respondents
through their predecessors-in-interest, who, in turn, have been in open and continued
possession thereof since 1937. Private respondents stepped into the shoes of their
predecessors-in-interest and by virtue thereof, acquired all the legal rights necessary to
confirm what could otherwise be deemed as an imperfect title.
Subsequent cases have hewed to the above pronouncement such that open, continuous
and exclusive possession for at least 30 years of alienable public land ipso jure converts
the same to private property. This means that occupation and cultivation for more than 30
years by an applicant and his predecessors-in- interest, vest title on such applicant so as
to segregate the land from the mass of public land .
The Public Land Act requires that the applicant must prove that (a) the land is alienable
public land and (b) his possession, in the concept above stated, must be either since time
immemorial or for the period prescribed in the Public Land Act. When the conditions set
by law are complied with, the possessor of the land, by operation of law, acquires a right
to grant, a government grant, without the necessity of a certificate of title being issued.
As such, the land ceases to be a part of the public domain and goes beyond the authority
of the Director of Lands to dispose of.
In the case at bar, private respondents were undoubtedly natural-born Filipino citizens at
the time of the acquisition of the properties and by virtue thereof, acquired vested rights
thereon, tacking in the process, the possession in the concept of owner and the prescribed
period of time held by their predecessors-in-interest under the Public Land Act. In
addition, private respondents have constructed a house of strong materials on the
contested property, now occupied by respondent Lapiña's mother.
But what should not be missed in the disposition of this case is the fact that the
Constitution itself allows private respondents to register the contested parcels of land in
their favor.
Pursuant thereto, Batas Pambansa Blg. 185 was passed into law, the relevant provision of
which provides:
"Sec. 2. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who has lost his Philippine
citizenship and who has the legal capacity to enter into a contract under
Philippine laws may be a transferee of a private land up to a maximum area of
one thousand square meters, in the case of urban land, or one hectare in the case
of rural land, to be used by him as his residence. In the case of married couples,
one of them may avail of the privilege herein granted; Provided, That if both
shall avail of the same, the total area acquired shall not exceed the maximum
herein fixed.
"In case the transferee already owns urban or rural lands for residential
purposes, he shall be entitled to be a transferee of an additional urban or rural
lands for residential purposes which, when added to those already owned by
him, shall not exceed the maximum areas herein authorized."
From the adoption of the 1987 Constitution up to the present, no other law has been
passed by the legislature on the same subject. Thus, what governs the disposition of
private lands in favor of a natural-born Filipino citizen who has lost his Philippine
citizenship remains to be BP 185.
Even if private respondents were already Canadian citizens at the time they applied for
registration of the properties in question, said properties as discussed above were already
private lands; consequently, there could be no legal impediment for the registration
thereof by respondents in view of what the Constitution ordains. The parcels of land
sought to be registered no longer form part of the public domain. They are already private
in character since private respondents' predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous and exclusive possession and occupation thereof under claim of ownership
prior to June 12, 1945 or since 1937. The law provides that a natural-born citizen of the
Philippines who has lost his Philippine citizenship may be a transferee of a private land
up to a maximum area of 1,000 sq. m., if urban, or one (1) hectare in case of rural land, to
be used by him as his residence (BP 185).
It is undisputed that private respondents, as vendees of a private land, were natural born
citizens of the Philippines. For the purpose of transfer and/or acquisition of a parcel of
residential land, it is not significant whether private respondents are no longer Filipino
citizens at the time they purchased or registered the parcels of land in question. What is
important is that private respondents were formerly natural-born citizens of the
Philippines, and as transferees of a private land, they could apply for registration in
accordance with the mandate of Section 8, Article XII of the Constitution. Considering
that private respondents were able to prove the requisite period and character of
possession of their predecessors-in-interest over the subject lots, their application for
registration of title must perforce be approved.

Republic v. Nillas [2007]

Within the last 20 years, the Sta. Ana doctrine on the inapplicability of the rules on
prescription and laches to land registration cases has been repeatedly affirmed. The
doctrine of stare decisis compels respect for settled jurisprudence, especially absent any
compelling argument to do otherwise. Indeed, the apparent strategy employed by the
Republic in its present petition is to feign that the doctrine and the cases that spawned
and educed it never existed at all.
We affirm Sta. Ana not out of simple reflex, but because we recognize that the principle
enunciated therein offers a convincing refutation of the current arguments of the
Republic.
The Republic observes that the Property Registration Decree (PD No. 1529) does not
contain any provision on execution of final judgments; hence, the application of Rule 39
of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure in suppletory fashion. Quite the contrary, it is
precisely because PD No. 1529 does not specifically provide for execution of judgments
in the sense ordinarily understood and applied in civil cases, the reason being there is no
need for the prevailing party to apply for a writ of execution in order to obtain the title,
that Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is not applicable to land registration
cases in the first place.
The failure on the part of the administrative authorities to do their part in the issuance of
the decree of registration cannot oust the prevailing party from ownership of the land.
Neither the failure of such applicant to follow up with said authorities can. The ultimate
goal of our land registration system is geared towards the final and definitive
determination of real property ownership in the country, and the imposition of an
additional burden on the owner after the judgment in the land registration case had
attained finality would simply frustrate such goal.
Clearly, the peculiar procedure provided in the Property Registration Law from the time
decisions in land registration cases become final is complete in itself and does not need
to be filled in. From another perspective, the judgment does not have to be executed by
motion or enforced by action within the purview of Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure.
Following these premises, it can even be posited that in theory, there would have been no
need for Nillas, or others under similar circumstances, to file a petition for revival of
judgment, since revival of judgments is a procedure derived from civil procedure and
proceeds from the assumption that the judgment is susceptible to prescription. However,
the Court sees the practical value of necessitating judicial recourse if a significant number
of years has passed since the promulgation of the land court's unimplemented decision or
order, as in this case. Even though prescription should not be a cause to bar the issuance
of the decree of registration, a judicial evaluation would allow for a thorough
examination of the veracity of the judgment or order sought to be effected, or a
determination of causes other than prescription or laches that might preclude the issuance
of the decree of registration.

Ting v. Heirs of Lirio [2007]

As for petitioner's claim that under Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court reading:
SEC. 6. Execution by motion or by independent action. — A final and executory
judgment or order may be executed on motion within five (5) years from the
date of its entry. After the lapse of such time, and before it is barred by the
statute of limitations, a judgment may be enforced by action. The revived
judgment may also be enforced by motion within five (5) years from the date of
its entry and thereafter by action before it is barred by the statute of
limitations[,]
the December 10, 1976 decision became "extinct" in light of the failure of respondents
and/or of their predecessors-in-interest to execute the same within the prescriptive
period, the same does not lie.
Sta. Ana v. Menla, et al. enunciates the raison d'etre why Section 6, Rule 39 does not
apply in land registration proceedings, viz:
We fail to understand the arguments of the appellant in support of the above
assignment, except in so far as it supports his theory that after a decision in a
land registration case has become final, it may not be enforced after the lapse of
a period of 10 years, except by another proceeding to enforce the judgment or
decision. Authority for this theory is the provision in the Rules of Court to the
effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five
years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) This provision of the
Rules refers to civil actions and is not applicable to special proceedings,
such as a land registration case. This is so because a party in a civil action
must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse
party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as
provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing
 party. In special proceedings the purpose is to establish a status, condition
or fact; in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a
parcel of land is sought to be established. After the ownership has been
proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to
enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing
party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to
oust him therefrom.
Furthermore, there is no provision in the Land Registration Act similar to Sec.
6, Rule 39, regarding the execution of a judgment in a civil action, except the
proceedings to place the winner in possession by virtue of a writ of possession.
The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in
possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the expiration of the
period for perfecting an appeal.
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Manotok Realty v. CLT Realty [2007]

First, there is only one OCT 994. As it appears on the record,
that mother title was received for transcription by the Register of
Deeds on 3 May 1917, and that should be the date which should be
reckoned as the date of registration of the title. It may also be
acknowledged, as appears on the title, that OCT No. 994 resulted
from the issuance of the decree of registration on (19)April 1917,
although such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or
the date when the title took effect.

Second. Any title that traces its source to OCT No. 994 dated
(19) April 1917 is void, for such mother title is inexistent. The fact
that the Dimson and CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT
No. 994 dated (19) April 1917 casts doubt on the validity of such
titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in
fact, sufficient to invalidate the Dimson and CLT claims over the
subject property if singular reliance is placed by them on the dates
appearing on their respective titles.
 Third. The decision of this Court in MWSS v. Court of Appeals
and Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals cannot apply to the cases at bar,
especially in regard to their recognition of an OCT No. 994 dated
19 April 1917, a title which we now acknowledge as inexistent.
Neither could the conclusions in MWSS or Gonzaga with respect
to an OCT No. 994 dated 19 April 1917 bind any other case
operating under the factual setting the same as or similar to that at
bar.

Angeles v. Secretary of Justice [2010]

As can be gleaned from the above discussion, the issuance by the LRA officials of a
decree of registration is not a purely ministerial duty in cases where they find that such
would result to the double titling of the same parcel of land. In the same vein, we find
that in this case, which involves the issuance of transfer certificates of title, the
Register of Deeds cannot be compelled by mandamus to comply with the RTC Order
since there were existing transfer certificates of title covering the subject parcels of land
and there was reason to question the rights of those requesting for the issuance of the
TCTs. There was, therefore, sufficient basis for public respondents to refuse to comply
with the RTC Order, given the finding, contained in the cited documents, that OCT No.
994 dated April 19, 1917, on which petitioner and her co-plaintiffs in the civil case
clearly anchored their rights, did not exist.
It is important to emphasize at this point that in the recent case resolved by this Court En
Banc in 2007, entitled Manotok Realty, Inc. v. CLT Realty Development Corporation (the
2007 Manotok case), the controversy surrounding the Maysilo Estate and the
question of the existence of another OCT No. 994 have been finally laid to rest. All other
cases involving said estate and OCT No. 994, such as the case at bar, are bound by the
findings and conclusions set forth in said resolutions.
As stated earlier, petitioner anchors her claim on previous cases decided by this
Court which have held that there are two existing OCT No. 994, dated differently, and the
one from which she and her co-plaintiffs (in Civil Case No. C-424) derived their rights
was dated earlier, hence, was the superior title. Regrettably, petitioner's claim no longer
has a leg to stand on.
Specifically, petitioner cannot anymore insist that OCT No. 994 allegedly issued on April
19, 1917 validly and actually exists.
Thus, in the 2009 Manotok case, this Court evaluated the evidence engaged in by said
Special Division, and adopted the latter's conclusions as to the status of the original title
and its subsequent conveyances. This case affirmed the earlier finding that "there is only
one OCT No. 994, the registration date of which had already been decisively settled as 3
May 1917 and not 19 April 1917" and categorically concluded that "OCT No. 994 which
reflects the date of 19 April 1917 as its registration date is null and void."
It appears, however, that the partition and accounting of a portion of the Maysilo Estate
that she and her co-plaintiffs prayed for can no longer prosper because of the conclusive
findings quoted above that the very basis of their claim, a second, albeit earlier registered,
OCT No. 994, does not exist.

Classification of Public Lands

Director of Lands v. CA and Bisnar [1989]
It bears emphasizing that a positive act of the government is needed to declassify land
which is classified as forest and to convert it into alienable or disposable land for
agricultural or other purposes. Unless and until the land classified as forest is released in
an official proclamation to that effect so that it may form part of the disposable
agricultural lands of the public domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not
apply.
Thus, possession of forest lands, however long, cannot ripen into private ownership. A
parcel of forest land is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Bureau of Forestry and
beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens
System.
Section 48 (b) of Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended, applies exclusively to public
agricultural land. Forest lands or areas covered with forests are excluded.

Republic v. CA [2008]
Thus, unless specifically declared as mineral or forest zone, or reserved by the State
for some public purpose in accordance with law, all Crown lands were deemed alienable.
In this case, petitioner has not alleged that the disputed portion had been declared as
mineral or forest zone, or reserved for some public purpose in accordance with law,
during the Spanish regime or thereafter. The land classification maps petitioner attached
to the complaint also do not show that in 1930 the disputed portion was part of the forest
zone or reserved for some public purpose. The certification of the National Mapping and
Resources Information Authority, dated 27 May 1994, contained no statement that the
disputed portion was declared and classified as timber land.
Petitioner has not alleged that the Governor-General had declared the disputed portion of
the subject property timber or mineral land pursuant to Section 6 of Act No. 2874.
It is true that Section 8 of Act No. 2874 opens to disposition only those lands which have
been declared alienable or disposable.
However, Section 8 provides that lands which are already private lands, as well as lands
on which a private claim may be made under any law, are not covered by the
classification requirement in Section 8 for purposes of disposition. This exclusion in
Section 8 recognizes that during the Spanish regime, Crown lands were per se
alienable unless falling under timber or mineral zones, or otherwise reserved for some
public purpose in accordance with law.
Clearly, with respect to lands excluded from the classification requirement in Section 8,
trial courts had jurisdiction to adjudicate these lands to private parties. Petitioner has not
alleged that the disputed portion had not become private property prior to the enactment
of Act No. 2874. Neither has petitioner alleged that the disputed portion was not land on
which a private right may be claimed under any existing law at that time.
As with this case, when the trial court issued the decision for the issuance of Decree No.
381928 in 1930, the trial court had jurisdiction to determine whether the subject property,
including the disputed portion, applied for was agricultural, timber or mineral land.
Thus, even as the 1935 Constitution declared that all agricultural, timber and mineral
lands of the public domain belong to the State, it recognized that these lands
were"subject to any existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the
inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution". When the
Commonwealth Government was established under the 1935 Constitution, spouses Carag
had already an existing right to the subject land, including the disputed portion, pursuant
to Decree No. 381928 issued in 1930 by the trial court.

Republic v. T.A.N. Properties [2008]

The well-entrenched rule is that all lands not appearing to be clearly of private dominion
presumably belong to the State. The onus to overturn, by incontrovertible evidence, the
presumption that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable and
disposable rests with the applicant.
In this case, respondent submitted two certifications issued by the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). The certifications are not sufficient. DENR
Administrative Order (DAO) No. 20, dated 30 May 1988, delineated the functions and
authorities of the offices within the DENR. Under DAO No. 20, series of 1988, the
CENRO issues certificates of land classification status for areas below 50 hectares. The
Provincial Environment and Natural Resources Offices (PENRO) issues certificate of
land classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. DAO No. 38, dated 19 April
1990, amended DAO No. 20, series of 1988. DAO No. 38, series of 1990 retained the
authority of the CENRO to issue certificates of land classification status for areas below
50 hectares, as well as the authority of the PENRO to issue certificates of land
classification status for lands covering over 50 hectares. In this case, respondent applied
for registration of Lot 10705-B. The area covered by Lot 10705-B is over 50 hectares
(564,007 square meters). The CENRO certificate covered the entire Lot 10705 with an
area of 596,116 square meters which, as per DAO No. 38, series of 1990, is beyond the
authority of the CENRO to certify as alienable and disposable.
The Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, has no authority under DAO Nos. 20 and
38 to issue certificates of land classification.
Hence, the certification issued by the Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, in the
form of a memorandum to the trial court, has no probative value.
Further, it is not enough for the PENRO or CENRO to certify that a land is alienable and
disposable. The applicant for land registration must prove that the DENR Secretary had
approved the land classification and released the land of the public domain as alienable
and disposable, and that the land subject of the application for registration falls within the
approved area per verification through survey by the PENRO or CENRO. In addition, the
applicant for land registration must present a copy of the original classification approved
by the DENR Secretary and certified as a true copy by the legal custodian of the official
records. These facts must be established to prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Respondent failed to do so because the certifications presented by respondent do not, by
themselves, prove that the land is alienable and disposable.
Only Torres, respondent's Operations Manager, identified the certifications submitted by
respondent. The government officials who issued the certifications were not presented
before the trial court to testify on their contents. The trial court should not have accepted
the contents of the certifications as proof of the facts stated therein. Even if the
certifications are presumed duly issued and admissible in evidence, they have no
probative value in establishing that the land is alienable and disposable. DSATCI
Applying Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents referred to in Section
19 (a), when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication
thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having legal custody of the record, or by
his deputy . . . . The CENRO is not the official repository or legal custodian of the
issuances of the DENR Secretary declaring public lands as alienable and disposable. The
CENRO should have attached an official publication of the DENR Secretary's issuance
declaring the land alienable and disposable.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not fall
within the class of public documents contemplated in the first sentence of Section 23 of
Rule 132. The certifications do not reflect "entries in public records made in the
performance of a duty by a public officer", such as entries made by the Civil Registrar in
the books of registries, or by a ship captain in the ship's logbook. The certifications are
not the certified copies or authenticated reproductions of original official records in the
legal custody of a government office. The certifications are not even records of public
documents. The certifications are conclusions unsupported by adequate proof, and thus
have no probative value. Certainly, the certifications cannot be considered prima facie
evidence of the facts stated therein.
The CENRO and Regional Technical Director, FMS-DENR, certifications do not prove
that Lot 10705-B falls within the alienable and disposable land as proclaimed by the
DENR Secretary. Such government certifications do not, by their mere issuance, prove
the facts stated therein.
We agree with petitioner that while the certifications submitted by respondent show that
under the Land Classification Map No. 582, the land became alienable and disposable on
31 December 1925, the blue print plan states that it became alienable and disposable on
31 December 1985. Respondent alleged that "the blue print plan merely serves to prove
the precise location and the metes and bounds of the land described therein . . . and does
not in any way certify the nature and classification of the land involved." It is true that the
notation by a surveyor-geodetic engineer on the survey plan that the land formed part of
the alienable and disposable land of the public domain is not sufficient proof of the land's
classification. However, respondent should have at least presented proof that would
explain the discrepancy in the dates of classification. Marquez, LRA Records Officer II,
testified that the documents submitted to the court consisting of the tracing cloth plan, the
technical description of Lot 10705-B, the approved subdivision plan, and the Geodetic
Engineer's certification were faithful reproductions of the original documents in the LRA
office. He did not explain the discrepancy in the dates. Neither was the Geodetic
Engineer presented to explain why the date of classification on the blue print plan was
different from the other certifications submitted by respondent.
Under R.A. 9176, the application for judicial confirmation is limited only to 12
hectares, consistent with Section 3, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution that a private
individual may only acquire not more than 12 hectares of alienable and disposable land.
Hence, respondent, as successor-in-interest of an individual owner of the land, cannot
apply for registration of land in excess of 12 hectares. Since respondent applied for
56.4007 hectares, the application for the excess area of 44.4007 hectares is contrary to
law, and thus void ab initio.
 CMU v. Republic [2016]
To prove that a land is alienable, the existence of a positive act of the
government, such as presidential proclamation or an executive order; an administrative
action; investigation reports of Bureau of Lands investigators; and a legislative act or a
statute declaring the land as alienable and disposable must be established. Hence, a
public land remains part of the inalienable public domain unless it is shown to have
been reclassified and alienated by the State to a private person.
As noted, Proclamation No. 476 issued by then President Garcia, decreeing
certain portions of the public domain in Musuan, Maramag, Bukidnon for CMU's site
purposes, was issued pursuant to Section 83 of C.A. No. 141. Being reserved as CMU's
school site, the said parcels of land were withdrawn from sale and settlement, and
reserved for CMU. Under Section 88 of the same Act, the reserved parcels of land
would ordinarily be inalienable and not subject to occupation, entry, sale, lease or other
disposition, subject to an exception, viz.:
Section 88. The tract or tracts of land reserved under the provisions of
section eighty-three shall be non-alienable and shall not be subject to
occupation, entry, sale, lease, or other disposition until again declared
alienable under the provisions of this Act or by proclamation of the
President. (Emphasis supplied)
For the said President's directive to file the necessary petition for compulsory
registration of parcels of land be considered as an equivalent of a declaration that the
land is alienable and disposable, the subject land, among others, should not have been
reserved for public or quasi-public purposes.
Therefore, the said directive on December 12, 1960 cannot be considered as a
declaration that said land is alienable and disposable. Unlike in De la Rosa, the lands,
having been reserved for public purpose by virtue of Proclamation No. 476, have not
ceased to be so at the time the said directive was made. Hence, the lots did not revert to
and become public agricultural land for them to be the subject of a declaration by the
President that the same are alienable and disposable.
We have ruled in the case of CMU v. DARAB that the CMU land reservation is
not alienable and disposable land of public domain.
In the case at bar, CMU failed to establish, through incontrovertible evidence,
that the land reservations registered in its name are alienable and disposable lands of
public domain. Aside from the series of indorsements regarding the filing of the
application for the compulsory registration of the parcels of land and the said directive
from the President, CMU did not present any proof of a positive act of the government
declaring the said lands alienable and disposable.
For lack of proof that the said land reservations have been reclassified as
alienable and disposable, the said lands remain part of inalienable public domain,
hence; they are not registrable under Torrens system.
 Non-registerable Properties
Santulan v. Executive Secretary [1977]
That rule in paragraph 32 is in consonance with article 4 of the Spanish Law of
Waters of 1866 which provides that, while lands added to the shores by accretions and
alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea forth part of the public domain, such
lands, "when they are no longer washed by the waters of the sea and are not necessary for
purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for the coast
guard service", shall be declared by the Government "to be the property of the owners of
the estates adjacent thereto and as increment thereof ." (cited in Ignacio vs. Director of
Lands, 108 Phil. 335, 338).
In other words, article 4 recognizes the preferential right of the littoral owner
(riparian according to paragraph 32) to the foreshore land formed by accretions or
alluvial deposits due to the action of the sea.
The reason for that preferential right is the same as the justification for giving
accretions to the riparian owner, which is that accretion compensates the riparian owner
for the diminutions which his land suffers by reason of the destructive force of the waters
(Cortes vs. City of Manila, 10 Phil. 567). So, in the case of littoral lands, he who loses by
the encroachments of the sea should gain by its recession (Banks vs. Ogden, 2 Wall. 57,
67, 17 L Ed. 818, 821).

Republic v. CA and Lastimado [1979]

If the allegation of petitioner that the land in question was inside the military reservation
at the time it was claimed is true, then, it cannot be the object of any cadastral proceeding
nor can it be the object of reopening under Republic Act No. 931. Similarly, if the land in
question, indeed, forms part of the public forest, then, possession thereof, however long,
cannot convert it into private property as it is within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
Bureau of Forestry and beyond the power and jurisdiction of the Cadastral Court to
register under the Torrens System.
Even assuming that the government agencies can be faulted for inaction and neglect
(although the Solicitor General claims that it received no notice), yet, the same cannot
operate to bar action by the State as it cannot be estopped by the mistake or error of its
officials or agents. Further, we cannot lose sight of the cardinal consideration that "the
State as persona in law is the juridical entity, which is the source of any asserted right to
ownership in land" under basic Constitutional precepts, and that it is moreover charged
with the conservation of such patrimony.
||

Chavez v. Public Estate Authority [2002]

Section 58 of Act No. 2874 categorically mandated that
disposable lands of the public domain classified as government
reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands "shall be disposed of to
private parties by lease only and not otherwise." The Governor-
General, before allowing the lease of these lands to private parties,
must formally declare that the lands were "not necessary for the
public service." Act No. 2874 reiterated the State policy to lease
and not to sell government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands
of the public domain, a policy first enunciated in 1907 in Act No.
1654. Government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands
remained sui generis, as the only alienable or disposable lands of
the public domain that the government could not sell to private
parties.
Act No. 2874 did not authorize the reclassification of
government reclaimed, foreshore and marshy lands into other non-
agricultural lands under Section 56 (d). Lands falling under
Section 56 (d) were the only lands for non-agricultural purposes
the government could sell to private parties. Thus, under Act No.
2874, the government could not sell government reclaimed,
foreshore and marshy lands to private parties, unless the legislature
passed a law allowing their sale.
Under Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, the
foreshore and submerged areas of Manila Bay are part of the
"lands of the public domain, waters . . . and other natural
resources" and consequently "owned by the State." As such,
foreshore and submerged areas "shall not be alienated," unless they
are classified as "agricultural lands" of the public domain. The
mere reclamation of these areas by PEA does not convert these
inalienable natural resources of the State into alienable or
disposable lands of the public domain.
There must be a law or presidential proclamation officially
classifying these reclaimed lands as alienable or disposable and
open to disposition or concession. Moreover, these reclaimed lands
cannot be classified as alienable or disposable if the law has
reserved them for some public or quasi-public use.
The President has the authority to classify inalienable lands of
the public domain into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, pursuant to Section 6 of CA No. 141. under Article 422 of
the Civil Code, a property of public dominion retains such
character until formally declared otherwise.
The Amended JVA covers not only the Freedom Islands, but
also an additional 592.15 hectares which are still submerged and
forming part of Manila Bay. There is no legislative or Presidential
act classifying these submerged areas as alienable or disposable
lands of the public domain open to disposition. These submerged
areas are not covered by any patent or certificate of title. There can
be no dispute that these submerged areas form part of the public
domain, and in their present state are inalienable and outside the
commerce of man. Until reclaimed from the sea, these submerged
areas are, under the Constitution, "waters . . . owned by the State,"
forming part of the public domain and consequently inalienable.
Only when actually reclaimed from the sea can these submerged
areas be classified as public agricultural lands, which under the
Constitution are the only natural resources that the State may
alienate. Once reclaimed and transformed into public agricultural
lands, the government may then officially classify these lands as
alienable or disposable lands open to disposition. Thereafter, the
government may declare these lands no longer needed for public
service. Only then can these reclaimed lands be considered
alienable or disposable lands of the public domain and within the
commerce of man.
 Absent two official acts — a classification that these lands are
alienable or disposable and open to disposition and a declaration
that these lands are not needed for public service, lands reclaimed
by PEA remain inalienable lands of the public domain. Only such
an official classification and formal declaration can convert
reclaimed lands into alienable or disposable lands of the public
domain, open to disposition under the Constitution, Title I and
Title III of CA No. 141 and other applicable laws.

Executive Order No. 654, 89 which authorizes PEA "to

determine the kind and manner of payment for the transfer" of its
assets and properties, does not exempt PEA from the requirement
of public auction. EO No. 654 merely authorizes PEA to decide the
mode of payment, whether in kind and in installment, but does not
authorize PEA to dispense with public auction.
It is only when the public auction fails that a negotiated sale is
allowed, in which case the Commission on Audit must approve the
selling price. The Commission on Audit implements Section 79 of
the Government Auditing Code through Circular No. 89-296 dated
January 27, 1989. This circular emphasizes that government assets
must be disposed of only through public auction, and a negotiated
sale can be resorted to only in case of "failure of public auction."
At the public auction sale, only Philippine citizens are qualified
to bid for PEA's reclaimed foreshore and submerged alienable
lands of the public domain. Private corporations are barred from
bidding at the auction sale of any kind of alienable land of the
public domain.

Chavez v. NHA [2007]

To lands reclaimed by PEA or through a contract with a private
person or entity, such reclaimed lands still remain alienable lands
of public domain which can be transferred only to Filipino citizens
but not to a private corporation. This is because PEA under PD
1084 and EO 525 is tasked to hold and dispose of alienable lands
of public domain and it is only when it is transferred to Filipino
citizens that it becomes patrimonial property. On the other hand,
the NHA is a government agency not tasked to dispose of public
lands under its charter — The Revised Administrative Code of
1987. The NHA is an "end-user agency" authorized by law to
administer and dispose of reclaimed lands. The moment titles over
reclaimed lands based on the special patents are transferred to the
NHA by the Register of Deeds, they are automatically converted to
patrimonial properties of the State which can be sold to Filipino
citizens and private corporations, 60% of which are owned by
Filipinos.
The reason is obvious: if the reclaimed land is not converted to
patrimonial land once transferred to NHA, then it would be useless
to transfer it to the NHA since it cannot legally transfer or alienate
lands of public domain. More importantly, it cannot attain its
avowed purposes and goals since it can only transfer patrimonial
lands to qualified beneficiaries and prospective buyers to raise
funds for the SMDRP.
From the foregoing considerations, we find that the 79-hectare
reclaimed land has been declared alienable and disposable land of
the public domain; and in the hands of NHA, it has been
reclassified as patrimonial property.

Remedies
1. Petition for Review
Eland Philippines, Inc. V. Garcia [2010]
A summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. A
summary judgment is proper if, while the pleadings on their face appear to raise
issues, the affidavits, depositions, and admissions presented by the moving party
show that such issues are not genuine.
It must be remembered that the non-existence of a genuine issue is the
determining factor in granting a motion for summary judgment, and the movant has
the burden of proving such nonexistence. The trial court found no genuine issue as
to any material fact that would necessitate conducting a full-blown trial. However, a
careful study of the case shows otherwise.

It is of utmost importance to remember that petitioner is

already the registered owner (Original Certificate of Title
[OCT] No. 0-660 issued by the Register of Deeds) of the
parcel of land in question, pursuant to a decree of
registration (Decree No. N-217313, LRC Record No.
62686) based on the ruling of the same court that granted the
summary judgment for the quieting of title.
As borne out by the records and undisputed by the
parties, OCT No. 0-660 of petitioner was issued on August
29, 1997 pursuant to a Decree issued on August 20, 1997,
while the complaint for the quieting of title in Civil Case
No. TG-1784 was filed and docketed on March 5, 1998;
hence, applying the above provisions, it would seem that the
period of one (1) year from the issuance of the decree of
registration has not elapsed for the review thereof. However,
a closer examination of the above provisions would clearly
indicate that the action filed, which was for quieting of title,
was not the proper remedy.
Courts may reopen proceedings already closed by final
decision or decree when an application for review is filed by
the party aggrieved within one year from the issuance of the
decree of registration. However, the basis of the aggrieved
party must be anchored solely on actual fraud.
In the present case, the one-year period before the
Torrens title becomes indefeasible and incontrovertible has
not yet expired; thus, a review of the decree of registration
would have been the appropriate remedy.
2. Action for Reconveyance
Roque v. Aguada [2014]
The essence of an action for reconveyance is to seek the
transfer of the property which was wrongfully or
erroneously registered in another person's name to its
rightful owner or to one with a better right. Thus, it is
incumbent upon the aggrieved party to show that he has a
legal claim on the property superior to that of the registered
owner and that the property has not yet passed to the hands
of an innocent purchaser for value.
Here, it is undisputed that Sps. Roque have not paid the
final installment of the purchase price. 57 As such, the
condition which would have triggered the parties' obligation
to enter into and thereby perfect a contract of sale in order to
effectively transfer the ownership of the subject portion
from the sellers (i.e., Rivero et al.) to the buyers (Sps.
Roque) cannot be deemed to have been fulfilled.
Consequently, the latter cannot validly claim ownership over
the subject portion even if they had made an initial payment
and even took possession of the same.
In fine, Sps. Roque failed to establish any superior right
over the subject portion as against the registered owner of
Lot 18089, i.e., Land Bank, thereby warranting the dismissal
of their reconveyance action.

Reyes v. Montemayor [2009]

Insofar as a person who fraudulently obtained a property is concerned, the
registration of the property in said person's name would not be sufficient to vest in
 him or her the title to the property. A certificate of title merely confirms or records
title already existing and vested. The indefeasibility of the Torrens title should not be
used as a means to perpetrate fraud against the rightful owner of real property. Good
faith must concur with registration because, otherwise, registration would be an
exercise in futility. A Torrens title does not furnish a shield for fraud, notwithstanding
the long-standing rule that registration is a constructive notice of title binding upon
the whole world. The legal principle is that if the registration of the land is
fraudulent, the person in whose name the land is registered holds it as a mere trustee.
It has long been established that the sole remedy of the landowner whose property has
been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another's name is to bring an ordinary action
in an ordinary court of justice for reconveyance or, if the property has passed into the
hands of an innocent purchaser for value, for damages. "It is one thing to protect an
innocent third party; it is entirely a different matter and one devoid of justification if
deceit would be rewarded by allowing the perpetrator to enjoy the fruits of his nefarious
deed". Reconveyance is all about the transfer of the property, in this case the title thereto,
which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in another person's name, to its
rightful and legal owner, or to one with a better right. Evidently, petitioners, being the
rightful owners of the subject property, are entitled to the reconveyance of the title over
the same.
What is apparent to this Court is that private respondent executed the Waiver and
Quitclaim dated 15 January 1998 so as to effect the transfer of the subject property to
third persons, i.e., Engracia's heirs, and defeat any judgment granting the petitioners the
remedy of reconveyance of the subject property.
This having been said, an action for reconveyance is an action in personam available to a
person whose property has been wrongfully registered under the Torrens system in
another's name. Reconveyance is always available as long as the property has not passed
to an innocent person for value.
Engracia's heirs cannot be considered "innocent" persons or persons who acquired the
subject property "for value". Engracia's heirs "re-acquired" the subject property by virtue
of the private respondent's Waiver and Quitclaim dated 15 January 1998. That the said
document was executed by private respondent, who admitted to holding a dubious title to
the subject property, should be sufficient to put Engracia's heirs on notice and to cause the
latter to investigate the other transfers and titles issued for the subject property. The
Waiver and Quitclaim dated 15 January 1998 also does not establish that the subject
property was transferred to Engracia's heirs for value, it appearing to have been executed
by private respondent in favor of Engracia's heirs without any consideration at all. Hence,
the cancellation of TCT No. T-369793 in private respondent's name and the issuance of
TCT No. T-784707 in the names of Engracia's heirs cannot bar the reconveyance of the
subject property to petitioners.
A judgment directing a party to deliver possession of a property to another is in
personam; it is binding only against the parties and their successors in interest by title
subsequent to the commencement of the action. The Court may deem Engracia's heirs as
private respondent's successors-in-interest, having acquired title to the subject property
through private respondent after the commencement of petitioners' action for
reconveyance of the same property.

Gasataya v. Mabasa [2007]

Reconveyance is available not only to the legal owner of a
property but also to the person with a better right than the
person under whose name said property was erroneously
registered. While respondent is not the legal owner of the
disputed lots, she has a better right than petitioner to the
contested lots on the following grounds: first, the deed of
conditional sale executed by DBP vested on her the right to
repurchase the lots and second, her right to repurchase them
would have subsisted had they (the Gasatayas) not defrauded
her.
The registration of the properties in petitioner's name did not obliterate the fact
that fraud preceded and facilitated such registration. Actual or positive fraud
proceeds from an intentional deception practiced by means of misrepresentation of
material facts, which in this case was the conscious representation by petitioner's
father (Sabas Gasataya) that respondent's obligation to DBP had already been settled.
It is fraud to knowingly omit or conceal a fact, upon which benefit is obtained, to the
prejudice of another. Consequently, fraud is a ground for reconveyance.
Moreover, the law only protects an innocent purchaser for value and not one
who has knowledge of and participation in the employment of fraud. An innocent
purchaser for value is one who buys the property of another without notice that some
other person has a right to or interest in that same property, and who pays a full and
fair price at the time of the purchase or before receiving any notice of another
person's claim. Obviously, petitioner was not an innocent purchaser for value.

Amerol v. Bagumbayan [1987]

An action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust must perforce
prescribe in ten years and not otherwise. A long line of decisions of this Court, and of
very recent vintage at that, illustrates this rule. Undoubtedly, it is now well-settled that an
action for reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years
from the issuance of the Torrens title over the property.
It is abundantly clear from all the foregoing that the action of petitioner Datomanong for
reconveyance, in the nature of a counterclaim interposed in his Answer, filed on
December 4, 1964, to the complaint for recovery of possession instituted by the
respondent, has not yet prescribed. Between August 16, 1955, the date of reference, being
the date of the issuance of the Original Certificate of Title in the name of the respondent,
and December 4, 1964, when the period of prescription was interrupted by the filing of
the Answer cum Counterclaim, is less than ten years.

Sanjorjo v. Quijano [2005]

We agree with the ruling of the CA that the torrens title
issued on the basis of the free patents became as indefeasible as
one which was judicially secured upon the expiration of one
year from date of issuance of the patent. The order or decision
of the DENR granting an application for a free patent can be
reviewed only within one year thereafter, on the ground of
actual fraud via a petition for review in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) provided that no innocent purchaser for value has
acquired the property or any interest thereon. However, an
aggrieved party may still file an action for reconveyance based
on implied or constructive trust, which prescribes in ten years
from the date of the issuance of the Certificate of Title over the
property provided that the property has not been acquired by an
innocent purchaser for value.
 Uy v. Court of Appeals [2015]
The law creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey the property and its
title in favor of the true owner. Correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of PD No. 1529 and
Article 1456 of the Civil Code with Article 1144 (2) of the Civil Code, the prescriptive
period for the reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten (10) years
reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of title. This ten-year
prescriptive period begins to run from the date the adverse party repudiates the implied
trust, which repudiation takes place when the adverse party registers the land. An
exception to this rule is when the party seeking reconveyance based on implied or
constructive trust is in actual, continuous and peaceful possession of the property
involved. Prescription does not commence to run against him because the action would
be in the nature of a suit for quieting of title, an action that is imprescriptible.
Whether an action for reconveyance prescribes or not is therefore determined by
the nature of the action, that is, whether it is founded on a claim of the existence of an
implied or constructive trust, or one based on the existence of a void or inexistent
contract.
We conclude that, contrary to the claim of petitioner, the action for reconveyance is
based neither on an implied or constructive trust nor fraud. Naval-Sai alleged that the
purported deed of sale, which became the basis to transfer the titles in petitioner's name,
was an absolute forgery because she never sold the two lots to any person. Naval-Sai also
alleged that her signature and that of her husband's, in the deed of sale are
forgeries. These allegations make the action one based on a void or inexistent contract for
lack of consent on the part of the alleged vendor, Naval-Sai. Based on the complaint,
Naval-Sai only consented to use the titles of the two lots as security to a loan she
obtained from Ng.
Applying the foregoing cases and without prejudging the issue of forgery, the
action for reconveyance will not be subject to prescription if the trial court finds that
the deed of sale is indeed forged, because the action would now be based on a fictitious
and void contract. If the trial court finds otherwise, then the issue of prescription would
not matter as the sale would stand and remain binding between Naval-Sai and
petitioner.
Similarly, the elements of laches must be proven positively. Laches is
evidentiary in nature, a fact that cannot be established by mere allegations in the
pleadings. Therefore, at this stage, the dismissal on the ground of laches would be
premature. The issues must be resolved in the trial on the merits.
Moreover, laches is a doctrine in equity, and applied only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law. The positive mandate of Article 1410 of the Civil
Code conferring imprescriptibility to actions or defense for the declaration of the
inexistence of a contract should pre-empt and prevail over all abstract arguments based
only on equity.
|||
 DBP v. Bautista [1968]
In the suit before the lower court, the Director of Lands and
the National Treasurer of the Philippines were likewise made
defendants by appellant bank because of its belief that if no
right existed as against appellee Bautista, recovery could be had
from the Assurance Fund. Such a belief finds no support in the
applicable law, which allows recovery only upon a showing that
there be no negligence on the part of the party sustaining any
loss or damage or being deprived of any land or interest therein
by the operation of the Land Registration Act. This certainly is
not the case here, plaintiff-appellant being solely responsible
for the plight in which it now finds itself.

3. Other Remedies Available

Cawis v. Carilles [2010]
Even assuming that private respondent indeed acquired title to Lot No. 47 in bad
faith, only the State can institute reversion proceedings, pursuant to Section 101
of the Public Land Act and our ruling in Alvarico v. Sola. Private persons may not
bring an action for reversion or any action which would have the effect of canceling
a land patent and the corresponding certificate of title issued on the basis of the
patent, such that the land covered thereby will again form part of the public
domain. Only the OSG or the officer acting in his stead may do so. Since the title
originated from a grant by the government, its cancellation is a matter between the
grantor and the grantee.
We further stated that granting, for the sake of argument, that fraud was
committed in obtaining the title, it is the State, in a reversion case, which is the
proper party to file the necessary action.
 In this case, it is clear that Lot No. 47 was public land when Andrada filed the
sales patent application. Any subsequent action questioning the validity of the award
of sales patent on the ground of fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation should thus be
initiated by the State. The State has not done so and thus, we have to uphold the
validity and regularity of the sales patent as well as the corresponding original
certificate of title issued based on the patent.

Yujuico v. Republic [2007]

Equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities
when as in this case, the lot was already alienated to innocent
buyers for value and the government did not undertake any act
to contest the title for an unreasonable length of time.
Considering that innocent purchaser for value Yujuico
bought the lot in 1974, and more than 27 years had elapsed
before the action for reversion was filed, then said action is now
barred by laches.
While the general rule is that an action to recover lands of
public domain is imprescriptible, said right can be barred by
laches or estoppel. Section 32 of PD 1592 recognized the rights
of an innocent purchaser for value over and above the interests
of the government.
More on the issue of laches. Laches is the failure or neglect,
for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that
which by exercising due diligence could or should have been
done earlier. It is negligence or omission to assert a right within
a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party
entitled thereto has either abandoned or declined to assert it.
From the undisputed facts of the case, it is easily revealed
that respondent Republic took its sweet time to nullify Castro's
title, notwithstanding the easy access to ample remedies which
were readily available after OCT No. 10215 was registered in
the name of Castro. All told, we are constrained to conclude
that laches had set in.